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Conglomerate Boom 2.0:<br />

A <strong>Stable</strong> <strong>Platform</strong>?<br />

October 20, 2015<br />

The opinions set forth in this Presentation are solely<br />

observations of JHL Capital Group LLC, and do not<br />

constitute investment advice or recommendations.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution.<br />

© 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved.


Disclaimer<br />

• This Presentation includes certain economic observations of JHL Capital Group LLC (“JHL”), and does not purport to give any form of investment advice.<br />

• There can be no assurance that the observations of JHL included in this Presentation are accurate, much less in any respect predictive of the value or<br />

future stock prices of any of the issuers with respect to which such observations are made.<br />

• JHL, in compiling this Presentation, has relied on information (including anecdotal information) obtained from third parties which JHL believes to be<br />

accurate but has no ability independently to verify.<br />

• JHL may hold certain positions which create a conflict of interest on the part of JHL in making the observations in this Presentation.<br />

• No one should rely on any of the observations made in this Presentation in making any investment decision; these observations are presented solely for<br />

the information of the recipient.<br />

• This is not an offering or the solicitation of an offer to purchase an interest. Any such offer or solicitation will be made to qualified investors only by means<br />

of a final offering memorandum and only in those jurisdictions where permitted by law.<br />

JHL Capital Group LLC ® , JHL Capital Group ® , JHL ® , and JHL’s logo are registered trademarks of JHL Capital Group LLC.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 2


Boom Cycles and Easy Money<br />

Easy access to capital fueled housing investment in the 2000s and energy investment in the post-financial crisis era.<br />

Global E&P Spending and US Private Fixed Residential Investment<br />

1985 – 2017E vs. 1977 – 2013<br />

1000<br />

Global E&P Spending (1985=100)<br />

2013 Forecasts<br />

2015 Forecasts<br />

US Private Fixed Residential Investment (1977=100)<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Evercore ISI, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 3


The 1960s Conglomerate Boom<br />

A major boom in conglomerate formation occurred in the 1960s driven by low interest rates, muted economic growth and investors’<br />

focus on earnings growth.<br />

LOW AND STABLE<br />

INFLATION AND<br />

INTEREST RATES<br />

MUTED ECONOMIC<br />

GROWTH<br />

INVESTORS’<br />

APPETITE FOR<br />

EARNINGS GROWTH<br />

Low interest rates depressed the<br />

cost of capital and encouraged<br />

investors to move into riskier<br />

assets<br />

A slowdown in growth in 1967<br />

fueled M&A activity and inflated<br />

the conglomerate bubble<br />

“Go-Go” fund managers or<br />

“gunslingers” focused on<br />

earnings growth independent of<br />

how it was generated, and<br />

developed an affinity for<br />

conglomerate stocks<br />

With a low cost of equity capital, high perceived corporate synergies and limited growth opportunities,<br />

investors paid ever-increasing multiples for acquisition-led growth.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 4


The 1960s Conglomerate Boom Index Companies<br />

Company Industries Leader<br />

Gulf & Western Industries Inc. Auto-parts, movie production, machinery, cigars, sugar production Charles Bluhdorn<br />

International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (ITT) Telecommunications, hotels, education, baked goods, rental cars Harold Geneen<br />

Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. Computer leasing, insurance Saul Steinberg<br />

Ling-Temco-Vought Inc. (LTV) Electronics, missiles, golf equipment, meat packing, pharmaceuticals Jimmy Ling<br />

Litton Industries Inc. Military electronics, submarines, typewriters, frozen foods, publishing Tex Thornton<br />

Monogram Industries Inc. Manufacturing, airplane toilets, electrical insulation Martin Stone<br />

Ogden Corp. Scrap metal, shipbuilding, cargo handling, food service Charlie Allen<br />

Teledyne Inc. Electronics, aerospace, microwaves, hydraulics, optics, steel Henry Singleton<br />

Textron Inc. Textiles, gas meters, golf carts, helicopters, radar antennas, watchbands Roy Little<br />

United States Industries, Inc. Automation machinery, robotics, steel, concrete pipe, textiles John Snyder<br />

Source: “The Rise and Fall of the Conglomerate Kings” by Robert Sobel, New York Times, company websites, academic journals.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 5


The 1960s Conglomerate Boom<br />

An index of 10 conglomerates appreciated 608% from August 1962 to July 1968, outperforming the S&P 500 Index by 531%.<br />

Conglomerate Index vs. S&P 500 Index<br />

AUGUST 9, 1962 – JULY 8, 1968<br />

800<br />

Conglomerate Index<br />

S&P 500 Index<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968<br />

Source: Chicago Booth Center for Research in Security Prices, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 6


The 1960s Conglomerate Bust<br />

Earnings growth failed to keep up with inflated expectations. Rising interest rates and a stalling economy resulted in lower stock prices. The<br />

conglomerates then crashed swiftly.<br />

• Acquisitions grew in size to<br />

maintain the momentum<br />

• The top of the market was a failed<br />

attempt by Saul Steinberg to<br />

acquire Chemical Bank in 1969<br />

Reality Failed to<br />

Meet Inflated<br />

Expectations<br />

Interest Rates<br />

Rose and Stock<br />

Prices Declined<br />

• 10 year interest rates rose from 4%<br />

in 1963 to 8% in 1969<br />

• Earnings disappointments drove<br />

stock prices lower<br />

• Lower stock prices and higher<br />

interest rates forced management<br />

teams to shed assets in the 1970s<br />

and 1980s<br />

Conglomerates<br />

Restructured<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 7


The 1960s Conglomerate Boom – Bust Cycle<br />

From its peak in July 1968, the Conglomerate Index declined by 79% over the next two years.<br />

Conglomerate Index vs. S&P 500 Index<br />

AUGUST 9, 1962 – DECEMBER 31, 1970<br />

800<br />

Conglomerate Index<br />

S&P 500 Index<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970<br />

Source: Chicago Booth Center for Research in Security Prices, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 8


The 1960s Conglomerate Boom – Bust Case Study: Leasco<br />

Leasco, with $236 million in equity capital, attempted to take over Chemical Bank, the sixth largest US bank, with $9 billion in assets. The<br />

financial establishment united against Saul Steinberg.<br />

Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation Stock Price<br />

SEPTEMBER 27, 1966 – AUGUST 14, 1970<br />

$300<br />

$250<br />

$200<br />

$150<br />

$100<br />

$50<br />

$0<br />

+5,495% in<br />

4 years<br />

Aug 1, 1968:<br />

Reliance accepts<br />

Leasco’s tender<br />

offer<br />

Nov 1968:<br />

Leasco<br />

begins<br />

secretly<br />

buying<br />

Chemical<br />

Bank stock<br />

Mar 1968:<br />

Leasco begins secretly<br />

buying Reliance Insurance<br />

stock<br />

IPO (1)<br />

Jan 31, 1969: Leasco’s takeover plans<br />

for Chemical Bank are disclosed<br />

(25%) over two weeks:<br />

Abrupt selling of large<br />

trading blocks... bear raid<br />

led by Chemical Bank?<br />

Feb 20, 1969:<br />

Steinberg ends<br />

Chemical Bank<br />

takeover attempt<br />

(87%)<br />

in 17<br />

months<br />

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971<br />

(1) Leasco filed for IPO in June 1965, but traded OTC until September 27, 1966.<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Chicago Booth Center for Research in Security Prices, “The Power of Collective Purse Strings” by Davita Glasberg, “The Go-Go Years: The Drama and Crashing Finale of Wall Street's Bullish 60s” by<br />

John Brooks, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 9


The Paired-Share REIT Boom – Bust Cycle<br />

An index of the four REITs with special tax privileges appreciated 290% over three years. The index plummeted 70% over the next year as<br />

President Clinton proposed regulations curbing their loopholes.<br />

Paired-Share REITs: Starwood Hotels, Patriot American Hospitality, Meditrust, First Union<br />

JANUARY 3, 1995 – DECEMBER 31, 1998<br />

400<br />

350<br />

Paired-Share REIT Index<br />

S&P 500 Index<br />

Jan 30, 1998:<br />

NYT article “Stocks of Four<br />

REIT’s Sag on Report of<br />

Threat to Status”<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

Jul 22, 1998:<br />

Congress<br />

signs IRS law<br />

reforming<br />

REITs<br />

100<br />

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999<br />

Even in a bull market, Paired-Share REITs had a devastating boom-bust cycle<br />

once the arbitrage peaked and became “front page news.”<br />

Source: Bloomberg, New York Times, US Government Publishing Office, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 10


The Paired-Share REIT Boom – Bust Case Study: Starwood<br />

Starwood was much smaller by market cap, but its high-priced stock provided Barry Sternlicht the currency to go after ITT Sheraton Corp –<br />

itself a remnant of Harold Geneen’s 1960s conglomerate.<br />

Starwood Hotels & Resorts Stock Price<br />

JANUARY 2, 1992 – JANUARY 2, 2000<br />

$35<br />

$30<br />

$25<br />

Oct 20, 1997:<br />

Stock peaks at $31.69 the week Starwood<br />

announces ITT acquisition for $14.3bn<br />

Sep 9, 1997:<br />

Starwood buys Westin Hotels<br />

for $1.5bn<br />

(66%)<br />

in 1 year<br />

$20<br />

$15<br />

$10<br />

$5<br />

Jan 1995:<br />

Sternlicht buys a<br />

paired-share REIT,<br />

Hotel Investors<br />

Trust<br />

+2,900% in<br />

5 years<br />

Jul 22, 1998:<br />

Congress<br />

signs IRS law<br />

reforming REITs<br />

Aug 26, 1998:<br />

Starwood plans<br />

to become a tax<br />

paying<br />

corporation<br />

Jan 7, 1999:<br />

Starwood<br />

restructures into<br />

a corporation<br />

$0<br />

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />

Source: Bloomberg, company press releases, Fortune Magazine, Associated Press, PR Newswire, US Government Publishing Office, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 11


The Conglomerate Boom 2.0: The <strong>Platform</strong> Boom<br />

A new conglomerate boom developed in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, driven by many of the same variables as in the 1960s.<br />

This new boom has been enhanced with tax arbitrage similar to the Paired-Share REIT boom.<br />

LOW AND STABLE<br />

INFLATION AND<br />

INTEREST RATES<br />

MUTED ECONOMIC<br />

GROWTH<br />

INVESTORS’<br />

APPETITE FOR<br />

EARNINGS GROWTH<br />

Low interest rates and financial<br />

repression depressed the cost of<br />

capital and encouraged investors<br />

to move into riskier assets<br />

Post 2008 crisis growth rates<br />

have repeatedly disappointed<br />

Hedge funds focused on<br />

earnings growth independent of<br />

how it was generated, and<br />

developed an affinity for platform<br />

stocks<br />

With a low cost of debt capital, high perceived corporate and/or tax synergies and limited growth<br />

opportunities, investors paid ever-increasing multiples for acquisition-led growth.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 12


The <strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index Companies<br />

Company Ticker Industry Stock Price (1) MCap (bn) TEV (bn) TBV (bn) TBV/Share EV/EBITDA P/E Ratio<br />

Allergan plc AGN Health Care $274.08 $114.3 $156.7 $(52.4) $(125.55) 18.4x 38.8x<br />

Altice ATC NA Consumer Discretionary 22.68 24.8 61.5 (23.6) (21.58) 9.5 10.8<br />

AMAG Pharmaceuticals Inc. AMAG Health Care 38.85 1.6 2.0 (0.4) (8.42) 8.7 11.1<br />

Anheuser-Busch InBev BUD Consumer Staples 115.13 188.4 237.1 (50.5) (30.86) 13.6 21.7<br />

Avago Technologies AVGO Information Technology 121.87 36.3 38.9 (0.9) (3.08) 10.6 25.2<br />

Concordia Healthcare Corp. CXR CN Health Care 31.64 1.4 2.0 (1.1) (26.10) 8.3 2.3<br />

Danaher Corp. DHR Industrials 89.06 59.9 73.7 (12.8) (19.01) 15.4 23.0<br />

Endo International plc ENDP Health Care 66.60 15.3 25.6 (1.8) (7.87) 17.9 35.8<br />

Hain Celestial Group HAIN Consumer Staples 51.94 5.5 6.2 (0.0) (0.12) 14.5 23.7<br />

Horizon Pharma Inc. HZNP Health Care 18.55 3.1 3.7 (0.7) (4.18) 13.9 265.0<br />

Jarden Corp. JAH Consumer Discretionary 49.85 11.9 16.5 (2.9) (12.03) 13.4 18.0<br />

Jazz Pharmaceuticals JAZZ Health Care 136.65 8.9 9.4 (0.5) (7.71) 11.7 25.1<br />

The Kraft Heinz Company KHC Consumer Staples 75.22 91.9 120.3 (9.7) (7.91) 17.4 28.4<br />

Liberty Global plc LBTYA Consumer Discretionary 45.80 40.9 81.3 (23.7) (25.71) 9.7 (60.1)<br />

Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals MNK Health Care 66.90 8.1 14.6 (6.6) (54.67) 10.5 24.6<br />

Medtronic MDT Health Care 73.43 106.2 123.5 (15.5) (10.75) 12.3 22.4<br />

Mylan N.V. MYL Health Care 42.73 22.1 28.0 (2.5) (4.77) 9.4 20.0<br />

Perrigo Company plc PRGO Health Care 162.62 23.9 28.4 (4.7) (31.79) 18.3 78.9<br />

<strong>Platform</strong> Specialty Products PAH Materials 12.59 2.7 6.2 (3.2) (14.83) 11.0 139.9<br />

Post Holdings Inc. POST Consumer Staples 60.49 4.1 8.6 (3.5) (50.98) 13.4 (103.0)<br />

Spectrum Brands Holdings SPB Consumer Staples 92.71 5.6 9.9 (3.4) (56.33) 12.3 26.8<br />

Thermo Fisher Scientific TMO Health Care 125.47 50.8 64.4 (11.5) (28.43) 15.4 25.4<br />

TransDigm Group Inc. TDG Industrials 215.06 12.3 20.1 (6.4) (112.81) 16.4 28.6<br />

Valeant Pharmaceuticals VRX Health Care 168.87 59.3 91.5 (33.9) (96.67) 16.3 61.5<br />

(1) As of October 15, 2015. Source: Bloomberg and Thomson consensus estimates, company filings and guidance, JHL research. Multiples based on forward earnings estimates.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 13


The <strong>Platform</strong> Boom Cycle<br />

From March 2009, to its peak on July 20, 2015, the <strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index surged almost 1,000% during a period when the S&P 500 Index rose<br />

215%.<br />

<strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index vs. S&P 500 Index<br />

MARCH 9, 2009 – JULY 20, 2015<br />

1100<br />

1000<br />

<strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index<br />

S&P 500 Index<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015<br />

Source: Bloomberg, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 14


The <strong>Platform</strong> Company Model<br />

The Outsiders: Eight Unconventional CEOs and Their Radically Rational Blueprint for Success<br />

“They disdained dividends, made disciplined (occasionally large) acquisitions,<br />

used leverage selectively, bought back a lot of stock, minimized taxes, ran<br />

decentralized organizations, and focused on cash flow over reported net income.”<br />

- William N. Thorndike<br />

Bill Anders (General Dynamics)<br />

Warren Buffett (Berkshire Hathaway)<br />

Katharine Graham (The Washington Post)<br />

John Malone (TCI)<br />

Tom Murphy (Capital Cities)<br />

Henry Singleton (Teledyne)<br />

Dick Smith (General Cinema)<br />

Bill Stiritz (Ralston Purina)<br />

The new buzzword is Zero-Based Budgeting.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 15


<strong>Platform</strong> Tactics: Creative Accounting by Healthcare Companies (1)<br />

Branded pharmaceuticals typically have a maximum patent life of 20 years. Historically, generic drugs have had annual price declines.<br />

GAAP vs. Non-GAAP Earnings Per Share ($)<br />

2015E<br />

Equity Value vs. Tangible Book Value ($ in billions)<br />

OCTOBER 15, 2015<br />

Non-GAAP EPS<br />

GAAP EPS<br />

Equity Value<br />

TBV<br />

$100<br />

$500<br />

$400<br />

$75<br />

$300<br />

$50<br />

$200<br />

$100<br />

$25<br />

$0<br />

($100)<br />

$0<br />

($200)<br />

GAAP earnings are lower for a reason. The amortization is real.<br />

(1) Healthcare companies in <strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index.<br />

Source: Bloomberg consensus, midpoint of company guidance when available, company filings, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 16


<strong>Platform</strong> Tactics: Aggressive Pricing<br />

Aggressive price inflation may not be sustainable in healthcare or other sectors as cyclical and regulatory pressures surface.<br />

$880<br />

Q3 2015<br />

Valeant<br />

$215<br />

Q4 2013<br />

Marathon<br />

$48<br />

Q1 2013<br />

Hospira<br />

Nitropress (VRX)<br />

+310%<br />

+348%<br />

Per vial<br />

$1,473<br />

Q1 2015<br />

Valeant<br />

$180<br />

Q4 2013<br />

Marathon<br />

$40<br />

Q1 2013<br />

Hospira<br />

Isuprel (VRX)<br />

+720%<br />

+350%<br />

Per vial<br />

$3,391<br />

Q1 2015<br />

$1,945<br />

Q3 2012<br />

$800<br />

Q2 2010<br />

$315<br />

Q1 2008<br />

Jazz<br />

Xyrem (JAZZ)<br />

+977%<br />

Per vial<br />

Q1 2015<br />

Mayne Pharma<br />

$1,849<br />

Q1 2014<br />

Actavis<br />

$20<br />

Q4 2013<br />

Warner Chilcott<br />

Doryx (AGN)<br />

+9,145%<br />

Per 500 tablets<br />

Single Serve Desserts (KHC) Powdered Tea (KHC) Frozen Dinners (KHC) Ketchup (KHC)<br />

+21%<br />

yoy<br />

+22%<br />

yoy<br />

+25-78%<br />

yoy<br />

+11%<br />

yoy<br />

Source: IMS, Wall Street Journal, Pixabay, Citibank, PriceRX, Wolters Kluwer, US House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, IRI, The Nielsen Company, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 17


<strong>Platform</strong> Tactics: Creative Tax Structures<br />

Tax arbitrage has been a critical value driver for many platform companies.<br />

Tax Rate Before and After Inversion Deals<br />

YEAR WHEN TAX INVERSION DEAL CLOSED<br />

45%<br />

Tax Rate Prior to Inversion<br />

2015E Non-GAAP Tax Rate<br />

30%<br />

15%<br />

0%<br />

VRX<br />

(2010)<br />

JAZZ<br />

(2012)<br />

AGN<br />

(2013)<br />

PRGO<br />

(2013)<br />

ENDP<br />

(2014)<br />

HZNP<br />

(2014)<br />

MYL<br />

(2015)<br />

Source: Company filings, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 18


<strong>Platform</strong> Tactics: Acquisitions Financed with Low Cost Leverage<br />

Leverage for the <strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index companies has increased dramatically over time.<br />

Total Acquisitions ($ in billions) (1)<br />

2009 – 2015 YTD<br />

$450<br />

Total Debt Issuance ($ in billions) (1)<br />

2009 – 2015 YTD<br />

$300<br />

$300<br />

$200<br />

$150<br />

$100<br />

$0<br />

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015<br />

YTD<br />

$0<br />

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015<br />

YTD<br />

<strong>Platform</strong> companies have accessed low cost debt financing for an accelerating volume of acquisitions.<br />

Will deals still prove accretive in a more normalized interest rate environment?<br />

(1) Includes deals announced but not closed. Debt issuance expected as stated by company press releases.<br />

Source: Company filings, Capital IQ, Bloomberg, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 19


Regulatory Response to <strong>Platform</strong> Tactics – Federal<br />

“In recent months, there have been reports of a number of corporate inversion transactions designed to<br />

change the tax domicile of a U.S.-based multinational firm with minimal change in its business operations…<br />

we should prevent companies from effectively renouncing their citizenship to get out of paying taxes.”<br />

– Jacob Lew, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, July 15, 2014<br />

“Price gouging like this in the specialty drug market is outrageous. Tomorrow I’ll lay out a plan to take it on.”<br />

– Hillary Clinton, Sep 21, 2015<br />

“Exclusive: U.S. probes allegations AB InBev seeking to curb craft beer distribution”<br />

– Reuters, Oct 12, 2015<br />

“Valeant subpoenaed by U.S. prosecutors over U.S. drug pricing”<br />

– Reuters, Oct 15, 2015<br />

The Federal political pressure has begun. It’s “front page news.”<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 20


Regulatory Response to <strong>Platform</strong> Tactics – State<br />

“Massachusetts bill seeks to rein in prices of some drugs… Similar ‘transparency’ legislation has been filed<br />

in New York, California, Pennsylvania, Texas, North Carolina, and Oregon, though the specifics of each deal<br />

vary”<br />

– Boston Globe, Aug 10, 2015<br />

“Turing Drug Distribution Probed by N.Y. After Price Hike”<br />

– Bloomberg, Oct 13, 2015<br />

“AB InBev Holds Talks With Regulators About California Deals”<br />

– Bloomberg, Oct 13, 2015<br />

The State political pressure has begun. It’s “front page news.”<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 21


The <strong>Platform</strong> Bust<br />

The prevailing wisdom of “lower for longer” will not last forever. A rising interest rate environment, global macroeconomic weakness and/or<br />

stock market volatility may further pressure today’s conglomerates.<br />

• Acquisitions have grown in size<br />

making integration difficult<br />

• Regulators questioning<br />

aggressive pricing, tax practices<br />

and anti-competitive behavior<br />

Reality Fails to<br />

Meet Inflated<br />

Expectations<br />

Interest Rates<br />

and Stock Market<br />

Volatility Rising<br />

• Fed ended asset purchases in<br />

October 2014<br />

• Equity market volatility has<br />

increased in the second half of 2015<br />

• Rising debt costs and deflated<br />

share prices will slow down pace of<br />

acquisitions<br />

• Cost discipline cannot indefinitely<br />

offset volume and/or intangible<br />

asset value declines<br />

• Break in psychology<br />

• When will investors become more<br />

focused on earnings quality?<br />

Conglomerates<br />

will Experience<br />

Pressure<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 22


The <strong>Platform</strong> Boom – Bust Cycle<br />

Since March 2009, the <strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index surged almost 1,000% during a period when the S&P 500 Index rose 215%. Since July 20, 2015,<br />

the <strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index has plummeted 24%.<br />

<strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index vs. S&P 500 Index<br />

MARCH 9, 2009 – OCTOBER 15, 2015<br />

1100<br />

1000<br />

<strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index<br />

S&P 500 Index<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

[24%]<br />

?<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

Source: Bloomberg, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 23


The <strong>Platform</strong> Boom – Bust Case Study: Valeant<br />

Michael Pearson led Valeant through a series of acquisitions, including a tax inversion, that fueled strong stock performance. The shares<br />

have started to rerate on regulatory scrutiny over aggressive pricing policy.<br />

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Stock Price<br />

JANUARY 2, 2008 – OCTOBER 15, 2015<br />

$300<br />

Sep 21, 2015: Hillary Clinton tweets<br />

about pharma price gouging<br />

$250<br />

$200<br />

$150<br />

$100<br />

$50<br />

+3,452%<br />

in 7 years<br />

Feb 4, 2008: Michael<br />

Pearson becomes<br />

Valeant CEO<br />

Jun 21, 2010: Valeant<br />

merges with Biovail and<br />

relocates to Canada<br />

Apr 22, 2014: Valeant<br />

announces proposal<br />

to acquire Allergan<br />

May 28, 2013:<br />

Valeant acquires<br />

Bausch & Lomb<br />

Feb 22, 2015: Valeant<br />

acquires Salix Pharma<br />

Nov 17, 2014:<br />

Actavis acquires Allergan<br />

Sep 28, 2015:<br />

US House Democrats<br />

launch investigation<br />

into drug pricing and<br />

request to subpoena<br />

Valeant<br />

$0<br />

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

[40%]<br />

?<br />

Oct 15, 2015:<br />

Valeant under<br />

investigation by<br />

Federal prosecutors<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, Valeant and Actavis press releases, Twitter, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 24


Valeant Valuation<br />

The market has granted Valeant $48.4 billion of “<strong>Platform</strong> Value” to its Outsider CEO improvements, cost of capital advantage and tax<br />

arbitrage. Arguably, this platform premium is even greater because most of Valeant’s assets have a finite shelf life.<br />

VRX at Cost (2008-Today)<br />

VRX at Market (Today)<br />

Total Enterprise<br />

Value<br />

$91.5bn<br />

“<strong>Platform</strong> Value”<br />

$48.4bn<br />

Equity Value<br />

$59.3bn<br />

Pearson and M&A<br />

$43.1bn<br />

Net Debt and<br />

Minority Interest<br />

$32.2bn<br />

Regardless of one’s view of this “<strong>Platform</strong> Value,” it now makes little sense for a creditor to want to be<br />

long this risk. Valeant’s five-year spreads have widened 160 bps in the last month.<br />

*Market data as of October 15, 2015. Pro forma for announced deals.<br />

Source: Company filings, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 25


If Valeant = Leasco…<br />

Leasco reached too far and was killed politically. This process has begun for Valeant.<br />

Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation Stock Price<br />

SEPTEMBER 27, 1966 – AUGUST 14, 1970<br />

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Stock Price<br />

JANUARY 2, 2008 – OCTOBER 15, 2015<br />

$300<br />

$300<br />

$250<br />

$200<br />

$150<br />

$100<br />

$50<br />

$0<br />

(87%)<br />

in 17<br />

months<br />

+5,495%<br />

in 4 years<br />

IPO (1)<br />

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970<br />

$250<br />

$200<br />

$150<br />

$100<br />

$50<br />

+3,452%<br />

in 7 years<br />

[40%]<br />

?<br />

$0<br />

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

(1) Leasco filed for IPO in June 1965, but traded OTC until September 27, 1966.<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Chicago Booth Center for Research in Security Prices, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 26


Conglomerate Boom – Bust Comparisons<br />

The platform boom was larger and more prolonged than the 1960s bubble, exacerbated by financial repression, low cost debt and tax<br />

arbitrage.<br />

Conglomerate Indices vs. S&P 500 Indices<br />

MARCH 9, 2009 – OCTOBER 15, 2015 vs. AUGUST 9, 1962 – DECEMBER 31, 1970<br />

1100<br />

<strong>Platform</strong> Boom Index Current S&P 500 Index 1960s Conglomerate Index 1960s S&P 500 Index<br />

1000<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

[24%]<br />

?<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Chicago Booth Center for Research in Security Prices, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 27


Outsiders and Cycles<br />

“We did set an aspirational target to be a top five pharma company by the end of 2016. A couple years ago,<br />

about the same time we set the aspiration of being a top 15 pharma company by the end of 2013, which a<br />

lot of people were highly skeptical of, but fortunately we were able to do that and so we figured that would be<br />

about $150 billion market cap roughly…”<br />

– Michael Pearson, CEO of Valeant Pharmaceuticals<br />

“We’d love to take a look at Coca-Cola… We could run it with 200 people.”<br />

- Jorge Lemann, Co-founder of 3G Capital<br />

“We’ll buy a second, a third and one day we’ll be able to say: ‘Hello Mr. Comcast!’ or ‘Hello, Mr. Charter!”<br />

- Patrick Drahi, Founder of Altice<br />

When an Outsider meets a cycle, it is likely the cycle whose reputation will remain intact.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 28


Bust Comparison<br />

All platform companies will be affected now that the feedback loop has gone into reverse.<br />

v1.0 v2.0<br />

1960s<br />

PLATFORMS<br />

Company Leasco Teledyne Valeant<br />

Kraft Heinz<br />

AB InBev<br />

CEO / Leader Saul Steinberg Henry Singleton Michael Pearson<br />

3G Capital<br />

Jorge Lemann<br />

Perception Bad Good Bad? Good?<br />

Peak-to-Trough Decline (87%) (89%) [40%]?<br />

KHC [14%]?<br />

ABI BB [23%]?<br />

Source: Bloomberg, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 29


The <strong>Platform</strong> Boom – Bust Case Study: AB InBev<br />

Serial acquirer Anheuser-Busch InBev’s stock price is faltering as the company announces the largest consumer acquisition ever.<br />

Anheuser-Busch InBev Stock Price<br />

JANUARY 2, 2008 – OCTOBER 15, 2015<br />

€ 120<br />

€ 100<br />

€ 80<br />

€ 60<br />

€ 40<br />

+1,052%<br />

in 7 years<br />

Jan 23, 2015:<br />

AB InBev<br />

acquires Elysian<br />

Brewing<br />

Nov 5, 2014:<br />

AB InBev acquires<br />

10 Barrel Brewing<br />

Feb 5, 2014:<br />

AB InBev acquires<br />

Blue Point Brewing<br />

[23%]<br />

?<br />

Oct 13, 2015:<br />

AB InBev announces<br />

SABMiller acquisition<br />

for $106bn<br />

€ 20<br />

Mar 28, 2011:<br />

AB InBev acquires<br />

Goose Island Brewery<br />

Nov 18, 2008:<br />

Merger of Anheuser-Busch and InBev is completed<br />

€ 0<br />

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

Source: Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, AB InBev press releases, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 30


Looming Debt Maturities are Larger than in 2009<br />

Companies will very likely have to refinance their debts at higher interest rates.<br />

US High-Yield and Leveraged Loan Maturities ($ in billions)<br />

2009 – 2017 vs. 2015 - 2023<br />

HY & LL 12/31/2008 HY & LL 9/30/2015<br />

$500<br />

$400<br />

$300<br />

$200<br />

$100<br />

$0<br />

2009 2015 2010 2016 2011 2017 2012 2018 2013 2019 2014 2020 2015 2021 2016 2022 2017 2023<br />

Source: Credit Suisse, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 31


This Bull Market<br />

This cycle has been the largest bull market in history, relative to nominal GDP growth.<br />

S&P 500 Index return is greater than GDP growth<br />

Difference between Annualized S&P 500 Index Return and Nominal GDP Growth<br />

14%<br />

1982-1987<br />

5%<br />

1957-1962<br />

3%<br />

2%<br />

1962-1966<br />

2002-2008<br />

0%<br />

1970-1973<br />

(2%)<br />

1966-1970<br />

GDP growth is greater than S&P 500 Index return<br />

14%<br />

2009-2015<br />

(2%)<br />

1974-1982<br />

7%<br />

8%<br />

1949-1957 1987-2001<br />

Increasing Duration of Bull Market<br />

Source: Bloomberg, JHL research.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 32


DEATH, TAXES & CYCLES<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution. © 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved. 33


Conglomerate Boom 2.0:<br />

A <strong>Stable</strong> <strong>Platform</strong>?<br />

October 20, 2015<br />

The opinions set forth in this Presentation are solely<br />

observations of JHL Capital Group LLC, and do not<br />

constitute investment advice or recommendations.<br />

Strictly confidential. Not for public distribution.<br />

© 2015 JHL Capital Group LLC. All rights reserved.

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