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AUSTRALIA AND<br />
THE US ASIAN<br />
<strong>ALLIANCE</strong> <strong>NETWORK</strong><br />
Elsina Wainwright<br />
ussc.edu.au<br />
March 2016
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
■■<br />
■■<br />
■■<br />
The United States’ presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is transforming from a traditional<br />
alliance network (of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand)<br />
into a web of strengthened alliances, new partnerships and creative linkages.<br />
Washington must manage this transformation carefully, so its alliance network<br />
maintains a deterrent function and reassures allies, but does not exacerbate US-<br />
China tensions.<br />
The changing regional setting has increased ANZUS’ value to both Australia and the<br />
United States. However, ANZUS has emerging fault lines that need to be addressed,<br />
including the risk that Australia’s and America’s strategic objectives might diverge.<br />
Australia has a major interest in the stability of the US Asian alliance network and broader regional<br />
web. The transformation of the US Asian alliance network beyond a hub-and-spoke framework<br />
is driven by shifting power relativities, particularly China’s rise and assertive regional behaviour. It<br />
is also part of a broader regional transformation, with a flurry of linkages not involving the United<br />
States forged in the last year alone. China is watching the changing US presence with suspicion, but<br />
also participating in some of the regional connections. Managing the tension between the threatbalancing<br />
and order-building dimensions of its network is an ongoing challenge for Washington.<br />
The Alliance 21 Program is a multi-year research initiative that examines<br />
the historically strong Australia-United States relationship and works to<br />
address the challenges and opportunities ahead as the alliance evolves<br />
in a changing Asia. Based within the United States Studies Centre at the<br />
University of Sydney, the Program was launched by the Prime Minister of<br />
Australia in 2011 as a public-private partnership to develop new insights<br />
and policy ideas.<br />
The Australian Government and corporate partners Boral, Dow, News Corp<br />
Australia, and Northrop Grumman Australia support the program’s second<br />
phase, which commenced in July 2015 and is focused on the following<br />
core research areas: defence and security; resource sustainability; alliance<br />
systems in Asia; and trade, investment, and business innovation.<br />
The Alliance 21 Program receives funding support from the following partners.<br />
Research conclusions are derived independently and authors represent their own<br />
view not those of the United States Studies Centre.<br />
Three policy priorities should guide Australian efforts to deepen both ANZUS and Australia’s regional<br />
relationships. First, ANZUS should become even more enmeshed in the emerging regional web<br />
of relationships and institutions. Canberra should articulate to regional partners and Washington<br />
how ANZUS fits into (and often complements) Australia’s regional engagement. Second, Canberra<br />
should contribute more to Washington’s deliberations on China’s rise. This includes finding<br />
pathways for China within this regional order, while remaining firm on important regional norms.<br />
Third, ANZUS’ formal mechanisms should be broadened to ensure a greater focus on fostering<br />
mutual and regional prosperity. Expanding the AUSMIN foreign and defence ministerial dialogue to<br />
include geoeconomic issues would enable a more comprehensive discussion on regional matters<br />
with strategic and economic dimensions. This would allow the 65 year-old ANZUS to be more<br />
effective in a transforming Asia.<br />
United States Studies Centre<br />
Institute Building (H03)<br />
City Rd<br />
The University of Sydney NSW 2006<br />
T: +61 2 9351 7249<br />
E: us-studies@sydney.edu.au<br />
W: ussc.edu.au
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Introduction<br />
The United States’ presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is transforming from a traditional<br />
alliance network (of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand)<br />
into a web of strengthened alliances, new partnerships and creative linkages. 1 This<br />
shift is a concerted US strategy, driven by changing power relativities, particularly<br />
China’s rise and assertive regional behaviour.<br />
The shift is also part of a broader regional transformation, with a flurry of strategic<br />
and economic linkages not involving the United States, many forged in the last<br />
year alone. 2 China is watching this transformation closely, viewing the changing<br />
US presence with suspicion, but also participating in some of the wider regional<br />
connections.<br />
This evolving US network can help reinforce regional stability by providing some<br />
predictability in the current strategic flux, as well as a flexible framework for<br />
addressing common challenges. But Washington must manage this transformation<br />
carefully so that the network maintains a deterrent function and reassures allies but<br />
does not exacerbate US-China tensions. It should be part of an inclusive regional<br />
order which accords more space to China. 3<br />
The Australia-US Alliance (‘the Alliance’) features prominently in the transforming<br />
US Asian alliance network. The United States values Australia’s reliability, regional<br />
expertise, and that it is less encumbered with historical territorial tensions than<br />
other Asian allies. Australia’s geography makes it increasingly important to regional<br />
US military planning. The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty<br />
(ANZUS) also remains a compelling value proposition for Australia in the current<br />
strategic climate, as Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper makes clear. 4 Despite<br />
this traditional strength, emerging fault lines in the Alliance need to be addressed.<br />
There is a risk that Australian and US strategic objectives might diverge, and they<br />
could make different decisions about an acceptable regional strategic order.<br />
Australia has a major interest in the ongoing stability of the US Asian alliance<br />
network and broader regional web. Deepening its own alliance with the US and<br />
at the same time, broadening regional engagement will require the Australian<br />
government to carefully manage often<br />
complex interdependencies. Three<br />
policy priorities should guide Australian<br />
efforts.<br />
ANZUS should become more<br />
enmeshed in the emerging regional<br />
web of relationships and institutions<br />
First, ANZUS should become more<br />
enmeshed in the emerging regional<br />
web of relationships and institutions.<br />
Too often Australian officials and the public alike conceptualise and discuss ANZUS<br />
in isolation from the United States’ other Asian alliances. In diplomatic discussions<br />
with regional partners and Washington, and in official public statements, Australia<br />
should more clearly articulate how ANZUS fits into (and often complements)<br />
Australia’s regional engagement. This would enable Australia to have a more<br />
independent regional posture, but also be an effective US ally, with greater regional<br />
expertise. 5<br />
Cover image: ‘AUSMIN meeting in Boston, MA, October 2015’ US Department of State<br />
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Second, Canberra should contribute more to Washington’s deliberations on China’s<br />
rise — the key driver of the changing US Asian alliance network. As a valued US<br />
ally with a major stake in how US-China relations unfold Canberra should both help<br />
Washington find pathways for China within this regional order and remain firm on<br />
the maintenance of important regional norms. This should include encouraging the<br />
US Administration and Congress to support regional and global architectural reform<br />
that accords China a greater role.<br />
Third, ANZUS’ formal mechanisms should be updated and broadened to ensure a<br />
greater focus on fostering mutual and regional prosperity. Existing leader meetings<br />
and working groups are naturally focused on defence and foreign policy issues, but<br />
increasingly Asian strategic issues have critical economic dimensions. Expanding<br />
the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) beyond foreign<br />
and defence dialogue to include geoeconomic issues would ensure a more<br />
comprehensive exchange of US and Australian views on emerging regional issues<br />
and update the 65 year-old ANZUS alliance to be more effective in a transforming<br />
Asia.<br />
This paper first surveys the nature and functions of the US global alliance network,<br />
and how the US Asia alliance network is transforming. 6 It then analyses the<br />
deepening Australia-US alliance and its place within the network. Finally it outlines<br />
policy objectives for ANZUS in this changing strategic environment.<br />
The US global alliance network:<br />
nature and aims<br />
The US global alliance network is now being shaped by a strategic shift involving a<br />
rising China, a revisionist Russia, a rupturing Middle Eastern order with a rampaging<br />
ISIS, an anemic Europe grappling with existential questions and refugee waves,<br />
and declining US relative power (though US absolute power remains unmatched).<br />
It is also shaped by US unwillingness to tolerate allied freeriding, fuelled by years<br />
of US budget constraints and sequestration-induced damage to defence planning. 7<br />
Some NATO countries are now raising defence budgets in the face of Russian<br />
assertiveness. However, European defence capability remains patchy and many<br />
states are deeply reluctant to use it. 8 Even once stalwart US allies like the United<br />
Kingdom have become less reliable. Post-Iraq wariness, austerity measures and<br />
domestic political introspection have led to a reduction in British defence personnel<br />
and capability, and strained the US-UK ‘special relationship’. While the United States<br />
is increasing its military presence in Europe as a result of heightened Russian-<br />
Western tensions, it continues to expect NATO and other allies to contribute more<br />
to their own and regional security. But US efforts to increase allied burden sharing<br />
without seeming to run down alliances have been fraught, feeding into criticism of<br />
US abdication of its leadership role. 9<br />
Notwithstanding these challenges the US global alliance network remains an integral<br />
feature of the international order and one of the most important dimensions of US<br />
global power. The United States, with more than 50 allies, is “the hub of alliances<br />
unrivalled in the history of nations”. 10 The United States and its Asia-Pacific allies<br />
alone account for one-third of the global economy, at US$25 trillion. 11 The US global<br />
alliance network dominates global military spending, comprising 65-70 per cent of<br />
the total. This aggregation of capability augments US power projection. 12<br />
Alliances became an integral part of US strategy at the end of the Second World<br />
War, when the United States oversaw the creation of the post-1945 international<br />
architecture and needed a forward presence — and allies — to maintain it. 13 With<br />
the onset of the Cold War the US global presence acquired the additional purpose<br />
of containing Soviet power. Alliances became a key policy tool for US policymakers<br />
to create “situations of strength”. 14 Within a few years the Truman and then<br />
Eisenhower Administrations forged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO,<br />
1947), the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS,<br />
1951), and alliances with Japan (1951), the Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953),<br />
and Taiwan (1954). Given US dominance there was a pronounced structural<br />
asymmetry to all these relationships, amounting to the provision of a US security<br />
guarantee in return, often, for troop presence.<br />
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NATO was a highly institutionalised collective defence apparatus. America’s Asian<br />
alliances were primarily bilateral but also included the trilateral ANZUS (with the<br />
US-New Zealand security relationship suspended in 1986). US officials concluded<br />
that largely bilateral alliances would satisfy US strategic objectives in Asia: to<br />
contain Soviet power and prevent the regional spread of communism; satisfy<br />
US basing requirements in Asia’s maritime theatre; reassure Australia and New<br />
Zealand that Japan was reigned in; and prevent anti-communist South Korea and<br />
Taiwan dragging the United States into war with China or the Soviet Union. 15 This<br />
San Francisco system of alliances gave a framework to the US regional presence: it<br />
provided stability and enabled a regional focus on prosperity. It was purposefully hub<br />
and spokes, with Washington at its centre, not spoke to spoke. US policymakers<br />
sought to optimise US leverage and constrain allied adventurism by ensuring the<br />
spokes did not connect. 16<br />
Each alliance was crafted to suit a particular set of circumstances. For example, the<br />
1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United<br />
States, which revised the 1951 US-Japan security treaty sought “to encourage<br />
closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of<br />
economic stability and wellbeing in their countries.” 17 This economic focus made<br />
sense, as the United States recognised its strategic and economic interest in<br />
Japan’s economic reconstruction.<br />
The 1991 Soviet collapse raised questions as to the continued relevance of the US<br />
global alliance network. Some of less compelling utility, such as the Southeast Asia<br />
Treaty Organization (SEATO), were disbanded. But NATO, the five US treaty allies<br />
in the Pacific, and a growing set of formal and informal US commitments in the<br />
Middle East outlasted the Soviet threat. NATO lost its immediate purpose with the<br />
Soviet demise. By contrast the US Asian alliance system retained the North Korean<br />
threat as a raison d’être and from the late 1970s served as a hedge against an<br />
ascending China. The Asia-Pacific network therefore retained the classic alliance<br />
function of reassuring allies in the face of enduring and potential threats, and its<br />
continued relevance was affirmed in the Pentagon’s 1995 East Asia Strategy. 18<br />
The Pentagon’s 1998 East Asia Strategy foreshadowed the evolution of the<br />
network. It described US Asian alliances in the post-Cold War as unlike threatbased<br />
Cold War alliances, instead serving “the interests of all who benefit from<br />
regional stability”. 19 Fostering alliances was the cornerstone of the George W. Bush<br />
Administration’s Asia policy, and the first pillar of the Obama Administration’s 2011<br />
rebalance policy of increased regional engagement. 20<br />
Functions of US alliances today<br />
US global alliances serve as tools to further US interests and also to reinforce<br />
stability in the following ways: first, they deter other states from aggression; for<br />
example, US strategic protection to NATO member states during the Cold War<br />
deterred against a Soviet incursion.<br />
Second, alliances enhance the US<br />
capacity to protect global sea-lanes vital<br />
for the passage of energy and trade.<br />
Third, alliances can provide predictability<br />
and a mechanism for managing crises,<br />
as well as restraining allies from<br />
pursuing destabilising policies. 21 This<br />
order-building role is particularly valuable<br />
The Asia-Pacific network retained<br />
the classic alliance function of<br />
reassuring allies in the face of<br />
enduring and potential threats<br />
during strategic transitions. NATO, for instance, helped facilitate a stable transition<br />
to the post-Cold War era. 22 Today, US strategic protection prevents Japan from<br />
pursuing a significantly more independent posture. Weakening or abolishing<br />
alliances, conversely, could generate a destabilising flux and increasing regional<br />
competition, as erstwhile allies shore up their security, perhaps by attempting to<br />
go nuclear.<br />
And fourth, the US global alliance network provides mechanisms and capability<br />
sets to address challenges requiring a collective response. 23 This order-building<br />
function is especially useful in the current global strategic setting: with a stymied<br />
global multilateral architecture and diffuse transnational challenges such as<br />
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terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, biologic threats, and the<br />
human security consequences of climate change. The alliance system provides a<br />
framework from which coalitions can be built, and other states drawn in, to address<br />
such challenges. 24<br />
Alliances can destabilise, however. They can preserve inter-state tensions in<br />
aspic, decreasing the need for allies to work on their own to preserve stability.<br />
For example, the hub-and-spoke arrangement insulated Japan from integrating into<br />
the region and reconciling with neighbours, leaving historical enmities in place. 25<br />
Alliance management requires extra care during strategic transitions, as alliances<br />
adapt to changing threat perceptions and strategic outlooks. NATO’s post-Cold<br />
War expansion, especially the 2008 statement of intention to incorporate Georgia<br />
and Ukraine, antagonised Russia by appearing poised to extend the alliance right<br />
up to its border. 26<br />
Allied abandonment and entanglement fears can also become more pronounced<br />
during strategic shifts. Japan and the Philippines in particular have sought<br />
reassurance about US commitment in recent years. 27 However, historical evidence<br />
suggests that entrapment risks can be overstated, at least for the senior ally: states<br />
tend to envisage the risks and factor them in when crafting their commitments. 28 For<br />
instance, the Obama Administration has not formally declared that US protection<br />
of the Philippines extends to Philippine-claimed South China Sea territory as it has<br />
with Japan and the Senkakus. 29<br />
Managing the tension between the threat-balancing and order-building dimensions<br />
of alliances is an ongoing challenge for the United States, particularly during strategic<br />
transitions, such as is occurring in Asia today. While the US alliance network can<br />
play a stabilising role calibration is required to minimise destabilising tendencies<br />
and maintain that equilibrium.<br />
America’s evolving Asian alliance network<br />
The strategic transition under way in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is transforming the US<br />
regional alliance network. The rise of China, but also India, Indonesia, and other<br />
states, is fuelling heightened competition and growing activity in regional sea lanes,<br />
which in turn are driving the emergence of the Indian Ocean as a strategic theatre<br />
and the Indo-Pacific as a strategic construct. 30 Territorial disputes and maritime<br />
tensions are worsening, as are a raft of non-traditional challenges, including<br />
cybersecurity, nuclear proliferation, and natural disasters intensified by climate<br />
change. The US rebalance, itself a response to global economic and strategic<br />
power shifting to the region, is also shaping this increasingly complex strategic<br />
environment.<br />
The US Asian alliance network is transforming in several important ways. First, the<br />
traditional hub-and-spoke relationships with the five Treaty allies are being updated<br />
according to each ally’s changing strategic outlook, particularly its perception of<br />
China. The United States is building allied maritime, cyber and space resilience<br />
capability, and has expanded joint allied exercises and training. Its Japan alliance<br />
has deepened significantly with the revision of the US-Japan Defence Cooperation<br />
Guidelines, increased interoperability and technology sharing, and the stationing<br />
in Japan of US capabilities such as Global Hawk drones and CV-22 Osprey. 31<br />
The Philippine alliance has rebounded from its 1990s nadir. The US-Philippine<br />
Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, which provides for a US rotational<br />
military presence and capacity building, including maritime domain awareness and<br />
Coast Guard assistance, can now be implemented after the Philippine Supreme<br />
Court declared it constitutional. 32<br />
The South Korea alliance maintains its North Korean focus with the United States<br />
increasing alliance deterrent capability, including recent discussions on installing<br />
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence System (THAAD). 33 Seoul is also boosting<br />
its contribution to the bilateral relationship, including financing for the US troop<br />
presence, and to regional security. The US-Thai alliance has been strained since<br />
the 2014 Thai coup, and the Thai junta signalled its distance from Washington with<br />
a decision to purchase Chinese submarines (though the deal is not yet finalised). 34<br />
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However, significant elements of US-Thai military-to-military cooperation remain in<br />
place. For instance, Thailand still hosts training exercises such as the multi-national<br />
Cobra Gold.<br />
These Treaty alliances are also transforming from purely patron-client relationships. 35<br />
US scrutiny of allies’ low defence spending and freeriding has increased and it is<br />
expecting allies to contribute more, including defence spending, complementary<br />
capability sets, and increased interoperability, to their own, regional, and even<br />
global, security.<br />
Second, the United States is purposefully transforming its alliance system beyond<br />
the hub-and-spoke framework and actively promoting Asian spoke-to-spoke<br />
linkages. 36 Japan is providing maritime, including Coast Guard, security assistance<br />
to the Philippines, for example, and the Australia-Japan strategic partnership has<br />
deepened, with growing defence technology, maritime security, and logistics<br />
cooperation. 37 Washington is encouraging its high-capability allies Australia,<br />
Japan and South Korea, to pool capability and increase interoperability; a concept<br />
described as ‘federated defence’. 38 These allies are also assisting in building the<br />
capacity of other US allies and partners.<br />
In addition, alliance agendas have broadened to encompass out-of-area operations<br />
and transnational challenges. For instance, the 2015 US-Japan Defence Guidelines<br />
envisage a regional and global role for the US-Japan alliance, including humanitarian<br />
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, peacekeeping, and maritime<br />
security. 39 In 2011, Japan established a counter-piracy presence in Djibouti, Africa<br />
and is expanding that base to accommodate potential HADR, peacekeeping and<br />
counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States and NATO. The guidelines<br />
also outline the economic dimension to the US-Japan alliance, describing how the<br />
United States and Japan “will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to<br />
provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the<br />
Asia-Pacific region and beyond.” 40<br />
Third, the United States is expanding beyond its traditional Northeast Asian focus,<br />
to incorporate South and South-East Asian partnerships. This includes an updated<br />
bilateral defence framework with India; rotational deployments of littoral combat<br />
ships in Singapore; maritime security and HADR assistance to Vietnam; counterterrorism<br />
and counter-piracy cooperation with Malaysia; and a strategic partnership<br />
with Indonesia. 41 The United States has also announced a US$250 million maritime<br />
South-East Asian assistance package to the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and<br />
Malaysia. 42<br />
Fourth, the United States has encouraged the recent dramatic creation of<br />
minilateral frameworks of US allies and partners, some not including the United<br />
States. Trilateral arrangements include the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic<br />
Dialogue, involving defence<br />
technology and maritime<br />
security cooperation, the US-<br />
Japan-South Korea information<br />
sharing and crisis management<br />
arrangement, US-Japan-<br />
India cooperation on maritime<br />
security and HADR information<br />
sharing, and the 2015 inaugural<br />
India-Japan-Australia strategic<br />
dialogue at which maritime security and cooperation were discussed. 43 The US<br />
head of Pacific Command also recently called for the revival of the 2007 US-Japan-<br />
Australia-India quadrilateral dialogue. 44<br />
The United States has encouraged the<br />
recent dramatic creation of minilateral<br />
frameworks of US allies and partners,<br />
some not including the United States<br />
Fifth, the United States is actively supporting regional institutions such as the East<br />
Asia Summit (EAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and<br />
its institutions, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+). 45<br />
President Obama recently hosted the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit to deepen<br />
the US-ASEAN strategic partnership.<br />
These are the elements of the concerted US strategy to turn its Asian alliance<br />
system into a web of alliances, partnerships, and minilateral frameworks. 46 It<br />
involves classic balancing against a rising China and concern about energy/<br />
trade route access. Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has<br />
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hardened the strategic calculus in Washington as well as in many Asian capitals.<br />
US policymakers have concluded that spoke-to-spoke linkages advance US<br />
interests by placing US Asian commitments within a more flexible framework. 47<br />
This provides room to manoeuvre and adjust the temperature of relationships and<br />
helps offset the loss of US leverage.<br />
Furthermore, years of US defence budget constraints and uncertainty have<br />
contributed to the focus on resource pooling to augment collective capability. 48 US<br />
policymakers have also decided that Asian multilateral institutions, while far from<br />
problem-solving bodies, can complement US alliances, provide a useful certainty<br />
to US regional commitments, and build trust and habits of cooperation. 49<br />
There are two other important dimensions to the US regional strategy.<br />
Washington recognises the centrality of US-China relations to regional and global<br />
stability. Accordingly, the United States has broadened US-China linkages and<br />
communication pathways, including military-military communications. The most<br />
significant of these initiatives is the annual US-China Strategic and Economic<br />
Dialogue at which US and Chinese senior officials hold extensive discussions on<br />
issues covering the breadth of the bilateral strategic and economic relationship.<br />
But Washington did not anticipate China’s rapid South China Sea land reclamations<br />
and willingness to withstand US and regional reactions. The US Administration<br />
has grappled with how to respond and it took months to commence freedom of<br />
navigation operations in the South China Sea. 50<br />
The economic dimension of the US regional strategy — the Trans-Pacific Partnership<br />
(TPP) — is also critical though it has yet to be ratified by Congress. The TPP creates<br />
a new economic architecture and has a significant strategic dimension: to diversify<br />
regional trade and investment networks, and therefore minimise the importance of<br />
any in particular. 51 The objective is to help lessen the divergence between regional<br />
states’ economic and security interests, as a number (including Australia) balance<br />
their largest trade relationship with China and their main security relationship with<br />
the United States.<br />
Regional security, economic and diplomatic ties not involving the United States<br />
have also grown markedly over the last decade. 52 An extraordinary array of intraregional<br />
strategic links have been forged or enhanced in the past year alone. They<br />
include India-Vietnam and Singapore-Vietnam defence agreements, the Vietnam-<br />
Philippine Strategic Partnership, the Singapore-India Strategic Partnership, the<br />
Australia-Singapore Strategic Partnership, and growing Australia-India strategic<br />
relations (with a 2015 naval exercise). Bilateral trade and investment relations have<br />
also expanded, including a number of bilateral free trade agreements.<br />
This intra-regional strategic flurry is partly a balancing response to China’s rise and<br />
activities in some regional seas and energy/trade route access fears. US officials<br />
are supporting this expanding cooperation. They have concluded that relationships<br />
generated independently of the United States can help keep regional tensions in<br />
check by diversifying interactions and lessening the US-China focus. 53 However,<br />
the United States does not have control of these linkages so there is a risk they will<br />
form in ways which might lessen US regional leverage or damage regional stability.<br />
There is a strong demand from allies and other Asia-Pacific states for continued<br />
US regional engagement especially given China’s continued South China Sea<br />
assertiveness. Still a plurality of views about the US role exists within Asian states,<br />
including allies. In Japan there are some longstanding concerns over US basing and<br />
there has been prominent criticism of alliance strengthening in Australia and the<br />
Philippines. 54 In South Korea there tends to be a detached acceptance, rather than<br />
an embrace, of US strategic protection. Many US allies and partners also maintain<br />
significant security relationships (as well as crucial economic relationships) with<br />
China and the United States understands that they do not want to be forced to<br />
choose.<br />
China is paying close attention to this regional transformation and views the<br />
transforming US alliance system with suspicion. 55 Chinese officials have criticised<br />
US alliances as ‘Cold War relics’ and argued that some US-led minilaterals<br />
— for example the 2007 US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral — amount to<br />
containment. 56 But despite some angst, China has largely acquiesced to the<br />
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trilateral dialogues. 57 China is also participating in some of the region’s increasing<br />
interconnectedness such as the resumed South Korea-Japan-China trilateral<br />
discussions, a number of free trade agreements, and the Asian Infrastructure<br />
Investment Bank (AIIB). It has also taken part in military exercises including China-<br />
India counter-terrorism drills, the low-level Australia-US-China survival Exercise<br />
Kowari, and the US-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). China’s response has<br />
been a complex mix of rising power assertiveness, counter balancing and order<br />
building.<br />
The cumulative result of all this activity is a regional web in which US Asian alliances<br />
are purposefully enmeshed: a mix of bilateral, multilateral, formal and also ad hoc<br />
mechanisms, some involving the United States and some not. 58 This evolving<br />
architecture can contribute to regional stability by providing a flexible framework<br />
to address challenges, while increased spoke-to-spoke linkages can offer better<br />
prospects for managing inter-allied tensions. Japan, for instance, is fostering<br />
relations with the Philippines and even South Korea. 59<br />
The challenge for US alliance management is to balance the order-building and<br />
threat dimensions of its networked alliance system. 60 The threat dimension<br />
remains crucial in a landscape of sustained and escalating tensions on the Korean<br />
peninsula and in the South China Sea. But the United States and other states need<br />
to maximise the order-building dimensions of these relationships, so they are not<br />
perceived as solely targeting China. Minilaterals require particular judiciousness.<br />
They are less likely to antagonise if they include a practical cooperation capability, to<br />
address common challenges such as natural disasters and future human security<br />
consequences of climate change, violent extremism and health security. It is also<br />
important that other regional partnerships and regional institutions are fostered at<br />
the same time, and where possible, draw in China. 61<br />
ANZUS in Asia<br />
The Australia-US Alliance is playing an increased role in the transforming US<br />
Asian alliance network. Australia and the United States continue to share many<br />
interests, not least in the maintenance of a stable, rules-based regional order. 62<br />
The shifting regional setting has lent a new lustre to some of the Alliance’s key<br />
features, increasing its importance to both the United States and Australia. For the<br />
United States, the first enhanced<br />
feature is geostrategic: the<br />
Alliance anchors US presence<br />
in the southern Pacific Ocean<br />
and the eastern side of the<br />
Indian Ocean, which are both of<br />
increasing strategic importance.<br />
Australia offers prime territory<br />
for training and equipment<br />
prepositioning, but is also out of<br />
range of the region’s growing anti-access/area denial capabilities. 63 It is near but<br />
sufficiently south of the increasingly strategically sensitive South-East Asian sea<br />
lanes, and is not a party to the region’s territorial disputes, making it Washington’s<br />
least complicated regional alliance. 64 It is also America’s only Indian Ocean ally. 65<br />
The shifting regional setting has lent<br />
a new lustre to some of the Alliance’s<br />
key features, increasing its importance<br />
to both the United States and Australia<br />
The second enhanced feature is reliability. Australia’s strong diplomatic support for,<br />
and military contribution to, Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria, contrasts favourably<br />
with other US allies. This commitment builds on Australia’s history of continuous<br />
involvement in US conflicts and has lent an outsized sense to Australia’s<br />
contribution, especially given Australia’s history of modest defence spend. 66<br />
Australia’s reputation as a can-do, proactive ally was further buttressed by its wellregarded<br />
stint on the UN Security Council. 67<br />
Australia and the United States also have an interdependence that the United<br />
States only shares with one other ally: the United Kingdom. Australia and the United<br />
Kingdom are America’s most important partners for non-duplicative intelligence<br />
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within the Five Eyes intelligence alliance and the United States depends on Australia<br />
in the niche area of space as well. 68 However, it is again worth noting that the UK’s<br />
reliability as an ally has decreased at the same time as Australia’s importance to the<br />
United States has grown. 69<br />
The third feature is ANZUS’ high military and diplomatic functionality, again<br />
compared to other alliances. Australia is one of a handful of US allies with<br />
an expeditionary capability, including amphibious capability, and its Iraq and<br />
Afghanistan involvement has led to an interoperability unmatched by any other two<br />
militaries. 70 Washington also benefits from Canberra’s diplomatic perspectives and<br />
engagement. US officials have long valued Australia’s capacity building and lead<br />
role in the South-West Pacific and parts of South-East Asia, and have employed<br />
Australian neighbourhood strategies in other contexts. For example, the United<br />
States Coast Guard (USCG) assistance to the Philippines and Vietnam has adapted<br />
the Australian Pacific Patrol Boat Program model. 71 In addition, the Alliance agenda<br />
has grown to include a broader suite of regional and global challenges, including<br />
the military campaign against ISIS and countering violent extremism diplomatic<br />
initiatives.<br />
For Australia, the Alliance continues to provide enduring benefits, including access<br />
to US intelligence and sophisticated defence equipment. 72 Australia also benefits<br />
from US political, diplomatic and technological support, such as the United States<br />
provided to Australia during its operation to recover MH17 victims from the Ukraine<br />
crash site. 73 The Alliance is an even more compelling value proposition for Australia<br />
in the transformed regional setting, in which regional military modernisation is<br />
eroding Australia’s capability gap, and the cost of securing Australia’s interests<br />
using expensive defence technology is climbing ever higher. 74 ANZUS remains a<br />
cost effective way for Australia to protect its vital interests, including safeguarding<br />
the regional sea lanes through which the majority of its trade flows. 75 Accordingly,<br />
Australia has backed US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea,<br />
and continued its decades-long routine air patrols over the South China Sea. 76 There<br />
are costs to the Alliance, including a posture which can be perceived in the region<br />
as less-than-independent and thus complicate Australia’s regional relationships.<br />
But without it, Australia would have to spend much more on defence and make<br />
significant economic trade-offs.<br />
The 2014 US-Australian Force Posture Agreement demonstrates the deepening<br />
bilateral defence ties: it provides a long-term (25 year) timeframe and further<br />
institutionalises the Alliance. 77 The rotational marine presence, US air equipment<br />
rotation, expanded joint training and exercises, and personnel exchanges have<br />
given ANZUS a self-reinforcing momentum as administrative infrastructure has<br />
been added, and the tempo and depth of interactions have increased. 78 Maritime<br />
security, space, and ballistic missile defence cooperation has expanded, as has the<br />
US presence at Australian bases. 79 Defence technology and scientific innovation<br />
are an increasing focus, including cooperation on hypersonics, electronic warfare,<br />
cyber, and enhanced ICT connectivity. 80<br />
The 2016 Defence White Paper describes the US alliance as the “centrepiece<br />
of [Australia’s] defence policy”, and declares that Australia will support the US<br />
role of “underpinning the stability of our region”. 81 The White Paper also makes<br />
international engagement a core defence function. Australia’s participation in<br />
multinational exercises will increase, and Australia’s regional defence partnerships,<br />
especially with Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, India and China, will<br />
be strengthened. 82<br />
The Australia-US economic relationship is also growing, though it is often eclipsed<br />
by the security relationship in public discussions and there is scope for significantly<br />
more growth. Two-way trade and investment has increased significantly, bolstered<br />
by the 2005 bilateral Free Trade Agreement: the United States is Australia’s biggest<br />
economic partner, when trade and investment are combined. 83 US goods exports<br />
to Australia have grown by 68 per cent since 2005. Australia’s goods exports to<br />
the United States have grown by 26 per cent, including an increase in Australia’s<br />
value-added exports heading to the United States. Food products, for example,<br />
nearly doubled to 2014 and two-way services trade has grown by 72 per cent since<br />
2005. 84<br />
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Bilateral investment has risen as well: US investment in Australia has more than<br />
doubled since 2005, and comprises 26.7 per cent of total foreign direct investment<br />
in Australia. 85 This is not solely resource based, though US investment in Australian<br />
energy has been substantial. US investment in service and high-tech industries —<br />
growing, job-producing segments of Australia’s economy — is also expanding. 86<br />
For example, US investment in professional, scientific and technical services<br />
quadrupled from 2004 to 2013, more than tripled in financial and insurance sector<br />
investments over the same period, and almost tripled in computers and electronic<br />
products. 87 Australia’s investment stock in the United States has likewise risen,<br />
though much less sharply, climbing in aggregate roughly 10 per cent between<br />
2005 and 2013. 88<br />
Fault lines and risks<br />
In terms of the breadth and regularity of interaction the Alliance has never been<br />
closer. The White Paper’s funding commitments and Alliance focus (including<br />
defence/technology cooperation and prioritising interoperability-enabling capability)<br />
are likely to be well received in Washington. The northern Australian infrastructure<br />
spending will give some momentum to the stalled Force Posture Agreement<br />
cost sharing discussions. 89 Washington is still watching Canberra’s submarine<br />
competitive evaluation process closely. US officials have largely not weighed in, but<br />
there seems a clear US Pacific Command preference for a Japanese submarine for<br />
strategic, security and technical reasons. 90<br />
But a robust ANZUS is by no means inevitable, and fault lines must be addressed.<br />
The relationship is driven too much by policy elites in both countries. While the<br />
Alliance is well supported in Australia across a fair degree of the political spectrum,<br />
Australians tend to view the alliance as a standalone bilateral, which is separate from<br />
the US Asian alliance network, and even from regional dynamics. 91 There is low<br />
public support in Australia for joining the United States in an Asian contingency. 92<br />
In the United States, there is little awareness outside the policy world of the<br />
dimensions of the relationship. Australia’s reliability is greatly valued, but it can<br />
sometimes be viewed in Washington as automatic support. 93 This can lead to<br />
complacency in Washington, with Canberra’s support being taken for granted.<br />
The most significant risk is whether Australian and US strategic objectives diverge<br />
as China’s rise alters the regional power structure. The United States looks at Asia<br />
from the north, whereas Australia looks up at the region from the south, through<br />
South-East Asia. These differing outlooks have already altered US and Australian<br />
perceptions, particularly of China, as their respective final positions on the AIIB<br />
indicate.<br />
This risk is heightened by the divergence of Australia’s own economic and security<br />
interests, with China its main trading partner, and the United States its main security<br />
partner. This was clearly apparent in the Darwin Port lease decision, which caused<br />
consternation in Washington. 94<br />
Australia’s trade relationship with<br />
China can make Canberra perceive<br />
a level of risk of Beijing’s economic<br />
punishment that is not borne out by<br />
evidence. 95<br />
China’s continued rise might lead to<br />
a crisis point, with the United States<br />
seeking to maintain regional primacy<br />
and Australia settling for something<br />
less. 96 This divergence of Australian and US strategic objectives is less likely if both<br />
accept incremental adaptation of the existing order, so that China can exercise<br />
increased leadership. 97 Certainly the current order has enabled China’s rise, and<br />
the stability it provides helps China maintain the economic growth required for its<br />
domestic stability. US dominance of global energy routes mean the United States<br />
could choke off China’s energy supply if tensions increased. 98 However, China’s<br />
South China Sea land reclamation and militarisation are testing operating principles<br />
such as freedom of navigation, and tensions are escalating.<br />
China’s continued rise might<br />
lead to a crisis point, with the<br />
United States seeking to maintain<br />
regional primacy and Australia<br />
settling for something less<br />
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Lastly, there is the risk of a weakening or retrenching United States. America’s<br />
unmatched global power has been buttressed by the resurgent US economy. 99<br />
But there are sharp questions about US global leadership on a myriad of global<br />
challenges, especially in the Middle East. There are also questions in Asia about<br />
the strength of America’s Asia focus, given pressing events in the Middle East and<br />
Europe. Furthermore, the United States has significant domestic vulnerabilities,<br />
including crumbling infrastructure and congressional dysfunction stymieing<br />
effective governance. 100 While US retrenchment from Asia remains unlikely, a<br />
weakened US security commitment would leave Australia exposed.<br />
These fault lines mean Australia’s continued reliability cannot be taken for granted,<br />
notwithstanding 100 years of fighting side by side.<br />
Conclusion<br />
The transforming US Asian alliance network can be a stabilising force in the region<br />
if it strikes a balance between threat balancing and order building. ANZUS itself can<br />
contribute more to regional security and be a mechanism for addressing common<br />
challenges if its fault lines are addressed and new opportunities for cooperation are<br />
pursued. Three policy priorities should guide Australian efforts.<br />
First, ANZUS should become more enmeshed in the emerging regional web of<br />
relationships and institutions. The Australian Government is right to deepen both<br />
ANZUS and regional partnerships with Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, China<br />
and other states, as well as support regional institutions such as the ADMM+. In<br />
diplomatic discussions with regional partners and Washington, and in official public<br />
statements, Australia should more clearly articulate how ANZUS fits into (and often<br />
complements) Australia’s regional engagement.<br />
Framing ANZUS less as a standalone bilateral and more as part of the web of<br />
regional linkages would allow Australia to forge a more independent regional<br />
posture. It would reduce the Alliance cost of being seen as too US-dependent, and<br />
help ANZUS evolve in ways consistent with regional stability. This approach would<br />
benefit the United States, too, by augmenting Australia’s role as a well-positioned<br />
ally. Strengthened regional relationships enhance Australia’s regional perspective,<br />
leading to better US policy outcomes in the southern Indo-Asia-Pacific.<br />
Second, Canberra should contribute more to Washington’s deliberations on<br />
responding to China’s rise. China’s rise is the key driver of the US Asian alliance<br />
network’s transformation, and Australia has a strong interest in the network and<br />
broader regional web remaining stable. As a valued US ally with a unique regional<br />
perspective, Canberra should help Washington find ways to integrate China<br />
into the existing order, to increase<br />
China’s stake in that order. 101 A good<br />
start would be encouraging the US<br />
Administration and Congress to<br />
support regional and architectural<br />
reform which gives China a<br />
greater role, along the lines of<br />
Congress’ belated ratification of the<br />
International Monetary Fund reform<br />
enlarging emerging power representation. This should include recommending that<br />
Washington be more receptive to initiatives such as the AIIB, and to eventually<br />
open the TPP to China.<br />
ANZUS’ formal meeting mechanisms<br />
should be broadened to increase the<br />
focus on economic partnerships and<br />
regional economic connectivity<br />
Canberra should also take more of a lead in establishing functional cooperation<br />
networks between the United States, China, and Asian neighbours which can<br />
tackle common challenges. These can leverage Australia’s terrain and expertise,<br />
including in crisis response. 102 Where possible, they should prioritise Chinese<br />
engagement, building on successes like Exercise Kowari and Australia-China<br />
cooperation during the flight MH370 search. One practical idea gaining traction<br />
is for a regional humanitarian and disaster relief centre to be located in northern<br />
Australia. 103<br />
At the same time, Australia should continue to take a firm stand on regional norms,<br />
including the non-alteration of the status quo by force. This involves continued<br />
support for US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea as well<br />
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as the continuation of Australia’s own long-standing patrolling under Operation<br />
Gateway. Australia should remain prepared to stand against further unilateral<br />
activities by China, such as any declaration of a South China Sea Air Defence<br />
Identification Zone.<br />
Pursuing these three policy objectives would help consolidate a mature and<br />
forward-looking ANZUS situated more squarely in a transforming Indo-Asia-Pacific.<br />
It would be an ideal way to mark ANZUS’ 65th anniversary.<br />
Third, ANZUS should add an economic dimension to its support for regional<br />
stability. ANZUS’ formal meeting mechanisms should be broadened to increase<br />
the focus on economic partnerships and regional economic connectivity. This<br />
would reduce often-bifurcated discussions on strategic and economic interests in<br />
Australia, particularly within the context of US-Australia-China relations. AUSMIN<br />
could be expanded to include the Australian Treasurer and US Treasury Secretary. If<br />
scheduling logistics require it, this could occur biennially in the first instance, when<br />
AUSMIN is hosted in the United States. Rather than diluting the focus of Australian-<br />
US security discussions, this more comprehensive dialogue structure would tackle<br />
more effectively the growing number of issues in the alliance with both security<br />
and economic dimensions. Adding an economic dimension to AUSMIN might lead,<br />
in time, to a more formal bilateral commitment on mutual and regional prosperity,<br />
similar to the US-Japan alliance framework.<br />
An institutionalised sharing of geoeconomic perspectives would be particularly<br />
useful, given Australia’s and America’s different vantage points in Asia. It would<br />
build on existing bilateral business, trade and TPP discussions, models such as the<br />
Australia-Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and the Prime Minister’s<br />
and Foreign Minister’s recent comments on how economic interdependence<br />
offsets regional tensions. 104 It would also promote continued expansion of Australia-<br />
US business-business linkages and overall Australia-US trade and investment. 105 As<br />
commodity prices fall and China’s economy slows, the Australian economy needs<br />
to continue to reorient toward more technology- and innovation-focused markets<br />
such as the United States. Deeper bilateral economic engagement can buttress<br />
the defence relationship, and reduce the divergence of Australia’s economic and<br />
security interests.<br />
This report may be cited as:<br />
Elsina Wainwright, ‘Australia and the US Asian alliance network’, Alliance 21<br />
Report (United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, March 2016).<br />
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Endnotes<br />
1. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact sheet: Advancing the<br />
rebalance to Asia and the Pacific’, Washington DC, 16 November 2015.<br />
2. These intra-Asian linkages have been described as an ‘Asia power<br />
web’ in a Center for a New American Security analysis. Patrick<br />
M. Cronin, Richard Fontaine, Zachary M. Hosford, Oriana Skylar<br />
Mastro, Ely Ratner and Alexander Sullivan, ‘The Emerging Asia<br />
Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties’, Center<br />
for a New American Security, Washington DC, June 2013.<br />
3. William T. Tow, ‘Rebalancing and order building: Strategy or<br />
illusion?’, William T. Tow and Douglas Stuart, eds. The New<br />
US Strategy Towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot,<br />
London and Routledge, New York, 2015, pp. 31, 46.<br />
4. Australian Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper,<br />
Canberra, February 2016, for example paragraphs 2.17, 5.22.<br />
5. Ely Ratner, ‘Australia’s new activism: The view from Washington’, The<br />
Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 23 July 2014.<br />
6. This paper defines alliances as commitments for mutual defence support<br />
and military cooperation. Stephen M. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or<br />
Collapse’, Survival, vol. 39, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 156-179, at p. 157.<br />
7. Michael Birnbaum, ‘Gates rebukes European allies in<br />
farewell speech’, Washington Post, 10 June 2011.<br />
8. Constanze Stelzenmüller, ‘Europe to Planet America: Stay<br />
with us, but don’t stampede us’, Policy Brief, German Marshall<br />
Fund of the United States, Paris, September 2015.<br />
9. David Rothkopf, ‘Does America need new ‘special relationships’?’,<br />
Foreign Policy, 4 August 2015. Richard Sokolsky and Jeremy<br />
Shapiro, ‘It’s hard to get good help these days: The problem with US<br />
allies’, Order from Chaos, Brookings Institution, 28 May 2015.<br />
10. Barack Obama, ‘Remarks at the United States Military Academy<br />
(West Point) Commencement Ceremony,’ United States Military<br />
Academy, 28 May 2014. No other state comes close; China,<br />
by contrast, has two allies: Pakistan and North Korea.<br />
11. Ashton Carter, ‘Remarks on the Next Phase of the US Rebalance to the<br />
Asia-Pacific’, McCain Institute, Arizona State University, 6 April 2015.<br />
12. US military spending is 35-40 per cent of global military spending, and<br />
US allies spend around 30 per cent of the total. Michael E. O’Hanlon,<br />
‘Dollars at work: What Defense spending means for the U.S. economy’,<br />
Order from Chaos, Brookings Institution, 20 August 2015.<br />
13. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the<br />
New World Order, Vintage, New York, 2004, p. 17; Robert Kagan,<br />
‘Superpowers don’t get to retire: what our tired country still owes the<br />
world’, New Republic, 26 May 2014; and Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Seeking<br />
Alliances and Partnerships: The Long Road to Confederationism<br />
in US Grand Strategy’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark,<br />
and Greg Chaffin, eds., US Alliances and Partnerships at the<br />
Center of Global Power, Strategic Asia 2014-15, National Bureau<br />
of Asian Research, Seattle and Washington, DC, 2014, p. 12.<br />
14. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State<br />
Department, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1969, p. 378.<br />
15. Victor D. Cha, ‘Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance<br />
System in Asia’, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter<br />
2009/10, pp. 158-196, at pp. 158-9, 168, 190.<br />
16. In particular, they were concerned that South Korea and Taiwan might band<br />
together to get the US to take on China and North Korea. Cha, p. 189.<br />
17. US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 1960, Preamble.<br />
18. Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘East Asian Security: The Case for<br />
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Deep Engagement’, Foreign Affairs, 1 July 1995.<br />
19. United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,<br />
November 25 1998, section 2. See also Tow, ‘Rebalancing<br />
and order building: Strategy or illusion?’, p. 36.<br />
20. Tom Donilon, ‘The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013’,<br />
Speech to the Asia Society, New York, March 11 2013.<br />
21. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy,<br />
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p. 22; Walt, ‘Why<br />
Alliances Endure or Collapse’, pp. 158, 173.<br />
22. Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’, p. 171.<br />
23. Bruce Jones, Still Ours To Lead: America, Rising Powers,<br />
and the Tension Between Rivalry and Restraint, Brookings<br />
Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2014, pp. 5, 27.<br />
24. Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘The American Century: RIP?’,<br />
The National Interest, September 24 2015.<br />
25. Cha, ‘Powerplay’, pp. 195-96. It likewise preserved South Korea’s historical<br />
resentments. See also Robert Kelly, ‘East Asia’s history wars: South Korea<br />
and Japan (Yes, once again)’, Asian Security Blog, 2 November 2015.<br />
26. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault’,<br />
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014, vol. 93, no. 5, pp. 77-89.<br />
27. Rod Lyon, ‘The US and assurance anxieties in Asia’, The Strategist, ASPI,<br />
16 September 2015; and ‘Philippines Sends SOS to the International<br />
Community’, Philippine Star, 2 May 2012. Concerns about alliance<br />
entanglement can also be greater during strategic adjustments.<br />
28. Michael Beckley, ‘The Myth of Entangling Alliances’, International Security,<br />
vol. 39, no. 4, Spring 2015, pp. 7-48; David Santoro, ‘America’s Treaty<br />
Allies: worth going to war over?’ The National Interest, 28 April 2014.<br />
29. Lyon, ‘The US and assurance anxieties in Asia’; and Barack<br />
Obama and Benigno Aquino III, Remarks by President Obama<br />
and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint<br />
Press Conference, Washington DC, 28 April 2014.<br />
30. Michael Wesley on the shifting power dynamics and the<br />
Indo-Pacific’s emergence, ‘Australia’s Alliance in a Changing<br />
Asia’, Alliance 21 Report, United States Studies Centre,<br />
University of Sydney, Sydney, August 2012, pp. 2-4.<br />
31. Japan Ministry of Defence (JMOD), Guidelines for Japan-US Defence<br />
Cooperation, Tokyo, 2015; Craig Whitlock and Anne Gearan, ‘Agreement<br />
will allow U.S. to fly long-range surveillance drones from base in Japan’,<br />
Washington Post, 2 October 2013; and Reiji Yoshida, ‘U.S. to station<br />
Ospreys at Yokota Air Base starting in 2017,’ The Japan Times, 12 May 2015.<br />
32. Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Philippine Court Upholds New<br />
US Defense Pact’, The Diplomat, 12 January 2016.<br />
33. KJ Kwon and Paula Hancocks, ‘South Korea, U.S. to discuss<br />
THAAD missile defense system’, CNN, 7 February 2016.<br />
34. ‘Thailand tilts away from the US’, The Wall Street<br />
Journal Editorial, 30 June 2015.<br />
35. Susan E. Rice, ‘America’s future in Asia’, Remarks at Georgetown<br />
University, 20 November 2013; and Scott Snyder, ‘The US-ROK Alliance<br />
and the US Rebalance to Asia’, in Tellis, Denmark and Chaffin, ‘US<br />
Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power’, pp. 61-85.<br />
36. White House Fact Sheet, ‘Advancing the rebalance<br />
to Asia and the Pacific’, 16 November 2015.<br />
37. Toko Sekiguchi, ‘Japan to Provide Patrol Vessels to the<br />
Philippines’, The Wall Street Journal, 4 June 2015.<br />
38. Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Zack Cooper, ‘Federated<br />
Defense in Asia’, Center for Strategic and International Studies,<br />
Washington DC, December 2014; and Michael J. Green and Lt. Gen.<br />
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Thomas Conant (USM C Ret.), ‘An independent perspective of US<br />
defence policy in the Asia-Pacific region’, Statement before the US Senate<br />
Armed Services Committee, Washington, 3 February 2016, p. 4.<br />
39. JMOD, Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation, 2015, Section 5.<br />
40. Ibid.<br />
41. White House Fact Sheet, ‘Advancing the rebalance<br />
to Asia and the Pacific’, 16 November 2015.<br />
42. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact sheet: U.S. Building<br />
Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia’, Washington DC, 17 November 2015.<br />
43. David Lang, ‘The not-quite-quadrilateral: Australia, Japan<br />
and India’, The Strategist, ASPI, 9 July 2015.<br />
44. Harry B. Harris Jr, ‘Let’s be ambitious together’, Raisina<br />
Dialogue Remarks, New Delhi, 2 March 2016.<br />
45. James A Baker III, ‘America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific<br />
Community’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, number 5, Winter 1991-92, pp. 1-18.<br />
46. White House Fact Sheet, ‘Advancing the rebalance to Asia and<br />
the Pacific’, 16 November 2015; US Department of Defense, The<br />
Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, Washington DC, 2015, p.<br />
20; and Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr., ‘From Wheels to<br />
Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements’, The<br />
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 7-17, at p. 11.<br />
47. Chuck Hagel, ‘The U.S. Approach to Regional<br />
Security’, Singapore, 1 June 2012.<br />
48. US Department of Defence, Quadrennial Defense<br />
Review, Washington DC, 2014, p. VI.<br />
49. Bates Gill, ‘Alliances under Austerity: What does American want?’,<br />
ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity<br />
Series, September 2013. Some institutions also provide specific<br />
benefits: the EAS allows useful discussions at leaders’ level, and<br />
the ADMM+ is relatively action oriented, promoting functional<br />
cooperation on maritime security, HADR, and counterterrorism.<br />
50. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Zack Cooper, John Schnaus,<br />
et al, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships,<br />
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, January<br />
2016, p. 5; Michael J. Green, Peter J. Dean, Brendan Taylor and Zack<br />
Cooper, ‘The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia’, ANU Strategic and<br />
Defence Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity Series Report, July 2015, p. 11.<br />
51. Ashton Carter, ‘The United States and challenges to Asia-Pacific<br />
security’, 14th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 30 May 2015, p. 4.<br />
52. Patrick M. Cronin, Richard Fontaine, Zachary M. Hosford, Oriana<br />
Skylar Mastro, Ely Ratner and Alexander Sullivan, ‘The Emerging<br />
Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties’,<br />
Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, June 2013.<br />
53. Cronin, Fontaine, Hosford, Mastro, Ratner and Sullivan,<br />
‘The Emerging Asia Power Web’, p. 5.<br />
54. Malcolm Fraser with Cain Roberts, ‘Dangerous Allies’, Melbourne University<br />
Press, Carlton, 2014. One of the candidates for the 2016 Philippine<br />
Presidency opposes the US-Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement.<br />
55. Zhu Feng, ‘TSD - Emphemism for multiple alliance?’, in National Bureau<br />
of Asian Research Special Report, December 2008, pp. 43, 48.<br />
56. Brendan Nicholson, ‘China warns Canberra on<br />
security pact’, The Age, 15 June 2007.<br />
57. Rory Medcalf, ‘The ‘q’ word: US Pacific commander defies<br />
diplomatic niceties in New Delhi’, The Interpreter, Lowy<br />
Institute for International Policy, 4 March 2016.<br />
58. Brendan Taylor, ‘Conceptualizing the bilateral-multilateral security nexus’,<br />
and William T. Tow, ‘Conclusion’, in William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor,<br />
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eds, Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security: Contending<br />
cooperation, Routledge, London and New York, 2013; Elsina Wainwright,<br />
‘Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific’, New York<br />
University Center on International Cooperation, New York, April 2010.<br />
59. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration: A<br />
Strengthened Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and<br />
Goals of Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond’, Tokyo,<br />
4 June 2015; and Choe Sang-hun, ‘Japan and South Korea Settle Dispute<br />
Over Wartime “Comfort Women”’, New York Times, 28 December 2015.<br />
60. Tow, ‘Rebalancing and order building: Strategy or illusion?’, pp. 31, 46.<br />
61. Rory Medcalf, ‘Squaring the triangle: An Australian perspective<br />
on Asian security minilateralism’, National Bureau of Asia<br />
Research Special Report, December 2008, p. 28.<br />
62. Malcolm Turnbull, ‘New Responsibilities for an Enduring Partnership’, Center<br />
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 18 January 2016.<br />
63. Jim Thomas, Zack Cooper, Iskander Rehman, ‘Gateway to the<br />
Indo-Pacific: Australian Defense Strategy and the Future of<br />
the Australia-US Alliance’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary<br />
Assessments, Washington DC, 2013, pp. 13-20.<br />
64. Bates Gill, ‘The US-Australia Alliance: A Deepening Partnership<br />
in an Emerging Asia’, in Tellis et al, US Alliances and Partnerships<br />
at the Center of Global Power, at pp. 115-116.<br />
65. Bates Gill and Tom Switzer, ‘The New Special Relationship: The US-<br />
Australia Alliance Deepens’, Snapshot, Foreign Affairs, 19 February 2015.<br />
66. Mark Thomson, ‘Australia’s Future Defence Spending and its Alliance<br />
with the United States’, Alliance 21 report, United States Studies Centre<br />
at the University of Sydney, 2013; Hayley Channer, ‘Steadying the US<br />
rebalance to Asia: The role of Australia, Japan and South Korea’, Strategic<br />
Insights no. 17, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 2014, p. 7.<br />
67. Richard Gowan, ‘Syria, MH17, and the Art of the Possible’, The<br />
Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 22 July 2014.<br />
68. Elsina Wainwright, Interview with James Brown, New<br />
York/Sydney, October and November 2015.<br />
69. Tara McKelvey, ’Is the US-UK’s special relationship<br />
in decline?’, BBC, 22 May 2015.<br />
70. Maren Leed, J. D. McCreary, and George Flynn, ‘Advancing<br />
U.S.-Australian Combined Amphibious Capabilities’, Center for<br />
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2015.<br />
71. Evan Medeiros, ‘35 Years of U.S.-China Relations: Diplomacy,<br />
Culture and Soft Power’, Washington DC, 21 January 2015.<br />
72. Australian Department of Defence, Defence White Paper<br />
2013, Canberra, 13 May 2013, section 6.8.<br />
73. Ashton Carter and Marise Payne, ‘Remarks With Secretary of<br />
Defense Ash Carter, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, and<br />
Australian Defense Minister Marise Payne’, 13 October 2015.<br />
74. Dennis Richardson, Blamey Oration: The Strategic Outlook for<br />
the Indo-Pacific, RUSI’s Third International Defence and Security<br />
Dialogue, 27 May 2015. Accessed on SMH.com.au website<br />
75. Peter Jennings, ‘The U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: An Australian<br />
Perspective’, Asia Policy, no. 15, January 2013, pp. 38-44, at p. 41.<br />
76. Australian Department of Defence, ‘Statement: Freedom of<br />
Navigation in the South China Sea’, Canberra, 27 October 2015.<br />
77. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Force Posture<br />
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government<br />
of the United States of America, Canberra, 2014, Article 21 section 3.<br />
78. Gregory Poling, ‘AUSMIN takes the long view of US-<br />
Australia security cooperation’, CSIS Pacific Partners<br />
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Outlook, Volume IV, Issue 8, September 2014.<br />
79. AUSMIN 2015 Joint Statement, 13 October 2015.<br />
80. Ibid.<br />
81. Australian 2016 Defence White Paper, paragraph 2.17.<br />
82. Australian 2016 Defence White Paper, paragraph 5.17. Alan Dupont,<br />
‘Full spectrum defence: Re-thinking the fundamentals of Australian<br />
defence strategy’, Lowy Institute Analysis, Sydney, March 2015, p. 10.<br />
83. Julie Bishop, ‘US-Australia: The Alliance in an Emerging Asia’, Speech to<br />
the Alliance 21/CSIS Conference, Washington DC, 22 January 2014.<br />
84. East-West Center (EWC), United States Studies Centre at<br />
University of Sydney (USSC), and Perth USAsia Centre at University<br />
of Western Australia (USAC), ‘Australia matters for America/<br />
American matters for Australia’, Washington DC, 2015.<br />
85. Ibid.<br />
86. John Goyer, ‘US-Australia Trade Pact Impresses after First<br />
Decade’, US Chamber of Commerce, 24 March 2015.<br />
87. Michael White, ‘US-Australia Free Trade Agreement<br />
turns 10’, Global Trade Daily, 27 March 2015.<br />
88. EWC, USSC, and USAC, ‘Australia matters for<br />
America/American matters for Australia’.<br />
89. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence White<br />
Paper 2016, Canberra, 2016, Chapter 9, Sections 5.18-5.30.<br />
90. Cameron Stewart, ‘US eyes strategic benefits from Japan<br />
submarines deal’, The Australian, 22 January 2016.<br />
91. Rory Medcalf, ‘We’re not the only friends the United States has<br />
in the Asian region’, The Age, 16 June 2015; Alex Oliver, ‘Will<br />
92. Ibid.<br />
Australians support a deeper, bolder US alliance?’ The Interpreter,<br />
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 16 July 2015.<br />
93. Elsina Wainwright, Interviews with Washington DC analysts,<br />
New York/Washington DC, October and November 2015.<br />
94. Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Zack Cooper, John<br />
Schnaus, et al, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and<br />
Partnerships, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington<br />
DC, January 2016, p. 67. Michael Green and Andrew Shearer, ‘Mr<br />
Turnbull Goes to Washington’, The National Interest, 17 January 2016.<br />
95. Mark Thomson, ‘We don’t have to choose between the US and<br />
China’, The Strategist, ASPI, 2 May 2015; Darren Lim, ‘Hillary<br />
Clinton’s trade warning: Can China coerce Australia?’, The<br />
Interpreter, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 1 July 2014.<br />
96. Hugh White, ‘ANZUS in the Asian Century’, The Strategist,<br />
ASPI, 15 July 2015; and Hugh White, The China Choice: Why<br />
America Should Share Power, Black Inc., Collingwood, 2012.<br />
97. There seems to be some coalescence around this approach. Peter<br />
Varghese, ‘An Australian Worldview: A Practitioner’s Perspective’, Speech<br />
to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 20 August 2015;<br />
Ashton Carter, ‘The United States and challenges to Asia-Pacific security’,<br />
2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, p. 4; Michael J. Green, Peter J. Dean, Brendan<br />
Taylor and Zack Cooper, ‘The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia’,<br />
ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Centre of Gravity Series<br />
Report, July 2015, p. 12; and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and<br />
the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’, Foreign Affairs,<br />
1 January 2008, p. 1. There is also some evidence that China would be<br />
prepared to play an enlarged role within the existing order. Xi Jinping,<br />
Address at the General Debate, 70th Session of the United Nations<br />
General Assembly, New York, 28 September 2015; and Kevin Rudd, ‘US-<br />
China 21: The Future of US-China Relations under Xi Jinping: Summary<br />
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Report’, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, April 2015, p. 24.<br />
98. Chris Mills, ‘The United States’ Asia-Pacific Policy and the Rise of the<br />
Dragon’, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, August 2015, pp. 3-4.<br />
99. US power stems in part from its rebounding economy with<br />
unrivalled market influence and innovative capacity, the world’s most<br />
technologically advanced military, with a decades-lasting capability<br />
edge, and a new energy security. Jones, Still Ours To Lead.<br />
100. Richard N. Haass, Foreign policy begins at home: The case for putting<br />
America’s house in order, Basic Books, New York, 2013, pp. 139,155.<br />
101. Rudd, ‘US-China 21 Summary Report’, pp. 33-34.<br />
102. Gregory Poling and Benjamin Schaare, ‘Australia’s search for MH370:<br />
Regional leadership through HADR and Search and Rescue Efforts’,<br />
CSIS Pacific Partners Outlook, vol. IV, issue 3, 10 April 2014; Linda<br />
Jakobson, ‘Add substance to Australia’s strategic dialogue with China’,<br />
in Anthony Bubalo, ed., ‘Judicious ambition: International policy<br />
priorities for the new Australian government’, Lowy Institute Analysis,<br />
September 2013, pp. 12-13; Green, Hicks, and Cooper, ‘Federated<br />
Defense in Asia’; and Peter Jennings, ‘The known truths revealed<br />
by flight MH370’, Australian Financial Review, 20 March 2014.<br />
103. Anthony Bergin, ‘Darwin defence hub crucial to white paper’s diplomatic<br />
ambitions,’ The Australian, February 29 2016, p. 9; Jakobson, ‘Add<br />
substance to Australia’s strategic dialogue with China’, pp. 12-13.<br />
104. Julie Bishop, ‘Mapping Asia’s trajectory: An Australian perspective’,<br />
Address to the United States Studies Centre and Center for a<br />
New American Security, Washington DC, 26 January 2016.<br />
105. Niels Marquardt, ‘America and Australia: economic ties<br />
as strong and important as security ties’, The Strategist,<br />
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 August 2014.<br />
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About the author<br />
Dr Elsina Wainwright<br />
Adjunct Associate Professor<br />
United States Studies Centre<br />
Dr Elsina Wainwright is an adjunct associate<br />
professor at the United States Studies Centre and a<br />
non-resident fellow in its Alliance 21 Program. Based<br />
in New York, she is also a visiting senior fellow at<br />
the Center on International Cooperation at New York<br />
University. Previous roles include director of the<br />
strategy and international program at the Australian<br />
Strategic Policy Institute, an associate with McKinsey<br />
& Company, a consultant political analyst for the<br />
International Crisis Group, and a stipendiary lecturer<br />
in politics at Oriel College, Oxford University. She<br />
has arts and law degrees from the University of<br />
Queensland, and a master’s degree and doctorate in<br />
international relations from Oxford University, where<br />
she studied as a Rhodes Scholar.<br />
Media enquiries<br />
United States Studies Centre<br />
Institute Building (H03)<br />
The University of Sydney NSW 2006<br />
T: +61 2 9351 7249<br />
E: us-studies@sydney.edu.au<br />
W: ussc.edu.au<br />
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