JANUARY
Acad_eval_indiv_mkt_011817
Acad_eval_indiv_mkt_011817
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Individual enrollment at sufficient levels and<br />
a balanced risk pool<br />
Sufficient enrollment levels.<br />
At the overall market level, enrollment must be high enough to reduce random fluctuations<br />
in claims from year to year. In states that fund health insurance marketplace operations<br />
through user fees, market-wide enrollment must be sufficient to generate adequate user<br />
fee revenues. At the insurer level, enrollment must be high enough to achieve stability<br />
and predictability of claims and to benefit from economies of scale, so that per-enrollee<br />
administrative costs are low relative to average claims.<br />
A balanced risk pool.<br />
Because the ACA prohibits health plans from denying coverage or charging higher<br />
premiums based on pre-existing health conditions, having affordable premiums depends on<br />
enrolling enough healthy individuals over which the costs of the less-healthy individuals can<br />
be spread. Enrollment of only individuals with high health care needs, typically referred to as<br />
adverse selection, can produce unsustainable upward premium spirals. Attracting healthier<br />
individuals (e.g., through the ACA individual mandate and premiums subsidies) is needed<br />
to keep premiums more affordable and stable.<br />
A stable regulatory environment that facilitates fair and<br />
sufficient insurer competition<br />
Consistent rules and regulations applied to competing health plans.<br />
Health plans competing to enroll the same participants must operate under the same rules.<br />
If one set of plans operates under rules that are more advantageous to healthy individuals,<br />
then those individuals will migrate to those plans; less-healthy individuals will migrate to<br />
the plans more advantageous to them. In other words, plans that have rules more amenable<br />
to higher-risk individuals will suffer from adverse selection. In the absence of an effective<br />
risk adjustment program that includes all plans, upward premium spirals could result,<br />
threatening the viability of the plans more advantageous to higher-risk individuals.<br />
Stable effective regulatory environment.<br />
The rules and regulations governing the health insurance market need to be announced with<br />
sufficient lead time, relatively stable over time, and not overly burdensome in terms of costs<br />
or restrictions on innovation.<br />
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES 5