THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY

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DEVELOPING ONE ARMY Photo by Army Sgt. Rigo Cisneros Army Reserve engineers with the 416th and 412th Theater Engineer Commands work on an improved ribbon bridge across the 300-meter-wide Arkansas River during an exercise at Fort Chaffee. The bridge, requiring 42 segments, took three hours to complete. Training Support Forces Command (FORSCOM) employs First Army to assess training and ensure units are ready before they deploy. To support the intent of the Total Force Policy, First Army undertook a major reorganization and adjusted its primary mission focus from post-mobilization to pre-mobilization training support for Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. First Army partners with reserve component units throughout their readiness cycle to support the units’ pre-mobilization training and provide an estimate of postmobilization training time needed for those units to complete their culminating training exercise or capstone event. First Army has the majority of Regular Army soldiers assigned as required by the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. They provide the engagement and habitual relationships with reserve component units throughout the force generation cycle to enhance readiness while minimizing redundant training costs. In addition to the Regular Army personnel, First Army manning includes Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers (both Active Guard and Reserve, or AGR, and traditional drilling soldiers), making it a multicomponent unit. All three components have an obligation to provide adequate full-time manning within First Army to foster Total Force integration. However, in fiscal year 2014, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve manning rates for First Army authorizations were about 16 percent and 80 percent, respectively. Recommendation 48: The Army should resource First Army’s Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) positions from the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve at the aggregate manning level provided for each component not later than fiscal year 2017. 78 National Commission on the Future of the Army
DEVELOPING ONE ARMY “When you join the Guard today, you expect to deploy, and when you don’t have that opportunity, there’s a lot of disappointment.” Major General John L. Gronski (PAARNG), Commander, 28th Infantry Division during NCFA site visit to Fort Indiantown Gap. Mobilization In addition to generating near-term readiness, the Army must plan for mobilizing the entire Army to a state of readiness for war, contingency, or national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the reserve components, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. The Army does not mobilize forces in isolation, but does so as part of the DoD enterprise. The Commission noted that in his assessment of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey highlighted the acceptance of risk in the capacity of land forces and called for a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize the entire force. Recommendation 49: As recommended in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense should plan in fiscal year 2017 and execute no later than the end of fiscal year 2018 a comprehensive review of the nation’s ability to mobilize its existing reserves as well as its preparedness for the potential of national mobilization. Mobilization Support The Army National Guard mobilized in excess of 102,000 soldiers and the Army Reserve over 77,000 soldiers in 2003. Twenty-five installations conducted mobilization and demobilization operations that year. These mobilization locations, known as Mobilization Force Generation Installations (MFGI), operated at various levels of preparation: seven primary, five secondary, and thirteen contingency MFGIs. Today, the Army has only two active MFGIs, at Fort Hood and Fort Bliss, both in Texas. Only Fort Hood has a Pre-Deployment Training Equipment (PDTE) set permanently located on the site. Before determining which MFGIs would remain active, the Army located PDTE sets at the three Army Corps locations of Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Fort Hood. Because Fort Bliss has no PDTE site, the Army transports equipment to and from Fort Hood and other locations to support Army National Guard and Army Reserve post-mobilization training. The Commission found that the lack of a PDTE set at Fort Bliss increases transportation costs and reduces post-mobilization training time while units await equipment delivery. Recommendation 50: The Army should provide a Pre-deployment Training Equipment set to Fort Bliss, Texas, for its Mobilization Force Generation Installation role no later than fiscal year 2017. ONE ARMY EXPANDING Because the future strategic environment cannot be predicted with certainty, the Army needs to protect its ability to regenerate capabilities and expand the force whenever necessary. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance stated: …DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force. The 2014 QDR specified, “We will protect the ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands.” The guidance of these two documents is further amplified in Defense Planning Guidance FY17-FY21 for the Army. The Army established an Investment and Regeneration Task Force in 2012 and issued an Army Posture Statement on Investment and Regeneration in 2013 to concentrate planning for expanding the Army. The Under Secretary of the Army expounded on the need for planning with a 2014 information paper titled: How Fast Can the Army Grow? Implications of Regeneration Decisions. Nevertheless, the Army’s most recent response on planning for expansion noted that end strength reductions and funding decrements resulting from the Budget Control Act made resourcing expansion infeasible. With the shortfalls in funding and manning, the Army appears to have halted planning for expanding the force. One key finding from the October 2013 RAND study, Estimating Institutional Army Manpower Requirements addresses part of the expansion paradox: “If the Army indeed means to support expansion, the size of the institutional Army should paradoxically grow as the Army shrinks.” While rapid expansion of the Army is not feasible, without personnel management actions to retain mid-grade leaders, the Army risks diluting leaders’ average levels of professional experience, as occurred during World War II and the Vietnam War. Many National Commission on the Future of the Army 79
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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE O
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “Not later than
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Developing One Ar
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U.S. Army National Guard photo by S
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WHY THE NATION NEEDS AN ARMY CIVILI
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WHY THE NATION NEEDS AN ARMY Figure
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WHY THE NATION NEEDS AN ARMY “The
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National Commission on the Future o
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THE COMMISSION’S MISSION AND METH
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Page 33 and 34: U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Richard W.
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Page 37 and 38: FUTURE CHALLENGES Iran poses a mult
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Page 49 and 50: FISCAL CHALLENGES if the Army is to
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Page 61 and 62: THE ARMY FOR THE FUTURE Recommendat
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Page 89 and 90: APACHE TRANSFERS AND RELATED ISSUES
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Page 107 and 108: ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ALLOCATION Nati
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Page 113 and 114: APPENDIX A: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CO
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Page 131 and 132: APPENDIX F: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AA
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APPENDIX G: TESTIMONIES AND COMMENT
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APPENDIX H: COMMISSIONERS AND STAFF
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APPENDIX I: SUBCOMMITTEES OPERATION
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APPENDIX I: SUBCOMMITTEES FORCE GEN
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APPENDIX I: SUBCOMMITTEES DRAFTING
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APPENDIX J: SOURCES CONSULTED Defen
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APPENDIX J: SOURCES CONSULTED U.S.
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APPENDIX J: SOURCES CONSULTED U.S.
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THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY

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