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2 .<br />

THE EBOLA<br />

CRISIS IN<br />

SIERRA <strong>LEONE</strong><br />

also extended beyond the health sector, for example to security personnel<br />

who guarded quarantined areas or borders and were thus also at risk. This<br />

“inflationary effect” outside the health sector created the need for even<br />

more hazard payments.<br />

In all three countries, the Payments Programme collaborated closely<br />

with the Ministries of Health and Ebola Coordination Units to ensure that,<br />

through smart deployment of innovative technologies, together with<br />

private sector partnerships and unprecedented collaboration between<br />

humanitarian payment organizations and the financial services sector,<br />

Response Workers had control over their pay, that the right workers got<br />

paid the correct amount, and that payments were delivered on time.<br />

In Sierra Leone, hazard payment implementation was first initiated through<br />

an urgent arrangement between the Ministry of Health and Sanitation<br />

(MoHS) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) in<br />

September 2014. It was then shifted to the National Ebola Response Center<br />

(NERC) in November 2014 after difficulties the MoHS faced in managing<br />

large-scale payments, such that Response Workers were not being paid or<br />

were receiving their payments late. In addition, donors – notably the World<br />

Bank and African Development Bank who were funding hazard payments<br />

– were not able to verify lists of Response Workers, leading to a significant<br />

lack of confidence in the payee lists generated for funding support.<br />

The exponential growth of the Ebola epidemic during the emergency phase<br />

of the response challenged the traditional model of managing a crisis<br />

response workforce. EVD transmission patterns can – and did – change and<br />

flare within a matter of hours. As new transmission chains are identified in<br />

a crisis, and as new epicenters emerge, surge support with specific skills<br />

is required to contain the spread of the disease. “Getting to zero,” that is –<br />

breaking all known transmission chains – depends on Response Workers’<br />

Phases of<br />

Digitization<br />

PHASE 1<br />

DECEMBER 2014<br />

Focus: Shift to digital<br />

payments (payments<br />

through mobile money<br />

and bank accounts)<br />

17,803 Response<br />

Workers<br />

<br />

PHASE 2<br />

JANUARY 2015<br />

Focus: Shift to digital<br />

identification (creating<br />

unique identification<br />

numbers for all<br />

Response Workers)<br />

in addition to digital<br />

payments<br />

19,403 Response<br />

Workers<br />

PHASE 3<br />

FEBRUARY 2015 ONWARDS<br />

Shift to shared<br />

digital information<br />

management system<br />

among government<br />

agencies, development<br />

partners, and<br />

NGOs paying hazard<br />

pay to Response<br />

Workers<br />

35,000 Response<br />

Workers<br />

16

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