16 Rev2b NGA Opinion Supplementary doc - IRG
16 Rev2b NGA Opinion Supplementary doc - IRG
16 Rev2b NGA Opinion Supplementary doc - IRG
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
ERG (07) <strong>16</strong>rev2b <strong>NGA</strong> <strong>Opinion</strong> <strong>Supplementary</strong> Doc 11 / 69<br />
encourage efficient and timely investment in <strong>NGA</strong> networks. Efficient and timely investment<br />
involves investment decisions on the most appropriate technology at the right time and in<br />
specific locations by operators. However, this results in a range of complex options for investment<br />
that the market is best placed to assess. Regulation should therefore seek to leave<br />
investment decisions to the market, and to minimise any distortions to efficient investment<br />
that could result from regulatory intervention. At the same time, regulators should seek to<br />
provide a predictable regulatory environment and address barriers to efficient investment,<br />
including market power.<br />
ad 3.4 Treatment of Investment Risk<br />
Consultation Comments<br />
Several responses dealt with what they saw the risks of <strong>NGA</strong> to be:<br />
• An incumbent argued that the uncertainties surrounding costs, revenues, time and<br />
revenues meant that there was little point in trying to define FttH regulation now (FT)<br />
• Another emphasised that given large costs and long payback periods, regulatory certainty<br />
and impact of regulation on investment were key issues (Telefónica)<br />
One of the stakeholder associations commented that it believed that market definitions<br />
should be flexible enough to allow for operators to have a degree of freedom to experiment<br />
and identify new revenue streams (BSG).<br />
In contrast, a different stakeholder association believes that cost savings provide an incentive<br />
for incumbents to invest in <strong>NGA</strong> (BREKO).<br />
There was a general consensus on the need for a degree of regulatory certainty to facilitate<br />
investment in <strong>NGA</strong> from a number of respondents (BSG, ETP).<br />
An incumbent stressed that the concept of the ladder of investment needed to be defined in<br />
order to reduce uncertainty, whilst another reiterated the view that regulatory uncertainty,<br />
makes a risky investment even riskier (PT, OTE).<br />
Several incumbents expressed specific ideas as to how returns should reflect risk:<br />
• One incumbent references OFCOM’s <strong>NGA</strong> consultation and suggests that ERG<br />
should do an in-depth investigation on cost models as Cost plus with an activityspecific<br />
cost of capital and Returns adjusted for a symmetric “fair bet” (TDC).<br />
• Another suggests that a real options approach could be adopted (TI).<br />
Several altnets also suggested how the risk in their <strong>NGA</strong> investments might be rewarded:<br />
• One of them suggests a “Broadband Premium” allowing altnets to receive termination<br />
rates reflecting the actual cost of their <strong>NGA</strong> roll-out costs and reflecting difference in<br />
cost and risk between altnets and incumbents (EuroISPA).<br />
• Another suggested that altnets might be allowed to use voice termination rates to<br />
fund <strong>NGA</strong>, but also suggested a broadband premium mechanism (Fastweb).