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the national bureau of asian research
asia policy
23
january 2017
roundtables
Assessing U.S.-Asia Relations in a Time of Transition
David Shambaugh, Sheila A. Smith, Sue Mi Terry, Richard C. Bush, Kimberly Marten,
Ashley J. Tellis, Teresita C. Schaffer, Brian Harding, and Michael Clarke
The North Korean Nuclear Threat
Chung-in Moon, Ren Xiao, Yasuhiro Izumikawa, Van Jackson, and Andrei Lankov
articles and essays
Japan’s Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force
in the East China Sea
Céline Pajon
The Failure of Maritime Sanctions Enforcement
against North Korea
Robert Huish
book review roundtable
Minxin Pei’s
China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay

asia policy
• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •
a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic
research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific
Michael Clarke
National Security College,
Australian National University
C. Christine Fair
Georgetown University
editors
C. Christine Fair and Mark W. Frazier editors
Georgetown University The New School
Jessica Keough managing editor
Joshua Ziemkowski copy and style editor
Craig Scanlan, Alison Cheung, and Sarah Mac copyeditors
editorial advisory committee
Mark Frazier
The New School
Bhubhindar Singh
S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies
Michael Wills
The National Bureau of
Asian Research
Muthiah Alagappa
Institute of Strategic and
International Studies Malaysia
Michael Armacost
Stanford University
Richard Bush
Brookings Institution
Steve Chan
University of Colorado, Boulder
Thomas Christensen
Princeton University
Eliot Cohen
Johns Hopkins University
Nicholas Eberstadt
American Enterprise Institute
Elizabeth Economy
Council on Foreign Relations
Richard Ellings (co-chairman)
The National Bureau of
Asian Research
Aaron Friedberg
Princeton University
Paul Godwin
National War College (ret.)
Michael Green
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Stephen Hanson
College of William and Mary
Harry Harding
University of Virginia
Robert Hefner
Boston University
David Kang
University of Southern California
Mark Katz
George Mason University
editorial board
David Lampton
Johns Hopkins University
Nicholas Lardy
Peterson Institute for
International Economics
Chae-Jin Lee
Claremont McKenna College
Steven Lewis
Rice University
Cheng Li
Brookings Institution
Kenneth Lieberthal
Brookings Institution
Kimberly Marten
Barnard College
Barrett McCormick
Marquette University
Rory Medcalf
National Security College,
Australian National University
Rajan Menon
City College of New York,
City University of New York
Vali Nasr
Johns Hopkins University
Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute for
International Economics
Margaret Pearson
University of Maryland
Minxin Pei
Claremont McKenna College
T.J. Pempel
University of California,
Berkeley
Dwight Perkins
Harvard University
Kenneth Pyle (co-chairman)
University of Washington
(emeritus)
Lawrence Reardon
University of
New Hampshire
Robert Ross
Boston College
Richard Samuels
Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
Andrew Scobell
RAND Corporation
David Shambaugh
George Washington University
Susan Shirk
University of California,
San Diego
Sheldon Simon
Arizona State University
Robert Sutter
George Washington University
Richard Suttmeier
University of Oregon (emeritus)
Michael Swaine
Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
See Seng Tan
S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies
Ashley Tellis
Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
Robert Wade
London School of Economics
and Political Science
Vincent Wang
Ithaca College

asia policy
number 23 • january 2017
Contents
u roundtable u
Assessing U.S.-Asia Relations in a Time of Transition
introduction. ....................................2
dealing with china:
tough engagement and managed competition .........4
David Shambaugh
u.s.-japan relations in a trump administration. ...... 13
Sheila A. Smith
hazards on the road ahead:
the united states and the korean peninsula ......... 21
Sue Mi Terry
u.s.-taiwan relations in the
trump administration: no big fixes needed. ..........29
Richard C. Bush
trump and putin, through a glass darkly. ...........36
Kimberly Marten
avoiding the labors of sisyphus: strengthening
u.s.-india relations in a trump administration. ...... 43
Ashley J. Tellis
pakistan and the united states:
a more turbulent ride?. ........................... 49
Teresita C. Schaffer

u.s.–southeast asia relations:
raised stakes and renewed importance. ............. 57
Brian Harding
the u.s.-australia alliance in an era of change:
living complacently?. ............................ 63
Michael Clarke
u roundtable u
The North Korean Nuclear Threat:
Regional Perspectives on a Nuclear-Free Peninsula
introduction. ................................... 72
managing north korean nuclear threats:
in defense of dialogue and negotiations ............ 74
Chung-in Moon
old wine in a new bottle? china’s korea problem ..... 83
Ren Xiao
acting on the north korea playbook:
japan’s responses to north korea’s provocations. . . . . 90
Yasuhiro Izumikawa
deterring a nuclear-armed adversary
in a contested regional order:
the “trilemma” of u.s.–north korea relations. .......97
Van Jackson
why nothing can really be done
about north korea’s nuclear program. ............ 104
Andrei Lankov

u articles and essays u
japan’s coast guard and maritime self-defense
force in the east china sea: can a black-and-white
system adapt to a gray-zone reality?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Céline Pajon
This essay examines the need for growing coordination between the
Japan Coast Guard and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to better
cope with gray-zone situations.
the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
against north korea. ............................ 131
Robert Huish
This article examines the ineffectiveness of current sanctions on marine
traffic into North Korea by identifying four weaknesses that allow traffic
to continue: flags of convenience, misidentification or false registration,
offshore ownership, and shell-firm owners, managers, and insurers.
u book review roundtable u
Minxin Pei’s
China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay
china’s crony capitalism:
more than property rights. ...................... 154
Yan Sun
china is corrupt, but there is more to the story. .... 158
David Bachman
a partial view of china’s governance trajectory .... 162
Nicholas Calcina Howson
author’s response: a corruption market
more sophisticated than you think. ............... 166
Minxin Pei

asia policy
• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •
a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic
research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific
guidelines for submission
Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic
research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific. The journal publishes
peer-reviewed research articles and policy essays, roundtables on policy-relevant topics
and recent publications, and book review essays, as well as other occasional formats.
I. General Requirements
Asia Policy welcomes the submission of policy-relevant research on important issues in
the Asia-Pacific. The journal will consider two main types of submissions for peer review:
research articles that present new information, theoretical frameworks, or arguments and
draw clear policy implications; and policy essays that provide original, persuasive, and
rigorous analysis. Authors or editors interested in having a book considered for review
should submit a copy of the book to the managing editor at NBR, 1414 NE 42nd Street,
Suite 300, Seattle, Washington 98105. Submissions may be sent to .
Asia Policy requires that all submitted manuscripts have not been previously
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of the manuscript upon submission of the first draft, including whether the manuscript
or any component parts have been presented at conferences or have appeared online.
II. Manuscript Format
• The manuscript should be in Times New Roman, 12-point font with 1.5-line spacing. Research
articles should range from 8,000 to 12,000 words, and policy essays should range from 4,000 to
6,000 words.
• In order to be easily accessible to policymakers, each manuscript must include (1) a Title Page,
(2) a one-page Executive Summary, and (3) a concise Introduction according to the requirements
listed below.
1) The Title Page should include only the article title, author’s name, a list of five keywords,
and a short biographical statement (under 50 words) that lists the author’s e-mail address.

2) To help bridge the policy and academic communities, all research published by NBR
must include a one-page Executive Summary of approximately 275 words that includes:
• a Topic Statement
• the Main Argument
• the Policy Implications
A sample Executive Summary is provided in Section III below.
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Executive Summary [total length
not to exceed 275 words]
executive summary
This essay examines the linkages between China’s national economy and
foreign policy over the past 30 years, and assesses the claim that Chinese
foreign policy has undergone an important shift in which domestic demand
for energy and other raw materials heavily influence foreign policy decisions.
main argument
Article Topic [preferably
Assessments of Chinese foreign policy intentions and goals no often longer conclude than 2–3 lines]
that the need to gain more reliable access to oil and other natural resources is
Main Argument [preferably
a central aim of Chinese foreign policy and overall strategic considerations.
no longer than 6–10 lines]
This essay argues that the coherence of China’s economic goals and the
coordination needed to achieve them are eroding as multiple competing
interests within the Chinese polity emerge to pursue and protect power and
resources. This fragmentation of economic policy into multiple competing
agendas has to be understood alongside assessments that resource needs
drive Chinese foreign policy. The essay first surveys how shifting economic
priorities have influenced Chinese foreign policy over the past 30 years. A
second section discusses China’s shift from an export-led, resource-dependent
growth model to one that is more balanced toward domestic consumption.
The essay concludes by noting that China’s search for a rebalanced economy
and for a new growth model creates opportunities and constraints on Chinese
foreign policy.
policy implications
• While China’s domestic economic Policy goals have Implications always been [preferably an important in the form of
factor in foreign policy, Chinese diplomatic bulleted initiatives “if … then globally …” statements and its policies that spell
toward oil-producing states are driven out by the a far benefits more complicated or problems convergence associated with
of factors than a simple narrative of “oil specific diplomacy” policy options would suggest. rather than stating that
• China’s pluralized political economy the makes government such rebalancing “should” take much a certain more action]
difficult politically, given the potential winners and losers in this process.
Those who now urge China to make a shift away from an export-heavy
growth pattern are likely to grow increasingly frustrated unless they
understand that the central leaders do not possess the instruments to
quickly transform the Chinese economy.
• Given that China, like no other economy, has benefitted from the institutions
of the global economy, China has a strong interest in maintaining these
institutions and their liberal principles, even as the Chinese government
seeks to play a stronger role in their operation and governance.

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Part 1: English-Language Sources
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H.P. Wilmot, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval
Institute Press, 1982), 146–48.
• Edited volume (with ISBN): Editor[s]’ first and last name[s], ed[s]., title (city of publication:
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The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 22–42.
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National Interest in the Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996–2000, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 207.
• Journal article (in a journal with ISSN): Author[s]’ first and last name[s], “title of article,” title
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Jingdong Yuan, “The Bush Doctrine: Chinese Perspectives and Responses,” Asian Perspective 27, no. 4 (2003): 134–37.
• Reports (no ISBN or ISSN): Author[s]’ first and last name[s], “title of report,” publisher, report
series, date of publication, page number[s].
Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Policy Brief, no. 47, June 2006.
• Newspaper or magazine article: Author[s]’ first and last name[s], “title of article,” name of
newspaper/magazine, date of publication, page number[s].
Keith Bradsher, “U.S. Seeks Cooperation with China,” New York Times, July 24, 2003, A14.
• Electronic documents and website content: Author[s]’ first and last name[s], “title,” URL.
Footnote citation should emulate the corresponding print-source category if possible.
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cross-cutting_programs/conflict/focus_areas/natural_resources.html.
• Public documents: Government department or office, title of document, [other identifying
information], date of publication, page number[s].
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Proliferation of Nuclear Technology, report prepared by Warren H. Donnelly and Barbara Rather, 94th Cong.,
2d sess., 1976, Committee Print 15, 5–6.
• Personal communication and interview: Author[s]’ [personal communication/e-mail/
telephone conversation/interview] with [first and last name], place, date.
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Part 2: Foreign-Language Sources
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Treaty and Secret Agreements] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2001), 409–35.
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• Journal article: Author name[s], “foreign language article title” [English translation of article
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Liu Jianfei, “Gouzhu chengshu de Zhongmei guanxi” [Developing a Mature Sino-U.S. Relationship], Zhongguo kexue
xuebao 78, no. 2 (June 2003): 73–87.
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1994), 21.
Part 3: Subsequent Citation
Use author[s]’ last name and shortened titles (four words or less) for previously cited sources.
“Op. cit.” and “loc. cit.” should not be used.
First use: Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone,
1996), 136–37.
Subsequent use: Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 136–37.

asia policy, number 23 (january 2017), 1–69
• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •
roundtable
Assessing U.S.-Asia Relations in a Time of Transition
David Shambaugh
Sheila A. Smith
Sue Mi Terry
Richard C. Bush
Kimberly Marten
Ashley J. Tellis
Teresita C. Schaffer
Brian Harding
Michael Clarke
© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

asia policy
Introduction
A
s a new administration takes office in the United States in January
2017, it will need to formulate policies to address a wide range
of challenges in Asia. China continues to rise in terms of both material
and economic power, causing the Sino-U.S. relationship to become
increasingly competitive even as the two countries cooperate on issues
such as climate change. U.S. allies Japan and South Korea worry about
the growing nuclear threat from North Korea and question Washington’s
continued commitment to the region, while relations between Taiwan
and China have worsened since the election of Tsai Ing-wen in January
2016. In Southeast Asia, territorial disputes in the South China Sea are
escalating as countries take increasingly aggressive actions to defend their
claims. Australia, a long-time U.S. ally, is wary of U.S. retrenchment from
the region and fears being forced to choose between the United States
and China. In South Asia, Washington will need to balance its complex
relationships with India and Pakistan, two bitter enemies that see any
dealings with the United States by the other as detrimental to their own
interests. Finally, Russia will continue to challenge the United States on
a number of issues including cybersecurity and expansionism along its
western border with NATO countries.
This Asia Policy roundtable contains nine essays analyzing key U.S.
bilateral relationships in Asia and identifying the most salient current
and over-the-horizon issues in each dyad. David Shambaugh posits that
the United States must seek a responsible bilateral relationship with
China that contains and manages the competitive issues between the two
countries. Sheila A. Smith argues that the United States will need Japan’s
help in both maintaining regional stability and engaging rivals like
Russia. On the Korean Peninsula, Sue Mi Terry maintains that the new
administration will need to apply greater pressure on North Korea while
demonstrating stronger reassurances of alliance commitments to South
Korea as the South navigates its own complicated political transition.
Richard C. Bush’s analysis shows that Taiwan hopes U.S. commitments to
Taipei will not erode under pressure from Beijing.
To the west, Kimberly Marten argues that the United States and Russia
will continue to be at loggerheads on many issues, but because the new
administration seems interested in another attempt at a reset, analyzing
the future direction of this complex bilateral relationship produces more
questions than answers. Turning to South Asia, Ashley J. Tellis assesses
[ 2 ]

oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
the U.S. relationship with India in the context of regional dynamics and
argues that Washington should be careful not to derail its current path of
improved bilateral relations with New Delhi. Teresita C. Schaffer, on the
other hand, analyzes Pakistan as an unsteady U.S. partner whose strategic
objectives rarely align and are often at odds with Washington’s regional
goals. In Southeast Asia, Brian Harding observes that the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is situated to become a focus of U.S.
and Chinese competition for economic and strategic influence. Finally,
Michael Clarke reflects on the U.S.-Australia alliance and sees a need for
Canberra to facilitate more regional bilateral ties in the face of a potential
shift in U.S. support.
As each of these authors observes, the United States’ bilateral
relationships in Asia present major challenges, as well as opportunities,
for the incoming administration. Taken together, the issues raised—which
will often come into conflict across the different dyads—mean that Asia
must remain the focal point of U.S. foreign policy in the years ahead. The
roadmaps offered by the experts assembled for this roundtable provide a
useful starting point for navigating these critical relationships.
[ 3 ]

asia policy
Dealing with China:
Tough Engagement and Managed Competition
David Shambaugh
Sino-American relations are the major overarching factor in Asian
international relations (many would argue internationally). As the broad
trajectory of the relationship in recent years has been toward increasing
frictions and comprehensive competition, simply managing the competitive
dynamic so that it does not bleed into a fully adversarial relationship should
be a principal goal. The relationship could get worse—much worse—but
that is not in the national interests of either country.
Building cooperation where possible is a twin objective but should
not be an end in itself. For example, the two governments engage in nearly
one hundred bilateral dialogues, but these exchanges are quite pro forma
and yield limited tangible benefits for the United States. The new Trump
administration should “scrub” them from top to bottom—beginning with
the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)—and radically reduce them
so as to maximize tangible outcomes and minimize the expenditure of time,
money, and bureaucratic resources. The Chinese government has managed
to freeze and trap the U.S. government in a panoply of diplomatic processes,
while Beijing assiduously maneuvers worldwide to expand its own presence
and influence.
There is a deep reservoir of frustration and disillusion in the United
States concerning China—some of which emerged during the presidential
campaign—and a seeming consensus exists that Washington needs to get
tougher with Beijing on a broad range of issues. Donald Trump tapped into
this sentiment concerning business outsourcing, but it runs far deeper into a
variety of issue areas. But despite Trump’s emphasis on the economic element
of the relationship, the big change in U.S.-China relations is that security
issues are now as or more important than economic issues, and as a result, the
economic ballast is not as important as before. A big part of this reality is that
david shambaugh is a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and the Director
of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington
University. He is currently a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His most recent books are China’s Future and
The China Reader: Rising Power (both 2016) and China Goes Global: The Partial Power (2013). He can
be reached at .
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
American business has been experiencing a much more difficult environment
in China. 1
The United States’ growing frustrations with China lead to the
temptation to “get tough” with Beijing. But this may prove difficult given
the interdependencies between the two countries and China’s own ability to
retaliate against and inflict pain on U.S. interests. Moreover, the relationship
is at something of a geostrategic inflection point—with China’s power and
influence growing regionally and globally, while the United States’ power
appears to be declining relatively. While tempting for Washington, getting
tough at such a time can be provocatively dangerous. Power-transition
theorists are quick to remind us that this is precisely the most unstable
and vulnerable period in relations between established powers and rising
powers—i.e., when one or the other misjudges its own relative position
and takes preemptive actions against the other. The United States remains
far stronger than China across a range of indicators, 2 but the Chinese
leadership may overestimate both China’s strengths and the United States’
weaknesses. For its part, the Trump administration may underestimate
China’s sensitivities and capacity to retaliate against U.S. interests.
Under such conditions, mature management of a volatile relationship
is mandatory—bounding the negative dynamics while working to expand
the areas of positive cooperation is the principal challenge for both
governments. With this broad maxim in mind, the balance of this essay
assesses the state of the relationship that the Trump administration inherits
and the deeper variables that will affect its evolution in the future.
Looking Back to Move Ahead
In anticipating how the Trump administration may move in its dealings
with Beijing, it is first useful to take stock of the state of U.S.-China relations
and the China policy that the administration will inherit. Of course, no new
U.S. administration must continue the policy of its predecessor—although
continuity is reassuring, particularly to markets. But Trump has already
1 See, for example, American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China, “American
Business in China,” 2016 u http://www.amchamchina.org/policy-advocacy/white-paper. The
increasing difficulties for foreign businesses in China are hardly limited to U.S. companies.
European companies have been experiencing similar—or worse—obstacles. See, for example,
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, “European Business in China—Position
Paper 2016/2017,” 2016 u http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/press-releases/2489/
european_chamber_calls_for_reciprocity.
2 See the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies u
http://chinapower.csis.org.
[ 5 ]

asia policy
rattled the relationship prior to assuming office by breaking two core tenets
of all eight previous U.S. administrations: speaking by telephone with
Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen and questioning why the United States has
to be “bound” by the one-China principle. During a December 11 television
interview, he also stated, “I don’t want China dictating to me.” 3
While Trump may break from the policies of his predecessors, the
Obama administration’s China policy has reflected strong continuity with
that of the Bush administration. We have had sixteen consecutive years
of “hedged engagement”—i.e., strategic and security hedging against
China in Asia combined with engagement on a range of bilateral and
global governance issues. Like his predecessor, President Barack Obama
understood that the best China policy is a strong Asia policy. 4 Obama’s
“pivot” or “rebalance” policy was in part intended to constrain China
strategically in Asia. Trump would be wise to continue and intensify
this effort. Given his liberal and multilateral predilections, Obama came
into office also very much committed to a broad agenda for Sino-U.S.
collaboration in global governance. This part of Obama’s China policy
was met with deep skepticism by Beijing at first, but since 2013 under Xi
Jinping we have witnessed China greatly “up its game” in this arena. The
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is one key indication of
this positive change in China’s diplomatic posture; other examples include
increased financial and personnel contributions to the UN operating budget
and peacekeeping operations, antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden,
multilateral economic governance, public health contributions to fight the
Ebola and Zika virus outbreaks, and the Iranian nuclear deal. True, China is
still not doing anything to cooperate on the war against the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or in the Syrian crisis (taking no refugees and playing
no diplomatic role to bring an end to the civil war and carnage), and its
official development assistance program of approximately $3.5 billion still
lags substantially behind its financial capabilities. So there is still room for
improvement for the world’s no. 2 power, but overall we have witnessed
positive developments in this aspect of U.S.-China relations and China’s
contributions to global governance.
In other areas, however, it must be said that the recent state of
U.S.-China relations—and the relationship the Trump administration
3 Emily Rauhala, “Beijing Rebukes Trump for Remark on Taiwan,” Washington Post, December 13, 2016.
4 See David Shambaugh, “President Obama’s Asia Scorecard,” Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2016 u
http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-post-obama-world/president-obamas-asia-scorecard.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
will inherit—has been characterized by increasing frictions and
across-the-board, rising competition: military and security competition,
competition for influence in Asia, growing international geostrategic
competition, ideological and political competition, and commercial
competition. In all of these and other areas, the U.S.-China relationship
exhibits considerable suspicion and tension. Recent public opinion surveys
also indicate that distrust of the other power is pervasive and rising. 5
While regrettable, all this negativity is to be expected and should be
considered as the “new normal”—rather than some chimera of harmonious
cooperation. Whether viewed through the power-transition prism (the
Thucydides trap), the “security dilemma” paradigm, the ideological prism
of the two contradictory political systems, or other perspectives, it is not
abnormal that these two major powers are not getting along very well
and are experiencing the competitive dynamic in their relationship. But
the key task—indeed responsibility—for both governments is to manage
comprehensive competition so that it does not bleed into becoming a fully
adversarial relationship, which neither side seeks nor needs.
Buffering Competition
At the same time, we must not lose sight of the more positive dimensions
of the complicated U.S.-China relationship:
• The two exchange $659.4 billion in two-way trade. 6 China is one of
the United States’ fastest-growing export markets, and virtually all
major U.S. corporations have a presence there.
• The United States has invested a cumulative $75 billion in China,
employing an estimated 1.6 million Chinese workers. Chinese FDI
in the United States is a more recent phenomenon, but it is growing
extremely rapidly—totaling $15 billion and employing 100,000 U.S.
5 Richard Wike and Bruce Stokes, “Chinese Public Sees More Powerful Role in World, Names
U.S. as Top Threat,” Pew Research Center, October 2016 u http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/10/05/
chinese-public-sees-more-powerful-role-in-world-names-u-s-as-top-threat; and Richard Wike,
“Americans’ Concerns about China: Economics, Cyberattacks, Human Rights Top the List,”
Pew Research Center, September 2015 u http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/09/09/
americans-concerns-about-china-economics-cyberattacks-human-rights-top-the-list.
6 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The People’s Republic of China” u https://ustr.
gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china.
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workers in 2015, with Chinese companies registering a sevenfold
increase in the first nine months of 2016. 7
• In the 2015–16 academic year, a total of 328,547 Chinese students
studied at U.S. universities and vocational schools, generating
$11.43 billion in revenue. Additionally, an estimated 50,000 Chinese
students attended U.S. secondary schools during the same period. 8
• In 2014, Chinese tourists spent an impressive $24 billion in the United
States. In 2015, 2.6 million Chinese tourists visited the United States,
and this figure is expected to rise to 2.9 million in 2016, which was
branded as “U.S.-China tourism year.” 9
• Dozens of “sister city” and state-province relationships as well as a
variety of nongovernmental cultural exchanges fortify societal ties.
These statistics and other indicators are all evidence of deep U.S.-China
interactions and interdependence. This cooperative dimension serves to
buffer the competitive dimension to a significant extent, and this reality
is good news for overall relations. Both sides need to constantly work to
expand and deepen this cooperative dimension, but it also should not be
overestimated. At the end of the day, U.S.-China relations are a mixed
cooperative/competitive relationship (“coopetition”). 10
The Menu of Issues
So, where does all this leave the Sino-American relationship going
forward? There are, of course, a host of issues on the bilateral, regional,
and global agendas that confront the Trump administration and the two
governments. On the U.S. side, these include:
7 “China Investment in U.S. Economy Set for Record, but Political Concerns Grow,” Wall Street
Journal, April 12, 2016 u http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-investment-in-u-s-economy-setfor-record-but-political-concerns-grow-1460422802;
and Thilo Hanemann, Daniel H. Rosen, and
Cassie Gao, “Two-Way Street: 25 Years of U.S.-China Direct Investment,” Rhodium Group and
the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, November 2016 u https://www.ncuscr.org/
twowaystreet.
8 Institute of International Education, “Open Doors Fact Sheet: China,” 2016 u http://www.iie.org/
Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheets-by-Country/2016.
9 U.S. Department of Commerce statistics cited in Chen Weihua, “China Tourists a Boost
to U.S.,” China Daily, March 17, 2016 u http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/us/2016-03/17/
content_23902119.htm; and “U.S. and China to Launch 2016 U.S.-China Tourism Year,” U.S.
Department of Commerce, Press Release, February 25, 2016 u https://www.commerce.gov/news/
press-releases/2016/02/us-and-china-launch-2016-us-china-tourism-year.
10 See David Shambaugh, “Tangled Titans: Conceptualizing U.S.-China Relations,” in Tangled Titans:
The United States and China, ed. David Shambaugh (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 3–24.
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• the increasingly constricted commercial and investment environment
for U.S. companies in China;
• rapidly rising Chinese investments in sensitive technological
sectors in the United States that impinge on national security and
commercial assets;
• cybersecurity and broader technological espionage in the United States;
• human rights and the repressive environment in China;
• Chinese restrictions on U.S. NGOs, academics, and journalists in
China (including visa blacklists);
• North Korea (probably at the top of the list of immediate challenges);
• China’s activities in the South and East China Seas;
• the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific and broader Indo-Pacific region;
• the more constricted political environment in Hong Kong;
• new leadership in Taiwan and hence potential volatility in the
China-Taiwan-U.S. triangle;
• nontraditional security issues in global governance (next steps on
climate change, energy security, counterterrorism, antipiracy, human
smuggling, and pandemics, among other issues).
This is the lengthy menu of issues on the agenda that the Trump
administration inherits. Each issue is extremely complex, and in virtually
every area the United States and China have significant differences of opinion
and diverging national interests. This fuels the increasingly competitive
relationship outlined above. But how to assert one’s interests while managing
a competitive relationship so that it does not become a fully adversarial one? 11
Neither Washington nor Beijing possesses the experience or a playbook for
managing a relationship that is so deeply interdependent yet simultaneously
filled with complex bilateral frictions and geostrategic rivalry.
The Deeper Context
While important, bureaucratically managing the issues on the
bilateral, regional, and global agendas is not by itself a sufficient way to
11 These issues, and potential policy approaches to them, are addressed in the Task Force on U.S.
Policy toward China, “Engagement with Resolve: An Interests-Based Approach to China,” Asia
Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and University of California–San Diego 21st Century
China Center (forthcoming).
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understand how U.S.-China relations will likely evolve over the coming
years. There are deeper forces at work in the relationship of which officials
on both sides should be cognizant. These can be thought of as five
variables that will do much to shape how each side approaches the other in
the months and years ahead.
The first variable I would identify is the political insecurity of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which manifests itself in viewing
“Western hostile forces” (a code word mainly referring to the United States)
as subverting the regime’s grip on power. This is a regular narrative in
China and deeply ingrained in the official psyche and propaganda. If the
Trump administration initiates a period where the United States draws
inward, it could actually relieve this perception in China and the CCP and
hence remove one element of tension in relations. Trump said nothing
during the campaign about China’s internal situation or human rights
(he is a businessman—and businesspeople doing business overseas tend
to view human rights policy as an unwelcome complication to advancing
their business interests). Thus, this element of tension in the relationship
might actually subside (which would be welcomed in Beijing), although
the economic and strategic tensions would remain. Conversely, it is equally
plausible that the hard-liners in the Trump administration may double
down and increase criticism of and pressure on Beijing for its repression
(which would have the opposite effect).
The second variable is Trump himself. He has already proved himself
unpredictable and unknowledgeable about world affairs. He holds no
apparent affection for China, regularly criticizing a variety of Chinese
actions. Notably, he has already broken the Taiwan taboo by questioning
the bedrock one-China policy and speaking with Taiwan’s president. The
Chinese side is accustomed to U.S. presidents following the “engagement”
framework, one-China policy, and other time-honored modalities. Thus,
the unpredictability of Trump is a huge new variable, as is his penchant to
publicly and sharply criticize others—Chinese political culture has very
limited tolerance for public criticism.
Third, there is the variable of Chinese nationalism and the country’s
need to be recognized as a leading global power. That will not change and
likely will only increase. The Chinese believe their “time has come” and
that the United States is in protracted decline. The reason this is a variable
is that it could lead to China overreaching and challenging the United
States—possibly provoking a conflict. For its part, the United States is filled
with its own narrative about “making America great again,” its sensitivity
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about its “leadership” role in the world, and quite likely would not back
down from a test posed by China. This could occur over Taiwan, the East or
South China Sea disputes, North Korea, or an inadvertent military incident.
It is precisely against this type of Chinese psychological backdrop that an
accidental incident could trigger irrational reactions and a real conflict.
A fourth variable—parallel to the third—depends on how the United
States defines its national interests and strategic position in East Asia and
the Asia-Pacific. If the United States adopts a “maximalist” position—one
that allows for no “peer competitor” and denies China strategic space—then
there will be increasing frictions and likely military confrontation sooner or
later. 12 Conversely, if Trump pulls back from Asia—as his campaign rhetoric
suggested—then this will relieve the strategic pressure on China and thus
might improve U.S.-China relations. The historical analogy would be with
Great Britain and the United States at the turn of twentieth century—when
Britain ceded the western hemisphere to the United States as a sphere of
influence, thus defusing the Thucydides trap of that era.
To some extent, the United States should be sensitive that the western
Pacific is China’s “front yard” and Beijing is hypersensitive about the U.S.
military presence along its coastline. The United States is unique in having
two oceans that serve as strategic buffers, while China has no such luxury
and has experienced roughly two hundred years of strategic pressure on its
eastern maritime frontier. At the same time, China needs to accept that the
United States has been a Pacific power since 1900, and particularly since
1945. Not only is the United States a long-standing Pacific power, but its
strategic presence and alliances have done much to preserve peace and
stability (critical to economic growth) in the region since 1975. All nations
in the Asia-Pacific have benefitted from that presence (including China),
and none wish the United States to withdraw—or be pushed out of the
region. China will constantly and continually probe Washington’s alliances
and relationships in the region, as well as working to build its own network
of regional ties and client states.
An important fifth variable will be the behavior of regional countries.
Here it is important to consider the broad Indo-Pacific region. Five
countries are allied with the United States (Japan, South Korea, Thailand,
Australia, and the Philippines), some are strategically aligned with the
United States (Vietnam, Singapore, New Zealand, and India), and several
12 See Michael Swaine, Wenyan Deng, and Aube Rey Lescure, Creating a Stable Asia: An Agenda for a
U.S.-China Balance of Power (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016).
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are strategically “neutral” (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia,
Laos, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh), while two are aligned with
China (Pakistan and Cambodia). How all these countries navigate the
U.S.-China regional rivalry will be a crucial determinant. They all seek
close relations with both sides, and none wish to be forced to choose
between Beijing and Washington. Every single one of these countries
walks this tightrope—seeking strong economic ties with both China
and the United States—but most seek close security ties with the United
States. So far, not a single state is looking to China for security protection
(except perhaps Pakistan). Quite to the contrary, these states are all quite
ambivalent about, and many very suspicious of, China and do not wish to
live under a 21st-century version of the ancient tributary system.
Thus, at the time of a U.S. presidential transition, the Sino-American
relationship is in a considerable state of flux. Since 1972 and across nine
U.S. presidents and six Chinese leaders, the relationship has had elements
of friction—but it has endured and continually grown. It is deeply
interdependent and has proved to be resilient. Yet there is a fragility and
unpredictability to the relationship today not witnessed since 1989.
Domestic, regional, and global variables will all condition it—and these
internal and external forces mean that the relationship is not entirely
in the control of leaders on both sides, as exogenous factors will have a
large impact.
At the end of the day, because the Sino-U.S. relationship is the most
important relationship in world affairs, both sides must manage it with
a deep sense of responsibility, exhibit sensitivity toward the other’s
perspectives, make pragmatic compromises, and realize that the failure to
contain the competitive elements could mean disaster for both countries,
the broader Asian region, and the world beyond. This may not be the best
marriage in the world, but it is a marriage where divorce is not an option.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
U.S.-Japan Relations in a Trump Administration
Sheila A. Smith
Donald Trump shocked many in Japan during his presidential
campaign. Trump suggested in a New York Times interview that
Japan and South Korea should develop their own nuclear weapons to
contend with North Korea, stating that “if we’re attacked, they do not
have to come to our defense, if they’re attacked, we have to come totally
to their defense. And…that’s a real problem.” 1 On the campaign trail, he
repeatedly returned to the topic of Japan to note the lack of reciprocity in
the security relationship. At a rally in Iowa on August 6, Trump claimed
he was told that Japan pays 50% of the costs of basing U.S. troops there,
but he then asked, “Why don’t they pay 100%?” 2
These assertions, however, may have little to do with how the Trump
administration manages the U.S. relationship with Japan. What may be most
important is how it envisions U.S. interests in Asia and how it approaches
the United States’ relationship with Japan’s neighbor, China.
This essay will first discuss the likely changes in U.S. strategy toward
Asia under Trump and the implications for U.S.-Japan relations. The next
section will then offer several policy options for the Trump administration
to consider, while the conclusion will assess the impact of Russia’s relations
with both the United States and Japan on the alliance.
Changes in U.S. Strategy toward Asia and the Implications for Japan
The incoming Trump administration’s approach will differ from
the Obama administration’s “rebalance” to Asia. Several broad areas of
policy change seem likely. First, U.S. policy toward China will be more
fraught, and the trade relationship is likely to be the first target of the new
administration. Indeed, designating China as a currency manipulator was
high on the list of what Trump stated he would do in the first hundred days of
his presidency. But since the election, Trump has taken this idea of shaking
sheila a. smith is Senior Fellow for Japan Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She can be
reached at .
1 “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views,” New York Times, March 26, 2016.
2 Jesse Johnson, “Trump Rips U.S. Defense of Japan as One-Sided, Too Expensive,” Japan Times,
August 6, 2016.
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up the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) a step further by suggesting that he would be willing to
abandon the one-China policy that has guided Washington’s relationship
with Beijing since normalization in the 1970s. Accepting a phone call from
Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen on December 2 was the first departure, but
his statements that followed were even more explicit about his intention to
recalibrate the U.S. relationship with the PRC.
Second, the Trump administration seems interested in building up U.S.
military capabilities, including in the Asia-Pacific. Trump’s Asia advisers
have used President Ronald Reagan’s “peace through strength” concept
to advocate for a demonstration of U.S. military power. At face value, this
strategy may not be all that alarming for allies such as Japan, who prefer
that the United States maintain a strong military presence in Asia. How
the incoming president intends to use those forces, however, could be more
worrisome in the context of a far more contentious U.S.-PRC relationship.
Finally, it seems unlikely that the incoming administration will
prioritize the Asia-Pacific’s annual multilateral gatherings to the same
degree as its predecessor. Support for the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and its related regional meetings, such as the East Asia
Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, is likely to diminish. Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe and President Barack Obama have been strong
supporters of ASEAN’s efforts to institutionalize a regional summit
meeting, and their administrations have supported the ASEAN Regional
Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus that seek to find
common ground between regional security and military leaders.
These broad changes in the U.S. approach to the Asia-Pacific will shape
President Trump’s relationship with Japan. First, Washington’s relationship
with Beijing will have a significant impact on bilateral ties between Tokyo
and Beijing. Should tensions with Beijing rise, Tokyo will feel the impact.
A trade war with China would of course be a disaster for most of the
Asia-Pacific economies, and Japan’s economy would be badly affected. Any
protectionist impulse by the United States would affect China’s exports not
only to the United States but also to Japan. Moreover, attempts to levy tariffs
on Chinese manufacturers would affect the global supply chain so necessary
to Japanese companies operating in the United States. Any strain with the
PRC that reduces confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds would shape Japanese
exposure as Tokyo is now the largest investor in U.S. government bonds.
In short, an economic clash between the United States and China would be
harmful to Japan, as it would be to many around the globe.
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Second, tensions with China over Taiwan could shake the foundations
of Japanese security. The last time the United States and China disagreed
over Taiwan, it led to a military showdown across the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing’s attempts to rattle its sabers at Taipei’s new government unsettle
Tokyo. In light of Japan’s continued tensions with China over the Senkaku
Islands and in light of China’s vastly improved maritime capabilities,
deliberately introducing this level of uncertainty will certainly increase the
PRC’s military pressures on Japan. Already Taiwan is being subjected to
ever-greater military stress in its waters and airspace. Given the proximity
of Japanese southern islands to Taiwan, Japan could easily find itself in the
middle of a very uncomfortable military showdown, or Japan itself could
become Beijing’s target. On December 9, the People’s Liberation Army Air
Force flew six aircraft between Okinawa’s main islands and Miyako Island
and another four through the Bashi Strait south of Taiwan. When the
aircraft were confronted with Japan Air Self-Defense Force fighters, Chinese
officials claimed that the Japanese planes were overly aggressive. Japan
denied this version of events. Tensions thus already rose in the East China
Sea even before the Trump administration began.
Finally, while many in Tokyo may welcome a tougher U.S. posture
toward Beijing, there is still considerable concern over how an incoming
Trump administration might respond to North Korean provocations. Every
new U.S. administration must early on confront Pyongyang’s willingness
to provoke Seoul and raise tensions on the peninsula. With the recent
announcement of a new UN Security Council resolution, and with Beijing’s
acceptance of increasing the economic sanctions on Pyongyang, pressure
on Kim Jong-un will rise. China, for example, reportedly reduced its coal
imports from North Korea by $700 million in 2016 to conform with the
new sanctions. 3 But there are additional troubling signs for the peninsula.
The impeachment of President Park Geun-hye has weakened South Korea,
and as the Constitutional Court considers Park’s future, a new presidential
election looms large, making it likely that a coordinated response to a
potential North Korean provocation would be difficult.
Raising the temperature of these Northeast Asian relationships over
the coming months could lead to a far riskier set of military interactions
across the East China Sea. In the absence of military risk-reduction
mechanisms between Japan and China, the United States would need to
3 See “China Puts Temporary Ban on North Korean Coal Imports,” Reuters, December 11, 2016 u
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-un-china-idUSKBN14007R.
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play a critical role in trying to de-escalate tensions through deterrence and
diplomacy. Regional instability would only increase should the presidential
transition prove too chaotic or if Beijing or Pyongyang were to perceive that
Washington’s commitment to deter aggression against its allies in Tokyo or
Seoul had weakened.
An Agile Alliance
Over the next four years, the U.S. president will need to double
down on alliance cooperation with Japan. Abe’s overtures to Trump may
prove helpful in shaping the new U.S. administration’s approach to its
ally, and even in designing an overall approach to Asia. Tokyo’s interests
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are strong, and Abe has invested
considerable political resources in bringing the agreement to a successful
conclusion. There is still hope in Japan that the TPP will be reconsidered by
Trump, but Abe has openly stated that “the TPP is meaningless without the
participation of the United States.” 4 Should the new administration follow
through on Trump’s campaign promise to back away from the TPP, it will
be a tremendous setback for Japan and for Abe.
Military cooperation between the United States and Japan is critical to
both countries. In the wake of the Cold War, Tokyo and Washington have
upgraded their thinking about how the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the
U.S. forces in the Pacific can best assure deterrence and contribute to regional
peace and stability. Tokyo’s investment in ballistic missile defenses includes
R&D with the United States and has been upgraded since Pyongyang’s
rapid development of its missile program. Maritime cooperation, long a
mainstay of the alliance, now extends to regional cooperation with other
maritime powers in Asia. Japan’s navy, the Maritime Self-Defense Force,
also contributes to antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, protecting
global commerce. Upgrades in Japan’s military capabilities, including
through the introduction of the F-35 and in intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities, will be a significant contribution to the regional
balance of power as Chinese capabilities continue to grow. The incoming
Trump administration must affirm its continued commitment to fine-tune
strategic cooperation in the U.S.-Japan alliance.
4 “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following His Visit to Argentina and His
Attendance at the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Lima, Peru and Related Meetings,” Prime
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, November 21, 2016.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
A few positive signs exist for improving cooperation under the new
administration. Trump can expect to have Abe as a partner for much of the
next four years, as the conservative Liberal Democratic Party is expected
to extend his term as leader of the party. Barring an electoral setback, this
should keep him in the prime minister’s office through 2020. Another reason
for optimism is that Tokyo policymakers welcome a “strong America”
platform, with its ambition for economic growth and military superiority,
and will be eager to work at linking this to an equally strong foundation for
economic and military cooperation in the alliance.
Yet the Trump administration will need to analyze carefully the equities
in the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Trump campaign’s emphasis on reciprocity in
the alliance with Japan revived a dated language for burden sharing. Today,
few in Japan see providing more money for U.S. forces as appropriate. Tokyo
and Washington just concluded their five-year bilateral host-nation support
agreement in 2015, and that provides $1.6 billion per year in support of
U.S. forward-deployed forces. What will be more important going forward
will be the improvements in military coordination and planning and in
the roles, missions, and capabilities needed by Japan and the United States
to demonstrate the capacity to deter threats and ensure maritime security
across Asia-Pacific sea lanes.
A second much-needed area of alliance attention is in crisis-management
capabilities. There is plenty of opportunity for military strains to become
serious conflicts during crises, and Northeast Asia has had its share of
close calls. The 2010 sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyong
Island by North Korea were managed diplomatically by Seoul, but these
events have raised the sensitivities of South Koreans to pressures from
the North. Likewise, the clashes between Tokyo and Beijing over the East
China Sea islands brought two Asian giants close to a military exchange and
deepened fears in Japan of Chinese opportunism. To better prevent tensions
from escalating to the level of military force, U.S. and Japanese security
leaders announced a new alliance coordination mechanism in 2015, which
will ensure full coordination of responses to crises and a commitment to
de-escalate incidents that could result in armed conflict. The mechanism
was an asset to U.S. and Japanese responses to North Korean missile and
nuclear tests in 2016 and will be particularly useful should an incident
between Japanese and Chinese forces occur. Tokyo and Beijing must be
encouraged to conclude their own military risk reduction agreement.
Finally, the United States and Japan must accelerate their cooperation
with other partners in the Asia-Pacific. This is critical first and foremost
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to regional maritime cooperation but is also important to the economic
development of the Asia-Pacific. Trilateral cooperation among the United
States, Japan, and South Korea ensures military readiness in the face of an
increasingly provocative and militarily capable North Korea. Seoul and
Tokyo have just concluded an information-sharing agreement that had been
derailed in 2012 during a rise in political tensions between the two U.S.
allies. The United States and Japan also cooperate closely with Australia,
ensuring that the western Pacific remains safe and secure.
New opportunities to involve Japanese strategic planners in regional
cooperation should be supported. Growing strategic consultations with
India are vital to the United States and Japan, and the trilateral Malabar
exercise in 2015 demonstrated the shared interest in extending cooperation
throughout the Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister Abe has also continued to
discuss maritime cooperation with the Philippines, even as President
Rodrigo Duterte has pulled back from military exercises between U.S. and
Philippine armed forces. Finally, Tokyo and Washington have a long list
of shared interests with the ASEAN nations, particularly with the coastal
states concerned about maritime security.
A Final Word on the Putin Factor
The potential for positive change in relations between the United
States and Russia offers opportunity and challenge to U.S.-Japan relations.
The deterioration of U.S. relations with Russia during the Obama
administration is well-known, and Trump has been clear that a top priority
for his administration will be to develop a better working relationship with
President Vladimir Putin. But U.S. military and intelligence leaders see
critical conflicts of interest with Putin’s Russia, and the cyberattacks during
the U.S. presidential election remain a considerable hurdle to improving
U.S.-Russian relations. Tensions within the incoming administration on the
U.S.-Russia relationship are all but assured.
Prime Minister Abe also wants to see improvement in his country’s
relations with Moscow and has engaged in ongoing discussions with Putin
on a path to finally signing a bilateral peace treaty. A comprehensive deal
between Abe and Putin would include a resolution to the territorial dispute
over what Japanese refer to as the Northern Territories and Russians
term the Kuril Islands. Four islands are at stake, and Putin has indicated
that he would be willing to go back to a proposal crafted in the 1950s of
returning two of the islands to Japan. But there are likely to be conditions
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attached, including a promise not to allow military access to either Japan
or the United States. Japanese fishermen, however, would be grateful
for the clarity that this agreement would bring. On his side, Putin wants
a large injection of Japanese capital into the Russian Far East. Japanese
corporations are already invested in the region’s resources, including
liquefied natural gas near Sakhalin Island, but are wary of overly exposing
themselves while the U.S.-Russia relationship remains on hold. Putin’s
visit to Japan on December 15–16 brought some sense of movement on the
economic front, but little yet in terms of resolving their sovereignty dispute
over the Northern Territories. Overall there was disappointment in Japan
that Putin was not willing to move further on an initiative that would bring
the Japanese and Russians closer together on the islands, but Abe will be
visiting Moscow in 2017 to continue to press for a cooperative outcome on
the islands.
Geopolitics are also driving this relationship, however. The two powers
will restart their strategic dialogue—the 2+2 meeting of foreign and
defense ministers that Putin and Abe agreed on early in their diplomatic
effort. Putin reminded his Japanese audience that it was the United States
that was the primary impediment to improved bilateral relations. 5 While
it seems premature to expect that a peace treaty between Japan and
Russia will emerge soon, the next U.S. administration must discuss with
the Abe government their approaches to Russia. Even though Tokyo and
Washington may not share similar perspectives on Putin’s ambitions, the
alliance must rest on an understanding of where the divergences in national
interests may lie.
Conclusion
The 2016 presidential campaign was a tumultuous one for the
U.S.-Japan relationship. Trump’s comments on Japan alarmed and unsettled
many on both sides of the Pacific. In the wake of the election, however,
communications with the Trump transition team as well as between Trump
and Abe have eased some of the anxiety about the future of the alliance
under the new U.S. administration.
Yet the larger uncertainty about how the new president will shake
up U.S. policy toward Asia continues to shape Japanese attitudes on
the transition. Confrontation with China would put Japan in the crosshairs,
5 Sheila A. Smith, “Putin’s Japan Visit,” Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound, December 19,
2016 u http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/12/19/putins-japan-visit.
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particularly if it involves military tensions. Also, a trade war between the
United States and the PRC would have deleterious effects for the Japanese
economy and could destabilize the global trading order. In a rapidly
changing Asia, Japan’s prime minister and the U.S. president will need to
develop a strategy for the alliance that is more than reacting to the latest
provocations. It is time for an alliance that can articulate a shared strategic
vision and is far more agile in anticipating the complex moves afoot in the
geopolitics of today’s Asia.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
Hazards on the Road Ahead:
The United States and the Korean Peninsula
Sue Mi Terry
In important ways, U.S. relations with the Korean Peninsula have been
frozen in amber since the end of the George W. Bush administration.
President Barack Obama did not try to revive the failed six-party talks.
Instead, he cooperated with a friendly conservative government in
Seoul—first under President Lee Myung-bak, then under President
Park Geun-hye—both to strengthen sanctions on North Korea and to
improve alliance and defense coordination among the United States, the
Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan. This resulted in Seoul’s decision
to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile
defense system and to share military intelligence with Tokyo. It did not,
however, stop Kim Jong-un from pressing ahead with the regime’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programs. With North Korea now threatening to
deploy nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting
the continental United States, the need for unity between Seoul and
Washington on how to confront this threat is greater than ever. But this
comity will be harder to achieve than before because of the tectonic shifts
that are occurring in South Korea just as the new U.S. administration is
taking office.
This essay examines the outlook for U.S. policy toward the Korean
Peninsula, beginning with an examination of the political upheaval
currently occurring in Seoul and the growing threat posed by the Kim
regime. The essay then analyzes options for the United States and concludes
with policy recommendations for the incoming administration.
South Korea: Political Upheaval Could Challenge U.S.-ROK Alliance
Donald Trump suggested during the campaign that he is likely to seek
renegotiation with Seoul and Tokyo to convince the two allies to increase
their share of the cost to subsidize the expense of stationing U.S. troops in
Northeast Asia. He might actually have had a good chance of extracting a
greater contribution out of South Korea if the conservative Park remained
in office as president. But she is in the process of being ousted as a result
sue mi terry is Managing Director for Korea at BowerGroupAsia. She can be reached at
.
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asia policy
of a scandal involving the undue influence exerted over her by long-time
confidant Choi Soon-sil. Choi stands accused of abusing her privileged
position to extort $70 million or more from leading chaebols (South Korean
business conglomerates), with some of the money allegedly siphoned off
for her personal use. This scandal considerably decreases the odds of the
conservative Saenuri Party staying in power and increases the likelihood
of a more liberal candidate winning the presidency. If that were to happen,
it could heighten uncertainty about the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance
because the opposition parties in South Korea are more inclined than
Washington to find common ground with Pyongyang.
South Korea’s parliament impeached President Park in December
2016, and now the Constitutional Court must decide within six months
whether to uphold the motion. If the impeachment motion is upheld, Park
would have to leave office and a snap presidential election would occur
within 60 days. Besides UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon, who has
hinted strongly but not officially declared whether he will run when his
term expires at the end of 2016, the leading candidate to replace Park is
the liberal opposition leader, Moon Jae-in. Compared with President Park
or Secretary General Ban, Moon is far less enamored of the United States
and far more inclined to take a conciliatory line with North Korea. Moon
is likely to revive his own version of the Sunshine Policy toward the North
pursued by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roo Moo-hyun from 1998 to
2008. During this period, Seoul pumped approximately $8 billion in
economic assistance into North Korea in the hopes of improving bilateral
relations, and there was a wide gap between Washington and Seoul over
how to handle Pyongyang. 1 Moon has also repeatedly underscored a policy
favoring Beijing, which will likely entail a greater diplomatic investment
in relations with China than with the United States. All in all, having
declared his intent to revive former president Roh’s legacy, Moon is likely
to modify the U.S.-ROK alliance to alleviate China’s chronic security
concerns, including by delaying or canceling the planned deployment of
THAAD and moving away from closer ties with Japan. 2
1 Evan Ramstad, “North Korea: A Burden for the Future?” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2010.
2 “South Korean Leadership Contender Moon Jae-in Suggests THAAD Deployment Should Be
Decided by the Next Government,” South China Morning Post, December 15, 2016 u
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2054913/south-korean-leadership-contendermoon-jae-suggests-thaad;
and “South Korean Presidential Frontrunner Pledges Dialogue with
DPRK Leader, Reset with Japan,” Global Times, December 16, 2016 u http://www.globaltimes.cn/
content/1024105.shtml.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
The same is true of another leading progressive candidate rapidly
rising in polls, Lee Jae-myung, mayor of Seongnam, a city near Seoul.
With populist movements gaining traction globally, Lee, whose nickname
is “Korea’s Trump,” is tapping into anger in South Korea over corruption
and the lack of jobs. Invoking Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, Lee has
promised to eliminate an “establishment cartel” and break up the chaebols.
He has said that he will meet with Kim Jong-un unconditionally and that
Japan should be dubbed a “security foe” of South Korea because it has not
been repentant enough for its aggression in the early twentieth century. 3
Before the Choi scandal, Ban was the leading candidate to replace
Park, but in the aftermath of the scandal, the odds of a Moon or Lee
administration have greatly increased. In the event that the Trump
administration pushes too hard for a greater South Korean contribution
to U.S. alliance expenses—and particularly if this demand is accompanied
coincidentally by a scenario that spurs anti-American sentiment (like the
one in 2003 surrounding the death of two girls in an accident involving a
U.S. military vehicle or the protests in 2008 over U.S. beef imports)—either
Moon or Lee, as the new president of South Korea, might refuse to comply
with U.S. demands and allow U.S. troops to leave. This is a deeply unsettling
prospect for both the alliance and the strategic stability of Northeast Asia.
North Korea: Calculated Provocations and Nuclear Weapons
Development
Meanwhile, the Kim regime is sure to continue its dangerous
provocations and attempt to drive a wedge between Washington and
Seoul, one of its “go to” strategies in the past. North Korea already
conducted its fifth nuclear test on September 9—the second such event in
2016—following the test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile in early
August. Pyongyang is now only biding its time until it conducts yet another
nuclear test, with the end goal of achieving the capability to attack the
United States with nuclear weapons. At least in the beginning of the Trump
administration, Kim may calculate that it is better to show some restraint to
explore the potential for a pathway to talks with Washington; if the North
does show restraint, this would be in stark contrast with how it greeted the
incoming Obama administration—with a multistage rocket launch and
3 “I Jaemyeong, ibeon-en Ban Ki-mun bipan ‘chin-ildogjaebupae selyeog-ui kkogdugagsi’ ”
[This Time, Lee Jae-myung Criticizes Ban Ki-moon as “Corrupt Puppet of Pro-Japanese Forces”],
Joongang Ilbo, December 21, 2016 u http://news.joins.com/article/21029269.
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asia policy
a second nuclear test in May 2009. Although the Kim regime no longer
desires negotiations with Washington to achieve denuclearization, it does
seek negotiations to conclude a peace treaty that would shore up its internal
and international standing.
Indeed, there are a number of Korea watchers who argue that
President Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” and strategy of sanctions
have failed and that it is time to return to negotiations with Pyongyang,
even without preconditions. 4 Some of these critics also argue that it is time
to negotiate with the North over capping or freezing its nuclear weapons
development rather than seek denuclearization, which they believe is
no longer a realistic goal. They advocate that the United States should
conclude a peace treaty with North Korea because only then would the
North feel secure enough to denuclearize. 5
As well-intentioned as these arguments are, following such advice
would be a mistake. Engaging with the Kim regime prematurely is not likely
to lead to either denuclearization or, in the long run, peace and stability
on the Korean Peninsula. All U.S. administrations dating back to the Bill
Clinton presidency in the early 1990s have tried to address the North Korean
threat through various means, including engagement and negotiations
sweetened by economic aid to Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership
has been happy to pocket the aid, but it has not delivered on promises of
ending its nuclear program. The Obama administration even negotiated a
freeze in 2012, dubbed the “Leap Day deal,” in which North Korea agreed to
a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests. Almost immediately
after the deal, Pyongyang violated it by launching a new satellite using
ballistic missile technology banned by the United Nations. Moreover, the
question remains, even if there is another deal to cap the North’s nuclear
weapons program, how would we know that the Kim regime will apply the
freeze to all of its facilities? We even lack the knowledge of where all the
North’s nuclear facilities are.
A similar problem exists with the argument for a peace treaty. There is
not a shred of evidence that a treaty would solve any of the problems created
by North Korea’s policies—from its nuclear program to human rights
violations—and it would be difficult to monitor. The long history of dealing
4 See, for example, Jane Harman and James Person “The U.S. Needs to Negotiate with North Korea,”
Washington Post, September 30, 2016; and Joel S. Witt, “How the Next President Can Stop North
Korea,” New York Times, September 13, 2016.
5 See, for example, Leon V. Sigal, “Getting What We Need with North Korea,”
Arms Control Today, April 2016 u https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_04/Features/
Getting-What-We-Need-With-North-Korea.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
with the North is littered with broken promises and verification problems.
The Kim regime’s call for a peace treaty is not in any case intended to achieve
an effective and lasting peace mechanism to replace the 1953 armistice but
simply to facilitate a negotiation process that would lead to the pullout of
U.S. troops from South Korea and an end to the U.S.-ROK alliance.
This is not to say that the United States should never resume negotiations
with the North. But Washington should consider doing so only after decisively
raising the cost for the Kim regime of its present path and only when North
Korea is genuinely interested in denuclearization. At the present moment, the
Kim regime has not indicated that it is ready to reconsider its policy choices.
In fact, the regime has stressed in the past few years that it has no intention of
ever giving up its nuclear arsenal, even revising the constitution to enshrine
North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. The North continues to see possessing
nuclear weapons as essential for its national identity, security, and power and
prestige on the international stage.
If there is any chance at all that North Korea would ever entertain the
idea of giving up its nuclear program, it would be only because the new
administration has made it very clear that the Kim regime is facing a stark
choice between keeping its nuclear arsenal and regime survival. Contrary
to what many believe, Washington has not used every option available at
its disposal to ratchet up pressure against the regime. Until February 2016,
the United States did not maintain comprehensive sanctions against North
Korea—U.S. sanctions were a mere shadow of those applied to Iran, Syria,
or Burma and even narrower than those applicable to countries such as
Belarus and Zimbabwe. As many experts have pointed out, the argument
that sanctions on North Korea have maxed out is simply untrue. 6
Today, we finally have stronger sanctions in place for North Korea
following President Obama signing into law the North Korea Sanctions
and Policy Enforcement Act in February 2016. The following month the
UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2270, imposing
new sanctions on the Kim regime, including mining exports. In June,
triggered by requirements of the sanctions act, the Obama administration
finally designated North Korea as a primary money-laundering concern,
and in July the Treasury Department designated Kim Jong-un, ten other
senior North Korean individuals, and five organizations for human rights
violations. In late November the UN Security Council imposed another
6 See, for example, Joshua Stanton, “North Korea: The Myth of Maxed-Out Sanctions,” Fletcher
Security Review 2, no. 1 (2015); and Bruce Klingner, “Six Myths about North Korea Sanctions,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Korea Chair Platform, December 19, 2014.
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asia policy
round of sanctions, adopting Resolution 2321, which further caps North
Korea’s coal exports, its chief source of hard currency.
The Korean Peninsula and Steps on the Road Ahead
For sanctions to work, they will need to be pursued and, even more
importantly, enforced over the course of several years, as the United
States did with Iran. Here, the chief problem has been that China is still
reluctant to follow through in fully and aggressively implementing the
UN sanctions. This is why secondary sanctions are necessary. The Obama
administration has been slow to sanction Chinese firms or any of the
dozens of third-country enablers of North Korean proliferation and money
laundering because doing so risks further straining relations with Beijing.
The incoming Trump administration, however, has signaled a possibly
more aggressive approach with China, given Trump’s willingness to
become, even before the inauguration, the first U.S. president to talk to a
president of Taiwan since 1979. This action—likely seen by the Chinese
leadership as being confrontational toward China—could spill over onto the
Korean Peninsula and further hamper prospects of Chinese cooperation in
implementing sanctions on North Korea. But even if it does not, in practice
there have been hard limits to how far Beijing is willing to turn the screws
on its clients in Pyongyang. Therefore, even if the United States must endure
some ire from Beijing for enforcing secondary sanctions, this is exactly what
the incoming administration should do.
History gives us a useful example of how secondary sanctions could
work. In September 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
Macao-based Banco Delta Asia for laundering North Korea’s counterfeit
dollars, which led to the blocking of $25 million in North Korean
deposits—one of the key streams of hard currency for sustaining the Kim
regime. A North Korean negotiator at the time told a U.S. official that the
United States had finally found a way to hurt the Kim regime. 7 The North
eventually returned to the talks and agreed to give up its nuclear weapons
program after the United States agreed to return the funds to the Kim
regime. Unfortunately, after this important leverage was traded away, the
talks fell apart over verification of the North’s disarmament. But what
the case showed is that third countries—in this case China—will comply
with sanctions if their banks face real consequences for conducting illicit
7 Juan C. Zarate, “Conflict by Other Means: The Coming Financial Wars,” Parameters 43, no. 4 (2013–14):
88 u http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2013/9_Zarate.pdf.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
business with North Korea. This confirms the lesson of the Iran nuclear
deal, which ultimately showed that sanctions can obtain results only if they
are tough, enforced, and sustained over several years.
In addition to enforcing the existing sanctions, the next steps are to close
loopholes and add more individuals and entities to the designated entity list to
further confront North Korea with a clear choice between keeping its nuclear
program and regime survival. For example, the United States could seek to
ban North Korea’s exports of labor for hard currency. The latest round of UN
sanctions ignored the legions of North Korean laborers sent abroad, mostly to
China and Russia, to work in the mining, logging, textile, and construction
industries. All in all, the North Korean regime has sent more than 50,000
people to work in conditions that amount to forced labor to circumvent UN
sanctions, earning up to $2.3 billion annually in hard currency for the regime,
according to a UN investigator. 8
In addition to sanctions, there are other actions the incoming
administration could pursue to ratchet up pressure on the regime, including
on the human rights front. It is time to integrate the focus on security and
the focus on human rights—normally two separate policy approaches—into a
single, unified whole. North Korea continues to be the world’s most repressive
state. The threat has always emerged from the nature of the Kim family regime
itself. Not only is focusing on the North’s human rights record the right thing
to do, it could also be a practical source of leverage as well.
The incoming administration should lead efforts in the United Nations
and elsewhere to condemn North Korea’s human rights violations. The
United States should continue to challenge the legitimacy of Kim Jong-un
and his regime based not only on its defiance of UN Security Council
resolutions against its weapons program but also on its grotesque crimes
against humanity. The incoming administration should also consider
developing a comprehensive strategy to help the people of North Korea
break the information blockade imposed by the state. Historically, the
regime has been able to exercise tight control over the population by
indoctrination and a monopoly on information. But unofficial information
is already increasingly seeping into the North across the porous border with
China, chipping away at regime myths and undermining the solidarity of
the North Korean people behind the regime. The new administration may
want to examine ways to increase support for radio broadcasts and other
overt and covert means to transmit targeted information into North Korea.
8 “North Korea Putting Thousands into Forced Labour Abroad, UN Says,” Guardian, October 29, 2015.
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asia policy
Above all, the United States must communicate to the North that it will
suffer devastating and regime-ending consequences should it ever think of
attacking the United States or its allies in the region. The Kim regime must
come to believe that it will lose far more than it will gain by continuing its
provocative course and nuclear weapons development.
The big concern is that even if Washington continues with a hard-line
stance against North Korea, South Korea under a new progressive leadership
may pursue an entirely different policy. The only real solution for Washington
then is to continue efforts to work with Seoul—regardless of who becomes
the president—to upgrade the alliance. This means continually working
on issues beyond the peninsula, including joint peacekeeping missions,
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, cybersecurity,
space, missile defense, nuclear safety, and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief. The more the U.S-ROK alliance expands beyond its original
threat-based rationale to an alliance based on common values such as
democracy, human rights, and free markets, the more difficult it will be for
Seoul to ignore Washington and pursue an independent course.
Last, the incoming U.S. administration should continue to state its
commitment to extended nuclear deterrence over South Korea. The U.S.
security arrangement with South Korea since 1953, which includes a nuclear
guarantee by which the United States pledges to protect South Korea, has
enabled the South to disavow the development and deployment of nuclear
weapons. While campaigning, when Trump was asked whether he was
worried that a withdrawal of U.S. troops might lead Japan and South
Korea to go nuclear, he was nonchalant about this prospect. Perhaps this
was a negotiating tactic to convince the two allies to pay more of the costs
associated with their protection. Regardless, it will be important for the
United States to continue its commitment to defend South Korea, including
through nuclear deterrence. This will discourage dangerous provocations
and an attack from the North and make it less likely that the South will
pursue an independent policy—including the possible development of its
own nuclear arsenal—that could imperil U.S. interests in the region. Despite
the increased hazards ahead on the Korean Peninsula, opportunities exist
for progress if amid difficult political transitions the United States and South
Korea can stay closely aligned in facing the menace from North Korea.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
U.S.-Taiwan Relations in the Trump Administration:
No Big Fixes Needed
Richard C. Bush
As the Obama administration officials hand off Asia policy to Donald
Trump and his team, one success story is the relationship with Taiwan.
Through concerted efforts and in spite of very occasional difficulties,
Washington and Taipei have broadened and deepened their bilateral ties
over the last eight years. The two governments are working, in the words
of one U.S. official, “to build a comprehensive, durable, and mutually
beneficial partnership.” 1 Going forward, continuity, not reinvention, is
the most sensible path. A rift is not impossible, but if it occurs, it will be
because a deterioration in Taiwan-China relations drives a wedge between
Washington and Taipei. That has happened before, but it need not happen
again this time around. Based on current circumstances, a cross-strait
downturn is more likely to disrupt U.S.-China relations than U.S.-Taiwan
relations. This essay examines the ways in which the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship is both normal and unique, the changes brought by the January
2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen, and U.S. policy going forward.
A Unique Relationship
In some ways, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan seems perfectly
normal. Its economy is complementary to that of the United States, and
with a population of only 23 million people, it is still the United States’
ninth-largest overall trading partner and seventh-largest destination for
agricultural exports. In 2015, U.S. two-way trade in goods with Taiwan
exceeded $66 billion, a 4.5% increase from 2013. 2 In the last year, the United
States became Taiwan’s second-largest trading partner after mainland
China. Most significantly, Taiwan companies are the vital center of global
supply chains that run from the United States through Taiwan to China
richard c. bush is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he holds the Michael H.
Armacost Chair and Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies and is the Director of the
Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He can be reached at .
1 Susan Thornton, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2016 u http://docs.house.gov/
meetings/FA/FA05/20160211/104457/HHRG-114-FA05-Wstate-ThorntonS-20160211.pdf.
2 Ibid.
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asia policy
and to the world at large. Under a bilateral trade and investment framework
agreement, the two governments are working to deepen economic ties and
remove barriers.
At Taiwan’s request, the United States has sought to find ways to expand
Taiwan’s contributions to the international community, despite China’s
persistent efforts to exclude it. Facilitating global training is a good example.
In June 2015 the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding creating
the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, whereby the United States
and Taiwan agreed to conduct training programs for various Asian experts
to assist their own countries in building capacities to tackle issues where
Taiwan has proven experience and advantages. Counterterrorism is another
example. In 2015, as a member of the coalition to counter the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Taiwan worked together with the United States to
deliver 350 prefabricated homes for displaced families in northern Iraq. 3
Finally, as with many other places around the world, over several
decades immigrants from Taiwan to the United States have created a
human American stake in Taiwan’s future. A significant number of people,
probably over one million, in the United States have connections to Taiwan
and contribute to American life in myriad ways. In 2015, Taiwan was the
United States’ seventh-largest source of international students, higher than
the more populous Japan, United Kingdom, or Germany. 4
It is when we move from economic, functional, and people-to-people
areas to the diplomatic and security arenas that U.S.-Taiwan relations
become “not so normal.” The United States does not recognize or have
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) government in
Taipei but instead recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
Beijing. Washington has an embassy in Beijing and conducts its ties with
Taiwan through a nominally private organization, the American Institute
in Taiwan, which is staffed by U.S. government employees.
This unique character applies to security as well, with the political
and military threat from China perceived by Taiwan closely binding the
island to the United States. The ROC fears that through force, coercion,
or intimidation, Beijing will compel the island to be incorporated into the
PRC. That fear only deepens as China’s military power and willingness to
accept risk grow. Under the rubric of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the
3 Thornton, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
4 Ibid.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
United States has sustained a political commitment to defend Taiwan, and
substantive military-to-military relations are broad and deep. 5 Taiwan is
thus a rare case where Washington has a security partnership with an entity
with which it does not have diplomatic relations. Moreover, it has pledged to
help defend this entity against a government with which the United States
does have relations.
Beijing sees a threat of its own. It holds that the island is a part of the
sovereign territory of China and has set “reunification” of the island as its
goal since the PRC’s establishment in 1949. Since the early 1980s, Beijing has
urged the island to accept the unification formula used for Hong Kong (“one
country, two systems”), an approach Taiwan has consistently rejected. 6
China fears that Taiwan might move toward de jure independence. To deter
that possibility, it has acquired capabilities needed to mount a significant
attack on the island and to complicate any U.S. intervention. In order to
weaken the island’s defenses, China has objected to the U.S. security
relationship with Taiwan, including arms sales.
Taiwan’s democratization, completed in the early 1990s, introduced a
special complexity to the island’s relationship with both China and the United
States because the process released previously repressed Taiwan-centered
sentiments and even ignited calls for Taiwan independence. Whereas in a
1994 survey 26.2% of respondents said they were Chinese, 20.2% said they
were Taiwanese, and 44.6% said they were both, in 2016 only 4.1% of those
polled said they were Chinese, 59.3% said they were Taiwanese, and 33.6%
said they were both. 7
The public’s strong identification with Taiwan does not necessarily
translate into a strong desire for independence, though. Indeed, over 85% of
people surveyed want to preserve the status quo forever or for a long time. 8
Most Taiwan people are pragmatic and understand that a move toward
formal independence would lead to military action by China. 9 Still, Beijing
5 Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations, 1942–2000 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe,
2004), 152–60. The United States concluded a defense treaty with Taiwan in 1954, but the Carter
administration terminated it in 1979–80 as a condition for establishing relations with the PRC.
6 On Taiwan’s resistance to one country, two systems, see Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making
Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).
7 “Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan (1992/06~2016/06),” Election
Study Center, National Chengchi University, August 24, 2016 u http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/
news.php?Sn=166#.
8 “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Trend Distribution in Taiwan
(1992/06~2016/06),” Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, August 24, 2016 u
http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167.
9 Yuan-kang Wang, “Taiwan Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Security Issues: Implications for U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 2 (2013): 93–113.
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asia policy
worries that the identity trend fosters a growing separatist danger and fears
that a Taiwan leader will move toward independence through a series of
incremental and covert actions. The mainland was particularly aggressive
when Chen Shui-bian was president during 2000–2008. His Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) includes the creation of a Republic of Taiwan in its
charter, and he proposed initiatives that Beijing believed had separatist intent.
The Taiwan-China-U.S. triangle was calm from 2008 to 2016, when
Ma Ying-jeou, from the Kuomintang (KMT) party, was president. He
sought to stabilize cross-strait relations by engaging China, particularly
in the economic arena. But Ma was careful not to wade into political areas
for both policy and political reasons. 10 The United States supported these
developments because they contributed to its interest in peace and security,
while China believed that a gradual process toward unification had begun.
But midway through Ma’s second term, the public concluded that economic
ties to China increasingly worked to Taiwan’s disadvantage and that the
ROC was on a slippery slope to political incorporation.
The Election of Tsai Ing-wen and China’s Response
In the January 2016 presidential election, the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen rode
this unhappiness with KMT policies to an easy victory. Equally significant,
her party won control of the Legislative Yuan for the first time. Voters
apparently believed that Tsai could better address the mainly domestic
policy issues facing the island, and they took comfort in her pledge to
maintain the cross-strait status quo—that is, she would not provoke China.
Beijing was not so confident. Doubting Tsai’s stated intentions, it
demanded that she explicitly accept certain principles (the 1992 Consensus
and its “core connotation”) to prove that she did not have an independence
agenda. 11 Tsai addressed those issues only ambiguously, in part because
some in her party were resolutely opposed to accommodating China at
all. But ambiguity did not satisfy Beijing, and it intensified diplomatic and
political pressure. The PRC reversed the policy it followed in the Ma period
of allowing Taiwan’s participation in selected international organizations.
10 Richard C. Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2013).
11 The 1992 Consensus refers to an ambiguous understanding reached between the two sides in late
1992 that allowed interactions between semiofficial agencies of the two governments. The core of
the understanding was the principle—left undefined—of one China. It was Ma’s acceptance of the
1992 Consensus that facilitated the improvement in cross-strait ties for much of his presidency. The
“core connotation” is that the geographic territories of the mainland and Taiwan both belong to one
and the same China (that is, de jure independence for Taiwan was off the table).
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
It also gave economic incentives to local jurisdictions led by KMT politicians
and denied them to ones led by the DPP.
The U.S. interest in all of this is the preservation of cross-strait peace
and stability. Specifically, Washington has hoped that the differences
between China and the new Tsai government would not produce another
round of tensions between the two sides, as happened during the Chen
Shui-bian administration. But unlike Beijing, Washington has not assumed
Tsai will create trouble. Instead, it has called on both sides to demonstrate
restraint, patience, flexibility, and creativity. By these measures, Taipei has
met U.S. expectations more than Beijing has.
Confirming the U.S. judgment is President Tsai’s policy emphasis
since her May 2016 inauguration. Her agenda primarily focuses on the
domestic issues that swept her and her party to victory: ending economic
stagnation, reducing the reliance on nuclear power, meeting the needs of the
aging population, decreasing inequality, and reforming the judicial system.
While Tsai seeks to sustain good relations with the United States and Japan
and improve ties with Southeast and South Asia, she understands that her
success depends on continuity in cross-strait relations—hence, her effort to
offer ambiguous reassurance to Beijing.
So why did Beijing demand Tsai’s explicit reassurance when it should
have known the domestic political obstacles in the way? It does not require
special insight for Beijing to recognize that Tsai and her people have ample
reasons to mistrust mainland intentions (just as the mainland mistrusts
Tsai) and that Taiwan has its own need for reassurance. And yet China
neither acknowledges that mistrust is mutual nor accepts that the desire for
trust-building is also mutual. The most plausible explanation is that China
does not want to find a basis for mutual accommodation and coexistence.
Instead, it seems to wish to create obstacles to Tsai’s success and raise the
probability that the KMT will return to power sooner rather than later.
(How soon the KMT could do so is an open question. The factors that
produced its defeat in 2016 may well persist.)
Beijing’s choice not to accommodate its position to the DPP victory and
to the seven million voters who backed the party may reflect a judgment that
it need not accommodate Tsai and can simply wait her out. The PRC’s power is
growing, and it can frustrate Tsai’s policy goals and meddle in Taiwan politics.
It may indeed help create circumstances that bring the KMT back to power.
But such a cynical approach, combined with an unwillingness to adjust the
formula of one country, two systems, despite its widespread unpopularity on
the island, will only reduce any confidence that the Taiwan people may have
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asia policy
had in Beijing’s good intentions. Beijing’s heavy-handed response to political
protests in Hong Kong has only deepened their mistrust.
Going Forward
Beijing often blames the United States for Taiwan’s reluctance to
negotiate on acceptable terms. U.S. arms sales are the main complaint,
but there are others. And yet U.S. policy toward Taiwan is not the reason
that China has failed to make more progress toward its goal of unification.
Instead, Beijing’s own “one country, two systems” policy, which Taiwan
rejects, is the obstacle. The island’s democratization and the stronger
Taiwan identity that resulted certainly solidified that obstacle, but they
did not cause it. Taiwan’s leaders can certainly stir up localist nationalism
and increase tensions between Beijing and Washington. But even a more
China-friendly leader like Ma Ying-jeou was unwilling to move beyond
economic engagement to political talks. Just because China seeks to
deflect blame for a cross-strait stalemate and tension does not mean that
Washington or Taipei should accept responsibility.
Let us assume that President Tsai continues her policy of patience,
forbearance, and nonconfrontation and that Beijing, through its own
actions, does not divert her from that course. What, then, is an appropriate
future course for U.S.-Taiwan relations?
• The United States and Taiwan must continue to conduct their relations
through intensive communications, respect for each other’s interests,
and avoidance of surprises. The December 2 phone conversation
between President-elect Trump and President Tsai suggests that the
new U.S. administration may seek to upgrade bilateral relations to
some degree. That is likely to be more successful if Beijing can conclude
that the adjustments do not destroy the framework of unofficial ties
that Washington accepted in 1979 for its relations with Taipei. Under
no circumstances should Washington take steps that lead China to
punish Taiwan, even if it chooses to spare the United States.
• Washington and Taipei should work assiduously to liberalize bilateral
economic relations. Taipei would like to be part of a second round of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but since even the first round is in
doubt, its greatest opportunity lies with a bilateral investment agreement. 12
That in turn will require Taiwan to address some existing barriers
12 On the TPP, see Richard C. Bush, “Taiwan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: The Political
Dimension,” Brookings Institution, East Asia Policy Paper, no. 1, January 2014 u
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/taiwan-tpp-bush-012014.pdf.
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(e.g., market access for pork, regulations concerning pharmaceuticals).
But the United States should be willing to address those matters in the
course of negotiations, not as a required price of entry.
• The United States and Taiwan should deepen their security
relationship, including through U.S. arms sales, in response to China’s
continuing military buildup. The cooperation should be based on
a clear understanding of how China’s growing capabilities have
changed the threat Taiwan faces, as well as of what defense strategy
and procurement program would be the best response. Innovative
and asymmetric capabilities for Taiwan will likely enhance deterrence
better than state-of-the-art systems.
• The United States should continue to assist Taiwan with participation
in the international community. The unavoidable reality of China’s
opposition will require ongoing creativity on how to liberate Taiwan’s
ability to contribute.
Under no circumstances should the United States even consider “doing
a deal” with China regarding Taiwan’s future. The island’s interests should
not be sacrificed in order to get China to change its policies on other
interests of priority to the United States, such as North Korea. After all,
as noted above, China’s own policies are the reason it has failed to bring
around the island’s leaders and “win the hearts and minds” of the Taiwan
people, not the security support of the United States. There is no reason for
Washington to give to Beijing what it cannot secure for itself.
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Trump and Putin, Through a Glass Darkly
Kimberly Marten
As 2017 dawns, relations between the United States and Russia are at
their worst level since the height of the Cold War. Russia has been
under U.S. sanctions since it seized Crimea and intervened in eastern
Ukraine in 2014, and new sanctions were added after U.S. intelligence
agencies determined that Russia was responsible for hacking and publicizing
emails from the Democratic National Committee and other political actors
during the 2016 elections. In recent years, the number of dangerous military
incidents between the two countries has skyrocketed, as the Russian
military seems determined to test U.S. readiness by provoking hazardous
close encounters in the air and at sea. Russia has built up military forces and
weaponry along its borders with NATO countries, causing NATO at its 2016
Warsaw Summit to approve small force presence increases in some of its own
member states that border Russia, including the post-Soviet Baltic countries
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as Poland. Moscow regularly
stages unannounced war exercises modeled after World War II land battles.
Meanwhile, a wide range of arms control treaties between Washington and
Moscow, which helped define U.S.-Soviet relations and limit the danger
of their interactions in the late Cold War era, lie in tatters. As outgoing
President Barack Obama leaves office, communications between U.S.
officials and their Russian counterparts have reportedly virtually ceased.
But Donald Trump’s election has thrown a wrench into predictions
about U.S.-Russia relations. Trump has expressed admiration for Russian
president Vladimir Putin and seems to be heading for another attempt at
a “reset.” However, Trump’s statements and cabinet nominations have
engendered so much controversy, including within the Republican Party,
that it remains to be seen what direction U.S. policy toward Russia will take
during his administration. It is also unclear what President Putin may have
in mind for President Trump.
This essay will first examine the controversies over Russian hacking
and their potential consequences, and then consider U.S. sanctions and
their likely trajectory. Next, it will examine Russia-NATO tensions in more
depth, including Russian use of information warfare against Washington’s
kimberly marten is the Ann Whitney Olin Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and
the Director of the Program on U.S.-Russia Relations at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University.
She can be reached at .
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European allies. It will then turn to a discussion of Putin’s seeming aims.
The essay will close with an overall assessment of the relationship going
forward, focusing on challenges that will need to be overcome for Trump to
succeed in his attempts at a new reset in the relationship.
Russian Interference in the U.S. Election
U.S. policy toward Russia under Trump will take shape against
the backdrop of ongoing debates about Russian interference in the U.S.
presidential election. Despite some initial uncertainty about whether
the findings of U.S. intelligence agencies converged, more recent reports
indicate that the CIA and FBI agree that Putin himself most likely oversaw
the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and that the ultimate
Russian goal was to support Trump’s candidacy over that of Democrat
Hillary Clinton. There is additional evidence that Russian sources routinely
published “fake news” on English-language websites in an attempt to swing
public opinion against Clinton. Trump initially ridiculed these reports,
stating that no one really knows who did the hacking and that he does not
trust the CIA because of the bad intelligence it provided in the lead-up to
the Iraq War of 2003.
Several high-ranking Republican politicians have disagreed with
Trump’s dismissive comments and demanded an immediate rigorous
bipartisan investigation into Russian hacking. The internal conflict
among powerful Republican leaders is a crucial bellwether because
pitched disagreement between Congress and the White House over U.S.
policy toward Russia could wreak havoc on a wide variety of presidential
initiatives. A fundamental question to watch, then, as the Trump presidency
unfolds is whether Trump takes seriously the U.S. intelligence community’s
findings that Russia tried to sabotage the U.S. electoral process. If Trump
accepts this conclusion, it will be hard for him to reset relations with Russia.
If he rejects it and continues to criticize U.S. intelligence agencies publicly,
he may also find himself in a lasting bureaucratic battle that undermines his
own effectiveness.
U.S. Sanctions on Russia and the Ukraine Crisis
Trump said during the campaign that he would consider lifting the
sanctions imposed against Russia over the Ukraine crisis and might even
recognize the occupied Ukrainian province of Crimea as Russian territory.
Crimea’s Black Sea waters are rich in natural gas resources that Russia
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cannot exploit without access to Western technology. Russia also needs
sanctioned Western technology to exploit its Arctic oil reserves. Meanwhile,
the ongoing low-level war in eastern Ukraine shows no signs of ending.
Trump has nominated recently retired ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson
to be secretary of state—a man who received the Russian Order of Friendship
from Putin and whose firm’s $723 million joint venture with Russian state
oil company Rosneft was put in jeopardy by U.S. sanctions. This nomination
suggests that the Trump administration might consider lifting sanctions
and working to expand U.S. business opportunities in Russia. Of course,
global petroleum prices are low enough right now that investments by big
oil have diminished even in the Alaskan Arctic, so it is not clear that energy
deals with Russia would yield much profit for U.S. business anytime soon.
Even if Trump lifts the Russian sanctions that Obama imposed via
executive authority, the U.S. Congress could pass a new law keeping the
sanctions in place or even expanding them, a move that powerful Republican
senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham have championed. Congress
showed overwhelming bipartisan support for the Magnitsky Act of 2012,
which sanctioned Russian officials for human rights violations in the
arrest and jailhouse murder of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. Whether
bipartisan support for sanctions this time around would be strong enough
to withstand a presidential veto remains to be seen. But with the Magnitsky
Act, Congress learned that it could tie the president’s hands by connecting
his approval of sanctions to other issues that the administration valued—in
that case, approval for Russian entry into the World Trade Organization. It
could do something similar now to force Trump to extract real concessions
from Russia on any cooperative deal going forward.
The United States, Russia, and NATO
Many foreign policy experts contacted by the Council on Foreign
Relations believe that a militarized conflict between Russia and NATO
in Eastern Europe is a top security threat facing the world in 2017. 1 The
current Russian military doctrine of “information warfare” is particularly
threatening, since Putin and his generals see NATO and the West as
their primary opponents. Information warfare can involve nonmilitary
measures—such as false media reports, hacking, and financial and
logistical support for far-right political parties, including in the established
1 Paul B. Stares, “Preventive Priorities Survey: 2017,” Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive
Action, 2016 u http://www.cfr.org/conflict-assessment/preventive-priorities-survey-2017/p38562.
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democracies of Western Europe—designed to foster NATO disintegration
from within. Russia is in effect challenging the traditional European
values of liberal democracy and human rights that have animated the
alliance for decades.
Information warfare also includes special operations like those
used in Ukraine in 2014 to seize Crimea and foster armed conflict in the
Donbas. Worries about what this might mean for NATO multiplied when
evidence emerged that ethnic Russian nationalists were behind a failed coup
attempt during the October 2016 elections in NATO invitee Montenegro
(whose membership is currently undergoing ratification in various NATO
member states), although Moscow itself has not (at least yet) been tied to
the plot. Some analysts fear that Russia might intervene militarily into
one or more of the Baltic states and that NATO would be unable to react
effectively in time to stop the Russian advance. 2 Yet much more likely (and
hence more worrisome) than a direct invasion across the Russian border
is the possibility that Russia might accelerate and expand the information
war that it is already waging in the Baltics. For example, while Moscow’s
current efforts are mostly limited to pro-Russian and anti-NATO television
broadcasting to Russian speakers in these states, Moscow could exploit
economic or political discontent among the large population of stateless
ethnic Russians living in Latvia and Estonia to spark riots and thereby elicit
demands for Russian military protection. Russia might also try to undercut
NATO unity through military action in a non-NATO border state, such as
Moldova, Belarus, or even the Swedish island of Gotland, in an attempt to
sow panic and send NATO reeling in the face of Russian expansionism.
During his campaign, Trump appeared to disavow the Article 5
collective defense provision of the NATO charter. He questioned the value of
NATO to the United States and suggested that whether to defend a member
from attack would depend on that country’s financial contributions to the
alliance. As a result, both the European Union and several individual NATO
member states are scrambling to find new options for defending against
possible Russian aggression amid concerns that NATO might not survive as
an institution, at least as it is currently understood. If NATO disintegrates,
so will the United States’ global reputation as a reliable ally. Trump’s more
recent comments suggest that he will uphold U.S. NATO commitments.
2 For example, see David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s
Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016) u
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.
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Russian Perspectives on U.S. Relations
Russia has an obvious desire to re-establish itself as a great power with
influence beyond its borders and recover from what it sees as the humiliation
of its post–Cold War years of decline. These geopolitical aspirations help
explain Moscow’s military interventions in Ukraine and Syria, its force and
arms trade buildups, and its championing of both an alliance with China
and the development of the BRICS association (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa) as an alternative to dependence on Western-supported
financial and trade institutions. But all these aspirations are challenged by
Russia’s current economic and budgetary malaise, as well as by the lack of
truly shared interests between Moscow and many of its foreign partners.
Putin’s attempts to use these foreign adventures as a basis for his domestic
popularity may face increasing challenges over time. Putin seems to truly
fear that the United States and its European allies are trying to overthrow
his regime, but Russia may find itself needing to re-establish economic ties
with the West to stay afloat going forward.
Putin faces another presidential election sometime in 2018 (and could
call an early election this year), but no one at the moment believes his
victory is in question. The Kremlin demonstrated quite effectively its ability
to suppress the protests that erupted in large Russian cities following the last
presidential election in 2011. Since that time, Putin has further consolidated
his control over Russian television and other media sources. In April 2016,
he also created a new national guard under his direct command, employing
up to 400,000 troops.
Yet Putin’s crackdown against domestic political opposition may
ironically face a new challenge going forward. If the U.S. president is now
Putin’s friend, there is no longer an external enemy to accuse of undermining
the regime. For which country will the purported domestic traitors now be
working if not the nefarious United States, and how will Putin continue to
justify measures to exert control over the opposition?
Anticorruption activist and opposition politician Alexei Navalny
announced in December 2016 his intention to run against Putin in 2018,
but he does not appear to be a serious threat. Navalny’s last attempt at
political office, the Moscow mayoral campaign in 2012, led (as reliable
polls had predicted) to defeat. Meanwhile, Putin has launched his own
anticorruption drive, stealing Navalny’s thunder while tightening the grip
of his own favored cronies. For example, the Kremlin arrested (and then
fired) Putin’s own economics minister, Alexei Ulyukayev. A mainstream
economist known to favor structural reforms to raise Russia out of its
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recession, Ulyukayev may have been targeted because he dared to take on
the head of Russia’s powerful Rosneft state oil company, Igor Sechin (one of
Putin’s closest friends and a reputed former KGB officer), as Sechin strove
to extend Rosneft’s holdings. When seen in this light, any new U.S. oil deals
with Rosneft might help strengthen Putin’s key domestic coalition.
Assuming that Putin remains healthy, the future of Russia’s policy
toward the United States depends on him and his close network. No one, not
even in the Russian elite, is exactly sure how the Kremlin’s policy decisions
are made these days; there is no longer any kind of bureaucratic hierarchy to
control or influence them. Analysts do agree that the circle of decision-makers
has shrunk over time. Putin is a career KGB officer, skilled in deception and
disinformation, and he seems increasingly reliant on other intelligence officers
as advisers who may share his sense of paranoia about the West. He is also a
judo master, someone who thrives on finding his opponents’ weaknesses and
then causing them to fall from their own weight.
Putin pays a great deal of attention to personal relationships in
foreign affairs. This has ranged from the steadfast support he has shown
to a long-term Russian client, president Bashar al-Assad of Syria, to the
Russian state’s hounding of former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael
McFaul and his family. Presumably the relationship between Trump and
Putin will start on a good footing, given the positive regard the two seem
to hold for each other and Trump’s stated intention to work with Russia in
defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) while allowing Assad
to remain in power. But Trump regularly uses off-the-cuff jabs in tweets
and interviews to unnerve those who oppose him. As the honeymoon
between Trump and Putin wears off and diplomatic bumps emerge in the
U.S.-Russia relationship, the emotional tenor of relations between the two
leaders bears watching.
Conclusion
Resets in the U.S.-Russia relationship have been tried repeatedly since
the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, but none has endured for very
long. Russia nurses long-term grievances over the collapse of Soviet power
and the decline of Moscow’s leading role in the bipolar structure of the
Cold War, and tends to blame the United States for its troubles. Meanwhile
the United States has focused its attentions on China, not Russia, as the
rising global power, a trend that Trump seems ready to magnify with his
apparent disavowal of the one-China policy.
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Moscow has attracted attention from Washington primarily by being
disruptive, not cooperative. Putin has built his domestic reputation on
standing up to the West and overcoming U.S. attempts to control the
international system. It remains to be seen whether Putin’s carefully cultivated
image can withstand his cooperation with a domineering U.S. president.
For several years Putin has been building up the Russian military and
advertising Russia’s nuclear might—powerful symbols of the country’s Cold
War glory days. Trump has promised to prioritize U.S. military spending
and weapons purchases in turn. Can good relations between Putin and
Trump withstand a new arms race, especially at a time when Russia sees
itself as China’s ally and Trump has called into question the wisdom of U.S.
restraint toward China?
Through all the recent challenges in their relationship, the United
States and Russia have shared at least one common interest: limiting nuclear
proliferation by rogue actors like North Korea and Iran. Yet Trump has
said he may rethink the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and has also suggested
that perhaps Saudi Arabia—as well as U.S. allies South Korea and Japan in
Northeast Asia—would benefit from building their own nuclear weapons.
The Iran agreement benefits Moscow not only by delaying the appearance
of a new nuclear state near Russian borders (and a new nuclear arms race in
the Middle East) but also by opening commercial opportunities in Iran for
the Russian defense and civilian nuclear industries whose leaders are Putin’s
close allies. Can cooperative relations between Russia and the United States
survive such a fundamental disagreement about a key security issue?
The difficulty of this exercise is compounded by the fact that what
candidate Trump said on the campaign trail may not be what President
Trump champions in office. Yet words matter. One indiscreet tweet by
Trump during difficult bilateral negotiations with Russia might erase his
apparent friendship with Putin. The question then would be how the judo
master from the KGB might use Trump’s weaknesses against him, in an
effort to make the U.S. president fall from his own weight.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
Avoiding the Labors of Sisyphus:
Strengthening U.S.-India Relations in a Trump Administration
Ashley J. Tellis
For close to two decades now, the transformation of U.S.-India relations
has been a bipartisan project in Washington. It has also been uniquely
successful, as alternating Republican and Democratic administrations
have worked with governments led by both the Bharatiya Janata Party
and the Congress Party to exorcise the ghosts of old corrosive Cold War
disagreements. As a result, the United States and India, once sharply
divided by the issues of alliances and alignment, today routinely declare
their commitment to a durable strategic partnership.
Former Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, arguably the
progenitor of the new collaboration, once boldly declared the United
States and India to be “natural allies.” 1 At that moment in 1998, the vision
of fraternity seemed like fatuous rhetoric. But to the credit of Vajpayee’s
successors (Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi) and their U.S.
counterparts (George W. Bush, in particular), his ambition was brought to
fruition rapidly and productively enough for Barack Obama to assert that
U.S.-India ties could become the “defining partnership” of the century ahead.
The first section of this essay discusses the potential implications
of the “America first” agenda that Donald Trump outlined during his
presidential campaign for U.S.-India relations and regional security more
broadly. The second section then assesses several challenges facing the
bilateral relationship.
The Outlook for U.S.-India Relations during the Trump Administration
Although it is not inevitable, Donald Trump’s election as the 45th
president of the United States could interrupt the dramatic deepening
in U.S.-Indian ties to the disadvantage of both nations. If this outcome
were to materialize, it would not be necessarily because Trump harbors
ashley j. tellis is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He can be
reached at .
1 Atal Bihari Vajpayee, “India, USA and the World: Let Us Work Together to Solve the Political-
Economic Y2K Problem” (speech delivered to the Asia Society, New York, September 28, 1998) u
http://asiasociety.org/india-usa-and-world-let-us-work-together-solve-political-economicy2k-problem.
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any particular animus toward India. During the election campaign, he
admittedly did complain that “India is taking [U.S.] jobs” and that the
United States was being “ripped off” by many Asian countries, including
India. 2 But he also declared that he was “a big fan,” and that “if…elected
President, the Indian and Hindu community will have a true friend in the
White House.” 3
The variety of positions expressed by Trump suggests that the potential
threat to the continuing transformation of U.S.-India relations comes less
from his views on India—which are probably unsettled—than it does from
his iconoclastic convictions about the relationship between the United
States and the world. Throughout the campaign, Trump emphatically
affirmed his opposition to the existing international order, arguing that the
United States, far from being its beneficiary, was in fact its principal victim.
To remedy the inconveniences flowing from this pernicious “globalism,”
his America-first campaign promoted an agenda that rejected multilateral
free trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, demanded that
allies bear a greater share of the burdens associated with their defense, and
eschewed U.S. military intervention in virtually all instances other than to
avert direct threats to the U.S. homeland.
While many elements of this nationalist agenda are understandable—even
defensible—the worldview it represents diverges from that which initially
cultured the evolving U.S.-Indian partnership. Going back to the earliest years
of the George W. Bush administration, the United States’ rapprochement with
India was premised on the assumption that the principal strategic problem
facing both countries consisted of the rise of China and the threat it posed
to both U.S. primacy and Indian security—not to mention the safety of the
United States’ other Asian partner and allies—simultaneously. Since it was
assumed that the United States would subsist as the principal protector of the
liberal international order, and the Western alliance system in particular, even
in circumstances where the containment of China was impossible because
of the new realities of economic interdependence, the Bush administration
slowly gravitated toward a strategy of balancing China by building up the
power of key states located on its periphery.
2 “Donald Trump Quotes on India, China, Pakistan, Others: All You Want to Know in 10
Slides,” Financial Express, May 5, 2016 u http://www.financialexpress.com/photos/businessgallery/248200/donald-trump-on-india-china-pakistan-others-all-you-want-to-know-in-10-slidesdonald-trump-quotes/11.
3 “Donald Trump’s Quotes on India: Narendra Modi Is a Great Man, I Am a Fan of Hindus,”
Indian Express, October 16, 2016 u http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/
donald-trump-promises-a-better-friendship-with-india-praises-narendra-modi-3085432.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
India’s large size, its geographic location, and its own rivalry with
China made it the ideal partner in such a strategy. Hence, it was not
surprising that the Bush administration consciously sought to aid the
expansion of Indian power with the expectation that the presence of strong
states surrounding China would limit Beijing’s capacity for misbehavior.
The success of this solution where India was concerned, however, hinged
on two complementarities: one, that the United States would continue to
remain the ultimate guarantor of Asian security, ready to protect its friends
and allies should their own national capabilities or collaborative endeavors
prove insufficient to the task of constraining China’s aggressiveness; and
two, that Washington would persist in strengthening Indian power without
any expectations of strict reciprocity because New Delhi’s expanding
capabilities—insofar as they could help limit Chinese ambitions—advanced
the United States’ larger geopolitical objectives in Asia and globally.
To the degree that Trump’s administration adheres to his campaign
agenda and dashes both these expectations, the ongoing transformation of
U.S.-India relations will falter. In the first instance, this is simply because no
matter how much U.S. allies take responsibility for their own defense, they
are as of now simply incapable of protecting the liberal international order
independently, much less balancing China’s rise effectively. Only the United
States has the capability to secure these twin objectives simultaneously. If
Washington now wavers in pursuing these goals, it will undermine not only
the security and well-being of the United States’ friends and allies but also
its own global primacy. An Asia in which the United States ceases by choice
to behave like a preponderant power is an Asia that will inevitably become a
victim of Chinese hegemony. In such circumstances, there are fewer reasons
for India to seek a special strategic affiliation with the United States, as the
partnership would not support New Delhi in coping with the threats posed
by Beijing’s continuing ascendancy.
The current U.S. commitment to the rise of Indian power sans
symmetric reciprocity was devised during the Bush administration but
has been faithfully continued by President Obama for very good reasons. It
was anchored in the presumption that helping India expand in power and
prosperity served the highest geopolitical interests of the United States in
Asia and globally—namely, maintaining a balance of power that advantaged
the liberal democracies. Accordingly, it justified acts of extraordinary U.S.
generosity toward India, even if specific policies emanating from New Delhi
did not always dovetail with Washington’s preferences.
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asia policy
Given that what India could become—a power capable of successfully
balancing a rising China—mattered more for U.S. interests than what
New Delhi did on any other issue, U.S. policy for almost two decades has
embodied a calculated altruism whereby Washington continually seeks
to bolster India’s national capabilities without any expectations of direct
recompense. This approach has been exemplified by bold U.S. policy
decisions to conclude a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India,
support India’s candidacy for permanent membership in the UN Security
Council, provide New Delhi with expanding access to advanced U.S.
defense and dual-use technologies, and champion India’s membership in
the governing institutions of the global nonproliferation regime.
Because the burgeoning transformation in bilateral ties during the last
two decades has been nourished by such largesse (all motivated by good
strategic reason), any shift now toward transactionalism—if that is what
Trump’s America-first approach requires toward ostensibly free-riding
allies—would inevitably retard the further deepening of U.S.-Indian
strategic ties. This enervation would occur mainly because India’s current
developmental infirmities simply do not allow it to satisfy any expansive U.S.
demands for specific reciprocity, especially in areas such as trade openness.
To be sure, every Indian government would make the best effort
possible to satisfy U.S. expectations of reciprocity as they emerge—if the
issues at stake are judged to be worth it—but there would be no denying
the fact that the character of the bilateral relationship would change
fundamentally and not obviously for the better. If New Delhi fails to satisfy
the anticipation of reciprocity embodied by an America-first policy—a
likely prospect given India’s resource and power constraints—both nations
will have ended up worse off. Without the benefit of a preferential affiliation
with the United States, India’s challenges with regard to managing a rising
China (and even a troublesome Pakistan) will have become considerably
more difficult. The United States in turn will have lost the opportunity to
preserve an advantageous Asian balance of power, which by incorporating
a strengthened India actually constrains Chinese ambitions and thereby
buttresses U.S. primacy for more time to come.
Challenges Ahead
At this juncture in history the fundamental challenge to improving
U.S.-India relations does not consist of overcoming the various problems
commonly enumerated: the still significant barriers to market access
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in India; the Indian clamor for more employment visas, for greater access
to U.S. technology, or for a totalization agreement on social security
contributions; or even New Delhi’s disenchantment with several U.S.
global policies, its attitude to various international institutions, or its
approach to China and Pakistan. These issues are undoubtedly real, but
they can be managed, as they have been more or less satisfactorily for the
last twenty-odd years. It would help, however, if the Trump administration
took the existing threats of Pakistan-supported terrorism against India
more seriously, developed a considered strategy for aiding India in coping
with Chinese assertiveness, and persisted with the existing U.S. policy of
eschewing mediation on the thorny Indo-Pakistani dispute over Jammu and
Kashmir. Yet even such initiatives would realize their fullest success only if
the larger architectonic foundations of the bilateral relationship—centered
on boosting New Delhi’s power—are fundamentally preserved, not because
they happen to be favorable to India but more importantly because they
serve larger U.S. grand strategic interests in Asia and beyond.
If these interests were to be radically redefined such that the
preservation of the U.S.-dominated liberal order globally or in Asia ceased
to enjoy priority in Washington, the potential for U.S. benevolence (however
motivated) toward India would also proportionately diminish. If it were
to be replaced instead by policies that demand greater Indian repayment
for U.S. favors, New Delhi’s incentives to resuscitate a new version of
nonalignment could further increase. By itself, such an outcome does not
automatically undermine vital U.S. interests and may even advance them if
it results in greater independent intra-Asian balancing vis-à-vis China.
The only question at that point, however, would be whether these
behaviors are likely to be successful. If so, the United States will have gained
the best of all worlds: constraints on Chinese ambitions at low cost to itself.
But if autonomous intra-Asian balancing in the absence of U.S. support
fails to restrain China’s exercise of its growing power, the major regional
countries, including India, may be compelled to reach varying kinds of
accommodations with China. These outcomes would neither serve U.S.
interests in Asia nor help protect U.S. primacy globally. More importantly,
they can be avoided by persisting with the liberality that characterizes the
United States’ current policy toward its pivotal Asian partners such as India.
Much depends on what the Trump administration’s policy toward
Asia actually turns out to be in practice and the extent to which it exhibits
continuity with prevailing U.S. strategy. Since his election, Trump seems to
have subtly shifted away from some extremes of his America-first approach.
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He has, for example, in conversations with various European and Asian
leaders tacitly indicated his recognition of the value of standing U.S. alliances.
Two of his advisers, Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, have in fact plainly
declared that “there is no question of Trump’s commitment to America’s
Asian alliances as bedrocks of stability in the region.” 4 Such reassurances are
all to the good. But the new administration must go further.
It is insufficient to think of Beijing as posing merely economic problems
for Washington. It certainly does but represents much more: China
is fundamentally a geopolitical rival of the United States engaged in a
long-term struggle for mastery in Asia. China seeks to recreate the sphere of
domination it once enjoyed on the continent by cowing its neighbors—many
of which are U.S. allies—and by deploying the coercive capabilities that
could prevent the United States from coming to their aid in the event of a
crisis. China’s enduring objective consists of nothing less than ejecting the
United States from its current position as the hegemonic stabilizer of Asia.
The challenges posed by China’s rise and its assertive behaviors thus
implicate the core issues of political order throughout the Indo-Pacific
region, a part of the world to which the United States simply cannot be
indifferent without suffering grave risks to its own standing in international
politics. Coping with these problems will require the Trump administration
not only to strengthen existing U.S. alliances but also, and more importantly,
to recommit itself to preserving, as Condoleezza Rice once phrased it, “a
balance of power that favors freedom” in Asia. 5 An integral component
of that effort involves the unstinting U.S. support of India’s rise to power.
Any alternative approach to New Delhi will not only fail to produce the
best outcomes for the United States; it will also make the task of improving
bilateral relations akin to the labors of Sisyphus.
4 Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, “Donald Trump’s Peace through Strength Vision for the
Asia-Pacific,” Foreign Policy, November 7, 2016 u http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/07/
donald-trumps-peace-through-strength-vision-for-the-asia-pacific.
5 Condoleezza Rice, “A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom” (Walter B. Wriston Lecture delivered
at the Manhattan Institute, New York, October 1, 2002) u https://www.manhattan-institute.org/
html/2002-wriston-lecture-balance-power-favors-freedom-5566.html.
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Pakistan and the United States: A More Turbulent Ride?
Teresita C. Schaffer
The news following Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the U.S.
presidential election has provided a steady dose of drama to the
often turbulent U.S.-Pakistan relationship. During the campaign, Trump
promised to clamp down on “radical Islamic terrorism” and proposed a
total ban on Muslims entering the United States, later scaling this back
to “extreme vetting.” 1 Three weeks after the election came the phone
conversation between Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif and Trump.
The Pakistani government’s press release described the conversation as an
effusive exchange, with Trump quoted as saying “you are a terrific guy”
and that Pakistanis are “one of the most intelligent people.” 2 The Pakistani
account also described a Trump offer to mediate Pakistan’s “outstanding
problems.” This astonishing range of views from the incoming U.S.
leader would appear to foreshadow a time of great unpredictability in
U.S.-Pakistan ties.
U.S.-Pakistan relations have generated intense frustration for both
countries. But Pakistan has 180 million people, nuclear weapons, and a
major unresolved dispute with a nuclear neighbor. Among armed groups
present there, some are starkly at odds with the government, others the
army regards as intelligence assets, and some the United States regards
as terrorists. Pakistan also has close political and growing economic
relations with China, which it considers its most faithful friend. The new
U.S. administration, like its predecessors, will need to deal seriously with
Pakistan. Recent commentary referring to Pakistan, despite its history
of alliance with the United States, as a “frenemy” captures some of the
ambiguity in this complicated relationship. 3
teresita c. schaffer is a retired U.S. diplomat who served in Pakistan and around the region.
She is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Senior Advisor to McLarty
Associates. She can be reached at .
1 Jeremy Diamond, “Trump Proposes Values Test for Would-Be Immigrants in Fiery ISIS Speech,”
CNN, August 15, 2016.
2 Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage (Pakistan), “PM Telephones
President-Elect USA,” Press Release, November 30, 2016 u http://www.pid.gov.pk/?p=30445.
3 See, for example, the statement by Rand Paul at a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing
on the supply of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, March 2016, cited in Joe Gould, “Pakistan F-16 Sale
Survives U.S. Senate Dogfight,” Defense News, March 10, 2016 u http://www.defensenews.com/
story/defense/2016/03/10/pakistan-f-16-sale-survives-us-senate-dogfight/81602882.
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Are Pakistan and the United States Partners?
The strategic drivers of U.S.-Pakistan relations have had considerable
staying power over the years. The United States and Pakistan have been
security partners in one form or another since 1954. There have been three
periods of especially intense engagement: the early Cold War from 1954 until
the India-Pakistan war of 1965, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its
aftermath from 1979 to 1990, and the period since the attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001. During all three periods, Pakistan’s main
strategic goal was to line up support from major powers against what it saw
as an existential threat from its large neighbor, India. The U.S. objectives, on
the other hand, reflected strategic goals outside Pakistan—developing the
Cold War alliance system in the 1950s, responding to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in the 1980s, and after 2001 conducting the war on terrorism,
in which Afghanistan was a sanctuary for the terrorists who attacked New
York and Washington, D.C.
The two countries’ strategic objectives, in other words, were only
partly aligned. They believed they needed each other but also worked at
cross-purposes. In the past decade, their mismatched goals have badly frayed
their partnership, generating mistrust and cynicism in both countries.
Popular support for the United States has fallen starkly in Pakistan. In the
United States, congressional support for Pakistan remained strong until the
late 1980s but has declined sharply in the past decade.
Looking ahead, the U.S.-Pakistan strategic disconnect will continue to
shape two key U.S. strategic interests: the future of Afghanistan and peace
between the two nuclear neighbors, India and Pakistan. However, some of
the positions advanced by the Trump campaign, the Trump administration’s
key personalities, and Trump’s own style will powerfully affect the
environment in which both countries make policy. They will particularly
affect other highly emotive issues with which the United States and Pakistan
have wrestled, greatly heightening the volatility of the relationship.
Afghanistan and Terrorism
Afghanistan has been at the heart of U.S.-Pakistan engagement since
the attacks of September 11. As part of the strategic partnership against
terrorism, the United States provided Pakistan with substantial assistance,
which it hoped would enlist Pakistan in preventing Afghanistan from
again becoming a haven for terrorism. As in the past, the two countries’
immediate priorities were different. Pakistan sought to eliminate Indian
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influence in Afghanistan and establish a friendly government there,
achieving what was referred to as “strategic depth.” The United States aimed
to prevent the Taliban from remaining the dominant player in Afghanistan,
to banish al Qaeda, and to leave behind an Afghanistan that was reasonably
peaceful, coherent, and capable of keeping terrorism at bay. It hoped to leave
behind a measure of democracy as well.
The gap between these goals deepened the U.S.-Pakistan “trust deficit,”
as the Pakistanis called it. Pakistan’s continuing involvement with elements
of the Taliban and its unwillingness or inability to keep Taliban forces from
using Pakistani territory as a sanctuary led the United States to suspect that
Pakistan was making common cause with U.S. adversaries in Afghanistan.
From Pakistan’s perspective, the U.S. failure to accept its requirement for a
“friendly”—read subservient—government in Afghanistan put the United
States at odds with the goal of strategic depth dear to the Pakistan Army,
long the country’s most important political player.
The year 2011 showcased this strategic divergence and misunderstanding
at its worst. In January a CIA contractor assigned to the consulate general
in Lahore shot and killed two Pakistanis under disputed circumstances. He
was released from prison and repatriated only after a “blood money” deal
brokered by Saudi Arabia. On May 1 of that same year, the United States
raided the house where the architect of September 11, Osama bin Laden,
had been living for years, killing bin Laden. Just as importantly, the raid
publicly embarrassed the Pakistan Army, which was outraged by this
violation of sovereignty. Shortly thereafter, the outgoing U.S. chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his final congressional testimony, charged
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence with maintaining one of the most
hostile elements of the Taliban, known as the Haqqani network, as a virtual
subsidiary. Finally, in November 2011, approximately 25 Pakistani troops
were killed in a U.S.-led NATO attack on a border post between Pakistan
and Afghanistan. A U.S. investigation held that the incident was a tragic
error, but the Pakistan Army deemed it a deliberate assault. Pakistan
responded to this string of disasters by banning the transit of U.S. military
equipment to Afghanistan across Pakistan and by attempting to ban drone
attacks. Although the United States and Pakistan have climbed back from
the 2011 low point in their relations, mutual mistrust remains as the U.S.
government changes hands.
One question for the new administration will be deciding on the role
of the roughly nine thousand U.S. troops that remain in Afghanistan and
the future size of this force. The U.S. Defense Department and military
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leadership will almost certainly continue to make a strong argument that
the United States needs to achieve some degree of stability on the ground
and try to develop a coordinated game plan with Pakistan before making
further reductions in the U.S. military presence.
The Pakistan government, despite widespread resentment of the
United States, is in no hurry to see the small remaining U.S. military
contingent disappear. But it has proceeded with caution in clamping down
on antigovernment forces. The army’s most successful operation against
insurgents, Operation Zarb-e-Azb (“sharp strike”), was able to restore
government authority to large areas in the northwest but was undertaken only
after years of anxious deliberation. Nor does Pakistan wish to strengthen the
hand of what it regards as pro-Indian elements in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s desire to exercise decisive influence in Kabul—and more
broadly the U.S.-Pakistan strategic disconnect—has bedeviled the task
of creating and implementing a coordinated strategy between Islamabad
and Washington. Afghanistan has a weak record of maintaining internal
security, and Pakistan’s relations with the Afghan government are fractious
at best. There have been a number of efforts to negotiate a political
understanding between the Taliban and the Afghan government, some
of which were supposed to bring Pakistan and the United States into the
process. They all failed. Suspicions among different Afghan political
and insurgent leaders played a big part in this, and so did Pakistan’s
unwillingness to press its friends among the Taliban, many of whom reside
at least part-time in Pakistan, to negotiate.
In other words, the careful approach that other administrations
have pursued and that the new Trump administration is likely to try
to follow—first improve the situation on the ground, then phase out
the U.S. military presence—will require bringing together a group of
mutually suspicious allies that have historically been quite ready to betray
one another. Success will demand enormous patience at a time when
Congress and the American people have relatively little, and the Trump
administration may have less. The administration will undoubtedly be
looking for a way to muscle Pakistan into a more cooperative posture,
perhaps by conditioning economic assistance or military sales on
Islamabad delivering a better result in Afghanistan. The United States
has relatively few other sources of leverage against the Taliban. The fact
that terrorist groups have a presence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan
will intensify pressure on the Trump administration to show results.
Confrontational tactics have not had much success in the past, however.
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Cracking down on militants or on Pakistan’s Afghan allies could trigger
dangers that Pakistan regards as existential, so the pushback against
confrontational U.S. tactics could be far stronger than expected.
India, Nuclear Weapons, and Kashmir
What Pakistan has most wanted from each of its engagements with the
United States is an effective alliance against India. During the Cold War
alliance in the 1950s and in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, the United States expressed some sympathy with Pakistan
on some of its disputes with India. But even in those glory days Washington
stopped well short of an alliance against India. Now, with a quarter century
of dramatically expanding U.S.-India relations, a surging Indian economy,
and a weightier Indian role in global affairs, there is practically no chance
of the United States adopting a hostile policy toward India in order to
accommodate Pakistan. The Pakistan government understands this, but
the realization rankles, and it contrasts unfavorably with China’s more
enthusiastic embrace of Pakistan. Nothing in Trump’s campaign would
suggest that the new administration has any interest in such a policy. There
is also no congressional pressure in that direction, nor would U.S. strategic
interests benefit from such a move.
Historically, Pakistan had sought to involve the United States in
brokering India-Pakistan negotiations over Kashmir, the area the two
states have disputed since partition in 1947. Since the 1950s, India has
strenuously objected to any kind of third-party involvement, which it sees
as an affront to its dignity—and as undercutting its advantageous position
as the stronger of the two contending powers. India, moreover, controls
the most prized parts of the disputed territory. Pakistan still professes to
want U.S. involvement, but the army and others in fact question whether
U.S. intervention would advance its objectives. This dynamic explains why
there has been no serious U.S. effort to broker a Kashmir agreement since
the early 1960s. Consequently, despite the excitement stirred up by the
Trump-Sharif phone call, playing a mediating role is unlikely to be a serious
policy option for the United States.
U.S. crisis-management diplomacy has had more success. In 1999,
negotiations between then president Bill Clinton and Nawaz Sharif,
during his first term as Pakistan’s prime minister, led to a withdrawal of
the Pakistani troops that had infiltrated Kargil in the Indian-controlled
part of the old Kashmir state. Despite Pakistan’s historical quest to
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improve its bargaining position with India by involving the United States,
the U.S.-brokered withdrawal from Kargil had the opposite effect. It
contributed to the Pakistan Army’s decision to oust Sharif a few months
later. By contrast, President Clinton’s decision to maintain close contact
with Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee throughout the crisis
built up U.S.-India relations.
Another relative success story is the development of nuclear
confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan, though these
were worked out bilaterally. Since the two states went nuclear, they have
instituted measures such as the establishment of hotlines between senior
military commanders and an annual mutual declaration of the locations of
their nuclear installations, coupled with an agreement not to attack the sites.
On a couple of occasions since their nuclear tests in 1998, the two countries
have initiated talks about the issues they would need to resolve in order to
fully make peace. In 2003, Islamabad and New Delhi concluded a ceasefire
in Kashmir that lasted over a decade. But several promising starts went
nowhere, and India-Pakistan relations are now at a low point.
The chances of a breakthrough in the bilateral relationship are very
poor, and receptivity to a U.S. role in that direction is poor as well. While
some experts have argued that resolving the India-Pakistan dispute would
open the door to a more cooperative Pakistani approach to regional
security, the record of the past few years suggests that strong governments
in Islamabad and New Delhi working bilaterally have the best chance at
moving forward. This would argue for the new Trump administration to
closely watch India-Pakistan relations, remaining alert to opportunities
where the United States could discreetly encourage forward movement or, if
relations continue to sour, avert a crisis.
Pakistan’s Internal Challenges
U.S. policy has often tried to bring about changes in Pakistan’s complex
and sometimes troublesome internal governance. Pakistan has spent nearly
half of its independent existence under military rule, and even during
periods of civilian government, the army has been the single most important
political player. The army also largely controls foreign and security policy. It
has faced an active insurgency in parts of the country for over four decades,
representing a challenge to the government and, potentially, a homegrown
source of terrorism. Political violence has been high, and religious
minorities have been under threat. A new chief, Qamar Javed Bajwa, has
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just taken command of the Pakistan Army. Like his predecessors, he will
represent the institutional role of the army, but it is far too early to tell what
changes he may bring to the table.
Both President-elect Trump and Prime Minister Sharif undoubtedly
saw their phone call as the beginning of a personal relationship. Sharif has
been quite successful in establishing personal ties with national leaders
important to his country, but this has not necessarily translated into
favorable policies at the national level. Trump’s statements on the campaign
trail suggest that he might approach his longer-term dealings with Sharif as
an exercise of asymmetric power. That is likely to be a double-edged sword,
as the Pakistan Army can be unforgiving in punishing civilian leaders who
are too responsive to powerful foreigners.
The Trump administration may well change how the United States
deals with Pakistan on issues of governance and economics, which could
both ease and complicate the bilateral relationship. Reduced U.S. emphasis
on international human rights seems quite likely, and the Pakistani
government would certainly welcome this change. Similarly, Trump may
not be bothered by the Pakistan Army’s large role in politics and policy.
His administration may also be less interested in monitoring the conduct of
Pakistan’s elections and the quality of democratic governance.
In other respects, the Trump administration’s policies may be tougher
on Pakistan. One can imagine a more confrontational U.S. position pressing
Islamabad to clamp down on terrorist groups, both in Pakistan and in
Afghanistan. And while Trump may be eager to promote expanded business
ties in Pakistan, he may take a hard line on trade and be unsympathetic
to long-standing Pakistani interest in greater duty-free access to the U.S.
market. Finally, economic aid to Pakistan has been unpopular in the U.S.
Congress for a long time. Thus far there have been few clues as to whether the
new administration will be willing to push for generous foreign assistance
as a tool for building up the economy of a sometimes troubled partner.
In contrast to the big strategic issues, the Trump administration is more
likely to handle these questions of governance, terrorism, and economics
with the volatility that we observed during the campaign and the transition.
Many Pakistanis believe that the United States is hostile to Muslims, and
the statements they have read from the Trump campaign will reinforce this
view. The Pakistani government, as well as nonstate actors in Pakistan, will
be acutely sensitive to indications that the United States is targeting Islam.
Trump has said on several occasions that he values unpredictability in
business negotiations, implying that the same logic should guide foreign
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policy negotiations. His oft-repeated plan to call for renegotiating trade
agreements and his criticism of the quality of those negotiations suggest
that he wants to maximize the return to U.S. power in doing so. Any U.S.
negotiator, and any U.S. president, seeks to protect and advance American
interests. But those interests are often best advanced in concert with other
countries. Pakistan is a troublesome friend with whom U.S. interests are not
well-aligned. Nonetheless, advancing U.S. interests in this complex region
will require more strategic patience and creativity. There is a long history
of difficult negotiations between Pakistan and the United States in which
Pakistan has been fairly successful at manipulating the United States through
“the art of the guilt trip.” 4 There is ample scope for the United States to adopt
more savvy tactics, but the Trump administration would be wise to avoid
triggering outright hostility.
4 For a longer discussion of this history, see Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How
Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster (Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace, 2011).
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U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations:
Raised Stakes and Renewed Importance
Brian Harding
Southeast Asia’s profile has risen dramatically in U.S. foreign policy
circles in recent years. After the United States drifted away from the
region following the end of its involvement in Vietnam in 1975, U.S. attention
began to return in the early days of the George W. Bush administration,
although at that time largely in the context of President Bush’s global war on
terrorism. Toward the end of the Bush years, Washington began to wake up
to the broader importance of the region as a hub of global growth and as an
arena where competition for the future shape of Asia would take place in the
context of China’s rising regional influence. In 2007 the Bush administration
sent a strong signal of U.S. interest in deepening ties with the region when
it made the United States the first country to nominate an ambassador to
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Meanwhile, outside
the U.S. government, Southeast Asia studies programs began to crop up in
the Washington think-tank community, suggesting broad interest among
foreign policy elites in reflecting more deeply on the region’s importance.
This pattern accelerated dramatically under President Barack Obama.
This essay begins by describing developments in U.S.–Southeast Asia
relations during the Obama administration and then outlines challenges
that the Trump administration will face in the region. It concludes with
policy recommendations for the Trump administration.
Rebalance within the Rebalance
U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia—both with the ten ASEAN
countries bilaterally and with ASEAN as an institution—accelerated
dramatically beginning in 2009 under the Obama administration. This
surge in attention toward Southeast Asia followed decades of Northeast
Asia dominating U.S. policymaking toward Asia. While the administration
continued to pay considerable attention to Northeast Asia, a marked
uptick in attention to Southeast Asia constituted a rebalance within the
administration’s overall rebalance to Asia.
brian harding is the Director for East and Southeast Asia at the Center for American Progress.
He can be reached at .
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This shift was on clear display from the outset of the administration.
When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton broke with 50 years of tradition
and made her first trip as secretary to Asia, not only did she make stops in
Northeast Asia powerhouses Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing, but she also visited
Jakarta to signal her intention to work more closely with Southeast Asia,
including ASEAN’s de facto leader Indonesia. Furthermore, during that
landmark visit, she became the first secretary of state to visit the ASEAN
Secretariat, based in Jakarta. This move demonstrated that multilateral
engagement with ASEAN would be a high priority in the administration’s
regional approach, in line with Obama’s global re-engagement with
multilateral structures.
President Obama delivered on this early intention to engage ASEAN
more deeply in numerous ways. Multilaterally, he signed with ASEAN the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, paving the way for
U.S. membership in the East Asia Summit. He made the U.S. ambassador
to ASEAN resident in Jakarta (another first for a non-ASEAN country).
Obama inaugurated annual 10+1 ASEAN-U.S. summits and later in his
presidency hosted a landmark U.S.-ASEAN leaders retreat at Sunnylands
in California. On the people-people front, the Clinton State Department
launched the highly successful Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative,
aimed at deeper engagement with ASEAN youth. The Department of
Defense also became increasingly engaged with ASEAN as it embraced the
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus forum. Perhaps most importantly,
U.S. officials across the government began to make a habit of showing up
at regional meetings at all levels, including through the secretary of state’s
annual attendance at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
Bilateral relations in the region also surged. The U.S.-Philippines
alliance went from near irrelevance to a central component of Asia
policy, with the signing of the landmark Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement bringing the relationship into a new era. Ties with Myanmar
began anew when Obama seized the opportunity that reforms presented
to ease sanctions and normalize relations, while the end of defense
trade restrictions with Vietnam signaled a full normalization of ties.
Throughout the region, the administration built an architecture for
engagement that did not previously exist—from annual secretary of state
engagements with Indonesia and Singapore to defense policy dialogues
with Vietnam and Thailand.
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Headwinds
The progress the Obama administration made in deepening ties with
Southeast Asia could not have happened without strong demand for U.S.
involvement in regional affairs from regional countries. This demand is
fundamentally driven by the region’s concern about being dominated by a
single outside power—such as China—and interest in having as much U.S.
trade, investment, and technical assistance as possible. These drivers will
not disappear during the Trump administration.
However, the administration faces several challenges in terms of
Southeast Asia policy. First, among its difficulties will be to demonstrate that
the United States remains a reliable partner. Southeast Asians are already
asking what an “America first” foreign policy means and whether the
United States will continue to be engaged in regional affairs. The dismissal
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) raises major questions about what
the United States can bring to the table in terms of economic engagement,
despite high levels of FDI from the U.S. private sector. Regional countries
also wonder if the United States will continue to “sail, fly, and operate
anywhere international law allows.”
Donald Trump’s comments during his presidential campaign
regarding Muslims also create a new barrier to relations with the region,
particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Even if Trump adjusts
his rhetoric, he has already left a deep impression among Southeast Asian
elites and publics alike. While Indonesian and Malaysian foreign policy is
fundamentally interest-driven and not ideological, issues of religion will
hang over these relationships.
Finally, even if the Trump administration gets regional policy right,
it will find the region devoid of international leaders, with many countries
themselves looking inward. Two of Southeast Asia’s natural leaders and
obvious U.S. partners—the Philippines and Indonesia—are now led by
presidents who are popular at home but focused on internal affairs. With
Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar also focused on domestic issues, Vietnam
and Singapore form the vanguard of outward-looking ASEAN countries
in the near term. As a result, there is little driving substantial ASEAN
integration and cohesion over the next several years. Unfortunately, this
will constitute a risk for U.S.-ASEAN relations, as a better-integrated, more
effective ASEAN encourages U.S. policymakers to continue the at-times
difficult nature of multilateral diplomacy in Southeast Asia.
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Moving Forward
While the Obama administration will bequeath to the Trump
administration far more robust ties with Southeast Asia than it inherited,
it has also raised the stakes and set very high expectations. To continue to
deepen ties and advance U.S. interests in Asia, the United States will need to
focus on six general areas in its engagement with Southeast Asia.
Signal the region’s importance early. As an increasingly connected
region with over 600 million people, a $2.5 trillion economy, and the world’s
most strategically significant waterways, Southeast Asia’s importance to the
United States’ interests as a global power is irrefutable. Yet with the region
nervous about U.S. international leadership and uncertain about what an
America-first foreign policy entails, the administration should signal early
on that it will continue to be engaged with ASEAN and Southeast Asian
affairs. Trump can support this in many different ways, including by
directing his cabinet officials to travel early to the region, arranging for his
secretary of state to give a speech on Asia policy soon after the inauguration,
and signaling that he will attend the East Asia Summit in Manila and
continue other presidential-level engagement.
Develop an economic agenda. Developing an agenda for economic
engagement with the region following the withdrawal from the TPP
will be crucial for maintaining U.S. credibility. Trump himself clearly
understands the vitality of Southeast Asia as a market, given his personal
business activities in the Philippines and Indonesia, two of the most
important emerging economies in all of Asia. He should direct his cabinet
to recognize the same. In this context, deep engagement by the Department
of Commerce, following on Secretary Penny Pritzker’s strong record of
ASEAN engagement, will be particularly important.
Continue to wield hard power. While Southeast Asian leaders have
often critiqued Obama’s rebalance to Asia as being too focused on
defense and not focused enough on economic engagement, the defense
components of the rebalance remain important to the region. With
China’s assertive approach to the South China Sea in mind, the region
seeks continued U.S. presence to balance potentially disruptive Chinese
behavior. Suggestions that the United States will not live up to its
historical role in Asia have therefore unnerved many in Southeast Asia.
The president should make clear early on that the United States will
continue to stand up for international law and freedom of navigation in
the South China Sea and elsewhere.
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Show up. Showing up at regional meetings at the appropriate level is
critical for forging ties in Southeast Asia. This lesson was driven home
during the tenure of Condoleezza Rice as secretary of state from 2005 to
2009; while she did laudable things for U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, she
is best remembered for missing two of the four ARF meetings during her
tenure. The Obama administration took this lesson to heart and Secretaries
Clinton and Kerry attended all eight ARF meetings, which went a great
way toward building trust and becoming part of the region’s fabric. With
the Obama administration having established a host of other meeting
commitments, the bar is set very high for the Trump administration. At a
minimum, Trump must annually attend the East Asia Summit, periodically
hold 10+1 leaders meetings, and direct his secretary of state to attend the
ARF for the United States to continue to be at the table as the future of the
region is crafted.
Demonstrate an understanding of Islam in Southeast Asia. Trump’s
blanket statements about Islam during his presidential campaign will be a
major burden for his administration’s diplomacy in the region, particularly
with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. To help alleviate concerns that he is
at war with Islam, the Trump administration should explicitly acknowledge
that maritime Southeast Asia is a major center of the Muslim world and by
and large demonstrates Islam’s inherent peacefulness and tolerance.
Find ways to work with China. While Southeast Asian countries have no
interest in the United States and China forming a condominium of power
that determines the future of the Asia-Pacific, they also do not want the two
sides to be locked in blind competition. While individual countries have at
times tried to bring the United States and China together, friction between
Beijing and Washington has not facilitated a productive U.S.-China dynamic
in Southeast Asia. To build trust that the United States’ interest in the region
is not driven by competition with China—as is often assumed—the Trump
administration should proactively seek to find ways to cooperate with
Beijing on regional challenges. Existing channels of U.S.-China cooperation,
such as on renewable energy and oceans stewardship, offer a range of areas
of activity to expand to Southeast Asia.
Conclusion
Southeast Asia is a dynamic region of growing economic and strategic
importance. While diplomacy with the region requires patience and stamina,
given the need to engage bilaterally with countries as well as multilaterally
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with ASEAN, it brings great opportunities for the United States to advance
its interests, including through securing sea lanes, combatting transnational
threats, and benefitting from the region’s economic growth. If the United
States were to withdraw from regional affairs, this would lead to less order
in Asia, which would be detrimental to U.S. interests. While the Trump
administration will likely put its own stamp on policy toward Southeast
Asia, U.S. interests will be well served by continuing down the bipartisan
path of deeper engagement charted over the past decade.
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oundtable • assessing u.s.-asia relations in a time of transition
The U.S.-Australia Alliance in an Era of Change:
Living Complacently?
Michael Clarke
U
.S. primacy is both a strategic choice and an empirical condition, and
thus analysis regarding the future of U.S. primacy should focus on
both ideational (i.e., policy choices) and material variables (i.e., relativities
of power). 1 We are now witnessing significant shifts in the realms of U.S.
primacy that carry great weight for Australia. In material terms, while the
United States remains dominant across a range of measures (e.g., military
spending), 2 it has faced with growing intensity the great challenge of
all hegemonic powers—managing never-ceasing political and military
commitments and maintaining the economic capability to meet them. 3 The
Obama administration has attempted to grapple with this central challenge
via the retrenchment of military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan,
budget sequestration, and a concerted effort to avoid new military and
security commitments. 4
The results of this strategic choice to retrench U.S. commitments
to a more manageable level, however, have been problematic at both the
ideational and systemic levels. Ideationally, as amply demonstrated by the
2016 presidential election, we have seen the rise of a “restraint constituency”
among a significant segment of the U.S. public that openly questions both
the viability and desirability of maintaining U.S. primacy in international
affairs. 5 In a systemic context, perceptions of U.S. retrenchment have
michael clarke is an Associate Professor in the National Security College at the Australian
National University. He can be reached at .
1 Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” International Security 17,
no. 4 (1993): 52–53.
2 In 2015, U.S. military expenditure was $596 billion compared with China’s $215 billion and Russia’s
$66.4 billion. See Sam Perlo-Freeman, Aude Fleurant, Pieter Wezeman, and Siemon Wezeman,
“Trends in World Military Expenditure,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
SIPRI Factsheet, April 2016 u https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EMBARGO%20FS1604%20
Milex%202015.pdf.
3 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500
to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
4 For instance, see Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” Atlantic, April 2016, 70–90; and
Andreas Krieg, “Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy in
the Middle East,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016): 97–113.
5 Trevor Thrall, “Primed against Primacy: The Restraint Constituency and U.S. Foreign Policy,” War
on the Rocks, September 15, 2016 u http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/primed-against-primacythe-restraint-constituency-and-u-s-foreign-policy.
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also stimulated both adversaries and allies alike to consider the limits of
U.S. primacy. As Robert Jervis has noted, primacy not only means “being
much more powerful than any other state according to the usual and crude
measures of power (e.g., gross national product, size of the armed forces,
and lack of economic, political, and geographic vulnerabilities)” but also,
by virtue of this standing, means having the ability to “establish, or at least
strongly influence, ‘the rules of the game’ by which international politics is
played, the intellectual framework employed…and the standards by which
behavior is judged to be legitimate.” 6
The subsequent discussion focuses on the impact of current challenges
to the current U.S.-led international order derived from both the systemic
and ideational levels for the future of the U.S.-Australia alliance. It argues
that while Australia, like other U.S. allies in Asia, has been sensitive to the
challenges to U.S. primacy posed by states such as Russia and China and has
adjusted its defense and strategic policy accordingly, it has not adequately
considered how such systemic pressures have negatively affected American
perceptions of the durability of U.S. primacy.
Australia and Challenges to U.S. Primacy under Obama
An international order, as Henry Kissinger famously put it, is
“legitimate” if all great powers accept their role and identity within it
and embrace certain baseline conventions and rules governing interstate
behavior. 7 Adversaries such as Russia and China—through their actions
in Ukraine and the South China Sea—have clearly used the Obama
administration’s attempts at retrenchment as an opportunity to challenge
the baseline conventions and rules of the current international order and
in doing so test the limits of U.S. primacy. Some U.S. allies, such as Japan,
South Korea, and the Philippines, have also begun to consider with much
greater alacrity their strategic options—from greater defense self-reliance to
potential bandwagoning with a rising China—should such trends continue.
These trends should also be highly concerning for policymakers in
Canberra. While there has been significant academic debate in Australia
regarding the significance and impact of the rise of China on the country’s
national security and the U.S.-Australia alliance, official policy for the
past several years has attempted to hedge between the realities of deep
6 Jervis, “International Primacy,” 53.
7 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822
(New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1964), 3–6.
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economic engagement with Beijing and underlying concerns regarding its
strategic intentions throughout Asia. 8 The latter concern has resulted in
efforts to strengthen the alliance with the United States on the basis that
“strengthening the alliance network and joint capabilities will complicate
the strategic picture for China in various theatres and dissuade Beijing
from even more assertive and possibly reckless policies in the region.” 9
Indeed, much of Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper was based on the
core assumption that the longevity of U.S. primacy would persist. The
document judged that the “United States will remain the pre-eminent global
military power over the next two decades” and that its “active presence…
will continue to underpin the security of our region.”
Yet the ideational shifts and the systemic changes noted above
fundamentally challenge the core assumption that the United States will
not only remain the preeminent global military power but continue to
be fundamentally engaged in its various alliance relationships. To date
Australian leaders have been largely silent on this issue. Indeed, Donald
Trump’s unexpected victory has instead, in former prime minister Paul
Keating’s colorful words, prompted “reverential, sacramental” responses
to the alliance rather than critical reflection. 10 Many current and previous
officials, from Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull to former
ministers and ambassadors, have responded by simply reasserting the
centrality of the U.S. alliance for Australian defense and strategic policy. 11
The Turnbull government in particular has been careful to stress that the
alliance rests not so much on the individual characteristics of specific
administrations in Washington or Canberra but on shared values, interests,
and institutions. 12
8 A great deal of debate in this regard has stemmed from Hugh White, The China Choice: Why
America Should Share Power (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2013). See also Paul Kelly, “Australia’s
Wandering Eye,” American Interest, May/June 2013 u http://www.the-american-interest.
com/2013/04/12/australias-wandering-eye.
9 John Lee, “China in Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper,” Security Challenges 12, no. 1 (2016): 175.
10 Michael Kolzol, “Paul Keating Says ‘Cut the Tag’ with the U.S. after Donald Trump’s Shock Win,”
Sydney Morning Herald, November 10, 2016 u http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/paul-keating-says-cut-the-tag-with-the-us-after-donald-trumps-shock-win-20161110-
gsms4e.html.
11 Fergus Hunter, “Top Defence Official Warns of ‘Big Mistake’ of Questioning U.S. Alliance over
Donald Trump,” Sydney Morning Herald, November 24, 2016 u http://www.smh.com.au/federalpolitics/political-news/top-defence-official-warns-of-big-mistake-of-questioning-us-alliance-overdonald-trump-20161124-gswog5.html.
12 Sam Maiden and Claire Bickers, “Australian MPs React to President Elect Donald Trump’s
Victory,” News.com.au, November 10, 2016 u http://www.news.com.au/national/politics/
australian-mps-react-to-president-elect-donald-trumps-victory/news-story/0c24d864e903bf1c2
3207b58c1a2fc7b.
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The problem with such “genuflections” to the alliance is that they
refuse to acknowledge that the United States may in fact be in the process
of fundamentally reorienting its approach to the wider web of relationships
that have underpinned Asia-Pacific security for decades. As Hugh White
has pointedly noted:
The issue for Australia today isn’t whether we should step
back from our alliance with America, but whether America is
stepping back from its alliance with us. Or, to put it a little more
precisely, the question is whether we can be sure that America
will continue to play in [the] future the same strategic role in
supporting Asian security and Australia’s defence that it has
played for the past few decades. 13
Thus, the central problem is that the hub of the U.S. hub-and-spoke
alliance system in the Asia-Pacific may be on the verge of a disengagement
that could undermine the robustness of the system. While the credibility
of U.S. security guarantees embodied in the 1951 Australia, New Zealand,
United States Treaty (ANZUS) has long been a source of friction in the
bilateral alliance—and is thus not a new issue—there has not arguably
been an occasion when an incoming U.S. administration has so openly and
consistently questioned the efficacy of U.S. alliances. White’s identification
of the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. commitment to global and regional
order points to a need for Australian policymakers to reconsider a crucial
question: from Australia’s perspective, is the alliance with the United States
a fundamentally threat-centric or order-centric proposition?
Outlook for the U.S.-Australia Alliance
Historically, a case can be made that ANZUS assuaged Australia’s
long-standing concerns about its security in Asia, particularly during the
early decades of the Cold War when ascendant decolonization and the
spread of Communism were perceived as potential direct threats to the
country’s national security. 14 Yet Australian policymakers’ understanding
of the alliance grew over time to include considerations of Canberra’s
contribution to the maintenance of the rules-based order established by the
United States after 1945. Successive Australian governments have judged
13 Hugh White, “ANZUS in the Age of Trump,” Strategist, December 1, 2016 u https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/anzus-age-trump.
14 Stephan Frühling, “Wrestling with Commitment: Geography, Alliance Institutions and the ANZUS
Treaty,” in Australia’s American Alliance: Towards a New Era? ed. Peter Dean, Stephan Frühling, and
Brendon Taylor (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016).
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that strategic threats to the country’s national security could “arise as a
consequence of distant disruption of the global balance of power” and that
“by choosing to work with more powerful allies to help ensure a satisfactory
global balance, Australia thereby served its own interests.” 15 Such thinking
has underpinned Australian military commitments to the alliance from
the Korean War to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The potential that the United
States under the Trump administration may fundamentally reconsider
its commitment to the maintenance of the rules-based order would thus
directly and negatively impinge on Australia’s national security interests.
Many of Trump’s statements on foreign policy have critiqued what
could be termed the bipartisan post–Cold War foreign policy consensus
in Washington. This consensus has been based on the twin assumptions
that a “strong United States is still essential to the maintenance of the
open global order” and that “the alternative to America’s ‘indispensability’
is not a harmonious, self-regulating balance of independent states but an
international landscape marked by eruptions of chaos and destruction.” 16
The president-elect has challenged this consensus by propagating a
foreign policy agenda that appears to be predicated on three core positions:
the U.S. web of alliances has been overextended strategically and militarily,
the United States is disadvantaged by the open global economy, and the
United States is no longer respected by rivals or friends. The first position has
resulted in Trump openly questioning the utility of U.S. alliances (such as
NATO and Japan), threatening to withdraw U.S. security guarantees unless
states bear a greater proportion of financially ensuring those guarantees, and
speculating that these allies should acquire nuclear weapons of their own. 17
Meanwhile, his suggested remedy for the assertion that the United States
has suffered economically from the liberal global trading order championed
by successive administrations evokes a throwback to the protectionism of
nineteenth-century U.S. policymakers: threatening to impose high tariffs
on imports, pursuing a “trade war” against China, and scrapping the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Finally, the president-elect has indicated
15 Robyn Lim, “Australian Security Thinking after the Cold War,” Orbis 42, no. 1 (1998): 95.
16 Eliot Cohen, Eric S. Edelman, and Brian Hook, “Presidential Priority: Restore American
Leadership,” World Affairs, Spring 2016 u http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/
presidential-priority-restore-american-leadership.
17 See, for instance, “Transcript: Donald Trump, CNN Milwaukee Republican Presidential Town
Hall,” CNN, Press Release, March 29, 2016 u http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2016/03/29/
full-rush-transcript-donald-trump-cnn-milwaukee-republican-presidential-town-hall.
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that Washington must be willing to act unilaterally, particularly in the use
of military force. 18
Such pronouncements should be deeply concerning to Australian
policymakers, who have depended on the complementary relationship
between the strength of the U.S. alliance system in Asia and the
consolidation of an open global economic order to ensure Australia’s
long-term security. Overtly questioning long-standing alliances in Asia will
potentially undermine regional security by increasing uncertainty about
U.S. commitments to the region and also may provide incentives for both
allies and adversaries to pursue destabilizing initiatives.
If the alliance with the United States is fundamentally conceived in
order-centric terms, then it is imperative that policymakers in Canberra
move beyond genuflections to the alliance to consider strategic options in
response to the ideational change in Washington and systemic challenges
wrought by China’s rise. A number of immediate recommendations
suggest themselves in this regard. First, Canberra should intensify the
efforts already underway to develop “spoke-to-spoke” relationships
between itself and other U.S. allies and partners throughout the region,
such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and India. 19 Second, such bilateral
relationships should also be complemented by increased Australian efforts
to facilitate regional multilateral security dialogues and cooperation—such
as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus. 20 Third, Australia should
also recommit effort and resources to prosecuting the case for a strong
Australia-U.S. alliance and U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific in
Washington. Key here will be not only strategizing as to the best means of
engaging with the incoming administration but also presenting Australian
concerns and interests to the legislative branch through, for instance,
Australia’s Congressional Liaison Office. 21 This latter consideration will
18 For perceptive overviews of a possible Trumpian worldview, see Thomas Wright, “Trump’s
19th Century Worldview,” Politico, January 20, 2016 u http://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2016/01/donald-trump-foreign-policy-213546; and Alex Ward, “‘America Alone’:
Trump’s Unilateralist Foreign Policy,” War on the Rocks, May 31, 2016 u http://warontherocks.
com/2016/05/america-alone-trumps-unilateralist-foreign-policy.
19 See, for example, Takashi Terada, “Evolution of the Australia-Japan Security Partnership: Toward
a Softer Triangle Alliance with the United States?” in The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Regional
Multilateralism, ed. Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011),
217–32; and David Brewster, “The Australia-India Framework for Security Cooperation: Another
Step towards an Indo-Pacific Security Partnership,” Security Challenges 11, no. 1 (2015): 39–48.
20 Brendan Taylor, “A Pragmatic Partner: Australia and the ADMM-Plus,” Asia Policy, no. 22
(2016): 83–88.
21 On this issue, see Alan Tidwell, “The Role of ‘Diplomatic Lobbying’ in Shaping U.S. Foreign
Policy and Its Effects on the Australia-U.S. Relationship,” Australian Journal of International
Affairs (2016): 1–17.
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be of great significance for Canberra, which may need to push the case
with U.S. congressional leaders for the continued importance of an open
economic order for regional stability should the Trump administration
repudiate the TPP as promised. Undertaking such measures will both
serve as a prudent hedge against U.S. disengagement (regardless of level
and intensity) from the region and also permit Australian policymakers
to demonstrate Canberra’s willingness to bear an increasing burden in
strengthening regional security architecture.
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asia policy, number 23 (january 2017), 71–110
• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •
roundtable
The North Korean Nuclear Threat:
Regional Perspectives on a Nuclear-Free Peninsula
Chung-in Moon
Ren Xiao
Yasuhiro Izumikawa
Van Jackson
Andrei Lankov
© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

asia policy
Introduction
I
n 2016, North Korea successfully completed its fourth and fifth nuclear
weapon tests and redoubled its efforts to develop a credible delivery
system. The Kim Jong-un regime thus appears committed to continuing the
byungjin (parallel development) policy that has made the pursuit of nuclear
weapons a cornerstone of North Korea’s national security strategy. Most
analysts believe that the country currently possesses 10–16 nuclear weapons
and, under low to moderate growth estimates, could develop 20–50 weapons
by 2020. Statements by Kim in early 2017 indicate a persistent drive to
couple these weapons with fully operational ballistic missile systems that
can directly threaten the U.S. mainland in addition to U.S. allies in Asia.
Over the last two decades, the United States, its East Asian allies, and
other regional stakeholders have tried varying degrees of diplomacy, threats,
and sanctions to compel Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program, but to
date no successful formula has emerged. The Obama administration’s policy
of “strategic patience” with North Korea produced little change to the status
quo, and the regime’s growing nuclear proficiency is rapidly becoming a
problem that its neighbors in Northeast Asia can no longer ignore. Each
state, however, has different perspectives on how to best respond and
implement strategies that will bring about change on the Korean Peninsula.
This Asia Policy roundtable contains five essays that examine the
relationships between North Korea and South Korea, China, Japan, and
the United States. First, Chung-in Moon outlines South Korea’s recent
approach toward Pyongyang and argues that the time may be right for
a return to diplomacy. Ren Xiao explains China’s current challenge
of balancing growing fears of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities with
wariness over the insecurity that might arise on China’s borders if strong
international intervention brings about the collapse of the Kim regime.
Yasuhiro Izumikawa discusses Japan’s current strategy of enhanced
sanctions, reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence, and security cooperation
with South Korea and examines the durability of this playbook. Van
Jackson argues that the United States faces a “trilemma” with North Korea
as a deterrence challenge, a proliferation concern, and a wildcard to the
regional order. He concludes that competing strategies to solve these
issues will require Washington to take proactive and risky approaches
to achieving a resolution. Finally, Andrei Lankov analyzes North Korea
itself and asserts that a steadfast commitment to regime survival and a
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“hyperrealist” view of international relations will continue to motivate
Pyongyang’s uncompromising approach to security.
South Korea, China, Japan, and the United States all bring a different
strategic calculus to the problem of North Korea’s nuclear program.
The essays collected in this roundtable, however, demonstrate that each
approach—from diplomatic engagement to more robust sanctions and
threats of force—has so far failed to produce substantive change in North
Korea. Given the Kim regime’s persistent agenda and incendiary rhetoric,
the roundtable authors all agree that robust engagement between the United
States and the other stakeholders and clearer communication—whether
through deterrence or diplomacy—with North Korea itself will be needed.
Such cooperation might at times require that states prioritize policies that
perhaps sacrifice some strategic interests to achieve the common objective
of a North Korea free of nuclear weapons.
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Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats:
In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations
Chung-in Moon
Inter-Korean relations have hit rock bottom. Since President Park
Geun-hye’s inauguration in February 2013, her government pursued
the Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula initiative and
tried to improve ties with North Korea. But such efforts have failed, and
inter-Korean relations have worsened. 1 After North Korea’s fourth nuclear
test in January 2016, the Park government adopted a much tougher stance
by closing the Kaesong industrial complex and completely suspending
inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Seoul and Washington have
also intensified joint military exercises and training on deploying
strategic weapons. Pyongyang responded to these moves by conducting
numerous missile test launches and by undertaking an additional nuclear
test in September. A vicious cycle of action and reaction has heightened
inter-Korean military tension, which has deepened public anxiety. The
North and the South are engaging in a dangerous game of chicken without
any channels of communication, increasing the risk that an accidental clash
may well escalate into a full-blown military conflict.
Over the past seven years—while the six-party talks have been
derailed—North Korea is believed to have steadily amassed nuclear
materials and is now estimated to possess more than ten nuclear warheads.
Pyongyang has so far conducted five nuclear tests in total and acquired
short-range Scud-type missiles, intermediate-range Nodong and Musudan
missiles, and even submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It is also close
to developing intercontinental ballistic missiles and claims to have made
progress miniaturizing and diversifying its nuclear warheads as well.
The North Korean nuclear threat is thus no longer fictional but real and
poses serious security threats to the peninsula, all of Northeast Asia, and
the world. North Korean nuclear weapons would significantly alter the
chung-in moon is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Yonsei University. He is also a
Co-convener of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
He can be reached at .
1 Chung-in Moon and Seung-chan Boo, “Korean Foreign Policy: Park Geun-hye Looks at China
and North Korea,” in Japanese and Korean Politics: Alone and Apart from Each Other, ed. Takashi
Inoguchi (New York: Palgrave, 2015).
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
military balance on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately impede peaceful
coexistence there. The regional security impacts are also profound—a
nuclear domino effect might lead to proliferation elsewhere in Northeast
Asia. And the possibility exists that North Korea will export nuclear
materials, technology, and even warheads to other regions, threatening the
very foundations of world security in this age of global terrorism.
Against this backdrop, this essay provides a critical assessment of
existing strategies to deal with the North Korean nuclear deadlock by
focusing on sanctions and other pressures, deterrence and missile defense,
and preemptive attack and nuclear armament. It then suggests dialogue and
negotiation as a viable alternative.
The Limited Effectiveness of Sanctions and Other Pressures
The Park Geun-hye government has responded to the threats from
North Korea by employing a variety of countermeasures ranging from
sanctions and other pressures to deterrence, preemptive strikes, and defense.
Its preferred method of managing Pyongyang’s unruly behavior has so far
been sanctions. The Park administration strongly believes that North Korea’s
crimes (possession of nuclear weapons and violation of UN resolutions)
should be punished by comprehensive and forceful sanctions and that such
sanctions can compel the North and its leader, Kim Jong-un, to choose a
path toward denuclearization. Otherwise, the Kim regime will risk collapse.
But sanctions have not been effective. Despite the adoption of UN Security
Council Resolution 2270, North Korea has not shown signs of compliance.
On the contrary, its behavior has become more defiant, with the Kim regime
conducting a fifth nuclear test and additional missile tests. North Korea is still
a closed society and is very much accustomed to sanctions. Moreover, China
does not want to go ahead with any sanctions that would undermine stability
in the North and lead to regime collapse. Given that 91.3% of North Korea’s
trade is with China, as of December 2015, international sanctions cannot be
effective without Beijing’s full cooperation. 2
As sanctions and other pressures have not produced any tangible
outcomes, the South Korean government has not only strengthened its
deterrence posture but also begun to adopt a more assertive defense stance,
especially against a potential North Korean missile attack. This deterrence
2 Yoon Hee-hoon, “Bukhan, 2015nyeon daeoemuyeog gyumo 62.5eogdalleo” [Size of North Korea’s
Foreign Trade Reaches $6.25 billion in 2015], ChosunBiz, June 15, 2016 u http://biz.chosun.com/
site/data/html_dir/2016/06/15/2016061501425.html.
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strategy is composed of three elements. The first is deterrence against the
North by implementing a kill chain predicated on improved missile and
air-strike capabilities. The Park government has increased the defense budget
for this program. The second is to seek measures to enhance the extended
deterrence with the United States that provides the Republic of Korea (ROK)
with a nuclear umbrella. Washington has reassured Seoul of its commitment
to extended deterrence and nuclear protection. Finally, the Park government
is deliberating on the option of preemptive strikes. Should the South detect
any signs of an impending North Korean nuclear or conventional attack,
such strikes would aim to destroy Pyongyang’s attack assets and decapitate its
command-and-control center as well as its leadership.
Deterrence and Missile Defense: The Debate over THAAD
Given that deterrence is not sufficient to deal with threats coming from
the North, the Park government has been intensifying its missile defense
capabilities based on the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) systems. Whereas the former aims at defending the Seoul
metropolitan area, the latter is designed to protect primarily U.S. military
personnel and facilities deployed in South Korea, including the southern
part of the penunsula. To improve its missile defense capabilities, South
Korea is upgrading its Patriot defense system from the PAC-2 to the more
advanced PAC-3 system. Meanwhile, the United States is planning to deploy
one THAAD battery by July 2017, five months ahead of schedule.
The decision to deploy THAAD has caused immense external and
internal repercussions in South Korea. 3 Being alarmed by North Korea’s
increasing missile threats, the United States has called for the deployment
of THAAD in South Korea since early 2014. U.S. field commanders in South
Korea have argued that the system’s deployment is essential in order to
protect U.S. soldiers and facilities against North Korean missile attacks. But
the Park government was hesitant because of both domestic and Chinese
opposition. It even went so far as to deny the possibility of THAAD being
deployed, while maintaining its commitment to developing a domestic
South Korean missile defense system. On February 25, 2015, Defense
Minister Han Min-koo stated that South Korea did not have any plan to
acquire THAAD. As public concern arose, a presidential spokesperson
3 For background on the THAAD debates in South Korea, see Chung-in Moon and Seung-chan
Boo, “Coping with China’s Rise: Domestic Politics and Strategic Adjustment in South Korea,” Asian
Journal of Comparative Politics (forthcoming).
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
again sought to calm the situation by announcing that “there had been no
request, and hence no consultation and no decision.” 4
But North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, and
subsequent ballistic missile test launches altered the political landscape in
South Korea. Angered by Pyongyang’s provocative moves, on January 13,
President Park stated that “the deployment of THAAD will be examined
by taking our national security and national interests into account.” 5 In
early February the ROK Ministry of National Defense started official
consultations with the United States on the system’s deployment. On July 8,
the Ministry of National Defense officially announced its decision to allow
the deployment as a defensive measure to ensure South Korea’s security
and protect U.S. forces. It also underscored that THAAD will be focused
exclusively on North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not be
directed toward any third-party nations.
Immediate reactions from China were fierce. On July 8, Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei called for “an immediate
suspension of [the] THAAD deployment process” by stating that “the
deployment of the THAAD system by the U.S. and the ROK will in no way
help achieve the goal of denuclearization on the Peninsula and will gravely
sabotage the strategic security interests of regional countries including
China and regional strategic balance.” 6 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi
made much tougher remarks, stating that “the planned deployment of [the]
U.S. THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea far exceeds the Korean
Peninsula’s defense needs.” He also criticized the United States by saying
that it “should not harm other countries’ legitimate security interests with
the excuse of so-called security threats.” 7
Highly orchestrated Chinese mass media attacks were much more
aggressive. The People’s Daily denounced the move and said that the
deployment decision will threaten peace in Northeast Asia and that
4 “Cheongwadae Sadeu gongnonhwae bujeongjeok…‘3No’ ipjang jaehwagin” [Blue House Negative
toward Making THAAD a Public Issue…Reaffirms “3No” Stance], Yonhap, March 11, 2015 u
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2015/03/11/0200000000AKR20150311062400001.HTML.
5 “Hanmi, ‘Sadeu’ gongsik hyeobuihalkka?” [Will South Korea and the United States Officially
Discuss THAAD?], Yonhap, January 13, 2016 u http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/01/13
/0200000000AKR20160113147600014.HTML?input=1195m.
6 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on July 8, 2016,” Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 8, 2016 u http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1378753.shtml.
7 “Deployment of THAAD Far Exceeds Korean Peninsula’s Defense Needs: Chinese FM,” Xinhua,
July 9, 2016 u http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-07/09/content_26027598.htm.
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“South Korea will become a puppet of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia.” 8
The People’s Daily also featured a critical editorial, stating that “the
decision between Seoul and Washington to deploy the THAAD system
will impose unimaginable dangers on both the security of Northeast Asia
and the world’s strategic stability.” 9 Equally troubling was the impact
of the decision on cultural and educational exchanges. Chinese local
and provincial governments suspended exchange programs with South
Korean counterparts. The THAAD decision has also had an impact on
hallyu, the Korean cultural wave, which has enjoyed great popularity
in China. The Chinese entertainment industry has become reluctant to
sponsor hallyu stars’ concerts, while Chinese broadcasters have canceled
their appearances. 10
A nightmarish scenario for South Korea is one in which trade between
the two countries is undermined by the dispute over THAAD. South
Koreans vividly remember the trade dispute in 2000 when the government
increased import tariffs on Chinese garlic by ten times in order to protect
domestic farmers. Chinese retaliation was quick and merciless. The
Chinese government banned the import of South Korean mobile phones
and polyethylene. The ban cost South Korea $5 billion, whereas it gained
only $1 million through the increased tariffs on garlic. Now South Korea is
even more vulnerable to trade retaliation. China is its number-one trading
partner, accounting for about 23.6% of South Korea’s total trade. In 2015
alone, South Korea enjoyed a trade surplus of $46.9 billion. 11 In addition,
roughly 43% of foreign tourists came from China in 2014. Equally important
is that Chinese investment in South Korea has been exponentially growing,
reaching $197.8 billion in 2015. 12
China’s hostile response has polarized Seoul’s domestic politics.
Conservative forces led by the ruling Saenuri Party have argued that the
THAAD deployment is the right decision. They regard it as an unavoidable
self-defense measure to cope with nuclear and missile threats from
8 “Editorial: THAAD Deployment Puts South Korea at Risk,” People’s Daily, August 2, 2016 u
http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0802/c90000-9093806.html.
9 “China, Russia to Take Counter-measures over THAAD Deployment,” People’s Daily, August 4,
2016 u http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0804/c90000-9095540.html.
10 Yeh Young-june and Shin Kyung-jin, “After THAAD, China Takes Aim against Hallyu,” Korea
Joongang Daily, August 3, 2016 u http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.
aspx?aid=3022090.
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROK), Jungguk gwanryon juyo tong gye 2016 [Major Statistics on China
2016] (Seoul, 2016), 66–67.
12 Ibid., 67–70.
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
North Korea and as a concrete sign of the U.S. alliance commitment. 13
Meanwhile, liberal and progressive forces led by opposition parties have taken
a much tougher stance by calling for the immediate relinquishment of the
decision. This faction argues that THAAD has limited military utility and
believes that its deployment will not only harm relations with China, South
Korea’s vital economic partner, but also pit China and Russia against South
Korea while strengthening their ties with North Korea. Opposition groups see
the deployment of THAAD as a prelude to the ROK joining a U.S.-led theater
missile defense system, which could in turn revive a new Cold War structure
in Northeast Asia. Given such formidable domestic political opposition, the
scheduled THAAD deployment might not be smooth.
Preemptive Attack and Nuclear Armament
Some pundits in Seoul advocate a preemptive attack on North Korea.
Proponents of this policy argue that if South Korea and the United States
detect any signs of military action by the North, they should attack its
nuclear and missile assets, paralyze its command-and-control system, and
ultimately decapitate its leadership. This option, however, seems unrealistic
simply because it would not necessarily achieve the desired military and
political objectives. Destroying North Korea’s nuclear assets (nuclear
facilities, materials, and warheads) that are concealed in various places,
as well as its mobile missile-launching sites, would not be easy. Given the
heavily fortified command-and-control system, targeting and decapitating
the country’s political leadership would be virtually impossible. Meanwhile,
North Korea’s massive retaliatory capabilities and subsequent escalation of
military conflict would entail human casualties estimated to be over one
million people in the first month of war. 14 Thus, a preemptive attack cannot
be considered a viable option.
Some analysts argue that Seoul should develop an indigenous nuclear
arms program to deal with Pyongyang’s nuclear threat and urge the
government to go nuclear if the United States does not redeploy its tactical
13 “Hanmi, Sadeu (THAAD) baechi gyeoljeong gwanlyeon: Kim Hyun-a daebyeon-in hyeonangwanlyeon
seomyeon beuliping” [U.S.-ROK Relations and Deployment of THAAD:
Written Briefing by Spokesperson Kim Hyun-a], Saenuri Party website, July 8, 2016 u
http://www.saenuriparty.kr/web/news/briefing/delegateBriefing/readDelegateBriefingView.
do?bbsId=SPB_000000000918484.
14 William J. Perry, “Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Implications for U.S. Policy in Northeast Asia,”
Brookings Institution, Brookings Leadership Forum, January 24, 2003 u https://www.brookings.
edu/events/crisis-on-the-korean-peninsula-implications-for-u-s-policy-in-northeast-asia.
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nuclear weapons in South Korea. 15 But as soon as South Korea declares its
intention to pursue this course, it will face strong headwinds. The nation’s
nuclear power industry would be ruined, as would the country’s traditional
alliance with the United States. The South Korean economy would risk
being dealt international sanctions that could send it into a tailspin.
Moreover, South Korea going nuclear could be a tipping point that leads
other countries in Northeast Asia, namely Japan, to develop their own
nuclear arsenals. Thus, the South arming itself with nuclear weapons is not
a viable response to the North Korean threat.
Dialogue and Negotiation Are Still the Best Option
Sanctions, deterrence, preemptive attacks, and defense, including
THAAD, might not be ideal solutions to the North Korean threat. No
matter how devilish the North is, dialogue and negotiation seem to be the
only viable alternative. The fact that these options did not work in the past
should not be a reason to dismiss them. The United States and regional states
should find common ground against North Korea’s nuclear development.
Sanctions and other pressure should be utilized not as leverage to bring
about the collapse of the North Korean regime but as inducements for
North Korea to return to dialogue and negotiation. By way of conclusion, I
would like to suggest the following ideas. 16
First, we must be frank. We must speak our mind and also hear out
Pyongyang in order to find mutually acceptable solutions. Being deaf to
the North and insisting on unilateral preconditions can lead us nowhere.
Portraying the North as an untrustworthy rogue state would only reinforce
the perception that relations are asymmetrical, hindering meaningful
dialogue and negotiation. We must listen and talk to Pyongyang by placing
ourselves in its shoes.
Second, we must be practical and realistic. The goals for negotiations
must be adjusted to circumstances. We must face the reality that we cannot
make North Korea completely dismantle its nuclear weapons and facilities
in the short term. Instead, we should seek a moratorium on its nuclear
program to prevent further production of nuclear materials. Pyongyang has
15 Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, “Korea: Will South Korea’s Non-Nuclear Strategy Defeat North
Korea’s Nuclear Breakout?” in The War That Must Never Be Fought, ed. George P. Schultz and James
E. Goodby (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2015), 377–435.
16 For more on my perspectives on this issue, see Chung-in Moon, “North Korea: A Negotiated
Settlement Remains the Best Hope,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1, 2016 u http://thebulletin.
org/north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-what-now#wt.
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
repeatedly said it would cease nuclear activities if its terms were met. In this
regard, Siegfried Hecker’s step-by-step approach of “freeze, roll-back, and
verifiably dismantle” might provide us with a viable exit strategy. 17
Practical ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum might
be found in existing agreements that emerged from the six-party talks, such
as the September 19 joint statement of 2005, the February 13 agreement of
2007, and the “leap day” agreement of 2012. The framework of the six-party
talks is still useful, and it should be resumed without any delay.
Third, we must be flexible. We must put all possible cards on the
table, including a temporary halt to joint South Korea–U.S. military
drills, replacement of armistice with a peace treaty, allowance of North
Korea’s peaceful use of atomic energy and space/satellite program, and
normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United
States. We must not exclude these options just because they are being
demanded by Pyongyang. While addressing issues through dialogue, we
could probe Pyongyang’s intentions and demand responsibility for any
breach of faith.
Finally, as argued above, a mechanism for dialogue should be restored.
In this regard, the six-party talks are still the best venue for negotiation.
Concerned parties can have bilateral, trilateral, four-party, and five-party
talks within the six-party framework. In addition, the September 19
joint statement is still the best diplomatic document for denuclearizing
North Korea because it addresses all the relevant issues, such as peaceful
coexistence and diplomatic normalization between North Korea and the
United States, the creation of a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula
through a separate forum of concerned parties (North and South Korea, the
United States, and China), and the establishment of Northeast Asian security
and a mechanism for peace. All the available solutions are embodied in the
joint statement, and what is needed is simply a matter of political will and
commitment to its implementation. Deliberating on alternative mechanisms
for dialogue and negotiation will be time-consuming and even traumatic.
There is good news in this regard. A sudden political change in
South Korea could open a new horizon for dialogue and negotiation.
As President Park Geun-hye, who has advocated for sanctions and
military pressure, was impeached for the abuse of power and negligence
of presidential duties, her hard-line North Korean policy has also lost
17 Siegfried S. Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises,” Daedalus 139, no. 1
(2010): 44–56.
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momentum amid waning domestic political support. Most of the contenders
to replace her as president in 2017 have expressed their willingness to
engage with Pyongyang and to resolve the North Korean nuclear quagmire
through dialogue and negotiation. China will support such a move, but it is
unknown which stance the Trump administration will take. Nevertheless,
it seems clear that under new leadership the South Korean government
will contribute to ending the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic
patience,” while rekindling the utility of negotiated settlement.
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
Old Wine in a New Bottle? China’s Korea Problem
Ren Xiao
China’s dealings with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) have not been easy, not even during the Korean War in which
the two fought side by side. The relationship has experienced many ups and
downs over the years. Most recently, the nuclear tests by North Korea and
the United States’ planned deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea have forced China to rethink its
policy toward North Korea.
This essay will analyze the recent interactions between China and
the DPRK and examine the factors that prompted China to adopt a
tougher stance toward Pyongyang. However, this policy change has
been complicated and mitigated by the United States’ decision to deploy
THAAD in South Korea. Given its multiple strategic interests, China must
constantly balance between different players and options, and this has put
it in an awkward situation. Nevertheless, together with the United States
and other UN Security Council members, China supported UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2321. Looking forward, China is also faced
with the uncertainties that result from South Korea’s political crisis and the
transition to the Donald Trump administration in the United States.
Balancing Act
Since Kim Jong-il’s death and his son Kim Jong-un’s assumption of
power in December 2011, the Sino-DPRK relationship has been lukewarm.
Four years after the 18th Party Congress and Xi Jinping’s rise to the Chinese
Communist Party’s top post, no Xi-Kim meeting has happened yet. By
contrast, in that time China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have not only
exchanged state visits but also formed a free trade area, as the ROK has risen
on China’s foreign policy agenda.
In October 2015, Liu Yunshan—one of the seven members of China’s
top leadership—traveled to Pyongyang for the 70th anniversary of the
founding of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK). China made an effort to
improve the Sino-DPRK relationship, but less than three months later
North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016. The test
ren xiao is a Professor and Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy at Fudan
University in Shanghai. He can be reached at .
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immediately changed the dynamic of relations, and two months later
China and the other UN Security Council members reached a consensus
and released UNSCR 2270 to impose the toughest sanctions to date against
North Korea. The resolution contains unprecedented inspection and
financial provisions, including mandatory inspections of cargo to and from
North Korea and a requirement to terminate banking relationships with
North Korean financial institutions. Most significantly, it includes for the
first time sectoral sanctions, which prohibit the DPRK from both exporting
key resources such as coal, gold, iron, titanium, and rare earth materials and
importing aviation and rocket fuel. 1
With UNSCR 2270, China became much more serious with respect to
implementing the Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea’s
nuclear and missile development activities. In early April, the Ministry of
Commerce and the General Administration of Customs released a new list
of embargoed items that cannot be imported from or exported to North
Korea, though the list excluded items needed for maintaining the livelihood
of ordinary people or providing humanitarian assistance.
Pyongyang could not have been happy with the sanctions imposed
by China. However, neither Beijing nor Pyongyang wanted to sever
ties, and instead the two tried to maintain a “normal” relationship
during this time of heightened tension. Shortly after the WPK had held
its 7th Party Congress in May 2016—the first of its kind in more than
30 years—North Korea sent a high-level delegation to China to give a
briefing on developments at the congress. The delegation was headed by
Ri Su-yong, a member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central
Committee of the WPK, who met with President Xi. The delegation
delivered a message from Kim Jong-un expressing his hope to work with
China to strengthen and develop the two countries’ traditional bilateral
friendship and, ironically, maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
Building on prior communication, in July 2016, Xi and Kim exchanged
congratulatory telegrams to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the
signing of the 1961 Sino-DPRK mutual assistance treaty.
Beijing’s and Seoul’s policies toward North Korea have both converged
and diverged. After Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, South
Korea came to the conclusion that its engagement policy toward the North
had failed. It decided to close completely the Kaesong industrial park to cut
1 Antony J. Blinken, “Remarks at Seoul National University” (speech given at Seoul National
University, Seoul, October 28, 2016) u https://www.state.gov/s/d/2016d/263872.htm.
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off foreign exchange income for the North and prevent the inflow of finance
to the North’s nuclear and missile programs. The Park Geun-hye government
also took the unprecedented step of calling for the North Korean people to
leave their country, with the intent of accelerating the downfall of the Kim
regime. By implementing UNSCR 2270, China was doing what South Korea
had hoped for. However, unlike the ROK, Beijing does not desire regime
collapse, given the potentially undesirable consequences, including, but not
limited to, the flooding of refugees into northeastern China.
To Beijing’s disappointment and dismay, Pyongyang ignored its
advice about taking a new path and instead conducted a fifth nuclear test
in September 2016. Beijing had hoped the tough sanctions measures would
hit North Korea hard enough to change Kim’s mind. As discussed above,
China does not want the DPRK to collapse and thus has to carefully balance
its interests in denuclearization and regime stability. Meanwhile, the
United States and ROK continue to call for China’s strict implementation
of UN sanctions. Despite its core interest in stability, China hoped that its
authorization of UNSCR 2321, which restricts North Korea’s coal exports,
would signal that it is willing to put the North Korean regime’s survival
at risk through even more stringent application of economic pressure. At
the same time, Beijing believes—not without justification—that the United
States should shoulder its own responsibility for resolving the nuclear
problem and is reluctant to be told what relevant measures it should take
against Pyongyang.
The THAAD Controversy and Its Impact
As China was implementing UNSCR 2270 by taking more stringent
measures against the DPRK, the controversy over the THAAD system
suddenly complicated the whole picture. On July 8, 2016, South Korea
and the United States announced their decision to deploy the THAAD
system on South Korean soil. The announcement came shortly before
the planned release of the South China Sea ruling by an ad hoc tribunal
in The Hague, which was widely believed would be unfavorable to China.
Whereas Beijing had long prepared for the South China Sea ruling, the
THAAD announcement apparently came sooner than Chinese leaders had
expected. Clearly a blow to China’s interests, THAAD has become a wedge
between the ROK and China and slowed the progress in bilateral relations
following the exchange of state visits by Presidents Xi and Park and Park’s
attendance at the September military parade in Beijing commemorating the
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70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Seoul’s decision on THAAD
angered China, and many quickly called for sanctioning South Korea.
Beijing believes that THAAD exceeds the ROK’s defense needs and
that the X-band radar system likely to accompany its deployment would
undermine China’s security by offsetting its nuclear deterrence capability.
However, South Korea had its own logic, convinced that this decision was
necessitated by the DPRK’s moves. After the fourth nuclear test and the
long-range rocket test that soon followed, the Park administration agreed
to initiate consultations with the United States on the earliest possible
deployment of a THAAD system. North Korea’s accelerated missile testing
program, evident since April 2006, reinforced the urgency and need for a
meaningful response from Seoul.
According to the official announcement, operational deployment
of THAAD will occur by the end of 2017 and is intended to defend the
infrastructure and citizens of South Korea and to protect core military
capabilities underpinning the U.S.-ROK alliance. This was an obvious setback
for Chinese diplomacy. During the Xi-Park meeting on the sidelines of the
G-20 summit in Hangzhou in September 2016, the THAAD issue was once
again raised. According to what Xi said to Park, failing to resolve the issue
would be unfavorable to strategic stability in the region and would exacerbate
China’s existing suspicions. 2 China, South Korea, and the United States must
reach an understanding on the technical aspects of the system and identify
ways to reassure China that THAAD will not undermine its national security.
Amid heightened tension in the South China Sea, the THAAD decision
suggested to North Korea that the Sino-U.S. rivalry was worsening.
Pyongyang probably believed that it could take advantage of this situation.
This assumption was not totally wrong. U.S. naval operations, especially
sending warships into the South China Sea, highlighted the friction between
the United States and China and were inevitably seen as challenging
China. With Beijing already engaged in a delicate balancing act to pressure
Pyongyang to change its behavior while ensuring regime stability, the
decision on THAAD inevitably weakened China’s determination to strictly
sanction North Korea. In this sense, South Korea took this step at the
expense of the ROK-China relationship and of Beijing’s close cooperation
on sanctioning Pyongyang. According to a study carried out by the Sejong
Institute, a South Korean think tank, the volume of trade between China
2 See People’s Daily, September 6, 2016.
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
and the DPRK has been rising since the United States and South Korea
announced their plans to deploy THAAD. 3
The Fifth Nuclear Test
Against this backdrop of deteriorating Sino-ROK relations, Pyongyang
once again “helped” with Beijing-Seoul ties. On September 9, the DPRK’s
National Day, a fifth nuclear test was carried out—the second one in 2016.
The test was close enough to the Sino-DPRK border to send palpable tremors
into northeastern China and prompt schools there to be evacuated. People
in China’s northeastern region could apparently sense the quake and, given
the disastrous impact of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan,
were afraid of the possible catastrophic consequences of nuclear radiation
from the test. During Kim Jong-il’s seventeen years in power, only two
nuclear tests were carried out, whereas Kim Jong-un has already conducted
three in less than five years. This fact demonstrates Pyongyang’s obstinate
adherence to its present course. Since the fifth test, analysts in China have
become somewhat more sober about the reality of the DPRK’s nuclear
program and have suggested that China needs to work together with the
ROK and the United States to cope with it.
For many years, China tried to persuade its prickly nominal ally to take
a new path of reform and open up to the outside world. It repeatedly warned
Pyongyang that developing nuclear weapons would not necessarily increase
its security but, on the contrary, could lead to problematic consequences
and undermine its own interests both domestically and internationally.
More than two decades have passed since the outbreak of the Korean
nuclear crisis, and China has been unsuccessful in persuading Pyongyang
not to develop nuclear weapons. As a result, China’s security interests have
been undermined. Pyongyang’s actions have offered Washington ample
opportunity to beef up the U.S.-ROK alliance, an important part of the
“Asia rebalance” that Beijing feels wary about.
When the “incantation of the golden hoop” on North Korea tightened
as more sanctions were imposed, some Chinese companies attracted
3 China’s border trade with North Korea is reportedly “very active.” See Elizabeth Shim, “China
Border Trade with North Korea ‘Very Active,’ Report Says,” United Press International, August 22,
2016 u http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/08/22/China-border-trade-with-
North-Korea-very-active-report-says/2911471871707. See also Jong-seok Lee, “The Current State
of China–North Korea Economic Exchange and the North Korean Economy Observed from the
Border Areas,” Sejong Institute, Policy Briefing, August 25, 2016.
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the attention of U.S. and ROK information-gathering activities. 4 Before
September 2016, when the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced its
sanctions on the Hongxiang Company—based in Dandong, the Chinese
city in Liaoning Province that borders North Korea—Chinese authorities
were already investigating allegations that the company was involved in
illicit activities. Hongxiang was one of the larger companies doing business
with North Korea. At its peak, Hongxiang’s trade volume with the North
reached $100 million, with its core import being coal. According to an
informed source in Dandong, Hongxiang had no intention of helping North
Korea but rather attempted to profit. Its CEO, Ma Xiaohong, was detained.
This was simply a small part in the overall picture of the nuclear problem
and Sino-U.S. interplay, which means more difficulties for North Korea’s
foreign trade.
Overall, the reduction of imports and exports has considerably affected
the DPRK’s foreign exchange income, which likely is the biggest impact
that the UNSCR 2270 sanctions have had on North Korea. No doubt,
this will add further difficulties to the DPRK’s weapon programs. Most
importantly, exports of dual-use goods to North Korea have been banned.
Chinese customs has tightened its check on the goods to be exported to
North Korea and expanded the scope to cover more items potentially usable
for military-related purposes. Financial sanctions have become even more
severe. When the bank accounts for North Korean companies are closed,
trade between Chinese and North Korean companies usually must rely on
cash or even resort to barter, and this significantly limits the conduct of
trade. Thus, because of the new sanctions, the investment environment in
North Korea has further deteriorated. Foreign investment in some industries
drastically has decreased, and foreign companies have been forced to shift
to a wait-and-see attitude. The sanctions are further reinforced with the
passage of UNSCR 2321 on November 30, 2016, which unprecedentedly
imposes a $400 million ceiling with respect to the exportation of North
Korean coal per year. Additional constraints are imposed on exports of
copper, nickel, and zinc—approximately $100 million a year—as well as
monuments from the country. 5 As time goes by, the impact of the new
sanction measures, if enforced effectively, will become even more visible.
4 The incantation of the golden hoop is used by the monk to keep the monkey under control in the
novel Pilgrimage to the West.
5 Marcus Noland, “Analysis of UNSCR 2321 Sanctions on North Korea,” Peterson Institute for
International Economics, November 30, 2016 u https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witnesstransformation/analysis-unscr-2321-sanctions-north-korea.
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
Conclusion
Convinced that North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs
can only bring about negative effects, China has enough reasons to try to
rein in Pyongyang, but so far its efforts have been unsuccessful. Beijing is
also wary of the consequences of a North Korean collapse. This is an old
dilemma that China has struggled with for years. Moreover, Beijing is unsure
of how its interests would be affected by a united Korea that has a military
alliance with the United States. This uncertainty has added to Beijing’s list
of possible negative outcomes. Long taught by its ancient thinkers that one
should measure the two evils and choose the lesser one, China’s preference
for the status quo seems logical. However, this is a changing status quo
that may not be in China’s favor. North Korea has continued to conduct
nuclear tests, and Beijing has had no choice but to impose further sanctions.
Although irritated by Pyongyang’s misbehavior, China is less anxious and
worried than South Korea vis-à-vis the North. China must constantly find
a balance between its at times conflicting interests in the denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula and the stability of the DPRK. The decision to
deploy THAAD by South Korea and the United States somewhat weakened
Beijing’s determination to sanction Pyongyang, while the fifth nuclear test
once again pushed it to the side of prioritizing denuclearization. Given
China’s geographic proximity to the Korean Peninsula and competing
strategic interests, this balancing act will become increasingly difficult.
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Acting on the North Korea Playbook:
Japan’s Responses to North Korea’s Provocations
Yasuhiro Izumikawa
In 2009, when a series of nuclear and missile tests conducted by North
Korea led some analysts to argue that Pyongyang had abandoned
diplomacy and aimed to reunify the Korean Peninsula militarily, a highly
respected North Korea watcher, Narushige Michishita, opined that
Pyongyang was still “playing the same game.” 1 While North Korea has
continued to upgrade its nuclear and missile capabilities since then, Japan
has ironically developed its own playbook on how to respond to Pyongyang’s
repeated provocations. Tokyo’s responses to Pyongyang’s defiant actions in
2016 are faithfully based on this playbook: seeking enhanced sanctions,
ensuring U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, and enhancing security
cooperation with South Korea. Unfortunately, this playbook contains no
silver lining that may lead to the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and
missile threat. Furthermore, the effects of Japan’s policies based on its North
Korea playbook may be undermined by unexpected domestic turmoil in its
security partners.
In this essay, I elaborate on the three main components of Japan’s
responses to North Korea’s provocations and discuss the problems of each
component. In the concluding remarks, I point out two immediate challenges
for which Japan needs to be prepared and then propose how Japan may be
able to overcome the problems with its existing North Korea policies.
Seeking Enhanced Sanctions
When North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test on September 9,
2016, Japan’s denunciation was swift. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called
the nuclear test “totally unacceptable” and promised to “consider further
measures against North Korea including further action in the United
Nations Security Council.” 2 At the UN General Assembly on September 21,
yasuhiro izumikawa is a Professor in the Faculty of Policy Studies at Chuo University. He can be
reached at .
1 Narushige Michishita, “Playing the Same Game: North Korea’s Coercive Attempt at U.S.
Reconciliation,” Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 139–52.
2 Shinzo Abe, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan (on the Nuclear Test by North Korea),”
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, September 9, 2016 u http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/
statement/201609/statement.html.
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
he argued that “the nature of the military provocations North Korea has
persisted with…are substantially more serious than before” and declared
that Japan would lead the Security Council discussions on how to confront
North Korea. 3 On the sidelines of the General Assembly, Abe met Iranian
president Hassan Rouhani and requested that Iran sever ties with North
Korea in military cooperation. 4 Given the fact that arms exports are an
important source of North Korea’s foreign currency and that Iran is one of
Pyongyang’s largest customers, it certainly makes sense to try to undermine
Iran’s ties with North Korea. 5
However, it is unclear whether these calls for more effective sanctions
against North Korea will be heeded internationally, or even whether
they may prove effective if adopted. Needless to say, the most significant
impediment to enhanced economic sanctions is China, which provides
the lifeline for the Kim Jong-un regime. China prioritizes stability on the
Korean Peninsula and opposes North Korea’s nuclear program, which it
considers a threat that could destabilize the region and potentially risk
further nuclear proliferation there. Precisely because Beijing prioritizes
the peninsula’s stability, however, it adamantly refuses to take any action,
such as cutting North Korea’s energy supply, that could either prompt more
aggressive reactions from Pyongyang or lead to the regime’s collapse. 6 In
addition, Chinese officials suspect that taking tough actions against North
Korea could open a gate for Washington to approach Pyongyang, which
has sought better relations with the United States from the beginning. For
these reasons, it would be extremely difficult to persuade China to comply
with Japan’s and the international community’s wish to coerce North
Korea economically.
Ensuring U.S. Extended Deterrence
Following North Korea’s nuclear test on September 9, Prime
Minister Abe called President Barack Obama and expressed his desire
for maintaining close security cooperation with the United States.
3 Shinzo Abe, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Seventy-First Session of the United
Nations General Assembly,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, September 21, 2016 u
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201609/71unga.html.
4 Kohei Sakai, “Shusho, Iran homon ni iyoku. Shunokaidan de ‘tai Kitachosen gunjikyoryoku
danzetsu wo’ ” [Prime Minister Visits Iran. At Top Meeting, Suggests Stopping Military
Cooperation with North Korea], Nikkei, September 23, 2016, 2.
5 Mikael Weissmann and Linus Hagstrom, “Sanctions Reconsidered: The Path Forward with North
Korea,” Washington Quarterly 39, no. 3 (2016): 69.
6 Josh Rogin, “The Coming Clash with China over North Korea,” Washington Post, November 7, 2016.
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In response, President Obama “explained that he hopes to convey to
Prime Minister Abe and the people of Japan that the U.S.-Japan alliance
is solid and the United States security commitment to Japan including its
extended deterrence is unshakable.” 7
Obtaining such explicit assurances from the United States is necessary
not only for policy reasons but also for political reasons. With the
increasing evidence that North Korea has been mastering technologies
needed for the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and the development
of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, it is reasonable to assess that
Pyongyang is acquiring second-strike nuclear capabilities. Given that this
could undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, it is imperative
to demonstrate that the United States’ resolve to defend Japan from
North Korea’s threats remains as strong as ever. Politically, these explicit
assurances are important to calm a Japanese public that tends to be skeptical
of the reliability of U.S. defense commitments. These factors explain why
Japan swiftly expressed its opposition to the Obama administration’s idea
of declaring “no first use” of nuclear weapons. 8 Japan also opposed the UN
resolution on October 27 calling for the initiation of negotiations on a treaty
banning nuclear weapons, despite sharp criticism from a domestic audience
with strong anti-nuclear sentiments. That Japan did not merely abstain
from voting reflects the Abe administration’s determination to maintain an
effective U.S. nuclear umbrella. 9
However, the surprising result of the 2016 U.S. presidential election
rattled Japan’s confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Within both the
Japanese government and the Japanese public, the concern has risen that
Donald Trump may act on the disturbing rhetoric of his presidential
campaign—that South Korea and Japan should defend themselves by
developing their own nuclear weapons if necessary, or that he would
welcome a sit-down with Kim Jong-un. 10 The damage is already done; in a
public opinion survey conducted after the election, 58% of those surveyed
7 “Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), September 9, 2016 u
http://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_000519.html.
8 Naoya Yoshino, “Bei no kaku sensei fushiyo kento, Nihon hukumu domeikoku hantai” [The United
States Considers No-First-Use Policy of Nuclear Weapons, Allies Including Japan Disagree], Nikkei,
August 17, 2016.
9 “Kakukinshi kosho ketsugi: Nihon hantai ‘Anpo yusen’ ” [Conclusion of Nuclear Weapons Ban
Negotiations: Japan Disagrees “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Should Be Priority”], Mainichi Shimbun,
October 28, 2016 u http://mainichi.jp/articles/20161029/k00/00m/030/156000c.
10 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Donald Trump Open to Japan and South Korea Having
Nuclear Weapons,” Financial Times, March 26, 2016 u https://www.ft.com/content/
c927017c-f398-11e5-9afe-dd2472ea263d.
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said that their worries about U.S.-Japan relations under President Trump
outweigh their positive expectations. 11 If the new U.S. administration
pursues the policies that Trump promoted during his campaign, the voices
within Japan calling for acquiring independent capabilities to conduct
surgical airstrikes against targets in North Korea or even nuclear weapons
may become louder.
Enhancing Security Cooperation with South Korea
South Korea has been an obstacle to effective trilateral cooperation
between the United States, Japan, and South Korea due to the strained
relations between Seoul and Tokyo since the beginning of the presidency of
Park Geun-hye. However, thanks partly to the agreement on the “comfort
women” issue reached in December 2015 and partly to the worsening
relations between China and South Korea, security cooperation between
Seoul and Tokyo has been steadily improving. 12 After North Korea’s fourth
nuclear test in January 2016, Prime Minister Abe and President Park
agreed to work together to influence the international community to take
a firm response to North Korea. 13 Since then, Abe and Park have conducted
summit meetings twice in 2016, promising close cooperation concerning
North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.
As for bilateral military cooperation, Japan has supported the
deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system
in South Korea since the South Korean–U.S. negotiations on the subject
began, and Tokyo welcomed Seoul’s decision to deploy the missile defense
system in July 2016. 14 Japan also began to explore whether South Korea
might be willing to sign the General Security of Military Information
Agreement (GSOMIA). The two states almost signed the agreement four
years ago, but South Korea declined to do so at the last minute due to
11 “Kongo no Nichibei kankei ni fuan 58%” [58% of Japanese People Worried about Future U.S.-Japan
Relationship], Yomiuri Shimbun, November 14, 2016.
12 For more detailed analysis of bilateral cooperation in 2016, see Scott A. Snyder and Brad
Glosserman, “Japan–South Korean Relations in 2016: A Return to the Old Normal,” Council on
Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound, September 23, 2016 u http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/09/23/
japan-south-korea-relations-in-2016-a-return-to-the-old-normal.
13 “U.S. to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense System in South Korea,” Japan Times, July 8, 2016 u
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/08/asia-pacific/u-s-deploy-thaad-missile-defensesouth-korea-china-slams-decision/#.WCmE14VOJjo.
14 “Kitachosen no kaku to Chugoku no kyohaku ga Kanbeinichi no anzenhosho no kessoku wo
kyokasaseta” [North Korea Nuclear Issues and China Threat Enforce Bond between United
States and Japan], Dong-a Ilbo, September 20, 2016; and Hyo-Ju Son, “Korea, Japan Expected
to Sign GSOMIA This Month,” Dong-a Ilbo, November 9, 2016 u http://english.donga.com/3/
all/26/777523/1.
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strong domestic opposition. Faced with the recent series of North Korean
provocations, however, the South Korean public has become somewhat more
understanding toward such intelligence cooperation with Japan, leading the
Park government to express its willingness to sign the agreement. Although
the two countries already share intelligence related to North Korea’s
nuclear and missile tests through the trilateral mechanism involving the
United States, signing the GSOMIA carries symbolic importance as well as
practical benefits. 15 The combination of the THAAD deployment in South
Korea and the GSOMIA will contribute to better intelligence about North
Korea’s activities.
The political scandal that erupted suddenly in Seoul may halt this favorable
trend, however. 16 On October 25, 2016, President Park admitted that she had
shared government secrets with her nonofficial confidante Choi Soon-sil,
the daughter of a religious cult leader who allegedly supported Park when
her mother, the wife of former president Park Chung-hee, was assassinated.
As the scale of Choi’s involvement in politics and the special treatment she
received from the Park government were revealed, the president’s approval
rating fell below 10%, and hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated and
demanded her resignation. Under such tense circumstances, the South Korean
government proceeded to sign the GSOMIA with Japan on November 23.
Opposition parties criticized the Park government for a “sell out” diplomacy
toward a former imperialist nation, 17 and on December 9 the South Korean
National Assembly voted to impeach President Park. As a result, the country’s
domestic politics have entered into a period of instability, making future
South Korean–Japanese security cooperation uncertain.
Challenges Ahead
Among the three pieces of Japan’s playbook on North Korea, the first
(seeking enhanced sanctions) aims to increase pressure on North Korea
to come to the negotiating table to resolve its nuclear and missile issues,
while the other two (ensuring U.S. extended deterrence and enhancing
15 “South Korea Willing to Share THAAD Data with Japan in Snub to China and Russia,” South
China Morning Post, August 4, 2016 u http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/1999113/
south-korea-willing-share-thaad-data-japan-snub-china-and-russia.
16 Benjamin Lee, “Strategic Implications of South Korea’s Political Scandal,” Diplomat, November 3,
2016 u http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/strategic-implications-of-south-koreas-political-scandal.
17 “Gunjikimitsu kyotei nikkan ga karishomei, Kankokuyato ha hanpatsu” [Military Intelligence-Sharing
Agreement Has Been Provisionally Signed, South Korean Opposition Parties Show Displeasure],
Nikkei, November 14, 2016 u http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASFS14H72_U6A111C1PP8000.
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security cooperation with South Korea) are the minimum conditions for
maintaining stability in northeast Asia. In 2016, Japan’s responses to North
Korea’s provocations have been more or less steady, although implementing
enhanced sanctions has been challenging due to China’s refusal to coerce
North Korea. The recent political developments in the United States and
South Korea, however, could seriously undermine the minimum necessary
conditions of the policy package for managing and resolving North Korean
problems. This requires Japan to do its best in maintaining trilateral
cooperation with the United States and South Korea. Toward the United
States, the Japanese government needs to establish sound relations with the
Trump administration as soon as possible and persuade the president, who
harbors isolationist inclinations, to maintain U.S. security commitments to
Japan as well as South Korea. Tokyo also needs to carefully watch South
Korea’s domestic situation and choose the best way to secure the gains made
in 2016. If it cannot do so, the basic premise for an effective North Korea
policy may crumble.
Even if Japan succeeds in clearing these hurdles, it still needs to address
both tactical and strategic questions. Concerning the tactical questions, Japan
must be prepared for two opposing scenarios regarding North Korea. First,
North Korea’s past behavior indicates that it may resort to limited yet serious
military provocations, in particular during a period of government succession
or domestic turmoil for its rivals. Therefore, Japan, together with its security
partners, should be prepared for possible aggression by North Korea.
Second, an equally pressing and more complicated question is how to
respond if North Korea makes compromises on the so-called abduction
issue. Since North Korea admitted that it had abducted Japanese citizens
during former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in
2002, the issue has been as important as the nuclear issue for the Japanese
public, although its salience has receded somewhat. In May 2014, North
Korea agreed to reinvestigate whether abducted Japanese might still
remain in the country, but little progress has been made. Nonetheless, it
is widely reported that Japanese diplomats contacted their North Korean
counterparts and raised the abduction issue in early September. 18 It is not
inconceivable that North Korea may attempt to take advantage of this issue
to drive a wedge between Japan, on the one hand, and the United States and
South Korea, on the other. In this author’s view, seeking a resolution of this
18 Yoshihiro Makino, “Sources: Japan, N. Korea Held Secret Talks on Abduction Issue,” Asahi
Shimbun, October 7, 2016 u http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201610070046.html.
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issue does not necessarily hurt the trilateral relationship if Tokyo properly
coordinates its approach with its security partners. But Tokyo should
be aware that how or at what price it pursues the goal could have serious
repercussions for trilateral cooperation.
From a more strategic perspective, it is high time that Japan, as
well as its partners, re-examine whether the existing approach—the
one based on the current playbook—is sufficient to achieve the goal of
denuclearizing North Korea, and if it is not, how they should revise their
means-ends calculus. As North Korea makes progress in acquiring a
second-strike capability, it becomes increasingly unlikely that Pyongyang
may renounce this capability at an acceptable price. If this is the case, the
United States, Japan, and South Korea must choose one of the following
options: the collapse of North Korea through military coercion, the
long-term containment of North Korea, or the transformation of the Kim
regime through accommodating a nuclear North Korea. They may also
need to re-examine options for inducing China’s compliance with this
desire to further squeeze Pyongyang. One idea that has been discussed
is to impose secondary sanctions on Chinese firms doing business with
North Korea. However, such a measure may not alter Beijing’s calculus as
long as it mistrusts U.S. intentions concerning the Korean Peninsula. The
United States, Japan, and South Korea may need to offer China a more
attractive bargain—such as the withdrawal of substantial U.S. forces from
South Korea—in exchange for Chinese cooperation. Japan and its security
partners must begin to discuss these difficult questions if they are serious
about resolving the North Korean nuclear and missile problems.
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Adversary in a Contested Regional Order:
The “Trilemma” of U.S.–North Korea Relations
Van Jackson
North Korea’s dogged pursuit of a nuclear and ballistic missile
capability has never been the sole reason for its confrontational
relationship with the United States. The issue sits at the intersection of
multiple narratives about where North Korea fits in U.S. strategy toward
Asia. From the U.S. perspective, North Korea is a deterrence challenge, a
proliferation threat, and a dangerous wildcard in the increasingly contested
regional order. Each of these views of North Korea implies different policy
priorities, and each favors different ways of addressing the North Korean
nuclear threat. The degree to which U.S. policy emphasizes different tools of
statecraft depends on how each of these three narratives defines the North
Korea problem.
This “trilemma” helps explain why all past attempts to solve the North
Korean nuclear puzzle have come up short. The complexity of the situation
presents hard choices, which successive U.S. presidents have preferred to
avoid, even though doing so has allowed the problem to grow worse and
more disadvantageous for the United States over time. But “passing the
buck” on a decisive course of action against North Korea is becoming
untenable. President Donald Trump may not have the luxury of passivity
and risk avoidance toward the North Korean nuclear problem. The United
States is gradually being forced to take a more decisive approach that
necessarily involves greater risk. But will it primarily be a domestic political,
geopolitical, or military risk?
The remainder of this essay will outline three different narratives about
how the North Korean nuclear problem matters in U.S. strategy—as a war
threat, as a nuclear proliferation threat, and as a threat to the regional
order. Each section will identify the key priority within a narrative, as well
as the relative importance of different tools of policy, from diplomacy and
sanctions to deterrence and preventive strikes. The essay then highlights
how these narratives exist as an uneasy triangle or trilemma: any attempt to
van jackson is an Associate Professor in the College of Security Studies at the Daniel K. Inouye
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He is also the author of the book Rival Reputations: Coercion
and Credibility in U.S.–North Korea Relations (2016). The views expressed are his own. He can be
reached at .
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definitively address the North Korean nuclear problem from one perspective
may require sacrificing a priority built into other perspectives.
A Threat to Successful Deterrence
Especially in defense circles, the highest priority for U.S. and regional
interests has long been maintaining stability through deterrence. When
deterrence-based stability is the overriding priority, barring a diplomatic
miracle, the United States must effectively plan to live with a nuclear-armed
North Korea. Diplomacy can help bolster deterrence but never undermine
it. International sanctions are a peripheral concern. Preventive strikes on
nuclear facilities are possible, but only if policymakers truly believe doing so
would have a future deterrence benefit, which is debatable. A stability-first
strategy toward North Korea involves preventing war through deterrence
and getting a better grip on the provocation problem.
First, deterrence of major war is a constant work in progress, not
something to be taken for granted simply because the United States is
the bigger power. Deterrence depends on a dynamic formula involving
capabilities, interest, and resolve—what it takes to deter invasion or military
adventurism changes depending on what North Korea does and has. North
Korea tinkering with the size and composition of its military arsenal should
compel the United States to frequently revisit contingency planning, force
presence, and strategic signaling considerations.
Second, whereas strategic deterrence has held on the Korean Peninsula
for more than a half-century, tactical deterrence has repeatedly failed.
North Korea has a long history of resorting to small-scale, isolated acts of
militarized violence (“provocations”) against the United States and South
Korea. U.S. policymakers have historically viewed these provocations
as undesirable but basically acceptable as long as war did not break out
anew. 1 But provocations are becoming a newly unacceptable problem
because of pressures from Seoul. Since 2010, when North Korea twice
attacked the South, the latter vowed “manifold retaliation” against North
Korea the next time it engaged in violent provocations, and South Korea
has been adjusting its military capabilities, doctrine, and force posture to
make good on that threat. 2 In the wake of the 2010 attacks, South Korean
public discourse has also increasingly favored developing an independent
1 Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in U.S.–North Korea Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016).
2 Ibid., 185.
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nuclear capability. Both of these prospects—war instigated by an ally
and an ally going nuclear—give the United States a much greater stake in
preventing future provocations.
From the defense viewpoint, North Korea’s nuclear first-strike
capability must be met with an adapted deterrence and warfighting posture
that takes confrontation seriously. To this end, the United States and South
Korea have engaged in some limited provocation planning, and consecutive
U.S. military commanders have publicly recommended deployment of the
now-controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system
to South Korea. 3 But these are partial measures that do not fully reconcile the
requirements of deterrence against a second-tier nuclear-armed adversary:
curbing (not enhancing) B-52 bomber deployments and other signals that
imply U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, limiting
alliance objectives in any conflict, and yet also demonstrating resolve against
lower-level attacks through decisive retaliation. 4 Even failing to fully come
to grips with what deterrence takes, the basic goal of avoiding war through
deterrence limits the negotiating space for U.S. diplomats; any concessions
or promises to North Korea that would erode deterrence or leave South
Korea more vulnerable to attack have proved politically unacceptable. The
security dilemma with North Korea has always handcuffed U.S. diplomats.
A Threat to the Nuclear Taboo
A second view emphasizes the nuclear proliferation threat that North
Korea poses. Nuclear nonproliferation has a large bureaucratic constituency
in the United States, and for good reason: the spread of nuclear weapons
makes for a more dangerous global situation and erodes a long-standing
U.S. advantage in foreign policy. When nuclear nonproliferation is the
top national security priority, U.S. diplomacy is heavily constrained by
the quixotic requirement that denuclearization be “on the table” as part
of any talks with North Korea. The nonproliferation imperative also offers
the strongest rationale for both economic sanctions and preventive strikes
against North Korean nuclear facilities.
3 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Nominations before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008 u http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg46092/html/CHRG-
110shrg46092.htm; and U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Nominations before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2011 u http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg74537/html/CHRG-112shrg74537.htm.
4 These requirements are outlined in Van Jackson, “Preventing Nuclear War with North
Korea,” Foreign Affairs, September 11, 2016 u https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
north-korea/2016-09-11/preventing-nuclear-war-north-korea.
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North Korea’s nuclear capability threatens U.S. nonproliferation
interests in two major ways. The first is the symbolic threat of North Korea
entering the club of nuclear states while flouting international law and
the nuclear taboo. U.S. policy has historically refused to acknowledge or
recognize North Korea as a nuclear power because of the implications it
would have for alliance relations and the global nuclear nonproliferation
regime. The second is North Korea’s actual “horizontal” proliferation
activity: trafficking materials and technical expertise that help other states
go nuclear.
To address the first threat, the United States primarily relies on
economic sanctions, which send a signal to aspiring nuclear states that it
is not acceptable to pursue nuclear weapons. If states can go nuclear while
still being a normal part of the international community, then what would
prevent others from following North Korea’s path? The logical case for
opposing Iranian, Saudi, Syrian, or Burmese nuclear weapons becomes
much harder, to say nothing of South Korean, Japanese, and Taiwan. Norms
die when others witness a norm violator going unpunished. 5 Sanctions
keep the nonproliferation norm alive; as long as the United States wishes to
prevent other states from going nuclear, sanctions must remain a tool of first
resort against North Korea.
To address the second threat, the United States’ robust
counterproliferation effort aims to enforce sanctions and physically prevent
North Korea from helping other states go nuclear. It does this by cracking
down on financial transactions, building the capacity of partner states to
enforce sanctions through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and
conducting interdiction operations, often in concert with PSI partners.
From the nonproliferation viewpoint, sanctions and maritime
interdictions are hardly sufficient to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons. Few, if any, analysts think that economic sanctions will change
North Korea’s willingness to negotiate away its nuclear program or halt
its proliferation activity. Diplomatic engagement with North Korea is
therefore an attractive approach, but only insofar as engagement aims at
the freeze and rollback of North Korea’s nuclear program, which seems
unlikely. The breakdown of talks with Pyongyang during the Obama
administration was traceable to just such a diplomatic impasse: the
United States refused to abandon the goal of denuclearization in any talks,
5 Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn, “Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes,” European
Journal of International Relations 18, no. 4 (2012): 719–42.
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while the one topic that North Korea would not permit for discussion
was elimination of its nuclear arsenal. Preventive strikes against nuclear
facilities remain at the extreme end of policy options for rolling back
North Korea’s nuclear program, though the 2007 strikes against a nuclear
reactor in al-Kibar—which Syria was constructing with North Korean
assistance—provide both a precedent and a model for how they might
be conducted. The risks of such an attack against North Korean facilities
are considerable, but under certain conditions even former secretaries of
defense William Perry and Ashton Carter have advocated such a move. 6
A Threat to the Regional Order
A third view of North Korea prioritizes the U.S. role in sustaining the
regional order. North Korea matters primarily as a litmus test of the United
States’ continuing centrality—or at least relevance—to Asian international
relations and U.S. allies in particular. The persistence of North Korea’s
nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in addition to its rampant human
rights violations, reveals the limits of U.S. influence in the region. When
regional order is the priority, the United States approaches the North
Korean nuclear problem as a proxy for its relations with China and its
alliance network. Diplomacy is a high-value tool of U.S. strategy even when
it goes nowhere. Sanctions show continued U.S. leadership and interest
in promoting regional stability. And preventive strikes, while generally
undesirable, under certain conditions may underscore the seriousness
of the United States’ willingness to uphold the rule of law and its alliance
treaty commitments. Faced with North Korea’s nuclear belligerence and the
priority of upholding regional order, the United States’ primary fixation is
on showing responsiveness to the North Korea problem while managing
relations with China and the U.S. alliance network—principally South
Korea and Japan.
On the balance sheet of Sino-U.S. competition and cooperation, the
North Korean nuclear issue never consistently falls on either side of the
ledger. Both states seek denuclearization, and both sides even place high
value on the stability of North Korea (at least to date), but China equates
stability with passivity while the United States believes that a failure to check
North Korean belligerence will create an even more unstable situation over
time. So the United States cooperates with—and even empowers—China
6 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, “If Necessary, Strike and Destroy,” Washington Post, June 22, 2006
u http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/AR2006062101518.html.
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on North Korea when it can but uses the issue as a vehicle for pressure on
China when it must.
The United States must also show that it takes seriously its deterrence
and defense commitments to South Korea and Japan and not appear idle as
North Korea improves the quality and quantity of its nuclear and missile
arsenal. This means nudging its allies to work together to the extent that
their domestic politics allow and responding to the changing requirements
of both deterrence of North Korea and reassurance of these allies. Toward
this end, the United States has been key to brokering the General Security
of Military Information Agreement on intelligence sharing between Japan
and South Korea and building the Defense Trilateral Talks among the three
countries into an institution. It has also worked closely with South Korea
not only to upgrade its missile defenses against North Korea’s expanding
threat but also to manage the resulting political friction, most notably
surrounding the decision to deploy a THAAD battery.
To a great extent, these measures undermine goodwill in the larger
Sino-U.S. relationship and reveal a tension between the United States’ need
to accommodate the preferences of a rising power and to bolster the stability
of the existing order based on its alliances. China has threatened diplomatic
and economic sanctions against South Korea for agreeing to the deployment
of THAAD, which it believes undermines the delicate military balance
between China and the United States. Beijing also accuses the United States
of using its alliances to strategically encircle China and regards cooperation
among U.S. allies as a zero-sum problem of competition with China. 7
From the viewpoint of the regional order, diplomatic engagement with
North Korea needs to be as inclusive as possible and might be considered
useful even if it fails to change North Korean behavior. Economic sanctions,
when all players can agree on them, serve a similar purpose. But on
measures of deterrence toward North Korea or assurance of the U.S. allies,
the United States faces cross-pressures. Whether at any given moment the
United States emphasizes deterrence or working diplomatically through
and with China depends on whether the greater priority is mollifying China
or reassuring allies. Preventive strikes are unappealing because it is difficult
to imagine a scenario in which Beijing would support such action against
7 Michael Lipin, “China Ups Pressure on South Korea over Missile Plan,” Voice of America, August 25,
2016 u http://www.voanews.com/a/china-ups-pressure-on-south-korea-over-missile-plan/3480077.
html; and Van Jackson, “Asian Security after U.S. Hegemony: Spheres of Influence and the Third
Wave of Regional Order,” Asan Forum, September–October 2016 u http://www.theasanforum.org/
asian-security-after-us-hegemony-spheres-of-influence-and-the-third-wave-of-regional-order.
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North Korean nuclear facilities. It might even mistake U.S. attacks against
North Korea as impending attacks on China. But depending on the degree
and mode of consultation with allies, preventive strikes could either bolster
or undermine the regional order and allies’ faith in the United States.
Breaking Out of the Trilemma
Resolving the North Korean nuclear threat requires taking on risks
that past presidents have sidestepped. In order to do that, U.S. policymakers
must clarify their priorities. The United States wants to show leadership and
prove that it is a reliable treaty ally. It wants to show resolve and that it will
not sit idle as threats toward the homeland or U.S. allies mount. It wants to
show that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is in both the U.S. national
interest and the interest of global stability. And it wants to avoid war. But if
everything is a priority, then nothing is. The United States may not be able
to achieve all these goals.
Empowering U.S. diplomats with true maneuvering room would require
sacrificing deterrence and potentially compromising the interests of allies.
Ignoring or tacitly recognizing North Korea’s nuclear capability would
deeply weaken the nuclear taboo and make further proliferation more likely.
And changing U.S. policy toward North Korea primarily because of either
Chinese or alliance preferences would make deterrence—and by extension
war avoidance—a secondary concern.
Faced with hard choices, the United States must soon take a gamble or
else allow North Korea to gradually chip away at the nuclear nonproliferation
regime, alliance confidence, and a favorable military balance on the
peninsula. If the status quo continues for much longer, North Korea will
pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, calling into question all that the
United States stands for in Asia.
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asia policy
Why Nothing Can Really Be Done about North Korea’s
Nuclear Program
Andrei Lankov
If one were asked to describe the worldview of the North Korean political
elites, it could be done in a single word: they are “hyperrealists.” Their
idea of how international relations are structured agrees extremely well with
the prescriptions of the realist school (of whose existence most of them seem
blissfully unaware), and in many cases they take this school’s ideas to its
logical extremes. This has been the case for well over half a century. This
hyperrealism is how a small group of North Korean hereditary elites have
managed to stay in power against seemingly impossible odds since the late
1950s. In that time, North Korea has survived the Sino-Soviet quarrel of
the 1960–80s, long-term economic decline, the meteoric rise of South Korea
(its major geopolitical rival), the collapse of the Soviet Union (its major aid
provider), and famine and the near-complete disintegration of its economy
in the 1990s.
Any one of these events would probably be enough to wipe out the
majority of the world’s regimes. But the Kim family regime is alive and
kicking. How did it manage this? How is it still surviving? The regime
largely persists because the Kim family is the best bunch of Machiavellians
currently in operation. The major goal of the North Korean regime is,
above all, survival. Its elites can hardly be expected to have read John
Mearsheimer’s works, but the regime’s approach appears to mimic the major
assumptions of the realist school. 1 These people do not make compromises
on issues that they, rightly or wrongly, believe concern not merely the
survival of their regime but also the survival of their state as an entity and,
above all, their own political survival.
This essay first considers the Kim regime’s prioritization of survival and
the implications of this orientation for North Korean foreign policy. It then
assesses the prospects for the international sanctions regime to successfully
pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program.
andrei lankov is Professor at Kookmin Univeristy in Seoul, specializing in North Korean history
and politics. He can be reached at .
note u This work was supported by the 2015 research program of Kookmin University in South Korea.
1 See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2014).
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
The Kim Regime’s Prioritization of Survival
North Korea is part of a divided nation and faces the far more powerful
South Korea. Once an agrarian backwater, lagging well behind the then
industrial North until the 1960s, South Korea has become one of the
powerhouses of the world economy. The per capita income ratio between
North and South Korea (1 to 22 if you believe the Bank of Korea’s most
recent estimates) now represents the world’s largest such gap between two
countries that share a land border. 2 This would be a great contrast anywhere,
but in this case the two states are populated by people who speak the same
language, claim a common national identity, and often present eventual
unification as their supreme goal.
The existence of such a neighbor means that any serious political crisis
inside North Korea could easily lead to regime collapse, followed by South
Korea’s absorption of the impoverished North. In a sense, we are talking
about a much-exaggerated version of the German reunification scenario. 3
If such an outcome transpires, the North Korean elites expect no quarter.
Unlike the East German leaders, they indeed have engaged in massive
violations of human rights for decades. The ratio of prisoners to the total
population in North Korea is roughly equal to that of Stalin’s Russia in
the early 1950s: the incarceration of political opponents’ entire immediate
families remained mandatory until the early 2000s, and the regime
conducted terrorist attacks and civilian abductions in earlier stages of
North Korean history. 4 Thus, the country’s elites have good reason to believe
that if their state collapses as a result of a foreign attack or internal popular
revolution, they not only will lose their power and (rather modest) affluence
but also are likely to be held responsible for past abuses.
To prevent such an outcome, North Korean decision-makers are not
only remarkably careful but also remarkably ruthless in their political
planning. They care about regime survival above all, treating all other
considerations as secondary. This is applicable to economic growth, which
in the majority of modern countries has become the paramount factor in
determining state strategy. That is not to say that the North Korean elites
2 Kim Hwa Yong, “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2015,” Bank of Korea, Press
Release, July 23, 2016.
3 For further discussion of this scenario, see Bruce W. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North
Korean Collapse (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013).
4 David Hawk, “The Hidden Gulag,” 2nd ed., Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012;
and “Taken! North Korea’s Criminal Abduction of Citizens of Other Countries,” Committee for
Human Rights in North Korea, May 12, 2011 u http://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Taken_LQ.pdf.
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do not need economic growth—they do, of course. However, this issue is
secondary to their supreme goal of state survival.
This prioritization of survival determines the regime’s attitude to the
outside world. The regime has no ideological attachment to any foreign state.
Even though official propaganda continues to reference socialism, North
Korean leaders are state-oriented pragmatists who know perfectly well that
Soviet-style centrally planned economies do not work. They are willing and
eager to play neighboring states against one another to maximize gains.
This is bad news for foreign diplomats since this worldview means that there
is very little chance for success in either the hard-line or soft-line approach
to the North Korean nuclear issue. The North Korean hereditary elites
will be remarkably indifferent to the promises of economic benefits and
remarkably tough and uncompromising when faced with outside economic
pressure and international sanctions. They do not trust the benefits gained
from denuclearization to be worth the tremendous security risks, and they
believe that giving into what they see as foreign blackmail will merely invite
more blackmail.
Unfortunately, such attitudes have been reinforced by recent experiences.
Top North Korean families remember quite well that Muammar Gaddafi
was the only strongman in the modern world who agreed to surrender his
nuclear weapons program in exchange for promises of economic benefits.
The sorry fate of the Libyan dictator and many of his supporters serves as
a timely reminder of why his decision, once widely eulogized by the foreign
media, was not that beneficial after all. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum on
Security Assurances (Budapest Protocol) has also served as a warning against
excessive belief in so-called security guarantees. The Budapest Protocol
provided Ukraine with guarantees of its territorial integrity in exchange
for the country ridding itself of the nuclear weapons it inherited from the
collapse of the Soviet Union. As we know, these guarantees of security and
territorial integrity—provided by the Russian Federation, the United States,
and the United Kingdom—were of no help whatsoever when the Crimean
Peninsula was taken by Russia.
These two incidents, as well as the U.S. invasion of Iraq, drove home
what the North Korean leaders have believed for decades—that international
obligations, treaties, guarantees, and written promises are seldom worth the
paper they are written on if not supported by force. At the end of the day,
only might and power matter. For an impoverished country such as North
Korea, nuclear arms are the only affordable kind of military might—ideally
combined with reliable delivery systems capable of striking the territories
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
of all major powers, the United States above all. This attitude was
well-encapsulated in North Korea’s reaction to Gaddafi’s fall. On March 22,
2011, the Korean Central News Agency quoted a spokesperson for the North
Korean Foreign Ministry who stated the following:
The present Libyan crisis teaches the international community a
serious lesson. It was fully exposed before the world that “Libya’s
nuclear dismantlement” much touted by the U.S. in the past
turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby the latter coaxed
the former with such sweet words as “guarantee of security” and
“improvement of relations” to disarm itself and then swallowed
it up by force. It proved once again the truth of history that peace
can be preserved only when one builds up one’s own strength as
long as high-handed and arbitrary practices go on in the world. 5
It is therefore quite naive to expect that promises of better trade conditions
and economic benefits will in any way make the North Korean government
compromise on what it sees as a basic condition of its survival. After all,
dead, overthrown, or imprisoned leaders are not that interested in receiving
economic benefits.
The International Sanctions Regime
Unfortunately for the hard-liners who currently dominate Washington’s
thinking on North Korean issues, international sanctions have even less
chance of success. To start with, North Korean society is designed in a way
that makes it highly immune to foreign pressure. As the experience of the
great famine demonstrated in the 1990s, the North Korean government is
quite willing and capable of continuing policies it considers necessary even
when its population starves to death in large numbers. During that period,
between 600,000 and 900,000 North Koreans starved to death, but the regime
did not face any noticeable security challenge and continued with its pursuit
of nuclear weapons. 6 Even if sanctions brought serious economic pressure, the
North Korean government would ignore the economic problems since the
survival—let alone the well-being—of the population is not particularly high
on its agenda, which is dominated by the issue of regime survival. Sanctions,
therefore, might have an impact only when strong enough to provoke serious
domestic discontent bordering on revolution. Only when faced with two
5 “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces U.S. Military Attack on Libya,” Korean Central News
Agency, March 22, 2011.
6 For the economic and political issues related to the famine of 1996–99, see Stephan Haggard and
Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007).
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equally dangerous threats—one of revolution provoked by mass starvation,
and another of disarmament in the face of the hostile world—might the
North Korean elites conceivably start thinking about concessions on the
nuclear issue, and even then such an outcome is unlikely.
However, it is extremely difficult to implement sanctions of this
magnitude because they rely on China’s continuous systematic support.
China now controls over 70% of North Korea’s foreign trade, so its
participation is vital for any efficient sanctions regime. 7 Chinese analysts
are perfectly aware that only truly devastating sanctions have a chance of
producing a desirable political impact. The problem is that China worries
about implementing such sanctions because the risk of the North Korean
regime imploding would be too high. Although China is not happy about
North Korea’s nuclear adventurism, it does not want to deal with the
manifold consequences of North Korea’s collapse, which it sees as a greater
threat than Pyongyang’s brinksmanship. Beijing does not want a civil war
or a state of anarchy in a neighboring nuclear-armed state, which might
require military or political intervention—both highly costly options. Last
but not least, it would not be happy if such a crisis were to result in the
unification of Korea under the control of Seoul and, hence, the emergence of
a pro-U.S., democratic, and unified Korean state. From the Chinese point of
view, the status quo, however imperfect, is better than all conceivable future
scenarios. This situation will not change. 8
Some observers in the United States have argued that Chinese attitudes
can be influenced by the continuous increase in the U.S. military presence
in Northeast Asia. It is assumed that the growing U.S. military presence
near China’s borders will eventually prompt Beijing to reconsider its
attitude toward North Korea’s brinksmanship. Indeed, the North Korean
nuclear and missile program provides the United States with valid reasons
to maintain and increase its military forces near Chinese borders. The
most recent example of such a development is the United States’ decision
to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile
defense system in South Korea—a decision that greatly annoyed China.
However, as the THAAD issue has recently demonstrated, Beijing will not
react to such pressure in the way many in Washington expect. Instead of
7 Ian E. Rinehart and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and
Internal Situation,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, R41259, January 15,
2016, 8 u http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf.
8 For a recent review of China’s approach to North Korea, see Scott Snyder, “Will China Change
Its North Korea Policy?” Council on Foreign Relations, March 31, 2016 u http://www.cfr.org/
north-korea/china-change-its-north-korea-policy/p37717.
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oundtable • the north korean nuclear threat
penalizing North Korea for being unnecessarily provocative, Chinese
leaders are increasingly inclined to see North Korea as a useful, if annoying,
counterweight to the U.S. presence, or at least as a buffer zone that allows
them to keep the United States and its allies at a distance. In fact, since the
THAAD deployment was announced, experts in Beijing have been thinking
about the best ways to sanction South Korea, while sanctions targeting
North Korea are likely to be relaxed considerably. 9
As devoted hyperrealists, North Korean leaders are perfectly aware of
this situation and work hard to use it to their advantage. They have done so
before: from the late 1950s to the late 1980s, North Korean foreign policy
was based on playing China and Russia against each other, and they are
equally willing to continue the same old game with new participants. Now
Pyongyang’s major targets are, of course, the United States, South Korea,
and China. Indeed, at the end of the day, Pyongyang’s willingness to raise
the stakes and its ability to ignore outside pressure have helped win a
measure of reluctant Chinese support. Of course, North Korea is equally
willing to exploit the deep ideological divide that separates the right and
left in South Korea’s domestic politics (the left being far more inclined to
provide North Korea with unconditional gifts and unilateral political
concessions). 10 In recent years, North Korea has even tried to drag Russia
back into the same great game by exploiting the increasingly tense relations
between Moscow and Washington, though with limited success.
From the North Korean point of view, there are no permanent allies
or permanent adversaries. Even the United States, in spite of the near
hysteric pitch of anti-U.S. propaganda in the North Korean media, is not
actually seen as an unconditional enemy. It is well known among both
U.S. diplomats and other informed foreigners that North Korean officials
sometimes privately express their hope that one day the United States could
actually become their country’s sponsor and protector, using North Korea
as a bulwark against China. These ideas, which David Straub, a former
Korea country desk director for the U.S. State Department, described to the
author as “North Korea’s strategic partnership fantasy,” will probably never
come true. 11 However, the very existence of such talk is a reminder of North
Korea’s deep belief in the realist approach to the world.
9 Author’s personal communication with Chinese officials and experts, Beijing, August 2016.
10 Han Kwan-soo and Jang Yoon-soo, “South Korean Conservative and Progressive Views on North
Korea,” Journal of the Korean Political Science Association 46, no. 1 (2012).
11 Author’s conversation with David Straub, Stanford, March 2013.
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Where does this leave the international community, which would like to
see North Korea denuclearize? The answer is pretty pessimistic. North Korea
decided to go nuclear long ago, it has become nuclear in the past decade,
and it will remain nuclear as long as the Kim family regime stays in power.
Given the survival skills of the North Korean elites, and their unwavering
commitment to a hard-nosed realism, the situation could last decades.
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asia policy, number 23 (january 2017), 111–30
• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •
Japan’s Coast Guard and Maritime
Self-Defense Force in the East China Sea:
Can a Black-and-White System Adapt to a
Gray-Zone Reality?
Céline Pajon
céline pajon is a Research Fellow in the Center for Asian Studies at the
Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri). She can be reached at
.
note u I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Japan Institute for
International Affairs (JIIA), which hosted me as an invited fellow in April and
July 2016. As part of this program, I had the chance to join a JIIA delegation
visit to the Maritime Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense Force bases
in Naha, Okinawa, and to the Japan Coast Guard base in Ishigaki. These
meetings provided crucial elements of information for this research. I also
would like to extend my deepest thanks to the experts and practitioners who
kindly shared their insights with me during my stay in Tokyo, as well as to the
anonymous reviewers who offered detailed comments on this essay.
keywords: japan; maritime security; coast guard; east china sea
© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

asia policy
executive summary
This essay examines the need for growing coordination between the Japan
Coast Guard (JCG) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to
better cope with gray-zone situations.
main argument
Coping with gray-zone situations is particularly challenging for Japan because
its security posture is based on a binary system that complicates coordination
between civilian and military agencies. In Japan, gray-zone situations
generally refer to the challenges raised by China’s maritime activities around
the disputed Senkaku Islands, creating situations that are neither peacetime
nor wartime contingencies. Dealing with such situations requires careful and
close management of law-enforcement contingencies that might escalate
into military conflicts. Japan’s unique security system has so far prevented
the adoption of a legal framework to regulate the coordination between the
civilian JCG, which is primarily responsible for securing national waters, and
the military JMSDF, which intervenes if a situation worsens. Despite some
progress, legal and technical issues still prevent optimal cooperation between
the two agencies, thus undermining Japan’s ability to respond to current
challenges in the East China Sea.
policy implications
• Because Japan has a binary security system that strictly divides civilian
and military corps and activities, the country will struggle to adapt its
institutions to China’s “salami slicing” strategy.
• Ensuring a well-integrated response to gray-zone situations would ideally
require a legal framework defining more precisely these situations and
articulating the respective roles of the JMSDF and JCG. If such a framework
is not possible, other steps should be taken, such as expanding technical
interoperability between the JMSDF and JCG; developing a common,
integrated maritime domain awareness; and increasing training and
exercises on more realistic scenarios.
• To improve its current security posture, Japan must implement a “whole of
government” approach that ensures optimal coordination between civilian
and military agencies rather than revising Article 9 of the constitution.

pajon • japan’s coast guard and maritime self-defense force
On August 6, 2016, an armada of 230 Chinese fishing boats, accompanied
by 7 China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels, was spotted near Japanese
waters around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. 1 This could have
been the starting point of a nightmare scenario for Japan in which the
disputed islands are taken by armed Chinese fishermen backed by big CCG
ships and eventually military vessels, leaving no chance for the Japan Coast
Guard (JCG) to adequately reply. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF) would then need to step in, with the risk of the situation escalating
into a military conflict.
Coping with “gray zone” situations, such as the above scenario, has
been Japan’s core security challenge in recent years. Defined in the National
Defense Program Guidelines of December 2013 as “neither pure peacetime
nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic
interests,” gray-zone situations mainly refer to the challenges raised by China’s
“reactive assertiveness” around the disputed Senkaku Islands (known as the
Diaoyu Islands in Chinese). 2 Beijing is challenging Japan’s sovereign control
by regularly sending vessels from law-enforcement agencies into its territorial
waters and contiguous zone. 3 Civilian or paramilitary forces are therefore
used to change facts on the ground while pushing the targeted country to
eventually take the initiative of using force to stop these activities.
These incursions, which do not amount to an armed attack, are blurring
the line between crime and defense, between law enforcement and military
activities. Gray-zone situations have been identified by Tokyo since 2010
and have informed the transformation of Japan’s defense posture. 4 Japan is
organizing a “dynamic joint defense force” and redeploying troops onto the
Ryukyu Islands, located in the southwest of the archipelago, closer to the
1 “Japan Protests after Swarm of 230 Chinese Vessels Enters Waters Near Senkakus,” Japan Times,
August 6, 2016.
2 Ministry of Defense (Japan), “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond,”
December 17, 2013 u http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_
e2.pdf; and “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks,” International Crisis Group,
Asia Report, no. 245, April 8, 2013, 12–15.
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the
Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response: Records of Intrusions of Chinese
Government and Other Vessels into Japan’s Territorial Sea,” November 2, 2016 u http://www.mofa.
go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html. More recently, naval ships were spotted in the contiguous zone
around the Senkaku Islands in June 2016. See “Japan Protests after Chinese Warship Sails Near
Disputed East China Sea Islands,” Reuters, June 9, 2016.
4 These situations were first defined as “confrontations over territory, sovereignty, and economic
interests that are not to escalate into wars.” See Ministry of Defense (Japan), “National Defense
Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond,” December 17, 2010, 3 u http://www.tr.emb-japan.
go.jp/T_06/files/National_Defense_Program_FY2011.PDF. Chinese maritime incursions into
Japanese waters increased sharply after September 2012, when the Japanese government bought
three of the five islets in the Senkakus from their private owner.
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Senkaku Islands. 5 Importantly, official documents call for more cooperation
and coordination between the JMSDF, on the one hand, and the JCG and
police forces, on the other. 6
Indeed, the JCG is the primary agency responsible for patrolling and
safeguarding Japanese waters: it is at the front line in the East China Sea. As
the capabilities of the CCG are set to grow, and as tensions over the disputed
Senkakus linger, Japan must reinforce its own coast guard. In addition, Tokyo
needs to ensure optimal coordination between the JCG and JMSDF, which
will intervene in the event that a crisis worsens. 7 The challenge is threefold:
first, to ensure optimal cooperation between the JCG and JMSDF in terms of
information sharing and surveillance of the area; second, to allow a smooth
transition of responsibility between the JCG and JMSDF without escalating
the situation into a military conflict should a contingency arise; and third,
to make sure that this overall defense arrangement constitutes an effective
deterrent.
The question of coping with gray-zone situations was supposed to be at
the core of the security legislation adopted in September 2015. However, the
series of laws in these reforms did not directly address the issue but instead
focused primarily on the limited use of the right to collective self-defense. 8 In
the absence of a legal framework, there have been many official, political, and
academic calls for more operational coordination between police, the JCG,
and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). In particular, a series of decisions
by the Cabinet to reinforce the maritime security posture all call for closer
cooperation. 9 To provide an optimal response to gray-zone situations, Tokyo
5 In particular, the National Defense Program Guidelines of December 2010 states that “the SDF
will permanently station the minimum necessary units on off-shore islands where the SDF is not
currently stationed.” See Ministry of Defense (Japan), “National Defense Program Guidelines for
FY 2011 and Beyond,” 14.
6 For example, the National Security Strategy states the following: “To fully protect its territories, in
addition to building a comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will enhance the capabilities of
the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime
surveillance capabilities. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant
ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.”
Ministry of Defense (Japan), National Security Strategy (Tokyo, December 17, 2013), 16.
7 Japan’s 2014 defense white paper provides the following guidance: “In the event that it is deemed
extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for
maritime security operations will be issued promptly and the SDF will respond to the situation
in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.” Ministry of Defense (Japan), Defense of Japan 2014
(Tokyo, 2014), 225.
8 The “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” also do not address this issue. See Ministry of
Defense (Japan), “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” April 27, 2015. The new alliance
coordination mechanism was established especially to allow the alliance to operate from peacetime
to wartime.
9 For more on these various cabinet decisions, see Ministry of Defense (Japan), Defense of Japan 2015
(Tokyo, 2015), 315–17, 323–24.
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pajon • japan’s coast guard and maritime self-defense force
must bridge legal and operational gaps that still prevent smooth coordination
between the JCG and police forces (with respect to law enforcement) and
the JMSDF (with respect to national defense). This essay argues that coping
with gray-zone situations is particularly challenging for Japan because the
country’s security posture is based on a binary, black-and-white system
between civilian and military agencies that complicates their coordination.
Moreover, if progress in operational cooperation can bridge some of the gaps,
the establishment of a legal framework that (1) clarifies the legal definition of
what constitute gray-zone situations, (2) articulates the respective roles of the
JCG and JMSDF, and (3) expands the rules of engagement of the JMSDF in
dealing with these situations would greatly solidify Japan’s deterrence posture
in the East China Sea.
This essay aims to explain the context of this choice between operational
coordination and legal disposition:
u pp. 115–19 provide background on gray-zone situations in the East
China Sea and context for understanding JCG and JMSDF roles there.
u
u
u
pp. 119–24 examine the legal stakes behind JCG-JMSDF coordination,
with a focus on the implications of the civilian status of the JCG and the
peculiarities of Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law allowing the
JMSDF to perform law-enforcement activities.
pp. 125–29 address the progress in operational cooperation between the
two agencies and highlight remaining challenges.
pp. 129–30 conclude the essay by recommending a “whole of government”
approach.
background on gray-zone situations and
the east china sea
As explained above, gray-zone situations represent neither peacetime
nor wartime situations. In the Japanese political debate on national security
strategy, this terminology refers to a number of scenarios. In May 2014 the
“Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for
Security,” which provided recommendations to revise the interpretation of
the constitution and review legal dispositions to strengthen Japan’s security
posture, identified six broad cases for discussion. Out of the six, two scenarios
touched on the issue of the use of individual self-defense in situations that
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asia policy
do not amount to an “armed attack.” 10 The first is when foreign submarines
sail submerged in Japan’s territorial seas and refuse to leave despite repeated
requests. The second involves an armed group conducting unlawful acts in a
sea area or on a remote island where it would be difficult for Japanese civilian
authorities (the police forces on land and the JCG at sea) to reply adequately. 11
After the first scenario was shelved by the New Komeito party (renamed
simply Komeito in September 2014), the most discussed scenario became
the case of armed Chinese fishermen entering Japanese territorial waters
and taking control of a remote island. In this scenario, a possible escalation
would see the arrest of the intruders by the police forces and the JCG,
followed by the deployment of Chinese naval vessels to rescue its citizens.
The JMSDF could be deployed on site, at the request of the prime minister’s
cabinet, with limited authorization to use force (as law enforcement). This
would create a tense situation with a high risk of military incident in which
JMSDF and Chinese naval vessels would face off, circling around the islands.
Another version would see the JCG overwhelmed by hundreds of Chinese
fishing boats from which commandos disguised as fishermen would seize the
Senkakus. The dilemma for Japan would be to choose between using force
first to displace the intruders and allowing them to remain with the risk of
Beijing claiming actual control of the islands. In this version, a clear division
between the roles of the JCG and JMSDF, with the latter’s early involvement,
would ensure more effective deterrence and a swifter, more consistent
response in case of an intrusion.
Recourse to nonmilitary tools to advance one’s interest regarding
territorial claims or access to natural resources has been used by China to back
up its claims in the East and South China Seas. Such tactics have been referred
to as “reactive assertiveness” or “salami slicing.” 12 Some experts explain this
approach as a form of “hybrid warfare,” by which China uses fishing vessels
in combination with paramilitary units such as CCG vessels to gain control
of disputed territories. 13 Japan sees this challenge as a core security concern;
10 Later, the number of gray-zone scenarios submitted by the Liberal Democratic Party to discuss with
the Komeito party expanded to include the “protection of U.S. warships on alert for ballistic missile
launches during peacetime” and “responses to illegal activities that impact on the JSDF when engaged
in exercises and other missions in international waters.” Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and
Security Policy Under the “Abe Doctrine” (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 50.
11 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the
Legal Basis for Security,” May 15, 2014 u http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/
houkoku_en.pdf.
12 Robert Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2012 u
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea.
13 James Kraska and Michael Monti, “The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia,”
International Law Studies 91 (2015): 450–67.
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pajon • japan’s coast guard and maritime self-defense force
the expansion of Chinese maritime activities since the mid-2000s has resulted
in more frequent patrols along the Japanese coastline and incursions into
Japanese waters. 14
When a Chinese trawler collided with JCG patrol boats in Japanese
territorial waters in 2010, resulting in the arrest of the Chinese skipper and
harsh reactions from the Chinese government toward Tokyo, the incident
served as a wake-up call. Hereafter, Chinese intrusions in the area happened
more frequently. The game-changing move came two years later in September
2012 after the Yoshihiko Noda government’s purchase of three of the Senkaku
Islands from their private owner to prevent their acquisition by the nationalist
governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara. Beijing reacted harshly, claiming that
Japan “broke the status quo in the East China Sea.” 15 During a period of high
tension over the next two years, China frequently sent fishing boats and vessels
from its maritime surveillance agencies, the CCG (created in 2013), and even
the military into waters adjacent to the islands. 16 After Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe and President Xi Jinping met for the first time in November 2014 and
reluctantly shook hands, the situation stabilized, and since then maritime
intrusions by China have become routinely organized, which will be discussed
in more detail below.
However, tensions have again escalated since June 2016 with a series of
new incursions, beginning with a Chinese warship entering the contiguous
water in the East China Sea on June 9. A few days later, a surveillance ship
entered Japanese territorial waters off Kagoshima. Then, between August 6
and 10, fifteen Chinese government ships sailed into the Japanese contiguous
zone around the Senkaku Islands, accompanied by more than 230 fishing
boats. 17 In response, the government of Japan issued repeated protests.
14 Among other examples, Chinese naval vessels were spotted patrolling around disputed gas fields
in the East China Sea in 2005. Groups of Chinese warships also repeatedly passed through the
Tsugaru and Miyako channels in 2008 and 2010 and even circled the entire Japanese archipelago
in July 2013. Li Xiaokun, “China Sails through ‘First Island Chain,’ ” China Daily, August 2, 2013 u
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-08/02/content_16863855.htm.
15 The Senkaku Islands have been under Japanese control since 1895. In the 1970s, Beijing and Taipei
claimed sovereignty over the islets after a UN report suggested that oil and gas reserves could
be found in the surrounding sea areas. While Japan has consistently maintained that there is no
territorial dispute, it never posted civilian forces or JSDF troops on the islands. In 1978, Deng
Xiaoping proposed to shelve the issue and let the next generation solve it. Tokyo never officially
recognized that Deng’s stance could constitute a kind of status quo situation. However, before the
purchase of the three islets in September 2012, Tokyo was careful to inform Beijing to avoid any
misunderstanding. It was also careful not to follow this move with any buildup on the islands.
16 For an official record of the incursions in the contiguous zone and territorial waters around the Senkaku
Islands, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels.”
17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Status of Activities by Chinese Government Vessels and
Chinese Fishing Vessels in Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands,” August 26, 2016 u http://
www.mofa.go.jp/files/000180283.pdf.
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Tokyo is also closely monitoring the situation in the South China Sea, where it
fears that the tactic of “attrition” used by China in 2012 to gain control over
the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines might be applied to acquire de
facto control over the Senkaku Islands.
Given Chinese maritime activities in Japanese waters, the JCG and JMSDF
are both on alert. The JCG is a civilian law-enforcement agency modeled on
the U.S. Coast Guard. The JCG’s patrolling role has increased since the end of
the Cold War and following Japan’s signing of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1996. In 1998 the JCG’s main mission
shifted from responding to maritime incidents and environmental damage
to coping with threats against the security of territorial waters. 18 At the same
time, however, constabulary missions have been increasingly considered not
only as law-enforcement but also as national security issues, given the more
frequent incursions in Japanese waters, especially from North Korean and
Chinese governmental vessels and fishing boats. After repeated incursions by
suspicious North Korean ships in Japanese waters in the late 1990s and early
2000s (which will be discussed in more detail below), the law was revised to
allow the JCG under certain conditions to direct fire in order to stop such
suspicious ships. This led some experts to qualify the JCG as a “fourth branch
of the Japanese military.” 19 However, even today the status, mission, budget,
and capacities of the JCG are clearly distinct from those of the JMSDF.
The JMSDF has three primary missions: to defend Japan’s maritime
domain, to engage in noncombatant operations overseas (defense diplomacy),
and to respond to calls for search and rescue activities within Japanese
territorial waters in case of maritime incidents. 20 Accordingly, the JMSDF
patrols Japanese waters with vessels and airplanes and responds to warship
intrusions. It also supports the JCG if the latter cannot adequately respond to
contingencies. Since the 2000s, the JMSDF has focused on ensuring maritime
control and superiority in the East China Sea in the face of a more assertive
China and also on developing an expeditionary capability to take part in
international operations, such as the antipiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden
since 2009. 21
18 This shift was expressed in the JCG annual report of that year. See Andrew L. Oros and Yuki
Tatsumi, Global Security Watch—Japan (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 60.
19 Richard J. Samuels, “‘New Fighting Power!’ Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian
Security,” International Security 32, no. 3 (2007/2008): 84–112.
20 Oros and Tatsumi, Global Security Watch, 60.
21 Alessio Patalano, “Japan as a Seapower: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities under Three Defence
Reviews, 1995–2010,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 3 (2014): 403–41.
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In terms of capacities, the JCG’s budget for fiscal year 2016 is
204.2 billion yen ($1.7 billion), with a total of 455 vessels (including 366 patrol
boats and ships) and 13,422 personnel. In comparison, the JMSDF’s budget
tops 1,200 billion yen ($9.9 billion), with 18 submarines, 47 warships
(33 destroyers, 9 frigates), and 45,500 personnel. 22 To ensure intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, in the coming years Japan
will acquire 5 destroyers, 5 submarines, and 23 P-1 patrol aircraft and SH-60K
patrol helicopters, as well as 4 early-warning aircraft, 28 F-35A fighter jets,
3 tanker and transport aircraft, and 3 Global Hawk drones.
adapting legal dispositions to gray-zone situations
The Case for a Legal Arrangement to Ensure Civil-Military
Coordination in Gray-Zone Situations
A legal arrangement would be useful to redefine and clarify the respective
responsibilities of the police, JCG, and JSDF when dealing with gray-zone
situations and thereby ensure smooth cooperation between them. 23 With
respect to law-enforcement activities, in principle the police forces are active
on Japan’s soil, the coast guard patrols the sea, and the JMSDF provides
support if the need arises. Back in 2014, the Abe government attempted to
formulate a law to further refine each agency’s role. But the negotiations
did not succeed in passing comprehensive legislation, mainly because of
the competition between agencies on their respective missions. The police
forces were especially concerned with protecting their power from outside
interference and opposed the expansion of JSDF responsibility. On the
other hand, the JCG resisted an enlargement of its missions toward more
“paramilitary” activities. 24 Enacting a law would indeed create some conflicts
that would be very delicate to handle and manage for these agencies. Such
competition has so far prevented a further clarification of each agency’s
capabilities, mission, and role in the East China Sea.
Political reasons also played a role in the decision to shelve the legal
option. Indeed, the Buddhist Komeito party, the coalition partner of the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is by nature very cautious about a
22 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016 (London: Routledge, 2016).
23 In case of armed attack on Japan, the JCG can fall under the supervision of the JSDF, according
to Article 80 of the JSDF Law. However, no legal basis regulates the relations between the two
institutions in peacetime.
24 Interviews with military and strategic experts, Tokyo, July 2016.
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military normalization of the country and acted as a brake on the process.
In negotiations with the LDP in May and June 2014 regarding the various
options, the party, after persuading the LDP to drop several scenarios that
appeared too unrealistic, argued that most gray-zone scenarios could be
handled by the JCG with law-enforcement measures. 25
For these two sets of reasons, legislation to redefine the responsibilities
of the police, JCG, and JSDF could not be passed. The government agreed
instead to improve the application of the existing legal arrangement. 26 In other
words, the JCG and JSDF would have to improve their coordination at the
operational level to make up for the failure to build an ad hoc law.
The case for a legal arrangement was subsequently brought up by
the opposition parties. In summer 2015 the Democratic Party of Japan
and the Japan Innovation Party jointly proposed a territorial security bill
(ryoiki keibi hoan) aiming to define priority zones in the East China Sea in
which the JSDF would take over the primary responsibility for patrol and
defense. 27 This bill was rejected on the ground that it would have the effect
of identifying the weak points or “soft bellies” in Japan’s territorial defense.
Another version with small modifications was submitted in February 2016
with the same fate. 28 Yet despite these repeated failures in the Diet, this
policy proposal was still part of the opposition’s political program for the
July 2016 upper house elections. 29
The Civilian Nature of the JCG: Whither Article 25?
The JCG’s resistance to the adoption of a legal framework that would
better integrate its activities with those of the JMSDF is explained by
the coast guard’s strategic culture. First, the Maritime Security Agency
(which was renamed the JCG in 2000) was created in 1948—before the
establishment of the JMSDF in 1954. As a result, the JCG considers the
JMSDF as an offspring, and there has been a persistent sense of rivalry
25 Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy, 51.
26 Interviews with military and strategic experts, Tokyo, July 2016.
27 “DPJ and JIP Cosponsor Territorial Security Act,” Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), July 8, 2015.
28 The “priority zones” would be defined for up to two years, instead of five years, and the Ministry of
Defense would have to consult the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, which
supervises the JCG, to deploy the JSDF in one of these zones. “DPJ and JIP Cosponsor Territorial
Security Act, Security Legislation Revisions,” DPJ, February 18, 2016 u https://www.dpj.or.jp/
english/news/?num=21012.
29 DPJ, “The Democratic Party’s Priority Policies: Our Promise to the People—Economic
Revitalization Begins with Individual People,” June 20, 2016 u https://www.minshin.or.jp/
download/29468.pdf.
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between the two agencies. Second, according to Article 25 of the Japan Coast
Guard Laws and Regulations, the JCG is a purely civilian law-enforcement
agency. 30 As such, it is placed under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism (MLIT). Even though it was modeled after the U.S.
Coast Guard, the JCG is not a paramilitary force and thus is reluctant to
meddle with military affairs.
According to some experts and practitioners, the JCG’s disposition
prevents further coordination with the JMSDF and more high-level joint
trainings. Pressure is mounting for a necessary revision of the JCG’s status
to enable the agency to better deal with more dangerous situations with only
limited expansion of its hardware capacities. Growing coordination with
the JMSDF would help alleviate the JCG’s burden by sharing information
in a more integrated way, enhancing training to better cope with complex
situations, and ensuring a smooth transition if the JMSDF is called in to take
control of a situation.
Although the question of a revised status for the JCG is still very
sensitive, the agency’s missions and governance have already experienced
some changes in recent years. In summer 2012, the JCG’s missions were
expanded to allow it policing authority on Japan’s remote islands that lack
a police presence. The coast guard can also now order foreign vessels to
leave Japanese territorial waters without boarding them. These dispositions
help ensure swifter and more efficient JCG interventions when dealing with
incidents surrounding remote islands. 31
The JCG’s governance also recently evolved. In 2013, Yuji Sato
became the first officer from within the coast guard to hold the top post of
commandant. 32 Until then, this post had always been occupied by a civilian
from MLIT. Sato’s successor, Satoshi Nakajima, who took over the command
in June 2016, was also an officer from the JCG. 33 This trend is beneficial
for fostering a better mutual understanding between JCG and JMSDF
counterparts. However, commandants rising through the ranks of the JCG
30 Article 25 states that “nothing contained in this Law shall be construed to permit the Japan Coast
Guard or its personnel to be trained or organized as a military establishment or to function as
such.” See “Japan Coast Guard Laws and Regulations,” 224 u http://www.odinwestpac.org/doc/
law/05.pdf.
31 Sheila Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2015), 223.
32 Reiji Yoshida, “Next Coast Guard Chief to Come Up from Ranks,” Japan Times, July 18, 2013 u
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/18/national/next-coast-guard-chief-to-come-up-fromranks/#.V48k0xI9jcs.
33 “Japan Coast Guard to Get New Commandant as Senkakus Dispute Heats Up,” Japan Times,
June 11, 2016.
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remain very cautious in their relations with the Ministry of Defense, as they
are under the close scrutiny of MLIT bureaucrats. Also, the fact that the two
MLIT ministers since 2012 belong to the Komeito party (which traditionally
holds an anti-militarist stance) is reinforcing the political pressure on the
JCG commandants to act in a restrained manner in their relations to their
military counterparts. 34 Thus, even if attitudes have turned more positive
regarding an eventual revision of the JCG’s status, a large majority of coast
guard officials still cherish Article 25 as the agency’s core identity. 35
The JMSDF’s Maritime Security Operations and the Question of
Military Escalation
If a gray-zone situation cannot be controlled by the JCG, the JMSDF can
be sent in support. In such a case, because no defined military attack had
occurred, the JMSDF would not take an orthodox military action (boei kodo).
Instead, it would conduct maritime security operations (kaijo keibi kodo)
according to Article 82 of the JSDF Law. This order allows the military to
conduct law-enforcement activities in support of the JCG, and it has been
issued only three times: in 1999, to chase a North Korean spy ship; in 2004, as
a reply to the incursion of a Chinese submarine in Japanese territorial waters;
and in 2009, to allow the JMSDF to conduct antipiracy operations in the
Gulf of Aden.
According to the government’s interpretation of Japanese law, maritime
security operations should be considered as a noncombat activity. As such, the
government argues that an order to engage in maritime security operations
should not be considered an act of military escalation. Indeed, under this
order, the JMSDF can use weapons along the strict conditions provided by the
JCG Law. As a result, the Japanese government makes a distinction between
the “use of weapons” by the JSDF under these specific circumstances and the
broader “use of force” to defend against an armed attack. 36
34 Interview with a JMSDF officer, Tokyo, July 2016.
35 The civilian nature of the JCG also allows the agency to conduct international cooperation activities
as part of the Official Development Assistance program.
36 Interview with a legal expert on the JMSDF, Tokyo, July 2016. The use of weapons is allowed
only for self-defense and for firing warning shots if vessels refuse orders to stop. Some experts
consider that such “strictures of the legislative framework for the use of force in Japan may
expose its vulnerability to certain types of hostile conduct by external actors, especially when
they engage in covert operations or surprise attacks.” Hitoshi Nasu, “Japan’s 2015 Security
Legislation: Challenges to Its Implementation under International Law,” International Law
Studies 92 (2016): 264.
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The specific order of maritime security operations results from the
characteristics of the defense policy in Japan: the missions and activities
conducted by the JSDF are described in a positive list, which is much more
restrictive than the negative list that most other countries use to place limits
on their military activities. As explained earlier, the JSDF was created after
the police forces and the JCG. In short, the maritime security order of
operations is a purely Japanese concept. As such, its proper significance and
implications are difficult for Japan to convey to other countries, including its
U.S. ally or another strategic partner: France. 37 In a gray-zone situation, for
example, the United States would simply rely on its paramilitary or military
forces. More importantly, while Japan considers military security operations
as another layer of law enforcement conducted by more capable forces to
prevent a military escalation, 38 China does not share this understanding and
would consider any intervention by the JMSDF in a gray-zone situation as
a unilateral military escalation on the part of Japan. 39 That is the reason the
Chinese strategy of reactive assertiveness is so difficult for Japan to tackle:
Japan must reply to a gray-zone situation with a black-and-white security
system in which optimal coordination between the JCG and JMSDF is
difficult to achieve.
Even though the significance of Japanese military security operations
is not well understood outside Japan, the government is nevertheless trying
to facilitate the procedure to ensure a smooth response by the JSDF, if
needed. In July 2014 a Cabinet Office decision called for the simplification
of the procedure to activate Article 82: since May 2015, only a meeting
over the phone between the Cabinet members is required to green-light a
JSDF intervention. 40
However, several experts and practitioners consider that the rules of
engagement under this order may not be broad enough to enable the JSDF
to retake control of a situation in a gray-zone type of emergency, nor have a
37 Interview with a strategic expert, Tokyo, July 2016.
38 All JCG and JSDF members interviewed by the author confirmed that their instructions are strict:
to prevent any military escalation and to respond in the most conservative and patient manner in
order to avoid miscalculation on the part of China.
39 Interviews with experts and practitioners of maritime affairs, Tokyo, July 2016.
40 “If the situation requires a particularly urgent decision and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting
attended by all Ministers of State cannot be promptly held, a Cabinet decision shall be made with
the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone or other means, presided over by the Prime
Minister.” Ministry of Defense (Japan), Defense of Japan 2015, 323.
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real deterrence effect. 41 For them, the legal conditions in Japan to conduct an
orthodox military action with the full use of force are currently too severe
and should be relaxed to allow more appropriate reactions to gray-zone
situations. 42 These observers advocate that the use of the right to self-defense
should be allowed prior to an issuance of a defense mobilization order. 43
Actually, the May 2014 report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the
Legal Basis for Security suggested that “even in the case of an infringement
that cannot be judged whether it constitutes an ‘organized and planned use
of force,’ action to the minimum extent necessary by the SDF to repel such
an infringement should be permitted under the Constitution.” 44 It adds
that this action would be permitted under international law, especially if
such infringements are repeated frequently enough to be considered as an
“armed attack.” 45 However, the report concludes that this move could “invite
criticism at home and overseas that Japan is expanding the concept of the
right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.” 46 For this reason, it
seems premature for Tokyo to employ such legal reasoning to allow greater
rules of engagement by the JMSDF in gray-zone situations. An attempt to
provide a more legally grounded definition of what constitutes a gray-zone
situation would nevertheless be a desirable first step toward expanding the
JMSDF’s role.
While the legal dimension of the issue still remains a quagmire, the
next section will consider how to ensure an optimal operational response to
gray-zone situation in the East China Sea.
41 See Yoji Koda, “Ki gatsukeba Senkaku ni goseikoki ga hirugaeru jitai mo, nihon no boeitaisei
no mujun to seidoteki kekkan” [If We Realize, the Five-Star Red Flag Could Even Fly on the
Senkaku—Flaws and Contradictions of the Japanese Defense System], Diamond, October 9, 2013.
42 There are currently three conditions for Japan to use armed force to defend itself: when there is an
imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan, when there is no other means than force
to respond, and when use of force is confined to the minimum necessary.
43 See the first and second proposals in Tokyo Foundation, “Maritime Security and the Right of
Self-Defense in Peacetime: Proposals for a National Security Strategy and the New National
Defense Program Guidelines (Summary),” 2014. Also see Nasu, “Japan’s 2015 Security Legislation,”
263–66, 269. Nasu suggests that the category of “existential threat to Japan” created by the 2015
security legislation to enable the use of collective self-defense could be more broadly defined to
allow for the use of self-defense in gray-zone situations without a clear armed attack.
44 Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, “Report of the Advisory Panel on
Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security,” May 15, 2014, 42–43.
45 “The concept has not been denied that also in cases where individual acts of infringement may not
amount to an ‘armed attack’ by itself, if such infringements were to ‘accumulate,’ they may then be
viewed as an ‘armed attack, and that in this scenario it would be possible under international law to
exercise the right of self-defense.” Ibid., 43.
46 Ibid., 45.
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ensuring better operational coordination
between the jcg and jmsdf in the east china sea
The Current Situation in the Ryukyu Islands
In March 2016 the JCG inaugurated on Ishigaki Island a special unit
dedicated to safeguarding the waters around the Senkakus: 606 personnel,
ten large 1,500-ton patrol ships (with 20-milimeter guns and water cannons),
and two helicopter-equipped patrol vessels are now stationed on the small
island, located only 170 kilometers (km) from the Senkakus (while Naha,
on Okinawa’s main island, is 410 km away). In addition to the twelve new
ships based on Ishigaki, the Naha headquarters has six 1,000-ton or larger
patrol ships and one helicopter-equipped patrol vessel for other operations.
With 1,722 personnel in total, the 11th JCG regional division is the largest
in Japan. 47
Along with this expansion of the JCG base, the JSDF is also reinforcing
its presence in the region. 48 While coastal surveillance units from the Japan
Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) are set to be stationed on several islands
in the Yaeyama archipelago near the Senkakus, the JMSDF will remain at its
main base of Naha. From there, the Fleet Air Wing 5 participates in monitoring
the waters around the Senkakus with twenty P-3C patrol airplanes. Thus, both
the JMSDF and JCG patrol the area, ensuring around-the-clock surveillance.
After 2012, the JCG increased the frequency of its sea patrols to two to three
times during the day, while the JMSDF flies its P-3Cs twice a day.
As a principle, the JCG has to react to any incursion, no matter how
small it is, which is very demanding. However, since November 2014, when
Abe and Xi agreed to meet for the first time, the situation has been stabilized
with a relative routinization of the interactions with the CCG, following
47 “Japan Coast Guard Inaugurates Special Senkaku Patrol Unit,” Japan Times, April 17, 2016 u
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/17/national/japan-coast-guard-inaugurates-specialsenkaku-patrol-unit/#.V46IczXvcTo;
and “Japan Coast Guard Deploys 12 Ships to Patrol
Senkakus,” Japan Times, April 4, 2016 u http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/04/national/
japan-coast-guard-deploys-12-ships-to-patrol-senkakus/#.V5Ef4zXvcTq.
48 In 2015, a second F-15 fighter squadron was moved to the Naha base on the main island of
Okinawa. The newly established 9th Air Wing conducts scrambles two or three times a day to
counter Chinese aerial incursions into Japanese territory. Moreover, several bases for the Japan
Ground Self-Defense Force are planned to be built on the Ryukyu Islands in the coming years. One
base on Yonaguni hosting a coastal surveillance unit with 150 troops was inaugurated in 2015.
The next bases will be on Miyako (700–800 troops) and Amami (550 troops) by the end of 2018
and on Ishigaki (500–600 troops) by the end of 2019. These three bases will be responsible for
coastal surveillance, retaking remote islands with combat troops, and anti-ballistic missile defense,
and they will be equipped with anti-ship missiles, ground-to-air missile batteries, and PAC-3
anti-missile batteries. “Ishigakijima ni 500nin kibono rikujihaibi he nanseishoto no boeikyoka”
[Toward the Deployment of 500 GSDF Troops to Ishigaki—The Defensive Reinforcement of the
Nansei Islands], Asahi Shimbun, November 26, 2015.
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the 3-3-2 formula: three CCG ships enter the Japanese waters three times
a month for up to two hours during each visit. 49 Each time, the JCG sends
a message in Chinese and Japanese to the ships to leave the waters, and
the CCG replies that these are Chinese waters and that the vessels have the
right to pass through. The ships stay approximately two hours and leave the
territorial waters to continue sailing around the islands for approximately
ten hours.
The ships deployed by the CCG are usually between 1,000 and 3,000 tons,
including refurbished People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels above 2,000 tons.
Its large 10,000-ton ships have not been deployed so far to the area around
the Senkakus. In case of an incident, the two sides have established a hotline
between their headquarters, but it has not been used so far. While the CCG
ships do not respect a secure distance between boats and zigzag, which
renders navigation more hazardous, they do seem to be careful not to escalate
the situation, according to the JCG.
Even though the situation seems to be under control, it remains quite
tense, and many fear contingencies involving hybrid warfare, such as an
attempt by an armed group disguised as fishermen to take control of a remote
Japanese island. This kind of scenario would require optimal coordination
between the JCG and JMSDF.
The Growing Coordination between the JCG and JMSDF
As explained earlier, there is not a history or culture of close
cooperation and coordination between the JCG and JMSDF. However, this
situation has improved step by step, especially after the two cases of North
Korean spy ships entering Japan’s territorial waters in 1999 and 2001. In
the March 1999 incident, the government requested that the JMSDF chase
the spy vessels because of their high speed instead of the JCG, which was
originally in charge of the mission and initially preferred for the job by the
government. 50 Following this case, the JCG Law was revised to allow more
extensive rules of engagement. In December 2001 the JCG was ordered
to give chase to a suspicious North Korean ship. Following an exchange
49 Interview with a JCG official, Ishigaki, July 2016; and Yoichi Funabashi, “A Coast Guard–Maintained
Peace in the East China Sea,” Japan Times, April 19, 2016. This routine evolved after the exceptionally
large deployment of Chinese fishing boats and coast guard ships around the Senkaku Islands in
August 2016. Since then, the CCG’s routine seems to have changed to a 4-3-2 formula: four ships have
been spotted three times a month in Japan’s territorial waters, lingering for up to two hours. Author’s
interviews with several Japanese officials, December 2016.
50 Lindsay Black, Japan’s Maritime Security Strategy: The Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Outlaws
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 104.
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of shots, the ship detonated itself and sank. After these two incidents, a
manual was adopted to set up procedures for joint JCG-JMSDF responses
to such scenarios, and regular joint training and exercises between the
JSDF and the JCG were initiated.
Another important step was the government’s decision to allow JCG
officers onboard JMSDF ships to conduct antipiracy operations in the Gulf
of Aden. Such cooperation has been taking place since 2009 and seems to
have helped deepen mutual understanding and improve people-to-people
relations between the two institutions. It has also removed some cultural
barriers to closer cooperation, and today the SDF and JCG work together
more frequently. For example, during the group of seven (G-7) summit in
Mie Prefecture, JCG personnel were on board JMSDF vessels to ensure the
security of the surroundings. 51
Another important step was the first joint training on a gray-zone
scenario, which was held in July 2015. However, the actual exercise was
reportedly quite low-profile and remained at the law-enforcement level. 52
Thus, operational coordination between the JCG and JMSDF
has improved considerably in recent years. The two agencies adopted
an information-sharing protocol that has facilitated the exchange of
information on a daily basis, and they are also working to establish a
coordination framework not only at the operational level but also between
regional commands. Nonetheless, the level of coordination is still not high
enough, and many challenges remain to deepening it.
Remaining Challenges to Reach Optimal Operational Coordination
Overall, greater interoperability between the JCG and JMSDF is
desirable. One challenge, identified in 2011 but still an issue today, is updating
communication systems and secure channels. Because civilian and military
units usually do not use the same channel to communicate, even in an updated
JCG communication system, hardware, software, and procedures would need
to be improved to facilitate smoother communication. 53 Also, while there may
be a common operational picture at the ship level, the JCG and JMSDF still do
not share the technology that would allow for fully integrated, comprehensive
maritime domain awareness. This limits the scope of coordination and prevents
both sides from anticipating the worsening of a situation.
51 Interview with a JCG official, Tokyo, July 2016.
52 “MSDF, Coast Guard to Hold ‘Gray Zone’ Drill Off Izu,” Japan Times, July 7, 2015.
53 Tetsuo Kotani, “The Japan Coast Guard: Japan’s ‘Hidden Navy?’ ” Strategic Insights, March 2011.
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Furthermore, there is actually still no unified command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) system among the three branches of the JSDF, which hinders the
seamless implementation of joint service operations. 54 Although a common
system is reportedly being developed, the sharing of such a high-tech tool
between the JMSDF and JCG would require the latter to upgrade its equipment.
Another important challenge is the strong need for more exercises and
training to ensure smooth joint operations between the JCG and JMSDF if a
gray-zone situation worsens. One related issue to highlight is that the JCG and
JMSDF do not have the same chain of command and control. To compensate for
this limitation, the two agencies should perform frequent training exercises and
should design multilayered countermeasures to deal with gray-zone situations. 55
The integration of the JCG within the security governance institutions
is another weakness in the security system. As part of MLIT, the coast
guard is represented to a certain extent in the National Security Council,
but its association with U.S. forces through the Alliance Coordination
Mechanism is still under discussion. Some experts also suggest setting up a
crisis-management program encompassing all relevant government agencies
dealing with maritime security in Japan. 56
Finally, a large majority of experts and practitioners concur that, despite
the recent upgrade, the JCG needs further improvements in equipment and
personnel. Although an internal reallocation took place to allow for the
creation of the “Senkaku fleet” and a new shipbuilding plan, the JCG’s basic
budget has not significantly increased since 2006. 57 Its limited resources are
overstretched by the requirement to monitor a large exclusive economic zone of
18,800 square km. One option for bridging this capabilities gap is to introduce
a large fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) that might relieve both the
JCG and JMSDF by ensuring around-the-clock surveillance of the Senkaku
Islands. The budget for the acquisition of three Global Hawk drones has been
secured for fiscal year 2016. 58 The UAVs would in principle be operated by a
54 The policy report on Japanese maritime security by the Tokyo Foundation also underlines this particular
point. Tokyo Foundation, “Maritime Security and the Right of Self-Defense in Peacetime,” 17–18.
55 Takashi Saito, “Waga kuni no toshboei wo kangaeru” [Thinking about the Japanese Distant Islands
Defense], Sekai no Kansen, December 2012.
56 Tokyo Foundation, “Maritime Security and the Right of Self-Defense in Peacetime,” 20–21.
57 In 2006 the JCG budget amounted to 179.0 billion yen, and in 2005 it was 187.6 billion yen. Since
2006, the basic budget has ranged between 174.0 billion yen (in 2013) and 189.0 billion yen (in
2007). Nao Arakawa and Will Colson, “The Japan Coast Guard: Resourcing and Responsibility,”
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, April 1, 2015.
58 Ministry of Defense (Japan), “Defense Programs and Budget of Japan: Overview of FY2016
Budget,” December 2015, 3–4.
[ 128 ]

pajon • japan’s coast guard and maritime self-defense force
joint organization, but discussion of how to organize such a unit and dispatch
the information collected by the drones is still in progress. 59
In addition to expanding the actual fleet with cutting-edge ships, the
JCG needs to replace its existing vessels with more modern ships. The Asahi
Shimbun estimates that around 35% of the 366 JCG patrol boats, built in the
1970s or 1980s, are outdated. 60 Moreover, 50% of the JCG ships will be in need
of replacement in the next five years. In April 2016 a budget was secured to
replace 15% of the outdated boats, but there is an urgent need to speed up
the shipbuilding process. The used boats could be offered with preferential
conditions to Japan’s maritime partners in Southeast Asia.
In the context of more frequent and unpredictable ballistic missile
launches by North Korea, in August 2016 Japan’s Ministry of Defense
announced its decision to make permanent the order to intercept and destroy
such missiles. 61 This standing order puts additional pressure on the capacities
of the JMSDF and further highlights the need to upgrade the equipment and
strengthen the capabilities of the JCG so that it can better share the burden of
ISR activities in the East China Sea.
conclusion
The 2015 security legislation failed to address the gray-zone situation as a
domestic challenge. To the extent that the issue was raised, the government’s
efforts focused on increasing operational coordination between the JCG and
JMSDF. Despite some improvements, legal brakes and limited capacity still
prevent the upgrade of such coordination to ensure a smooth response to a
gray-zone situation.
The specific challenge posed by the Chinese strategy of reactive
assertiveness in the East China Sea is that it tends to blur the line between
law enforcement and warfare. Because Japan’s security system strictly divides
civilian and military corps and activities, the country has struggled to adapt its
institutions to this new reality. This creates weaknesses in Japan’s deterrence
posture in the East China Sea.
59 Masayuki Hironaka, “A Perspective on Japan,” Center for a New American Security, Proliferated
Drones, June 2016 u http://drones.cnas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/A-Perspective-on-Japan-
Proliferated-Drones.pdf.
60 Yoshitaka Ito, “35% of Coast Guard Vessels Outdated as Seas Remain Troubled,” Asahi Shimbun,
October 7, 2016.
61 “Missile Interception to Be Standing Order SDF,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 6, 2016.
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Against this background, a growing group of experts and practitioners in
Japan is calling for the government to reopen the discussion regarding ad hoc
legislation that would clarify the roles and missions of police forces, the JCG,
and the JMSDF in gray-zone situations. However, three main obstacles remain:
first, strong institutional competition and rivalry between police forces, the
JCG, and the JSDF; second, an agenda that might not allow the government
to spend political capital on passing a new security bill after the 2015 struggle,
especially if Prime Minister Abe chooses to focus on a constitutional revision;
and third, the strong attachment within the JCG to Article 25, which prevents
it from developing a paramilitary force.
To address these three issues, Japan needs to adopt a “whole of
government” approach to ensure its security in the new regional context
of gray-zone situations. Improving the country’s current security posture
depends much more on implementing such an approach than on revising
Article 9 of the constitution. Of course, implementing measures to break
bureaucratic stovepipes and create a culture of coordination is not an easy task
and will be met with fierce resistance not only in Japan but also in numerous
other countries. The creation of the National Security Council in late 2013
was an important step toward fostering an interagency approach.
To formulate an optimal response to gray-zone situations, Japan must
further clarify its terminology and provide a more legally grounded definition
that would facilitate establishing a number of options for a proportionate
response. Institutional reform will be paramount for improving coordination
between the JCG and JMSDF, which also has implications for developing
jointness among the three branches of the JSDF. While progress has been made
in discussions on a joint headquarters for the three branches, much remains to
be done. 62 In particular, jointness is instrumental in putting together a capable
amphibious force that would be able to retake invaded islands. While Japan,
with the assistance of the United States, is currently developing the Amphibious
Rapid Deployment Brigade as part of the Western Army Infantry Regiment of
the JGSDF, it seems that rivalries between the JGSDF and JMSDF, operational
gaps in cross-services communication, and budget issues are complicating the
process. 63 The amphibious unit, initially scheduled to be established in 2017, is
now set to become operational only in 2018.
62 “Japan Eyes Permanent Joint HQ for SDF,” Japan Times, March 13, 2016.
63 Erik Slavin, “Japan Preparing Amphibious Force: It Looks a Lot Like a Marine Brigade,” Stars and
Stripes, November 4, 2016; Grant Newsham, “Japanese Self Defense Forces Must Work Together
to Counter China’s Firepower,” Asia Times, September 6, 2016; and Paul Kallender-Umezu,
“Japan’s Amphib Capabilities Struggle with Rivalries, Budgets,” Defense News, October 7, 2015.
[ 130 ]

asia policy, number 23 (january 2017), 131–52
• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •
The Failure of Maritime Sanctions
Enforcement against North Korea
Robert Huish
robert huish is an Associate Professor of International Development
Studies at Dalhousie University in Canada. He was recently the Ron
Lister Fellow in the Department of Geography at the University of Otago in
New Zealand. He can be reached at .
keywords: north korea; sanctions; human rights; maritime traffic
© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

asia policy
executive summary
This article examines the ineffectiveness of current sanctions on marine
traffic into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by identifying
four weaknesses that allow traffic there to continue: flags of convenience,
misidentification or false registration, offshore ownership, and shell-firm
owners, managers, and insurers.
main argument
Based on a review of automatic identification system data tracking
approximately 70 vessels that entered DPRK ports between April 2016
and October 2016, current sanctions on North Korea do not appear to be
impeding marine traffic into the country. The majority of marine traffic into
the DPRK during this period was from Chinese ports by vessels flagged by
several countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the DPRK. The registration
and flagging of vessels trading with North Korea occurs via offshore firms that
are based outside sanctions enforcement zones in places such as Hong Kong,
the British Virgin Islands, and the Seychelles. Sanctions against North Korea
are thus largely symbolic gestures of disapproval that do not demonstrate any
capability to change the political behavior of the Kim Jong-un regime. For
sanctions to influence the regime’s behavior, it would be necessary to pursue
restrictions on the capital flows that allow marine traffic to enter the country
rather than sanctioning the regime itself.
policy implications
• The role of offshore capital reduces the potency of smart sanctions and
recent financial measures against North Korea. If offshore interests are not
taken into consideration, then it is unlikely that these policies will have any
real effect on the regime’s political behavior.
• The intermediaries of vessel owners, managers, and insurers are all
financially gaining from trade with the DPRK, which presents an important
target for financial measures. Insurers of some of these vessels are situated
in countries that do uphold sanctions, notably the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, South Korea, and New Zealand.
• The Banco Delta Asia case demonstrates an important aperture in sanctions
enforcement by relying on financial measures that do not target the regime
itself but go after the surrounding capital networks on which it relies.

huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
In February 2016 the United States escalated its enforcement of sanctions
against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and in June
2016 it imposed a new set of prohibitions on the regime, citing evidence of
gross human rights violations. 1 Sanctions, in the form of financial restrictions
and the prohibition of marine traffic, have been increasingly imposed on a
global scale against the DPRK in the past several years. 2 Many scholars and
policy analysts have long questioned the efficacy of sanctions to alter the
behavior of hostile countries or thwart human rights abuses. 3 This article
analyzes the efficacy of current sanctions on the DPRK, specifically those
focused on curtailing marine traffic into the country.
Despite the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions in March
2016 and U.S. sanctions in June 2016, marine traffic into the DPRK continued
throughout 2016. Between April 2016 and October 2016, I used automatic
identification system (AIS) software from the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) to analyze marine traffic into active DPRK ports and
identified approximately 70 incoming vessels, mostly arriving from Chinese
ports but also from other locations, including a vessel that traveled to Sinpo
harbor from Vancouver, Canada. While the methods used in this article are
insufficient to produce a conclusive account of all marine traffic into the
DPRK, this study finds that, despite the existence of sanctions, marine traffic
regularly enters DPRK ports owing to the reflagging of vessels under flags of
convenience and ownership of vessels by offshore capital management firms.
This suggests that the Kim Jong-un regime has the means to bypass many of
the sanctions that are currently in place.
1 UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review—Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” January 4, 2010 u http://lib.ohchr.org/
HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session6/KP/A_HRC_13_13_PRK_E.pdf; Elise Labbott and Ryan
Browne, “U.S. Sanctions North Korean Leader for First Time over Human Rights Abuses,” CNN,
July 8, 2016 u http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/06/politics/north-korea-kim-jong-un-humanrights;
Kim Tae-woo, “Human Rights in North Korea: The Real Key to Denuclearization,”
Diplomat, July 26, 2016 u http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/human-rights-in-north-korea-thereal-key-to-denuclearization;
and “Treasury Sanctions North Korean Senior Officials and Entities
Associated with Human Rights Abuses,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, July 6,
2016 u https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0506.aspx.
2 Carol Morello, “U.S. Sanctions North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un,” Washington Post, July 6, 2016
u https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-sanctions-north-korean-leaderkim-jong-un/2016/07/06/af0da71c-4390-11e6-bc99-7d269f8719b1_story.html;
and “Treasury
Sanctions North Korean Senior Officials.”
3 See, for example, Navin A. Bapat and Bo Ram Kwon, “When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining
and Enforcement Framework,” International Organization 69, no. 1 (2015): 131–62; A. Cooper
Drury, “Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The U.S. President’s Decision to Initiate Economic
Sanctions,” Political Research Quarterly 54, no. 3 (2001): 485–508; Nikolay Marinov, “Do Economic
Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005):
564–76 ; and Alex Vines, “The Effectiveness of UN and EU Sanctions: Lessons for the Twenty-First
Century,” International Affairs 88, no. 4 (2012): 867–77.
[ 133 ]

asia policy
By illuminating these marine traffic patterns and analyzing how they
undermine the efficacy of sanctions, this article contributes to the current
policy debates on both North Korea and the effectiveness of sanctions
more generally. UN and state sanctions all directly target marine traffic
into the DPRK by taking financial measures against the owners, insurers,
and managers of the vessels that are connected to the regime. This article
identifies several trading entities that supply the regime and suggests that
in many cases the firms are offshore shell companies that fall outside direct
sanctions enforcement. There are also cases of sanctions violations by vessels
that are insured or owned within UN-complying jurisdictions, but no
evidence exists to suggest any attempt to enforce sanctions by seizing assets
or imposing financial penalties on the owners. This article thus demonstrates
that sanctions, taken together, fall short of their desired efficacy due to
the DPRK’s offshore capital networks and the lack of political will for
enforcement. It is organized into the following four sections:
u pp. 134–37 provide an overview of sanctions theory.
u pp. 137–45 describe recent sanctions enacted against the DPRK.
u pp. 145–50 examine maritime traffic into North Korea and analyze four
weaknesses in the sanctions regime related to vessel reflagging, false
identification, offshore vessel ownership, and poor oversight of maritime
insurance companies.
u
pp. 150–52 consider potential options for addressing these weaknesses to
make sanctions against the Kim regime more effective.
the theory of sanctions from “naive” to “smart”
The proximity of South Korea’s population to a hostile North is a unique
geopolitical quandary, which has resulted in soft engagement, rather than
hard military engagement, with the regime, most recently through sanctions.
The instrumental theory of sanctions suggests that denying resources to
hostile regimes, or excluding the target from the foreign community, will
invoke behavioral change. 4 George Lopez and David Cortright interpret
instrumental sanctions as assuming that a repressed population in a target
4 William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, “The Theory of International Economic Sanctions:
A Public Choice Approach,” American Economic Review 78, no. 4 (1988): 786–93.
[ 134 ]

huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
state “will redirect the pain of sanctions onto authoritarian political leaders”
to bring about policy changes. 5
Many scholars, however, suggest that sanctions do not result in
behavioral change; if anything, they lead the target state to create new
geopolitical relationships with nations not directly in the line of sight of the
sanctions. 6 Johan Galtung called the intentions of such sanctions “naive” in
hoping for a “proportionate relation” between value deprivation and political
disintegration. 7 Peter van Bergeijk argues that sanctions can only have a real
effect if a target nation is an active participant in free-market, liberalized
geographies of trade. 8 Cuba, for example, faces one of the longest, and often
well-enforced, packages of economic sanctions in history, yet many scholars
agree that this policy has done little to influence the Cuban government. If
anything, the measures strengthened its position of power. 9 As Navin Bapat
and Bo Ram Kwon suggest, many nations that impose sanctions do not have
the political appetite to enforce penalties on their own citizens and entities
that violate them. 10 And even if enforcement is carried out, often the leaders
of hostile governments will have the personal capacity to circumvent
sanctions, while the general population suffers greatly due to a broader lack
of resources. 11
Considering this existing scholarship, the pursuit of targeted financial
measures, or “smart” sanctions, has been lauded as a means of geopolitical
influence by limiting access to resources used by the governing authorities
5 George A. Lopez and David Cortright, “Financial Sanctions: The Key to a ‘Smart’ Sanctions
Strategy,” Die Friedens-Warte 72, no. 4 (1997): 327–36.
6 Abel Escribà-Folch, “Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and
Sanctions,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 6 (2012): 683–713; Dean Lacy and Emerson
Niou, “A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information,
and Threats,” Journal of Politics 66, no. 1 (2004): 25–42; David Lektzian and Mark Souva, “An
Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (2007):
848–71; T. Clifton Morgan, “Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous
Evidence,” International Interactions 41, no. 4 (2015): 744–54; and Manuel Oechslin, “Targeting
Autocrats: Economic Sanctions and Regime Change,” European Journal of Political Economy 36
(2014): 24–40.
7 Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case
of Rhodesia,” World Politics 19, no. 3 (1967): 378–416.
8 Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, Economic Diplomacy and the Geography of International Trade
(Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2009).
9 Daniel W. Fisk, “Economic Sanctions: The Cuba Embargo Revisited,” in Sanctions as Economic
Statecraft, ed. Stephen Chan and A. Cooper Drury (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2000); and
William M. LeoGrande, “Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past,”
International Affairs 91, no. 3 (2015): 473–88.
10 Bapat and Kwon, “When Are Sanctions Effective?”
11 Drury, “Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy.”
[ 135 ]

asia policy
rather than the entire population. 12 This involves policies that would either
cause personal discomfort to leaders in the target nation or deny the availability
of resources for their hostile objectives. 13 William Kaempfer and Anton
Lowenberg argue that sanctions of minimal economic hardship can invoke
political change if they are targeted at specific interest groups or ruling classes. 14
Despite the enthusiasm for smart sanctions, challenges remain. There is
the risk that financial measures could be overused, abused, or misused as a go-to
foreign policy solution, which could seriously compromise their credibility
and effectiveness. 15 Targeted sanctions on arms create a black market, visitor
travel bans have no effect on persons with multinational citizenship, targeted
trade sanctions can disrupt local economies for vulnerable populations, and
financial sanctions are difficult to enforce considering the role of offshore
capital. 16 A study by Daniel Drezner concluded that “no systematic evidence”
exists to demonstrate that “smart sanctions will yield better policy results
vis-à-vis the targeted country.” 17
Moreover, smart sanctions that propose a targeted approach on key
actors still assume a narrow geopolitical view by focusing on the relationship
between the issuer and the target. T. Clifton Morgan argues that a new theory
of sanctions is needed where instead of imposing sanctions “as an effort to
induce the target to act differently…we should view sanctions as an effort
to have a direct effect on the environment in which the target makes its
decisions.” 18 As Lopez and Cortright argue, financial sanctions have little
effect if the target has time to move assets to secure locations. 19 The role
of offshore capital, as will be further discussed in this article, has reduced
the potency of recent financial measures and other smart sanctions against
North Korea inasmuch as the offshore companies that facilitate trade with
12 Joy Gordon, “Smart Sanctions Revisited,” Ethics and International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2011):
315–35; Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Barbara Oegg, “Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative?”
(paper presented at the Peterson Institute for International Economics symposium “Sanctions
Reform? Evaluating the Economic Weapon in Asia and the World,” Washington, D.C., February
23, 2000); and Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, “Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?” World Politics 54,
no. 3 (2002): 373–403.
13 Michael Brzoska, “From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions,” Global Governance 9,
no. 4 (2003): 519–35.
14 William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, “The Theory of International Economic Sanctions:
A Public Choice Approach,” American Economic Review 78, no. 4 (1988): 786–93.
15 Sue E. Eckert, “The Use of Financial Measures to Promote Security,” Journal of International
Affairs 62, no. 1 (2008): 103–11.
16 Gordon, “Smart Sanctions Revisited.”
17 Daniel W. Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,”
International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (2011): 96–108.
18 Morgan, “Economic Sanctions Theory.”
19 Lopez and Cortright, “‘Smart’ Sanctions Strategy.”
[ 136 ]

huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
the Kim regime are largely immune from sanctions or enforcement. 20 While
sanctions theory has evolved considerably, sanctions practice against North
Korea remains narrow by targeting capital flows between the regime and the
sanctioning countries themselves, which has proved insufficient. 21
recent sanctions against north korea
The dual purpose of international sanctions on vessel traffic and trade
to the DPRK is to encourage the regime to abandon its nuclear program and
to punish it for evident human rights violations. The severity of the human
rights crisis in North Korea has been described as “deeply disturbing” at best
and “unimaginable” at worst. 22 Some 200,000 political prisoners are held in
labor camps. 23 The country abides by a feudal system of order and control
known as the songbun system, a class-based ranking of persons into “loyal,”
“wavering,” or “hostile” to the Kim dynasty. 24 Evidence suggests that the regime
systematically holds public executions, institutes capital punishment without
judicial process, engages in torture and intimidation, enacts censorship, and
organizes state-authorized violence against civilians. 25
What’s more, the Kim regime continues to pursue nuclear proliferation,
despite international laws that prohibit it. In 2009 the DPRK declared that
it possessed nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Outside North Korea,
the Kim regime’s pursuit of nuclear technology is a security concern that
routinely frustrates the international community. However, within the
DPRK, the nuclear program is a dominant force in the cultural hegemony
of the regime. The government routinely celebrates the program as a needed
protection for the autonomy of the country. North Korea spends a quarter of
its GDP on military activities, yet it cannot ensure the most basic resources
for its own population.
20 Mark P. Hampton and John Christensen, “Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, Tax Havens,
and the Re-configuration of Global Finance,” World Development 30, no. 9 (2002): 1657–73.
21 Tostensen and Bull, “Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?”
22 Robert M. Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System
(Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012); Vaclav Havel, Kjell
Bondevik, and Elie Wiesel, “Turn North Korea into a Human Rights Issue,” Spiegel, October 31,
2006 u http://www.spiegel.de/international/opinion-turn-north-korea-into-a-human-rightsissue-a-445594.html;
and “North Korea: Events of 2015,” Human Rights Watch, World Report
2016, 2016 u https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/north-korea.
23 Tania Branigan, “North Korea Holds 200,000 Political Prisoners, Says Amnesty,” Guardian, May 4,
2011 u https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/04/north-korea-political-prisoners-amnesty.
24 Collins, Marked for Life.
25 UN Human Rights Council, “Report of Working Group.”
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asia policy
Table 1 provides an overview of sanctions on DPRK vessels. These
restrictions are meant to restrict the movement of any vessel owned, managed,
or operated by the Kim regime. The United Nations listed 31 North Korean
“blacklisted” vessels under Resolution 2270. 26 This list is meant to include
vessels that are flagged in the DPRK or owned by the Kim regime under the
Pyongyang-based company Ocean Maritime Management, as well as those
that are sailing under flags of convenience but that are ultimately operated
by the regime (see Table 2). 27 However, many vessels on this list have since
been reflagged in third countries, and ownership data suggests that they are
controlled by offshore shell companies, some of which are traceable through
the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ Offshore Leaks
Database, which contains information from the Panama Papers. 28 Many
vessels on this list continue to facilitate trade with Pyongyang while being
insured by European, UK, and U.S. companies.
On July 7, 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department enacted new sanctions
specifically targeting Kim and ten other top officials in the DPRK. 29 The recent
seizure orders by the United States exhibit a political willingness to act in
response to the human rights crisis in North Korea, in addition to addressing
the nuclear proliferation threat from the Kim regime. The sanctions freeze any
property that Kim or his colleagues have in U.S. jurisdictions. The Treasury
Department bases the sanctions on “North Korea’s notorious abuses of human
rights…and to further our efforts to expose those responsible for serious
human rights abuses and censorship in North Korea.” 30 Executive Orders
13722 and 13687 target individuals who “have engaged in, facilitated, or been
responsible for an abuse or violation of human rights by the Government
of North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea” and who could assist in the
regime’s nuclear proliferation goals. 31 This executive order aims to punish
these officials by confiscating any assets that they may have in the United
States and U.S. territories. 32
26 “Security Council Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2270 (2016),” UN Security Council, Press Release,
March 2016.
27 “Flag of convenience” is a term applied to a vessel that is flagged under a foreign country, without
any real connection to it, in order to avoid financial restrictions.
28 “Orion House Services HK,” Offshore Leaks u https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/11001746.
29 “Treasury Sanctions North Korean Officials.”
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Labbott and Browne, “U.S. Sanctions North Korean Leader.”
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huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
TABLE 1
Marine Vessel Sanctions against North Korea
Country/
organization
Vessel
registration
Insurance Flagging Ownership Leasing Management
DPRK-flagged
vessels banned from
domestic ports
Ban on imports
from and exports
to the DPRK
Canada Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Yes Prohibited
China Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
Mandatory inspections
of vessels for
contraband items
Prohibition on
imports of North
Korean coal and iron
European
Union
Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Yes
Partial ban on exports
and imports related
to military use
Japan Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
Total ban on all vessels
that have entered
North Korean ports
regardless of flagging
Prohibited since
early 2016
New Zealand Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
Mandatory inspections
of vessels for
contraband items
Prohibited
Norway Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
Mandatory inspections
of vessels for
contraband items
Partial ban on exports
and imports related
to military use
Acts and laws
Adoption of
UN Resolution
2270, Special
Economic
Measures Act
Adoption of
UN Resolution
2270, Special
Economic
Measures Act
EU Regulation
2016/682
Adoption of
UN Resolution
2270
Adoption of
UN Resolution
2270
Adoption of
UN Resolution
2270
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asia policy
Table 1 continued
Country/
organization
Vessel
registration
Insurance Flagging Ownership Leasing Management
DPRK-flagged
vessels banned from
domestic ports
South Korea Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
Total ban on all vessels
that have entered
North Korean ports
within 180 days
United
Kingdom
Prohibited
Applications
can be made
for special
circumstances,
otherwise not
permitted
Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
Special circumstances
only
United
Nations
Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
Mandatory inspections
of vessels for
contraband items
United States Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Yes
Ban on imports
from and exports
to the DPRK
Other than
special economic
cooperation
programs, all
imports and exports
are prohibited
Partial ban on
imports; ban on
exports related to
military use
Ban on importing
materials for
military use; ban on
exporting goods
that could generate
profit for the regime;
prohibition of luxury
goods
Total ban on all
imports; ban on
certain exports,
notably arms and
luxury goods
Acts and laws
Adoption of
UN Resolution
2270 with
additional
measures
Export Control
Orders 2008
(SI 2008/3231),
2007
(SI 2007/1334)
UN Resolution
2270; Security
Council
Decision
2016/476
Executive
Order 13466
[ 140 ]

huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
TABLE 2
List of Ships Blacklisted by the UN Security Council under Resolution 2270
IMO Name Management Insurance Home port Flagged Notes
7640378 Tan Chon Myongsan Marine Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
7937317
Chong Chon
Gang
Chong Chon Gang
Shipping
Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
8018900 Ji Hye San
Haejin Ship
Management
London P&I Pyongyang North Korea –
8018912 Ryong Rim
Haejin Ship
Management
London P&I Pyongyang North Korea
AIS Broadcast as Nauticast; harbored in Buenaventura
(COBUN), Colombia, on October 10, 2016
8133530 Song Jin
Haejin Ship
Management
South of England P&I Pyongyang North Korea –
8330815 Hu Chang Myongsan Marine Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
8405270 Hui Chon
Pyongjin Ship
Management
West of England P&I Pyongyang North Korea –
8405402 Gold Star 3 Hua Heng Shipping West of England P&I Hong Kong Cambodia
Removed from list; heading to Nampo harbor as of
October 12, 2016; connections to Orion House in the
Offshore Leaks Database
8412467 South Hill 2 Hua Heng Shipping West of England P&I Hong Kong Sierra Leone –
8511823 Grand Karo East Grand Shipping Unknown Hong Kong Cambodia –
8606173 Chol Ryong
Haejin Ship
Management
Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
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Table 2 continued
IMO Name Management Insurance Home port Flagged Notes
8602531 JH 86 Heng Li Marine West of England P&I Yantai Cambodia
Removed from list; owned by Heng Li Marine, an
offshore firm connected to Orion House
8625545 Ra Nam 2
Korea Samilpo
Shipping
West of England P&I Pyongyang North Korea
Destined for Japanese port of Nakanoseki as of October
12, 2016
8661575 Tong Hung 1
Tong Hung Shipping
and Trading
Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
8713471 Mi Rim Mirim Shipping West of England P&I Pyongyang North Korea
Ties to Mirim Limited in the British Virgin Islands,
according to the Offshore Leaks Database
8819017 Se Pho
Haejin Ship
Management
Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
8829555 Po Thong Gang
Ocean Marine
Management
Unknown Pyongyang North Korea Broadcasting as O Rang
8829593 Kang Gye
Ocean Marine
Management
Unknown Pyongyang North Korea
Double broadcast of IMO number as a U.S. military ship
named ATLS-9701 (MMSI number)
8909575 Chong Bong Hua Heng Shipping Steamship Mutual P&I Hong Kong North Korea Links to Orion House, according to the Panama Papers
8914934 Everbright 88 Bali Shipping Korea P&I Club Hong Kong Sierra Leone Removed from list; formerly named J Star
8916293 Chong Rim 2 Ocean Bunkering Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
8987333 Ryo Myong
Korean Polish
Shipping
Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
9009085 Thae Phyong San Hua Heng Shipping Korea P&I Club Hong Kong North Korea –
9041552 Hoe Ryong Hoe Ryong Shipping Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
[ 142 ]

huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
Table 2 continued
IMO Name Management Insurance Home port Flagged Notes
9110236 First Gleam Sinotug Shipping American Club P&I
Marshall
Islands
Tanzania
Removed from list; formerly named the Dawnlight; left
Chongjin destined to Hungnam on October 10, 2016
9138680 South Hill 5 Hua Heng Shipping Skuld P&I Hong Kong Palau Removed from list
9163154 Jin Tal
Blue Ocean
Management
West of England P&I Wendeng Belize
Removed from list; ship broadcasting as Sheing Da 6;
CST Administration (Bahamas) is the director, according
to the Offshore Leaks Database; Credit Suisse Trust is
the intermediary
9163166 Jin Teng
Golden Soar
Development
West of England P&I Hong Kong Belize
Removed from list; ship broadcasting as Sheng Da 8;
Golden Soar listed in the Panama Papers and linked to
Orion House in Hong Kong (jurisdiction, British Virgin
Islands)
9314650 Ra Nam 3W
Korea Samilpo
Shipping
Steamship Mutual
P&I UK
Pyongyang North Korea –
9333589 Orion Star Bene Star Shipping American Club P&I Hong Kong Mongolia
Removed from list; traveled from Wonsan to Chongjin
between October 2 and 5, 2016
9361407 Mi Rim 2 Mirim Shipping Unknown Pyongyang North Korea –
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The question remains as to whether any of those named in the executive
orders actually have property or assets in the United States. Assets held
in offshore accounts set up by third-party intermediaries often cannot be
seized under such measures. In addition to the eleven individuals named in
Executive Orders 13722 and 13687, five firms are also included. However,
all these entities are DPRK government departments, with no mention of
banks, transportation firms, merchants, or suppliers. Previous U.S. executive
orders have targeted DPRK banks and firms for seizure based on nuclear
security concerns. 33
The financial measures that involve maritime vessels are aimed at
reducing the importation of military goods and luxury items. The U.S.
Office of Foreign Assets Control passed Executive Order 13551 in June
2015 to target the maritime transport of goods to North Korea, with a
specific focus on military material and resources. This executive order
uses an assets seizure clause for anyone who has “imported, exported,
or re-exported any arms or related material”; provided “training, advice,
or other services” related to arms materials; or “imported, exported, or
re-exported luxury goods into North Korea.” 34 Executive Order 13466
“prohibits persons from registering vessels in North Korea, obtaining
authorization for a vessel to fly the North Korean flag, and owning, leasing,
operating, or insuring any vessel flagged by North Korea.” 35 This 2015
legislation, while aimed at stopping arms trafficking into the country, has
the ability to target individuals who are profiting from business with the
Kim regime. It thus could disrupt trade with the DPRK if the stakeholder
also has direct dealings with the United States.
Other countries have imposed sanctions on marine vessel traffic into the
DPRK. The European Union, Canada, and New Zealand all follow the UN
sanctions to restrict trade and financial transactions with the Kim regime.
The UK Treasury has a list of 66 North Korean individuals whose assets are
subject to seizure. 36 In addition, the British government names 42 DPRK
entities, including banks, firms, and merchants. Effectively enforcing these
sanctions remains a problem, however, given that the entities targeted likely
have their assets outside UK jurisdiction. Although heralded as a worthwhile
33 “North Korea Designations,” Office of Foreign Assets Control, July 6, 2016 u https://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20160706.aspx.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 “Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in the UK,” HM Treasury, Office of Financial
Sanctions Implementation (UK), September 6, 2016 u https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/528488/northkorea.pdf.
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huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
political move, such executive orders to freeze assets do not actually apply
much pressure on their targets and thus have little value in curbing human
rights abuses or deterring nuclear proliferation.
A notable change in tone exists with the recent U.S. financial measures to
focus on human rights as the impetus for the sanctions rather than previous
efforts that solely aimed at quelling nuclear proliferation or tactical security
concerns. These measures do not target third parties, whereas the 2015
legislation provides the capacity to take action on those trading and dealing
with the regime via marine traffic. In both cases, the fundamental purpose of the
sanctions is to bring about behavioral change; yet unless the financial networks
on which the Kim regime depends are targeted, this is unlikely to occur.
current marine traffic into north korea
Between April 2016 and October 2016, I used IMO’s AIS software—a
system that tracks the recorded position and destination of merchant marine
vessels—to record approximately 70 vessels that entered DPRK ports. This
figure may not include all traffic, but it certainly captures the majority of
it. Of the seventeen ports in the DPRK, most marine traffic enters the port
of Nampo, located down river from Pyongyang. Other active ports include
Daeson, Chongjin, Wonsan, and Sinpo. The vessels’ IMO numbers and call
signs were recorded, along with country flag, home port, past track, and
itinerary history. The analysis also recorded the management companies,
owners, and insurers of the vessels. Taken together, the data demonstrates
that despite imposed sanctions, marine traffic continues to Nampo, which is a
supply port for the capital, and Sinpo, which includes a submarine pen that is
being expanded. 37 This finding exposes four challenges to enforcement of the
sanctions regime: the use of flags of convenience, false or misleading vessel
identification and registry, offshore ownership, and the failure of maritime
insurance companies to monitor compliance with sanctions requirements.
Flags of Convenience and False Identification
The container ships entering DPRK ports are almost entirely arriving
from either Chinese ports or the Russian port of Vladivostok. The exceptions
37 Nick Hansen and Jeremy Binnie, “North Korea Building New, Larger Submarine Pens,” IHS Jane’s
Defence Weekly, July 26, 2016 u http://www.janes.com/article/62516/north-korea-building-newlarger-submarine-pens.
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asia policy
are the vessels Cheyenne (IMO 9706504) and Ryong Rim (IMO 8018912) that
left the Japanese ports of Kashima and Yokohama, respectively, in early May
2016. Dailan, Bayuquan, Tianjin, Jingtang, and Lianyungang are all Chinese
ports from which vessels have departed for the DPRK. Yet despite the number
of ships arriving from Chinese ports, no Chinese-flagged vessels were found
to have entered DPRK ports during the period of time examined. Rather,
nineteen ships were flagged under the DPRK, six were flagged under Panama
colors, six were flying Tanzanian flags, four were flagged in Russia, and four
carried Mongolian colors. Other arriving vessels were flagged in Jamaica,
Liberia, India, Togo, Taiwan, the Bahamas, and Cambodia. No data on the
cargo the ships carried is publicly available.
While some vessels are linked to the regime or connected to offshore
capital, some are not and instead rely on misleading travel plans,
misidentification, or false registries. The Voge Challenger (IMO 9490454), a
Liberian-flagged vessel owned by TSC Ship Management out of Hamburg,
traveled from Bahia Blanca, Argentina, to Sinpo, North Korea, on April 16,
2016. On June 18, it left Vancouver, Canada, broadcasting its destination
as Port Qasim in Pakistan. AIS tracking confirmed the ship’s anchorage 38
days later in Port Qasim for a twelve-hour period on August 3. However, the
tracking information also shows that the vessel stopped in Sinpo between
July 17 and July 26, which constitutes a sanctions violation under Canadian
and European law. According to Canadian law, vessels cannot leave Canadian
ports carrying goods destined for the DPRK, while the EU prohibits companies
from insuring, owning, or managing vessels trading with the DPRK.
Other ships entering North Korean waters may have violated regional
regulations, including those imposed by China and South Korea. In March
2016, Japanese media reported that China banned DPRK-flagged vessels
from entering six of its ports. 38 The DPRK-flagged vessel Su Song, formerly the
Sun Orion (IMO 9024889), entered the port of Weifang, one of the allegedly
banned Chinese ports, on July 19, 2016. Chinese authorities later denied
that the ports were given instructions to prohibit DPRK-flagged vessels. 39
The vessel Chon Un 68 (IMO 9001021) is a Tanzanian-flagged cargo ship with
a capacity of four thousand tons. AIS tracking shows that on July 10, 2016,
the vessel docked at Nampo port, and on July 18 it was docked at Weifang.
38 Takuya Hiraga, “China Expands Embargo on North Korea Vessels to 6 Ports,” Asahi Shimbun,
March 22, 2016 u http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201603220043.html.
39 “China Denies Reports of Entry Ban on All North Korean Vessels,” Yonhap, March 23, 2016
u http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/03/23/0200000000AEN20160323008200315.
html?92265450.
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huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
On July 29, 2016, the ship registered its destination as Barra, a small passenger
ferry terminal in the western Hebrides of Scotland. This, however, was a false
registry by the ship’s management meant for distraction. On October 10,
2016, the Chon Un 68 was sailing for Nampo, once again with its registered
destination as Barra.
Offshore Ownership and Weak Oversight of Maritime
Insurance Companies
The companies that own and manage these vessels are mostly based in
Hong Kong, Singapore, or Pyongyang and registered in offshore locations
such as the British Virgin Islands, Samoa, Hong Kong, Seychelles, Panama,
and the Bahamas. The companies that own the vessels—including Hunchun
Sino Unity, Hua Heng Shipping, Korea Kumunsan Trading, Fortune Shipping
International, Nanjing Ocean Shipping Co., World Merge Shipping, and
Dorian—are all mentioned in the Offshore Leaks Database (also known as
the Panama Papers). 40 These firms are established in offshore locations with
the assistance of third-party intermediaries, many of which are based in
Hong Kong or Singapore. The Hong Kong company Orion House is cited
as the intermediary for several of these shipping firms, including four
North Korean vessels on the United Nation’s blacklist. 41 Since these firms
are registered in offshore locations, the United States, South Korea, and
the EU are unable to pursue enforcement of sanctions. 42 Offshore firms are
incredibly opaque, especially with respect to identifying their stakeholders
or boards of directors. Intermediaries play an essential role in establishing
offshore holdings, and the system could not function in its current form
without their assistance. There is little, however, that authorities can do to
penalize or otherwise stop intermediaries. As long as they exist, marine
traffic will continue to flow to the DPRK.
Most of the vessel traffic into the DPRK relies on this murky network
of offshore capital. However, companies that do not rely on third-party
offshore firms own some vessels that enter DPRK ports. The vessel Badri
Prasad (IMO 8903284) was owned by Essar Shipping, an Indian company
that is affiliated with Essar Energy, a power-generation company in
India. In April 2016, the Badri Prasad docked in Sinpo port, stopped
in Yantai port in China, and then traveled to Pakistani waters. As of
40 “Heng Li International Limited,” Offshore Leaks u https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/10002681.
41 Ibid.
42 “Orion House Services HK.”
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asia policy
December 2016, the vessel appears to be decommissioned. The CEO of Essar
Power, K.V.B. Reddy, was featured by the North Korean media in early 2016. 43
Although Essar’s traffic between India and Pakistan may be a concern for
Indian authorities, the Indian government’s Act East policy has encouraged
more trade with the DPRK. 44 Ri Su-young, the DPRK’s foreign minister,
visited India in 2015, and since then relations seem to be warming. 45
Another factor is that many of the marine protection and indemnity (P&I)
insurance companies connected to vessel traffic into North Korea are able
to operate in violation of sanctions because mechanisms of enforcement are
not rigorously applied. Some of these insurance firms are questionable shell
companies themselves with offshore holdings, but others are legitimate. Yet
even when the management firms dealing with North Korea exist outside
sanctions jurisdictions, the firms insuring the vessels are registered within
enforceable territories. West of England P&I, for example, is headquartered
in Luxembourg and has an office in London. It is the insurance provider
for dozens of vessels traveling to North Korea, including the Mi Yang 8
(IMO 8863733), a DPRK-flagged vessel owned by Miyang Shipping in
Pyongyang. Likewise, Raetsmarine Insurance, a Dutch company, insures the
DPRK-flagged vessel Kum San Bong (IMO 8810384), and Britannia Steam
Ship Insurance covers the Zhang Hong No. 1 (IMO 8307894), a Taiwan-owned
and -flagged vessel that entered Nampo on July 30, 2016. The Norwegian
firm Skuld P&I currently insures the Tian Zhu (IMO 9338981), a formerly
DPRK-flagged vessel owned by Hunchun Sino Unity Shipping in Hong Kong.
On July 19, 2016, Skuld posted a page on its website stating that U.S. and
EU sanctions prevent firms from offering marine insurance to DPRK-flagged
vessels. 46 As of August 1, 2016, the IMO broadcast signal reported that the
name of the Tian Zhu had changed to Chang Phyong and that the vessel is now
sailing under the flag of Kiribati—a flag of convenience. 47 The Chon Un 68,
mentioned above, is owned by Hua Heng Shipping and K&H Shipping based
in Hong Kong. However, the ship is insured by a South Korean firm, Korea
P&I Club, based in Seoul, despite the fact that South Korean law prohibits the
43 “KVB Reddy Takes Charge for New Initiatives at Essar Power MP Limited,” North Korea Times,
March 8, 2016 u http://www.northkoreatimes.com/index.php/sid/242005081.
44 Jimmy Youn, “NK-India Relationship,” Korea Times, January 6, 2016 u http://www.koreatimes.
co.kr/www/news/opinon/2016/03/162_194809.html.
45 Ibid.
46 Daria Avdeeva, “North Korea Sanctions,” Skuld, July 19, 2016 u https://www.skuld.com/topics/
voyage--port-risks/sanctions/insight/insight-north-korea-sanctions/north-korea-sanctions.
47 This is a common marine practice where a merchant vessel is registered in a country that is
different from the country of the ship’s owners. This is done to avoid sanctions, as well as taxes and
excise costs in various countries.
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huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
insurance of ships entering North Korea. Other insurers of vessels entering the
DPRK include Steamship Mutual P&I, North of England P&I, and Standard
Club in the United Kingdom.
A noteworthy example of poor compliance with sanctions by maritime
insurance companies involves the Sun Unity, now named the Sun Rizhao
(IMO 8736382), which traveled from a Chinese anchorage to Nampo port
on August 2, 2016. The vessel is owned by a Hong Kong–based firm and
insured by Maritime Mutual Insurance Association, a New Zealand–based
company. In 2005, the government of Japan complained to the government of
New Zealand that Maritime Mutual had exploited a loophole in sanctions law
in order to profit from insuring DPRK vessels entering Japanese waters. The
company calls itself an insurance agent even though it is not registered as one
in New Zealand. The directors of Maritime Mutual are thought to be based
in Liechtenstein and on the island of Guernsey. 48 The company has insured
DPRK vessels with impunity for over ten years. New Zealand responded to
Japan’s complaint against Maritime Mutual by maintaining that it could do
nothing to prevent its corporations from insuring DPRK vessels. 49 In sum,
European, Asian, and other marine insurance firms are actively providing
coverage for vessels entering the DPRK and possibly for vessels using flags of
convenience, which flaunts sanctions restricting the insurance of vessels tied
to the Kim regime.
Shareholders and directors of offshore accounts or of intermediary firms
could be targets for international pressure, but once again no real juridical
authority exists within current sanctions law to pursue action. What is even
more troubling is that it appears that insurance firms that fall within sanctions
jurisdictions, including the New York–based insurance firm American
Club P&I that insures the First Gleam (IMO 9110236) and Orion Star
(IMO 9333589), continue business with impunity. Any firm with assets in the
United States should be pursued under Washington’s executive orders, but there
is no evidence of such actions being taken. The lack of political will to enforce
sanctions against violating vessels and their associated entities becomes obvious
when vessels like the Voge Challenger and the Cheyenne enter U.S. waters after
docking at a DPRK port. The Cheyenne was reported in DPRK ports in May
2016 but returned to U.S. ports in August 2016.
48 “Lax NZ Laws Provide Rogue State with a Loophole,” Sunrise Exchange News, March 8, 2005 u
http://www.insurancenews.com.au/local/lax-nz-laws-provide-rogue-state-with-a-loophole.
49 Ibid.
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In sum, marine traffic continues to flow into North Korea, with most of the
vessel owners flying flags of convenience and registering with offshore firms,
some not accurately disclosing their port calls, and some being insured by
marine P&I companies that are merely shells. In the latter case, the insurance
companies are in violation of UN sanctions and domestic financial regulations.
The Badri Prasad case discussed above demonstrates emerging relations
between India and North Korea regardless of international sanctions. The
activities of the Voge Challenger and the Chon Un 68 could also be challenged
as violations of current sanctions inasmuch as these vessels are operating in
jurisdictions with specific sanctions laws against the DPRK. However, many
of the owners and managers of vessels entering the DPRK are connected to
offshore capital, and additional financial regulations would be needed to target
the flow and exchange of money between the regime and the vessel operators.
This would involve targeting the offshore firms rather than the regime itself.
The lack of action to strengthen enforcement demonstrates a phenomenal
indifference to the issue or an embarrassing inability to enforce sanctions on
vessels. In either case, the current state of active marine traffic into the DPRK
exposes the weaknesses of the recent sanctions aimed at the Kim regime, as
the deep involvement of offshore holding companies, combined with lax
enforcement, outmaneuvers current sanctions.
concluding thoughts
This article demonstrates that marine traffic into the DPRK continues
despite many international sanctions against the Kim regime. Current
sanctions target DPRK-flagged vessels rather than the capital flow between
the regime, offshore entities, and marine vessels flying flags of convenience.
By examining vessel traffic into the DRPK, this article exposes four major
obstacles in the practical enforcement of sanctions as they currently stand:
the use of flags of convenience, false or misleading registration, offshore
ownership, and lax oversight of maritime insurance firms. Offshore holding
companies are connected to the majority of marine traffic into the DPRK,
and additional financial measures are required to effectively monitor these
companies’ compliance with sanctions. Despite the fact that some vessels
and their insurers are openly in violation of sanctions, there is no evidence of
enforcement against these companies. Beyond the design of smart sanctions
against the Kim regime, actual enforcement is lacking. The July 2016 voyage
of the Voge Challenger discussed above is an example of an easy target for
[ 150 ]

huish • the failure of maritime sanctions enforcement
sanctions enforcement, yet the vessel sailed unhindered to a DPRK port that
is pursuing aggressive military expansion.
As it stands, the intersection of sanctions and geopolitics suggests
great difficulty in effectively enforcing sanctions. In 2005 the United States
imposed financial sanctions on the Banco Delta Asia, an offshore bank
that received millions in cash deposits from North Korea, to block any
financial dealings with the North Korean regime. 50 This led to a run on
the bank’s accounts as clients feared having their assets frozen under the
sanctions. 51 Rachel Loefler has argued that targeting the financial system
rather than the DPRK government itself adds significant cost to the regime
and reduces its ability to pursue hostile activities. 52 Aaron Arnold likewise
points to the efficacy of measures that isolate financial entities from global
capital and the U.S. market rather than attempting to isolate the target country
itself. 53 Still, even when enacted, such financial measures have merely added
expense to the regime rather than deterring North Korea from pursuing its
nuclear ambitions.
The pressure put on the Banco Delta Asia demonstrates an important
aperture in the enforcement of sanctions by not targeting the regime itself but
rather going after the surrounding capital networks on which it relies. This
approach could be effective in putting pressure on the DPRK by eliminating
or restricting funds transferred between the Kim regime and shipping
companies doing business in Nampo and Sinpo harbors. The challenge
remains to advance such sanctions from being merely annoying to the regime
to actually deterring malicious behavior. Achieving behavioral change will
require greater attention to the financing networks on which the regime relies,
notably subaltern trade and offshore capital. 54 Unfortunately, as the ineffective
enforcement on sanctions of marine traffic to the DPRK demonstrates, as
long as offshore capital remains outside sanctions enforcement and insurance
providers are not pursued through financial measures, the regime will not
likely change its behavior.
Three potential avenues exist for governments to address the challenge
posed by offshore capital. First, they could target any banks or financial
50 Daniel Wertz, “The Evolution of Financial Sanctions on North Korea,” North Korean Review 9, no. 2
(2013): 69–82.
51 Ibid.
52 Rachel L. Loeffler, “Bank Shots: How the Financial System Can Isolate Rogues,” Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2009, 101–10.
53 Aaron Arnold, “The True Costs of Financial Sanctions,” Survival 58, no. 3 (2016): 77–100.
54 Saul B. Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2008).
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firms that are known to have a connection to North Korean capital flows.
Tracking the DPRK accounts themselves may be difficult, but as the Banco
Delta Case demonstrates, it is possible to pursue such actions. Second,
governments could target the marine owners, managers, and insurance
providers that operate vessels bound for the DPRK. Payments must be made
to the owners and managers of vessels entering North Korean ports, and if
governments identified and targeted this revenue stream, their enforcement
of sanctions would be much more effective. Finally, governments could target
offshore intermediaries like Orion House that profit from setting up holding
companies. In all three policy options, the target would not be the DPRK itself
but the flow of money from the regime to third parties.
If the international community is to continue to employ financial
sanctions against the Kim regime as a deterrent to nuclear proliferation or
human rights abuses, these connections to offshore capital must be addressed
in a way that impedes capital flows between the regime and vessel owners.
Measures that simply target the regime itself have not proved effective. The
human rights crisis in the DPRK may be beyond imagination, but it is not
beyond resolve. Effectively addressing this crisis, as well as North Korea’s
growing nuclear weapons program, requires actions that expose the links
to broader networks of subaltern capital. The failure to do so will enable the
Kim regime’s survival and the North’s continued violation of human rights
and nuclearization.
[ 152 ]

asia policy, number 23 (January 2017), 153–73
• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •
book review roundtable
Minxin Pei’s
China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016
ISBN: 978-0-6747-3729-7 (cloth)
Yan Sun
David Bachman
Nicholas Calcina Howson
Minxin Pei
© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

asia policy
China’s Crony Capitalism: More Than Property Rights
Yan Sun
Minxin Pei’s excellent new book China’s Crony Capitalism: The
Dynamics of Regime Decay makes several important contributions
to the fields of China studies, political economy, and comparative politics.
It invigorates the debates about the viability of China’s model of economic
development and political system, develops a host of analytical concepts
and tools for the study of crony capitalism, and provides a comprehensive
and well-documented analysis of the evolution and nature of China’s crony
capitalism in the post-Tiananmen era.
Each of these contributions deserves further elaboration and acclamation,
but for the purposes of this review, it would be more useful to critically
assess Pei’s arguments. The core argument advanced in the book rests on
the connection between corruption and partial public property reforms as
the defining features of China’s crony capitalism. Decentralizing the rights
of control over state assets without clarifying the rights of ownership, Pei
argues, has provided those who govern those assets with “opportunities
and incentives” for stealing undervalued state-owned assets (pp. 29, 34).
Radical decentralization of administrative authority, moreover, has granted
officials new discretionary powers, thus creating “capacity” and “means” for
plundering state assets (p. 34). The mechanisms for performing these activities
include “vertical collusion” among superiors and subordinates, “horizontal
collusion” among insiders in state agencies, and “outsider-insider collusion”
between officials and private businesspeople (pp. 37–43).
The above framework is crisp and brilliant but overstretched, achieving
analytical clarity at the expense of empirical complexity. Incomplete property
reforms certainly facilitated the theft of state assets both quantitatively and
qualitatively, but with or without public property or its incomplete reform,
many forms of crony capitalism covered (and not covered) in the book would
still exist, given China’s current political setting. In all those forms, the
common denominator is unchecked public power—or to partially borrow
Pei’s term, ambiguous ownership rights over public power, not just over public
properties. Regardless of property ownership rights in statutes, the execution
of public policies and laws will always entail decision-making and the
yan sun is a Professor of Political Science at Queens College and the Graduate Center, City University
of New York. She can be reached .
[ 154 ]

ook review roundtable • china’s crony capitalism
discretionary powers of individual officials. It is the checks and limits on these
powers that make a difference. In Asia alone, crony capitalism has existed in
states from East to Southeast Asia without having anything to do with public
ownership per se. Pei’s analytical prism of incomplete property reforms is too
narrow to capture the range and dynamics of China’s crony capitalism or its
corruption in general.
First, Pei’s model cannot account for all forms of crony capitalism
in China and arguably not even all those treated in his own study. His
framework does a superb job of explaining collusive corruption in areas
directly involving state assets, such as land use, property development,
mining, and state-owned enterprises. But it is less convincing in areas not
directly involving state assets, such as public offices for sale, collusion with
organized crime, and abuse of judiciary or regulatory power. The linkage of
offices for sale to partial property rights, Pei argues, is that the practice binds
subordinates to a network of “vertical collusion” with superiors, who must
secure their cooperation in the delivery of favors to private businessmen
(p. 79). However, Pei does not show any direct evidence of this linkage,
basing the claim mainly on the fact that officials disciplined for the sale of
office also engaged in bribe extraction in other areas. But there are many
ways superiors can induce collusion from subordinates, including sharing
spoils and reciprocating favors. In fact, few subordinates would conceivably
pass up on opportunities to curry favor with superiors by cooperating.
In other forms of crony capitalism that do not directly involve state
assets the linkage to unclear property rights seems even weaker. Of those
covered in the book, official collusion with the mafia is attributed to the
irresistible opportunities created by changes in property rights for the mafia
to expand into high-profit sectors, which necessitates political protection,
while the abuse of judiciary and regulatory powers is blamed on the
ecosystem of crony capitalism created by partial property rights reforms. But
in all these forms, the culprit remains unchecked public power. In addition,
several important areas of corruption that are not covered in this book but
that concern the public directly may have little linkage to public property
reforms or crony capitalism—for example, corruption in the healthcare
sector (such as overuse of expensive interventions and medicines), the
education sector (such as admission to choice elementary and secondary
schools), vehicle administration (vehicle registration and traffic violations),
and the financial sector (loans and stock markets). In each case here, the
key causes are monetary incentives, on the one hand, and meager regulatory
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force over the discretionary power of administrators and professionals, on
the other.
Second, Pei dismisses regional dynamics, arguing that a majority and
a variety of provinces are represented in his data. On closer look, even in
his own data, regional dynamics are an important cause and characteristic
of China’s crony capitalism and corruption. Here the key dynamics are the
reach of the state: the weaker the central state, the more corrupt the local
state and local officials. By Pei’s own account, the party secretary at the
county level is especially impressive in generating income from corruption
despite his moderate status in the hierarchy of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) (p. 86). He is right to suggest that this is because the county
chief is at the front line of the party-state and has abundant opportunities to
extract bribes. But this point needs to go further.
The importance of the county level and state power can be appreciated
from the CCP’s earlier success in bringing the state to the county level and
below. Traditionally the landed gentry and powerful clans dominated here,
serving to inhibit the reach of the state beyond urban areas. The imperial
courts and the republican regimes barely had any organizational structure
and staffing below the county level, eventually driving the mistreated and
unprotected peasantry to the Communist movement. Upon coming to
power, the CCP managed to wipe out the long-standing state weakness
in the countryside. But this strength has been eroded by the recent
decentralization of administrative power, leaving the county and prefectural
levels (and below) the weakest links in the reach of the state (a prefecture is a
collection of counties). The chu-rank cadre—the highest official rank at the
county and prefectural levels and at the bureau level in urban areas—may be
said to actually run China. These officials are at the forefront of governing
their jurisdictional turf, while those at higher ranks are more removed from
direct governance and rule more or less through the chu-rank cadre.
Pei’s own data bears out these patterns, although he does not relate
them to regional dynamics. Of the 50 cases of public office for sale that he
documents, the two major groups of offenders were party secretaries in
countries and prefectures (62%) and bureau chiefs in state agencies (18%),
totaling 80% of the cases (p. 81). Not incidentally, Anhui, a poor province,
accounts for the largest share of the reported cases (18%). Of an incomplete
list of law-enforcement chiefs sentenced for criminal activities cited by Pei,
50% were chiefs of prefectural and county bureaus of public security and
39% were deputy chiefs of such bureaus, totaling 89% (p. 185).
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In Pei’s data on official collusion with the criminal underground and
local mafia states, the affected provinces and cities also point to regional
dynamics. As previous studies have found, a host of localized and structural
factors have led to the rise of organized crime in post-Mao China, including
historical traditions of secret and gang societies, industrial downsizing and
massive unemployment, economic inequality and relative deprivation, and
finally political corruption. Thus, a mix of local traditions and contemporary
transitional woes may explain organized crime and local mafia states in the
central, southeastern, and southwestern provinces in Pei’s data, while the
collapse of the heavy industrial economy may explain those problems in the
three northeastern provinces. To ignore the different mix of local dynamics
simply because many provinces have been affected by similar problems is both
to understate the complexity of local causes and to overstate national patterns.
Third, the industries with well-defined ownership rights—cited by
Pei as relatively immune from crony capitalism—are also affected, albeit
in ways unaccounted for in the model. These include retail, light industry,
and high-tech industries in the nonstate sector. One way they are affected
by crony capitalism is through the receipt printing system. Regulatory
agencies require that formal sales receipts be printed from authorized
systems (requiring special software and printers), which must be purchased
from authorized dealers, who in turn are usually cronies of bureau officials.
Official receipts are imperative for payment, accounting purposes, and—for
export companies—tax rebates. The official receipt systems are frequently
updated, requiring firms to buy new versions periodically. For export
companies, there is the additional trouble of buying official software to go
through customs procedures online, with annual fees totaling thousands
of yuan. Again, the authorized dealers are usually cronies of the regulatory
agencies. Extra levies such as these have become routine and are taken
for granted as part of doing business, but they place undue financial and
procedural burdens on private firms.
Overall, Pei is right to argue that the party’s interests lie in the
self-perpetuation of its power, but China’s Crony Capitalism offers little direct
evidence for the assertion that crony capitalism has become the purpose
and foundation of such power. The foundation of the party’s power is
indeed tied to state ownership of public property, but in a way different from
that argued by Pei. The legitimacy of the CCP as a Communist party that
represents public interests rests on its claims to socialism, but without public
property ownership there would be no socialism or ideological basis for the
party’s legitimacy. The CCP has yet to find ways to effectively supervise the
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administration of public properties as well as other spheres of public power.
This problem is rooted in the public’s lack of rights over state power through
specific mechanisms of political representation and oversight over that
power. That is, the CCP appoints itself as the political representative of the
Chinese people and the overseer of its own power apparatus.
For the time being, China’s crony capitalism is varied enough
hierarchically to make the party appear to be standing upright. The
party’s crackdown on the “tigers,” or high-level offenders, has restored
much credibility to the regime. Yet ironically, it is the “flies,” or low-level
offenders, who have proved difficult to crack down on and require more
than top-down political campaigns to rein in.
China Is Corrupt, but There Is More to the Story
David Bachman
Minxin Pei’s China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay
is a major contribution, likely to significantly influence discussions
about China and its future. He argues that China’s political economy is
characterized by crony capitalism, manifest in collusion between political
and business elites, leading to the fundamental decay of China’s Leninist
system in its late stages. Moreover, the legacy of crony capitalism bodes
poorly for a post-Leninist democratic regime in China.
There is much in this work with which I agree. Yet I have some major
areas of disagreement as well. Pei uses a principal-agent framework
to make his argument. In this framework, he sees lower-level officials
(agents) unresponsive to the norms and incentives established by the
upper levels of the political system (the principals). The agents use their
ability to control and distort information as well as the limited time and
resources the principals have to monitor their subordinates to evade
central directives and expectations. It is certainly clear from the cases that
david bachman is the Henry M. Jackson Professor of International Studies at the University of
Washington. He can be reached at .
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ook review roundtable • china’s crony capitalism
Pei uses as evidence that there is a great deal of corruption in the Chinese
political system. But does this mean that the principals are helpless or that
local officials are unresponsive to the incentives established by the center?
Corruption may be endemic, but is it the whole story or even the most
important part of the story?
A significant amount of research has been undertaken suggesting
that at least officials who want to rise to higher positions are responsive
to upper-level incentives emphasizing economic growth targets, as well
social stability and (perhaps until very recently) population control. While
corruption has been a characteristic of party-state rule, so too has growth.
Moreover, some of the activities that Pei sees as endemic corruption may
also be critical to growth. As one study argued, higher land sales in one year
correlate with higher transportation infrastructure spending in following
years, which are correlated with higher growth. Higher transportation
infrastructure spending is also correlated with higher land prices in
subsequent years. 1 The allocation of land, insider trading, and “takings” of
land from rural communities may all be deeply corrupt activities and an
inefficient allocation of scarce resources. But it is not clear that this is as
predatory and rapacious as Pei suggests, nor is it clear that the results are
not in keeping with overall central (and regime) goals.
The principal-agent framework originates from writings in institutional
economics and, as with many economic models, assumes that actors are
maximizing their preferences or utilities. In this book, it appears that Pei
believes that corrupt actors in the Chinese system are maximizing their
income and/or power. But as I have suggested above, one might be both
corrupt and advancing broader goals. Consider several cases. Mu Suixin was
mayor of Shenyang before he was toppled in 2001, having been implicated in
a bribery ring exercised by a local criminal element (p. 246). But Mu was also
seen as an up-and-comer. He was featured on a PBS documentary, China in
the Red, and he gave extensive access to the camera crew. He was portrayed
as decisive, working hard to cope with Shenyang’s unemployment problems,
at least until his arrest (also covered in the documentary). Presumably, he
received approval from the Liaoning provincial party committee to have his
work so publicly covered. Indeed, PBS access to Mu may have been approved
by the party center. He was corrupt, but he also was seen as trying to meet
popular demands and respond to central directives.
1 Jing Wu, Yongheng Deng, Jun Huang, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yin Yeung, “Incentives and
Outcomes: China’s Environmental Policy,” Center on Capitalism and Society 9, no. 1 (2014).
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In a similar vein, we might view the situation of Bo Xilai, the former
party secretary of Chongqing Municipality who was tried and convicted for
corruption (and whose wife was convicted in the murder of a British citizen).
Bo also appears to have challenged the leadership arrangement made for
the 18th Party Congress, culminating in Xi Jinping’s ascendency. Bo is
mocked for his attempts to revive “red songs and dances,” but he was an
innovative leader in Chongqing, trying to address issues related to housing
and the hukou (urban residency) system, cracking down on corruption,
and narrowing differences between urban and rural areas. Some of these
policies and experiments were drawing national attention.
The point of these two examples is not to excuse the corruption or
to deny its existence. It is to suggest that there may be more to Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) governance than simply corruption. Overall
party goals can be advanced despite (and maybe because of) corruption.
One can be corrupt and still responsive to overall incentives coming from
above. Moreover, as many quantitative studies of lower-level leadership
(below the Central Committee) suggest, 2 those who rise fastest in the
political hierarchy are those who create the most economic growth.
Obviously for a prefectural party chief to advance to the provincial level,
that person needs to produce rapid growth. That growth is a reflection
of growth rates of the prefecture (composed of subordinate county and
county-level city units). Thus, the prefectural head needs the county party
heads to produce growth that is part of the aggregate prefectural totals.
He or she may allow the county heads to buy their positions, but if the
prefectural head is ambitious, he or she also needs the lower levels to
produce results in keeping with central incentives.
Pei argues that corruption has reached unprecedented levels, involving
more people and more money than ever before. Certainly, the sums involved
and numbers of people implicated in particular corrupt networks are huge.
He sees this as a decisive indicator of the late-stage decay of a Leninist
regime, with the party-state as increasingly rapacious and predatory. Here,
I think he makes a mistake that many who write on corruption do—they
focus on money. But the currency of Leninist systems is power. In the Mao
period there was little monetary corruption because of the overall levels of
2 For example, Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The
Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China,” Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005): 1743–62;
Li Han and James Kai-Sing Kung, “Fiscal Incentives and Policy Choices of Local Governments:
Evidence from China,” Journal of Development Economics 116 (2015): 89–115; and Pierre Landry,
Decentralized Authoritarianism in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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poverty, the planned economy, and limited consumer goods. Yet, abuse of
power was rampant; discretionary authority could extract “favors”—such
as sex in exchange for recommendations to attend university in the case of
local cadres and sent-down youth—or when quotas came down for people
to purge, officials would purge individuals whom they disliked. Mao and
his allies would complain repeatedly about his opponents setting up
independent kingdoms unresponsive to his concerns. The decade of the
Cultural Revolution, one would have to say, was not a period when China
was ruled by an effective Leninist system, as factionalism was pervasive. So
we might ask, when was the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ruled by an
effective Leninist party apparatus? If Pei is to argue that China can no longer
be seen as a Leninist state, we should ask, when was it ever an archetypical
Leninist state? And if its record as a Leninist state is at best spotty, what
makes the current situation one characterized as late-stage decay?
Moreover, if Pei is correct and the PRC is in late-stage decay, it seems
that this stage might be quite long. His database of 260 corruption cases
covers 25 years, containing examples starting in 1990 and continuing
through 2015. This is more than a third of the existence of the PRC. Throw
in the Cultural Revolution, and more than half of the history of the PRC
has been characterized by the failure of Leninism to be institutionalized.
If that is the case, doesn’t this suggest that we may need to think about the
trajectory of CCP rule in different ways?
Finally, I would question Pei’s characterization of the Chinese state
as predatory. The classic case of a predatory state in the literature on
comparative politics is Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) under
Mobutu Sese Seku. A land rich in resources saw no growth, and almost all
wealth created ended up in the hands of Mobutu and his cronies in Swiss
bank accounts. Yes, there is rapacious and predatory behavior in China,
but a predatory state could not deliver the kinds of economic growth and
rise of income standards that have characterized China since the onset of
the reform program. As Pei notes, much of the crony capitalism he finds
concerns land use, mines, and state-owned enterprises. But these are
likely to be diminishing sectors of economic activity, and some informed
observers see the market triumphing over the political system. 3
Minxin Pei argues in China’s Crony Capitalism that the Communist
state in China is nearing its expiration date. He extensively documents
3 Nicholas R. Lardy, Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China (Washington, D.C.:
Peterson Institute of International Economics, 2014).
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and theoretically articulates how corruption is bringing about the fall of
Communist power. I agree that the CCP faces an expiration date, and that
corruption is part of the story. Yet I think there is much more to that story
as well and that corruption is not quite as problematic as Pei sees it.
A Partial View of China’s Governance Trajectory
Nicholas Calcina Howson
Minxin Pei’s new book China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics
of Regime Decay recites in detail the morass of corruption and
collusion in which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) party-state finds
itself. Encyclopedic in scope, the book addresses corruption, extraction, and
network formation in many of modern China’s formal settings—including
in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the nomenklatura system, state
institutions, enterprises, the investment sector, and the real property
market, among others—but also in nonformal contexts such as the rise of
the “local mafia state.” The book’s basic storyline is this: the PRC’s radical
devolution of intertwined political power and governance authority over
productive assets in the early 1990s, matched with the accelerating creation
of property rights, delivered on the party’s mission to lift China out of
poverty and create sustained economic development. It did so, however, at
the cost of generating uniquely harmful incentive structures and resulting
extractive and efficiency-defeating behavior that has contributed to
regime decay and the frustration of any future advance to democratic and
rule-of-law governance structures.
Passionate as the book is, there are aspects that detract significantly
from its power and coherence. This review identifies three of those aspects:
the data under examination, the theoretical framework, and the extended
concluding argument of the book.
The first aspect is the data employed and how it is used. Pei’s study
is largely based on 260 cases of party discipline (and rarely criminal
nicholas calcina howson is a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School.
He can be reached at .
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prosecution) culled from the state media over several decades—ranging
from semi-autonomous sources like Caixin to party-state propaganda
organs such as the People’s Daily and Xinhua. The limited data set
employed in the book and its origins have at least three implications.
First, the substance of the book is largely determined by data originating
from central-level propaganda and thus only rarely captures central-level
party-state misdeeds. This would not be a negative if the data could be
controlled for the fact that it is rife with often unproven (and some, in my
knowledge, untrue) allegations deemed essential to a propaganda campaign
or political attack. Second, there is a concern as to how representative these
cases are of the different contexts prevailing in China today and over a
period of more than three decades. Third, while Pei cautions readers that
the data he invokes is not representative, he nonetheless draws rather robust
conclusions based on such data. One example can be seen in chapter 3:
Even though the fifty cases…in the sample were not randomly
chosen, they provide useful clues for understanding how
this form of collusion [maiguan maiguan] is carried out.
Geographically, the fifty cases are drawn from twenty-two
provinces, indicating the prevalence of this practice. Nine
cases are from Anhui, a poor province with a high incidence of
maiguan maiguan, at least according to press reports. Henan, a
relatively poor agrarian province, and Guangdong, the booming
manufacturing powerhouse, have five cases each. Hainan and
Shandong have three cases each. As the sample includes both
poor and prosperous regions, it appears that this practice exists in
regions at all levels of economic development, although, without
more data, it is impossible to determine its exact distribution
(pp. 80–81, emphasis added).
In essence, this passage states that because the limited sample of
50 cases includes an equal number of 5 cases from poor Henan Province
and rich Guangdong Province, “it appears that this practice exists in
regions at all levels of economic development.” Or does the caveat in the
final clause deny that? This conclusion touches on a key question for
development scholars—the relationship between economic development
and governance—but is rendered on data that social scientists may find
problematic for the reasons discussed above.
While I appreciate the attempt to theorize the phenomenon of
collusive capitalism, the book’s second shortcoming concerns some of the
assumptions supporting its theoretical analysis. For instance, Pei points out
repeatedly that crony capitalism was not observed in China until the 1990s.
This is true, but that is because the “capitalism” side of crony capitalism did
not exist in China before that time. “Cronyism” instead occurred then in
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the embrace of a centrally planned, state-controlled economy. This telling,
therefore, confuses an ex post development (reform and opening to the
outside world) for something in the long-term status quo ante (elite collusion
and cronyism) stretching back through the entirety of the CCP party-state
and indeed Chinese history.
A second example is the frequent connection Pei makes between
“authoritarian” governance and crony capitalism, overcorrelating two
independent variables. In fact, the book refutes any asserted link between
an authoritarian regime and the rise of cronyism. As stated throughout
the book, the move that enabled cronyism in reform-era China is the early
1990s devolution of political and economic power away from the center of
authoritarian rule and the resulting dilution and fragmentation of national,
or unitary, authoritarian governance. This is precisely the reason the PRC’s
current administrative “center” is now so intent on recovering aspects of
authoritarian rule.
Third, Pei’s theoretical framework does not give adequate consideration
to alternative ways in which the political, economic, and societal
mechanisms he describes might work. For example, chapter 2, “The Soil of
Crony Capitalism,” outlines the party nomenklatura system of personnel
appointments and correctly notes how it tracks onto board and senior
executive positions at corporatized state-owned enterprises (SOE). Pei’s
conclusions about this phenomenon fail to take account of an alternative
story: how the nomenklatura infiltration of enterprise appointments might
make the people in these jobs more accountable than they were historically
as managers of SOEs, given that financial performance, personal civil
or criminal penalties, or other failures (e.g., a declining stock price) will
directly hamper their advancement inside the party. As a final example,
when Pei theorizes the origins of the PRC’s crony capitalism, he identifies as
critical a “lack of clarity” or “vagueness” of underlying property rights, by
which he means the separation of formal “ownership” from use, profit-share,
and disposition of nonresidual use rights (see, for example, pp. 180–82). Few
observers, I think, would agree that there is a lack of clarity with respect to
the residual ownership rights retained by the party-state with respect to any
of the situations that the book invokes. Instead, the abiding issue in China
today is about the “contest” over those well-understood rights.
The last of the book’s limitations I focus on here is in the extended
argument that surfaces in the conclusion as follows: The PRC’s program
of reform and opening to the outside world in the 1980s, the creation and
distribution of property rights in the 1980s and 1990s, and the subsequent
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devolution of party-state power and control of state assets in the 1990s
and early 2000s allowed China to experience unprecedented growth
while simultaneously creating sufficient conditions for the descent into
crony capitalism; that crony capitalism has permanently undermined the
party-state’s legitimacy and effectiveness and thus contributed to the terminal
decay of the CCP regime; the party’s decline can only be reversed by the
introduction of democratic accountability and the rule of law; and yet crony
capitalism itself creates a strong path dependency that will frustrate any
attempt to advance political reform or allow the CCP regime to save itself.
First, a threshold problem in this concluding argument is that the book’s
analysis is directed toward an end state called “democracy.” Instead of setting
up crony capitalism as a serious obstacle to good governance, it makes the
easier move of positioning crony capitalism as a block to democracy and
Western-style rule of law. Democracy could alternatively be seen as one means
to a distinct end: legitimate and accountable state governance and sustainable
economic growth, all delivered with a minimum of cronyism.
Second, as with every other state managing the transition from a
state-owned, centrally planned economy to a market economy built around
the exchange of property rights, the always-fraught step in this process is
the distribution of newly created property rights into the hands of those who
will wield those rights. There is no nation in history that has accomplished
the creation and distribution of property rights into a developing market
without initially putting them predominantly into the hands of, or having
those rights opportunistically seized by, incumbent insiders, state officials,
oligarchs, and so forth, especially when political reform is not enacted
simultaneously. This distribution of, and contest over, newly crafted property
rights is the sine qua non of creating even a semi-market-based economic
system, given the structure out of which the PRC and developmentally
similar states seek to transition. The only other available mechanism for
the PRC was shock privatization, with the immediate distribution of all
property rights and assets into non-party-state hands. That process for the
PRC almost certainly would have created even more intense dysfunction,
criminality, and ultimately political instability.
Third, concomitant processes over the past 30 years might be understood
as a remedy for the unilateral descent to regime collapse. These include, among
others, what the PRC calls “legal system construction,” a socialist-sounding
term for the creation of substantive law and regulation and the governance
institutions necessary for implementation and enforcement of those new
state norms. One view of development is that over time, and even without
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basic political system change, the increased viability of and traction gained
by these legal and governance institutions will temper and mostly defeat the
phase of unbridled cronyism, which as I note above is a necessary, if ugly,
initial stage for the creation and distribution of property rights under law,
leading eventually to the establishment of commodity markets and long-term
development. The failure to acknowledge these mutually interacting processes
is a significant problem for the book, for China’s Crony Capitalism does not
look beyond the abundant indicia of cronyism or consider the reality of
concomitant institutional development. True evaluation of the existence of
the alternative development path that I suggest is underway in the PRC today
requires serious inquiry into how the PRC’s legal and regulatory system
and associated governance institutions work, and how they work differently
over time and in radically different environments in China. If Pei does see
this other part of the PRC’s development narrative, he seems to be arguing
that it is not sufficient to arrest regime decay, and that true development with
continued regime legitimacy requires the accountability promised only by a
mix of democracy and rule of law. 1
1 For an important analysis of how China’s economic growth both prods and results from observable
institutional change, thus providing concrete indicia not just of regime decay but also of enhanced
regime legitimacy, see Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2016).
Author’s Response:
A Corruption Market More Sophisticated Than You Think
Minxin Pei
The criticisms and comments of the three distinguished participants in
this roundtable cover a wide range of issues, and it is impossible to
address all of them here. In the space below, I respond to three main concerns
about China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay raised
minxin pei is the Tom and Margot Pritzker ‘72 Professor of Government and George R. Roberts
Fellow and Director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna
College. He can be reached at .
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in their reviews: (1) theoretical framework and arguments, (2) empirical
evidence and interpretation, and (3) implications of the findings.
Theoretical Framework and Arguments
The book’s main theoretical contribution is to offer an institutional
explanation for the emergence of a particular type of corruption—collusive
corruption perpetuated mainly to enable political and business elites to
loot nominally state-owned assets at steep discounts or no cost. It traces
the rise of this type of looting to a series of changes in China’s property
rights regime in the post-Tiananmen era that significantly decentralized
control rights without clarifying ownership rights. The main theoretical
argument itself is straightforward. In the context of other significant
decentralizing institutional changes that have granted local-level officials
enormous discretion (most critically power over personnel appointments),
the combination of decentralized control rights and unclear ownership
rights (or, strictly speaking, the absence of real owners) creates an
ideal environment for political and business elites to collude and loot
valuable assets such as land, mining resources, and assets in state-owned
enterprises (SOE). Collusion is necessitated by both the decentralization of
control rights (with multiple officials empowered with approval authority)
and unclear ownership (which attracts multiple claimants). The same
logic and institutional conditions also apply to the widespread collusive
corruption in infrastructure investments.
This theoretical framework offers an original explanation for the rise of
collusive looting in the post-Tiananmen era. It does not, however, claim to
explain all forms of corruption, as Yan Sun implies. The type of corruption
she identifies is best characterized as garden-variety theft or petty corruption,
not looting. So the analytical framework centered on property rights does not
explain garden-variety theft. But how do we account for the rise of collusion
in corrupt activities that do not involve the looting of state-owned assets? In
the book, there are three sets of cases where property rights are not directly
involved: the purchase and sale of public office, collusion between law
enforcement and organized crime (although in at least 20% of the cases crime
bosses gained undervalued land and mines with the help of local officials),
and collusive corruption in courts and regulatory agencies. It is instructive
to note that in these cases the median corruption income of the chief
official perpetrator ranges between 510,000 and 760,000 yuan—a fraction
of the median corruption income of the chief official perpetrator colluding
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with businessmen (9.5 million yuan) and the median corruption income
of the chief perpetrator of collusive corruption in SOEs (6.4 million yuan)
(pp. 120 and 155). The huge disparity in corruption income confirms the
importance of property: officials engaged in garden-variety theft get paid for
services, whereas those engaged in collusive looting are rewarded much more
handsomely for obtaining undervalued or costless public assets.
The purchase and sale of public office constitute a critical linkage in the
formation of collusive networks in the Chinese political system. Sun does
not believe that China’s Crony Capitalism provides evidence showing that
party chiefs sold offices to subordinates explicitly to facilitate their corrupt
activities (including doling out undervalued state-owned assets to their
business cronies). This is not true. Of course, due to the limited information
revealed in the official media and court documents, it is impossible to build
an overwhelming case demonstrating this connection. Nevertheless, two
pieces of evidence support this conclusion. Some cases included in the
book show that the party bosses (or chief perpetrators) took bribes from
subordinates who later did their bidding. In addition, the majority of officials
(86%) caught for engaging in selling public offices also engaged in collusion
with private businessmen, while 68% of officials caught for colluding with
businessmen sold public offices—two telling indications of the connection
between the practice of buying and selling public office and collusion
between officials and businessmen (pp. 82 and 121). Sun’s suggestion that
subordinates would have gladly done favors for their party chiefs regardless
of whether they had bribed these officials to be appointed or promoted may
sound reasonable. However, for a party chief, asking someone who owes
him no favor to perform an illegal act would be far too risky. By contrast,
a subordinate who has paid a bribe is someone he can trust with such tasks.
The spread of collusion to law enforcement, courts, and regulatory
agencies is driven by two dynamics, both of which are identified in the
book even though they are not related to property rights. The first dynamic
is the pervasive practice of buying and selling offices, which results in the
formation of corruption networks in these institutions and creates the
dynamic of “bad money driving out good money.” The second dynamic is
the intrinsic attractiveness of collusion, such as greater protection and profit
potential established by the existing literature.
David Bachman questions whether the central Chinese state is helpless
in combating collusion by its agents. Frankly, this is not the issue the
book investigates. However, the sorry record of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) in fighting corruption by its own agents shows that, at least in
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the current institutional setting, the regime has great difficulty aligning the
interests of its agents with its own or devising the right incentives. To be
sure, the principal (the CCP) may be able to monitor and discipline a small
number of top-level elites more effectively. However, as Sun suggests, the
lower-level officials (or “flies”) present bigger challenges to the principal.
Here, I disagree with Sun’s assessment of the principal’s capacity to discipline
its agents. It is too early to conclude that Xi Jinping’s fight against corruption
“has restored much credibility to the regime.” As for campaign-style efforts
to combat corruption, the CCP has launched countless campaigns in the
past, all ultimately ineffectual. Unless the CCP allows a freer media, reduces
its role in the economy, or builds a more independent legal system, an
approach that relies on campaigns will not likely succeed in destroying the
corruption networks that have colonized the party-state.
Nicholas Howson is skeptical of the argument that crony capitalism
emerged only in the post-Tiananmen era because he thinks there was no
“capitalism” in the pre-Tiananmen era. This is not true, however—capitalist
private enterprise emerged in the 1980s and had become a dynamic force in
China by the end of the decade. To be sure, cronyism existed in the sense
that the state’s deep and extensive involvement in the economy generated
rent-seeking. However, in the 1980s there was no large-scale looting of
state-owned assets, whereas such looting has become commonplace in
the post-Tiananmen era. In addition, Howson believes that the book
overcorrelates “authoritarian governance” and crony capitalism while
refuting “any asserted link between an authoritarian regime and the rise
of cronyism.” What I in fact argue is that, while crony capitalism (defined
as collusion between political and business elites) can exist in any political
regime, the most rapacious form of crony capitalism is likely to emerge in
an authoritarian regime, in which the ruling elites enjoy unchecked power
(a point made by Sun) and can use such power to loot the property under
their control.
Howson also claims that one of the flaws of China’s Crony Capitalism
is that it “does not give adequate consideration to alternative ways in which
the political economic and societal mechanisms” described might work. He
argues, for example, that the enormous discretion given to SOE executives
might make them more “accountable.” The evidence compiled in the book,
the abysmal financial performance by SOEs, and stories of massive looting
inside SOEs recently revealed in China’s anticorruption campaign all
indicate that such discretion has not made executives accountable. Howson
also claims that “few observers…would agree that there is a lack of clarity
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with respect to the residual ownership rights retained by the party-state.”
The opposite is most likely the case. Few observers would agree that there
is any clarity of the residual ownership rights. Because a party-state is a
regime, not an individual, its purported ownership rights in reality can be
seized by its agents who temporarily exercise direct control over these rights.
Indeed, where such clarity exists, as in the case of corporations with real
private owners (whether Chinese or Western), the type of looting observed
in Chinese SOEs is rare, if nonexistent.
Empirical Evidence and Interpretation of Data
Studying corruption presents an enormous empirical challenge to
researchers because the behavior is hidden and unobservable. Collecting
a totally random sample of corruption cases is thus impossible, since
some kind of selection bias is inevitable. Indeed, all empirical studies on
corruption have to rely on two sets of data—surveys of perceptions of
corruption and information released by public authorities (in this case,
the Chinese party-state). Survey data may tell us how the public at large
perceives the degree of corruption, but it reveals little else. Information
provided by public authorities has its own limitations. In the case of China,
the government may choose to release information on some cases but
not on others. For instance, the CCP provides scant details of corruption
perpetuated by its senior leaders. The party also discloses relatively sparse
information about ministers, provincial party chiefs, and governors arrested
for corruption. This is the main reason that the cases of corruption used in
the book involve mostly local-level officials (city and county).
Besides the selection bias attributed to Chinese authorities, another
problem is the reliability of the information that these authorities allow to be
released. In a regime where investigations of officials accused of corruption
are never transparent, official allegations, whether true or untrue, cannot be
proved. Howson states that information released by official sources is “rife
with often unproven (and some, in my knowledge, untrue) allegations.” He
suggests that the “data can be controlled for” such a fact—without letting us
know how “control” can be performed. To the extent that nobody can separate
truth from falsehood in such data, such control is simply not feasible.
Faced with such limitations on the availability and reliability of
data, researchers have two choices. One is not to touch the subject at all.
The other is to recognize the inherent limitations of the data and treat
it with caution. Obviously, most researchers working on corruption
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have rejected the first option. In using official sources, my method was
to collect a sufficient number of cases to ascertain both the quantitative
and qualitative aspects of collusive corruption. Because of the inherent
selection bias (in this case, I had to rely on cases prosecuted by the CCP’s
discipline and inspection committees at various levels), the quantitative
findings must be treated as estimates reached with best efforts. Even when
we account for such limitations, the quantitative findings of the book
suggest that such estimates may not be far off the mark. For example, the
estimates of the average size of a corruption network, of the relationship
between the rank of officials and their corruption income, of detection risk,
and of the disparity between the value that the corruption market places
on protection service and undervalued public assets all appear to be quite
plausible. While conceding the limitations of the data, I think a reasonable
position is that the quantitative findings from this data set should be taken
seriously until we have better data.
Even more useful, in my judgment, are the qualitative findings obtained
from the analysis of the data set. Previous research on corruption in China
not only overlooks its collusive aspect but also does not provide a sufficiently
rich description of such activities. Careful examinations of the patterns of
behavior in the cases of collusive corruption that were included in the data set
have yielded illuminating details that help us understand how the corruption
market in China works. For instance, we now have a better idea of how local
officials finance their purchases of public office (mainly through theft and
sometimes with the help of private businessmen). We have also learned how
gift giving, dining, and socialization facilitate the establishment of access to
officials, as well as how corruption networks unravel.
As the bulk of the cases involve local officials, Sun raises the issue of
“regional dynamics” and posits a different, albeit familiar, argument that
links weaker central control with local corruption. While this argument is
not necessarily wrong, it needs to be established with empirical evidence
that measures the weakness of “the central state.” I agree that this is a
subject worth pursuing, but it is not the objective of the book.
Implications of the Findings
The findings of China’s Crony Capitalism raise several important
issues. Bachman brings up the promotion of local officials in the Chinese
party-state, citing research that tries to establish that performance, not
bribery, influences promotion. Although this body of research has not
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produced conclusive results, I believe it has inherent limitations and also
does not contradict the findings of the book in the case of buying and
selling public offices. First, such research focuses on only mayors and party
chiefs, thus ignoring the vast majority of other officials. In reality, the
officials excluded from such research are the most active buyers in China’s
illicit market for public office (although party chiefs, who normally are
sellers, also become buyers when they seek promotions). Second, given that
the competition for promotion is fierce, that the performance records of
most local party chiefs and mayors may look similar, and that such records
account for only a portion of their overall assessment, officials aspiring to
higher office can improve their chances by currying favor with or directly
bribing their superior party chiefs.
Another issue Bachman raises is the durability of one-party rule in the
context of regime decay. I contend that, to the extent that collusive corruption
is often observed in regimes experiencing late-stage decay, the pervasiveness
of such corruption (roughly 45% of all exposed corruption cases involve
multiple individuals) is an important indicator of an advanced state of decay
(pp. 261–68). How long can a regime in late-stage decay survive? The honest
answer is that nobody knows. The most reasonable answer is that, while
internal corruption is one of the critical factors of the loss of legitimacy
and fall of autocracies, other important variables—including some that are
likely more important, such as economic performance and the unity of the
ruling elites—will also determine the fate of the CCP. The fall of autocracies
is rarely caused by one single factor.
For Howson, there may be processes and developments that parallel
regime decay and offset its destructive impact on one-party rule. Although
he does not point this out explicitly, many observers would agree that one
of the developments—the enormous increase in wealth and standard
of living—both provides the CCP with performance-based legitimacy
and compensates for the economic losses incurred through the looting
by the elites. The example that Howson does provide—“legal system
construction”—is a more questionable one. To be sure, China has made much
progress in constructing a legal system, but this progress is uneven at best. In
terms of the legal system’s capacity to constrain cronyism and looting, there
is no evidence that it is effective in doing so, especially when the looters are
those with political power (and direct control over the legal system).
The most intriguing question raised by Howson is whether the
seizure of public assets by elites and regime insiders is unavoidable in an
economy undergoing fundamental reform of property rights. While we
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must recognize the enormous difficulties in creating clear, secure, and
enforceable property rights in transition economies, it is also reasonable
to argue that regime type is one of the key determinants of whether and
how much the ruling elites can loot. Under similar circumstances, elites
in autocracies can loot more easily and amass more illicit wealth than
in established democracies or states that have made the transition to
democratic governance, as shown by the different observed outcomes of
privatization in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.
On this point, Howson and I have no real disagreement because he also
notes the critical importance of simultaneous political reform, which I take
to mean, in this particular context, democratization and the establishment
of the rule of law.
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asia policy
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