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Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5185

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84 A. Wierzbicki and R. Nielek<br />

Emergence hypothesis holds <strong>in</strong> several cases, but not universally; therefore, we<br />

have <strong>in</strong>vestigated the sensitivity of fairness emergence to various factors that<br />

<strong>in</strong>fluence the quality of the reputation system.<br />

4.1 Fairness Emergence <strong>in</strong> the Long Term<br />

The first studied effect has been the emergence of fairness <strong>in</strong> the long term. In<br />

the simulation experiment, we have measured the G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient and have run<br />

the simulation until the G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient stabilized. This experiment has been<br />

repeated us<strong>in</strong>g three scenarios: <strong>in</strong> the first one, the agents did not use any reputation<br />

system, but selected partners for transactions randomly. In the second<br />

experiment, the reputation system was used, but agents submitted negative reports<br />

with the probability of 0.2. In the third experiment, negative reports have<br />

always been submitted.<br />

The results of the three experiments are shown on Figure 1. The Figure plots<br />

the average G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient of honest agents from 50 simulation runs aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />

the number of turns of the simulation. It can be seen that when agents do<br />

not use the reputation system, the G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient stabilizes for a value that is<br />

almost twice larger than the value of G<strong>in</strong>i that is obta<strong>in</strong>ed when reputation is<br />

used. Furthermore, there is a clear effect of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the frequency of negative<br />

feedbacks: the G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient decreases faster and stabilizes at a lower value<br />

when p− rep = 1 . The <strong>in</strong>itial growth of the G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient from 0 is due to the<br />

fact that at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the simulation, the distribution of honest agent<br />

utilities is equal (dur<strong>in</strong>g the warm-up stage, utilities of agents are not recorded.<br />

All agents start with a zero utility after warm-up completes.)<br />

The result of this experiment seems to be a confirmation of the FE hypothesis.<br />

The distributions of honest agents’ utilities have a lower G<strong>in</strong>i coefficient (and<br />

a higher total sum of utilities) when the reputation system is used. Yet, the<br />

problem here is that <strong>in</strong> realistic auction systems, most agents only have a small<br />

Fig. 1. Fairness Emergence <strong>in</strong> the long term

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