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Command Responsibility

CMN_ICL_Guidelines_Command_Responsibility_En

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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW GUIDELINES: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY<br />

well as to failure to punish:<br />

“[…] Where the accused is charged with a failure to prevent crimes of subordinates,<br />

it would have to be established that his failure was a significant—though not<br />

necessarily the sole— contributing factor in the commission of the crime. Where<br />

a superior has been charged with a failure to punish crimes, it would have to be<br />

established that his failure was a significant contributing factor in the failure of<br />

the competent authorities to investigate the crimes, and to identify and punish<br />

the perpetrator.” 320<br />

Ambos describes the test to be applied as follows:<br />

“[…] In concrete terms, the prosecution—in accordance with the generally<br />

recognized conditio formula or ‘but for’ test—must prove that the crimes<br />

would not have been committed if the superior had properly supervised the<br />

subordinates. Thus, the conditio formula must be inverted. While normally a<br />

positive act causes a certain consequence, i.e. the consequence would not have<br />

occurred without this act, in the case of omission the argument goes the other way<br />

around: the omission ‘causes’ the consequence, since the omitted act would have<br />

prevented it from occurring. […] As a result, it is sufficient that the superior’s<br />

failure of supervision increases the risk that the subordinates commit certain<br />

crimes. Any higher standard would overstretch the causation requirement, since<br />

we deal with a hypothetical causation of events ‘in an imaginary world’: it is<br />

empirically impossible to say what would have happened if the superior had<br />

complied with the duty of supervision. In other words, the existence of an exact<br />

causal relationship between the failure of supervision and the commission of the<br />

crimes can hardly be proven ex post.” 321<br />

However, Ambos cautions:<br />

“[…] there are cases where the pure (inverted) conditio formula could lead to<br />

unsatisfying results. In such cases, normative theories of (objective) attribution<br />

or the proximate cause doctrine could be helpful.” 322<br />

320 Mettraux, 2009, p. 263 (footnote omitted), supra note 311.<br />

321 Kai Ambos, “Superior <strong>Responsibility</strong>”, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal<br />

Court: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 860 (footnotes omitted).<br />

322 Ibid., p. 861 (footnotes omitted).<br />

88<br />

CASE MATRIX NETWORK

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