ALLIANCE NETWORK

AUSTRALIA AND 

THE US ASIAN 

ALLIANCE NETWORK 

Elsina Wainwright 

ussc.edu.au 

March 2016

UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | ALLIANCE 21 

AUSTRALIA AND THE US ASIAN ALLIANCE NETWORK 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

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The United States’ presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is transforming from a traditional 

alliance network (of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand) 

into a web of strengthened alliances, new partnerships and creative linkages. 

Washington must manage this transformation carefully, so its alliance network 

maintains a deterrent function and reassures allies, but does not exacerbate US- 

China tensions. 

The changing regional setting has increased ANZUS’ value to both Australia and the 

United States. However, ANZUS has emerging fault lines that need to be addressed, 

including the risk that Australia’s and America’s strategic objectives might diverge. 

Australia has a major interest in the stability of the US Asian alliance network and broader regional 

web. The transformation of the US Asian alliance network beyond a hub-and-spoke framework 

is driven by shifting power relativities, particularly China’s rise and assertive regional behaviour. It 

is also part of a broader regional transformation, with a flurry of linkages not involving the United 

States forged in the last year alone. China is watching the changing US presence with suspicion, but 

also participating in some of the regional connections. Managing the tension between the threatbalancing 

and order-building dimensions of its network is an ongoing challenge for Washington. 

The Alliance 21 Program is a multi-year research initiative that examines 

the historically strong Australia-United States relationship and works to 

address the challenges and opportunities ahead as the alliance evolves 

in a changing Asia. Based within the United States Studies Centre at the 

University of Sydney, the Program was launched by the Prime Minister of 

Australia in 2011 as a public-private partnership to develop new insights 

and policy ideas. 

The Australian Government and corporate partners Boral, Dow, News Corp 

Australia, and Northrop Grumman Australia support the program’s second 

phase, which commenced in July 2015 and is focused on the following 

core research areas: defence and security; resource sustainability; alliance 

systems in Asia; and trade, investment, and business innovation. 

The Alliance 21 Program receives funding support from the following partners. 

Research conclusions are derived independently and authors represent their own 

view not those of the United States Studies Centre. 

Three policy priorities should guide Australian efforts to deepen both ANZUS and Australia’s regional 

relationships. First, ANZUS should become even more enmeshed in the emerging regional web 

of relationships and institutions. Canberra should articulate to regional partners and Washington 

how ANZUS fits into (and often complements) Australia’s regional engagement. Second, Canberra 

should contribute more to Washington’s deliberations on China’s rise. This includes finding 

pathways for China within this regional order, while remaining firm on important regional norms. 

Third, ANZUS’ formal mechanisms should be broadened to ensure a greater focus on fostering 

mutual and regional prosperity. Expanding the AUSMIN foreign and defence ministerial dialogue to 

include geoeconomic issues would enable a more comprehensive discussion on regional matters 

with strategic and economic dimensions. This would allow the 65 year-old ANZUS to be more 

effective in a transforming Asia. 

United States Studies Centre 

Institute Building (H03) 

City Rd 

The University of Sydney NSW 2006 

T: +61 2 9351 7249 

E: us-studies@sydney.edu.au 

W: ussc.edu.au



Introduction 

The United States’ presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is transforming from a traditional 

alliance network (of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand) 

into a web of strengthened alliances, new partnerships and creative linkages. 1 This 

shift is a concerted US strategy, driven by changing power relativities, particularly 

China’s rise and assertive regional behaviour. 

The shift is also part of a broader regional transformation, with a flurry of strategic 

and economic linkages not involving the United States, many forged in the last 

year alone. 2 China is watching this transformation closely, viewing the changing 

US presence with suspicion, but also participating in some of the wider regional 

connections. 

This evolving US network can help reinforce regional stability by providing some 

predictability in the current strategic flux, as well as a flexible framework for 

addressing common challenges. But Washington must manage this transformation 

carefully so that the network maintains a deterrent function and reassures allies but 

does not exacerbate US-China tensions. It should be part of an inclusive regional 

order which accords more space to China. 3 

The Australia-US Alliance (‘the Alliance’) features prominently in the transforming 

US Asian alliance network. The United States values Australia’s reliability, regional 

expertise, and that it is less encumbered with historical territorial tensions than 

other Asian allies. Australia’s geography makes it increasingly important to regional 

US military planning. The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty 

(ANZUS) also remains a compelling value proposition for Australia in the current 

strategic climate, as Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper makes clear. 4 Despite 

this traditional strength, emerging fault lines in the Alliance need to be addressed. 

There is a risk that Australian and US strategic objectives might diverge, and they 

could make different decisions about an acceptable regional strategic order. 

Australia has a major interest in the ongoing stability of the US Asian alliance 

network and broader regional web. Deepening its own alliance with the US and 

at the same time, broadening regional engagement will require the Australian 

government to carefully manage often 

complex interdependencies. Three 

policy priorities should guide Australian 

efforts. 

ANZUS should become more 

enmeshed in the emerging regional 

web of relationships and institutions 

First, ANZUS should become more 

enmeshed in the emerging regional 

web of relationships and institutions. 

Too often Australian officials and the public alike conceptualise and discuss ANZUS 

in isolation from the United States’ other Asian alliances. In diplomatic discussions 

with regional partners and Washington, and in official public statements, Australia 

should more clearly articulate how ANZUS fits into (and often complements) 

Australia’s regional engagement. This would enable Australia to have a more 

independent regional posture, but also be an effective US ally, with greater regional 

expertise. 5 

Cover image: ‘AUSMIN meeting in Boston, MA, October 2015’ US Department of State 

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Second, Canberra should contribute more to Washington’s deliberations on China’s 

rise — the key driver of the changing US Asian alliance network. As a valued US 

ally with a major stake in how US-China relations unfold Canberra should both help 

Washington find pathways for China within this regional order and remain firm on 

the maintenance of important regional norms. This should include encouraging the 

US Administration and Congress to support regional and global architectural reform 

that accords China a greater role. 

Third, ANZUS’ formal mechanisms should be updated and broadened to ensure a 

greater focus on fostering mutual and regional prosperity. Existing leader meetings 

and working groups are naturally focused on defence and foreign policy issues, but 

increasingly Asian strategic issues have critical economic dimensions. Expanding 

the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) beyond foreign 

and defence dialogue to include geoeconomic issues would ensure a more 

comprehensive exchange of US and Australian views on emerging regional issues 

and update the 65 year-old ANZUS alliance to be more effective in a transforming 

Asia. 

This paper first surveys the nature and functions of the US global alliance network, 

and how the US Asia alliance network is transforming. 6 It then analyses the 

deepening Australia-US alliance and its place within the network. Finally it outlines 

policy objectives for ANZUS in this changing strategic environment. 

The US global alliance network: 

nature and aims 

The US global alliance network is now being shaped by a strategic shift involving a 

rising China, a revisionist Russia, a rupturing Middle Eastern order with a rampaging 

ISIS, an anemic Europe grappling with existential questions and refugee waves, 

and declining US relative power (though US absolute power remains unmatched). 

It is also shaped by US unwillingness to tolerate allied freeriding, fuelled by years 

of US budget constraints and sequestration-induced damage to defence planning. 7 

Some NATO countries are now raising defence budgets in the face of Russian 

assertiveness. However, European defence capability remains patchy and many 

states are deeply reluctant to use it. 8 Even once stalwart US allies like the United 

Kingdom have become less reliable. Post-Iraq wariness, austerity measures and 

domestic political introspection have led to a reduction in British defence personnel 

and capability, and strained the US-UK ‘special relationship’. While the United States 

is increasing its military presence in Europe as a result of heightened Russian- 

Western tensions, it continues to expect NATO and other allies to contribute more 

to their own and regional security. But US efforts to increase allied burden sharing 

without seeming to run down alliances have been fraught, feeding into criticism of 

US abdication of its leadership role. 9 

Notwithstanding these challenges the US global alliance network remains an integral 

feature of the international order and one of the most important dimensions of US 

global power. The United States, with more than 50 allies, is “the hub of alliances 

unrivalled in the history of nations”. 10 The United States and its Asia-Pacific allies 

alone account for one-third of the global economy, at US$25 trillion. 11 The US global 

alliance network dominates global military spending, comprising 65-70 per cent of 

the total. This aggregation of capability augments US power projection. 12 

Alliances became an integral part of US strategy at the end of the Second World 

War, when the United States oversaw the creation of the post-1945 international 

architecture and needed a forward presence — and allies — to maintain it. 13 With 

the onset of the Cold War the US global presence acquired the additional purpose 

of containing Soviet power. Alliances became a key policy tool for US policymakers 

to create “situations of strength”. 14 Within a few years the Truman and then 

Eisenhower Administrations forged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 

1947), the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS, 

1951), and alliances with Japan (1951), the Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953), 

and Taiwan (1954). Given US dominance there was a pronounced structural 

asymmetry to all these relationships, amounting to the provision of a US security 

guarantee in return, often, for troop presence. 

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NATO was a highly institutionalised collective defence apparatus. America’s Asian 

alliances were primarily bilateral but also included the trilateral ANZUS (with the 

US-New Zealand security relationship suspended in 1986). US officials concluded 

that largely bilateral alliances would satisfy US strategic objectives in Asia: to 

contain Soviet power and prevent the regional spread of communism; satisfy 

US basing requirements in Asia’s maritime theatre; reassure Australia and New 

Zealand that Japan was reigned in; and prevent anti-communist South Korea and 

Taiwan dragging the United States into war with China or the Soviet Union. 15 This 

San Francisco system of alliances gave a framework to the US regional presence: it 

provided stability and enabled a regional focus on prosperity. It was purposefully hub 

and spokes, with Washington at its centre, not spoke to spoke. US policymakers 

sought to optimise US leverage and constrain allied adventurism by ensuring the 

spokes did not connect. 16 

Each alliance was crafted to suit a particular set of circumstances. For example, the 

1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United 

States, which revised the 1951 US-Japan security treaty sought “to encourage 

closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of 

economic stability and wellbeing in their countries.” 17 This economic focus made 

sense, as the United States recognised its strategic and economic interest in 

Japan’s economic reconstruction. 

The 1991 Soviet collapse raised questions as to the continued relevance of the US 

global alliance network. Some of less compelling utility, such as the Southeast Asia 

Treaty Organization (SEATO), were disbanded. But NATO, the five US treaty allies 

in the Pacific, and a growing set of formal and informal US commitments in the 

Middle East outlasted the Soviet threat. NATO lost its immediate purpose with the 

Soviet demise. By contrast the US Asian alliance system retained the North Korean 

threat as a raison d’être and from the late 1970s served as a hedge against an 

ascending China. The Asia-Pacific network therefore retained the classic alliance 

function of reassuring allies in the face of enduring and potential threats, and its 

continued relevance was affirmed in the Pentagon’s 1995 East Asia Strategy. 18 

The Pentagon’s 1998 East Asia Strategy foreshadowed the evolution of the 

network. It described US Asian alliances in the post-Cold War as unlike threatbased 

Cold War alliances, instead serving “the interests of all who benefit from 

regional stability”. 19 Fostering alliances was the cornerstone of the George W. Bush 

Administration’s Asia policy, and the first pillar of the Obama Administration’s 2011 

rebalance policy of increased regional engagement. 20 

Functions of US alliances today 

US global alliances serve as tools to further US interests and also to reinforce 

stability in the following ways: first, they deter other states from aggression; for 

example, US strategic protection to NATO member states during the Cold War 

deterred against a Soviet incursion. 

Second, alliances enhance the US 

capacity to protect global sea-lanes vital 

for the passage of energy and trade. 

Third, alliances can provide predictability 

and a mechanism for managing crises, 

as well as restraining allies from 

pursuing destabilising policies. 21 This 

order-building role is particularly valuable 

The Asia-Pacific network retained 

the classic alliance function of 

reassuring allies in the face of 

enduring and potential threats 

during strategic transitions. NATO, for instance, helped facilitate a stable transition 

to the post-Cold War era. 22 Today, US strategic protection prevents Japan from 

pursuing a significantly more independent posture. Weakening or abolishing 

alliances, conversely, could generate a destabilising flux and increasing regional 

competition, as erstwhile allies shore up their security, perhaps by attempting to 

go nuclear. 

And fourth, the US global alliance network provides mechanisms and capability 

sets to address challenges requiring a collective response. 23 This order-building 

function is especially useful in the current global strategic setting: with a stymied 

global multilateral architecture and diffuse transnational challenges such as 

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terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, biologic threats, and the 

human security consequences of climate change. The alliance system provides a 

framework from which coalitions can be built, and other states drawn in, to address 

such challenges. 24 

Alliances can destabilise, however. They can preserve inter-state tensions in 

aspic, decreasing the need for allies to work on their own to preserve stability. 

For example, the hub-and-spoke arrangement insulated Japan from integrating into 

the region and reconciling with neighbours, leaving historical enmities in place. 25 

Alliance management requires extra care during strategic transitions, as alliances 

adapt to changing threat perceptions and strategic outlooks. NATO’s post-Cold 

War expansion, especially the 2008 statement of intention to incorporate Georgia 

and Ukraine, antagonised Russia by appearing poised to extend the alliance right 

up to its border. 26 

Allied abandonment and entanglement fears can also become more pronounced 

during strategic shifts. Japan and the Philippines in particular have sought 

reassurance about US commitment in recent years. 27 However, historical evidence 

suggests that entrapment risks can be overstated, at least for the senior ally: states 

tend to envisage the risks and factor them in when crafting their commitments. 28 For 

instance, the Obama Administration has not formally declared that US protection 

of the Philippines extends to Philippine-claimed South China Sea territory as it has 

with Japan and the Senkakus. 29 

Managing the tension between the threat-balancing and order-building dimensions 

of alliances is an ongoing challenge for the United States, particularly during strategic 

transitions, such as is occurring in Asia today. While the US alliance network can 

play a stabilising role calibration is required to minimise destabilising tendencies 

and maintain that equilibrium. 

America’s evolving Asian alliance network 

The strategic transition under way in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is transforming the US 

regional alliance network. The rise of China, but also India, Indonesia, and other 

states, is fuelling heightened competition and growing activity in regional sea lanes, 

which in turn are driving the emergence of the Indian Ocean as a strategic theatre 

and the Indo-Pacific as a strategic construct. 30 Territorial disputes and maritime 

tensions are worsening, as are a raft of non-traditional challenges, including 

cybersecurity, nuclear proliferation, and natural disasters intensified by climate 

change. The US rebalance, itself a response to global economic and strategic 

power shifting to the region, is also shaping this increasingly complex strategic 

environment. 

The US Asian alliance network is transforming in several important ways. First, the 

traditional hub-and-spoke relationships with the five Treaty allies are being updated 

according to each ally’s changing strategic outlook, particularly its perception of 

China. The United States is building allied maritime, cyber and space resilience 

capability, and has expanded joint allied exercises and training. Its Japan alliance 

has deepened significantly with the revision of the US-Japan Defence Cooperation 

Guidelines, increased interoperability and technology sharing, and the stationing 

in Japan of US capabilities such as Global Hawk drones and CV-22 Osprey. 31 

The Philippine alliance has rebounded from its 1990s nadir. The US-Philippine 

Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, which provides for a US rotational 

military presence and capacity building, including maritime domain awareness and 

Coast Guard assistance, can now be implemented after the Philippine Supreme 

Court declared it constitutional. 32 

The South Korea alliance maintains its North Korean focus with the United States 

increasing alliance deterrent capability, including recent discussions on installing 

the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence System (THAAD). 33 Seoul is also boosting 

its contribution to the bilateral relationship, including financing for the US troop 

presence, and to regional security. The US-Thai alliance has been strained since 

the 2014 Thai coup, and the Thai junta signalled its distance from Washington with 

a decision to purchase Chinese submarines (though the deal is not yet finalised). 34 

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However, significant elements of US-Thai military-to-military cooperation remain in 

place. For instance, Thailand still hosts training exercises such as the multi-national 

Cobra Gold. 

These Treaty alliances are also transforming from purely patron-client relationships. 35 

US scrutiny of allies’ low defence spending and freeriding has increased and it is 

expecting allies to contribute more, including defence spending, complementary 

capability sets, and increased interoperability, to their own, regional, and even 

global, security. 

Second, the United States is purposefully transforming its alliance system beyond 

the hub-and-spoke framework and actively promoting Asian spoke-to-spoke 

linkages. 36 Japan is providing maritime, including Coast Guard, security assistance 

to the Philippines, for example, and the Australia-Japan strategic partnership has 

deepened, with growing defence technology, maritime security, and logistics 

cooperation. 37 Washington is encouraging its high-capability allies Australia, 

Japan and South Korea, to pool capability and increase interoperability; a concept 

described as ‘federated defence’. 38 These allies are also assisting in building the 

capacity of other US allies and partners. 

In addition, alliance agendas have broadened to encompass out-of-area operations 

and transnational challenges. For instance, the 2015 US-Japan Defence Guidelines 

envisage a regional and global role for the US-Japan alliance, including humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, peacekeeping, and maritime 

security. 39 In 2011, Japan established a counter-piracy presence in Djibouti, Africa 

and is expanding that base to accommodate potential HADR, peacekeeping and 

counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States and NATO. The guidelines 

also outline the economic dimension to the US-Japan alliance, describing how the 

United States and Japan “will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to 

provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the 

Asia-Pacific region and beyond.” 40 

Third, the United States is expanding beyond its traditional Northeast Asian focus, 

to incorporate South and South-East Asian partnerships. This includes an updated 

bilateral defence framework with India; rotational deployments of littoral combat 

ships in Singapore; maritime security and HADR assistance to Vietnam; counterterrorism 

and counter-piracy cooperation with Malaysia; and a strategic partnership 

with Indonesia. 41 The United States has also announced a US$250 million maritime 

South-East Asian assistance package to the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and 

Malaysia. 42 

Fourth, the United States has encouraged the recent dramatic creation of 

minilateral frameworks of US allies and partners, some not including the United 

States. Trilateral arrangements include the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic 

Dialogue, involving defence 

technology and maritime 

security cooperation, the US- 

Japan-South Korea information 

sharing and crisis management 

arrangement, US-Japan- 

India cooperation on maritime 

security and HADR information 

sharing, and the 2015 inaugural 

India-Japan-Australia strategic 

dialogue at which maritime security and cooperation were discussed. 43 The US 

head of Pacific Command also recently called for the revival of the 2007 US-Japan- 

Australia-India quadrilateral dialogue. 44 

The United States has encouraged the 

recent dramatic creation of minilateral 

frameworks of US allies and partners, 

some not including the United States 

Fifth, the United States is actively supporting regional institutions such as the East 

Asia Summit (EAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 

its institutions, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+). 45 

President Obama recently hosted the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit to deepen 

the US-ASEAN strategic partnership. 

These are the elements of the concerted US strategy to turn its Asian alliance 

system into a web of alliances, partnerships, and minilateral frameworks. 46 It 

involves classic balancing against a rising China and concern about energy/ 

trade route access. Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has 

6



hardened the strategic calculus in Washington as well as in many Asian capitals. 

US policymakers have concluded that spoke-to-spoke linkages advance US 

interests by placing US Asian commitments within a more flexible framework. 47 

This provides room to manoeuvre and adjust the temperature of relationships and 

helps offset the loss of US leverage. 

Furthermore, years of US defence budget constraints and uncertainty have 

contributed to the focus on resource pooling to augment collective capability. 48 US 

policymakers have also decided that Asian multilateral institutions, while far from 

problem-solving bodies, can complement US alliances, provide a useful certainty 

to US regional commitments, and build trust and habits of cooperation. 49 

There are two other important dimensions to the US regional strategy. 

Washington recognises the centrality of US-China relations to regional and global 

stability. Accordingly, the United States has broadened US-China linkages and 

communication pathways, including military-military communications. The most 

significant of these initiatives is the annual US-China Strategic and Economic 

Dialogue at which US and Chinese senior officials hold extensive discussions on 

issues covering the breadth of the bilateral strategic and economic relationship. 

But Washington did not anticipate China’s rapid South China Sea land reclamations 

and willingness to withstand US and regional reactions. The US Administration 

has grappled with how to respond and it took months to commence freedom of 

navigation operations in the South China Sea. 50 

The economic dimension of the US regional strategy — the Trans-Pacific Partnership 

(TPP) — is also critical though it has yet to be ratified by Congress. The TPP creates 

a new economic architecture and has a significant strategic dimension: to diversify 

regional trade and investment networks, and therefore minimise the importance of 

any in particular. 51 The objective is to help lessen the divergence between regional 

states’ economic and security interests, as a number (including Australia) balance 

their largest trade relationship with China and their main security relationship with 

the United States. 

Regional security, economic and diplomatic ties not involving the United States 

have also grown markedly over the last decade. 52 An extraordinary array of intraregional 

strategic links have been forged or enhanced in the past year alone. They 

include India-Vietnam and Singapore-Vietnam defence agreements, the Vietnam- 

Philippine Strategic Partnership, the Singapore-India Strategic Partnership, the 

Australia-Singapore Strategic Partnership, and growing Australia-India strategic 

relations (with a 2015 naval exercise). Bilateral trade and investment relations have 

also expanded, including a number of bilateral free trade agreements. 

This intra-regional strategic flurry is partly a balancing response to China’s rise and 

activities in some regional seas and energy/trade route access fears. US officials 

are supporting this expanding cooperation. They have concluded that relationships 

generated independently of the United States can help keep regional tensions in 

check by diversifying interactions and lessening the US-China focus. 53 However, 

the United States does not have control of these linkages so there is a risk they will 

form in ways which might lessen US regional leverage or damage regional stability. 

There is a strong demand from allies and other Asia-Pacific states for continued 

US regional engagement especially given China’s continued South China Sea 

assertiveness. Still a plurality of views about the US role exists within Asian states, 

including allies. In Japan there are some longstanding concerns over US basing and 

there has been prominent criticism of alliance strengthening in Australia and the 

Philippines. 54 In South Korea there tends to be a detached acceptance, rather than 

an embrace, of US strategic protection. Many US allies and partners also maintain 

significant security relationships (as well as crucial economic relationships) with 

China and the United States understands that they do not want to be forced to 

choose. 

China is paying close attention to this regional transformation and views the 

transforming US alliance system with suspicion. 55 Chinese officials have criticised 

US alliances as ‘Cold War relics’ and argued that some US-led minilaterals 

— for example the 2007 US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral — amount to 

containment. 56 But despite some angst, China has largely acquiesced to the 

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trilateral dialogues. 57 China is also participating in some of the region’s increasing 

interconnectedness such as the resumed South Korea-Japan-China trilateral 

discussions, a number of free trade agreements, and the Asian Infrastructure 

Investment Bank (AIIB). It has also taken part in military exercises including China- 

India counter-terrorism drills, the low-level Australia-US-China survival Exercise 

Kowari, and the US-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). China’s response has 

been a complex mix of rising power assertiveness, counter balancing and order 

building. 

The cumulative result of all this activity is a regional web in which US Asian alliances 

are purposefully enmeshed: a mix of bilateral, multilateral, formal and also ad hoc 

mechanisms, some involving the United States and some not. 58 This evolving 

architecture can contribute to regional stability by providing a flexible framework 

to address challenges, while increased spoke-to-spoke linkages can offer better 

prospects for managing inter-allied tensions. Japan, for instance, is fostering 

relations with the Philippines and even South Korea. 59 

The challenge for US alliance management is to balance the order-building and 

threat dimensions of its networked alliance system. 60 The threat dimension 

remains crucial in a landscape of sustained and escalating tensions on the Korean 

peninsula and in the South China Sea. But the United States and other states need 

to maximise the order-building dimensions of these relationships, so they are not 

perceived as solely targeting China. Minilaterals require particular judiciousness. 

They are less likely to antagonise if they include a practical cooperation capability, to 

address common challenges such as natural disasters and future human security 

consequences of climate change, violent extremism and health security. It is also 

important that other regional partnerships and regional institutions are fostered at 

the same time, and where possible, draw in China. 61 

ANZUS in Asia 

The Australia-US Alliance is playing an increased role in the transforming US 

Asian alliance network. Australia and the United States continue to share many 

interests, not least in the maintenance of a stable, rules-based regional order. 62 

The shifting regional setting has lent a new lustre to some of the Alliance’s key 

features, increasing its importance to both the United States and Australia. For the 

United States, the first enhanced 

feature is geostrategic: the 

Alliance anchors US presence 

in the southern Pacific Ocean 

and the eastern side of the 

Indian Ocean, which are both of 

increasing strategic importance. 

Australia offers prime territory 

for training and equipment 

prepositioning, but is also out of 

range of the region’s growing anti-access/area denial capabilities. 63 It is near but 

sufficiently south of the increasingly strategically sensitive South-East Asian sea 

lanes, and is not a party to the region’s territorial disputes, making it Washington’s 

least complicated regional alliance. 64 It is also America’s only Indian Ocean ally. 65 

The shifting regional setting has lent 

a new lustre to some of the Alliance’s 

key features, increasing its importance 

to both the United States and Australia 

The second enhanced feature is reliability. Australia’s strong diplomatic support for, 

and military contribution to, Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria, contrasts favourably 

with other US allies. This commitment builds on Australia’s history of continuous 

involvement in US conflicts and has lent an outsized sense to Australia’s 

contribution, especially given Australia’s history of modest defence spend. 66 

Australia’s reputation as a can-do, proactive ally was further buttressed by its wellregarded 

stint on the UN Security Council. 67 

Australia and the United States also have an interdependence that the United 

States only shares with one other ally: the United Kingdom. Australia and the United 

Kingdom are America’s most important partners for non-duplicative intelligence 

8



within the Five Eyes intelligence alliance and the United States depends on Australia 

in the niche area of space as well. 68 However, it is again worth noting that the UK’s 

reliability as an ally has decreased at the same time as Australia’s importance to the 

United States has grown. 69 

The third feature is ANZUS’ high military and diplomatic functionality, again 

compared to other alliances. Australia is one of a handful of US allies with 

an expeditionary capability, including amphibious capability, and its Iraq and 

Afghanistan involvement has led to an interoperability unmatched by any other two 

militaries. 70 Washington also benefits from Canberra’s diplomatic perspectives and 

engagement. US officials have long valued Australia’s capacity building and lead 

role in the South-West Pacific and parts of South-East Asia, and have employed 

Australian neighbourhood strategies in other contexts. For example, the United 

States Coast Guard (USCG) assistance to the Philippines and Vietnam has adapted 

the Australian Pacific Patrol Boat Program model. 71 In addition, the Alliance agenda 

has grown to include a broader suite of regional and global challenges, including 

the military campaign against ISIS and countering violent extremism diplomatic 

initiatives. 

For Australia, the Alliance continues to provide enduring benefits, including access 

to US intelligence and sophisticated defence equipment. 72 Australia also benefits 

from US political, diplomatic and technological support, such as the United States 

provided to Australia during its operation to recover MH17 victims from the Ukraine 

crash site. 73 The Alliance is an even more compelling value proposition for Australia 

in the transformed regional setting, in which regional military modernisation is 

eroding Australia’s capability gap, and the cost of securing Australia’s interests 

using expensive defence technology is climbing ever higher. 74 ANZUS remains a 

cost effective way for Australia to protect its vital interests, including safeguarding 

the regional sea lanes through which the majority of its trade flows. 75 Accordingly, 

Australia has backed US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, 

and continued its decades-long routine air patrols over the South China Sea. 76 There 

are costs to the Alliance, including a posture which can be perceived in the region 

as less-than-independent and thus complicate Australia’s regional relationships. 

But without it, Australia would have to spend much more on defence and make 

significant economic trade-offs. 

The 2014 US-Australian Force Posture Agreement demonstrates the deepening 

bilateral defence ties: it provides a long-term (25 year) timeframe and further 

institutionalises the Alliance. 77 The rotational marine presence, US air equipment 

rotation, expanded joint training and exercises, and personnel exchanges have 

given ANZUS a self-reinforcing momentum as administrative infrastructure has 

been added, and the tempo and depth of interactions have increased. 78 Maritime 

security, space, and ballistic missile defence cooperation has expanded, as has the 

US presence at Australian bases. 79 Defence technology and scientific innovation 

are an increasing focus, including cooperation on hypersonics, electronic warfare, 

cyber, and enhanced ICT connectivity. 80 

The 2016 Defence White Paper describes the US alliance as the “centrepiece 

of [Australia’s] defence policy”, and declares that Australia will support the US 

role of “underpinning the stability of our region”. 81 The White Paper also makes 

international engagement a core defence function. Australia’s participation in 

multinational exercises will increase, and Australia’s regional defence partnerships, 

especially with Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, India and China, will 

be strengthened. 82 

The Australia-US economic relationship is also growing, though it is often eclipsed 

by the security relationship in public discussions and there is scope for significantly 

more growth. Two-way trade and investment has increased significantly, bolstered 

by the 2005 bilateral Free Trade Agreement: the United States is Australia’s biggest 

economic partner, when trade and investment are combined. 83 US goods exports 

to Australia have grown by 68 per cent since 2005. Australia’s goods exports to 

the United States have grown by 26 per cent, including an increase in Australia’s 

value-added exports heading to the United States. Food products, for example, 

nearly doubled to 2014 and two-way services trade has grown by 72 per cent since 

2005. 84 

9



Bilateral investment has risen as well: US investment in Australia has more than 

doubled since 2005, and comprises 26.7 per cent of total foreign direct investment 

in Australia. 85 This is not solely resource based, though US investment in Australian 

energy has been substantial. US investment in service and high-tech industries — 

growing, job-producing segments of Australia’s economy — is also expanding. 86 

For example, US investment in professional, scientific and technical services 

quadrupled from 2004 to 2013, more than tripled in financial and insurance sector 

investments over the same period, and almost tripled in computers and electronic 

products. 87 Australia’s investment stock in the United States has likewise risen, 

though much less sharply, climbing in aggregate roughly 10 per cent between 

2005 and 2013. 88 

Fault lines and risks 

In terms of the breadth and regularity of interaction the Alliance has never been 

closer. The White Paper’s funding commitments and Alliance focus (including 

defence/technology cooperation and prioritising interoperability-enabling capability) 

are likely to be well received in Washington. The northern Australian infrastructure 

spending will give some momentum to the stalled Force Posture Agreement 

cost sharing discussions. 89 Washington is still watching Canberra’s submarine 

competitive evaluation process closely. US officials have largely not weighed in, but 

there seems a clear US Pacific Command preference for a Japanese submarine for 

strategic, security and technical reasons. 90 

But a robust ANZUS is by no means inevitable, and fault lines must be addressed. 

The relationship is driven too much by policy elites in both countries. While the 

Alliance is well supported in Australia across a fair degree of the political spectrum, 

Australians tend to view the alliance as a standalone bilateral, which is separate from 

the US Asian alliance network, and even from regional dynamics. 91 There is low 

public support in Australia for joining the United States in an Asian contingency. 92 

In the United States, there is little awareness outside the policy world of the 

dimensions of the relationship. Australia’s reliability is greatly valued, but it can 

sometimes be viewed in Washington as automatic support. 93 This can lead to 

complacency in Washington, with Canberra’s support being taken for granted. 

The most significant risk is whether Australian and US strategic objectives diverge 

as China’s rise alters the regional power structure. The United States looks at Asia 

from the north, whereas Australia looks up at the region from the south, through 

South-East Asia. These differing outlooks have already altered US and Australian 

perceptions, particularly of China, as their respective final positions on the AIIB 

indicate. 

This risk is heightened by the divergence of Australia’s own economic and security 

interests, with China its main trading partner, and the United States its main security 

partner. This was clearly apparent in the Darwin Port lease decision, which caused 

consternation in Washington. 94 

Australia’s trade relationship with 

China can make Canberra perceive 

a level of risk of Beijing’s economic 

punishment that is not borne out by 

evidence. 95 

China’s continued rise might lead to 

a crisis point, with the United States 

seeking to maintain regional primacy 

and Australia settling for something 

less. 96 This divergence of Australian and US strategic objectives is less likely if both 

accept incremental adaptation of the existing order, so that China can exercise 

increased leadership. 97 Certainly the current order has enabled China’s rise, and 

the stability it provides helps China maintain the economic growth required for its 

domestic stability. US dominance of global energy routes mean the United States 

could choke off China’s energy supply if tensions increased. 98 However, China’s 

South China Sea land reclamation and militarisation are testing operating principles 

such as freedom of navigation, and tensions are escalating. 

China’s continued rise might 

lead to a crisis point, with the 

United States seeking to maintain 

regional primacy and Australia 

settling for something less 

10



Lastly, there is the risk of a weakening or retrenching United States. America’s 

unmatched global power has been buttressed by the resurgent US economy. 99 

But there are sharp questions about US global leadership on a myriad of global 

challenges, especially in the Middle East. There are also questions in Asia about 

the strength of America’s Asia focus, given pressing events in the Middle East and 

Europe. Furthermore, the United States has significant domestic vulnerabilities, 

including crumbling infrastructure and congressional dysfunction stymieing 

effective governance. 100 While US retrenchment from Asia remains unlikely, a 

weakened US security commitment would leave Australia exposed. 

These fault lines mean Australia’s continued reliability cannot be taken for granted, 

notwithstanding 100 years of fighting side by side. 

Conclusion 

The transforming US Asian alliance network can be a stabilising force in the region 

if it strikes a balance between threat balancing and order building. ANZUS itself can 

contribute more to regional security and be a mechanism for addressing common 

challenges if its fault lines are addressed and new opportunities for cooperation are 

pursued. Three policy priorities should guide Australian efforts. 

First, ANZUS should become more enmeshed in the emerging regional web of 

relationships and institutions. The Australian Government is right to deepen both 

ANZUS and regional partnerships with Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, China 

and other states, as well as support regional institutions such as the ADMM+. In 

diplomatic discussions with regional partners and Washington, and in official public 

statements, Australia should more clearly articulate how ANZUS fits into (and often 

complements) Australia’s regional engagement. 

Framing ANZUS less as a standalone bilateral and more as part of the web of 

regional linkages would allow Australia to forge a more independent regional 

posture. It would reduce the Alliance cost of being seen as too US-dependent, and 

help ANZUS evolve in ways consistent with regional stability. This approach would 

benefit the United States, too, by augmenting Australia’s role as a well-positioned 

ally. Strengthened regional relationships enhance Australia’s regional perspective, 

leading to better US policy outcomes in the southern Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

Second, Canberra should contribute more to Washington’s deliberations on 

responding to China’s rise. China’s rise is the key driver of the US Asian alliance 

network’s transformation, and Australia has a strong interest in the network and 

broader regional web remaining stable. As a valued US ally with a unique regional 

perspective, Canberra should help Washington find ways to integrate China 

into the existing order, to increase 

China’s stake in that order. 101 A good 

start would be encouraging the US 

Administration and Congress to 

support regional and architectural 

reform which gives China a 

greater role, along the lines of 

Congress’ belated ratification of the 

International Monetary Fund reform 

enlarging emerging power representation. This should include recommending that 

Washington be more receptive to initiatives such as the AIIB, and to eventually 

open the TPP to China. 

ANZUS’ formal meeting mechanisms 

should be broadened to increase the 

focus on economic partnerships and 

regional economic connectivity 

Canberra should also take more of a lead in establishing functional cooperation 

networks between the United States, China, and Asian neighbours which can 

tackle common challenges. These can leverage Australia’s terrain and expertise, 

including in crisis response. 102 Where possible, they should prioritise Chinese 

engagement, building on successes like Exercise Kowari and Australia-China 

cooperation during the flight MH370 search. One practical idea gaining traction 

is for a regional humanitarian and disaster relief centre to be located in northern 

Australia. 103 

At the same time, Australia should continue to take a firm stand on regional norms, 

including the non-alteration of the status quo by force. This involves continued 

support for US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea as well 

11



as the continuation of Australia’s own long-standing patrolling under Operation 

Gateway. Australia should remain prepared to stand against further unilateral 

activities by China, such as any declaration of a South China Sea Air Defence 

Identification Zone. 

Pursuing these three policy objectives would help consolidate a mature and 

forward-looking ANZUS situated more squarely in a transforming Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

It would be an ideal way to mark ANZUS’ 65th anniversary. 

Third, ANZUS should add an economic dimension to its support for regional 

stability. ANZUS’ formal meeting mechanisms should be broadened to increase 

the focus on economic partnerships and regional economic connectivity. This 

would reduce often-bifurcated discussions on strategic and economic interests in 

Australia, particularly within the context of US-Australia-China relations. AUSMIN 

could be expanded to include the Australian Treasurer and US Treasury Secretary. If 

scheduling logistics require it, this could occur biennially in the first instance, when 

AUSMIN is hosted in the United States. Rather than diluting the focus of Australian- 

US security discussions, this more comprehensive dialogue structure would tackle 

more effectively the growing number of issues in the alliance with both security 

and economic dimensions. Adding an economic dimension to AUSMIN might lead, 

in time, to a more formal bilateral commitment on mutual and regional prosperity, 

similar to the US-Japan alliance framework. 

An institutionalised sharing of geoeconomic perspectives would be particularly 

useful, given Australia’s and America’s different vantage points in Asia. It would 

build on existing bilateral business, trade and TPP discussions, models such as the 

Australia-Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and the Prime Minister’s 

and Foreign Minister’s recent comments on how economic interdependence 

offsets regional tensions. 104 It would also promote continued expansion of Australia- 

US business-business linkages and overall Australia-US trade and investment. 105 As 

commodity prices fall and China’s economy slows, the Australian economy needs 

to continue to reorient toward more technology- and innovation-focused markets 

such as the United States. Deeper bilateral economic engagement can buttress 

the defence relationship, and reduce the divergence of Australia’s economic and 

security interests. 

This report may be cited as: 

Elsina Wainwright, ‘Australia and the US Asian alliance network’, Alliance 21 

Report (United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, March 2016). 

12



Endnotes 

1. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact sheet: Advancing the 

rebalance to Asia and the Pacific’, Washington DC, 16 November 2015. 

2. These intra-Asian linkages have been described as an ‘Asia power 

web’ in a Center for a New American Security analysis. Patrick 

M. Cronin, Richard Fontaine, Zachary M. Hosford, Oriana Skylar 

Mastro, Ely Ratner and Alexander Sullivan, ‘The Emerging Asia 

Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties’, Center 

for a New American Security, Washington DC, June 2013. 

3. William T. Tow, ‘Rebalancing and order building: Strategy or 

illusion?’, William T. Tow and Douglas Stuart, eds. The New 

US Strategy Towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot, 

London and Routledge, New York, 2015, pp. 31, 46. 

4. Australian Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 

Canberra, February 2016, for example paragraphs 2.17, 5.22. 

5. Ely Ratner, ‘Australia’s new activism: The view from Washington’, The 

Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 23 July 2014. 

6. This paper defines alliances as commitments for mutual defence support 

and military cooperation. Stephen M. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or 

Collapse’, Survival, vol. 39, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 156-179, at p. 157. 

7. Michael Birnbaum, ‘Gates rebukes European allies in 

farewell speech’, Washington Post, 10 June 2011. 

8. Constanze Stelzenmüller, ‘Europe to Planet America: Stay 

with us, but don’t stampede us’, Policy Brief, German Marshall 

Fund of the United States, Paris, September 2015. 

9. David Rothkopf, ‘Does America need new ‘special relationships’?’, 

Foreign Policy, 4 August 2015. Richard Sokolsky and Jeremy 

Shapiro, ‘It’s hard to get good help these days: The problem with US 

allies’, Order from Chaos, Brookings Institution, 28 May 2015. 

10. Barack Obama, ‘Remarks at the United States Military Academy 

(West Point) Commencement Ceremony,’ United States Military 

Academy, 28 May 2014. No other state comes close; China, 

by contrast, has two allies: Pakistan and North Korea. 

11. Ashton Carter, ‘Remarks on the Next Phase of the US Rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific’, McCain Institute, Arizona State University, 6 April 2015. 

12. US military spending is 35-40 per cent of global military spending, and 

US allies spend around 30 per cent of the total. Michael E. O’Hanlon, 

‘Dollars at work: What Defense spending means for the U.S. economy’, 

Order from Chaos, Brookings Institution, 20 August 2015. 

13. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the 

New World Order, Vintage, New York, 2004, p. 17; Robert Kagan, 

‘Superpowers don’t get to retire: what our tired country still owes the 

world’, New Republic, 26 May 2014; and Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Seeking 

Alliances and Partnerships: The Long Road to Confederationism 

in US Grand Strategy’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, 

and Greg Chaffin, eds., US Alliances and Partnerships at the 

Center of Global Power, Strategic Asia 2014-15, National Bureau 

of Asian Research, Seattle and Washington, DC, 2014, p. 12. 

14. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State 

Department, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1969, p. 378. 

15. Victor D. Cha, ‘Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance 

System in Asia’, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter 

2009/10, pp. 158-196, at pp. 158-9, 168, 190. 

16. In particular, they were concerned that South Korea and Taiwan might band 

together to get the US to take on China and North Korea. Cha, p. 189. 

17. US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 1960, Preamble. 

18. Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘East Asian Security: The Case for 

13



Deep Engagement’, Foreign Affairs, 1 July 1995. 

19. United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 

November 25 1998, section 2. See also Tow, ‘Rebalancing 

and order building: Strategy or illusion?’, p. 36. 

20. Tom Donilon, ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’, 

Speech to the Asia Society, New York, March 11 2013. 

21. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, 

Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p. 22; Walt, ‘Why 

Alliances Endure or Collapse’, pp. 158, 173. 

22. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, p. 171. 

23. Bruce Jones, Still Ours To Lead: America, Rising Powers, 

and the Tension Between Rivalry and Restraint, Brookings 

Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2014, pp. 5, 27. 

24. Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘The American Century: RIP?’, 

The National Interest, September 24 2015. 

25. Cha, ‘Powerplay’, pp. 195-96. It likewise preserved South Korea’s historical 

resentments. See also Robert Kelly, ‘East Asia’s history wars: South Korea 

and Japan (Yes, once again)’, Asian Security Blog, 2 November 2015. 

26. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault’, 

Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014, vol. 93, no. 5, pp. 77-89. 

27. Rod Lyon, ‘The US and assurance anxieties in Asia’, The Strategist, ASPI, 

16 September 2015; and ‘Philippines Sends SOS to the International 

Community’, Philippine Star, 2 May 2012. Concerns about alliance 

entanglement can also be greater during strategic adjustments. 

28. Michael Beckley, ‘The Myth of Entangling Alliances’, International Security, 

vol. 39, no. 4, Spring 2015, pp. 7-48; David Santoro, ‘America’s Treaty 

Allies: worth going to war over?’ The National Interest, 28 April 2014. 

29. Lyon, ‘The US and assurance anxieties in Asia’; and Barack 

Obama and Benigno Aquino III, Remarks by President Obama 

and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint 

Press Conference, Washington DC, 28 April 2014. 

30. Michael Wesley on the shifting power dynamics and the 

Indo-Pacific’s emergence, ‘Australia’s Alliance in a Changing 

Asia’, Alliance 21 Report, United States Studies Centre, 

University of Sydney, Sydney, August 2012, pp. 2-4. 

31. Japan Ministry of Defence (JMOD), Guidelines for Japan-US Defence 

Cooperation, Tokyo, 2015; Craig Whitlock and Anne Gearan, ‘Agreement 

will allow U.S. to fly long-range surveillance drones from base in Japan’, 

Washington Post, 2 October 2013; and Reiji Yoshida, ‘U.S. to station 

Ospreys at Yokota Air Base starting in 2017,’ The Japan Times, 12 May 2015. 

32. Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Philippine Court Upholds New 

US Defense Pact’, The Diplomat, 12 January 2016. 

33. KJ Kwon and Paula Hancocks, ‘South Korea, U.S. to discuss 

THAAD missile defense system’, CNN, 7 February 2016. 

34. ‘Thailand tilts away from the US’, The Wall Street 

Journal Editorial, 30 June 2015. 

35. Susan E. Rice, ‘America’s future in Asia’, Remarks at Georgetown 

University, 20 November 2013; and Scott Snyder, ‘The US-ROK Alliance 

and the US Rebalance to Asia’, in Tellis, Denmark and Chaffin, ‘US 

Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power’, pp. 61-85. 

36. White House Fact Sheet, ‘Advancing the rebalance 

to Asia and the Pacific’, 16 November 2015. 

37. Toko Sekiguchi, ‘Japan to Provide Patrol Vessels to the 

Philippines’, The Wall Street Journal, 4 June 2015. 

38. Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Zack Cooper, ‘Federated 

Defense in Asia’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Washington DC, December 2014; and Michael J. Green and Lt. Gen. 

14



Thomas Conant (USM C Ret.), ‘An independent perspective of US 

defence policy in the Asia-Pacific region’, Statement before the US Senate 

Armed Services Committee, Washington, 3 February 2016, p. 4. 

39. JMOD, Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation, 2015, Section 5. 

40. Ibid. 

41. White House Fact Sheet, ‘Advancing the rebalance 

to Asia and the Pacific’, 16 November 2015. 

42. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact sheet: U.S. Building 

Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia’, Washington DC, 17 November 2015. 

43. David Lang, ‘The not-quite-quadrilateral: Australia, Japan 

and India’, The Strategist, ASPI, 9 July 2015. 

44. Harry B. Harris Jr, ‘Let’s be ambitious together’, Raisina 

Dialogue Remarks, New Delhi, 2 March 2016. 

45. James A Baker III, ‘America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific 

Community’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, number 5, Winter 1991-92, pp. 1-18. 

46. White House Fact Sheet, ‘Advancing the rebalance to Asia and 

the Pacific’, 16 November 2015; US Department of Defense, The 

Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, Washington DC, 2015, p. 

20; and Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr., ‘From Wheels to 

Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements’, The 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 7-17, at p. 11. 

47. Chuck Hagel, ‘The U.S. Approach to Regional 

Security’, Singapore, 1 June 2012. 

48. US Department of Defence, Quadrennial Defense 

Review, Washington DC, 2014, p. VI. 

49. Bates Gill, ‘Alliances under Austerity: What does American want?’, 

ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity 

Series, September 2013. Some institutions also provide specific 

benefits: the EAS allows useful discussions at leaders’ level, and 

the ADMM+ is relatively action oriented, promoting functional 

cooperation on maritime security, HADR, and counterterrorism. 

50. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Zack Cooper, John Schnaus, 

et al, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, January 

2016, p. 5; Michael J. Green, Peter J. Dean, Brendan Taylor and Zack 

Cooper, ‘The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia’, ANU Strategic and 

Defence Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity Series Report, July 2015, p. 11. 

51. Ashton Carter, ‘The United States and challenges to Asia-Pacific 

security’, 14th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 30 May 2015, p. 4. 

52. Patrick M. Cronin, Richard Fontaine, Zachary M. Hosford, Oriana 

Skylar Mastro, Ely Ratner and Alexander Sullivan, ‘The Emerging 

Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties’, 

Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, June 2013. 

53. Cronin, Fontaine, Hosford, Mastro, Ratner and Sullivan, 

‘The Emerging Asia Power Web’, p. 5. 

54. Malcolm Fraser with Cain Roberts, ‘Dangerous Allies’, Melbourne University 

Press, Carlton, 2014. One of the candidates for the 2016 Philippine 

Presidency opposes the US-Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement. 

55. Zhu Feng, ‘TSD - Emphemism for multiple alliance?’, in National Bureau 

of Asian Research Special Report, December 2008, pp. 43, 48. 

56. Brendan Nicholson, ‘China warns Canberra on 

security pact’, The Age, 15 June 2007. 

57. Rory Medcalf, ‘The ‘q’ word: US Pacific commander defies 

diplomatic niceties in New Delhi’, The Interpreter, Lowy 

Institute for International Policy, 4 March 2016. 

58. Brendan Taylor, ‘Conceptualizing the bilateral-multilateral security nexus’, 

and William T. Tow, ‘Conclusion’, in William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, 

15



eds, Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending 

cooperation, Routledge, London and New York, 2013; Elsina Wainwright, 

‘Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific’, New York 

University Center on International Cooperation, New York, April 2010. 

59. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration: A 

Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and 

Goals of Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond’, Tokyo, 

4 June 2015; and Choe Sang-hun, ‘Japan and South Korea Settle Dispute 

Over Wartime “Comfort Women”’, New York Times, 28 December 2015. 

60. Tow, ‘Rebalancing and order building: Strategy or illusion?’, pp. 31, 46. 

61. Rory Medcalf, ‘Squaring the triangle: An Australian perspective 

on Asian security minilateralism’, National Bureau of Asia 

Research Special Report, December 2008, p. 28. 

62. Malcolm Turnbull, ‘New Responsibilities for an Enduring Partnership’, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 18 January 2016. 

63. Jim Thomas, Zack Cooper, Iskander Rehman, ‘Gateway to the 

Indo-Pacific: Australian Defense Strategy and the Future of 

the Australia-US Alliance’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments, Washington DC, 2013, pp. 13-20. 

64. Bates Gill, ‘The US-Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership 

in an Emerging Asia’, in Tellis et al, US Alliances and Partnerships 

at the Center of Global Power, at pp. 115-116. 

65. Bates Gill and Tom Switzer, ‘The New Special Relationship: The US- 

Australia Alliance Deepens’, Snapshot, Foreign Affairs, 19 February 2015. 

66. Mark Thomson, ‘Australia’s Future Defence Spending and its Alliance 

with the United States’, Alliance 21 report, United States Studies Centre 

at the University of Sydney, 2013; Hayley Channer, ‘Steadying the US 

rebalance to Asia: The role of Australia, Japan and South Korea’, Strategic 

Insights no. 17, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 2014, p. 7. 

67. Richard Gowan, ‘Syria, MH17, and the Art of the Possible’, The 


68. Elsina Wainwright, Interview with James Brown, New 

York/Sydney, October and November 2015. 

69. Tara McKelvey, ’Is the US-UK’s special relationship 

in decline?’, BBC, 22 May 2015. 

70. Maren Leed, J. D. McCreary, and George Flynn, ‘Advancing 

U.S.-Australian Combined Amphibious Capabilities’, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2015. 

71. Evan Medeiros, ‘35 Years of U.S.-China Relations: Diplomacy, 

Culture and Soft Power’, Washington DC, 21 January 2015. 

72. Australian Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 

2013, Canberra, 13 May 2013, section 6.8. 

73. Ashton Carter and Marise Payne, ‘Remarks With Secretary of 

Defense Ash Carter, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, and 

Australian Defense Minister Marise Payne’, 13 October 2015. 

74. Dennis Richardson, Blamey Oration: The Strategic Outlook for 

the Indo-Pacific, RUSI’s Third International Defence and Security 

Dialogue, 27 May 2015. Accessed on SMH.com.au website 

75. Peter Jennings, ‘The U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: An Australian 

Perspective’, Asia Policy, no. 15, January 2013, pp. 38-44, at p. 41. 

76. Australian Department of Defence, ‘Statement: Freedom of 

Navigation in the South China Sea’, Canberra, 27 October 2015. 

77. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Force Posture 

Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government 

of the United States of America, Canberra, 2014, Article 21 section 3. 

78. Gregory Poling, ‘AUSMIN takes the long view of US- 

Australia security cooperation’, CSIS Pacific Partners 

16



Outlook, Volume IV, Issue 8, September 2014. 

79. AUSMIN 2015 Joint Statement, 13 October 2015. 

80. Ibid. 

81. Australian 2016 Defence White Paper, paragraph 2.17. 

82. Australian 2016 Defence White Paper, paragraph 5.17. Alan Dupont, 

‘Full spectrum defence: Re-thinking the fundamentals of Australian 

defence strategy’, Lowy Institute Analysis, Sydney, March 2015, p. 10. 

83. Julie Bishop, ‘US-Australia: The Alliance in an Emerging Asia’, Speech to 

the Alliance 21/CSIS Conference, Washington DC, 22 January 2014. 

84. East-West Center (EWC), United States Studies Centre at 

University of Sydney (USSC), and Perth USAsia Centre at University 

of Western Australia (USAC), ‘Australia matters for America/ 

American matters for Australia’, Washington DC, 2015. 

85. Ibid. 

86. John Goyer, ‘US-Australia Trade Pact Impresses after First 

Decade’, US Chamber of Commerce, 24 March 2015. 

87. Michael White, ‘US-Australia Free Trade Agreement 

turns 10’, Global Trade Daily, 27 March 2015. 

88. EWC, USSC, and USAC, ‘Australia matters for 

America/American matters for Australia’. 

89. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence White 

Paper 2016, Canberra, 2016, Chapter 9, Sections 5.18-5.30. 

90. Cameron Stewart, ‘US eyes strategic benefits from Japan 

submarines deal’, The Australian, 22 January 2016. 

91. Rory Medcalf, ‘We’re not the only friends the United States has 

in the Asian region’, The Age, 16 June 2015; Alex Oliver, ‘Will 

92. Ibid. 

Australians support a deeper, bolder US alliance?’ The Interpreter, 

Lowy Institute for International Policy, 16 July 2015. 

93. Elsina Wainwright, Interviews with Washington DC analysts, 

New York/Washington DC, October and November 2015. 

94. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Zack Cooper, John 

Schnaus, et al, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and 

Partnerships, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington 

DC, January 2016, p. 67. Michael Green and Andrew Shearer, ‘Mr 

Turnbull Goes to Washington’, The National Interest, 17 January 2016. 

95. Mark Thomson, ‘We don’t have to choose between the US and 

China’, The Strategist, ASPI, 2 May 2015; Darren Lim, ‘Hillary 

Clinton’s trade warning: Can China coerce Australia?’, The 


96. Hugh White, ‘ANZUS in the Asian Century’, The Strategist, 

ASPI, 15 July 2015; and Hugh White, The China Choice: Why 

America Should Share Power, Black Inc., Collingwood, 2012. 

97. There seems to be some coalescence around this approach. Peter 

Varghese, ‘An Australian Worldview: A Practitioner’s Perspective’, Speech 

to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 20 August 2015; 

Ashton Carter, ‘The United States and challenges to Asia-Pacific security’, 

2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, p. 4; Michael J. Green, Peter J. Dean, Brendan 

Taylor and Zack Cooper, ‘The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia’, 

ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity Series 

Report, July 2015, p. 12; and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and 

the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’, Foreign Affairs, 

1 January 2008, p. 1. There is also some evidence that China would be 

prepared to play an enlarged role within the existing order. Xi Jinping, 

Address at the General Debate, 70th Session of the United Nations 

General Assembly, New York, 28 September 2015; and Kevin Rudd, ‘US- 

China 21: The Future of US-China Relations under Xi Jinping: Summary 

17



Report’, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, April 2015, p. 24. 

98. Chris Mills, ‘The United States’ Asia-Pacific Policy and the Rise of the 

Dragon’, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, August 2015, pp. 3-4. 

99. US power stems in part from its rebounding economy with 

unrivalled market influence and innovative capacity, the world’s most 

technologically advanced military, with a decades-lasting capability 

edge, and a new energy security. Jones, Still Ours To Lead. 

100. Richard N. Haass, Foreign policy begins at home: The case for putting 

America’s house in order, Basic Books, New York, 2013, pp. 139,155. 

101. Rudd, ‘US-China 21 Summary Report’, pp. 33-34. 

102. Gregory Poling and Benjamin Schaare, ‘Australia’s search for MH370: 

Regional leadership through HADR and Search and Rescue Efforts’, 

CSIS Pacific Partners Outlook, vol. IV, issue 3, 10 April 2014; Linda 

Jakobson, ‘Add substance to Australia’s strategic dialogue with China’, 

in Anthony Bubalo, ed., ‘Judicious ambition: International policy 

priorities for the new Australian government’, Lowy Institute Analysis, 

September 2013, pp. 12-13; Green, Hicks, and Cooper, ‘Federated 

Defense in Asia’; and Peter Jennings, ‘The known truths revealed 

by flight MH370’, Australian Financial Review, 20 March 2014. 

103. Anthony Bergin, ‘Darwin defence hub crucial to white paper’s diplomatic 

ambitions,’ The Australian, February 29 2016, p. 9; Jakobson, ‘Add 

substance to Australia’s strategic dialogue with China’, pp. 12-13. 

104. Julie Bishop, ‘Mapping Asia’s trajectory: An Australian perspective’, 

Address to the United States Studies Centre and Center for a 

New American Security, Washington DC, 26 January 2016. 

105. Niels Marquardt, ‘America and Australia: economic ties 

as strong and important as security ties’, The Strategist, 

Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 August 2014. 

18



About the author 

Dr Elsina Wainwright 

Adjunct Associate Professor 


Dr Elsina Wainwright is an adjunct associate 

professor at the United States Studies Centre and a 

non-resident fellow in its Alliance 21 Program. Based 

in New York, she is also a visiting senior fellow at 

the Center on International Cooperation at New York 

University. Previous roles include director of the 

strategy and international program at the Australian 

Strategic Policy Institute, an associate with McKinsey 

& Company, a consultant political analyst for the 

International Crisis Group, and a stipendiary lecturer 

in politics at Oriel College, Oxford University. She 

has arts and law degrees from the University of 

Queensland, and a master’s degree and doctorate in 

international relations from Oxford University, where 

she studied as a Rhodes Scholar. 

Media enquiries 


Institute Building (H03) 

The University of Sydney NSW 2006 

T: +61 2 9351 7249 

E: us-studies@sydney.edu.au 

W: ussc.edu.au 

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