Circassian Bibliography & Library - Circassian World

Bagov (Bagh), P. M. et al, Grammatika kabardino-cherkesskogo
literaturnogo yazika [Grammar of the Kabardino-Cherkess
Literary Language], Moscow: Nauka, 1970.
Bagration, M., ‘The Caucasus and Russia in the Historical Past’, in
The Caucasus, nos 6/7 (11/12), June-July 1952, pp 14-20.
Baies Al-Majali, A. M., Language Maintenance and Language Shift
among Circassians in Jordan, MA Thesis, University of Jordan,
1988.
Bailey, H. W., ‘Ossetic (Narta)’, in A. T. Hatto (ed.), Traditions of
Heroic and Epic Poetry (Vol. 1: The Traditions), London: The
Modern Humanities Research Association, 9, 1980.
Bakke, K. M., ‘The Chechen Wars and Russian Center-Region
Relations’, paper presented at The Annual Meeting of the
International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton
Chicago, Chicago, IL, 28 February 2007. Online. Available
HTTP:
(accessed 3 October
2007). [Abstract: With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in
1990-1991, the majority of the 32 ethnically-defined Russian
regions issued declarations of sovereignty. Of them, only
Chechnya ended up battling the Russian federal government. In
this paper, I demonstrate how and why the institutions connecting
Chechnya and Moscow fell short of resolving differences between
the two and, indeed, helped precipitate a full-fledged civil war
between them. In particular, I argue that the ways in which centerregion
institutions and practices respond to regional-level societal
traits such as ethnicity and wealth influence whether–and which
part of–the state becomes a target of political mobilization. If the
responsibility for a region or ethnic group’s grievances can be
attributed to the central government, mobilized action against the
central government is more likely to occur. In Chechnya, both
ethnic and economic grievances could be attributed to the central
government and the ways in which relations between the center
and the regions were governed, thus justifying action directed at
the center. Furthermore, the central government’s response to the
Chechen demands helped justify violence as a means. From 1991
to 1994, Moscow switched back and forth between promising
concessions to the Chechens and preparing for violent action,
resorting to the latter in late 1994. But even before the center’s
military invasion of Grozny in December 1994, more routine
channels for funneling the Chechen demands faced challenges due
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