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16 Rev2b NGA Opinion Supplementary doc - IRG

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ERG (07) <strong>16</strong>rev2b <strong>NGA</strong> <strong>Opinion</strong> <strong>Supplementary</strong> Doc 11 / 69<br />

encourage efficient and timely investment in <strong>NGA</strong> networks. Efficient and timely investment<br />

involves investment decisions on the most appropriate technology at the right time and in<br />

specific locations by operators. However, this results in a range of complex options for investment<br />

that the market is best placed to assess. Regulation should therefore seek to leave<br />

investment decisions to the market, and to minimise any distortions to efficient investment<br />

that could result from regulatory intervention. At the same time, regulators should seek to<br />

provide a predictable regulatory environment and address barriers to efficient investment,<br />

including market power.<br />

ad 3.4 Treatment of Investment Risk<br />

Consultation Comments<br />

Several responses dealt with what they saw the risks of <strong>NGA</strong> to be:<br />

• An incumbent argued that the uncertainties surrounding costs, revenues, time and<br />

revenues meant that there was little point in trying to define FttH regulation now (FT)<br />

• Another emphasised that given large costs and long payback periods, regulatory certainty<br />

and impact of regulation on investment were key issues (Telefónica)<br />

One of the stakeholder associations commented that it believed that market definitions<br />

should be flexible enough to allow for operators to have a degree of freedom to experiment<br />

and identify new revenue streams (BSG).<br />

In contrast, a different stakeholder association believes that cost savings provide an incentive<br />

for incumbents to invest in <strong>NGA</strong> (BREKO).<br />

There was a general consensus on the need for a degree of regulatory certainty to facilitate<br />

investment in <strong>NGA</strong> from a number of respondents (BSG, ETP).<br />

An incumbent stressed that the concept of the ladder of investment needed to be defined in<br />

order to reduce uncertainty, whilst another reiterated the view that regulatory uncertainty,<br />

makes a risky investment even riskier (PT, OTE).<br />

Several incumbents expressed specific ideas as to how returns should reflect risk:<br />

• One incumbent references OFCOM’s <strong>NGA</strong> consultation and suggests that ERG<br />

should do an in-depth investigation on cost models as Cost plus with an activityspecific<br />

cost of capital and Returns adjusted for a symmetric “fair bet” (TDC).<br />

• Another suggests that a real options approach could be adopted (TI).<br />

Several altnets also suggested how the risk in their <strong>NGA</strong> investments might be rewarded:<br />

• One of them suggests a “Broadband Premium” allowing altnets to receive termination<br />

rates reflecting the actual cost of their <strong>NGA</strong> roll-out costs and reflecting difference in<br />

cost and risk between altnets and incumbents (EuroISPA).<br />

• Another suggested that altnets might be allowed to use voice termination rates to<br />

fund <strong>NGA</strong>, but also suggested a broadband premium mechanism (Fastweb).

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