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But this debate is moot for the vast majority of South African citizens. A state-of-the-art home defence system featuring electric fence, beams and closed-circuit TV can easily cost R75,000 in set-up expenses. Basic private security arrangements (a burglar alarm linked to an armed response company) cost an additional R650 a month in service fees. Very few can afford even that. As we see in graph 8, 92 percent of black South Africans live in households whose monthly spend is less than R10k a month. Nearly 40 percent of whites fall into the same income bracket. For such people, panic buttons, electric fences and armed response are an unattainable fantasy. Basic private security arrangements (a burglar alarm linked to an armed response company) cost an additional R650 a month in service fees. Graph 8: Monthly expenditure by race, 2014 70,0% 60,0% 50,0% 40,0% 30,0% 20,0% 10,0% 0,0% R0–R399 R400–R799 R800 –R1 199 R1 200 –R1 799 R1 800 –R2 499 R2 500 –R4 999 R5 000 –R9 999 R10 000+ Black White Source: Stats SA, General Household Survey 2014, Statistical release PO318, 27 May 2015, p 167 Conclusions: • Fully professional private policing is effective but renegade operatives bear careful watching. • Private policing is a solution available only to the wealthier segment of the population and to business. The vast majority of South Africans cannot afford it and must look elsewhere for protection. 6 Township mob justice What criminologists refer to as vigilantism is rooted in ancient African traditions of community self-policing. Before whites came, “hunter guards” patrolled Ibo villages at night, Mungiki guarded Kikuyu cattle, and errant Zulus were judged and punished by councils of elders. In the colonial era, these “vigilante” formations continued to exist alongside formal policing structures introduced by Europeans and were often legitimated by legislation making allowance for customary law. 20 SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS 2230_SAIRR_WWACinSA_sm4.indd 20 2016/09/05 5:04 PM
After Uhuru, when many fl edgling African countries collapsed into chaos, vigilante movements came to the fore again, fi lling the vacuum created by weak or failed states. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, vigilantism is the most effective and sometimes the only form of policing. Anthropologists tell us that “vigilantism permeates all regions and all segments” of Nigerian society. The BBC says “vigilantes are the only ones who stand between robbers and residents,” and that captured robbers are likely to be killed before police arrive. Similar stories are reported in most African countries, but the full sweep of vigilante activity remains undocumented. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, vigilantism is the most effective and sometimes the only form of policing. Anthropologist Lars Buur tells us that vigilantism has been a feature of South African urban life since at least 1900. In early years it took the form of “tribal courts” transplanted into urban settings by rural immigrants. These councils of older males generally usually sought compromise and compensation for injuries infl icted, but were also known to impose fl oggings to which police generally turned a blind eye. In the struggle era, these conservative formations encountered opposition from Street Committees and Peoples’ Courts set up by the ANC-aligned United Democratic Front to impose revolutionary justice in so-called liberated zones. People’s Court’s often imposed the death penalty on political opponents but also sought to take over the everyday functions of white police and magistrates as a means of undermining the legitimacy of apartheid state. In the early 1990s the ANC to some extent lost control of these structures, inadvertently contributing to a climate of anarchy it is now struggling to eradicate. After the 1994 transition a new and more deadly form of vigilantism arose to combat rising crime in black areas. The media and academe paid close attention to the activities of Mapogo a Mathamaga, a Limpopo-based vigilante movement that at its height in 1999 claimed 35,000 members in four provinces. Mapogo’s “vigilante atrocities” (hundreds of fl oggings and several extra-judicial executions) were documented in some detail, as were murders and bombings carried out by PAGAD, a Cape Town vigilante group that declared war on drug dealers. But the full extent of township self-policing remained a mystery. In 2005, a new force entered the frame. The Daily Sun was a tabloid newspaper created to engage the interest of “blue collar man,” defi ned as a black, working-class township dweller. From the outset, the Daily Sun was taken by the phenomenon it calls “mob justice,” initially running almost daily stories on the subject, often with an unspoken nod of approval – people are desperate, police are useless, what do you expect? This pro-poor attitude – along with saturation coverage of witchcraft and soccer – soon made Daily Sun Africa’s largest newspaper, with a claimed daily circulation of nearly half a million. In interview with Newsweek in 2014, Daily Sun publisher Jeremy Gordon estimated that his paper received “three to six” tip-offs a week about extra-judicial killings. In his view, most of these killings were spontaneous and almost unpoliceable: “Someone cries thief, a mob chases the suspect down and burns or beats him to death, but when the police arrive, the community closes ranks and nobody says knows anything. It’s as if ghosts did it.” Gordon cautioned that Daily Sun’s coverage of such incidents was nowhere near comprehensive, and that court reports provide no yardstick. “We’ve never covered a trial that led to convictions in a mob justice case,” said Gordin. “Never.” WINNING THE WAR ON CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA: A NEW APPROACH TO COMMUNITY POLICING 21 2230_SAIRR_WWACinSA_sm4.indd 21 2016/09/05 5:04 PM
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Page 5 and 6: Table 2: Selected crime categories:
Page 7 and 8: 2000 2013 CHANGE COUNTRY NUMBERS RA
Page 9 and 10: Table 4: Breakdown of aggravated ro
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Page 13 and 14: Before he came to trial, however, t
Page 15 and 16: Oddly, SAPS generals and the cabine
Page 17 and 18: YEAR ACTIVE REGISTERED SECURITY BUS
Page 19: African identity documents purchase
Page 23 and 24: On the morning of September 15, Mrs
Page 25 and 26: are presumably rooted in the fact t
Page 27 and 28: In 2000, Solidarity founded Helpend
Page 29 and 30: helicopter, private security reacti
Page 31 and 32: This early success sparked more suc

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