pakistan’s

security adviser and deputy foreign minister in November 2015 paved the way for Modi’s first visit
to Afghanistan the following month. During this day-long trip, Modi officially handed over three
attack helicopters to Afghanistan, the first time that India has provided lethal weaponry to the
Afghan National Security Forces, and spoke of the need for the two countries to work together to
tackle common challenges.
However, Pakistan’s links with the various Afghan insurgent groups have placed it in an
important position to influence political and security developments in Afghanistan. Better ties
with Pakistan are thus necessary for Kabul to reach a political agreement with the Taliban,
something that Ghani, despite his public pronouncements, recognizes. This is evident from
Kabul’s continuing efforts to work with Islamabad and explore the possibility of resuming the
peace process with the Taliban. 59 It remains to be seen how Ghani balances his relations with both
India and Pakistan. Pakistan has always strongly opposed any military ties between India and
Afghanistan. The Strategic Partnership Agreement signed between the two in 2011, which commits
India, among other things, to “assist…in the training, equipping, and capacity building programs”
for the Afghan National Security Forces, has always been a source of concern for Pakistan. 60
While India, for its part, has good objective reasons for a normalization of ties between Kabul
and Islamabad, the real question is about the terms. If the reconciliation is seen as limiting
Afghanistan’s sovereignty or lending Pakistan special privileges across the Durand Line, New
Delhi will be deeply concerned.
Spurt in Cross-border Terrorism
Developments in Afghanistan could also add a new dimension to the issue of cross-border
terrorism. India is concerned that prolonged instability in Afghanistan or the re-emergence of
the Taliban as the dominant force, even if only in some provinces, could turn the country into a
haven for radical extremist groups. Such fears are based on past events in Afghanistan. During
the 1990s, under international pressure, Pakistan shited many militant groups’ bases from its
Punjab Province and tribal areas to eastern Afghanistan. It initially paid the Jalalabad Shura
and subsequently the Taliban to provide these groups with protection. 61 Groups like the LeT,
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and Hizb-ul Mujahideen were provided sanctuary and an operating base
in Afghanistan from where they could carry out activities against India. The Taliban was also
allegedly complicit in the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 in 1999. Maulana Masood
Azhar, who was released as part of a hostage deal, subsequently planned and executed terrorist
attacks on Indian soil from his base in Pakistan.
Indian opposition to the Taliban is rooted in these past experiences. New Delhi continues to
view the group as Pakistan’s puppet, incapable of negotiating or operating independently. India is
concerned that the Taliban’s involvement in Afghanistan’s future political setup would invariably
provide an opportunity for Pakistan to enhance its influence in the country. From an Indian
perspective, it is thus critical to prevent Pakistan from becoming the sole arbitrator of Afghan
94
NBR
59 “Four-Nations Session in Islamabad Agrees on Resuming Peace Talks,” Tolo News, December 9, 2015, http://www.tolonews.com/en/
afghanistan/22731-four-nations-session-in-islamabad-agrees-on-resuming-peace-talks.
60 “Taliban Leadership Approves Preliminary Peace Talks with Afghan Govt,” Khaama Press, February 22, 2015, http://www.khaama.com/
taliban-leadership-approves-preliminary-peace-talks-with-afghan-govt-9950.
61 Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords (London: Pan Books, 2001).
SPECIAL REPORT u FEBRUARY 2016