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What Agenda
for Human Security
in the
Twenty-first Century?

What Agenda
for Human Security
in the
Twenty-first Century?

Editors:
UNESCO
Social and Human Sciences Sector
The ideas and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the participants in the
First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions and
do not necessarily reflect the views of UNESCO.
The designations employed throughout the publication do not imply the expression of any
opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country,
territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers
or boundaries.
Any communication concerning this publication may be addressed to:
Ms Moufida Goucha / Ms Claudia Maresia
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
Social and Human Sciences Sector
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15, France
Tel: +33 (0)1 45 68 45 54 / 52
Fax: +33 (0)1 45 68 55 52
E-mail: peace&security@unesco.org
Website: http://www.unesco.org/securipax
First published in 2001 by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization
7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France
Second edition 2005
© UNESCO 2001, 2005
Printed in France

First International Meeting
of Directors of Peace Research
and Training Institutions
What Agenda
for Human Security
in the
Twenty-first Century?
27-28 November 2000
SHS/FPH/PHS/2005/PI/H/3

Contents
Foreword 11
Opening Ceremony 15
Inaugural speech 17
by Mr Koïchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO
read by Mr Ali Kazancigil, Assistant Director-General for Social
and Human Sciences a.i.
Keynote address on the promotion of human security within
the United Nations 21
by Mr Hassen Fodha, Director, United Nations Information
Centre (UNIC), Paris, France
Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen
human security 27
by H.E. Mr Louis Hamel, Ambassador, Permanent Delegate
of Canada to UNESCO
Presentation of the International Year for the Culture of Peace 33
by Mr Enzo Fazzino, Programme Specialist, International Year
for the Culture of Peace, UNESCO
First Round Table
The main challenges facing the promotion of human security
and peace in Africa 37
Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Bertrand Badie, Graduate
Programme Director, Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, France 39
5

Lecturers:
Peace and human security in Africa 43
by Mr Gabriel Siakeu, President, World Association for the School
as an Instrument of Peace (EIP), Yaoundé, Cameroon
Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS 57
by Mr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security
Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa
Second Round Table
The main challenges facing the promotion of human security
and peace in Europe 71
Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Philippe Ratte, Senior
Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO 73
Lecturer:
National, societal and human security: General discussion with
a case study from the Balkans 77
by Mr Bjørn Møller, Former Secretary-General, International
Peace Research Association (IPRA), Copenhagen, Denmark
Third Round Table
The main challenges facing the promotion of human security
and peace in Latin America and the Caribbean 129
Moderator: Ms Kaisa Savolainen, Director, Division for the
Promotion of Quality Education, UNESCO
Lecturers:
Peace, human security and the democratic deficit in Central America 131
by Mr Alejandro Bendaña, President, Centro de Estudios
Internacionales (CEI), Managua, Nicaragua
6

Human security: An academic perspective from Latin America 139
by Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena, Director, Facultad Latino
Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Santiago, Chile
The principal challenges to the promotion of human security
in Latin America and the Caribbean 157
by General Juan Alberto Lezama, Director, Centro de Altos
Estudios Nacionales (CALEN), Montevideo, Uruguay
Fourth Round Table
The main challenges facing the promotion of human security
and peace in the Arab States 169
Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr René Zapata, Director,
Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting,
UNESCO 171
Lecturer:
Challenges to human security in the Middle East 173
by Ms Ghada Ali Moussa, Researcher, National Center for Middle
East Studies (NCMES), Cairo, Egypt
Fifth Round Table
The main challenges facing the promotion of human security
and peace in Asia and the Pacific 185
Moderator: Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos, Assistant Director-General,
‘Priority Africa’ Department, UNESCO
Lecturers:
What perspectives on human security in Asia in the twenty-first
century? Some parallels with Africa 187
by Mr Timothy M. Shaw, Director, Dalhousie University Centre
7

for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada; Visiting Professor, Aalborg
University, Denmark
Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Asia 203
by Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan, Director-General, Bangladesh
Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka,
Bangladesh
Closing Session
Reports on the debates of the five Round Tables: 217
First Round Table, Rapporteur: Mr Mambaelele Mankoto,
Programme Specialist, Division of Ecological Sciences, UNESCO 217
Second Round Table, Rapporteur: Ms Antonella Verdiani, Programme
Specialist, Education for Universal Values Section, UNESCO 218
Third Round Table, Rapporteur: Ms Suzanne Diop, Programme
Specialist, Division for Intercultural Projects, UNESCO 219
Fourth Round Table, Rapporteur: Mr Luis Salamanques, Programme
Specialist, Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO 220
Fifth Round Table, Rapporteur: Mr Quang Nam Thai, Programme
Specialist, Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and
Tolerance, UNESCO 221
Final Recommendations 225
presented by Ms Moufida Goucha, Rapporteur-General
Director, Peace and Human Security Programme
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance,
UNESCO
8

Agenda for Action of the International SecuriPax Network
for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace 231
Appendices
Organizing Committee 235
Programme 237
Working document – The promotion of human security:
The state of play 243
List of participants 249
Bio-sketches of the lecturers 265
The UNESCO SecuriPax Forum 273
UN Resolution A/RES/53/243 of 13 September 1999 – Declaration
and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace 275
UN Resolution A/RES/53/25 of 10 November 1998 – International
Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children
of the World (2001–2010) 289
Other UNESCO publications of interest 293
9

Foreword
by Ms Moufida Goucha
on behalf of the Organizing Committee
Human security is a paradigm in the making, as stressed
in the Final Recommendations of the First International Meeting
of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, which
had as its theme: ‘What Agenda for Human Security in the
Twenty-first Century?’
As the Director-General of UNESCO stated in his
inaugural speech, ‘The theme that has brought you together
today links in with UNESCO’s own proposals for the orientation
of its future activities, since its Draft Medium-Term Strategy for
2002–2007 is entitled “UNESCO – Contributing to peace and
human development in an era of globalization”. In every one of
its fields of competence – education, the sciences, culture and
communication – the Organization will devote all its energies to
helping states to grapple resolutely with the risks and threats
hanging over humanity. Eradication of poverty, preservation of
ecosystems (especially freshwater resources), respect for human
rights and cultural diversity, and promotion of an ethics of
science and technology are among the priorities which
UNESCO has laid down in order to fight this battle. For human
security is a global and inclusive concept. Some of its aspects –
extreme poverty, terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental
degradation, illegal immigration and AIDS – go far beyond
national boundaries. That is why international cooperation is
essential in order to achieve tangible results. We must take action
together without further delay.’
11

The meeting, whose objectives were the following:
(1) to bring together directors of institutions
concerned with peace research and training who are
representative of several countries and regions, in order that they
may present the priorities of their action-oriented research
programmes;
(2) to prompt reflection among them resulting in joint
programmes aimed at promoting peace and human security;
(3) to lay the foundations of steadier cooperation
among such institutions in the form of networks;
(4) to make plans for practical projects, particularly in
the field of education and training for peace and human security,
paying special attention to educational content and to UNESCO
Chairs; had the benefit of the contributions of a number of
eminent specialists from the world’s regions, who gave the key
lectures for each of the round tables. As may be seen, these
lectures, starting out from widely different viewpoints, deal with
the new challenges to be met and suggest new avenues of action
for promoting human security. Our warmest gratitude is hereby
expressed to these specialists for sharing their knowledge and
experience with all the participants, and for allowing the meeting
to draw up its Final Recommendations and to adopt an Agenda
for Action on the basis of an in-depth analysis of major issues to
be dealt with in the near future.
I should also like to take this opportunity to thank all the
other participants who contributed to the success of the meeting:
those from all over the world who made valuable intellectual
contributions to the debates with enthusiasm and conviction, the
moderators, in particular Mr Bertrand Badie who made a major
contribution to the preparation of the launching of the
UNESCO SecuriPax Forum, and last but not least, the
Rapporteurs, representing all UNESCO’s fields of competence.
As this volume comes off the press, the follow-up to the
Recommendations of the First International Meeting of
Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions is well
12

under way, in particular with a view to defining human security
agendas at the regional and in particular at the subregional level.
Thus, in the framework of the International SecuriPax
Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace
launched by the participants in November 2000, four regional
follow-up expert meetings have been organized for the second
half of 2001 on the theme ‘Peace, Human Security and Conflict
Prevention’:
first, on Africa, in cooperation with the Institute for
Security Studies, in Pretoria (South Africa), July 2001;
second, on South Asia, in cooperation with the Pakistan
Institute of International Affairs (PIIA), in Karachi (Pakistan),
October 2001;
third, on Central Asia, in cooperation with the National
Commission for UNESCO, in Almaty, (Kazakhstan), November
2001;
fourth, on Latin America and the Caribbean, in
cooperation with the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences
(FLACSO), in Santiago (Chile), November 2001.
The proceedings of these expert meetings will also be
jointly published by UNESCO and its partners and will serve to
set the agendas of the regional international conferences planned
for 2002–2003, as well as the Second International Meeting of
Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, to be held
in 2003 at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris.
Last but not least, many of the issues already identified
have also been duly reflected in UNESCO’s Draft Medium-Term
Strategy for 2002–2007, in which human security is given a
prominent place under Strategic Objective 5, entitled Improving
human security by better management of the environment
and social change. In this framework, UNESCO will, inter alia,
‘further address the need to prevent conflicts at their source and the
needs of the most vulnerable populations at regional and
subregional levels, through its global network of peace research
and training institutions, thereby reinforcing human security and
13

contributing to the implementation of the Decade for a Culture
of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World’ (para.
108 of the Draft Medium-Term Strategy for 2002–2007). One
of the expected outcomes under Strategic Objective 5 is ‘the
elaboration of integrated approaches to human security at the
regional, subregional and national levels, targeting the most
vulnerable populations, including the preparation of
methodologies for the prevention and resolution of conflicts, in
particular over natural resources’.
14

Opening Ceremony

Inaugural speech
by Mr Koïchiro Matsuura,
Director-General
of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO)
Directors, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Allow me to welcome you to UNESCO on the occasion
of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research
and Training Institutions.
This meeting, held as part of the International Year for the
Culture of Peace, deals with an extremely topical theme: ‘What
Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?’. For
although the Cold War belongs to the past, the same cannot be
said of the many territorial, ethnic and religious conflicts which
survive here and there on the fertile ground of intolerance,
discrimination, environmental degradation and extreme poverty.
When the United Nations system was set up in the midtwentieth
century, it gave UNESCO a special mandate, at the
crossroads of human knowledge and human aspirations, to
encourage all approaches that might strengthen individual
human dignity, self-awareness and personal fulfilment.
This meeting will be instrumental in strongly reasserting a
number of values – peace, democracy, justice, tolerance and
freedom of expression – which the Organization has defended
since it was established, and in fulfilling the injunctions of its
Constitution ‘to contribute to peace and security by promoting
collaboration among the nations through education, science and
culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the
17

ule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms
which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without
distinction of race, sex, language or religion’.
Many of you are already closely involved in our
Organization’s work for peace in the fields of research, education
and training. The proceedings of this meeting will no doubt help
to strengthen it.
The theme that has brought you together today links in
with UNESCO’s own proposals for the orientation of its future
activities, since its Draft Medium-Term Strategy for 2002–2007
is entitled ‘UNESCO – Contributing to peace and human
development in an era of globalization’.
In every one of its fields of competence – education, the
sciences, culture and communication – the Organization will
devote all its energies to helping states to grapple resolutely with
the risks and threats hanging over humanity. Eradication of
poverty, preservation of ecosystems (especially freshwater
resources), respect for human rights and cultural diversity, and
promotion of an ethics of science and technology are among the
priorities which UNESCO has laid down in order to fight this
battle.
For human security is a global and inclusive concept.
Some of its aspects – extreme poverty, terrorism, drug trafficking,
environmental degradation, illegal immigration and AIDS – go
far beyond national boundaries. That is why international
cooperation is essential in order to achieve tangible results. We
must take action together without further delay.
It is ten years since the international community became
aware of the extent of the problem. In 1992, the United Nations
Security Council expressly recognized that non-military threats
to peace required urgent action just as much as conflicts between
states and within states.
Two years later, the United Nations Development
Programme’s Human Development Report 1994 on human
security initiated a broad debate which substantially helped to
18

enrich the concept of human security and provide the impetus
for wide-ranging action to curb the impact of threats to it. I am
thinking in particular of Canada’s initiative to make the concept
of human security more operational in order to establish a
specific policy agenda, and of the priority given to promoting
democratic security in the Council of Europe. I am also thinking
of Japan, whose initiative facilitated the setting up of the human
security fund in the United Nations in March 1999 with a
contribution of $90 million, and which is preparing to fund an
information, education and communication campaign on
HIV/AIDS prevention in China that will shortly be launched by
the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
and UNESCO.
The 1995 World Summit for Social Development in
Copenhagen also underlined the urgent need to tackle poverty,
especially extreme poverty, as well as social exclusion, both of
which are being covered by the work of a broad coalition of
international, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations. The same holds true for the fields of food safety,
environmental safety and a number of other areas which are now
termed ‘new dimensions of security’.
For UNESCO and the whole of the international
community, one of the main keys to human security and all
forms of development – individual, social, economic and
sustainable – is education. The World Education Forum held in
Dakar (Senegal) in April 2000 provided striking confirmation of
this fact.
There will be no lasting peace without sustainable
endogenous development, which attacks the root causes of
division and of entrenched poverty and exclusion. Education
fulfils its true purpose by allowing individuals to make their own
decisions and take control of their own lives.
What a distance we have travelled from that time, not so
very long ago, when we thought of security in terms of defence
19

and when resources for security were allocated solely for the
purchase of arms!
But there is still a long way to go before human security
becomes a central concern of every society.
Your discussions, I have no doubt, will help us towards
that goal.
I therefore wish you every success in your work. You may
count on UNESCO’s firm support.
Thank you for your attention.
20

Keynote address on the promotion
of human security within the United Nations
by Mr Hassen Fodha,
Director, United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), Paris, France
It is with great pleasure that I take the floor today with the
contribution of the United Nations system to the First
International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and
Training Institutions, held on the initiative of UNESCO.
Needless to say, this meeting is most timely since it comes
in the wake of the Millennium Summit and its Declaration,
marking the commitment of all Member States to refine and
apply concerted, coordinated action for a better world of peace,
tolerance and human security.
The Millennium Declaration, signed by, among others,
the 150 heads of state and government present, states: ‘We
recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our
individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold
the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global
level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people,
especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of
the world, to whom the future belongs … We consider certain
fundamental values [freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance,
respect for nature and shared responsibility] to be essential to
international relations in the twenty-first century.’
The Millennium Declaration calls for strong partnerships
with civil society and particularly non-governmental
organizations, including the private sector, in order to end
poverty and destitution and to help advance development plans
in the world.
21

It must be recalled that with the year 2001 we are also
entering the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and
Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001–2010) and
will be celebrating the United Nations Year of Dialogue among
Civilizations.
Peace research and training institutions respond to all
these universal measures and priority objectives; and the United
Nations is grateful to them for their willingness and their
aptitude for playing a key role in peace-building, in that their
research can throw light not only on the causes of conflicts but
also on how to establish and then consolidate a just and lasting
peace afterwards; moreover, their training activities produce a
multiplier effect in terms of civilian actors for peace, tolerance
and solidarity.
They can do much to create conditions for a dynamic
promotion of human security, inseparable from human
development, as the annual Human Development Reports of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have clearly
shown, particularly since 1994.
The theme you have chosen to look at in detail, ‘What
Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?’, is a
central concern of many societies with the general realization of
growing international action for security and the protection of
individuals. Efforts to ensure the security of individuals and
communities must today be conducted in unison by all players in
society, with heed for the fact that the globalization under way
requires new forms of interdependence concerning all spheres of
life in society, without exception.
I will not dwell upon the far-reaching changes to the
concept of security that have come about in recent years, since a
consensus is emerging on the multidimensional nature of security
and the basic foundation needed for its construction, that is,
respect for all the rights proclaimed in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Like human rights, human
security is indivisible; like human rights, human security must
22

also be universal. Hence action for human rights has become a
central prerequisite to all the programmes and activities of the
United Nations system, since human security demands respect
for and implementation of all human rights, including the
various fundamental freedoms, the right to dignity and the right
to development.
I should like, for my part, to return to some aspects I see
as essential and that deserve emphasis and, above all,
incorporation in the work you are embarking on today at
UNESCO.
First, there is no getting away from the harsh fact that
intra-state or internal conflicts persist despite the huge efforts in
recent years by the international community, whether under
United Nations auspices or through the regional
intergovernmental organizations to which the Charter of the
United Nations gives a major role in maintaining peace and
security.
The United Nations peace-keeping forces are present in
sixteen countries in the world and step in to maintain an often
purely notional peace, as they cannot end conflicts or try to
alleviate the suffering and the consequences that peoples,
particularly women and children, suffer in these regions of the
world.
Non-state forces and paramilitary groups, which are often
predatory and closely linked to the most diverse trafficking, in
particular of drugs and armaments, go unpunished in many
countries, with the constant risk of perpetuating conflicts and
spreading them regionally.
The figures say it all: the internal conflicts of the past ten
years have left more than 5 million dead and produced
25 million refugees worldwide.
The international community has come to realize in the
past decade that intra-state conflicts call for new approaches in
preserving and maintaining peace.
23

The Millennium Declaration calls for prompt action on
all fronts: first, that of prevention, by promoting steady, balanced
economic growth, while protecting human rights and minority
rights and adopting political agreements that ensure the equitable
representation of all groups. At the same time, protection of the
most vulnerable, strengthening of peace-keeping operations,
better targeting of sanctions and arms reduction remain priorities
for the whole international community.
The General Assembly is exploring the possibility of
establishing a flexible and efficient follow-up mechanism able to
react rapidly where necessary.
Clearly, though, the objective of living in a world without
fear cannot be dissociated from that of living in one protected
from need.
The known figures on the quarter of the world’s
population living in extreme poverty means that the United
Nations system must face up to the imperative of responding.
The Millennium Summit and the various reports of the
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, on the subject commit
themselves to it: halving by 2015 the proportion of people living
in extreme poverty. Member States are invited to submit by 2005
national plans and strategies for achieving this. The objective of
halving poverty in the world by 2015 requires much effort from
the entire international community, including civil society. It is a
credible commitment to the prospects of human globalization.
Extreme poverty is compounded by the devastating effects
of pandemics, primarily the AIDS pandemic which is
threatening to wipe out achievements in human development, in
particular in sub-Saharan Africa, where its ravages will by 2010
produce 40 million orphans. However, AIDS is spreading well
beyond Africa, with increases of more than 70 per cent in the
numbers of infected persons in Asia between 1996 and 1998,
while starting to loom very large indeed in countries such as the
Russian Federation.
24

The AIDS pandemic was recently described in the United
Nations as a genuine threat to peace and security, and it was
stated that prevention strategies and strategies to treat people
suffering from the affliction must be strengthened urgently.
All these crucial problems, together with others such as
environmental degradation and the depletion of natural
resources, have combined effects on population groups and
particularly on the most vulnerable of them.
Your work today and the follow-up to it provide an
illustration of civil society in action; practical action with regard
to peace training, the culture of peace and the attitude that all
individuals must have in their daily lives. It is not enough for
states to legislate or for international organizations to run
conventions; education must also prepare people and
information must build awareness.
Your workshops concern all the regions of the
international community: Africa, the Arab States, Asia, the
Caribbean, Europe and Latin America. They are intended to
build a universal network able to meet the challenge of human
security and introduce a mechanism to implement urgent and
priority decisions.
Thanks to your voluntary action, the concept of human
security is also turning into a veritable agenda for action drawing
on all available knowledge and resources.
Volunteers can play their part in transforming societies. In
his report to the Millennium Summit, Kofi Annan proposed the
creation of a corps of volunteers to travel throughout the
developing countries and help to train communities in order to
ensure that the new information technology actually serves
human development. Forty development volunteers are already
in the field. Several others are being assigned to the unit
concerned with ‘harnessing information technology for
development’ and will soon be swelling the ranks of these
volunteers.
25

Our meetings at UNESCO contribute their own brick to
the edifice and so consolidate action to promote a culture of
peace.
I will end by expressing the hope that your work here at
UNESCO Headquarters will be thoroughly successful and
productive. I am sure that the efforts we all make together within
the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies, in common
with what you accomplish at this meeting and later, will over the
years have beneficial consequences of a magnitude beyond
anything we can predict or conceive of today.
26

Keynote address on the Canadian initiative
to strengthen human security
Towards human security:
a people-centred approach to foreign policy
by H.E. Mr Louis Hamel,
Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO
1 New global realities
Canada’s foreign policy of human security begins with this
simple understanding: that nobody, in the present age, is safe
from the violence that threatens the security of people. It is plain,
for example, that war itself now occurs increasingly within states,
and kills mostly civilians. But it is just as plain that the causes of
conflict, and the consequences, extend far beyond national
borders. And violence against human security also takes other
forms. We see it in systematic abuses of rights and freedoms. In
the cruellest exploitations of children and women. In the
extortions of warlords and the drug trade, and in the disorders of
corruption. No people anywhere are invulnerable to these
threats, or unaffected by the violence. It is the defining nature of
our age that whether or not we share the great benefits of
globalization, we are all subject to its dangers.
Canada’s approach to human security responds to these
global realities. And it addresses directly the imperative of human
security – to protect people from pervasive, violent threats to
their rights, their safety, or their lives. Indeed, human security is
now more widely and better understood as an imperative of
governance – an obligation of states, and of others in the global
27

community. The provision of human security is a matter of good
governance, within states and among them.
As a policy imperative, human security serves to focus
attention and action not just on the security of the state, but on
the security of the person. Kofi Annan, the United Nations
Secretary-General, has given voice to this new emphasis. ‘The
state,’ he has said, ‘is now widely understood to be the servant of
the people, and not vice versa.’ By looking more to the security
of people in the conduct of international relations, we redefine
the very meaning of security – and transform the conduct of
world affairs.
2 Human security, national security
This is not to disparage the place of the state, or its
importance in protecting people. On the contrary, human
security and national security are complementary. People are
made safer by an open, tolerant and responsive state, capable of
ensuring the protection of all its citizens. At the same time,
improving human security reinforces the state by strengthening
its legitimacy and its stability.
It is important to add, however, that while the security of
the state is a necessary condition of human security, it is not a
sufficient condition. When states are externally aggressive,
internally repressive, or too weak to govern effectively, human
security suffers. Sometimes, the state itself – strong or weak – is
the most brutal enemy of human security. In such cases, the
international community will hear calls for intervention and
humanitarian necessity may ultimately outweigh arguments of
sovereignty.
3 Human security, human development
So human security and state security are closely related.
Similarly, human security is brother and sister to human
28

development. Human security provides the sheltering
environment for human development, the social peace and
freedom from fear that make development practical. Just as
surely, good human-development strategies can relieve the
privations and inequalities – and remedy the ills of bad
governance – that jeopardize human security. Human security
and human development serve and strengthen each other.
4 Canada’s human security agenda
Human security is simply defined: it means freedom from
pervasive threats to the rights, the safety, or the lives of people. It
is the threat of violence that distinguishes the human security
objectives of Canadian foreign policy.
Of course, violence is not the only threat to human wellbeing.
Poverty, the ruin of the environment, the pressures of
urbanization, and epidemics of infection all constitute challenges
to human security. Specifically, Canada has identified five foreign
policy priorities for advancing human security:
First, protection of civilians. More than 80 per cent of all
the casualties in present-day conflicts are civilians. That is why
strengthening protection for people, especially those at risk from
violence, is a defining priority on Canada’s human security
agenda. The Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines is
a successful example, but more challenges remain: to protect waraffected
children and internally displaced persons; to strengthen
human rights protection; to find better ways, and better rules, for
international humanitarian intervention.
Our second priority concerns peace support operations.
These are no longer just about peace-keeping. Now, more than
ever, peace support operations require complex combinations of
military and civilian expertise. Enhancing international capacity
to succeed at these complex operations is an urgent international
objective.
29

A third priority is conflict prevention. Just as the causes of
violent conflict are fearfully diverse, so the means of prevention
must be many and varied. The priority here is to improve
international capacity, and develop local institutions, to prevent
conflict and build peace. With sanctions that are more effective,
and less harmful. With controls on the pernicious trade in small
arms. With post-conflict peace-building that is lasting and just.
Fourth is the promotion of good governance. Failures of
governance carry grave consequences: political and social
exclusion, inequities, discontent and civil strife. That is why the
development of accountable, democratic governance is critical to
building a society’s capacity to manage conflict without violence.
The fifth priority, one of critical importance, is public
safety. Transnational, criminal violence threatens the safety of
people everywhere. These are the destructive and complicated
threats of organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.
Against these menacing forces, human security requires better
international coordination of knowledge and action.
5 Effective coalitions for human security
Violent threats to human security, in all their diversity,
share this common characteristic: they always interact, in
dangerous contagions of cause and effect. Think of the
connections between, say, the sufferings of war-affected children,
failed discipline among security forces, a weak justice system, and
corporate connivance in diamond smuggling or the drug trade.
The linkages are insidious, and they reach across national
borders. Against these interacting threats, not even powerful
governments can prevail alone. Protecting human security
requires cooperative coalitions among states – acting with others
in the global community.
These coalitions are being organized in a new, more open
and more creative kind of diplomacy. They take many forms,
with many different memberships, as needs and opportunities
30

arise. At the United Nations, for example, we now see the
Security Council, with several of the UN Specialized Agencies,
turning more powerful attention – and action – to the protection
of human security.
One of the significant features of globalization is the
proliferation, activism and special expertise of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in advancing human security. It is often
NGOs that give the first warning of crisis, inform the
international media, and galvanize government action. Just as
often, NGOs provide critical knowledge of local conditions,
coordinate relief and development operations, and share the
work of long-term peace-building programmes. In truth, NGOs
and their worldwide networks have become indispensable
partners and political allies in the protection and promotion of
human security. Examples abound, from the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines, to the work of Human Rights
Watch for the International Criminal Court, to the Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. The Canadian Government
acknowledges and values these NGO partnerships. This is how
successful governance in today’s world, specifically on the human
security agenda, will be achieved – by ever more vigorous
collaborations among government institutions, NGOs, business,
and labour.
6 Conclusion
The human security imperative responds to the violence of
the present age – it compels collaborative action. No government
can succeed alone. It recognizes that our own security is
indivisible from the security of others. Ultimately, it unites us all
in the shared opportunity to redeem the meaning of our
common humanity, to build a more just and peaceful global
community.
31

The human security network
The Human Security Network, which includes
participation by over a dozen countries from all regions of the
world, originally grew out of a bilateral arrangement between
Canada and Norway – the ‘Lysøen’ partnership, named after the
Norwegian island where the idea was conceived. Building on the
success achieved through international cooperation on the
landmines campaign, Canada and Norway sought to apply the
same energy and advocacy to a range of other threats to people’s
safety.
Since its establishment two years ago, the Network has
promoted international support for UN efforts to protect
civilians, including two ministerial meetings, in Bergen, Norway
(May 1999), and in Lucerne, Switzerland (May 2000), attended
by NGO experts from around the world. Jordan is to host the
next ministerial meeting of the Network in Petra in May 2001.
An informal, flexible mechanism, the Network identifies
concrete areas for collective action, for example, coordinated
preparation for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in
2001. It also plays a catalytic role by bringing to international
attention new and emerging issues, for example the challenge of
engaging non-state actors, such as armed groups, in complying
with international humanitarian and human rights law.
Members of the Human Security Network include
Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and, as an
observer, South Africa.
32

Presentation of the International Year
for the Culture of Peace
by Mr Enzo Fazzino,
Programme Specialist, UNESCO
On 20 November 1997 the General Assembly of the
United Nations proclaimed the year 2000 as the International
Year for the Culture of Peace in order to ‘mobilize public opinion
at the national and international levels for the purpose of
establishing and promoting a culture of peace’. 1 The Declaration
and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace adopted by the
General Assembly in September 1999 2 supplemented the
proclamation by indicating the key players and the major areas in
which the culture of peace should be applied.
The Programme of Action calls upon civil society in
general and non-governmental organizations in particular, with
governments and the United Nations system, to work in
partnership to form a ‘global movement for a culture of peace’.
The 72 million people 3 – more than a hundredth of the
world’s population – who have signed Manifesto 2000, pledging
to apply in their daily lives the principles on which the culture of
peace is based, give an idea of the extent to which public opinion
has been mobilized in more than 160 countries of the world,
thanks to the work of thousands of organizations in civil society.
Of the 1,700 local, national and international
organizations (associations, cities, schools, media, universities,
1 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Resolution E/1997/47, 22 July
1997.
2 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/53/243, 13 September
1999.
3 This figure is as of end November 2000.
33

companies, governmental and United Nations organizations),
183 are research and training institutions. 4 Several of the
institutions that you are representing at this meeting today have
played an active part in the International Year.
This global movement, which began with the
International Year for the Culture of Peace, can be strengthened
and broadened in the coming International Decade, 2001–2010.
As a follow-up to the year 2000, the Decade is devoted to
promoting ‘a culture of peace and non-violence for the children
of the world’. 5
In his most recent document about the Decade, 6 Kofi
Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, presents two
parallel approaches to be followed in its implementation:
partnerships for a global movement and education to be
extended to all the children of the world.
First, the global movement ‘needs to be continued and
strengthened in order to involve everyone, at all levels of society,
in the transition from a culture of war and violence to a culture
of peace and non-violence’. 7 In order to do this, the global
movement will be able to use the network of National
Committees and offices put in place by UNESCO during the
International Year. Networks of international organizations are
another channel for mobilizing civil society.
Second, children should be at the centre of the Decade
and, among the specific measures to be taken, ‘priority should be
given to education, including the teaching of the practice of
peace and non-violence to children. All other areas of action for
a culture of peace should take children into special
consideration’.
4 This information can be found on the International Year website:
www.unesco.org/iycp.
5 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/53/25, 10 November
1998.
6 Document A/55/377, 12 September 2000.
7 Idem.
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‘Education should be engaged in the broad sense of the
term – not only formal education in schools but also out-ofschool
institutions, including the family and the media. It should
involve the full participation of governments, intergovernmental
organizations and the civil society … an approach that is
comprehensive and holistic, involving all educational partners
and various agents of socialization, including non-governmental
organizations and community organizations in a process of
democratic participation.’ 8
One of the objectives of this meeting, ‘to make plans for
practical projects, particularly in the field of education and
training for peace and human security’, corresponds well with
this way of implementing the Decade. The International Year for
the Culture of Peace led millions of people to become sensitive
to, aware of and committed: the Decade should transform this
commitment into action in longer-term projects such as those
you are going to plan and implement.
The United Nations Programme of Action on a Culture of
Peace set out the major fields of activity for such practical projects:
(a) education for a culture of peace and non-violence;
(b) sustainable economic and social development;
(c) respect for all human rights;
(d) equality between women and men;
(e) democratic participation;
(f) understanding, tolerance and solidarity;
(g) participatory communication and the free flow of
information and knowledge;
(h) international peace and security.
What is new about the concept of the culture of peace –
structured around eight major areas – is that it provides a single
framework within which to maximize the complementary nature
of, and synergy between, all the players: governments, the United
Nations system and civil society.
8 Idem.
35

I invite you to join the global movement for the culture of
peace or, for those of you who took part in the International Year,
to continue and redouble your efforts during the Decade,
particularly through the network of peace research and training
institutions that you are going to form. I wish you a successful
meeting.
Thank you.
36

First Round Table
The main challenges facing the promotion
of human security and peace in Africa
Moderator:
Mr Bertrand Badie,
Graduate Programme Director, Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, France
Lecturers:
Mr Gabriel Siakeu,
President, World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP),
Yaoundé, Cameroon
Mr Jakkie Cilliers,
Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS),
Pretoria, South Africa

Opening remarks
by the moderator, Mr Bertrand Badie,
Graduate Programme Director, Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, France
Allow me – after all I must do something to deserve my
chairmanship – to open these proceedings with a few reflections,
which you may rest assured will be brief. Human security –
which we have already heard something about, and the speakers
at the opening session emphasized the point – is a new concept,
one that for me evokes four key words, and perhaps with these
words we may begin to reflect. They are human purpose, globality,
interdependence and rationality.
Human purpose. For me it is a major event that security has
now finally been reconciled with its true purpose: people, human
beings. Security is becoming once again what it should always
have been, an instrument for the advancement of human
progress and the construction of humanism. The notion of
military security tended to make security not so much an
instrument as an end in itself, and tended, where security
remained an instrument, to make it no more than an instrument
of power. The idea of military security was associated more with
the idea of an instrument of power than an instrument of human
development. Reverting to the idea of human security means
reshaping security into what it ought to be – an instrument in the
service of humanity. And that, I think, is one of the first gains.
Globality, meaning that human security desectoralizes the
principal constituents of social progress and human progress. We
can no longer view food security, as we used to, in particular
during the Cold War, as distinct from economic security, itself
distinct from military security, which is in turn distinct from the
defence and promotion of human rights. These are not
compartments of human endeavours; they represent human
39

endeavour as a whole. And then to be aware, to demonstrate, and
to act, to ensure that the promotion of human rights, food
security and economic security are efforts that converge towards
a single goal, is a second very important element which is
inherent in the idea of human security.
The third idea is perhaps that of interdependence, which
seems very important to me. It has become banal to say that we
live in an interdependent world, but, when it comes to security,
this is no longer so banal, since the security of my neighbour,
near or far, is vital to my own security. I cannot live securely,
safely, or feel protected if my neighbour has no security. My
neighbour’s insecurity today is my own insecurity tomorrow.
And, therefore, linking the various social contracts on which the
various nation-states are founded, is a correspondence which we
must learn to promote and build on as an element of collective
security. This is perhaps the second death of Thomas Hobbes; in
any event I believe that it is the resurrection of this idea of
humanity that has perhaps been – and I speak here in the name
of my own academic freedom – somewhat hastily sacrificed,
abandoned, to the notion of peoples.
And lastly, the fourth element, rationality. Human security
must not become a concept which is uniquely, or even chiefly,
ethical or moral. Human security is a collective asset, a common
good that is necessary for the advancement of men and women
wherever they may find themselves and whatever they may be. It
is not merely to satisfy a moral need that we promote, indeed
must promote, human security; it is also because this is the only
chance for humanity to survive in the face of the challenges
confronting it. Promoting human rights and promoting food
security are certainly positive accomplishments, but, beyond
that, they entail the construction of a universe of security,
assurance, tranquillity, which is an essential prerequisite to
progress and the accomplishment of the collective goals of
everyone on the planet. This is not only an ethical discourse – I
fear, moreover, that politicians are not very attentive to ethical
40

discourse – it is also a utilitarian discourse. Human security has
real utility, and I think this is an aspect which will have to be
highlighted in our work to show that we are fighting not only for
what is good but also for what is clearly in our interest.
For this reason I should like, very tentatively and very
provisionally, to propose the idea that human security is first of
all an attitude. Rather than a programme, it is an attitude, a way
of being, a way of viewing the world, of viewing international
relations, of viewing the interaction between economics and
politics, between politics and culture, between culture and
society, and so forth. It is a stance. Military security was not a
stance; it was a budget, and it was a policy. Human security is a
way of being and a way of fitting into the international system.
41

Peace and human security in Africa
by Mr Gabriel Siakeu,
President, World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP),
Yaoundé, Cameroon
1 Preliminary note
Human security and peace can only be properly
appreciated by those who, at some time or another, have
experienced acts or scenes of insecurity, violence and war. For the
rest of humanity, security and peace are very secondary
considerations, and this forum is just one more of its kind, an
opportunity for speeches, statements and debates; one more
meeting, as ever here at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris;
another international gathering to be consigned to oblivion once
the curtain falls tomorrow.
My agreeing to take the floor at this First International
Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions
– and it goes without saying that the honour is mine – signifies
my belief that this meeting will come up with practical
resolutions and recommendations that will be put into effect,
whose influence will gradually spread so that the promotion of
human security may be effective, so that a lasting peace may be
established not just in Africa, in whose name I am speaking
today, but also throughout the world. For human security and
peace cannot be genuine unless shared by all the nations and all
the citizens of the world, without exception.
He who has the signal honour of addressing you today,
while not claiming to have immediately suffered insecurity and
war, was born in a country which, at the time, was engaged in a
43

struggle for independence. That struggle coincided with a power
contest between two rivals opposed by seemingly different
ideologies that were exacerbated by the then colonial power. It
was a dark period in the history of my country, marked by
arbitrary detentions, summary executions, abductions,
disappearances, new and ambiguous expressions such as curfew,
state of emergency, the limited movement allowed to citizens
provided that they could produce a laissez-passer, and with no
freedom of expression or of assembly, as a corollary of the singleparty
system established between 1966 and 1990.
I have also had occasion to take on the role of consultant
in a very beautiful African country where security and peace
today are no more than hollow, meaningless words. For when
children can be killed by crushing in a mortar or dissection, just
as a butcher chops a piece of beef, cutting open the belly of a
pregnant woman with a machete to pull out the foetus, then let
us admit that we have reached the peak of horror and that this
kind of act is very difficult to credit to human beings. And yet the
evidence is there.
This is a country where the only crime is to be born into
one or other of the only two tribes; a country where killings have
become so natural and frequent that one may be pleasantly
surprised to learn at the end of the day that no one has been
killed. This is a country where visibly starving and sick old
people, orphans of war and AIDS, are crammed into veritable
concentration camps set up near the capital for reasons that are
clear though unspoken.
I have also travelled up and down the coast of a country in
West Africa and been struck by the practically unbreathable air,
polluted from the open-air sale of petroleum; and I have visited,
not far from there, the major market of a town built near an
immense tip where rubbish and detritus of all kinds are deposited
and where thousands of people converge.
After such a summary account of my own unfortunate
experiences of insecurity in the course of my brief existence, a
44

question occurs to me: why is there this climate of insecurity and
violence in the world?
The causes of human insecurity are to be found in the
mind and nature of people.
The answer is bitter and sad: it is indeed the human mind.
And this mind is marked by cruelty, selfishness, greed,
egocentrism, hatred, distrust, contempt, and an obsession with
power and money.
As these personality traits cannot be modified by scientific
and technical research nor by political speeches and programmes,
we can understand the profound meaning of the Constitution of
UNESCO which proclaims that ‘since wars begin in the minds
of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must
be constructed’.
This way of thinking coincides with that of the World
Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP). The
slogan of this Geneva-based international non-governmental
organization (NGO), of which I run a national section, is
‘Disarm the mind to disarm the hand’.
We may now understand the concern of the world’s
nations after the Second World War, expressed in the Charter of
the United Nations in these terms: ‘We the peoples of the United
Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, … to promote social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom, … to practice tolerance and
live together in peace with one another as good neighbours…’.
The proclamation by the United Nations is a call for more
security and non-violence. Otherwise, how can we imagine a
family enjoying security when the parents, as victims of an
economic crisis, have been made redundant or when the children
finish their studies and are still looking for their first job?
How can we imagine human security in a village whose
crops have been destroyed by a swarm of locusts, or which is
permanently under threat from the neighbouring village, or in
which there are no health and education facilities?
45

How can we imagine people enjoying security in a town
where factories pollute the air, where road traffic is dense, where
slums and ghettos exist cheek by jowl with rich neighbourhoods?
How can we imagine people enjoying security in a country
where there is no political changeover, a country where
corruption has been institutionalized, a country where the right
to education and health is a right for some but not for all?
How can we imagine human security in a world onequarter
of whose population lives below subsistence level; a world
where three-quarters of the wealth belongs to one-quarter of its
inhabitants and where a mere ten countries direct the conduct of
all the other states?
As the problems differ from one continent to another,
however, I have been asked to look at the main challenges facing
the promotion of human security in Africa. If these challenges are
taken up in all continents, we can hope that they will in the
aggregate allow human security to be ensured worldwide.
Africa is the continent of all ills.
From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, Africa
experienced the slave trade. This shameful commerce played its
part in depopulating and weakening the continent.
From the end of the nineteenth century to the
independence period, around 1960 for most countries, Africa was
colonized. That colonization resulted in the Balkanization of the
continent. Africa was divided into colonial possessions regardless
of geographical realities. Some conflicts sapping the African
continent today derive from this arbitrary apportionment.
• We have seen the upheaval of the social structures of the
colonies – with customs swept aside, changed habits, the
emergence of social contrasts – in short the acculturation of
Africans.
• We have seen the weakening of communities through
forced labour such as portering and corvées, a further form of
slavery.
46

• We have seen the looting of mineral resources for
European industries. In the colonies, such work as road-building
and the establishment of administrative structures was only
carried out with an eye to the needs of the colonizing countries.
• We have seen the dismantling of the African economy, or
what passed for it at the time.
The word independence initially aroused many hopes.
Since 1960, however, Africans have become disillusioned.
Colonization was succeeded by neocolonialism, the continuation
of the colonial system in another form, resulting in the
omnipresence of the former colonizing power. We can count on
the fingers of one hand the countries in Africa which have not
experienced coups d’état and armed conflict. Even those that had
become reputed havens of peace and political stability are now
going through (and we hope only going through) a very alarming
period of disorder, violence and insecurity.
As if that were not enough, all these woes are compounded
by:
• diseases such as ebola, cholera, malaria and, of course,
the AIDS pandemic. Some experts think that by 2010, the
twenty-three countries hardest hit by AIDS will have lost 66
million individuals.
• pollution. African countries are industrializing or still
under-industrialized. However, the activity of industrialized
countries is damaging the environment on a global scale and
causing extensive pollution and disruption of ecosystems. If the
current trend persists, the natural environment will be
increasingly threatened, particularly since the effects of bush fires
and deforestation must be taken into account in Africa.
• poverty. Almost 1.3 billion people live on less than a
dollar a day, and nearly 1 billion cannot meet their minimum
nutritional needs. The vast majority of them live in Africa, which
moreover accounts for upwards of thirty-five of the fifty
leastdeveloped countries in the world – the poorest of the poor.
The situation is worsening because of armed conflicts and
47

violence that could reach unprecedented levels. This violence,
generated by tribal, ethnic and religious conflict, will be the most
common form of conflict in the coming century and will claim
hundreds of thousands of victims each year in Africa.
This whole catalogue of woes, and many others, are
unmistakable signs of insecurity and war in Africa. The current
situation is serious and it is time to find urgent solutions so that
Africa, already badly What Agenda for Human Security in the
Twenty-first Century? Peace and human security in Africa
26affected, does not become definitively mired in violence.
As already noted, it is not enough to list the evils afflicting
the world and endangering world peace. This is no time simply
to be surprised at the evergrowing number of refugees, street
children, AIDS orphans and destitute, at the tragic scale of the
effects of environmental damage, and so on.
It is time to take action and to act positively in a way that
will make people safer, and as a result to establish lasting world
peace. The challenge here is on a world scale and, in my opinion,
it cannot be confined to a single continent since security and
peace are either a matter for all continents or they are nonexistent.
Furthermore, the development train is one that travels
fast, very fast indeed. Africa must catch it, hold on to it, keep up
the same speed and avoid just submitting to it.
The challenge of development is a major one, a challenge
that cannot be met without security and without peace. There
can be no sustainable development without peace. There can be
no peace without security. Peace and security are two inseparable
and imperative notions for the development of Africa. It is
therefore urgent to promote them, but to promote them in terms
of the strategies and major challenges set out below.
48

2 The Internet and computer technology: to make up time
Internet: multiple services
On 17 October 1996, at the meeting on Africa and the
new information technologies held in Geneva, President Alpha
Omar Konaré of Mali stated: ‘If we say yes to the challenges of
the new information technologies, it is without being naive, since
we are well aware of the considerable implications…’.
The importance of information and communication is
indeed no longer disputed. The opportunities offered by the
Internet to Africa are countless.
Internet users, wherever they are, whatever their
education, can learn, meet one another, share hobbies, look for
associations and information of all kinds and make friends with
people on the other side of the world through electronic mail.
What is more, scientific and technical information
circulates with disconcerting ease and speed. African Internet
users, who are increasingly numerous I am glad to say, may
consult freely accessible databases of universities and research
centres.
Thanks to the Internet tool, African teachers can obtain
documentation to use in their classes. Students can find
documentation for their research, dictionaries, encyclopaedias
and maps. Farmers can connect to find out more about new
cultivation methods. Commercial businesses have an ideal
medium for vaunting their goods and services to millions of
potential customers. The Internet is a gateway to leisure
activities, sport and job opportunities. All over the world people
can keep abreast of the latest national and international
developments by consulting any of the countless news services
available on the Internet.
49

Internet: still too expensive
Unfortunately, as the cost of telecommunications is high
and markets still limited, Internet service providers generally
charge more in Africa than elsewhere for opening Internet
accounts. According to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 20 hours of Internet access cost
$29 in the United States, including telephone bills and tax
charged by the provider, as against $74 in Germany, $52 in
France, $65 in the United Kingdom and $53 in Italy. Seeing that
per capita income in these countries is ten times the African
average, one may well have misgivings about the spread of the
Internet in Africa. And while that may be a financial problem,
there is another more sensitive social issue involved: how can a
community whose form of communication is based on the oral
tradition prepare for the concept of universal communication?
3 Education: a primary way of promoting the culture of peace
Education: at least able to read and write
Imagine what someone who cannot read or write is
missing. Surely, such people are completely cut off from any
understanding of how their environment is changing and can
take no effective part in running public affairs. They therefore
constitute what amounts to a brake on social development. Of
course, using a computer does not require a given intellectual
level, but it does presume a universal language beyond the reach
of illiterates. One has to be able, at least, to read and write.
In addition to school-type teaching, this means a vast
African literacy campaign to familiarize everyone with computers
and use of the Internet.
50

Education: a matter of all and for all
The great hope for Africa lies in the education of all its
children. Education in the broadest sense, including formal, nonformal
and informal education and demanding the participation
of all partners – ministries of education, families, the media,
religious leaders, parents’ associations and, above all, NGOs.
The EIP has understood that education is a prerequisite
for peace and development, serves humanity and opens up the
path to understanding for all the world’s children. It is therefore
at pains to encourage education worldwide and secure respect for
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
stipulating inter alia that education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages, and that elementary
education shall be compulsory.
It is therefore all-important to invest in education.
Respecting the right to education means building peace, the
progress of nations and sustainable development.
Investment in sustainable human development, as
Federico Mayor, former Director-General of UNESCO, said,
means opting for an essential change of direction in a world
where the gap that separates us from one another in terms of
material prosperity and knowledge continues to grow rather than
to shrink.
4 Human rights and fundamental freedoms: learn to live together
Peace-loving states and individuals must do everything
they can to ensure that the content of existing international and
national instruments concerning human rights and fundamental
freedoms is well known, popularized, put into practice,
experienced and shared.
Investing in education is good, while investing in the
promotion of human rights is even better and complementary.
Human rights education gives people the opportunity to get to
51

know one another better, to practise mutual tolerance and to
accept in some people feelings and ways of thinking and acting
that differ from those of others. Through human rights
education, we learn respect for life and human beings, we learn
mutual understanding and we combat all attitudes that
encourage war, violence and intolerance, the source of human
insecurity.
EIP-Cameroon is convinced that human rights education
must start as early as possible, with the inclusion of human rights
and peace education in state education systems, in particular
from the primary level or even sooner.
How, though, can education be promoted in an African
population when the vast majority live below subsistence level?
There is after all a saying that words are wasted on the starving.
5 Combating poverty: a prerequisite for security
and peace in the world
Combating poverty: for shared happiness
Can one have it all and be happy alongside those who have
nothing? Can one be happy alone? Can one live in security and
peace in a world a quarter of whose population goes hungry, is ill
and has no hope of improvement? The rich countries have
understood this and a first step was taken on 18 June 1999 in
Cologne, where almost $48 billion (i.e. less than 0.5 per cent of
global gross domestic product) of debts owed by forty-one poor
countries, out of a total debt of nearly $230 billion, was cancelled
by the G7 countries.
Rich countries: could do better
We may already appreciate the generosity of the Western
countries but hope that they will, as soon as possible, adopt the
position of Germany in favour of total and immediate debt
52

cancellation. This would ease the burden of the poorest
countries, which ought to be devoting their resources to
development and in particular to social sectors such as education
and health.
When we take a close look at the forty-one countries that
could be eligible for debtservicing relief, we realize that most of
them have been or are involved in armed conflict. We are forced
to the conclusion that poverty is a cause (if not the main cause)
of insecurity and violence. Combating poverty, providing
education in general and education on human rights and
fundamental freedoms in particular, and popularizing computers
and the Internet are the major challenges that Africa must take
up to make security a reality. What can actually be done to move
on from the dream to reality? The actions I put forward here,
while neither entirely new nor unknown, are proposed to
encourage reflection on the contribution that must be made in
order that human security may cease to be just a matter of slogans
in Africa.
Strengthen the capacity for action of civil society,
in particular NGOs
NGOs are support bodies seeking through their activities
to complement government action. Their action in all fields
deserves to be encouraged and consolidated, particularly through:
• training NGO officials in fund-raising techniques,
project development and management of their structure;
• training NGO members in human rights and peace
education;
• providing structures with computer equipment;
• training members to use the Internet so that communities
and associations able to join together in accordance with shared
interests or affinities can be enhanced and energized;
• establishing and supporting NGO coalitions working to
promote human rights and peace, which should meet regularly to
53

take stock of their activities and refocus their work on the
ground.
Introduce new development-oriented military policies
The key purpose of the armed forces is of course to ensure
national stability and the security of citizens. To that end, they
use weapons spelling violence, death and desolation. Hence the
military are trained and prepared for war. It is time to shape in
them a new attitude, that of peace, by directing them towards
development activities.
The military, who in most states make up a substantial
proportion of the working population, can be trained for social
work.
They can also take part in agriculture (bringing land under
cultivation), health (increasing the number of health centres,
especially in rural areas), building road infrastructure, public
works, and so on.
This new direction for the armed forces would ‘disarm the
minds of the military to disarm the hands’ and transform armed
forces, defence and war ministries into ministries for peace. And,
as revealed by a famous inscription that so aptly adorns a wall of
the United Nations esplanade in New York, ‘they shall beat their
swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks:
nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they
learn war any more’.
Imagine for just a moment how many violations of human
rights the world would be spared if all its inhabitants were to
adopt this position today and learn war no more!
Insecurity would give way to security and war (which is
the antithesis of human rights) would disappear in favour of
lasting peace.
54

World lobbying campaign to promote human security
Such a campaign would mean encouraging the
participation of all those involved in development, without
exception, in a vast world movement for peace. Let us recall the
groups of men and women who, through their action and
pressure, have secured the adoption of positions making for
better human conditions in the world:
• The Jubilee 2000 Coalition, an association made up of
NGOs, religious groups, media bodies and individuals, carried
out an active campaign to persuade governments to adopt a
stance on debt relief for insolvent countries.
• The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL),
founded by human rights defenders, which has brought together
over 1,000 organizations in sixty countries. Their significant
achievement was the adoption of an international treaty banning
landmines.
The network being created here in Paris of directors of
peace research and training institutions could follow this example
and build awareness in the world for the sake of greater human
security, in particular:
• by encouraging governments (which always feel
politically vulnerable) to regard human rights as a humanitarian
and not a political issue and to apply human rights treaties;
• by approaching the competent authorities with a view to
including human rights and peace teaching in their education
systems and ensuring that they abide by their obligations;
• by encouraging arrangements for monitoring, surveying
and reporting on the application and violation of international
standards regarding the right to education;
• by launching an appeal for support for popularization of
the Internet to all those involved in development, such as NGOs,
schools, research centres, government services, and so on;
• by backing all women’s initiatives for peace and equal
access for girls and women to quality education;
55

• by conducting a publicity campaign for parents so that
they never buy or give their children toys associated with war and
violence, such as toy rifles, tanks, swords, grenades, and so on.
If all these initiatives were taken into account they, among
others, would be bound to contribute to building a world in
which human security and peace become realities.
Bibliography
The Culture of Peace and UNESCO; basic document summary report. See
www.unesco.org/cpp.
UNESCO transdisciplinary project ‘Towards a Culture of Peace’. See
www.unesco.org/cpp.
The following periodicals:
Jeune Afrique, No. 2007, June–July 1999;
Amina, No. 367, November 2000;
Réveillez-vous, 22 November 1998;, 22 July 1997;
The Watchtower, 15 September 2000.
The latter cites:
• Global Environment Outlook 2000, Nairobi, United Nations Environment
Programme, 2000;
• The Global Burden of Disease and Injury, Harvard University Press, 1996;
• Confronting AIDS, the situation in the developing countries, joint report by the
European Commission and the World Bank;
• Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face, New York,
United Nations Development Programme, 1999;
• At the Dawn of a New World: the Security of the United States in the Twenty-first
Century, United States commission on national security in the twenty-first century.
The Human Right to Peace: declaration by the Director-General of UNESCO, January
1997, 15 pp. (UNESCO doc. SHS.97/WS/6.)
56

Security in Africa:
State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS
by Mr Jakkie Cilliers,
Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS),
Pretoria, South Africa
1 Introduction
For many the end of the Cold War promised an end to
conflict and held out the prospects for peace and prosperity. This
has proved inaccurate for Africa, as for much of the rest of the
world. In fact, conflict in Africa has increased in recent years. To
these challenges, and their impact on the continent, a new
scourge is now added in the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on
the already precarious African security situation.
This paper deals with the issue of state formation in Africa
followed by an analysis of the impact of HIV/AIDS. The purpose
is to explore and outline these two challenges as a basis for
discussion rather than to suggest remedial action.
2 State formation in Africa
Effective colonial rule of much of Africa lasted for a
relatively brief historical space of some eighty years – as opposed
to settlements along the coast which go back several centuries.
During this period the colonial countries sought to administer
African countries along their own models, generally a foreign
administration largely run by foreigners in a very different
continent. The result, at the time of independence during the
1950s and 1960s, was a series of African states with the trappings
of Europe, but inherently untouched by Western influence,
57

politics and systems – much like South Africa after apartheid. As
a result, the modern state structure in Africa imposed on the
continent during this period often forms little more than a thin
carapace over the largely hidden realms of the informal economy
and its companion polity.
At root the colonial and apartheid state was based on
domination and on its ability to impose its hegemony upon the
subject peoples and to extract from them the taxes necessary for
the maintenance of the colonial state apparatus.
Colonial administrations were bound together by a
common code of ethics and surety of racial solidarity – an
intrusion ruled by a foreign elite banded together under the
governor by a code of behaviour, ‘a set of guardians whose
strength lay in the pack’. 1
While the colonial state was essentially bureaucratic, the
post-independence regimes have been ultrapolitical. 2 Many African
states came to independence through low-intensity conflicts waged
by liberation movements against colonial powers. Having taken
power in this way, the new state incumbents were left highly
exposed and vulnerable to challengers from within – sometimes
from competitors bent on using these very same methods against
them once the unifying solidity of a common enemy had
disappeared. Rulers also now had to rely on their fellow nationals
to maintain law and order, some with political ideas and ambitions
of their own. It soon became evident, as in all functionally
undifferentiated societies, that the closer one was to the centre of
the political apparatus, the greater the chances of material reward.
As a result, the state in Africa has often been the primary arena for
competition, for power, and for influence over the distribution of
scarce resources. Writing in the early 1980s, Jackson and Rosberg
noted: ‘What the Church was for ambitious men in medieval
Europe or the business corporation in nineteenth and twentieth-
1 D. Austin, ‘Things Fall Apart’, Orbis, Winter 1982, pp. 928–9.
2 Ibid., p. 929.
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century America, the state is today for ambitious Africans with skill
and fortune.’ 3 In the absence of other opportunities the state in
Africa largely serves as a ‘private’ resource instead of a ‘public’ good.
The driving force behind Africa’s second experiment with
democracy during the 1980s and early 1990s came both from
ideological conviction and the growing impatience of an everbolder
public consciousness, and from the related matter of the
continent’s prevailing economic crisis. For the first time since
independence, domestic support became more important than
foreign patrons, and African leaders had to confront the inherent
weaknesses of their regimes and to consider sharing power with
others. These were uncomfortable times, for all this happened at
a time of deep and structural economic crisis.
At the very moment when democratization stimulated the
popular demand for better social and welfare services, structural
adjustment required that this be denied. In broad terms this
played a significant part in further undermining the state’s claims
to legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens. As the World Bank
itself recognized in its 1997 World Development Report, ‘An
institutional vacuum of significant proportions has emerged in
many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, leading to increased crime and
an absence of security, affecting investment and growth’.
By the 1990s the ‘military balance’ between the state and
society in Africa had changed profoundly. At independence, one
could still argue that most of the post-colonial regimes retained
the balance of force through control over the security apparatus
and the level of armaments at their unique disposal. At the turn
of the century an increased number of African states have
atrophied and weapons have spilled over from armed conflicts
throughout the region, circulating virtually uncontrolled. This
has allowed groups in a number of societies to arm and challenge
the incumbent elite, while in many instances the security
3 R. H. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince,
Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant, p. 14, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1982.
59

agencies themselves have decayed and lost their coherence. As a
result, a military victory by any of the various armed forces in a
number of countries at war, such as the Democratic Republic of
the Congo or the Sudan, is unlikely to reduce levels of social
violence or the trend towards social fragmentation without
additional and substantial negotiations and peace-building
measures. At the same time state control, to the extent that it
exists in the form of organized administration and the provision
of services, has contracted inward, in many instances reflecting
an exclusively urban bias and neglect of the rural populations.
Today the surfeit of arms and lack of control over national
territories has resulted in much of sub-Saharan Africa being
characterized not by the state’s monopoly over the instruments of
coercion, but by a balance of force between the state and the
community. The result, in a highly armed and violent continent,
ironically, is the creation of a security vacuum. Within Nairobi,
Johannesburg or Luanda security is available to those who can
afford it. In Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia, war continues in
those countries that have exploitable resources worth fighting for
and that can sustain conflict. In all instances those vast sections
of the population in the rural areas, dependent upon subsistence
agriculture, are left to fend for themselves and forced to arm and
organize to prevent their exploitation by local warlords,
ethnically based politicians or criminals.
Although the end of superpower competition had resulted
in a reduction in state-sponsored arms transfers to Africa, the fact
that local disputes were less globalized meant that outside powers
had less will to impact upon on the conduct, termination and
outcome of these conflicts. Local rivalries and antagonisms were
given freer rein, being more remote from world centres of power
and insignificant in terms of the global system. Africans could no
longer rely on outside assistance to end local wars that were no
threat to vital foreign interests and are now forced to accept
responsibility for peace and security themselves – though at a
time when the African state is at its weakest.
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The loss of the coherence of the state has also encouraged
the emergence of new forms of power relations, notably between
the central government and local actors, and of new institutions,
such as vigilante groups and private militias. The creation of new
economic and financial opportunities has seen the emergence of
national and transnational actors who are directly implicated in
criminal economic activities such as drug trafficking, trade in
stolen cars, general smuggling, and more. In short, the
outsourcing and commercialization of state functions in
unconsolidated states have not proved a panacea for the lack of
capacity that has characterized the postcolonial state.
For a time external non-state actors, including private
military companies, stepped into the void left by the
international community, sometimes as proxies, sometimes as
independent agents, able to influence local events to their own
advantage or that of their paymaster. More recently it would
appear as if a number of African leaders are using their armed
forces in part pursuit of commercial opportunities in
neighbouring countries.
With the collapse of bipolar competition, Africa’s
importance has reverted to a lower level, reflecting its lack of
strategic relevance and marginal economic role. As the state
weakened, governance contracted inward, often reflecting little
more than the limits of the urban sprawl and an absence of
administration in the countryside, making governance more
myth than reality.
The effect of the end of the Cold War has also forced substate
actors to develop alternative resources from those prevalent
during the bipolar era. Over time, organized violence itself has
become an economic means of accumulation in certain areas.
Previously organizations such as the MPLA and UNITA could
obtain resources by presenting themselves as instruments in a
much wider scheme, that of superpower competition. In the
post-bipolar era, Cold War patronage has been replaced by the
exploitation of easily accessible natural resources. Less dependent
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upon external support, the exploitation of diamonds, cobalt,
hardwood and the like have reduced the ability of external actors
to pressurize the protagonists. Increased internationalization and
the apparent universal salience of economic liberalization,
sometimes referred to as globalization, has opened up new
avenues for linkages by local actors that can now bypass state
control through networks that are neither geographically located
nor internationally regulated. The information age has not only
benefited traders on Wall Street, but also rebel leaders, allowing
them to hold and transfer off-shore accounts, to hide liquid assets
and to purchase arms through brokers in distant countries where
control is weak. The business of war profiteering has become
privatized and often relocated to less-developed countries where
lack of controls and oversight ease operations.
In this sense the rise in so-called ‘resource wars’ reflects the
changed domestic and regional economic and social patterns
under conditions of greater international interaction and access
to the global economy for developing countries. In a country
such as Angola, Cold War patronage has been replaced by
resource war instrumentalization.
Direct conflict between African states, such as that
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, has in fact been a relatively isolated
phenomenon. Not so war by proxy. Today any numbers of
African countries are involved in indirect confrontations with
one another. Often these conflicts are conducted through
support to armed opposition parties in neighbouring states,
sometimes with a religious or ethnic character, often taking place
in a third country, drawing others into the war and expanding
the conflict. There are many examples of these activities in the
Horn and in Central Africa. In other cases neighbouring
countries have involved themselves directly in the internal affairs
of others or allowed their territory to be used as a springboard for
such involvement. Possibly the most obvious examples today
relate to what is happening in central and eastern parts of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Yet in other instances
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countries have been drawn into conflicts by their difficulty in
controlling their often inhospitable and rugged borders,
particularly when international boundaries cut through rather
than follow broad ethnic and tribal divides.
But the most significant characteristic of these conflicts is
the degree to which they are now African wars.
Unsupported by foreign patrons, Africa is coming to terms
with itself and the African state seeking a solid root. In this
manner, free from colonialism and the Cold War, the turbulence
in Africa reflects a delayed process of state formation. As state
formation in Europe not that long ago was often a bloody and
messy affair, so state formation in Africa is also serving to be
violent and accompanied by intense human suffering. But, very
different to Europe, Africa has already been carved into political
entities – the state has preceded the nation.
At the strategic level the degree to which Africans are
wrestling with their own security identity is a source of hope for
the future, despite the extent to which the global economic rules
are biased against developing countries. The largest unknown
factor is the potential role of HIV/AIDS.
3 HIV/AIDS and Africa 4
It is hardly possible to overstate the potential impact of an
epidemic that has the capacity to reverse decades of national
development, to widen the gulf between rich and poor nations,
and to cause unprecedented social disruption. In Africa the
epidemic is now more devastating than war: in 1998, 200,000
Africans died from conflict, but 2.2 million died from AIDS. 5 The
rapid loss of human capital, from every walk of society, reflects the
decimation of a major conflict, with similar consequences.
4 The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by Martin
Schönteich of the ISS with the section on HIV/AIDS.
5 Council of Foreign Relations, Panel to discuss HIV/AIDS, A New Priority for
International Security, Briefing Pack, Washington, D.C., 5 June 2000.
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The year 2000 began with 24 million Africans infected
with the HIV virus. In the absence of a medical miracle, nearly
all will die before 2010. Each day 6,000 Africans die from
HIV/AIDS. Each day, an additional 11,000 are infected. The
epidemic has proceeded much faster in some countries than in
others. Altogether, at the end of 1999, there were sixteen
countries (all in sub-Saharan Africa) in which more than onetenth
of the adult population aged 15 to 49 was infected with
HIV. In seven countries (all in southern Africa), at least one adult
in five was living with the virus. In Botswana, 36 per cent of the
adult population is HIV-positive. In Swaziland and Zimbabwe,
the infection rate is 25 per cent. Lesotho is at 24 per cent. In
Namibia, South Africa and Zambia, the figure is 20 per cent. In
none of these countries has the spread of the virus been checked. 6
In contrast to most infectious diseases, which take their
heaviest toll among the elderly and the very young, HIV/AIDS
takes its greatest toll among young adults. By 2010, Africa is
expected to have 40 million orphans – roaming the countryside
and city streets without schooling or work, prime candidates for
the criminal gangs, marauding militias and child armies that have
slaughtered and mutilated tens of thousands of civilians in
countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia in the last decade.
HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming one of the key human
security issues in sub-Saharan Africa. The effects of the epidemic are
felt in a number of interrelated ways. Recently more attention has
been paid to the economic consequences. A number of researchers
have commented and tried to calculate the macro-economic
consequences of HIV/AIDS on the gradual, but cumulative erosion
of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in heavily affected
countries. In a country such as Zimbabwe, for example, AIDS
deaths had already severely impacted upon subsistence agriculture
long before the recent politically induced economic crisis.
6 HIV Epidemic Restructuring Africa’s Population, Worldwatch Issue Alert 1A10,
31 October 2000. Available at http://www.worldwatch.org/chairman/issue/001031.html
64

It is evident that HIV/AIDS will exacerbate population
pressures and trends, particularly migration and urbanization, to
create more volatile social and political situations. This
combination can produce heightened competition for limited
resources and foster more intense rivalries among groups in
countries marked by ethnic, religious, or other diversity.
War serves to spread HIV/AIDS in ways that compound
the impact and extent of the pandemic. The armed forces (both
formal and guerrilla forces), which constitute a major population
bloc in many African societies, are highly mobile and often active
across borders. For example, a movement such as UNITA is
active in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Namibia. Seeking to
contain the rebels, the Angolan armed forces have long been
deployed in the DR Congo and Congo-Brazzaville, while
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and others have deployed
troops in the DR Congo, within which Uganda is also involved
in a proxy war with the Sudan. As the infection pattern in African
combat forces, largely composed of single males at the peak of
their sexually active life, is generally higher than in the civilian
population, conflict serves to spread the pandemic. The impact
of HIV on civilian populations lies in the high rates of sexual
interaction between military and civilian populations, whether
through commercial sex, or in rape as a weapon of war; and in
the extreme vulnerability of displaced and refugee populations to
HIV infection. Women in a refugee camp are six times more
likely to contract HIV than the general outside population. 7
Apart from spreading the disease, HIV infection poses an
additional and serious threat to the order function of the African
state. Unlike the situation in many other areas, African armed
forces are actively employed internally either in support of or
parallel to the police in providing internal security. High AIDS
attrition rates within the armed forces therefore does not only
7 Council of Foreign Relations, op. cit.
65

compromise the armed forces’ readiness, but also limits their
ability to impose social order and to protect countries from
external intervention. This compounds the security vacuum
evident in many African countries and therefore contributes to
the weakness of state institutions and the recourse to alternative
sources of security.
The spread of the disease can further intensify pressures on
governmental structures. Disease can decimate the ranks of
skilled administrators, diminish the reach or responsiveness of
governmental institutions, or reduce their resilience. This will
detrimentally affect the operational effectiveness of such
institutions as the police, prosecution service and judiciary.
Weaknesses in the criminal justice system will be exacerbated by
increased poverty and social tensions, and a burgeoning orphan
population. The result will inevitably be an increase in crime
from its already high levels.
If a government is perceived to be incapable of adequately
addressing health problems created by the spread of HIV/AIDS,
this can produce a heightened sense of marginalization among
affected populations and a stronger sense of deprivation and
resentment. Alienation can be particularly adverse when
combined with chronic poverty. These attitudes can contribute
to the eruption of violence, not just spontaneously, but in some
cases as the result of exploitation by ethnic, religious, or national
elites to serve their narrow interests. 8
But tragically it is not only war and conflict that spread the
disease, but also the effects of peace. We already know that the
aftermath of complex humanitarian crises presents particular
opportunities that could accentuate the HIV/AIDS risk climate: 9
8 Contagion and Conflict. Health as a Global Security Challenge, Report of the
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and the CSIS International
Security Program, p. 14, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington,
D.C., January 2000.
9 Council of Foreign Relations, op. cit.
66

• social disruption resulting in sudden, widespread and
profound poverty exacerbated by reductions in agricultural
output;
• lack of income leading to sale of sex by women – but also
by children;
• increased child labour, and many children living on the
streets;
• active migration to find work, further disrupting family
integrity;
• lives characterized by a desperation that fosters increases
in sexual and domestic violence and abuse, rape and gender
inequality;
• decimated health infrastructure, and deterioration of
most state services such as education, security and welfare.
No wonder therefore that a January 2000 report by the
United States Government’s National Intelligence Council
concluded that there is a definite link between infectious disease
epidemics (in particular HIV/AIDS) and security 10 and that the
United Nations Security Council debate on AIDS in Africa some
months later redefined the epidemic as a threat to human
security. The US Government report found that:
• The impact of HIV/AIDS is likely to aggravate and even
provoke social fragmentation and political polarization in the
hardest-hit countries in sub- Saharan Africa.
• The relationship between disease and political instability
is indirect but real. Infant mortality (likely to more than double
in a number of southern African states because of HIV/AIDS by
2010) correlates strongly with political instability, particularly in
countries that have achieved a measure of democratization.
• The severe social and economic impact of HIV/AIDS,
and the infiltration of the epidemic into the ruling political and
military elites and middle classes of developing countries, are
10 The Global Infectious Threat and its Implications for the United States, NIE 99-
17D, Washington, D.C., US Government National Intelligence Council, 2000.
67

likely to intensify the struggle for political power to control scarce
state resources. This will hamper the development of a civil
society and other underpinnings of democracy, and will increase
pressure on democratic transitions in sub-Saharan Africa.
• An estimated 22 million orphans in sub-Saharan Africa
by 2010 are expected to comprise a ‘lost orphaned generation’
with little hope of educational or employment opportunities.
Such societies will be at risk of increased crime and political
instability as these young people become radicalized or are
exploited by various political groups for their own ends – the
child-soldier phenomenon may be one example. The increase in
crime and political instability, moreover, will be accompanied by
a probable increased availability in illicit small arms and increased
operations of organized criminals in sub-Saharan Africa.
The more widespread the disease, the weaker the state’s
capacity to respond. The weaker the state’s capacity to respond,
the greater the increase in the prevalence of the disease. 11 This
negative spiral is most intense in southern African countries
whose state capacity is severely limited since they have fewer
human, financial, and other resources from which to draw to
break the cycle.
4 Conclusion
I began by arguing that the end of colonialism left most
African states poorly prepared for selfgovernance, let alone
independence. The subsequent Cold War served to buttress weak
African states but at the same time stunted any further
institutionalization of the state as somehow separate and distinct
from private interests.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the situation
is much changed. At independence, one could still argue that
most of the post-colonial regimes retained sufficient monopoly of
11 Contagion and Conflict…, op. cit., pp. 15–16.
68

force through control over the security apparatus and the level of
armaments at their disposal. Subsequently an increased number
of African states have atrophied and weapons have spilled over
their borders from armed conflicts throughout the region,
circulating virtually uncontrolled. This has allowed groups in any
number of countries to arm and challenge the incumbent elite
while the security agencies themselves, in many instances, have
decayed and lost their coherence.
It has long been evident that a number of African states are
either weak or exist as what some have referred to as ‘quasi-states’
– they exist mainly because they are recognized internationally as
existing, not because they perform the functions of a state or
share its attributes.
What will happen in this situation when one then
considers the AIDS epidemic raging across sub-Saharan Africa –
a tragedy of epic proportions and one that is altering the region’s
demographic future – reducing life expectancy, raising mortality,
lowering fertility, creating an excess of men over women, and
leaving millions of orphans in its wake?
Undoubtedly the impact of the epidemic will be
magnified by the fragility and complexity of the continent’s
geopolitical systems. Eleven of the world’s twenty-seven conflicts
are in Africa; fifteen sub-Saharan countries face food
emergencies; drought in East Africa threatens to exacerbate food
scarcity. These emergencies pose real threats to social and political
stability in Africa. United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan, told the Security Council at the beginning of 2000: ‘By
overwhelming the continent’s health and social services, by
creating millions of orphans, and by decimating health workers
and teachers, AIDS is causing social and economic crises which
in turn threaten political stability.’ 12
12 AIDS Becoming Africa’s Top Human Security Issue, UN Warns, Joint United
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) press release, 10 January 2000.
Available at http://www.unaids.org/whatsnew/press/eng/ pressarc00/ny10100.html
69

There are many unknowns in the effects of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in Africa. How will the loss of so many adults in rural
communities affect food security? What will be the social effects
of the missing generation of young adults unable to rear their
children? How will intra-African peace-keeping operations be
affected by the epidemic that disproportionately affects military
personnel? What impact will the virus have on the functioning of
state departments in already poorly performing criminal justice
systems in sub-Saharan Africa? How will 30 per cent to 40 per
cent of the adult population, who are HIV-positive and dying,
react when their government decides to spend limited state
resources on policing, education or housing instead of building
more hospitals and care centres for those infected by the virus?
I believe that the threat of HIV/AIDS underlines the
requirement for state-building and for the simultaneous
engagement of civil society. Strong, efficient and capable states
will remain the prerequisite for both stability and democracy in
Africa – the precondition for peace-building. But the experience
in Uganda demonstrates the degree to which only civil society
has the ability to engage in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
70

Second Round Table
The main challenges facing the promotion
of human security and peace in Europe
Moderator:
Mr Philippe Ratte,
Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO
Lecturer:
Mr Bjørn Møller,
Former Secretary-General,
International Peace Research Association (IPRA), Copenhagen, Denmark

Opening remarks
by the moderator, Mr Philippe Ratte,
Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO
A few words of introduction, if you will, before we hear
Mr Møller’s report, which he will present this afternoon.
Remember that the Second World War had not yet ended when
General de Gaulle decided to found the future and security of
France, and more generally of Europe, on the concept of civil
security. The purpose of the notion of civil security adopted
immediately after the war was to create within society a force and
a momentum that would ensure long-term peace. Let us recall
also that that war, the Second World War, was the result of a
bitter failure, the failure of collective security and the pacifist
principles that had inspired it for a good many years before it
collapsed with the failure of the League of Nations.
And then, need I call your attention – I rather hesitate to do
so after a meal which probably held an element of risk – to the fact
that what is in the news today is food security, or rather food
insecurity, and that if matters were taken to their logical extreme,
the only reasonable position would be perpetual fasting. So, to
extricate ourselves from this predicament, I would also like to call
your attention as etymologists to the fact that the concept of
security is a vague and curious one. The word comes from the Latin
securus, ‘free from care’, from se (without) and cura (care, concern);
and it is therefore a strange concept because it is based not on a
reality but on the concern we have about it, the preoccupation that
we have in relation to that reality. It is, in a sense, halfway between
two concepts which flank it, the concept of defence on the one side
– where, clearly, we react to aggression, to attack – and at the other
extreme the concept of safety, safety being an ontological position
in which we do not even have to worry about security.
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At this rather vague halfway point where we locate the
concept of security, I would like, perhaps being provocative, to
suggest that you think in contrary terms, in terms of ‘curity’. The
word does not exist, the concept does not exist, but it has to do
with taking care of something. Security is all well and good, but
it is tragic when it means neglecting the changeable and vague
situations that exist around us; the concept of security is only
valuable insofar as it inspires in us an attitude of ‘curity’, of care,
of concern about things.
We have many reasons to do this – and I would like to
mention just five areas in which this concept of security has its
rightful place. The first is our relation to others in the classical
tradition of the Peace of Westphalia – moreover, it is state
security that is going to be discussed here, I believe. In this case,
we protect ourselves against the risks that others might make us
run, ‘others’ being an extremely large category, and which, within
Europe itself, which is perhaps geopolitically the most stable part
of the world today, is not without some worrying aspects,
whether in the East, or recently in the Balkans, or perhaps in the
South. But there are two other dimensions that considerably
expand this relationship to others: the relationship, on the one
hand, to the world, and on the other hand, to oneself. First, the
dimension of the world, which is greater than the sum of its
parts, and which is a global, holistic phenomenon. We have just
witnessed the failure of the conference which was supposed to reexamine
our concerns about the greenhouse effect, and which
showed that states are unable, for the time being, to properly
manage a global situation as worrying as this. Opposite is the
dimension of the self, within societies, within nations, within
communities, where the most serious threats to security may exist
– drugs, sects, social breakdown, loss of points of reference, and
so forth.
I would like to add two additional dimensions: after others,
the world, the self, we have things: such as this amazing prion
which has no name in any language, these viruses or retroviruses
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which act inside things, this piercing anxiety we have about the
progress of science. This is the feeling that within things
themselves, within the physical reality of what we eat, of where
we go, of what we breathe, there may be very serious causes of
insecurity.
The final dimension is that of the future. Situations that
are very safe today, which give us a feeling of extreme security, can
change with time. I would therefore like to suggest a very simple
framework to structure our debates a little. In the classic
framework, we are in the middle and worried about our security
in relation to others or the security between others. The four
other dimensions, that which is known, i.e. the world and the
self, the two extremes, that which is greater than the state, that
which is smaller than the state (society, content, the individual,
moral reference points), and then, in the same duality, things and
the future, make up the five dimensions which may prompt us to
reflect on the question of security. A difficult reflection, which is
why it is fortunate that you are all here to debate the matter with
your competence and knowledge. I would like to illustrate this
difficulty with a second framework, before giving the floor to
those for whom it is intended.
Here is an example of another classic and extremely simple
framework for security. In the middle is the territory. Everyone
knows what a territory is, it has borders, it is limited, it is known.
Around the territory is the nation. A nation is larger than a
territory – it has interests, it has commercial dimensions, it has a
reputation, and so forth. And then, still larger than the nation, is
the defence system, which is projected outwards from the
territory and the nation to protect them as far as possible. Next
we have the ‘three Ss’: within the territory, the concept of internal
security; beyond the limits of defence, the concept of collective
security; and linking the two, that which is the most allencompassing
and the most internal, the problem of security,
which is much more complex, inasmuch as it involves values and
philosophical reference points, extremely subtle systems of
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international relations and legal values. This is a very comfortable
situation because we know where the concepts are, where the
problems are, and where the means of handling them are.
The trouble is that this situation no longer exists, and the
current situation, it seems to me, is much closer to a test for
colour-blindness, in which people who cannot distinguish
certain colours see only a mass of dots, a cloud of elements,
which is extremely confusing and chaotic. The sharpest eyes will
distinguish something resembling an S, but it may be a serpent,
or a dollar sign, or perhaps security, we don’t know.
76

National, Societal and Human Security:
General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
by Mr Bjørn Møller,
Former Secretary-General, International Peace Research Association (IPRA),
Copenhagen, Denmark
1 Preface
‘Human security’ has become something of a catchphrase,
used both by United Nations agencies, national development aid
agencies and international as well as national non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) has been in the forefront of this debate, as
illustrated by the following quotations:
‘The concept of security must change from an exclusive
stress on national security to a much greater stress on people’s
security, from security through armaments to security through
human development, from territorial security to food,
employment and environmental security’ (Human Development
Report 1993). 1
‘For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by
the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security
has been equated with the threats to a country’s borders. For too
long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most
people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries
about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event.
Job security, income security, health security, environmental
security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of
1 Human Development Report 1993: People’s Participation, New York, United
Nations Development Programme, 1993. Overview available at
http://www.undp.org/hdro/e93over.htm
77

human security all over the world. … Human security is relevant
to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor. The threats to
their security may differ – hunger and disease in poor nations and
drugs and crime in rich nations – but these threats are real and
growing. … Most people instinctively understand what security
means. It means safety from the constant threats of hunger,
disease, crime and repression. It also means protection from
sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives –
whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communities or in our
environment’ (Human Development Report 1994). 2
The Commission on Global Governance in its 1995
report on Our Global Neighbourhood likewise lent its support to
a reorientation towards human security:
‘Although it is necessary to continue to uphold the right of
states to security, so that they may be protected against external
threats, the international community needs to make the protection
of people and their security an aim of global security policy.’ 3
However, the academic community has been more
reluctant to embrace the concept of human security, perhaps out
of fear that doing so might blunt the edge of an otherwise sharp
analytical tool.
There is certainly some justification for this reluctance.
‘Security’ is such a positively value-laden term (in analogy with
‘peace’) that it is virtually impossible to argue against security.
With the exception of Hecate, who in Shakespeare’s Macbeth (Act 3,
Scene 5) described security as ‘mortals’ chiefest enemy’,
everybody has to be in favour of ‘security’, however defined.
Hence the temptation to subsume whatever is desirable
(‘motherhood and apple pie’) under it, which would surely do
little to enhance its analytical utility.
2 Human Development Report 1994, New Dimensions of Human Security, New
York, United Nations Development Programme, 1994. Overview available at
http://www.undp.org/hdro/e94over.htm
3 Our Global Neighbourhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 82.
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The following account analyses the development of the
theoretical use of the concept, from a rather narrow, state-centric
and militarized one (‘national security’), via one focusing on
national and other identities (‘societal security’), to a much wider
concept, including concerns for human rights, development,
gender issues, etc., labelled ‘human security’. In conclusion is an
illustration of how the different forms of security are interlinked,
with a look at national, societal and human security problems in
the Balkan conflicts.
2 From positivism to constructivism
International relations and peace research perspectives
As an academic term, ‘security’ was until fairly recently
almost monopolized by the discipline of international relations
(IR). IR theorists employed the term in a rather narrow sense,
i.e. as almost synonymous with military power. According to
this simplistic logic the more military power, or the more
favourable the military balance, the more security. Surprisingly
little was, however, written about the concept of security (as
opposed to presumed strategies for achieving it) by the IR
theoreticians. In his seminal work on Realism, Hans
Morgenthau thus hardly bothered to define ‘security’. 4 Arnold
Wolfers was thus almost alone in venturing a definition, which
has become ‘standard’:
4 The closest he came to a definition was: ‘National security must be defined as
integrity of the national territory and its institutions’, in Hans J. Morgenthau,
Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, p. 562, 3rd edition, New
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1960. In another connection, he added ‘culture’ to the list,
emphasizing that the ‘survival of a political unit in its identity’ (i.e. ‘security’)
constitutes ‘the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-à-vis
other units’. See ‘The Problem of the National Interest’ (1952), in idem, Politics in
the Twentieth Century, pp. 204–37 (quote from p. 219), Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1971.
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‘Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of
threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of
fear that such values will be attacked.’ 5
Even this definition leaves open a number of questions:
Whose values might be threatened? Which are these values? Who
might attack them? By what means? Whose fears should count?
How might one distinguish between sincere (albeit perhaps
unfounded) fears and faked ones? And should the ‘absence’ of
threats and/or fear be understood in absolute or (as indicated by
the term ‘measure’) relative terms? I shall return to most of these
questions in due course.
In contrast to IR, peace researchers have for decades
endeavoured to develop meaningful conceptions of peace,
security and violence 6 – a preoccupation that also reflects their
longstanding interest in development issues 7 and desire to break
5 Arnold Wolfers, ‘National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol’, in idem, Discord
and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics, pp. 147–65 (quote from p. 150),
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962.
6 See also Gert Krell, ‘The Development of the Concept of Security’, in Egbert
Jahn and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.), Elements of World Instability: Armaments,
Communication, Food, International Division of Labour, Proceedings of the
International Peace Research Association Eighth General Conference, pp. 238–54,
Frankfurt, Campus Verlag, 1981; Egbert Jahn, ‘From International Peace Research
to National Security Research’, in Nobel Jaap (ed.), The Coming of Age of Peace
Research. Studies in the Development of a Discipline, pp. 57–75, Groningen, Styx,
1991; Daniel Frei, ‘Was ist unter Frieden und Sicherheit zu verstehen?’, in Wolfgang
Heisenberg and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Sicherheitspolitik kontrovers. Frieden und
Sicherheit. Status quo in Westeuropa und Wandel in Osteuropa, Vol. 1, pp. 41–9, Bonn,
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1990; Carolyn Stephenson, ‘New
Conceptions of Security and their Implicatons for Means and Methods’, in
Katharine and Majid Tehranian (eds.), Restructuring for World Peace. On the
Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, pp. 47–61, Creskil, N.J., Hampton Press,
1992; Dietrich Fischer, Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach,
Aldershot, Dartmouth/United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1993.
See also Bjørn Møller, ‘Security Concepts: New Challenges and Risks’, Working
Papers, No. 18, Copenhagen, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1993.
7 See, for example, Johan Galtung, ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, Journal
of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1971, pp. 81–118; idem, ‘A Structural Theory of
Imperialism – Ten Years Later’, Millennium, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1980, pp. 183–96; idem,
The True Worlds. A Transnational Perspective, New York, Free Press, 1980; Peter
Lawler, A Question of Values. Johan Galtung’s Peace Research, pp. 70–9, Boulder,
80

those bonds of ethnocentrism that have always characterized
IR. 8
Both Johan Galtung’s term ‘positive peace’ and the late
Kenneth Boulding’s ‘stable peace’ could thus, in retrospect, be
seen as precursors of the emerging, expanded security concept. 9
For ‘security’ to be genuine and durable, it would have to be
based on a positive or stable peace structure. This would entail
considerably more than a mere ‘negative peace’, in its turn
equated with an absence of war, representing merely one
particular form of ‘direct violence’. Genuine peace and security
would thus presuppose an elimination (or at least a reduction) of
what Galtung called ‘structural violence’, i.e. the relative
deprivation of large parts of the world population. Thus
conceived, a ‘positive peace’ was more or less synonymous with
what is today referred to as ‘human security’ (vide infra).
Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; Arghiri Emmanuel, L’Échange Inégal, Paris, Maspero,
1969; Samir Amin, Le développement inégal, Paris, Editions du Minuit, 1973; idem,
L’accumulation à l’échelle mondiale, Vols. 1–2, Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1976;
Andre Gunter Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York,
Monthly Review Press, 1969; idem and Barry K. Gills (eds.), The World System. Five
Hundred Years or Five Thousand?, London, Routledge, 1996; Proceedings of the
International Peace Research Association Second Conference, Vol. I: ‘Studies in
Conflicts’, Vol. II: ‘Poverty, Development and Peace’, IPRA Studies in Peace
Research, Assen, Von Gorcum & Co., 1968.
8 Stephanie Neuman (ed.), International Relations Theory and the Third World,
New York, St Martin’s Press, 1998. On the US dominance of the discipline see also
Ole Wæver, ‘The Development of a Not So International Discipline: American and
European Developments in International Relations’, in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert
O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner (eds.), Exploration and Contestation in the
Study of World Politics, pp. 687–727, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1999.
9 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, in idem, Peace: Research,
Education, Action. Essays in Peace Research. Volume I, pp. 109–34, Copenhagen,
Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1975; idem, ‘Peace Research’, ibid., pp. 150–66; idem, ‘What
is Meant by Peace and Security? Some Options for the 1990s’, in idem,
Transarmament and the Cold War. Essays in Peace Research, Volume VI, pp. 61–71,
Copenhagen, Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1988. On ‘stable peace’, see Kenneth
Boulding, Stable Peace, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1978; or idem, ‘Moving
from Unstable to Stable Peace’, in Anatoly Gromyko and Martin Hellman (eds.),
Breakthrough. Emerging New Thinking, pp. 157–67, New York, Walker & Co., 1988.
81

Belatedly, members of the IR community have come to
accept the challenge of developing broader conceptions of security. 10
Barry Buzan and his collaborators (but not including the present
author) at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) have
belonged to the theoretical vanguard in this endeavour by virtue of
their analyses of national as well as ‘societal’ security (vide infra). 11
However, while acknowledging the need for shifting the focus from
the (now defunct) East-West conflict and military matters, 12 most
10 A good illustration of the development is the two consecutive versions of a
textbook on security studies, Richard Shultz, Ray Godson and Ted Greenwood (eds.),
Security Studies for the 1990s, Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, 1993; and Richard H. Shultz
Jr, Roy Godson and George H. Quester (eds.), Security Studies for the 21st Century,
Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, 1997. A precursor of the present debate was Richard
Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp.
162–77. Good overviews are Joseph E. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones: ‘International
Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field’, International
Security, Vol. 12, No. 4, Spring 1988, pp. 5–27; Sean Lynn-Jones, ‘The Future of
International Security Studies’, in Desmond Ball and David Horner (eds.), Strategic
Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, Series
‘Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence’, Vol. 89, pp. 71–107, Canberra, Strategic
and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National
University, 1992. See also Peter Mangold, National Security and International Relations,
London, Routledge, 1990; Ken Booth, ‘Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in
Theory and Practice’, International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, 1991, pp. 527–45; idem
(ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, London, Harper Collins,
1991; Michael Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.), World Security. Trends and Challenges
at Century’s End, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1991; Michael Clarke (ed.), New
Perspectives on Security, London, Brassey’s Defence Publishers/ Centre for Defence
Studies, 1993; G. Wyn Rees (ed.), International Politics in Europe. The New Agenda,
London, Routledge, 1993; Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick M.
Morgan, Security Studies Today, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999.
11 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies
in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edition, London/Boulder, Colo., Harvester
Wheatsheaf/Lynne Rienner, 1991; idem, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Ole
Wæver et al., The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era,
London, Pinter, 1990; Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre
Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London,
Pinter, 1993; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New
Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1998.
12 Good examples of ‘expanded strategic studies’ are Neville Brown, The Strategic
Revolution. Thoughts for the Twenty-First Century, London, Brassey’s Defence
Publishers, 1992; Lennart Souchon, Neue deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Herford,
Mittler Verlag, 1990.
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members of the ‘strategic studies’ (now often relabelled ‘security
studies’) community have continued their rearguard battle
against what they regard as an inappropriate expansion of the
concept of ‘security’.
Even though a consensus thus seems to be emerging on the
need for a certain widening, disagreement persists about where to
draw the line. To expand the notion of security too far – say, to
include the absence of all types of problem – would not be
practical, as it would merely create the need for an additional term
for ‘traditional security’, now relegated to being merely one species
of the genus ‘security’. Not to widen the concept at all, on the
other hand, might relegate ‘security studies’ to a very marginalized
position, if (as seems likely) traditional security problems will be
perceived as having a sharply diminishing salience – at the very
least as far as the West (or North) is concerned.
Social constructivism
The quest for a ‘correct’ definition of an ‘essentially
contested concept’ 13 such as ‘security’ is probably futile. Rather,
this is a matter of definitions, which may be more or less useful
or relevant, and which may both reflect and impact on power
relations, but which can be neither right nor wrong. One may
thus have to agree with Lewis Carroll’s fictitious Humpty
Dumpty in his linguistic philosophy:
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither
more nor less.’ ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can
make words mean so many things.’ ‘The question is,’ said
Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that’s all’ (Through the
Looking Glass). 14
13 W. B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, in Max Black (ed.), The
Importance of Language, pp. 121–46, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Praeger, 1962.
14 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass,
p. 274, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1962.
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The ‘Humpty Dumpties’ of political science and IR,
usually labelled ‘constructivists’, are probably right in rejecting as
futile the quest for concepts that are ‘correct’ in the sense of
corresponding to reality, if only because this ‘reality’ is itself
socially constructed, inter alia, by means of concepts such as
‘peace’ and ‘security’. Mindful of being part of the game oneself,
what the analyst can do is merely to analyse how concepts are
used, and how the security discourse is thus evolving. 15 As argued
by Ole Wæver and others, the challenge is to analyse the security
discourse as a complex ‘speech act’ (or Wittgensteinean ‘language
game’), i.e. to explore the evolving ‘securitization’ and
‘desecuritization’ of issues. 16 Among other advantages, this
15 A basic work on social constructivism is Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman
(1967), The Social Construction of Reality, London, Allen Lane. On this and various
‘postmodern’ approaches to IR theory see Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics:
A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner,
1994; John A. Vasquez, ‘The Post-positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific
Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment’s Fall’, in Ken
Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, pp. 217–40,
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang
Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge’, in
Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (eds.), op. cit. (note 8), pp. 215–46. For a
critique see Øyvind Østerrud, ‘Antinomies of Postmodernism in International
Studies’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, November 1996, pp. 385–90.
16 Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz
(ed.), On Security, pp. 46–86, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995; Buzan
et al., 1998, op. cit. (note 11). The notion of language games comes from Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Philisophische Untersuchungen, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953. Recent
works of a related constructivist or post-structuralist orientation include David
Campbell, Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,
revised edition, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998; Simon Dalby,
‘Rethinking Security: Ambiguities in Policy and Theory’, International Studies,
Burnaby, B.C., Dept. of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, 1991; K. M.
Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security,
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998; Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do
You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier’, European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 226–55; Lene Hansen, ‘A Case for
Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist Conceptualization of Security’,
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1997, pp. 369–97; Costas
M. Constantinou, ‘Poetics of Security’, Alternatives, Vol. 25, No. 3, July–September
2000, pp. 287–306. For a critique of the ‘Copenhagen School’(Buzan, Wæver and others)
84

approach induces caution with regard to elevating too many
problems to the status of ‘security problems’, which inevitably
has political implications, some of which may be undesirable.
• First, in the political discourse to label something a
‘security problem’ may be (ab)used by the powers that be for a
‘tabooization’ of issues and marginalization of ideological
opponents. A matter with alleged national security implications
is arguably ‘off limits’, i.e. not a totally legitimate subject for
political or academic debate, but one where everybody has to
show loyalty to ‘the common cause’. In order to prevent such a
closure of important debates, a relevant political goal might be a
‘desecuritization’ of pertinent issues, which may allow for a more
open and fruitful debate.
• Second, certain strata in society may benefit from
securitization, e.g. because they are traditionally viewed as
responsible for ‘security’, however defined. To securitize various
problems may thus provide the armed forces with a justification
for their claim on national resources, which may not be desirable.
‘Critical security studies’ devote themselves, inter alia, to
uncovering the interests and power games underlying the security
discourse. 17
On the other hand, to proclaim something to be a security
problem may certainly be justifiable, as it attaches a label of
urgency to an issue. Hence the attraction of, for example,
securitizing environmental problems, which is tantamount to
elevating a problem to one of ‘existential’ importance. Unless
for not being consistently constructivist see Bill McSweeney, ‘Security and Identity:
Buzan and the Copenhagen School’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1,
1996, pp. 81–93; idem, Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International
Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
17 See, for example, Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical
Security Studies. Concepts and Cases, London, UCL Press, 1997; Richard Wyn Jones,
Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1999; K. M.
Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security,
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998.
85

solved without delay such a problem may destroy all other values,
which warrants giving it absolute first priority. 18
Whether to expand the concept of security or not, and if so
in which direction and to what extent, is thus a matter of both
political choice and analytical convenience. In the following I
analyse how it might be expanded while paying a certain attention
to both the positive and negative political implications thereof.
3 Axes of expansion
In principle, expansion can take place along different ‘axes’, i.e.
as answers to various questions, which may be subdivided according
to how radically they depart from the prevailing orthodoxy.
• Security of whom? This is the question of focus, i.e. of
the appropriate ‘referent object’ (in the terminology of Buzan et
al., whereas Bill McSweeney prefers the term ‘subject’). 19 Three
types of entity immediately spring to mind which might be either
secure or insecure: the state, other human collectives, or the
individual, more about which shortly.
• Security of what? Depending on whose security is at
stake, security will be a matter of an absence of threats to different
values, i.e. it may have completely different connotations.
• Security from whom or what? This is the question of the
source of threat. Different values may obviously be placed in jeopardy
by different actors, in addition to which there may be numerous
18 A good example of this is the recent writings of Gwyn Prins, who argues in favour
of a reorientation of security studies to the environment. See, for example, idem,
‘Politics and the Environment’, International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4, 1990, pp. 711–30;
idem, ‘A New Focus for Security Studies’, in Ball and Horner (eds.), op. cit. (note 10),
pp. 178–222; idem, ‘Global Security and Military Intervention’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 27,
No. 1, March 1996, pp. 7–16; idem, ‘Security challenges for the 21st century’, NATO
Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 27–30; idem, ‘The Four- Stroke Cycle in
Security Studies’, International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 781–808.
19 Ole Wæver, ‘Self-referential Concepts of Security as an Instrument for
Reconstruction of an Open-ended Realism in IR’, in idem, Concepts of Security, pp.
347–73, Copenhagen, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1997;
Buzan et al., 1998, op. cit. (note 11), pp. 35–42; McSweeney, op. cit. (note 16), p. 87.
86

‘structural’ threats (global warming, for example) without any agents.
These might, in principle, also be securitized, but they rarely are.
My main emphasis is on these three questions (see Table 1),
and especially on that of focus, as this is where ‘human security’
represents the most radical departure from security studies orthodoxy.
However, I also briefly discuss three additional sets of questions:
Table 1: Expanded concepts of ‘security’
• Security from what? Depending on which values are
supposed to be threatened by whom (or what), these threats may
appear in different dimensions (or ‘sectors’), such as the military
domain, the environment, or the economy.
• Security by whom? This is a question of agency, as there
will be different answers to the question of who is supposed to
‘do security’, depending on all of the above. Moreover, this
question of agency has both a macro (international) and a micro
(sub-state) dimension. The former refers to the level at which
security is sought, e.g. by individual states, dyads or larger groups
of states, or the international system as such. The latter refers to
the abovementioned division of labour within society between
the ‘security services’ and the rest.
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• Security by which means? This is a question of both
strategies (or, rather, ‘grand strategies’) and of concrete plans
determining, for example, the relative importance of military and
other means to the end of security.
4 State-centric (‘national’) security
Most of the security discourse continues to revolve around
the state, but even here it makes sense to distinguish between
orthodox security studies and ‘alternative security studies’.
The orthodox version
What characterized the traditional IR approach to
‘security’, especially during the era of almost unchallenged
dominance of Realism and neorealism, 20 was a focus on the state
as the referent object of security, i.e. that entity which was
allegedly insecure, but should be made secure. Even though the
preferred term was ‘national’ security, this was a misnomer,
because nations are not the same as states, except in a score or so
of genuine nation-states (Japan, for example) where nation and
state happen to be (almost) coterminous. 21
20 For a historical account of ‘Realism’ see, for example, Michael Joseph Smith,
Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University
Press, 1986. The best example of classical Realism is Morgenthau, op. cit. (note 4).
Good examples of neorealism are Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics,
Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1979; Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World
Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; Robert O. Keohane (ed.),
Neorealism and its Critics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986; and Buzan,
op. cit. (note 11). See also Frankel Benjamin, (ed.), Roots of Realism, London, Frank
Cass, 1996; idem (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewal, London, Frank Cass,
1996; Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political
Economy. The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold, London, Routledge, 1998. For a
critique see John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics. From Classical Realism to
Neotraditionalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
21 Buzan, op. cit. (note 11), pp. 69–82. On the concept of ‘nation’ see, for
example, two excellent readers: John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.),
Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; idem and idem (eds.), Nationalism,
88

Even in those instances, however, the state, is an entity sui
generis, often portrayed as endowed with almost metaphysical
features or personified, i.e. treated as if it were an individual ‘writ
large’. Neither the interests nor the will of the state are thus
reducible to the sum of those of its citizens, but they are likewise sui
generis. 22 State security is, in the final analysis, only definable in
terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 23 What Realists have
really referred to has thus been the security of the territorial (rather
than nation-) state, which was indeed the principal actor in their
‘Westphalian’ universe. It was presumed (if only ‘for the sake of the
argument’) to be both universal and perennial. In fact it was neither,
but a historical product of fairly recent vintage and, until the latter
half of the twentieth century, a distinctly ‘northern’ phenomenon. 24
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. See also Ernst Gellner, Nations and
Nationalism, London, Basil Blackwell, 1983; Sukumar Periwal (ed.), Notions of
Nationalism, Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995; Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London,
Verso, 1991; Paul Brass, Nations and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison, London,
Sage, 1991; James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Houndsmills,
Macmillan, 1991; Charles Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New
Europe, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1995; Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and
Nationalism. Theory and Comparison, London, Sage, 1991.
22 On the notion of raison d’état see, for example, Friedrich Meinecke,
Machiavellism. The Doctrine of Raison d’Etat and its Place in Modern History,
Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1984. Besides Machiavelli, other ancestors of
modern Realism come close to a personification of the state, e.g. Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968, who describes the
Commonwealth as ‘the multitude so united in one person’ (p. 227). On the concept
of ‘national interest’ see Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas and Benjamin Frankel
(eds.), Origins of National Interests, London, Frank Cass, 1999.
23 R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993; Rodney Bruce Hall, ‘Territorial and
National Sovereigns: Sovereign Identity and Consequences for Security Policy’,
Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2/3, Winter 1998/Spring 1999, pp. 145–97.
24 On European state-building see Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European
States, AD 990–1990, Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1990; Anthony Giddens, The
Nation-State and Violence, Oxford, Polity Press, 1995; Bruce Porter, War and the Rise
of the State, New York, Free Press, 1994; Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its
Competitors, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1994. See also Michael
Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State.
89

The international system, in its turn, was supposed to be
anarchic, i.e. lacking in supranational authority and consisting of
sovereign states, each pursuing its ‘national’ interest ‘defined in
terms of power’ or, somewhat more modestly, in terms of security
in the sense of state survival. Furthermore, this universe was
characterized by perpetual strife, as national interests inevitably
collided, hence the pervasiveness of competition, conflict and war. 25
As states were thus inherently insecure, they were well
advised to make sure that their power would suffice to parry threats
from other states to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. As far
as the system as such was concerned, the best safeguard of peace
would presumably be a ‘balance of power’. 26 As pointed out by
critics, such balance is inherently difficult to define, and well-nigh
impossible to achieve or preserve. Hence, such an anarchical
system had an inherent propensity for arms races and war. 27
The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty, University Park, Pa.,
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty.
Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1999. On the
‘export’ of the European state model to the developing world see Mohammed
Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and
the International System, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; Christopher
Clapham, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and
the State of War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
25 The best example is Waltz, op. cit. (note 20). For a critique see Alexander
Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391–425.
26 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, 1955, reprint, New
York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1967, passim; Arnold Wolfers, ‘The Balance of Power in
Theory and Practice’, in idem, op. cit. (note 5), pp. 117–31; Michael W. Doyle, Ways
of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, pp. 161–94, New York, W. W.
Norton & Co., 1997; Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power. History and Theory,
London, Routledge, 1996. For a critique see Vasquez, op. cit. (note 20), pp. 249–86.
27 K. J. Holsti, ‘The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations’ (1964),
in Robert L. Pfalztgraff Jr (ed.), Politics and the International System, 2nd edition, pp.
181–95, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1972; Ernst B. Haas, ‘Balance of Power:
Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?’, pp. 452–80, 1953, ibid.; Robert Neild, An
90

While most ‘Realists’ have placed the main emphasis on
military threats, hence also on military strength as the most
reliable safeguard of ‘national security’, a few authors have held a
somewhat broader view of state security, for example by
including the economic dimension of security. 28 Such ‘economic
security’, however, may mean (at least) two rather different
things. 29 Either it may be understood narrowly as referring to the
economic foundations of military power, or it may be seen as an
aspect (or dimension) of security in its own right.
• Economic power is eminently ‘fungible’ in the sense that
it may be transformed into almost anything, including military
strength. Money can thus buy a state weapons from abroad, and
economic strength may increase productivity, thus allowing for a
transfer of labour from the civilian sphere into that of arms
production or armed service. In the final analysis, wealth is thus
tantamount to military mobilization potential, if not in the short
term then at least in the medium to long term. 30
London, Macmillan, 1990; Bjørn Møller, ‘From Arms to Disarmament Races:
Disarmament Dynamics after the Cold War’, in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.), The New
Agenda for Peace Research, pp. 83–104, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999.
28 An example of this is Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; idem, ‘The Economic Dimension of
International Security’, in Henry Bienen (ed.), Power, Economics, and Security. The
United States and Japan in Focus, pp. 51–68, Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1992;
Kenneth Waltz also included economic factors in his ‘aggregate capabilities’, for
example in op. cit. (note 20), pp. 129–31. For a recent attempt at measuring such
aggregate strength see Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne and Melissa
McPherson, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age, Santa Monica,
Calif., RAND, 2000.
29 See, for example, Bienen (ed.), op. cit. (note 28), cf. Buzan, op. cit., 1991 (note
11), pp. 230–69.
30 See, for example, Klaus Knorr, ‘The Determinants of Military Power’, in
Bienen (ed.), op. cit. (note 28), pp. 69–133; which is an update on idem, The War
Potential of Nations, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1956. The
archetypal example of such a potential military giant with modest standing armed
forces or military expenditures, hence with an unexploited mobilization potential is,
of course, Japan. See, for example, Michael W. Chinworth, Inside Japan’s Defense.
91

• Economic strength may also be seen as a viable
functional substitute for military power, both for offensive and
defensive purposes. Economic warfare may thus be employed to
cripple the economy of an adversarial state, thereby indirectly
also its military potential, as in the case of blockades or economic
sanctions. 31 Conversely, economic strength may be a powerful
contribution to national security, as it may render the state
invulnerable to such warfare. Certain peace researchers (Galtung
and others) have therefore advocated economic self-sufficiency as
a means of ‘defence’, i.e. of national security. 32
Technology, Economics and Strategy, McLean, Virginia, Brassey’s, 1992; Craig C.
Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (eds.), Japan. A New Kind of Superpower, Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; Michael J. Green, Arming Japan. Defense
Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1995; Glenn D. Hook, Militarisation and
Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan, London, Routledge, 1996; Thomas M.
Huber, Strategic Economy in Japan, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1994; Ron
Matthews and Keisuke Matsuyama (eds.), Japan’s Military Renaissance?, New York,
St Martin’s Press, 1993; Neil Renwick, Japan’s Alliance Politics and Defence
Production, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1995; Richard J. Samuels, ‘Rich Nation,
Strong Army’. National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, Ithaca,
N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1994.
31 On sanctions see, for example, Donald G. Boudreau, ‘Economic Sanctions and
Military Force in the Twenty- First Century’, European Security, Vol. 6, No. 2,
Summer 1997, pp. 28–46; Elizabeth S. Rogers, ‘Using Economic Sanctions to
Control Regional Conflicts’, Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, Summer 1996, pp.
43–72; Kimberly Ann Elliott, ‘The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely
Empty’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 50–65; Robert A.
Pape, ‘Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work’, ibid., pp. 66–77; Franklin L.
Lavin, ‘Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma’, Foreign Policy, Vol. 104,
Fall 1996, pp. 139–53; David Cortright and George A. Lopez (eds.), Economic
Sanctions. Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, Boulder, Colo.,
Westview Press, 1995; Ernest H. Preeg, Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions.
Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the U.S. National Interest, Washington, D.C.,
CSIS Press, 1999; Geoff Simons, Imposing Economic Sanctions. Legal Remedy or
Genocidal Tool?, London, Pluto Press, 1999.
32 Johan Galtung, There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to Peace and Security, p. 13,
Nottingham, Spokesman, 1984; Dietrich Fischer, Preventing War in the Nuclear Age,
pp. 142–53, Totowa, N.J., Rowman & Allanheld, 1984; idem, Wilhelm Nolte and
Jan Øberg, Frieden gewinnen. Mit autonomen Initiativen den Teufelskreis
durchbrechen, pp. 195–99, Freiburg, Dreisam Verlag, 1987.
92

Moderate alternatives
Proposals for a modification of this security strategy
without any radical rejection of its premises, and certainly
without shifting the focus from state security, have been voiced
(at least) since the early 1980s, inter alia under the label
‘Common Security’. The term was promulgated in the Palme
Commission’s 1982 report Common Security. A Blueprint for
Survival. Its main message was that security under conditions of
anarchy and high levels of armaments required ‘mutual restraint
and proper appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age’, in the
absence of which ‘the pursuit of security can cause intensified
competition and more tense political relations and, at the end of
the day, a reduction in security for all concerned’. Furthermore,
‘the security – even the existence – of the world [was
acknowledged as] interdependent’, hence the admonition that
‘security can be attained only by common action’. 33 Common
Security was thus envisaged as a way of resolving (or perhaps
better: circumventing or transcending) the well-known ‘security
dilemma’, about which so much has been written by IR scholars,
not least by Realists. 34
The growing number of references to Common Security
(alternatively labelled ‘security partnership’, ‘mutual security’,
33 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common
Security. A Blueprint for Survival, pp. 138, 5, 7, 9, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1982.
34 John M. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and
Realities, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1951, passim; idem, ‘Idealist
Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, No. 2, 1950,
pp. 157–80; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics,
pp. 58–93, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1976; cf. idem,
‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1978, pp.
167–214; Buzan, op. cit., 1991 (note 11), pp. 294–327; Charles L. Glaser, ‘The
Security Dilemma Revisited’, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997, pp.
171–201; Randall L. Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status- Quo Bias: What Security
Dilemma?’, in Frankel (ed.), Realism, op. cit. (note 20), pp. 90–121. The most
elaborate study of the security dilemma is Alan Collins, The Security Dilemma and
the End of the Cold War, Edinburgh, Keele University Press, 1997.
93

‘reciprocal security’ or ‘cooperative security’) in political
statements as well as in the academic literature was,
unfortunately, not matched by any rigorous theoretical analysis
of the implications of the concept. 35 Some (including the present
author) advocated a rather austere, minimalistic and
parsimonious concept of Common Security, tantamount to little
more than an admonition to mutual restraint. This presupposes
neither any abandonment of competition in favour of
cooperation nor any far-reaching institutionalization – much less
a rejection of the ‘Realist’ premises.
Thus conceived, Common Security would be little more
than an special instance of ‘cooperation among adversaries’, i.e. a
form of ‘regime’ entirely compatible with the teachings of both
‘soft Realism’, ‘liberal institutionalism’, 36 and the so-called
35 Among the theoretical analyses, the following deserve mention: Raimo
Väyrynen (ed.), Policies for Common Security, London, Taylor & Francis, 1985; Egon
Bahr and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu
den Ausgangsüberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer
Sicherheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986; Richard Smoke, ‘A
Theory of Mutual Security’, in idem and Andrei Kortunov (eds.), Mutual Security. A
New Approach to Soviet-American Relations, pp. 59–111, London, Macmillan, 1991;
Kurt Gottfried et al., Towards a Cooperative Security Regime in Europe, Ithaca, N.Y.,
Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1989; Kurt Gottfried and Paul Bracken
(eds.), Reforging European Security. From Confrontation to Cooperation, Boulder,
Colo., Westview Press, 1990; Janne Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement. Cooperation
and Security in the 21st Century, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press,
1994.
36 On cooperation among adversaries see Helen Milner, ‘Review Article:
International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses’,
World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, April 1992, pp. 466–96. Good examples of this
tradition include Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, Vol.
36, No. 2, Spring 1982, pp. 357–78; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation,
New York, Basic Books, 1984; Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance
and Choice in International Relations, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1990;
Charles L. Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help’, in Frankel (ed.),
Realism, op. cit., (note 20), pp. 122–63. On regimes see Stephen D. Krasner (ed.),
International Regimes, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1982; Harald Müller,
Die Chance der Kooperation. Regime in den internationalen Beziehungen, Darmstadt,
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993; Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and
International Relations, Oxford, Clarendon Paperbacks, 1995; Andreas Hasenclever,
94

‘English School’ notions of ‘international society’. 37 Moreover, it
did not automatically entail any broader notion of security, but
signified little more than the same type of security, only to be
achieved by other, less confrontational means. The state
remained the referent object of security and the focus remained
on threats from other states, including (or perhaps even
primarily) military threats, against which a military defence was
still deemed indispensable. For which purpose Common Security
proponents tended to advocate ‘non-offensive defence’ (NOD,
also known as ‘defensive defence’ or ‘non-provocative defence’). 38
Other Common Security proponents went further,
seeking to subsume a very broad panoply of security strategies
under Common Security, and typically also emphasizing the
need for broader concepts of security, including development,
ecological security, etc. Laudable though such endeavours
Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge
Studies in International Relations, Vol. 55, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1997. On liberal institutionalism see Robert O. Keohane, ‘Neoliberal
Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics’, in idem (ed.), International
Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, pp. 1–20,
Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989; idem, Lisa L. Martin, ‘The Promise of
Institutionalist Theory’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp.
39–51; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International
Institutionalism, London, Routledge, 1998.
37 Martin Wight, Systems of States, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977;
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, London,
Macmillan, 1977; Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Hedley Bull on
International Society, London, Macmillan, 2000; Adam Watson, The Evolution of
International Society, London, Routledge, 1992; Tim Dunne, Inventing International
Society: A History of the English School, London, Macmillan, 1998.
38 Bjørn Møller, Common Security and Non-Offensive Defense. A Neorealist
Perspective, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1992; idem, Resolving the Security
Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defense, London, Brassey’s
Defence Publishers, 1991; idem, The Dictionary of Alternative Defense, Boulder,
Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; or Egon Bahr and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Gemeinsame
Sicherheit. Konventionelle Stabilität. Bd. 3: Zu den militärischen Aspekten Struktureller
Nichtangriffsfähigkeit im Rahmen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988.
95

certainly were, very little was achieved in terms of rigorous
theoretical analysis. 39
Another extension of the state-centric concept of security
was that of ‘Collective Security’, which is both more and less
radical than (some versions of) Common Security. Less radical in
the sense of being conceived of as a counter to the traditional
state-versus-state military threats, yet more radical by envisaging
a transfer of powers from the state to supranational authorities,
i.e. a partial relinquishment of sovereignty. Whereas collective
security was until recently dismissed as irrelevant by most of the
IR community (because of its poor achievement in the inter-war
years), 40 it was being taken increasingly seriously in the
immediate aftermath of the Cold War. 41 So far, however, the
39 Egon Bahr and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Dimensionen und
Disziplinen. Bd. 2: Zu rechtlichen, ökonomischen, psychologischen und militärischen
Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987;
Dieter S. Lutz and Elmar Schmähling (eds.), Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale
Diskussion. Bd. 5: Beiträge und Dokumente aus Ost und West, Baden-Baden, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990.
40 Cf. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939. An Introduction
to the Study of International Relations, 2nd edition 1946, New York, Harper
Torchbooks, 1964; Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress
of International Organization, 4th edition, pp. 21–40, New York, Random House,
1984; George W. Downs, ‘Beyond the Debate on Collective Security’, in idem (ed.),
Collective Security Beyond the Cold War, pp. 1–13, Ann Arbor, Mich., University of
Michigan Press, 1994; Charles Lipson, ‘Is the Future of Collective Security Like the
Past?’, ibid., pp. 105–31.
41 Dieter S. Lutz (ed.), Kollektive Sicherheit in und für Europa: Eine Alternative?
Beiträge zur Utopie und Umsetzung einer neuen Friedens- und Sicherheitsprogrammatik.
Pro und Contra, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1985; idem, Sicherheit
2000. Gemeinsame Sicherheit im Übergang vom Abschreckungsregime zu einem System
Kollektiver Sicherheit in und für Europa, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
1991; Dieter Senghaas, Europa 2000. Ein Friedensplan, Frankfurt am Main,
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990; Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Beyond the Alliance System’, World
Policy Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 215–50; Robert C. Johansen, ‘Lessons
for Collective Security’, ibid., Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 561–74; Charles A.
Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, ‘Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of
Europe’, International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991, pp. 114–61; idem and
idem, ‘The Promise of Collective Security’, ibid., Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp.
52–61; Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Collective Security in a Changing World, Boulder, Colo.,
96

1991 war against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait remains the
only real-life example of a collective security operation, and the
victorious West’s systematic undermining of UN authority does
not bode well for its future. 42 Even if it should miraculously be
given another chance, however, even collective security would do
little to address other security problems. It does not
fundamentally address the motives for aggression, but merely
seeks to dissuade attack by deterrence and/or defence; and it does
nothing to change, but rather tends to perpetuate, the
‘Westphalian’ state system with all its detrimental implications
for other forms of security (vide infra).
State security: the indirect approach
The latter critique does not really apply to the more
radical alternative strategy for state security that might be called
‘the indirect approach to state security’, borrowing from the
terminology of Basil Liddell Hart. 43
Lynne Rienner, 1993; Andrew Butfoy, ‘Themes Within the Collective Security Idea’,
The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 490–510;
Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, ‘Collective Security and State Survival in
the Interstate System’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 1994,
pp. 33–59; Bjørn Møller, ‘Multinationality, Defensivity and Collective Security’, in
Jörg Calließ (ed.), Rüstung – Wieviel? Wozu? Wohin?, Loccumer Protokolle, No. 63/93,
pp. 251–90, Rehburg-Loccum, Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1994; idem, ‘UN
Military Demands and Non-Offensive Defence. Collective Security, Humanitarian
Intervention and Peace Operations’, Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2,
December 1996, pp. 1–20. For a more sceptical view, see Richard K. Betts, ‘Systems
for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New
Europe’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992, pp. 5–43; Mark T.
Clark, ‘The Trouble with Collective Security’, Orbis, Vol. 39, No. 2, Spring 1995,
pp. 237–58; Josef Joffe, ‘Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed
Dreams and Dead Ends’, Survival, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 36–50.
42. For an elaboration see Bjørn Møller, ‘The Slippery Slope of Authority Eroded:
A Rejoinder’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 1999, pp. 87–90; idem, ‘The
United States and “the New World Order”’, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 11,
Nos. 1–2, June and December 1998, pp. 77–118.
43. Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy. The Indirect Approach, 2nd revised edition, 1967
reprint, New York, Signet Books, 1974.
97

The furthering of interdependence, even to the point of
integration, is such an indirect approach to state security,
addressing primarily the motivation for aggression and doing so
almost entirely by non-military means, thus representing a ‘soft
security’ strategy. This has, for example, been Second round table
National, societal and human security: General discussion with a
case study from the Balkans 45the predominant approach to
security taken by the European Union ever since its infancy. 44 The
underlying understanding has been that a web of mutual
interdependencies may serve as a powerful inhibition against war,
in perfect conformity with the tenets of ‘classical’ liberalism, as well
as with the writings of Norman Angell, and modern analysts of
‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Nye, among others). 45
44 Ernst Haas, International Political Communities, pp. 93–110, New York,
Anchor Books, 1966; Roger Hansen, ‘Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade
of Theoretical Efforts’, in Michael Hodges (ed.), European Integration, pp. 184–99,
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1972; Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, ‘Neofunctionalism:
Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New
Dynamism of the EC’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1,
1991, pp. 1–22.
45 On the ‘classics’ see Crauford D. Goodwin, ‘National Security in Classical
Political Economy’, in idem (ed.), Economics and National Security. A History of Their
Interaction, pp. 23–35, Durham, Duke University Press, 1991; Doyle, op. cit. (note
26), pp. 230–50. On the modern ‘liberal peace’ theorem see, for example, Edward D.
Mansfield, Power, Trade and War, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1994.
On complex interdependence, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and
Interdependence. World Politics in Transition, Boston, Mass., Little, Brown, 1977; and
for a historical survey, Jaap de Wilde, Saved From Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in
the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex
Interdependence, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1991. See also Hylke, Tromp,
‘Interdependence and Security: the Dilemma of the Peace Research Agenda’, Bulletin
of Peace Proposals, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1988, pp. 151–8; Ernst B. Haas, ‘War,
Interdependence and Functionalism’, in Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), The Quest for Peace.
Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies, Cultures and States, pp.
108–27, London, Sage, 1987; Katherine Barbieri, ‘Economic Interdependence: A
Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33,
No. 1, February 1996, pp. 29–49; John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz and
Bruce Russett, ‘The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International
Conflict, 1950–85’, ibid., pp. 11–28; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, ‘The
Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict,
1950–1985’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 267–94.
98

From its modest start with the European Coal and Steel
Community, via the Rome Treaty and the European Economic
Community (EEC) to the present EU, the ‘European project’ has
thus all along been motivated by the quest for peace, as was made
explicit in the 1952 Schuman Declaration:
‘World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of
creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. …
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan.
It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a
de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe
requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and
Germany. … The pooling of coal and steel production should
immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations
for economic development as a first step in the federation of
Europe. … The solidarity in production thus established will
make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes
not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.’ 46
These considerations remain as valid today as they were
then. The EU has already proceeded way beyond the ‘Westphalian
model’, and is today more than a ‘pluralistic security community’
in the traditional sense. Whether its progressive amalgamation
will eventually produce a new ‘superstate’, or a polity sui generis
remains to be seen, but it is surely a solid security community
where traditional security concerns among the members have
receded into near oblivion, 47 i.e. a zone of stable peace. 48
46 Robert Schuman, ‘The Schuman Declaration’, in Brent F. Nelsen and
Alexander C.-G. Stubb (eds.), The European Union. Readings on the Theory and
Practice of European Integration, pp. 11–12, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1994.
See also David Mitrany, ‘A Working Peace System’, ibid., pp. 77–97.
47 The classic work on security communities is Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political
Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of
Historical Experience, pp. 3–90, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957.
On the EU project see Ole Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West
European Non-War Community’, in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.),
Security Communities, pp. 69–118, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998;
99

The limitations of state-centric security
The Realist worldview upon which all of the above
strategies were premised was not merely bleak and probably
incorrect. With the exception of the aforementioned ‘indirect
approach’, it also invited the development of strategies that were
counterproductive in the sense of sacrificing other human values
for those of the sovereignty and territorial inviolability of the
state. So-called ‘national security’ was thus achieved at the
expense of ‘human security’.
National (i.e. state) security was, moreover, all too often
equated with the security of the regime in power. Contrary to the
Hobbesian view of the state, if controlled by an unscrupulous
regime the state often ceases to be a protector of its citizens and
becomes a security threat to them, as in the case of various
African ‘vampire states’ 49 or totalitarian regimes. 50 However, the
rules of the game of ‘Westphalia’ privilege existing states,
regardless of their nature, and proscribe interference into
‘domestic affairs’, i.e. everything taking place within the
territorially defined exclusive domain of the sovereign states
comprising the system. Within this protected domain numerous
unspeakable atrocities have been committed, and human security
thus violated with impunity.
idem, ‘Integration as Security: Constructing a Europe at Peace’, in Charles Kupchan
(ed.), Atlantic Security: Contending Visions, pp. 45–63, New York, Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 1998.
48 On zones of peace see Max Singer and Aaron Wildawsky, The Real World Order.
Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil, Chatham, N.J., Chatham House Publishers, 1993.
49 The term stems from George B. N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, New York, St
Martin’s Press, 1998. See also William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States,
Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1998.
50 A contemporary example is Iraq. See Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear. The
Politics of Modern Iraq, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1998. On the
equation of Saddam’s cause with that of the nation, ‘Arabism’ and even Islam see
Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word. The Political Discourse in Iraq, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1998.
100

More recently, there has been some movement on this
issue. To the extent that UN forces [or those of other
international organizations, such as the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)] have not ‘merely’ been
employed for restoring peace between states, but also within
states, or for safeguarding human rights there, they might be seen
as harbingers of a modified international system with an
amended set of rules. In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, the UN
Secretary-General thus included the following cautious
formulation:
‘The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain
the state. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity
are crucial to any common international progress. The time of
absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory
was never matched by reality.’ 51
A ‘new world order’ would, however, no longer be based
on sovereign states with impermeable borders, but would be a
truly global one in which ‘international politics’ is replaced by
‘domestic politics on a global scale’ (Weltinnenpolitik) where
human security (vide infra) might receive its due priority. 52
51 Boutros-Boutros Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace- Keeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the
Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January
1992’, in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations, Divided
World. The UN’s Role in International Relations, new expanded edition, pp. 468–98,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993.
52 Recent works about the possible modification, or even abandonment of the
‘Westphalian order’ of sovereign states include J. A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End
of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, London, Edward
Elgar, 1992; Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild
and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa,
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1996; Michael Ross Fowler and
Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State. The Evolution and
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty, University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1995; Luis E. Lugo (ed.), Sovereignty at the Crossroads. Morality and
International Politics in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield,
1996; Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia?
101

However, it remains to be seen whether those isolated instances
of ‘humanitarian interventions’ that the world has seen so far are
in fact harbingers of such a new order, or merely aberrations from
‘business as usual’ attributable to the confusion of the present
transitional period – or oldfashioned power politics dressed up as
humanitarianism. 53
5 From ‘national’ to societal security
Whereas most Realists and neorealists deny the
importance of individual security, charging this approach with
‘reductionism’, 54 some of them nevertheless acknowledge the
inadequacy of the state-centric approach.
Threats to identity
The so-called ‘Copenhagen School’ thus advocates
accepting human collectivities as possible ‘referent objects’ of
security. The particular form of security applicable to such
National Sovereignty and International Intervention, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995; Mortimer Sellers (ed.), The New World Order. Sovereignty,
Human Rights and the Self- Determination of Peoples, Oxford, Berg, 1996.
53 On humanitarian intervention see, for example, Nigel Rodley (ed.), To Loose
the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights,
London, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1992; Richard Connaughton, Military
Intervention in the 1990s. A New Logic of War, London, Routledge, 1992; Ariel E.
Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (eds.), Foreign Military Intervention.
The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict, New York, Columbia University Press, 1992;
Michael J. Mazarr, ‘The Military Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention’, Security
Dialogue, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 1993, pp. 151–62; Adam Roberts, ‘Humanitarian
War: Military Intervention and Human Rights’, International Affairs, Vol. 69, No.
3, July 1993, pp. 429–50; Jonathan Moore (ed.), Hard Choices. Moral Dilemmas in
Humanitarian Intervention, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1998; John
Williams, ‘The Ethical Basis of Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council
and Yugoslavia’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 1–23.
On Kosovo see the concluding chapter.
54 See, for example, Waltz, op. cit. (note 20), pp. 60–7; idem, Man, the State and
War. A Theoretical Analysis, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.
102

collective, yet non-state, referent objects is labelled ‘societal
security’, which in the seminal work on the topic was defined as
‘… the ability of a society to persist in its essential character
under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More
specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions
for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association,
and religious and national identity and custom.’ 55
‘Societal security’ is thus a matter of ‘identity’, which has
indeed become quite a fashionable topic in IR theory. 56 It resonates
quite well with the rediscovery of the cultural aspects of international
relations (viz. the ‘clash of civilizations’ debate), 57 just as it corresponds
to the actual ‘securitization’ of such phenomena as migration or
‘cultural imperialism’ (viz. the debate about ‘franglais’ as a threat to
55 Ole Wæver, ‘Societal Security: the Concept’, in idem et al., op. cit. (note 11),
pp. 17–40 (quote from p. 23). See also Barry Buzan, ‘Societal Security, State Security
and Internationalization’, ibid., pp. 41–58.
56 Ole Wæver, ‘Identities’, in Judit Balázs and Håkan Wiberg (eds.), Peace Research
for the 1990s, pp. 135–50, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1993; Yosef Lapid and
Friedrich Kratochwill, ‘Revisiting the “National”, Toward an Identity Agenda in
Neorealism’, in idem and idem (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory,
pp. 105–26, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; Anthony D. Smith, ‘The
Formation of National Identity’, in Henry Harris (ed.), Identity. Essays Based on
Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford, pp. 129–53, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1995; Helena Lindholm, ‘Introduction: A Conceptual Discussion’,
in idem (ed.), Ethnicity and Nationalism. Formation of Identity and Dynamics of
Conflict in the 1990s, pp. 1–39, Göteborg, Nordnes, 1993; David Keithly, ‘Security
and Ersatz Identity’, European Security, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 80–96; Paul
A. Kowert, ‘National Identity: Inside and Out’, Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2/3,
Winter 1998/Spring 1999, pp. 1–34; Iver B. Neumann, ‘Identity and the Outbreak
of War’, International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 3. No. 1, January 1998, pp. 7–22;
Michael E. Williams, ‘Identity and the Politics of Security’, European Journal of
International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 204–25.
57 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996. For a critique see Stephen Chan, ‘Too
Neat and Under-thought a World Order: Huntington and Civilizations’,
Millennium, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1997, pp. 137–40; David A. Welch, ‘The “Clash of
Civilizations” Thesis as an Argument and as a Phenomenon’, Security Studies, Vol. 6,
No. 4, Summer 1997, pp. 197–216; Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal and
Michaelene Cox, ‘Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some
Evidence’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5, September 2000, pp. 583–608.
103

French culture). 58 Unfortunately, it also holds the potential of
appealing to xenophobic political groupings on the extreme right
with whom the authors surely do not want to join ranks.
Combined with the aforementioned methodology of
discourse analysis and the postmodern rejection of ‘objectivist
ethics’, 59 one might fear that the theory (however inadvertently)
may simply lead to ‘rubber-stamping’ all assertions of threats to
national (or ethnic) security as equally valid. If there are no
objective yardsticks against which to measure such allegations,
the analyst is confined to merely recording what is being
securitized, perhaps by opportunistic leaders seeking power by
playing the ‘nationalist card’ in a manipulatory fashion, as did
such figures as Slobodan Milosevich or Franko Tudjman. 60 If
‘anything goes’ then the analyst must be prepared for this:
‘If total moral relativism, which is undeniably one of the
options of postmodernity, gains the upper hand, even the assessment
of mass deportation and genocide becomes a matter of taste.’ 61
58 René Étiemble, Parlez-vous Franglais?, Paris, Gallimard, 1973. See also Maxim
Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation. Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in
Modern France, London, Routledge, 1992; Ulla Holm, ‘Det franske nationsbegrebs
betydning for franske indvandrerdiskurser’, forthcoming in Peter Seeberg (ed.), No
Title, Odense, Odense Universitetsforlag, 2001.
59 See, for example, Mike Featherston, ‘In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An
Introduction’, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 5, Nos. 2–3, June 1988, pp.
195–215; Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fehér, The Postmodern Political Condition,
Oxford, Polity Press, 1988. On (the lack of) postmodern ethics see Paul Saurette, ‘“I
Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them”: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the
Will to Order in International Relations Theory’, Millennium, Vol. 25, No. 1,
Spring 1996, pp. 1–28. For an attempted rebuttal of the charges against
postmodernism see Jim George, ‘Realist “Ethics”: International Relations and
Postmodernism: Thinking Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy Thematic’, ibid., Vol. 24,
No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 195–223.
60 John A. Hall, ‘Nationalisms, Classified and Explained’, in Sukumar Periwal
(ed.), Notions of Nationalism, pp. 8–33, Budapest, Central European University
Press, 1995; Ernst B. Haas, ‘Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction’,
Millennium, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1993, pp. 505–45; Maurice Pearton, ‘Notions in
Nationalism’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1–15. On the
Balkans see the concluding chapter.
61 Heller and Fehér, op. cit. (note 59), p. 9.
104

This moral nihilism is part of the critique raised by Bill
McSweeney against the Copenhagen School. Another part of his
critique is the continuing focus of the state, not as the sole
referent object, but as the mechanism through which all
securitization attempts have to pass. Finally, the ‘school’ (if so it
is) is criticized for privileging some possible identities over others,
namely national and ethnic ones. Rather than assuming a priori
that these are always the most salient identities, the analyst
should adopt a scientific approach, requiring actual sociological
investigations into how people rank-order their various
identities. 62
With these caveats in mind, the theory of societal security
seems to have some merits, as it allows for a better understanding
of certain recent phenomena than traditional security analysis.
Much of the recent discourse about ‘risks’ as opposed to ‘threats’
may, for example, really reflect societal security concerns for
national unity, as do the (alleged) new types of threats such as that
from Islam (vide infra). Of course, the various societal
developments referred to in this discourse also impinge on the
state level in various ways, yet to make this their ‘admission ticket’
into the field of ‘security problems’ is often rather far-fetched.
Run-away population growth has, for example, been
singled out by some authors as perhaps the most serious security
problem for the decades ahead, 63 if only because of the
‘Malthusian’ implications of a growing discrepancy between the
available resources for consumption and the much-fastergrowing
number of would-be consumers. This may certainly
constitute a (human) security problem in its own right,
particularly of course for the losers in the competition for scarce
global resources, but also with implications for the winners.
62 McSweeney, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 68–78.
63 See, for example, Pierre Lellouche, Le nouveau monde. De l’ordre de Yalta au
désordre des nations, pp. 257–305, Paris, Grasset, 1992.
105

It might, for example, become a societal security
problem for the North if resource depletion in the South
should lead to a tidal wave of migration to the North. 64
Whereas it strains the imagination to envision, say, countries
such as Denmark being more than marginally affected by this,
countries in the borderland between North and South (such as
the entire Mediterranean region) might well be more seriously
affected. Migration may also flow in the East-West direction,
not so much as a reflection of a population surplus, as because
of a deficit of resources, say if the economic transformation
embarked upon since 1989 should fail completely. One might,
for example, envisage migration from the former Soviet Union
to Poland, and/or from the latter or the Czech Republic to
Germany. If sufficiently massive, such migration flows might
conceivably place national identity in the receiving countries at
risk. 65
Another societal security problem is represented by the
forces of nationalism that were unleashed by the democratic
revolutions of 1989 and 1991 in the east and south-east of
Europe. 66 To the extent that this leads to violent strife between
ethnic and/or religious or cultural groups (a phenomenon of
which there have already been dozens of examples), it certainly
constitutes a serious societal security problem, where one group’s
security spells insecurity for the others. This is a genuine ‘societal
security dilemma’, which may even have such abhorrent
64 See, for example, Myron Weiner, ‘Security, Stability and International
Migration’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992/93, pp. 91–126.
65 Martin O. Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry, ‘Migration and the Links Between
Social and Societal Security’, in Wæver et al., op. cit. (note 11), pp. 148–66.
66 See, for example, Jack Snyder, ‘Averting Anarchy in the New Europe’,
International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, Spring 1990, pp. 5–41; Stephen Iwan
Griffiths, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1993; Charles A. Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism and
Nationalities in the New Europe, A Council of Foreign Relations Book, Ithaca, N.Y.,
Cornell University Press, 1995.
106

manifestations as ethnic cleansing or even genocide. 67 It also
threatens to become a political security problem affecting the
already weak states in the countries in question, if nationalism is
manifested in a struggle for secession. This is often exacerbated
by the so-called ‘matrozka effect’, which promises fragmentation
down to very small, and often not survivable, political units. 68
Problems such as the above may also have repercussions for
the relations between states, i.e. develop into ‘traditional’ (statecentric)
security problems. Communal strife thus has an inherent
propensity for internationalization, especially in those (numerous)
cases where a suppressed, exploited or otherwise disadvantaged
ethnic group can draw on the support of its ‘paternal’ state. 69 Also,
nationalism entails the risk that the numerous unresolved
territorial disputes may be reinvigorated. Were this to happen,
especially during a period of political weakness, ‘old-fashioned’
war for territorial conquest may, once again, become conceivable.
This does not mean that societal security is a mere derivative of
national security but simply serves to illustrate how all levels in the
security game are interlinked (vide infra).
67 On the societal security dilemma see Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma of
Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 27–47; Barbara F. Walter
and Jack Snyder (eds.), Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, New York, Columbia
University Press, 1999; Paul Roe, ‘The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict
as Tragedy’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, March 1999, pp. 183–202.
68 The image refers to the famous Russian wooden dolls: when you open the
biggest one, a smaller appears, inside which is an even smaller, etc. On secession see
Mortimer Sellers (ed.), The New World Order. Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-
Determination of Peoples, Oxford, Berg, 1996; Antonio Cassese, Self- Determination
of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995;
Michael Freeman, ‘The Right to Self-Determination in International Politics: Six
Theories in Search of a Policy’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1999,
pp. 355–70; Hudson Meadwell, ‘Secession, States and International Society’, ibid.,
pp. 371–87; Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamics of Secession, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
69 Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), The Internationalization of Communal Strife,
London, Routledge, 1992; Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of
Internal Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1996; David A. Lake and Donald
Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and
Escalation, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1998.
107

Religion and gender
Even though ‘societal security’ as a concept supposedly
applies to any human collective, it has almost exclusively focused on
national and ethnic collectives (viz. McSweeney’s above-mentioned
critique). Important though these certainly are, one might also
envision cleavages among other societal groupings that might
eventually come to be securitized. A first step in this direction
would surely be political organization. Because of the absence of
this, it still strains the imagination to envision a securitization of, for
example, the virulent smokers versus non-smokers dispute, but in
principle it could not be ruled out. More likely is a possible
(societal) securitization of religion or gender.
Religion has already been extensively politicized, if only
because of its close links to some forms of nationalism. 70 A few
nations (Jews and Bosnian Muslims, for example) are thus defined
in religious terms, which is also the case of states such as Pakistan
and Iran (both with the prefix ‘Islamic Republic of’). In such
cases, ‘alien’ religions risk being viewed as threats to national
cohesion, hence securitized. To the extent that nations or states are
not defined in religious terms, but as secular, the politization of
any religion (even the ‘national’ one) may likewise come to be seen
as a threat, as in modern-day Turkey or India, or in certain Arab
states where radical Islamic fundamentalism threatens already
Islamic states. 71 Even in the case of stable and cohesive states such
70 Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, London, Routledge, 1992;
Luc Reychler, ‘Religion and Conflict’, International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 2,
No. 1, January 1997, pp. 19–38; Peter Janke (ed.), Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.
Europe and Asia, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1994.
71 On Turkey see Metin Heper, Ayshe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (eds.), Turkey and
the West. Changing Political and Cultural Identities, London, I. B. Tauris, 1993;
Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey. The Challenge to Europe and the United States,
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000; Vojzech Mastiny and R.
Craig Nation (eds.), Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising
Regional Power, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1996. On India see Partha
Chatterjee, ‘History and the Nationalization of Hinduism’, in Vashuda Dalmia and
108

as those of the West we see this phenomenon, as in the growing
securitization of Islam by the West, not merely in the shape of
allegations to the effect that Islamic states constitute a threat to
peace, but also with a societal security twist, arguing that Islam
(personified by migrants) is a threat to Western civilization. 72
Gender might in principle also be securitized, as indicated
by various strains of ‘feminist IR studies’, the gist of which seems
to be that the traditional focus on the state reflects male
domination, and that the concurrent emphasis on military means
corresponds to innate male aggression, hence that an
empowerment of women would produce more genuine and
lasting security. 73
Heinrich von Stietencron (eds.), Representing Hinduism. The Construction of
Religious Traditions and National Identity, pp. 103–28, New Delhi, Sage, 1995. On
the Islamist threat to the Arab States see Laura Guazzone (ed.), The Islamist
Dilemma. The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World,
Reading/New York, Ithaca Press, 1995.
72 Paul Rich, ‘European Identity and the Myth of Islam’, Review of International
Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3, July 1999, pp. 435–52. See also Graham E. Fuller and Ian
O. Lessler, A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, Boulder, Colo.,
Westview, 1995; Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, London, I. B.
Tauris, 1996; Mohammed A. Muqtedar Khan, ‘US Foreign Policy and Political
Islam: Interests, Ideas, and Ideology’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, No. 4, December
1998, pp. 449–62; Haifaa A. Jawad, ‘Islam and the Threat: How Fundamental Is the
Threat?’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 140, No. 4, August 1995, pp. 34–8; Shireen T.
Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West. Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful
Coexistence, Westport, Conn., Praeger Press, 1998; Mark Huband, Warriors of the
Prophet. The Struggle for Islam, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1999; Fereydoun
Hoveyda, The Broken Crescent. The ‘Threat’ of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism,
Westport, Conn., Praeger Press, 1998; Scott W. Hibbard and David Little, Islamic
Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace,
1997.
73 Lene Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence
of Gender in the Copenhagen School’, Millennium, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2000,
pp. 285–306. In feminist circles the notion of male aggression seems to be fairly
widespread. See, for example, Benina Berger Gould, ‘Gender Psychology and Issues
of War and Peace’, in Knud S. Larsen (ed.), The Social Psychology of Conflict,
pp. 241–9, London, Sage, 1992; Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence: Conflict
Analysis Reconsidered, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996; Johan
Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization,
pp. 40–8, London, Sage, 1997. On genderized security studies in general see also Terriff
109

Both these topics also have obvious human security
aspects, if only because they are regulated in several human rights
conventions. Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights thus makes clear that
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’
Article 18 of the same convention would also seem to
proscribe any securitization of religion with the following
unequivocal stipulation:
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.’
Regardless of whether, say, the influx of Muslims might
arguably constitute a threat to some nations’ identity, i.e. a
societal security threat (a very big if) it would thus constitute a
violation of human rights to prevent these people from practising
their religion, hence a threat to human security, to which I shall
now, at long last, turn.
6 Human security
Just as societal security may thus endanger individual
security, the state-centred approach to security has been charged
et al., op. cit. (note 10), pp. 82–98; Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Feminist Inquiry and
International Relations’, in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), New
Thinking in International Relations Theory, pp. 77–91, Boulder, Colo., Westview
Press, 1997; J. Ann Tickner, ‘Feminist Perspectives on Security in a Global
Environment’, in Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds.), Globalization, Insecurity,
and the African Experience, pp. 41–58, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1999. For a
male perspective on the woman’s particular view of the world see Ken Booth,
‘Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist’, in Krause and Williams, op. cit.
(note 17), pp. 83–120, especially pp. 99–101.
110

with neglecting the people, i.e. of jeopardizing human security.
This is basically a matter of human well-being and, in the last
analysis, survival of people, regardless of their national or other
affiliations. 74
Human security versus state and societal security
Thus conceived, human security may indeed be placed in
jeopardy by an unrestrained quest for state security, say if the latter
should involve war. Hence, for example, the uncomfortable ‘Red
or dead’ dilemma which haunted NATO (and especially Germany)
for decades: should one place the survival of the population at risk
for the sake of such intangible values as sovereignty? 75 Or should a
74 On human security as a concept see Astri Suhrke, ‘Human Security and the
Interests of States’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 265–76;
George MacLean, ‘The Changing Perception of Human Security: Coordinating
National and Multilateral Responses. The United Nations and the New Security
Agenda’, at www.unac.org/canada/security/ maclean.html; William T. Tow and
Russell Trood, ‘Linkages between Traditional Security and Human Security’, in
William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In- Taek Hyun (eds.), Asia’s Emerging Regional
Order. Reconciling Traditional and Human Security, pp. 13–32, Tokyo, United
Nations University Press, 2000; Woosang Kim and In-Taek Hyum, ‘Toward a New
Concept of Security: Human Security in World Politics’, ibid., pp. 33–46; Peter
Wilkin, ‘Human Security and Class in a Global Economy’, in Thomas and idem
(eds.), op. cit. (note 73), pp. 23–40; Caroline Thomas, ‘Furthering the Debate on
Human Security’, ibid., pp. 179–83; Agostinho Zacarias, Security and the State in
Southern Africa, pp. 139–60, London, I. B. Tauris, 1999; McSweeney, op. cit. (note
16), pp. 152–72; Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival. Environmental Decline, Social
Conflict and the New Age of Insecurity, pp. 135–53 et passim, London, Earthscan,
1997; Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, Vol.
17, No. 4, 1991, pp. 313–26; idem, ‘Human Wrongs and International Relations’,
International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 103–26.
75 See, for example, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (ed.), Kriegsfolgen und
Kriegsverhütung, 2nd edition, Munich, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971; Horst Afheldt,
Atomkrieg. Das Verhängnis einer Politik mit militärischen Mitteln, 2nd edition,
Munich, dtv, 1987; Karl D. Bredthauer and Klaus Mannhardt (eds.), Es geht ums
Überleben. Warum wir die Atomraketen ablehnen, Cologne, Pahl-Rugenstein, 1981;
Henry Kendall, ‘The Effects of a Nuclear War’, in Hylke Tromp (ed.), War in Europe.
Nuclear and Conventional Perspectives, pp. 35–44, Aldershot, Gower Publishing
Group, 1989; Robin Clarke (rapporteur), London Under Attack. The Report of the
Greater London Area War Risk Study Commission, London, Basil Blackwell, 1986.
111

developing state invest heavily in the implements of state security
(i.e. armed forces) at the inevitable expense of economic
development? 76 According to a ‘cosmopolitan’ ethics, 77 what really
matters is the survival and well-being of the individuals, or as the
utilitarians formulated it, ‘the greatest happiness principle’. 78
Such happiness is, of course, compatible with, but only rarely
presupposes, the sovereignty of one’s state, or for that matter the
cohesion of one’s societal group. Moreover, for principled
proponents of this view, state security can merely be a relevant
goal to the extent that the state derives its powers from la volonté
générale. If and when the state ceases to represent the interests of
its citizens, say when state security places individual security in
jeopardy, the latter must take precedence. 79
Even though the state was presumably ‘created’ for the
sake of its citizens’ security, it can also constitute a threat to their
security, as mentioned above. The life of man (and woman) in
Hitler’s Germany or Pol Pot’s Kampuchea, for example, was
76 Marcus Cheatham, ‘War, Military Spending, and Food Security in Africa’, in
Norman A. Graham (ed.), Seeking Security and Development. The Impact of Military
Spending and Arms Transfers, pp. 229–53, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1994;
Kwabena Gyimah- Brempong, ‘Do African Governments Favor Defense in
Budgeting?’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 2, May 1992, pp. 191–206; J.
Paul Dunne and Nadir A. L. Mohammed, ‘Military Spending in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Some Evidence for 1967–85’, ibid., Vol. 32, No. 3, August 1995, pp.
331–43; K. Muepu, ‘Defence Expenditures Reduction and the Re- Allocation of
Resources in Southern Africa with Specific Reference to South Africa’, Strategic
Review for Southern Africa, Vol. 20, No. 1, May 1998, pp. 58–90. On the general
relationship between military spending and development see Nicole Ball, Security
and Economy in the Third World, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1988.
77 For an analysis of the communitarian/cosmopolitan dichotomy, see Chris
Brown, International Relations Theory. New Normative Approaches, Hemel
Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
78 John Stuart Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’, in Max Lerner (ed.), Essential Works of John
Stuart Mill, pp. 189–248, New York, Bantam Books, 1963. See also Anthony Ellis,
‘Utilitarianism and International Ethics’, in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel
(eds.), Traditions in International Ethics, pp. 158–79, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1993. (Cambridge Studies in International Relations Series.)
79 Cf. Jean-Jacques Rosseau, Du contrat social, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1966.
112

surely at least as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ as it was
in the proverbial ‘state of nature’, i.e. before the establishment of
the state as an institution. 80 Too strong and oppressive
‘Leviathans’ may thus constitute security threats in their own
right, as acknowledged by at least some IR writers, even by some
of the Realist or neorealist persuasion. 81
The main security problem in today’s developing world
may, however, not be an excess but rather a deficit of state power.
Most developing states are thus ‘weak states’ in which there is a
‘dissonance between the loci of authority and power’
(Mohammed Ayoob), where society and state boundaries are far
from coterminous, inter alia as a reflection of the colonial legacy,
and where the state’s administrative capacity is quite inadequate,
making it little more than a hollow shell, i.e. a ‘quasi-state’.
Hence the lack of state as well as regime legitimacy and a
perpetual struggle for control of the state apparatus and for
autonomy or cessation – a struggle which all too often assumes
violent forms, and which sometimes leads to complete state
collapse. 82 The resultant armed conflicts may already be the most
prevalent form of war (say, measured in terms of numbers of
violent deaths) and will most likely become so in the coming
80 Quotation from Hobbes, op. cit. (note 22), p. 186.
81 For example, Buzan, op. cit., 1991 (note 11), pp. 35–56.
82 Ayoob, op. cit. (note 24); idem, ‘The Security Predicament of the Third World
State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective’, in Brian L. Job
(ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma. National Security of Third World States, pp. 63–80
(quotation from p. 66), Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1992; Brian L. Job, ‘The
Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World’,
ibid., pp. 11–35; Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States. Sovereignty, International
Relations, and the Third World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990;
Thomas G. Weiss and Maryl A. Kessler (eds.), Third World Security in the Post-Cold
War Era, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1991; Holsti, op. cit. (note 24); Clapham,
op. cit. (note 24); William I. Zartmann (ed.), Collapsed States. The Disintegration and
Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; Ali A.
Mazrui, ‘The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa’, in Olara A. Otunnu and
Michael W. Doyle (eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century,
pp. 233–44, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
113

years, where ‘Hobbesian Warre’ (bellum omnium contra omnes)
may almost supersede the ‘Clausewitzian war’ among states as the
most widespread form of violent conflict. 83
Not only may ‘war’ thus be getting smaller, but more
widespread, but other forms of violent conflict also seem to
proliferate. In weak states, ordinary crime and intercommunal
strife may become so prevalent that security simply becomes
‘privatized’. When and where the state cannot ensure law and
order, people tend to take matters into their own hands. In order
to protect themselves, their families and their property, they will
resort to self-help, such as by arming themselves, or by enlisting
the services of private security companies – as we have seen in a
country such as South Africa. 84 This gradually leads to an erosion
of the state’s Weberian ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of force’,
producing a vicious circle where violence spurs a proliferation of
small arms, in its turn producing more violence, etc. 85
83 Taylor B. Seybolt, ‘Major Armed Conflicts’, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, pp. 15–58;
Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, ‘Armed Conflict, 1989–99’, Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5, September 2000, pp. 635–50. See also Kalevi J.
Holsti, ‘International Theory and War in the Third World’, in Job (ed.), op. cit.
(note 82), pp. 37–60; Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York,
Free Press, 1991; Donald M. Snow, UnCivil Wars: International Security and the New
Pattern of Internal War, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1996; Reno, op. cit. (note
49); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Oxford,
Polity Press, 1999; Bjørn Møller, ‘The Faces of War’, in Christian P. Scherrer and
Håkan Wiberg (eds.), Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace
Strategies, pp. 15–34, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999.
84 Jacklyn Cock, ‘The Cultural and Social Challenge of Demilitarization’, in
Gavin Cawthra and Bjørn Møller (eds.), Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces
in Southern Africa, pp. 117–44, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997; Robert Chetty (ed.),
Firearm Use and Distribution in South Africa, Pretoria, National Crime Prevention
Centre, 2000; Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), Peace, Profit or Plunder? The
Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, Halfway House, Institute for
Security Studies, 1999; Greg Mills and John Stremlau (eds.), The Privatisation of
Security in Africa, Braamfontein, South African Institute of International Affairs,
1999.
85 Max Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’ (1918), in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills
(eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 77–128 (quote from p. 78), New
York, Galaxy Books, 1958.
114

Structural violence and human security
Direct violence (in the terminology of Johan Galtung) is
not, however, the only threat to human security, as various forms
of ‘structural violence’ (vide supra) may produce even larger
numbers of casualties and even greater human suffering. In order
to make any analytical sense of this rather ‘fuzzy’ and vague term,
however, we have to break it down into sub-categories.
• First, there are those non-violent, but nevertheless
‘intentional’ threats to human security, for which the state is to
blame, i.e. the broad category of human rights violations,
documented inter alia in the annual Human Development
Reports of the UNDP, or in the reports of NGOs such as Human
Rights Watch or Amnesty International.
• Second, we have structural violence perpetrated by one
societal group against another, as by the White minority against
the Black and Coloured majority in South Africa under
apartheid, or by Israelis against Palestinians in the occupied
territories until the present day. 86 The general oppression of
women by men would fall into the same category, even though it
is, alas, all too often also combined with direct physical violence,
including rape. 87
• Third comes the kind of structural violence which the
global order, according to some analyses, represents, either in the
general shape of ‘imperialism’, ‘centre-periphery relations’ or
86 On the ‘apartheid system’ in Gaza see Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip. The Political
Economy of De-Development, Washington, D.C./London, Institute for Palestine
Studies/I. B. Tauris, 1995.
87 Charlotte Bunch and Roxanne Carrillo, ‘Global Violence against Women: The
Challenge to Human Rights and Development’, in Michael T. Klare and Yogesh
Chandrani (eds.), World Security. Challenges for a New Century, 3rd edition, pp.
229–48, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1998. On rape as a means of war see Mary
Ann Tétreault, ‘Justice for All: Wartime Rape and Women’s Rights’, Global
Governance, Vol. 3, No. 2, May–August 1997, pp. 197–212. See also the figures for
rape in the Human Development Report 2000, New York, United Nations
Development Programme, pp. 247–51.
115

globalization, producing a relative deprivation of the peoples of
the developing world. 88
• Fourth, we have threats from ‘nature’, some of which
may surely be exacerbated, but which are not caused by, societal
and/or political factors, as is the case of HIV/AIDS (viz. South
African President Mbeki’s unfortunate and highly controversial
formulations). 89
Whether any of these forms of structural violence should
be securitized, i.e. treated as human security issues, is, as argued
above, a matter of political choice. It probably does little to
enhance the analytical rigour of security studies to include the
fourth type, which is basically a matter of humanity’s struggle
with nature.
88 On centre-periphery relations see the works cited in note 7. On globalization
see Michael Renner, ‘The Global Divide: Socioeconomic Disparities and
International Security’, in Klare and Chandrani (eds.), op. cit. (note 87), pp.
273–93; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question. The
International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, Cambridge, Polity Press,
1997; Malcolm Waters, Globalization, London, Routledge, 1995; Jaan Art Scholte,
Globalisation: A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999; Roland
Robertson, Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture, London, Sage, 1992; Ian
Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation. International Relations in the Twentieth
Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997; Nelson W. Keith, Reframing
International Development. Globalism, Postmodernity, and Difference, London, Sage,
1997; James H. Mittelman (ed.), Globalization. Critical Reflections, Boulder, Colo.,
Lynne Rienner, 1996; Anthony G. McGrew, Paul G. Lewis et al., Global Politics.
Globalization and the Nation State, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992; Eleonore Kofman
and Gillian Youngs (eds.), Globalization. Theory and Practice, London, Pinter, 1996;
Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization. A Critique, Oxford, Polity Press, 1999.
89 What he said, in an interview with Time was, among other things: ‘If the
scientists … say that the virus is part of the variety of things from which people
acquire immune deficiency, I have no problem with that. But to say that this is the
sole cause and therefore the only response to it is anti-retroviral drugs, [then] we’ll
never be able to solve the AIDS problem. … If you accept that there can be a variety
of reasons, including poverty and the many diseases that afflict Africans, then you
can have a more comprehensive treatment response.’ Quoted from the statement
issued by the President’s office, 10 September 2000, available at
www.gov.za/president/index.html.
116

7 Environmental security
The man/nature relationship is also at the heart of the
debate about ‘environmental security’.
That the environment is degrading was discovered several
years ago. However, the awareness of ecological challenges was
especially boosted by the publication in 1987 of the report of the
Brundtland Commission on Our Common Future, which
inspired a flood of books on ‘environmental’ or ‘ecological
security’. 90 However, to recognize environmental decay as a
problem was, of course, one thing, to elevate it to the status of a
security problem was something else which remains disputed.
There are, at least, three different senses in which the
environment might become subsumed under an expanded
notion of security:
• First, environmental problems could be caused by war,
or preparations for war, of such severity as to count among the
90 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987; Gro Harlem Brundtland, ‘The
Environment, Security and Development’, SIPRI Yearbook 1993, pp. 15–26;
Richard H. Moss, ‘Resource Scarcity and Environmental Security’, ibid., pp. 27–36.
See also the articles by Gwyn Prins cited in note 18; Michael G. Renner, ‘National
Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions’, Worldwatch Paper, No.
89, Washington, D.C., Worldwatch Institute, 1989; Caroline Thomas, The
Environment in International Relations, pp. 115–51 et passim, London, Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1992; Ernst U. von Weizsäcker, Erdpolitik.
Ökologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt, 3rd, updated,
edition, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992; Elise Boulding,
‘States, Boundaries and Environmental Security’, in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo
van der Merwe (eds.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and
Application, pp. 194–208, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993; Simon
Dalby, ‘Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security
Discourse’, Alternatives, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 95–134; Lothar Brock,
‘Security Through Defending the Environment: An Illusion?’, in Elise Boulding
(ed.), New Agendas for Peace Research. Conflict and Security Reexamined, pp. 79–102,
Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1992; Patricia Mische, ‘Security Through
Defending the Environment: Citizens Say Yes!’, ibid., pp. 103–20; Ursula Oswald,
‘Ecodevelopment: What Security for the Third World’, pp. 121–6. A good overview
is Nina Græger, ‘Review Essay: Environmental Security’, Journal of Peace Research,
Vol. 33, No. 1, February 1996, pp. 109–16.
117

most serious indirect war effects. 91 A precursor of the current
environmental awareness in ‘peace circles’ was, for example, the
debate in the early 1980s on the ‘nuclear winter’ hypothesis,
according to which even a ‘small-scale’ nuclear war could have
caused a climatic and ecological disaster, the casualties of which
would not ‘only’ be the warring states, but the entire globe. 92
• Second, wars might accrue from environmental
problems, such as in the form of resource wars. An obvious
example might be wars over scarce water supplies, say between
states sharing the same river. 93
• Third, environmental problems might, according to
some analysts, constitute a security threat directly, i.e. whether or
not weapons and physical force ever enter into the picture. In
extreme cases, the physical basis of a state could be placed in
jeopardy by nature. For example, countries such as Bangladesh or
the Netherlands would almost disappear in the case of severe
global flooding.
91 A good overview is Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Armed Conflict and the
Environment: A Critique of the Literature’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No.
3, May 1998, pp. 381–400.
92 See, for example, Carl Sagan, ‘Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe’, Foreign
Affairs, Winter 1983–84, in William P. Bundy (ed.), The Nuclear Controversy. A
Foreign Affairs Reader, pp. 117–52, New York, New American Library, 1985; Paul
Ehrlich, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy and Walter Orr Roberts, The Cold and the
Dark. The World After Nuclear War, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984.
93 Peter H. Gleick, ‘Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International
Security’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 79–112; Miriam
R. Lowi, ‘Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of
Westbank Water’, ibid., pp. 113–38; Natasha Beschomer, ‘Water and Instability in
the Middle East’, Adelphi Papers, No. 273, London, International Institute of
Strategic Studies, 1992; Mary E. Morris, ‘Water Scarcity and Security Concerns in
the Middle East’, The Emirates Occasional Papers, No. 14, 1998; Thomas F. Homer-
Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University
Press, 1999; Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen, ‘Beyond Environmental Scarcity:
Causal Pathways to Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, May 1998,
pp. 299–317; Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the 3rd World. Conflict and
Cooperation in International River Basins, Washington, D.C., United States Institute
of Peace Press, 1999; Mohamed Suliman (ed.), Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict,
London, Zed Books, 1998.
118

While state security might thus, in principle, be
endangered by the environment, in most cases human beings
would be the victims. Hence, ‘environmental security’ as usually
conceived is really a species of the genus human security.
An even more radical position is, however, possible. All the
above might be criticized as hopelessly ‘anthropocentric’, whereas
the appropriate referent object might be the environment itself,
i.e. the global ecosystem, as argued by Robyn Eckersley. 94 One
implication of this view might be that true environmental
security might require an extermination of the main threat to the
environment, namely the species homo sapiens. This would
obviously be utterly incompatible with human security.
Belonging to the species in question myself, however, I shall
disregard this ultra-radical approach to security, its immaculate
logic notwithstanding.
8 Conclusion and illustration
The need for a comprehensive approach
We have thus seen that there are different forms of
security, with ‘national’ (i.e. state) security, societal and human
security constituting the main categories, defined by the different
referent objects (state, societal group, individual). As threats to
the different values of the various referent objects (sovereignty,
identity and survival) may appear in many different shapes, all
three categories have different ‘dimensions’ or ‘sectors’ such as the
military, economic, and environmental ones.
While this may make for a neat analytical framework, the
real world is less orderly, if only because the different forms of
security impinge upon each other, and strategies to achieve one
may damage the others – as shown in the case study of the
94 Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, London, UCL Press,
1992.
119

Balkans below. Hence the need for a comprehensive approach to
security, as acknowledged by several states. 95 Only by being
mindful of the implications for other forms of security can
strategies intended to solve security problems stay clear of the
well-known ‘fallacies of the last step’ and even of doing more
harm than good.
While this surely calls for a concept of security that goes
well beyond the traditional one, one should also guard against
excessive ‘securitization’, as this may entail risks such as
• A danger of militarization, as the security services
(mainly the army and the police) tend to assume that ‘security is
their business’. In times of impending cutbacks in military
expenditures, the military tend to be quite eager to embrace
expanded notions of security in the hope that this will protect
them against further reductions.
• A danger that a subsequent desecuritization of issues may
lead to a neglect of them. If security concerns, for example, are
accepted as the primary rationale for development assistance,
development aid may decline once it is realized that countries of
the South constitute no real danger to the North.
Illustration: the Balkan conflicts
The Balkan conflict(s) of the 1990s and (so far) the first
year of the new millennium provide ample illustration of the
complexities of the quest for security as well as of the linkages
between state, societal and human security. The following,
95 See, for example, Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War. Japan’s Concept of
Comprehensive National Security, Washington, D.C., Brassey’s, 1984; Kurt R.
Spillmann, 1989, ‘Beyond Soldiers and Arms: the Swiss Model of Comprehensive
Security Policy’, in Joseph Kruzel and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Between the Blocs.
Problems and Prospects for Europe’s Neutrals and Non-Aligned States, pp. 161–74,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. See also Muthiah Alagappa (ed.),
Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford, Calif., Stanford
University Press, 1998.
120

however, is merely a very tentative and preliminary analysis,
intended mainly as illustration.
The initial break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) was the result of societal security problems, in casu of the
quest for nation and statehood on the part of the constituent
parts. 96 However, it is difficult to judge to what extent the nations
of Tito’s Yugoslavia were primordial (i.e. ‘natural’, hence
enduring) or socially constructed, 97 maybe even instrumentalized
by unscrupulous leaders such as Milosevic and Tujman for their
private ends. 98 While there had certainly been ethnic and
nationalistic strife before, 99 there is no doubt that the nationalist
leaders benefited from the economic hardships (i.e. a human
security problem) afflicting the FRY from the mid-1980s 100 as
they were able to place the blame for the problems on the ‘ethnic
other’.
96 Håkan Wiberg, ‘Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia’, in Wæver
et al., op. cit. (note 11), pp. 93–109; Paul Mojzes, Yugoslav Inferno. Ethnoreligious
Warfare in the Balkans, passim, New York, Continuum Press, 1994.
97 For the distinction see John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.),
Ethnicity, pp. 32–56, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
98 Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death
of Tito to Ethnic War, pp. 21–59, 2nd edition, Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1996.
99 On the historical background see, for example, The Other Balkan Wars. A 1913
Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and
Reflections by George F. Kennan, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1993. On the more recent background see Sabrina P. Ramet,
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991, 2nd edition, pp. 176–213,
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992.
100 See, for example, Ramet, op. cit., 1992 (note 99), pp. 136–75; Viktor Meier,
Yugoslavia. A History of its Demise, pp. 10–23, London, Routledge, 1999; Vojin
Dimitijevic, ‘Disparity and Disintegration: The Economic Dimension of
Yugoslavia’s Demise’, in Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse (eds.), Yugoslavia, the
Former and Future. Reflections by Scholars from the Region, pp. 75–111, Washington,
D.C./Geneva, Brookings Institution Press/United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development, 1995.
121

The attempted, and eventually successful, secessions of
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from the FRY 101 could initially
be seen as a problem of national security for the latter, and societal
security for the former. Upon secession, however – or rather, upon
the international recognition of the new states 102 – what began as
an intra-state conflict became transformed, literally by the stroke
of a pen, into an international conflict between rump-Yugoslavia
(comprising Serbia and Montenegro) and the others, i.e. a
problem of national security. In legal terms, however, the struggle
in Bosnia between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims (later renamed
‘Bosniacs’) was an internal conflict (i.e. a societal security problem
for all three), albeit heavily internationalized through the support
by Serbia and Croatia for their ethnic kin. 103
It was further internationalized by the involvement of the
United Nations, subsequently also NATO, the former in the form
of peace-keeping forces and ‘safe havens’, the latter in the form of
air strikes and subsequent leadership of the Implementation Force
(IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) established to
implement the 1995 Dayton Agreement. 104 All this amounted to
101 A good overview is Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds. Yugoslavia’s Disintegration
and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2nd edition, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1995;
and Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War,
Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1995.
102 The EU played a special role in this connection, spearheaded by Germany. See
Mario Zucconi, ‘The European Union in the Former Yugoslavia’, in Abram Chayes
and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), Preventing Conflicts in the Post-Communist
World, pp. 237–78, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1996; Stephanie
Anderson, ‘EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing
Europe’s New Security Architecture’, European Security, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer
1995, pp. 328–53; Woodward, op. cit. (note 101), pp. 183–9.
103 Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia- Herzegovina. Ethnic
Conflict and International Intervention, passim, Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 1999.
104 Wolfgang Bierman and Martin Vadset (eds.), UN Peacekeeping in Trouble:
Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998; Phillip
Corvin, Dubious Mandate. A Memoir of the UN in Bosnia, Summer 1995, Durham,
Duke University Press, 1999; Elinor C. Sloan, Bosnia and the New Collective
122

a serious national security problem, especially for Serbia. Not
only did the air strikes, the more or less conventional war
between the three sides, and the genocidal atrocities committed
by the Serbs and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Croats and
Muslims constitute a human security problem for the civilian
population. So did the sanctions regime imposed on Serbia,
which turned it into the poorest country in Europe.
It all culminated when the conflict reached Kosovo where
a liberation movement, long suppressed by Serbia, rebelled. The
societal security problem of the Albanian Kosovars constituted an
obvious national security problem for Serbia. 105 Whereas the initial
Kosovar rebellion had been largely non-violent, under the
leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, 106 by 1998 it had come to bear all
the imprints of a guerilla war. Even though some of the allegations
against the Serbs should probably be taken cum grano salis, 107 there
Security, Westport, Conn., Praeger Press, 1998. On Dayton and the aftermath see
Pauline Neville-Jones, ‘Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia’, Survival,
Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1996–97, pp. 45–65; David Chandler, Bosnia. Faking
Democracy After Dayton, 2nd edition, London, Pluto Press, 2000; Chantal de Jonge
Oudraat, ‘Bosnia’, in Donald C. F. Daniel, Brad Hayes and Chantal de Jonge
Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises,
pp. 41–78, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999; Karin
von Hippel, Democracy by Force. US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World,
pp. 127–67, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Spyros Economides
and Paul Taylor, ‘Former Yugoslavia’, in James Mayall (ed.), The New Interventionism
1991–1994. United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia,
pp. 59–93, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Susan Woodward,
‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End a Civil War’, in Walter and Snyder
(eds.), op. cit. (note 67), pp. 73–145.
105 On the background see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short History, Basingstoke,
Macmillan, 1998; Greg Campbell, The Road to Kosovo. A Balkan Diary, Boulder,
Colo., Westview Press, 1999. Contrasting Serb and Albanian views are presented in
Thanos Veremis and Evangeloss Kofos (eds.), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War,
Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998.
106 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, London, Pluto Press, 2000.
107 Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo. How Myths and Truths Started a War, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1999. On the role of the media see Philip Hammond
and Edward S. Herman (eds.), Degraded Capability. The Media and the Kosovo Crisis,
London, Pluto Press, 2000.
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is little doubt that the Serb regime acted with extreme brutality
in its attempted counter-insurgency, thereby exacerbating the
societal security problems of the Kosovars. 108 At the same time,
repression in Serbia became more severe, thereby aggravating the
human security problems for the civilian population of Serbia
itself. 109 Something had to be done.
As both developments in Serbia proper and in Kosovo
(internationally recognized as being a province of Serbia) took
place within the protected sovereign domain, however, there was
no legal way of intervening militarily without a UN Security
Council Resolution authorizing the use of force. Hence, NATO
acted unilaterally, in blatant violation of international law, albeit
probably out of (mainly) humanitarian motives, i.e. for the sake
of the human security of the Kosovar civilians. 110 However, it is
also possible to argue that NATO was partly motivated by
societal security concerns of its own, i.e. by the (rather far-fetched,
but nevertheless perhaps earnest) fear that a flood of refugees
might upset the ethnic balance in European states. At the very
least, all NATO countries went out of their way to ensure that
the refugees remained in the Balkans, most of them in
Macedonia, where they did in fact cause societal security
problems. 111
108 Hannes Tretter, Stephan Müller and Violeta Demaj, ‘Die Verfolgung der
albanischen Volksgruppe im Kosovo’, in Joseph Marko (ed.), Gordischer Knoten
Kosovo/a: Durchschlagen oder entwirren?, pp. 127–55, Baden-Baden, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999.
109 Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic. Politics in the 1990s, London, Hurst,
1999; Eric D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia. Nationalism and the Destruction
of Alternatives, University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999; Sonja
Biserko, ‘Serbia: Dictatorship, Implosion or Recovery’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 30,
No. 3, September 1999, pp. 289–90.
110 For an unconvincing contrary opinion see Noam Chomsky, The New Military
Humanism. Lessons from Kosovo, London, Pluto Press, 1999.
111 Elmar F. Pichl, ‘Die “albanische Frage” in Mazedonien’, in Marko, op. cit. (note
108), pp. 57–73.
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The resultant 78-day war went disastrously wrong. 112 Far
from stopping the killings or the ethnic cleansing, Serbia
accelerated both once NATO started its war, as shown by the
figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) in Table 2. At least temporarily, the human
security problems were thus exacerbated.
Table 2: Refugees from Kosovo, 1999
Source: UNHCR, cited by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
at http://www.um.dk/kosovo/pjece/
112 Michael Mandelbaum, ‘A Perfect Failure. NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia’,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5, September–October 1999, pp. 2–8; Bjørn Møller,
‘The UN, the USA and NATO. Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of Kosovo’,
Working Papers, No. 23/1999, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute,
1999. For a more positive assessment see Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon,
Winning Ugly. NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution
Press, 2000; Ansgar Rieks and Dieter Weigold, ‘Der Kosovo-Konflikt – eine
militärpolitische Auswertung’, in Joachim Krause (ed.), Kosovo. Humanitäre
Intervention und Kooperative Sicherheit in Europa, pp. 13–54, Opladen, Leske &
Budrich, 2000; Bernhard Pfoh, ‘Eine Bilanz des Luftkrieges der NATO gegen
Jugoslawien’, ibid., pp. 55–88; Daniel A. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Kosovo
and the Great Air Power Debate’, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring 2000,
pp. 5–38.
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After the war, the returning Kosovars created an acute
societal security problem for the Serb minority in Kosovo, most of
whom chose to flee, seeking refuge in Serbia proper. This, of
course, ‘solved’ the societal security problem of the Albanian
population, but in a rather brutal manner, which also led to the
expulsion of the (completely innocent) Roma segment of the
population. 113
As the above account has, I hope, shown, the three forms
of security are closely linked, illustrating the need for a
comprehensive approach to security. To its credit, the EU took
the lead in this respect. On its initiative a summit meeting was
called in Sarajevo, where a ‘Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe’ was launched. 114 Somewhat ironically, the very same
countries that had launched the attack against the FRY on 24
March 1999, by adopting the Pact on 10 June 1999 reaffirmed
their ‘shared responsibility to build a Europe that is at long last
undivided, democratic and at peace’ (Sarajevo Summit
Declaration, art. 2, cited from www.summit-sarajevo-
99.ba/documents.htm).
• ‘1. …We affirm our collective and individual readiness
to give concrete meaning to the Pact by promoting political and
economic reforms, development and enhanced security in the
region. …
• ‘2. … we affirm our determination to work together
towards the full achievement of the objectives of democracy,
respect for human rights, economic and social development and
enhanced security to which we have subscribed by adopting the
Stability Pact. We reaffirm our shared responsibility to build a
Europe that is at long last undivided, democratic and at peace.
We will work together to promote the integration of South
113 Eric A. Witte, ‘Der Wideraufbau des Kosovo: die ethnische Dimension’, in
Krause (ed.), op. cit. (note 112), pp. 169–84.
114 Johannes Varwick, ‘Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg: Ein überforderter
Stabilitätsanker?’, in Krause (ed.), op. cit. (note 112), pp. 185–200.
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Eastern Europe into a continent where borders remain inviolable
but no longer denote division and offer the opportunity of
contact and cooperation. …
• ‘7. We will work together to accelerate the transition in
the region to stable democracies, prosperous market economies
and open and pluralistic societies in which human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging
to national minorities, are respected, as an important step in their
integration into euro-atlantic and global institutions. … Our
shared objective is the development of peaceful and good
neighbourly relations. …
• ‘8. The Stability Pact process will concentrate on the
areas of democracy and human rights, economic development
and cooperation as well as security.
• ‘9. … Established ethnic, cultural and linguistic
identities and rights should be consistently protected in
accordance with relevant international mechanisms and
conventions. We welcome the initiative by countries of the
region to develop a dialogue and consultations on human rights
issues.
• ‘11. … We pledge to work towards ending tensions and
creating peaceful and good neighbourly relations in order to
strengthen a climate of security throughout the region.’
This was as clear a commitment to ‘comprehensive
security’ as one could reasonably expect, including both national,
societal and human security concerns.
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Third Round Table
The main challenges facing
the promotion of human security and peace
in Latin America and the Caribbean
Moderator:
Ms Kaisa Savolainen,
Director, Division for the Promotion of Quality Education, UNESCO
Lecturers:
Mr Alejandro Bendaña,
President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI),
Managua, Nicaragua
Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena,
Director, Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)
Santiago, Chile
General Juan Alberto Lezama,
Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN),
Montevideo, Uruguay

Peace, Human Security
and the Demogratic Deficit
in Central America
Mr Alejandro Bendaña,
President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI),
Managua, Nicaragua
1 Introduction
Human security, in the post-war Central American
context, must above all take the form of the consolidation of
peace if the ending of war is to give way to the beginning of
justice. The human security challenge in this respect has come to
be known as post-conflict peace-building. According to the
United Nations Agenda for Peace, post-conflict peace-building
consists of ‘action to identify and support structures which will
tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse
into conflict’. 1
In Central America, as in other parts of the world,
concepts such as human security and peace-building were
employed to draw attention to the specific character of post-
Cold-War conflicts, post-war settings, and international
responses appropriate to them. However, it was not always clear
whether such terms were intended to be more descriptive than
analytical. In the absence of such analysis, definitions and
methodologies, their utility in dealing with the complexities of
post-war Central America was questionable.
1 Boutros-Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, 17 June 1992. (UN doc. A/47/277–S/24111.)
Available at http://www.un.org.Docs/SG/agpeace.html
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Nearly eight years after the El Salvador peace agreements
and four after the settlement in Guatemala, the question is
whether these countries are able to make the profound kind of
transformations put forward in ambitious peace-accord packages.
There are differences between the two countries, as there are
differences with Nicaragua where the peace settlement took the
form of the February 1990 election and a quietly negotiated
transition thereafter. In Guatemala and El Salvador, the principal
accomplishment was the apparent consensus on an
understanding of peace not only as the cessation of hostilities,
but also as addressing the principal problems that gave rise to the
conflict in the first place. In Nicaragua, a similar consensus came
about as regards maintaining many of the basic changes
undertaken as the result of the Sandinista Revolution, while
reversing some of its undemocratic features.
In this respect, one could argue that many elements of the
human security agenda were already contained in the political
settlements of the three countries:
• democratization and human rights;
• strengthening civilian authority and defining the role of
the army in a democratic setting;
• reforming the constitution and electoral system;
• addressing socio-economic problems, including land
reform;
• resettlement and reintegration of the demobilized and
displaced;
• incorporation of armed dissidents into political life.
Much has been accomplished as regards civil and political rights.
The restoration of civilian rule has greatly diminished the
systemic state-sponsored abuses of the past. Questions remain,
however, about the subordination of the armed forces in
Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as Honduras, and to a lesser
degree in Nicaragua. The military’s realm of political action was
greatly circumscribed, but it has retained much of its autonomy
intact. Progress as regards the judiciary system remains limited.
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Police reform in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador is in its
infancy, and impartiality is severely questioned.
2 The ‘new violence’
Direct violence
Violence and crime are surfacing as seemingly
insurmountable problems. El Salvador has the highest murder rate
in the world: an average of 120 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants. Deaths through violent crime for 1996 are estimated
to be 8,200, while 15,000 people were wounded by criminal
violence. This represents a ratio which, if it continues over the
next nine years, will mean that crime will have claimed more than
the 100,000 victims – 25 per cent more – known to have been
killed during the twelve years of the war. In Guatemala, Honduras
and El Salvador, polls reveal that common crime is the top public
concern. The impact of this crime wave on human rights and
human security is undeniable. Anti-crime legislation and policies
designed to deal with crime do not always meet international
standards for judicial processes or police accountability.
Peace has thus not been achieved at the level of everyday
life for most citizens. Violence has taken on a more social and
multifaceted expression than the polarized political violence of
the 1980s. Cultures and structures of violence are not vanquished
in peace settlements; they must be uprooted over time, and across
public and private life. For example, women’s organizations have
noted a rise in domestic violence throughout Central America,
which they link to the impact of peace and unemployment on
young men who have spent most of their youth fighting. A 1997
study from the Inter-American Development Bank showed that
some 52 per cent of women in Managua had experienced some
type of abuse in their homes: psychological, physical or sexual.
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Economic violence
The statistics tell a grim story. Between one-third and onehalf
of urban dwellers and about two-thirds of rural dwellers in
Central America live in poverty.
According to United Nations figures, in Nicaragua 47.9
per cent of the population lives in poverty, including 17.3 per
cent in extreme poverty. In the rural areas the figures are 68.5 per
cent and 28.3 per cent, respectively. Fifty per cent of children
living under conditions of poverty do not go to school. Half of
all children who abandon school do so for economic reasons.
There is no access to potable water for 35 per cent of the
population. Over 30 per cent of poor children and almost 40 per
cent of extremely poor children are malnourished, compared
with 12 per cent of non-poor children. Poor children under 5
years of age are particularly affected by chronic malnutrition, up
to 36 per cent among the extremely poor. Although on an overall
basis the surveys indicate that chronic malnutrition has declined
since 1993, it has increased by 45 per cent among the urban poor
and 30 per cent among the extremely poor. The worst levels of
chronic malnutrition are reported in the north and central parts
of Nicaragua, where nearly half of the extremely poor children
suffer from this condition.
A similar story can be told for Guatemala, where 75 per
cent of the population lives below the poverty line, or for
Honduras (50 per cent) and El Salvador (48 per cent).
Globalized violence
A human security programme must also take account of
economic policies that perpetuate poverty. The priority given by
the donor community to structural adjustment programmes after
peace accords is interpreted by elites and the public as signals that
economic liberalization and privatization are more important
than peace-building and human security concerns.
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National governments are not blameless, yet each claims
that its hands are tied by the nature of the region’s insertion into
the global economy. The G7 and their multilateral economic
organizations appear unwilling to make substantive concessions
in the form of real debt cancellation or preferential trading
arrangements for poor countries, including those recovering from
war. This means, for example, that in Nicaragua only 11 per cent
of the government budget is allocated to education, while 25 per
cent goes towards debt payments.
3 Peace education as global education
Human security is a precondition – not an outcome – of
development. Economic policies that favour growth over equity
and human development are not only analytically questionable,
they are undemocratic. The human security agenda should require
the development advocacy networks to push for modification in
external assistance policies, particularly for war and post-war
economies, to accelerate the reduction in foreign debt, and to
support small-scale producers, particularly in the countryside.
The value of a human security agenda lies partly in
exposing the hypocrisy of governments extolling peace and
democracy while at the same time imposing economic policies
that increase the suffering and exclusion of millions of people.
Human security entails worrying less about ‘formal democracy’
and more about ‘real democracy’, understood as equal access to
basic economic, social and cultural rights for the majority of the
population, along with the recognition of, and if need be
reparation for, historical injustice.
4 Conclusions and recommendations
• Ten years after the end of the war in Nicaragua, eight in
El Salvador and four in Guatemala, a negative peace prevails in
the region. Despite considerable external cooperation and
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international attention, the human security picture is not
positive. Poverty and violence are everyday features of life for
most Central Americans. To be sure, there are new political
openings and peaceful electoral transitions. State reform and
modernization is on the agenda, while non-governmental
organizations are energetically working to ensure a voice for
women and indigenous communities. The sum of local efforts to
build socio-economic justice is however outweighed by the
effects of an unfavourable global economic and political context.
A key challenge takes the form of what has been termed ‘civil
society strengthening’ to compensate for state and institutional
weakness, yet to do so in a way that is not disproportionately
dependent on externally funded projects.
• The human security agenda must forcefully engage what
others prefer to evade. We refer here to the perceived post-war
need for national reconciliation, on the one hand, and the
human rights imperative to counteract impunity and ensure
justice to victims, on the other. Lately the United Nations, driven
by Security Council orientations, seems to be acting as if there is
an unavoidable tension between human rights and peace. The
result in these cases is continuing impunity. If the human security
agenda means anything, it is that the principles of human rights
and international humanitarian law are nonnegotiable. The El
Salvador and Guatemala experiences point to the danger of UN
operations being perceived as prepared to sacrifice human rights
for a short-term political deal falsely labelled ‘peace’.
• Many international actors and national political figures
would prefer to pretend that the basic conflicts have been
‘resolved’, and that development as usual is back. Such reasoning
is not acceptable. The human security agenda in Central America
is first and foremost about social, economic and cultural rights.
The educational and organizational challenge is how to better
link the struggle for these rights with civil and political rights,
and to do so in a way that is not exclusively state-centred.
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• Education is one answer. But let us not be naive as to the
nature of the playing field. Awareness is one thing and
implementation quite another, especially in poor countries still
characterized by extreme (and growing) inequality and weak
democratic traditions. International financial institutions and
like-minded bureaucrats will argue that social and economic
rights – the human security and peace-building agenda – have to
be postponed: that they must be temporarily sacrificed in order
to allow the correct application of pro-growth neoliberal
economic policies. In this scheme of affairs, foreign investors
should not be intimidated by overly zealous communities
defending land rights, working women demanding better
conditions in sweatshop factories, or labour unions resisting the
privatization of public-sector enterprises and social-security
schemes.
• Human security cannot be negotiated away in the name
of ‘peace’, ‘peace process’, or ‘economic reform and macroeconomic
stability’. The macro-economic and macro-political
cannot be exclusive of the macro-social and macro-ethical.
Therefore, a human security matrix will recognize and act upon
the potential conflict between macro-economic requirements
upheld by international financial institutions and donors
(including UN donors) and economic rights and opportunities
for people.
137

Human Security: an academic perspective
from Latin America
by Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena, Director,
Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)
Santiago, Chile
1 Introduction
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the people
have begun to take centre stage in the international system. This
is a strategic change in perception. Today we recognize the origins
of this change, in the implementation of which states and
organizations of civil society must contribute simultaneously.
Countries with similar perspectives seek to place human
security as a pivot of international peace, governability and
international cooperation in this new century. This innovative
international approach will develop a new security agenda and a
new perspective for global and regional actions.
The idea that human rights are a value that should be
preserved, and that they should take precedence over other rights,
has been present since the birth of international public law. The
Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria (1480–1546), in a work
published in 1532, demonstrated that from the point of view of
international law, action must be taken against those countries
denying their citizens fundamental rights. Humanitarianism has
been an essential source of international law in the past five
hundred years, existing even before the Peace of Westphalia and
inter-state order in 1648. 1
1 Alfred Verdross, Derecho internacional público, Madrid, Editorial Aguilar, 1955.
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With the end of the Cold War and the process of
globalization, opportunities have increased for cooperation in the
international system and in diverse subregions. The
communication revolution, the new wave of democracies
worldwide, and the phenomenon of globalization have
contributed to universalizing the values and principles
established in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The promotion and respect of this charter require closer
association and cooperation.
An approach to global politics from the human interest
perspective, as developed by Mel Gurtov, allows the differentiation
of values from various theoretical perspectives. 2 Realist theory looks
at international phenomena, emphasizing conflicts and
competitiveness, which means that cooperation among the
different actors is not measured appropriately. The corporateglobalist
transnational perspective emphasizes the economic aspects
and the hegemony of a production model and division of labour of
a capitalist nature. However, if these are the rules of the game
ensuring general preservation, they are seen as a zero-sum game in
comparison with other values. In the absence of shared values, both
the realist and the corporate-globalist perspectives emphasize
competitiveness as the basis of conflict and permanent rivalry.
Looking at the world from a new perspective, with a
global-humanist projection, emphasizes different values. The need
for a more holistic perspective means asking the central question:
who speaks for the planet? Approaching international relations
from another angle means thinking about them as matters for the
people.
With this focus it is possible to relate diverse problems to
new priorities. The main priority is necessarily peace, which is
directly associated with social and economic justice, political
justice, human governance and the common responsibility for an
ecological balance.
2 Mel Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Interest, Boulder, Colo., Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1999.
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All these priorities are expressed through multiple
alternative emphases in terms of the values they seek to promote.
Table 1 compares the main values promoted by those who
support each theory.
Conditions currently exist to establish an international
coalition of states and organizations of civil society that could
support and advance initiatives aimed at increasing human
security and placing people at the centre of international security.
This would be primarily achieved through the perfecting of a
new international law to ensure peace and governability and the
advancement of positive incentives. In this respect, we take the
perspective outlined at the Lysøen meeting of the Human
Security Network, according to which an ‘innovative
international approach will be needed to address the sources of
insecurity, remedy the symptoms and prevent the recurrence of
threats which affect the daily lives of millions of people’. 3
Table 1: Alternative values to major theories
Source: Mel Gurtov, op. cit. pp. 25-6.
3 Chairman’s Summary, ‘A Perspective on Human Security’, Lysøen (Norway),
20 May 1999. The Human Security Network comprises the governments of Austria,
Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia,
Switzerland and Thailand.
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The academic role is fundamental to this endeavour. The
experience of FLACSO-Chile, especially through its ‘Peace and
Security in the AmericasProgram’, demonstrates the importance
of dialogue between academics, civil and military functionaries
and other key actors in the analysis of this new international
context and the formulation of recommendations to advance
stability and develop peace. Their participation contributes to
transparency of action and defines the terms of cooperation. In
addition, it could help to identify specific problems related to the
application of confidence-building measures. On the other hand,
the academic role in ‘Track Two’ diplomacy is crucial for positive
development (as shown by recent experience of border problems
between Ecuador and Peru).
The building of common perspectives in the multilateral
sphere, the support of states with similar political and social
perspectives, plus a solid theoretical foundation, create the
potential for new global public goods required for international
security and the sustainable development of the planet. In other
words, a fresh opportunity to construct linked international
regimes, organized from a new perspective of international
relations in which civil society and human beings increasingly
occupy a relevant place. We do not need new laws, we need to
institutionalize the existing ones.
We need to develop a more comprehensive and global
outlook on international security – a holistic perspective capable
of illustrating the direct interrelation between security,
development and peace. This becomes clearer when we consider
democratic political systems.
Evidence exists that democratic regimes tend to maintain
peaceful and demilitarized relations. War is therefore an unusual
phenomenon among democratic political regimes. Yet there are
exceptions. Nevertheless, if we also take into consideration the
international regimes linking the capitalist democracies of the
West, war has disappeared from the region’s future perspective.
To this region should be added a group of countries which is
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growing in significance – the Latin American countries. The
combination of democratic political systems, cooperative
multilateralism and common international regimes allow them to
achieve and maintain peace in an efficient manner.
Ensuring stability and peace makes it possible to adequately
satisfy the growing demand for human security. Without interstate
security, citizens run the highest risks, producing a change in
the conceptualization of international security.
2 Security: a concept in transition
An important tendency is revealed when moving from a
zero-sum paradigm to a paradigm which, while taking into account
the importance of power, attempts to find possible solutions
through cooperation. 4 In this respect, the theory of international
regimes is continually growing in significance and weight.
The new paradigm is essentially founded in persuasion
and in inducing achievements in a multilateral framework. From
an operational point of view, prevention systems (preventive
diplomacy), crisis prevention and early-warning systems are
crucial. As interdependence plays a crucial role, cooperation and
integration are also substantial elements. The plan of action
reaffirms the multilateral search for solutions. Regimes will thus
have a proactive character, given that their key elements are
prevention, early warning, and the joint search for solutions.
Security is a controversial concept, the conceptual definition and
delimitation of which are the result of political processes.
Security for some may mean insecurity for others. The
same reality is perceived and communicated from different
‘positions’. Security is also an elusive concept, embedded in a
broad category that transcends military issues and has
nonmilitary aspects. Security must be understood in its social,
historical, cultural and geographical context.
4 Danny Ertel, Negociación 2000, Colombia, McGraw Hill, 1996.
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During the Cold War, security concepts were broached
from the perspective of the state or from considerations linked to
state security and the militarization of international relations.
Post-Cold-War, a new dimension of human security has made a
forceful appearance as a key concept of a world in transition. 5
Both perspectives have been seen as controversial, although both
should have the welfare of human beings as their goal. The
intellectual challenge, which is also an institutional and operational
challenge, lies in the linking and associating of concepts from a
human security standpoint and projecting these concepts into
international security, including state security.
Every area of security theory involves a chain of concepts
that must be linked. In this way, international security is linked
to multilateralism, state security to national sovereignty, and
human security to governability and development. These three
spheres must be articulated and related more efficiently.
The complexity of the new reality and the new agenda
cannot be comprehended by traditional concepts of international
security. The response of some actors is to expand the concept of
international security, situating the context of security issues at
various levels (military, economic, social), hindering practical
operability and the development of specific actions. The main
threat in this respect is that social, economic and other policies
will become ‘militarized’.
The concept of international security must be centred
primarily on issues related to war and peace. International
security clings to the question of force: how to contain it, stop it,
restrict it and occasionally threaten to use it or actually use it.
This takes into account the conditions that reinforce or weaken
organized violence in international affairs and the conduct of all
types of military activity. In the post-Cold-War era, international
5 Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security, New
York, United Nations Development Programme, 1994.
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security has to be repositioned at the core of the nature of
conflict, as well as the use of force. 6
The different regions and countries of the world have
priorities that are important for sustaining life or avoiding threats
to it, but they are not all security issues. Moreover, security is not
necessarily at the top of all agendas. Everything tends to be
‘securitized’, therefore responses of a military nature, or those of
bureaucracies dealing with organized violence, take priority.
The emphasis changes when considering the trilogy of
human security, state security and international security,
depending on the scenario. In the majority of cases, the weight
will fall upon state security, because the state continues to be the
main international actor and the one that has the greatest resource
strength. Also, because the demands of civil society for the
mandatory requirements of human security are voiced and
implemented by the state, the latter has to meet the demands. In
turn, international stability is threatened by multilateral
alternatives in which the state is the actor issuing
recommendations and solutions. For several geographical regions,
mainly in Africa, the centre of gravity may be international
security and its main actors, i.e. the reaction of the international
system to a governance crisis in fragile or semi-defunct nations.
Sovereignty is a closely related concept. In a globalized
world, in addition to referring to the capacity of unilateral
definition in a determined territory, sovereignty corresponds to
the responsibility that the politicians and citizens of a territory
should demonstrate towards themselves and towards humanity as
a whole. Sovereignty in the globalized world represents national,
as well as international, responsibility.
It can thus be argued that if inter-state relations are
demilitarized, and if basic intrinsic distrust that is perceived as a
threat can be resolved, it should be possible to coordinate policies
6 Lawrence Freedman, ‘International Security: Changing Targets’, Foreign Policy,
No. 110, Spring 1998.
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and foster international collaboration on security matters. The
greater the global stability, the better that inter-state relations will
focus on and attach priority to the resolution of the demands of
human security. These demands are structurally connected to the
solution of development problems.
The effort of concentrating on a specific agenda avoids
overstating the concept of security and the consequent
militarization of all issues affecting human life.
The human security agenda includes a wide variety of
issues, such as natural disasters, racism, peace education,
refugees, cooperation for development, natural resources,
sustainable development, equity, small arms, child soldiers and
war-affected children, landmines, International Criminal Court,
ecological sustainability, etc. The breadth of these issues makes it
difficult to generate policies that would have a significant impact
on the international environment, hence the need to discover a
means of expression that will give consistency and coherence to
the concept of security. In my opinion, this continues to be the
use of force. Many life or death problems affecting a large part of
the population are linked to the use of force, whether because the
state does not have a monopoly over violence or because of its
inability to construct a demilitarized order.
Establishing goals and objectives, in terms of
international/global and regional public goods, facilitates the
effective articulation and promotion of comprehensive agendas
such as that outlined above.
Intra-state problems are a central characteristic of the new
international conflicts, highlighting the need to articulate more
accurately the three different levels of the concept of security.
Also, the growing presence of transnational phenomena
(international mafias, terrorists and so on) that use force but do
not have the capacity to pose strategic threats to the state, needs
to be addressed in order to design coordination mechanisms and
policies incorporating traditional non-military dimensions in the
use of force. This implies new means of prevention.
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The current historical period facilitates the construction of
new forms of association and international cooperation.
Coalitions established on the basis of cooperative multilateralism
help to reach the renewed goals of peace and international
security.
The Americas constitute a zone of peace. In the last decade
substantive advances have occurred through inter-state links, as
evidenced by the developments of diplomacy in the framework
of the Summits of the Americas. 7 In fact, one of the sections of
the Second Summit (1998) action plan is dedicated to
encouraging trust and security between states. In this section the
participating governments are instructed to develop and bring to
completion a series of specific measures in order to consolidate
peace and stability in the region. To this end they entrusted a
series of tasks to the Organization of American States (OAS),
such as the setting up of a special conference on international
security. 8 The consensus on a common conceptual framework
and the implementation of policies in areas of mutual trust,
transparency, and cooperation will require the creation of specific
follow-up mechanisms. In this respect, foundations have been
outlined for the construction of a System of International
Functional Regimes in Matters of International Security.
Similarly, systems must be created in the other areas of
concordance indicated by the heads of state and governments in
the Americas.
Some important deficiencies should be recognized,
however, as manifested by civil wars, transnational crime, lack of
governability, and the difficulty of confronting these nonmilitary
challenges in the international and domestic spheres.
7 Francisco Rojas-Aravena (ed.), Cooperación y seguridad internacional en las
Américas, Caracas, Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999; idem, Globalización, América
Latina y la diplomacia de cumbres, Santiago, FLACSOChile/Latin American and the
Caribbean Centre (LACC), 1998.
8 Action Plan, Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago (Chile), April 1998.
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The academic community could make a great
contribution here through its capacity to
• observe and contribute to early-warning measures;
• bring together actors from different sectors to participate
and generate confidence;
• design alternatives and options.
The main problem for the academic community is the
lack of resources to facilitate the development of sustained
perspectives, the experience of which could be transferred to
other parts of the world.
3 The human security agenda
The human security agenda is associated with the ability
to prevent, act and react to humanitarian emergencies. Rather
than humanitarian intervention, I prefer humanitarian action.
That is to say, the preventive capacity to protect people’s lives and
their security. The most important goal is to create the conditions
where events and crises affecting security can be foreseen.
The Human Security Network represents positive action
in the international multilateral environment. In the Declaration
of the Second Ministerial Meeting of this Network the goal ‘to
promote respect for human rights and international
humanitarian law, and to strengthen the rule of law and good
governance’ was highlighted. Participants recognized the need to
foster a culture of peace, including the peaceful resolution of
conflicts, to control the instruments of violence and to end
impunity in case of violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law. Ministers and representatives recognized that
threats to human security differ from one region of the world to
another, as do the resources available to meet these threats.
Network governments would work to build, over time, a wider
consensus on human security at the global level, and, at the same
time, would promote regional approaches and flexible
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frameworks for cooperation. They emphasized the importance of
an inclusive and transparent approach. 9
Coming back to the use of force as a conductive thread in
human security, two issues are particularly relevant: the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the role of
non-state actors in armed conflicts.
Light weapons
Latin America has taken substantial and significant steps
towards the banning and control of small arms and light
weapons. In the last few years, the countries of this region, on the
basis of regional political cooperation in the Rio Group, 10 decided
upon a series of initiatives. A commission was set up on the autolimitation
of armaments and control of illicit arms trafficking.
Substantive advances were made at a meeting in Cancun,
Mexico, in March 1997. The accords were formulated into a
proposition of the convention at the Rio Group Summit of
Asunción, Paraguay, in August 1997. The negotiations that
followed were brought to a successful conclusion and approved
by the OAS, culminating in the ‘Inter-American Convention
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials’,
13 November 1997. 11
9 Chairman’s Summary, Human Security Network Second Ministerial Meeting,
Lucerne (Switzerland), 11–12 May 2000.
10 The Rio Group is a mechanism to reach common positions on significant
subjects for Latin America at the regional or global levels. Founder members in 1986
were Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Mexico (the former Contadora Group), as
well as Argentina, Brazil and Peru. The Group expanded to include Bolivia, Chile,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and one representative each from the Central American
and Caribbean countries. At the 54th General Assembly of the United Nations in
1999, the Group resolved to incorporate as members in full standing Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
11 Available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ bureau_pm/csbm/inter_amer_firearms.html
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The region has also made significant progress concerning
transparency in the matter of conventional armaments. Of
particular significance is the ‘Inter-American Convention of
Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions’, which was
approved on 7 June 1999. 12
Important accords have also been reached on the issues of
international security, terrorism, and mutual confidence-building
measures at both the Summit of Miami (Florida, USA) in 1994
and that of Santiago (Chile) in 1998. It is of special significance
that the heads of state suggested calling extraordinary conferences
to analyse the concept of security. These will provide an
opportunity to present and apply the new conceptualizations of
security emerging from the Lysøen Network.
It is also important to note that the Central American
countries have signed The Central American Democratic
Security Treaty, 13 and that the members of the Southern Cone
Common Market (Mercosur), along with Chile and Bolivia, have
declared a zone of peace.
Despite these important advances, some deficiencies
remain. In terms of state security, several border delineation
issues have yet to be resolved. These conflicts threaten
international security, as shown by the crisis between Ecuador
and Peru throughout the 1990s. Nicaragua and Honduras are
other examples of states with territorial issues pending.
Similarly, in the domestic sphere, civil wars threaten security
and state viability, endangering international security as well as that
of the state in question. Both of these spheres affect human security.
The internal conflict in Colombia has had serious
consequences, including changes in Colombia’s relationship with
neighbouring countries, an increase in militarization in the
12 Available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ bureau_pm/csbm/fs_000622_transparency.html
13 Available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ bureau_pm/csbm/cadst.html
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egion, and damage to civil society. The conflict has spilled over
into other countries in the region.
The central issue concerning human security and the
possible use of force in Latin America is linked from a political
point of view to a lack of democracy, from an economic point of
view to inequality, and from a social point of view to
discrimination. The lack of democratic culture and of pacific
resolution of conflict increases the potential for the use of force
in the region. The illegal trafficking of arms also has a negative
effect on the chances of resolution.
In the twenty-first century, domestic conflicts are also
international conflicts, even more so when we place humanity at
the centre of international action. The international system needs
to generate multiple types of action before, during, and after
conflicts. Focusing on each situation allows more appropriate
action to be taken to positively influence the mitigation of conflict.
The role of academia is very important at each of these
stages. Academic institutions have the capacity to generate earlywarning
measures in the pre-conflict stages. During a conflict
they can suggest negotiated solutions and alternative methods of
resolving conflict. At the post-conflict stage, they can help to
design mechanisms to ensure governability.
The following suggestions could be addressed at this
multilateral forum in the perspective of integrating the question
of light weapons within a broader policy:
• Exchange foreign debt for light weapons.
• Set up an international financial endowment to buy
arms in pre- and post-conflict situations.
• Support the improvement of capacities to control the
entry and distribution of light weapons. Explore technological
developments, especially satellite technology, which allow greater
levels of cooperation worldwide. New questions should be raised
on how to develop accountability in a free market context.
• Cooperate in the exchange of laws and effective
experience.
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• Develop a culture of peace that gives a key role to
negotiation and pacific resolution of conflict.
• Draw up an international code of conduct for states and
companies related to the weapons trade. Without such a code, it
is impossible to effect monitoring, sanctions or embargoes.
Non-state actors in armed conflicts
Post-Seattle, The Economist referred to the presence of a
‘non-governmental order’. 14 We live in a world that is becoming
increasingly complex through the variety of actors and the
different relationships that they establish. The most diverse
powers are to be found among the non-state actors. Some are
very positive, such as the Red Cross, and are key factors in the
protection of human security. But terrorist organizations are also
acting internationally to cause grave damage to human and
international security.
This complex subject requires effective measures to avoid
the escalation of a conflict because of non-state actors’ relation to
it. All conflicts are simultaneously international and national today.
Our fundamental guiding principles here should aim to
promote a monopoly on the use of force by the main actor at
both international and state levels. The dispersion of capacities
and mechanisms of force increases opportunities for non-state
actors to use force, and thus increases opportunities for human
rights violations.
Governance is the key. Governance means greater
transparency, greater participation and greater accountability.
We need to know more about the national and
subregional contexts of conflict. With the end of the Cold War
we need a more complete interpretation.
14 The World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, USA,
November/December 1999, witnessed unprecedented public demonstrations
against the policies, practices and organizational set-up of the global trading body.
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We need to know why force is used. Poverty is not a
sufficient explanation. In this respect there is a certain vision of
the future in which cultural tradition is important. If this vision
is incorporated appropriately, it could be an important element
in the protection of human rights. Cultural traditions related to
human rights and the use of force are important to understand
the actions of different actors. The cultural aspect is closely
related to the dominance of law and the establishment of
effective national norms in accordance with international law.
The cultivation of a culture of pacific conflict resolution
completes our guiding principles. Each region has its own
cultural perspective. We need to include these in a global
perspective.
One of the leading risks to the international system is to
become involved with non-state actors that use belligerent force
in the explicit or implicit sense.
To avoid this risk, the space for dialogue generated by the
academic arena and non-governmental organizations is
fundamental. It is through ‘Track Two’ diplomacy that greater
participation and transparency of the actors involved in this
process will occur, a process that has as its principal objective
respect for humanitarian law, human rights, and the search for
alternatives to military conflict.
The academic world can assist this process by providing
more information, new interpretations, and a space for the
dialogue of politics and diplomacy.
International humanitarian action is always urgent in
character, but it must be balanced with a perspective of support
and cooperation for long-term development. Otherwise,
stabilization will not be possible and crises will recur.
The joint work of civil society (non-governmental and
academic organizations) with multilateral and intergovernmental
organizations facilitates the creation of a space for generating
efficient alternatives to protect the security of all humanity.
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4 Cooperative multilateralism
Effective cooperative policies are developed in the
multilateral arena. This is where it is possible to give policies a
fresh opportunity when violence appears. Multilateralism allows
the creation of spaces for negotiation and opportunities for
diplomacy. Building these multilateral spaces is essential. The
trust they offer allows the timely development of jointly
attainable goals. Even in extreme situations, it is possible to
present human rights as a significant factor in the (state or nonstate)
actors’ relationships. Without multilateralism,
opportunities for cooperation are reduced and the costs of
human security are increased; and multilateralism is
compromised as a basic principle that orders and regulates rights.
As a fundamental objective, multilateralism has had to
resolve the basic anarchy in the relations among central actors. In
the framework of multilateralism, agreement has been reached on
the basic rules and norms allowing cohabitation, thus reducing
conflict and promoting cooperation. International law effectively
exemplifies this.
We are moving from a strategic-state multilateralism
towards one of another kind, a societal-state multilateralism, and
although still disarticulated and disinstitutionalized, it will take
precedence in the future. We are faced with an international
society in the midst of an emergency. In this new multilateralism,
the reduction of sovereignty and the permeability of the nationstate
are expressed in all environments, the most obvious being
matters of finance and human rights. National sovereignty ceases
to exist, in the state sense, as we advance towards a world where
access to various means of communication and trade is becoming
easier. Values, in particular those of Western origin, have a
decisive influence.
We are experiencing the rise of a transnational civil society
with distinct forms, strengths and interests. A segmented and
asymmetric global framework, which combines multilateralism
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in some dimensions with strong monopolization in others, such
as the armed forces.
The traditional multilateral system is in crisis; a crisis
expressed in the United Nations, in the OAS, and in the
Organization of African Unity. The parliamentary-based
international system is in crisis and seeks to be replaced by an ad
hoc diplomacy. This is often exhausted by photo opportunities
without adopting actual, concrete decisions. We should therefore
advance towards an effective cooperative multilateralism.
Multilateralism can change the reality of the international
system and domestic politics. It is the only instrument capable of
generating decisions that go beyond the states that compose the
organization. How can one build such an association? It is a
human creation and therefore depends on the political will of the
individuals or organizations that develop it. Without shared
values a political consensus is impossible, and without a
consensus there will be no coordinated action; an institutional
reality will not exist.
The recognition and promotion of shared values allow for
the design and creation of an international public well-being and
a global public well-being. This is the main task of the twentyfirst
century. 15 This will allow the objectives of the United
Nations to be fulfilled.
Global problems, especially those referred to in the new
agenda (matters of finance, the environment, drugs, migration,
natural resources and quality of life) cannot be tackled by
unilateral politics. No state can resist their impact alone, action
on a world scale is required. 16 The development of a cooperative
multilateralism and the corresponding political determination
15 Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern, Global Public Goods.
International Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York, United Nations
Development Programme/Oxford University Press, 1999.
16 Informe Desarrollo Humano 1999, New York, United Nations Development
Programme/Mundi Prensa Libros, 1999. (Human Development Report 1999:
Globalization with a Human Face.)
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will allow a new architecture and new international institutions
to be built. The special task of the global system and regional
groups is to envision international well-being and an institutional
system capable of putting it into practice.
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The principal challenges
to the promotion of human security
in Latin America and the Caribbean
by General Juan Alberto Lezama,
Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN),
Montevideo, Uruguay
1 Introduction
Bearing in mind the time and framework allocated to this
meeting, I would like to express some reflections and proposals
that I hope will be constructive for the participants and
contribute to cooperation on specific projects.
First, I will briefly attempt to describe the institution that
I am honoured to head; explain why we have integrated with
UNESCO’s Management of Social Transformations (MOST)
Programme and mention some of the activities developed
therein; discuss the theme for which we are here today; and
conclude with some proposals.
The Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN) of
Uruguay, is a postgraduate studies institute run by the Ministry
of Defence. It was established in 1976 to allow both civilian and
military professionals to study assessment, planning and
management within the national strategy arena.
The CALEN provides a calm environment for study
where absolute academic freedom prevails, together with the
teacher’s right to instruct and investigate without government
intervention or compromise while respecting the law of the state.
My presentation today is my personal opinion and does not
represent the position of my country nor that of the institute.
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Turning to my second point, I must offer special thanks to
UNESCO for the opportunity to found a National Committee
of the MOST Programme, thus widening our horizons in joining
with UNESCO in the intellectual task of contributing to peace
through the application of the social sciences, promoting security
through education, science, technology, social communications,
computer technology and culture. We are taking part in this
initial experiment in order to commemorate fifty years of
UNESCO in Uruguay. We began with a meeting on 7 December
1999 at the CALEN on the theme ‘Human Security and
Development at the Beginning of the 21st Century’, attended by
well-known figures from Argentina, Brazil, UNESCO and our
own country.
This year, all the activities of the institute were focused on
the theme ‘Civil Security for a Culture of Peace and its
Importance in Human Development’, analysing thirty-one
research projects and a DELPHI poll. This work will be
presented at a seminar scheduled for December 2000, and the
results of the poll, some of which I have with me today, will be
published shortly.
UNESCO’s 2000–2001 budget refers to innovations in
education for a culture of peace. The year 2000 was one of
innovation for the CALEN, the results of which will be presented
at the meeting in Montevideo to which you are all invited.
Our country, Uruguay, has contributed to world peace
through missions in different continents over the years: Chaco
Boreal, 1935; Sinai, 1981; Iran-Iraq, 1988; Honduras-
Nicaragua, 1988; Cambodia, 1992; Mozambique, 1993; Liberia,
1993; Rwanda, 1994; Georgia, 1994; Angola, 1995. It is one of
the countries that, relative to the size of its population, has made
the greatest efforts towards world peace.
The theme of human security has been studied and
developed in depth by the MOST Programme since its creation
in 1993, and for this reason we are honoured to participate.
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Returning to the theme of this meeting, I think that some
concepts need to be clarified because the same words, thoughts
or concepts may mean different things to different people.
2 Basic concepts
There is no doubt that the concepts of security and
defence are intimately connected. However, this interrelation
does not imply a single entity. If a national defence policy
corresponds to that of the political representatives of society, with
the advice of the professionals who are mainly responsible for it,
the armed forces, a national security policy is something else
altogether. The concept of security covers the widest areas of
society, including the economy, education, health and welfare,
social security, employment, the smooth running of the political
system, development and modernization in harmony with the
environment, internal public order and much more, such as
sector policies. Clearly, responsibility for the design of a national
security policy and its implementation at the level of a national
security strategy transcends the institutions of the armed forces
and the state as a political association, despite the state’s strategic
role of advocate, coordinator, harmonizer and principal executor,
through which it immerses itself in civil society.
This raises questions about what is to be maintained in a
condition of security, protected from risk or aggression: obviously
the country, its inhabitants and the concept of ‘nationality’ – all
of which require clarification.
The central nucleus of every culture is based on its
ideology or national myth. This concept involves at least two
basic elements: on the one hand, a system of beliefs about the
position of a group, community or society in the world and
about its destiny. On the other hand, equally important, is the
adherence to a system of values, symbolically expressed and
reaffirmed through ritual ceremonies.
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This concept of national ideology is understood as a
cultural dimension with an explicit unbiased logic, with strong
characteristics that drive a society to historical action and form
the most solid basis of its global identity, all of which constitute
what we call ‘nationality’.
Several points should be added to the case we have
established so far:
• The theme under discussion implies the constitution and
development of nation-states. The concepts of nationality and
national identity are linked to the process of development of the
nation-state.
• This relates to the kind of definition that a group
attributes to itself – concerning its strengths and weaknesses,
hopes and fears, history, current prospects and future
expectations, everything that is found to be intimately related to
its traditions and values.
• The national identity resides in the collective memory.
• This memory is based on, and legitimized through, its
relation to the differences separating groups from one another
and produced by actor-narrators who interpret and manufacture
situations, beliefs and values. In the background is always to be
found the sphere of power with its struggles and conflicts, the
driving force of national historical development. Also, a
profusion of viewpoints indicates the presence of a profusion of
actors and political movements.
• Nationality or national identity is not a simple thing. It
consists of partial contributions that sometimes converge and
sometimes diverge.
• The maintenance of a national identity is not a static
process. Neither does it imply change. On the contrary, it
requires an attempt to understand new indigenous and
exogenous elements, which could naturally bring about a
synthesis with the national project, within a context of
integration.
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• A different, although complementary, approach
considers that the concepts of strategy, policy, objectives, security
and defence are intimately connected, to the point of
constituting a true conceptual system. The policy of national
objectives answers the question ‘what to do?’, while the national
strategy relates to the preparation and application of power in the
struggle for and/or maintenance of the objectives set out by the
policy. It assumes the ‘where, how and when’.
Speaking of strategy raises questions about how to follow
the objectives, with what means and in what coordinates of time
and space. Strategy, a political tool, must achieve the objectives
that have been proposed in spite of internal and external threats
to them. According to United Nations Document A 553/38,
security is a ‘situation in which states perceive that they are free
from military aggression, economic coercion and political
pressure, to freely continue with a development search’. National
defence is seen, in terms of action, as a strategy, because a strategy
is ‘how’ things are done.
Human security is the sum of all the rights that a person
may enjoy, and a fuller concept of security would be a ‘situation
of safety’, transcending physical security and encompassing social
tensions, dissidence within the state, political instability,
economic and commercial problems, production, technological
competition, etc., all factors that affect the survival and progress
of humanity and the environment, intrinsic to the idea of
security and incorporated in the collective feeling of the social
body. If we think of the opposite situation, insecurity in any of
its manifestations, it is clear that such a negative feeling is one of
the major factors working against the balance required to sustain
political and social stability in any country or region of the world.
The introduction to the Charter of the Organization of
American States (OAS) states: ‘Convinced that the historic
mission of America is to offer to man a land of liberty and a
favorable environment for the development of his personality
and the realization of his just aspirations’, and goes on to set out
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the nature and purposes of the organization. Two of these
purposes stand out: ‘to strengthen the peace and security of the
continent’ (Article 2a); and ‘to promote, by cooperative action,
[the Member States’] economic, social, and cultural
development’ (Article 2f). The principles set out in Chapter II
include ‘social justice and social security as bases of lasting peace’
(Article 3j); ‘the fundamental rights of the individual without
distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex’ (Article 3l);
‘respect for cultural values’ (Article 3m); and finally that ‘the
education of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom
and peace’ (Article 3n).
All this is affirmed by a commitment to the fundamental
rights and duties of states, with reference to ‘collective security’,
‘integral development’, and the creation of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee and the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, to take on board these themes.
It was thus that the Charter of the principal international
organization of the Americas expressed the will and collective
concern for the continental and human security of the Member
States and their populations. From this to our theme today, I
believe, is no great distance. At the time of the gestation of these
mechanisms of security for the hemisphere, the wise drafters of
the OAS Charter anticipated the theme that brings us here today.
It may be considered that new threats exist, such as those
mentioned today, nevertheless, interpreting other parts of the
text we see that some of them were foreseen: ‘To seek the solution
of political, juridical, and economic problems …’ (Article 2e);
‘Social justice and social security are bases of lasting peace’
(Article 3j); ‘Economic cooperation is essential to the common
welfare and prosperity of the peoples of the continent’ (Article
3k), already appear in the Charter of the OAS.
The extent and accuracy of some of the so-called new
threats, such as poverty, drug trafficking, international terrorism,
international mafias, degradation of the environment,
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unemployment and social marginalization, cognitive exclusion,
and selective emigration, are very difficult to determine.
In recent years much has been written and debated about
these threats, as if the penuries that our continent is suffering
from today were ‘new’, although we should point out that
national authorities and regional bodies have been actively
involved. In meetings of the OAS, of heads of state and ministers,
the more frequent topics of debate are related to human security
and future projections. The security of the continent, the security
of states and the security of humanity are convergent themes on
the permanent agenda of our governments.
I believe this would be a good opportunity to comment on
certain regional data that bear out our case.
For example, the population of China is six times that of
the Mercosur region, with an economic growth rate of 9.6 per
cent a year from 1983 to 1998, every seven years doubling its
gross domestic product (GDP), which is rather smaller than the
GDP of California but more than that of the whole of South
America.
Latin America has a growth rate of 1 per cent or negative,
depending on the country. It has a trade deficit with the United
States of $17 billion.
On the European front, some interesting data from the
World Trade Organization (WTO) show European Union
subsidies of the order of $143 billion, to ensure what is referred
to as the ‘nutritional security’ of 285 million Europeans. This
sum is greater than the GNP of all the countries of South
America, with the exception of Brazil and Argentina. If we think
of the Japanese, North American and European subsidies, $360
billion, we arrive at $1 billion per day – almost the figure for
Argentina.
With reference to science and technology, the United
States invests approximately $220 billion per year between private
and state enterprises, almost a third of the entire Brazilian GDP.
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Global trade figures, beginning with the five largest,
according to WTO 1999 estimates were:
1. United States: $710 billion, the equivalent of the GDP
of Brazil exported per year;
2. Germany: $545 billion, the GDP of Argentina plus the
rest of South America;
3. Japan: $388 billion, the GDP of Argentina;
4. France: $305 billion;
5. United Kingdom: $273 billion;
6. China: only $200 billion, but if Hong Kong and
Taiwan were included the country would be the second-largest
exporter in the world (and these figures were several months old);
7. Mexico: $120 billion, seventeenth on the WTO scale;
8. Brazil: locomotive of the Mercosur, exports $49 billion
and cannot expand much more as this figure represents 0.8 per
cent of the global market.
These are simply some examples to guide us. This new
international order, the gestation of which is so arduous and
difficult that only its general outlines are recognizable at the
moment, has attracted the attention of a number of academics.
They have meticulously listed the problems faced by humanity,
in transition from a bipolar world with the emphasis on state and
military security, to a multipolar world where the concept of
security is increasing in complexity and widening to include the
concept of personal security as well as the theoretical
construction of regional security.
The strategic threats that have been detected are many and
complex, in their causes as well as in their development and
consequences. Of particular note are the demographic explosion,
essentially affecting the poorest countries, which have fewer
resources and smaller scientific-technological capacity; and the
deterioration of the atmosphere partly caused by the struggle of
the most needy societies to survive, and partly by the consumer
culture that prevails in highly developed countries. It appears that
the consumption of one North American child causes as much
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environmental damage as that of two Swedish children, three
Italians, thirteen Brazilians or 280 Haitians. This discrepancy is
without a doubt a cause of friction and conflict.
The revolution in agriculture and biotechnology seriously
threatens the productive and exporting capacity of the
developing countries, in that the incessant development of
computing and robotics increases industrial production and
improves the quality of products while at the same time causing
the loss of countless jobs.
The revolution in international finance and
communications, the ceaseless expansion of transnational
companies, while transforming the world into a global village,
limit the decision-making capacity of the smallest and leastdeveloped
states, threatening to widen the breach between those
at the centre and those at the periphery.
The nation-state is not free from challenges, pressurized by
multiple local and independent demands and by the general
tendency to transfer matters that were formerly of domestic
interest to supranational entities and organs. The panorama
becomes even more complex when the list of strategic challenges
includes ethnic, cultural, religious and ideological conflicts, the
latter vestiges of the bipolar strategy of the Cold War and the
rigid mindset of certain groups.
The demographic explosion, environmental pillaging, and
exterior poverty encourages a current of ‘illegal’ immigrants,
many of whom are seeking the benefits of modernity in more
opulent societies, often provoking ethnocentric and xenophobic
reactions. This situation constitutes an unprecedented cultural
soup among which mafia groups and terrorists interact in cycles
that oscillate from mutual ignorance to reciprocal support.
Finally, post-modern culture with its attitudes of hyperconsumerism,
seen through the fleeting images of tele-reality, the
basic principle of which seems to be the cultivation of an extreme
hedonism, certainly does not help to promote solidarity and
cooperation among individuals, groups and states.
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Consideration of new threats does not imply, affirm or
admit that the traditional threats have definitively disappeared.
The armed forces, as well as learning to deal with the new
situations, thus have to maintain the capacity to respond to
classic hypotheses, some of which could even derive from the
escalation or evolution of new or current threats, as they are
known today.
As a corollary of this approach, priority does not need to
be given to international instruments regulating cooperation in
the hemisphere in the traditional way.
The peculiar nature of the new threats raises delicate
problems. Although it is desirable that states should cooperate to
confront a threat, international agreement should not facilitate
interference in the internal matters of a state.
The boundaries between these situations can sometimes
become blurred because of the nature of the threat. To attenuate
the danger means recognizing the central role of the government
in whose territory the situation that calls for international action
is developing. Such action should aim at cooperating with that
government and obtaining its agreement.
The link between new threats does not mean that they
should all be confronted by the armed forces or by military
means. The shape that they can assume, however, may have a
substantial effect on security and require eventual military
deployment, if the government so decides. The heads of South
American states, meeting in Brasilia at the Second Summit of the
Americas, pointed out the potential gravity of the new
phenomena.
The possible creation of international instruments to
respond to the new threats also raises some complex questions. It
is clearly convenient for different situations to be regulated by
multilateral mechanisms, themselves responsive to a multilateral
consensus of opinion. Thus state sovereignty could have been a
topic for serious consideration if safeguards had not been
foreseen in the successive treaties that link us.
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Today, certain facts are clearly recognized as new threats.
We wish to draw attention to the fact that these ‘new’ threats are
the result of the application of technologies that are not only used
for war but have been incorrectly, imprudently or perversely
used. It is on these points that we should concentrate our efforts,
generating knowledge, following up technological advances,
above all in areas that affect security. Otherwise we give out
signals of indifference or omission to the judicial system as well
as those of security and defence. Likewise we must expect
warnings from third parties in the event of their feeling
threatened by our action or non-action.
Finally, I wish to mention the concepts of Professor R.
Armand Dreiffuss, for whom one of the most delicate objectives
for the twenty-first century is to avoid exclusion:
• cognitive exclusion will mean ‘missing the train of
history’;
• incorporation in commercial and production platforms
of global reach is imperative;
• understanding of the gravitational field of other cultures
is required;
• subjection to inhabitual strategic policies is necessary,
and this applies to certain politicians.
Following this line of thought, we are facing two basic factors
concerning the future of humanity. The first is the colonization of
space. Not only military devices are launched into space, there are
colonization projects, space technology, space laboratories, and so
on. This is not Jules Verne’s dream, it is reality; facing the challenge
of a chimerical encounter with other forms of life.
The second factor is that, for the first time in the recorded
history of humanity, we are beginning to modify the physical and
mental aspects of living beings, with human as well as animal cloning.
These are two of the horizons towards which humanity is
heading in the next hundred years.
Must Latin America and the Caribbean be excluded? Should
we gather the collective force to succeed? Would it be worth the
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effort? I believe that, although our leaders will decide our future, it
is our duty to alert them to the risks and opportunities, and to the
growing importance of the time factor. The decisions are for today,
tomorrow could be too late, and we will be left on the platform.
In conclusion, I believe that the fundamental axes of the
proposed Human Security Network should be the dissemination
of projects and discoveries, the reform of academic links for the
benefit of our societies, in both state and particular sectors, so
that advances in science and technology may become the
‘patrimony of humanity’.
The defence of equal opportunities in commercial trade
could also condemn our economies to eternal poverty, no matter
how strong our efforts.
Bibliography
‘Human Security and Development at the beginning of the 21st Century’ Seminar,
CALEN-UNESCO Montevideo, December 1999. Participants: Professor R.
Armand Dreiffuss, Colonel Carlos Rodríguez Lagreca, Dr Jorge Lanzaro,
Ambassador Dr Hernán Patiño Mayer, Mr Manuel Bernales, Professor Oscar
Amorín, Mr Roberto Domínguez, Mr Francisco Lacayo.
Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), signed in Bogotá in 1948
and amended by the Protocols of Buenos Aires in 1967, Cartagena de Indias in
1985, Washington in 1992 and Managua in 1993. Available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/ english/charter.html
Professor R. Armand Dreiffuss, Time of Perplexities, 1996.
Our Creative Diversity, report of the World Commission on Culture and
Development, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization/United Nations, 1993.
United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace.
Available at http://www. unesco.org.cpp/uk/declarations
168

Fourth Round Table
The main challenges facing the promotion
of human security and peace in the Arab States
Moderator:
Mr René Zapata,
Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting,
UNESCO
Lecturer:
Ms Ghada Ali Moussa,
Reseacher, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES)
Cairo, Egypt

Opening remarks
by the moderator, Mr René Zapata,
Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting,
UNESCO
We are now going to begin our fourth regional discussion,
concerning the promotion of human security in the Arab States.
Before giving the floor to Professor Moussa, I would like to make
two general remarks.
The first concerns a problem that I think is crucial to
human security – the articulation between the recognition that
there are new and multiple dimensions of human security, as
clearly expressed in our discussions up to now, and what I would
call the compounded impact of all the new threats to
populations. This is one problem that has not been analysed in
its totality, not only at our meeting but in general. We do
recognize that environmental problems, food problems, ethnic
problems, cultural problems, have a direct impact on human
security. But we still lack a view of their impact at the local level.
Local can mean national, but we need to understand more
specifically, within a nation, how all these threats affect
populations, as a whole, at a given time and place.
The second general remark concerns the Arab States. We
are dealing here with a vast region, which has gone through very
complex and different processes of state-building since
decolonization, some states in relation to the Ottoman Empire,
others to imperial powers such as France or the United Kingdom.
It is a region that is striving for unity, as are many other regions
in different organizational schemes, whether through the League
of Arab States or at the subregional level through the Union of
the Arab Maghreb, which is trying to build, in cooperation with
the European Union, some structural articulations with other
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egions. A notable example is the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue
framework which, as you know, has advanced only slowly and
another, which of course weighs very heavily on the Arab States
as a whole, is the question of the Palestinian people. This is a
critical question and as Mary Robinson, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, said on visiting the
region, the situation of the Palestinian people is recognized by
many in the international community to be intolerable.
In conclusion, yesterday we talked about the diversity, the
differences between regions of Latin America, the distinction
between Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and in South
America, the differences in development, in the problems of
different regions. I think that today also we have to take
cognizance of the great diversity of the Arab States and of their
great creativity. The Arab States, from the cultural point of view,
are called upon to enhance the exposition of this creativity. We
may not know much about the region for linguistic or other
reasons, but I think that it is one of the most creative in terms of
political thought, in terms of the arts, in terms of music. This is
a factor to be taken into consideration when talking about
human security. The cultural dimension within a region is a very,
very important factor and sometimes a threat to cultural diversity
or cultural expression can also constitute a threat to human
security. I will not deal here with the Huntington thesis, except
to say that I feel that even within UNESCO, the concept of
fractures or clashes of civilizations was not taken seriously enough
at the time. It was taken seriously by a certain number of
organizations, especially defence organizations, but I do not
think we responded adequately to what was a schematic
reorganization of power politics which of course closely concerns
the question of Islam.
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Challenges to Human Security
in the Middle East
by Ms Ghada Ali Moussa,
Reseacher, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES)
Cairo, Egypt
1 Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the multilateral
organizations have come up with new concepts and terms
ranging from ‘sustainable development’ to ‘partnership’ and, last
but not least, ‘human security’. Yet these concepts are interrelated
and share many common principles, consistent with the
commitment of protecting and promoting human lives. One of
the most fundamental challenges that we face is the realization of
a humane, safe and equal world. This is not only a moral
imperative, it is a pragmatic goal, because the facts in the world
around us speak for themselves. These facts drive us, as
representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
government officials and intellectuals, to search for new
approaches and new tools. We need a new form of people-topeople
diplomacy, based on the collective efforts of a variety of
actors, inside and outside government bodies. It will depend on
the ability of NGOs and governments to raise people’s awareness
of fundamental human security needs and will require a broadbased
consensus between the state and other actors within the state
to address basic human rights, needs and fears affecting daily life.
This diplomatic effort reaches beyond traditional and
official relations between states to engage individuals and
organizations from a variety of sectors within civil society. We
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have seen the beginning of this new drive towards a much more
humane world in the successful fight against terrorism, pollution
and drug trafficking in today’s world, where a single state can
accomplish little on its own. More than ever, we need not only to
use but to empower the multilateral institutions that are available
and to try to work with like-minded and opposing countries
inside and outside these institutions to benefit from all ideas and
resources. Among the first priorities is to increase efforts to
strengthen international humanitarian law in order to improve
the security of individuals, especially in disadvantaged regions
such as Africa and the Middle East.
2 Challenges to human security
In my opinion, human security means acknowledging
nations’ and peoples’ rights to an equal share of economic, social
and political world development and protecting them from
threats emanating from within their own or other countries. And
because the concept we are dealing with here is very broad, a wide
range of old and new threats may be considered to be challenges
to human security, ranging from epidemic diseases to economic
crises and the use of weapons of mass destruction. These threats
are not of the same level and severity in each country. Every
country, although sharing similar threats with other countries,
has its own strategic threats and prioritizes them.
If human security is focusing on the security of people, we
cannot neglect the fact that their security largely depends on state
stability and a cooperative internal community. When dealing
with human security issues we are not denying the major and
necessary shift in internal relations and world affairs, which have
long placed the predominant emphasis on the security of the
state. However, protection of citizens, preventing violent
conflicts, supporting peace operations, governance and
accountability, combating terrorism, all these aspects engage ‘the
state’ as first priority, especially in developing countries where the
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NGOs and Track Three diplomacy (universities, research centres,
public opinion) still play a minor role compared with that of the
state and governments, and where people and states still fear
traditional forms of intervention when state efforts fail.
In today’s world there are worrying trends that are
disruptive in themselves and that threaten not only the existence
of the state, as the best-known legal framework, but of the
international order established in the last few decades. One clear
trend is ‘globalization’ which – although it may have led to an
emerging sense of community – has brought new challenges to
human security, principally the undermining of the importance
of cultural diversities; and superpowers that exercise leadership in
addressing problems of special interest to their countries, while
undermining problems that constitute a real challenge to human
security in developing countries and the Middle East, such as
social and economic progress and democracy.
As we make the transition into the new century, we must
acknowledge the concerns associated with globalization and
admit that it is a mere process, not a concept, and that we need
to maximize the benefits of globalization for all countries and
human beings. We also need to make every effort to secure full
respect for different approaches to globalization. I believe that the
concept of human security is of the greatest value and serves as a
complement to existing international agendas focusing on
promoting national security and human development.
3 Challenges to human security in Arab countries
As mentioned above, we may distinguish between
common challenges to human security, the solution of which is
considered vital to all world citizens, and challenges specific to
developing and Middle East and Arab countries. I intend to focus
on challenges emanating from within the Middle East states,
taking Egypt as an example, and challenges to human security
imposed by the international order.
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In order to respond strategically to some of these diverse
threats to human security in the Middle East and Arab countries,
I have identified nine major priority areas, which include
challenges affecting Egypt as a developing country and a key
Middle East country.
Egypt has survived changes of regime, ideology, patterns of
leadership, and, in modern times, transformations in modes of
production and social structure. Historically, most changes in
Egyptian life have been generated from the top down. Egyptian
bureaucracy has performed some useful functions. It has kept a
steady statecraft functioning and allowed Egypt to adjust to
sudden changes that could have upset the equilibrium of the state.
Few factors are more critical to the future of Egypt and
other Middle East countries than their progress on the economic
front. While the Arab countries have made measurable progress
in a number of areas, a critical distance has still to be traversed
before they are out of the economic danger zone. These countries
also have a great distance to traverse in order to overcome the
political and social costs of rapid structural adjustment and its
effect on internal stability.
Challenges to human security emanating from within the state
Population growth
The most serious challenge to the domestic stability of
Egypt and Arab countries, which feeds on underlying economic
and political discontent, is population growth. This constitutes
the worst threat to human security. The rate of growth in Egypt
has increased from 1.9 per cent in the 1970s to an estimated 2.9
per cent in 1996. Despite this relatively modest rise, the
population is growing by 1.8 million a year. This increase has, for
a number of years, exceeded the job-creation capacities of the
Egyptian economy and increased the number of poor and
marginalized people from 2.96 million (5.9 per cent of the total
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population) in 1990 to 3.44 million (6.5 per cent of the
population) in 1994. The figures have not changed dramatically
in 1999. The private and public sector together must create
sufficient employment opportunities to absorb a workforce that is
increasing by some 400 to 500 thousand new entrants each year.
Economic growth
Economic growth is related to population growth,
although it is also a reflection of world economic progress. In
Egypt, as in most other countries that undertake economic
reform, real growth in gross domestic product slowed after the
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program from an
average of 2.5 per cent annually (in Fiscal Year (FY) 89–91) to
0.41 per cent annually (in FY 92–93). Yet Egypt has managed to
absorb a population increase of about 14 to 15 million between
1981 and 1993, equal to the combined population of Jordan,
Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. However, it has
been estimated that Egypt would require a consistent growth rate
of no less than 5 per cent annually to absorb the expected
increase in population at the present level of per capita income of
approximately $710 in 1997. Although Egypt achieved a 5 per
cent growth rate by 1997, it is not clear that this level can be
sustained. Without a substantial decline in population growth or
an increase in employment, Egypt will face gradual erosion of the
significant gains in standard of living achieved over the previous
decade. Mobilization of new resources and skills at the national,
regional and international levels is urgently required to ensure
growth, employment and stability.
One of the most pressing and immediate economic
dimensions of human security is the employment problem. Egypt
needs to create a minimum of 6 million jobs in the coming years.
If current levels of unemployment are to be reduced significantly,
another 1.5 to 2 million jobs must be found for the next three
years. To reduce unemployment, the number of jobs must rise by
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about 50 per cent. Standards of professionalism must also be
reinforced and an approach developed that stresses quality over
quantity. All Arab countries need to launch more programmes of
social and political adjustment to augment and enhance the
programme of economic adjustment.
To ensure continuity and confidence, all changes should
be institutionalized within a clear, legal framework. The systems
in many Arab countries, including Egypt, require the institution
of much more serious measures of accountability from top to
bottom and from bottom to top. The above findings and
calculations affect the security of women, in particular, in a
negative way, assuming that the current very low participation of
women in the Egyptian workforce (about 12 per cent) will
persist. Increasing women’s market activities typically raises the
opportunity costs of children and contributes to reduced fertility
rates. These important long-term benefits will be foregone unless
more jobs can be created at the same real wage. To reduce poverty
– in this sense – real wages need to rise, which means a more
rapid opening up of the demand for labour.
Water supply and food security
Egypt’s total water supply is essentially fixed at 55 to 56
billion cubic metres annually. Whatever developments may
occur, despite improved storage and sharing of water among Nile
riparian states, they are unlikely to have much positive effect in
the short term, if Ethiopia increases its utilization of the Blue
Nile water resources and if the Sudan expands its irrigation
projects. More sophisticated demand management will therefore
be essential. This is overwhelmingly the responsibility of the
agricultural sector, because about 85 per cent of all Egyptian
water is used in farming. Water constraint could mean that
Egypt’s only road to food security lies in exporting farm and
factory products, depending on new land reclamation projects.
The same problem exists in other Arab countries such as Syria
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and Iraq, which faced a water crisis when Turkey launched its
GAP (Great Anatolia Project for electricity and irrigation in
south-east Turkey). Therefore, in order to prevent conflict over
water in the future, and because almost all rivers running through
Arab countries have their source in non-Arab countries, intensive
coordination between both groups should exist. We do not want
to be caught by the saying that water wars are inevitable.
Improving human resources
Any viable strategy of export-led growth, or any other
growth strategy, must include investment in upgrading the
quality of the most important resource in Egypt – human beings.
In this sense, the following points are of note:
• The failure to provide all Egyptians with basic literacy
has been a serious deficiency in public policy. Not until the late
1980s were almost all Egyptian boys enrolled in primary schools,
while almost a quarter of Egyptian girls are still not enrolled.
Without accelerated progress in this area, poverty reduction will
not be achieved and gender and social inequalities will widen.
• Improving human capital means the ability to respond to
shifting technological and market conditions. If Egypt and Arab
countries must export in order to employ and feed their citizens,
they must be able to compete in the international market with a
literate, skilled workforce. An illiterate workforce is poor material
from which to craft an export-led growth strategy.
• It is not enough to be aware of new technologies; Arab
countries need to possess the know-how to utilize them
effectively.
Environmental crises
Population growth, with an expansion in consumption
and excessive production, has led to environmental crises, climate
change and air pollution. In this endeavour, we still face the lack
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of cooperation between the stakeholders in this area to identify
the barriers and come up with innovative solutions or to form a
task force. Egyptian NGOs have played a major role in trying to
bring conflicting parties together and in introducing new
methods to resolve recurring conflicts. They have also
participated in awareness campaigns, which still need to be
expanded and strengthened. We are strongly committed to close
cooperation among ourselves and with developing countries and
international organizations to help to resolve major outstanding
issues, such as air pollution, which have greatly affected human
health and damaged production capacity.
Challenges to human security emanating from the international
system
World economy and trade
There is another form of ‘patriarchy’ that has negative
effects on developing countries. The twentieth century has
achieved unprecedented economic progress, yet not all
international parties have benefited from the boom. The world
economy grew stronger, but the number of poor and
marginalized people and countries grew more quickly, so that
social safety nets failed to catch up and to ensure strong,
sustainable growth and greater prosperity for all. It is true that the
multilateral trading system embodied by the World Trade
Organization has provided its members with enormous trade
opportunities, but it has not – until now – addressed the
legitimate concerns of developing-country members, or the
ineffectiveness of their participation because they were denied
access to world markets. In this sense a comprehensive
partnership cannot be developed because the partners are not on
an equal footing and because the world trade challenges to
developing countries do not address the improvement of the
situation of the least-developed countries.
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Weapons of mass destruction
The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction places a
great burden on the financial and economic capabilities of all
countries alike, depriving citizens of the opportunity of fulfilling
their basic needs and shifting resources. Egypt has made great
efforts to raise the awareness of the danger of proliferation in the
Middle East, calling upon states in the region, including Israel, to
join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and remains
committed to promoting universal adherence to and compliance
with the NPT, especially after the outnumbering of citizens in
Sinai and Jordan living near the Israeli nuclear reactor at Negev,
where there is fear of environmental damage. International
concern is also growing about the threat of terrorist groups and
individuals acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and
concerted efforts must be made to prevent such a crisis.
Neglecting cultural diversity
With the launching of the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis by
Samuel Huntington in 1993, 1 an attempt was made to transform
into a threat the very core of the values that deeply inspire the lives
of the great majority of the population of the Arab world in
general, and of the Middle East in particular – the values of Islam.
Huntington went so far as to speak of ‘Islam’s bloody
borders and of a Muslim propensity towards violent conflict’, and
explained Muslim violence in the last two decades by the absence
of one or more core states, or by the demographic explosion of
Muslim societies and the number of unemployed men between
the ages of 15 and 30. Needless to say, these explanations and
others referred to by Huntington are part of a clear-cut attempt
to isolate what he calls the West from the rest of the world, with
1 S. P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3,
1993, pp. 22–49.
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a view to legitimizing the exercise of armed power politics in the
twenty-first century. Even though many scholars have been
highly critical of Huntington’s ideas, one should be careful not to
underestimate the influence that they exert on strategic and
defence communities in Europe and the United States.
Although cultural diversities are a source of social and
economic dynamism and enrich human life, new social trends
neglect the fact that cultures not of Western origin could inspire
creativity and stimulate innovation. Not acknowledging and
respecting other cultures leads to racism and discrimination by
the people and their states (recalling what has happened to
foreigners and immigrants in Germany and France). Therefore,
and from this honourable gathering, I support the work of the
United Nations in its preparations for a Conference against
Racism, to be held in South Africa in 2001. 2 I also encourage
education ministers from all countries to meet to promote
education to foster the understanding of different cultures.
Lack of implementation of international humanitarian law
In the course of the twentieth century the international
community has witnessed many regional and civil wars, in which
all kinds of weapons – produced by human intelligence – have
been used against civilians and have threatened the security of
nations worldwide. Until now the international community has
failed to protect civilians from the effects of war, though advances
have been made in setting humanitarian rules and norms,
especially through the extensive efforts of the international Red
Cross and Red Crescent.
This is one of the major threats to human security in our
region, and is particularly evident in Iraq and the Sudan where
civilians are paying the price of international sanctions, or in the
2 World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance, August/September 2001, Durban, South Africa.
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Palestinian National Authority where civilians, mostly children,
are deprived of normal living conditions because of the Israeli
occupation and aggression and Israel’s refusal to implement the
Geneva Convention of 1949 and its additional Protocol of 1977
concerning the protection of civilians in time of war.
Last but not least, we in the Arab countries and the
Middle East region clearly recognize that the process of
globalization and the fast pace at which information and
technology are advancing have engendered various concerns. It is
not enough for conferences and meetings to address such
concerns so that the participants can enjoy peace of mind. We
need to see the results of such conferences and meetings
implemented, at least in one or two areas, to help in securing the
future of humanity. We do have a common concern, but perhaps
our legitimate tools differ, logically following the diversity of
cultures.
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Fifth Round Table
The main challenges facing
the promotion of human security and peace
in Asia and the Pacific
Moderator:
Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos,
Assistant Director-General, ‘Priority Africa’ Department, UNESCO
Lecturers:
Mr Timothy M. Shaw
Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada;
Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark
Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan,
Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of International
and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, Bangladesh

What perspectives on human security in Asia
in the twenty-first century?
Some parallels with Africa
by Mr Timothy M. Shaw,
Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada;
Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark
1 Introduction
‘… the building of cooperative peace within the
framework of ASEAN is of paramount importance for other regions
and their respective intergovernmental regional organizations.
Indeed, much can be learned from the methods of the ongoing
cooperative peace process within ASEAN …’ (Goucha and
Zapata, 1999, p. 19).
‘The first few years of the twenty-first century may
represent something of a hiatus for Asian regionalism, and other
forms of economic and security institutional diplomacy may
come to the fore …’ (Higgott, 2000, p. 262).
‘While the concept of human security has attracted much
attention in the West, including Canada, it remains poorly
understood and contested in Asia’ (Acharya and Acharya, 2000, p. 1).
The ‘Asian crisis’ (crises, in fact?) of the late 1990s
(Mastanduno, 2000; Soros, 2000, pp. 208–34) transformed the
character of ‘security’ issues and discourses throughout Asia as
well as prospects for and optimism about regional
cooperation/integration (Higgott, 2000). In the preceding heady
days of the ‘Asian miracle’, in which prevailing assumptions
about the ‘developmental state’ went unchallenged (Chan et al.,
1998), it was largely conceived as ‘national security’. At the start
of the new millennium – still the Pacific century? – not only the
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continent’s economic growth and development along with its
myriad ambitious regional projects (Bergsten, 2000) but also its
social and political stability are in question (Bello, 1990; The
Economist, 2000b, p. 93; Jomo, 1998).
One positive result of the unanticipated aftershocks of the
late 1990s throughout Asia, which followed on the global
earthquakes of the end of the Cold War half a decade earlier, has
been a transformation in definitions of and debates about
security around the region towards a more comprehensive notion
of ‘human security’ (Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and
Hernandez, 2001). This parallels the overall evolution of this
notion with its relevance to other continents such as Africa (Lee,
2000; UNDP, 1994). It also raises profound issues about the
distinctiveness and resilience of ‘Asian’ forms of capitalism, now
increasingly incorporated into more global forms via fireside sales
of assets to established Western multinationals (Soros, 2000,
pp. 201–34). The exceptionalism of Asia was always
problematic, notions of ‘Asian values’ notwithstanding (Mead,
2000). Now its comparability is non-controversial, reinforced by
assertions such as the ‘African renaissance’ (Shaw and Nyang’oro,
2000) in contrast to the ‘Asian demise’!
This overview seeks to estimate prospects for human
development in Asia by juxtaposing concepts of ‘human security’
at the start of the new century. It privileges notions of
‘governance’ in which a trio of actor types are involved: not just
states but also companies and civil societies. This enables it to
review the history and potency of three parallel tracks of
diplomatic-cum-strategic governance – Tracks One, Two and
Three – which reflect and reinforce the contributions of nonstate
actors (Kraft, 2000). In turn, I review the changing balance
among conventional, nuclear and human security in the region.
Section 5 speculates on a range of possible scenarios for Asia in
the first quarter of the twenty-first century, and the final part
considers implications arising from such a human security
perspective for established modes of analysis and practice, both
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established disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives alike,
with lessons for/from Africa (Shaw, 2000) as well as Asia
(Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Goucha and Zapata, 1999).
In part, this presentation constitutes something of a
personal confession or critique as I remained somewhat sceptical
about the relevance and acceptability of human security for this
region towards the end of the twentieth century (Quadir and
Shaw, 1998) given the degree of resistance in much of the region
(particularly emanating from the regime advocating the
‘Singapore School’!) towards even the notion of ‘human rights’.
But the spillover from the series of interrelated crises, ecological
as well as economic, has served to advance such analysis and
practice – from human rights to human security – even if not all
incumbent regimes so appreciate let alone welcome it (Acharya
and Acharya, 2000). And I have been pleased to develop the
notion of ‘island governance’ – how each island community (i.e.
its regime, economy and society), no matter what its formal
status, positions itself in the regional and global political
economies – in association with colleagues from the archipelagic
states of South-East Asia (Shaw, 1998).
2 Governance for human security
The Asian crisis of the late 1990s shook confidence in
Asian values and revealed the tenuousness of links between the
region’s economies, polities and societies (Soros, 2000, pp.
201–34). Continuing tensions among states, corporations and
civil societies point to the imperative of re-examining the
erstwhile ‘developmental state’ and learning new lessons from/for
Asia (Stein, 1995). Certainly, the intensity of the crisis/decline
and resilience of response/revival have diverged dramatically
throughout the region, with Hong Kong and Singapore least
negatively affected and Indonesia and the Philippines the most
(The Economist, 2000a, 2000b); i.e. the area’s Newly
Industrializing Countries (NICs) are today further away from
189

their aspirations than ever: the geese may be flying backwards!
Moreover, the continuing stagnation of the Japanese economy in
contrast to the sustained expansion of that in China affects the
balance between these regional powers at the turn of the century.
Furthermore, just as island governance draws attention to highly
divergent patterns of development among neighbouring island
political economies (e.g. Java versus Irian Jaya or Luzon versus
Mindanao), so forms of ‘globalizations’ have generated
opportunities for high-tech ‘islands’ such as the Special/Export
Processing Zones of coastal China or Bangalore in India, which
are becoming more integrated globally than nationally with
profound implications for the cohesion of these two major Asian
powers (Tiejun, 2000).
Pressures for first political and then economic
liberalization throughout the region have served to change the
balance between state and non-state actors leading towards new
patterns of governance between them. The sequences and
consequences of these conditionalities are crucial factors
determining whether human development and human security
are achievable and sustainable in today’s Asia (Acharya and
Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001).
Governance in Asia, as elsewhere in the new century,
means the ongoing roles of companies and civil societies as well
as states in policy- and decisionmaking on all issues, including
security (Wolfish and Smith, 2000). These are advanced through
the analysis of not-for-profit think-tanks (Stone, 2000) and the
related advocacy of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
increasingly orchestrated and advanced through regional and
global coalitions and networks (McGann and Weaver, 2000). In
turn, such ‘triangular’ relations serve to reinforce notions of
human rather than state security as other interests and threats are
recognized; in the classic United Nations Development
Programme conceptualization, protection from ‘the threat of
disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political
repression and environmental hazards’ (UNDP, 1994, p. 22).
190

In short, human security (cf. www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreignp/
humansecurity; www.unesco.org/securipax) is less concerned
with national, state or regime security than with basic needs,
community, economic, environmental, gender, personal and
political securities. These are internal and transnational rather
than inter-state, and they can be advanced by a variety of interests
and institutions rather than just the military. Thus, at least some
analysts and activists in Asia have gone beyond common,
comprehensive and cooperative security towards more inclusive
conceptualizations of human development/security (Acharya and
Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001).
3 Tracks One, Two and/or Three in the new millennium
Conventional notions of national security imply a
monopoly of ‘Track One’ official, inter-state diplomacy: the
classical ‘realist’ world. Such exclusive interregime negotiations
and confrontations still exist even if they are increasingly subject
to non-state attention, especially from the local to global NGOs
(e.g. Amnesty International, Greenpeace) and media. However,
reflective of presumed ‘Asian values’, to advance the Asian miracle
in the 1980s, a second tier was developed: a distinctive ‘Track
Two’ of diplomats, academics and others in their ‘personal
capacities’ typically focusing on ‘functional’ or ‘technical’
matters, such as communications, disasters, energy, oceans, river
valleys, etc. Such informal patterns of diplomatic governance,
centred around the twenty-plus national/associate/regional
members of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific (www.cscap.org), advanced furthest in the Institute of
Strategic and International Studies network in South-East Asia in
the early 1990s (www.jaring.my/isis), reinforcing the Asian
Regional Forum (ARF) of ASEAN (www.aseansec.org). But as
Richard Higgott indicates, such optimism and attention was not
to last:
191

‘Thus the events of 1997–98 – the most traumatic
experienced in Asia since decolonization and the Cold War
confrontations of the 1950s and 1960s – also have spawned
lessons for Asian regionalism. The crises have sidetracked policy
elites from the regional dialogue activities – trade liberalization
and security – popular throughout the first half of the 1990s. In
this context, ASEAN, as the activist leader of wider Asian regional
dialogues, has lost its way since 1997’ (Higgott, 2000, pp. 263–4).
In short, reverberations from the regional crises of recent
years have meant that the salience of Track Two peaked well before
the end of the century, to be superceded by a return to more
exclusive and antagonistic Track One inter-state relations along
with the evolution of a Track Three of non-state actors (Kraft,
2000). The latter is also ‘exclusive’ but not intentionally so: local
and national, regional and global NGOs along with more
progressive think-tanks, media. etc. (see www.twnside.org.sg).
While the former concentrates on orthodox short-term military
threats, the latter puts longer-term non-traditional issues on the
agenda: cultural, economic, ecological, personal, social,
technological threats to human development/security such as
droughts and floods, drugs and gangs, landmines and small arms,
etc. (Mbabazi et al., 2001; MacLean and Shaw, 2001).
Unfortunately, currently Tracks One and Three exist in somewhat
splendid isolation from each other, reflective of the lingering
tensions between state and civil society, although Kraft (2000)
hopes that mutual suspicion can be overcome by ‘inter-track’
‘confidence-building measures’. As Behera et al. indicate, Track
Three reflects voices from the margins of international relations
which seek to ‘build constituencies for peace which can question
conventional practices and beliefs and present alternatives to
official government positions’ (1997, p. 19).
In the first decade of the new millennium, Track Two is
clearly needed now more than ever to bridge the gap and facilitate
a dialogue between the three corners of the governance triangle both
intra- and inter-regionally. Such intentions lay behind some late-
192

twentieth-century national ‘architectures’ for Asian security and
development such as CANCAPS (www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps), the
Canadian adjunct of CSCAP [see also the new Swedish South Asian
Studies Network (SASNET) supported by the Swedish International
Development Agency, Sida (http://sasnet.soc.lu.se/) and related
Asia-Pacific (national through human) security networks]. At the
national level, it too seeks to bridge the state-corporate-civil
society/academic divide in an ongoing series of workshops,
discussions, publications, etc., which are largely compatible with
current official and non-state ‘foreign policy’ reflecting a human
security orientation, so reinforcing the work of the Asia Pacific
Foundation of Canada (www.asiapacific.ca). Symptomatic of the
interdependence of the Three Tracks, as well as their potential
outside as well as inside ASEAN, was the award of the Nobel Prize
for Peace in December 2000 to the President of the Republic of
Korea, Kim Dae Jung, for negotiating an unprecedented summit
with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north and
facilitating ‘family reunions’, which are leading to other state and
non-state attempts to engage the Kim Jong II regime.
4 Conventional, nuclear and human security in contemporary Asia
Just as the trio of diplomatic ‘Tracks’ have evolved within
the last decade, so has the balance among conventional, nuclear
and human security concerns (ISIS, 2000). If the first
predominated in the era of the Asian miracle, the last two have
become central at the turn of the century, reflective of an
intensification of intra- and inter-state inequalities and
insecurities. The escalation of nuclear-related stand-offs between
India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, and the two Koreas, has
come to supercede the several decades of Cold War bipolarity
between the two superpowers across the Arctic. Such
contemporary Asian flashpoints are even more ominous because
of the spread of ballistic-missile technologies. To date, a mixture
of great-power cajoling and Track Two mediation has prevented
193

either a nuclear accident or a protracted hot war, but recent Gulf
Wars should provide history lessons of the potential costs entailed.
In contrast to the revival of inter-state confrontations,
intra-state inequalities are intensifying as the stages of the crisis
unfold and the associated gains and costs are spread unevenly.
These have already led to an escalation of internal conflicts
around the peripheries of countries such as Indonesia and the
Philippines which may yet lead to de jure as well as de facto
separatist states such as Aceh and Irian Jaya. Like Africa, Asia has
had to accommodate ‘new states’ in the new century even if we
had all assumed that the ‘nationalist’ era of formal independence
ended in the 1960s. The painful birth of East Timor (Kraft,
2000; Traub, 2000), like that of Eritrea, may not deter other
aspirants as in the southern Philippines and reinforce the
attractions of relatively flexible and informal inter-island
‘triangles’ rather than more rigid archipelagic states.
Moreover, the cumulative consequences of environmental
decay are only beginning to be recognized, let alone calculated, as
clean air and water become ever more scarce (Quadir and Shaw,
1998). Certainly the ‘haze’ crises of the late 1990s constituted
something of a wake-up call even if illegal logging practices have
community as well as environmental aspects. Likewise, the
intrusion and spread of viruses such as HIV/AIDS have served to
concentrate minds on prevention, with the epidemic spreading
from Africa to Asia, especially among poorer, migrant communities.
Non-traditional security threats in Asia always bore more
resemblance to other continents like Africa than was admitted
during the boom years (MacLean et al., 2001). Even then
syndromes around drugs/gangs/guns, migration/refugees, piracy,
etc., were reminiscent of some African issues, including the
privatization of security. So the centrality of Afghanistan in the
world of hard drugs, as well as fundamentalism, may be Fifth
round table What perspectives on human security in Asia in the
twenty-first century? Some parallels with Africa 97contrasted to
some African trans-shipment centres. In part because of geography
194

as well as relative affluence, there has always been a much higher
prevalence of piracy on Asia’s high seas than around Africa’s long
coastline, although one correlate of on-land conflicts and peacekeeping
is off-shore crime, both to humans and resources such as
fish and coral (e.g. around Somalia). Indeed, the continuing
instability around the South China Sea is in part an instance of the
role of impoverished navies out of uniform! Hence the imperative
of effective ocean and island governance, reinforcing novel patterns
of Asian/archi-pelagic ‘triangles’ (Shaw, 1998).
Moreover, Asia has considerable experience of soldiers in
power, so that ‘civil-military relations’ have been as fraught there
as elsewhere. New forms of democratic governance may lead
towards a more transparent relationship in which NGOs join
elected officials in monitoring statutory forces to ensure
compliance with human rights and codes of warfare. As security
is privatized, so such supervision is needed for private military
companies as well. Soldiers continue to be engaged in private as
well as illegal sectors, in part to finance their operations,
particularly arms races, which seem to be heating up again at the
turn of the century. Ubiquitous ‘off-budget’ activities and
incomes – from small- to large-scale – mean that official figures
underestimate the real costs of military forces in Asia as elsewhere
(Berger, 2000; ISIS, 2000).
5 Scenarios for Asian futures in the new century
Given the above cautions about the elusiveness of human
development/security, along with increasingly revisionist
reflections around the Asian crisis (Bello, 1990; Jomo, 1998),
including the balance between more exclusive forms of ‘Asian
bilateralism’ versus more inclusive forms of Asia Pacific
regionalism (Asian Regionalism …, 2000; Mastanduno, 2000), at
least five plausible scenarios can be abstracted for the region over
the first one or two decades of the new millennium, with
profound implications for all other continents. These take into
195

account alternative definitions of national to human security
along with the parallel roles and relative salience of the three tracks
(Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Behera et al., 1997; Kraft, 2000).
First, notwithstanding the continuing reverberations of
the Asian crisis, the official, Track One optimistic scenario
advanced by ASEAN and some of its state (i.e. ARF) and
corporate supporters (i.e. emerging markets) consists of
extrapolations from the NIC model (Chan et al., 1998; Stein,
1995), albeit postcrisis with some modest human-development
dimensions added on: renewed high levels of growth and
cooperation based on revived Asian values (Higgott, 2000;
Mastanduno, 2000).
Second, the still unfamiliar yet all too realistic preview is
that of instability; i.e. Indonesia on a regional scale, reflective of
growing inequalities and the increasing ability or determination of
elements in civil society to so articulate or even orchestrate. Given
the prevalence of Asian ‘corporatism’ between states and
corporations, the third point of the triangle – civil society – has
been largely marginalized and overlooked .… until the fallout from
the crisis (Soros, 2000)! Now a range of human (and national)
security threats is both apparent and escalating, such as ethnic,
ideological, racial, regional and religious identities and claims
(Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001).
Third, in response to the above, a rather idealistic, ‘green’
or ‘civil society’ future is possible, however unlikely at the regional
level as a whole: sustainable human development/security in
which states and companies are restrained by pressures from the
other point of the triangle, reinforced by pressures of ecology and
equity, let alone extra-regional conditionalities about greenhouse
gases, etc. This corresponds to a synthesis of think-tank, Track
Three ideals (Kraft, 2000).
Fourth, if inequalities and insecurities persist through the
first decade of the new century, then a reversion to Asian values
of a militaristic variety may occur. To contain either overly liberal
reform or fundamentalist reactions, the ‘secular’ and ‘rational’
196

military may come to intervene to restore the dominance of the
state against civil society, possibly exacerbating tensions over
arms races, nuclear and chemical technologies, etc. (The
Economist, 2000a, 2000b).
Finally, fifth, given reverberations from Africa, an
‘anarchy’ nightmare might yet impact on this region: a
combination of ecological decay, economic decline, exponential
corruption, exhaustion from unwinnable regional wars,
privatized security, human and financial capital flight, and
unstoppable viruses leading to communal/racial/regional/
religious clashes (i.e. the other side of human security) too
widespread for traditional ‘peace-keeping’ or ‘humanitarian’
interventions from within and/or outside the continent
(MacLean et al., 2001; Soros, 2000, pp. 208–34).
Clearly, the last pair of possibilities serve as cautions lest
some mix of the more attractive Asian miracle projections fail to
materialize post-crisis. If, in the first years and decades of the
twenty-first century, the region is to avoid the unattractive
prospect of an ‘unpacific Asia’ (The Economist, 1994, p. 77) then
respect for non-state actors in governance and in Tracks Two and
Three is imperative (Asian Regionalism …, 2000). In brief, if the
Asian crisis leads towards more sustainable, democratic and
humane forms of human development/security then the region’s
unhappy as well as unanticipated fall from grace may in the long
run be beneficial (Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001): a welcome
prospect outside as well as inside Asia, with implications for
development analysis and practice elsewhere (Gills, 2000; Payne,
1998, 1999; Shaw, 2001a, 2001b).
6 Implications for established perspectives and practices
I conclude with a few tentative reflections on implications of
the Asian and related cases for established disciplines and emerging
interdisciplinary fields, with theoretical and applied implications.
Such analytic challenges have intensified with the end of the Cold
197

War, even if (still!) hegemonic discourses from the United States fail
to so appreciate. As indicated at the start, the character and tone of
the discourse inside and around Asia have been transformed in the
last five years (Gills, 2000; Higgott, 2000).
First, triangular forms of governance involving a range of
mixed actors confront established assumptions in political science
about the efficacy of statecentric forms of government. Similarly,
notions of regional ‘crisis’ confound orthodox regional notions
about the developmental state and the NIC model.
Second, the emergence of Tracks Two and Three along
with the roles of non-state actors in general undermine the realist
orthodoxies of international relations (Berger, 2000). Non-state
actors such as multinational corporations and NGOs now have
their own ‘foreign policies’ through which they relate to each
other and states at an ‘external’ level. The emergence of human
development/security further condemns the international
relations and foreign policy establishment who cannot begin to
understand mixed-actor, global coalitions against blood
diamonds, child soldiers, landmines, Multilateral Agreement on
Investment/World Trade Organization at the 1999 meeting in
Seattle, etc. (Lee, 2000; Soros, 2000).
Third, Asia’s metamorphosis over the last five years also
challenges established perspectives in development, even Asian,
studies. Triumphalist notions of Asian exceptionalisms and the
NIC model have evaporated along with Asian values
(Mastanduno, 2000; Mead, 2000). Yet the region’s histories cannot
be ignored, just as other continents’ lessons should now be noted
by Asia (Stein, 1995). Nevertheless, the recognition of non-state
actors in forms of mixed-actor governance and of human security
in forms of sustainable development cannot be underestimated in
terms of impact. If the Asian crisis forces rethinks within as well as
around the region, it will not be in vain, as the region’s people
deserve much greater degrees of human development/security than
they were able to realize in most of the twentieth century (Acharya
and Acharya, 2000; Goucha and Zapata, 1999).
198

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Main challenges facing the promotion
of human security in Asia
by Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan,
Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of International
and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, Bangladesh
1 Introduction
The concept of human security has been in existence for
centuries. As early as 1705, the German philosopher Leibniz
expressed the need for the state to provide common security (la
sécurité commune) to its people. The French philosopher
Montesquieu echoed the same sentiment, writing in the
eighteenth century that true political freedom could only be
achieved when people are secure. 1 However, the concept has
remained suppressed for so long, especially during the Cold War,
because of overemphasis on the state-centric geopolitical and
military aspects of security. This security discourse, which actually
flows from the realpolitik paradigm of the 1940s, deals with war,
violence and conflict. Security of the state or the regime in power
is defined in terms of the absence of such threats. It was believed
that security-related concepts such as containment, deterrence,
balance of power, mutually assured destruction, etc., would ensure
safety and security of the state and thereby its people.
Following in the footsteps of the developed Western
world, the impoverished newly emerging developing countries
also placed excessive emphasis on the military aspects of security
threats. They failed to comprehend that military security cannot
1 Quoted in Hussein Solomon, ‘From Marginalised to Dominant Discourse:
Reflections on the Evolution of New Security Thinking’, Institute of Strategic Studies
(ISS) Monograph Series, No. 20, February 1998, p. 4.
203

espond to some of human beings’ basic needs – freedom from
poverty, hunger and threats to their individual lives.
As a consequence, the developing world became highly
militarized, with its defence spending undergoing a sixfold
increase since 1960. Thus, the exhaustion of countries’ resources
from the developmental front to the military front hampered not
only their socio-economic growth but also caused continuing
social and political unrest, with all its negative regional and
international ramifications. These countries failed to provide their
people with security against internal threats emanating from
hunger, malnutrition, disease, unemployment and other
hardships. According to Michael Renner, 1,300 million people in
developing countries live in poverty and do not have access to safe
water, 900 million adults worldwide are illiterate and 800 million
people have inadequate food supplies; 500 million of these people
are malnourished and 175 million are under the age of 5 years. 2
Not only was a developing state unable to provide these
forms of security, but the state itself may be seen as a source of
insecurity to its people through corruption, oppressive
instruments for rent-seeking and extortion, and other forms of
bad governance. This is quite understandable in view of the fact
that the state apparatus itself develops vested interests in
preserving the interests of the establishment entities, most of
which run counter to those of ordinary people. In the face of
dissent and protestation, the state apparatus, which monopolizes
the instruments of violence, resorts to force and repression.
However, over the last few decades or so, the changes
witnessed in the national, regional and international arena such as
human rights violations, poverty, economic underdevelopment,
political instability, terrorism and proliferation of small arms,
environmental degradation, ethnic and religious violence, and
gender inequity, have led to the realization that the conventional
2 Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict,
and the New Age of Insecurity, p. 81, New York, Norton, 1996.
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or traditional security discourse appears inadequate to capture
these emerging sources of insecurity. These newer sources of
insecurity have had profound consequences for the individual
human being, society, state, and interstate relationship. They tend
to pose threats not only to the state but also to the community
and the individual. It is now widely recognized that state security
may not lead to human security. 3 In fact, overemphasis on state
security often endangers human security.
Hence the need for an alternative approach to security. Such
an alternative security paradigm, or an inclusive security discourse,
includes among other issues those of the security of the individual
and of the community. Here the prime focus is on the people, the
human being. The paradigm of human security was thus brought
to the centre stage because it creates a space where the issues
affecting human beings can be taken care of. The primary concern
here is ‘how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they
exercise their many rights, how much access they have to the
market and other social opportunities – and whether they live in
conflict or in peace.’ 4 It is a ‘positive and inclusive concept’ which
endorses people’s universal desire for self-preservation and
selfimprovement. Scholars and analysts now believe that it has the
potential to revolutionize society in the twenty-first century. 5
As defined by the United Nations Development
Programme’s Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions
of Human Security, human security is the summation of
economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community
and political security. A Canadian paper defines human security
as freedom of the individual from fear. It is a condition or state
3 See Jack Donnelly, ‘Rethinking Human Rights’, pp. 387–94; and Michael T.
Klare, ‘Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms’, pp. 353–8, Current History,
Vol. 95, No. 604, November 1996.
4 Concept Paper, WISCOMP Summer Symposium, New Delhi, India, 21–26
August 2000.
5 Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, ‘Human Security: A Broader Dimension’, The
Daily Star, 4 August 1999.
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of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to
people’s rights, safety or even their lives. 6 The present paper looks
into those socio-economic aspects that threaten individual
security in day-to-day activities.
In recent times human security is threatened everywhere,
including Asia. Hence understanding the concept is not
sufficient. One needs to know to what extent is human security
at stake? What are the existing challenges to human security? And
how do we face these challenges in order to ensure security now
and in the future? The present paper addresses some of these
questions.
2 Present state of human security in Asia
Asia comprises a vast territory with each region having its
own characteristics, giving rise to its own variety of problems and
challenges. The concept of security also varies in different degrees
in different parts of Asia. What may be the main challenges
facing East Asia may not hold true for South Asia or Central Asia.
Although the gap between South Asia and East Asia was
almost non-existent in the 1960s, the remarkable economic
performance of the East Asian countries in recent years has
widened the gap tremendously. As a result of their high gross
domestic product (GDP), the human development index and
genderrelated development index of East Asia (excluding China)
are now twice as high as those of South Asia. 7
The question that one may ask is whether human security
is ensured in its totality with the high GDP and high level of
income in East Asia. We have attempted to define human
security in terms of security that encompasses all aspects of the
welfare of a human being – economic, political, social,
6 David Preston and Don Hubert, ‘Towards Freedom from Fear: An Agenda for
Human Security’, BIISS Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 2000, p. 347.
7 Mahbub ul Haq, Human Development in South Asia, p. 66, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1997.
206

environmental – but that nevertheless poses a threat to direct
well-being. If we look at the state of human security in East Asia
from this perspective, it is obvious that the people are
economically secure and that East Asian economic prosperity has
ensured human development in terms of basic education, health
care, employment and so forth. However, social and political
indicators in these regions may not be so promising. To be more
specific, gun-related crime, drug abuse, domestic violence,
political unrest, etc., have endangered human security in these
countries. In all these cases the target is the innocent person. It is
not an overstatement to say that the very social fabric of these
societies is severely threatened by such factors.
Against this backdrop, we attempt to identify the main
challenges to promoting human security in Asia. It is threatened by
• poverty and underdevelopment;
• small arms and light weapons;
• landmines;
• drug abuse and trafficking;
• trafficking of women and children; and
• gender violence and human rights violations.
Poverty and underdevelopment
Poverty affects all aspects of human security. It is the most
serious and persistent threat to human security. According to the
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP), the rise in the total number of poor from
532 million to 562 million in South Asia is a great concern. The
region is home to nearly three-quarters of the total number of
poor in Asia and the Pacific, or about half the total number of
poor in all developing countries of the world.
Even though urban poverty is increasing, nearly four-fifths
of the total number of poor in the Asia and Pacific region are still
in rural areas. Poverty in the region continues to be primarily a
rural problem.
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Although the basic concept of security is undergoing
profound changes all over the world, as the security of people
moves to centre stage, the policy-makers of South Asia appear to
be undisturbed by this trend. According to the Human
Development Report, soldiers outnumber doctors by 6 to 1, at a
time when many people are dying of curable diseases. While
foreign exchange budgets are tight the region still manages to
spend twice as much as Saudi Arabia on the procurement of
modern arms from abroad, although the latter has a per capita
income twenty-five times higher than that of South Asia. While
global military spending was declining by about 37 per cent
during 1987–94, that of South Asia went up by 12 per cent. 8
Needless to say that such heavy military spending is pre-empting
scarce financial resources urgently needed for human
development. In a nutshell, ‘South Asia is fast emerging as the
poorest, the most illiterate, the most malnourished, the least
gender-sensitive, indeed the most deprived region in the world.
Yet it continues to make more investment in arms than in the
education and health of its people.’ 9
Small arms and light weapons
Apart from economic sources of human insecurity, the
Asian countries are perhaps among the worst victims of violence,
whether politically or socio-economically motivated. The main
tools of violence in most cases are small arms and light weapons
that have recently received much attention because of the havoc
they are creating at the national, societal and, most importantly,
at the individual level. These are the weapons that affect the
security of the individual without nations entering into war.
They have been taking a heavy toll on the lives of people in all
countries, seriously endangering personal safety and security. The
8. Ibid., p. 80.
9. Ibid., p. 1.
208

number of human lives lost through proliferation and trafficking
of these weapons is staggering. In recent years they have emerged
as having one of the most dangerous impacts on human security.
While the developed countries have been quick to address
the problem, not many developing countries have given the issue
the attention it deserves. In the meantime, illegal trafficking of
arms and drugs has assumed such enormous proportions that the
internal stability of several developing countries is threatened.
The evils of small arms are manifest in all parts of Asia. For
example, in the countries of southern Asia, violence carried out
by small arms and light weapons has become the norm rather
than the exception. Sophisticated small arms and light weapons
are smuggled in while cheap arms are manufactured in local
markets. The state has also been a source of arms supply in Asia.
Although small arms include portable weapons such as rifles,
revolvers, heavy and light machine guns and chemical grenades,
their size bears little relation to their destructive capability.
Thousands of people have lost their lives by bomb and bullet in
this region. In South Asia alone, although no data are available
on illegal small arms proliferation, a rough estimation shows that
more than 5 million illegal small arms exist in this region. With
the wide-spread availability of the AK-47 assault rifle in South
Asia, a ‘Kalashnikov culture’ has taken deep-seated root in
society. Improved technology has pushed children further into
warfare. In 1988, there were around 200,000 child soldiers under
the age of 15 years fully participating in conflicts all around the
world. 10 The dangerous dimension to the proliferation of small
arms is that they are in the hands of non-state actors. The largest
users of small arms in South Asia are non-state actors comprising
insurgents, separatist groups, terrorists, drug cartels, extortionists
and criminals.
10 Christopher Louise, The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and
Proliferation, p. 6, Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development, March 1995.
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Death and injury as a consequence of small arms and light
weapons is a direct threat to human security. Reports show that
in 1990, as many as sixteen ongoing conflicts and wars claimed
2,632,000 civilian lives. In the 1980s, the proportion of civilian
deaths rose to 74 per cent of the total deaths in armed conflicts
and in 1990 it appears to be close to 90 per cent. The war in
Afghanistan cost the lives of more than 500,000 people. 11
Currently, the prime target of the law-enforcing agencies in these
countries is controlling the proliferation of small arms. At the
intellectual level, however, the subject of small arms and light
weapons remains a political and security taboo and, as such, not
much systematic work has been done on the extent and impact
of this menace in the region.
Landmines
Landmines are another form of threat to human security.
Some 120 million active mines are scattered in over seventy
countries – one for every sixteen children or forty-eight human
beings on earth. Eight hundred people are killed and 1,200 are
maimed every single month. 12 Countries such as Viet Nam,
Cambodia and Afghanistan are infested with landmines. The
impact of landmines goes beyond physical suffering. In the long
run, all of society has to pay. According to a Red Cross report, 13
in Viet Nam each hectare can support roughly two families of
five. The 3,500 hectares of farmland infested with mines in the
Gio Linh district could normally support 35,000 people. Instead,
these people are reduced to poverty because of a war fought
before many of them were born. A 1995 study showed that in
Cambodia, 61 per cent of victims go into debt to pay for their
11 For details see Neila Husain, ‘Proliferation of Small Arms and Politics in South
Asia: The Case of Bangladesh’, RCSS Policy Studies, May 1999, pp. 19–20.
12 United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
13 Land Mines Must Be Stopped, a publication of the Mines Campaign Unit of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.
210

medical treatment, while in Afghanistan the figures are 84 per
cent for residents and refugees and 87 per cent for nomads. 14 The
unique characteristic of anti-personnel mines is that they kill and
injure more civilians after the ceasefire than during hostilities.
They fail to distinguish between combatant and civilian. 15
Drug abuse and trafficking
Asia finds itself at the crossroads, flanked on both sides by
two of the largest drug triangles (the Golden Triangle in the east,
and the Golden Crescent in the west), not to mention the fact
that the region is swarming with insurgencies and ethnic conflicts
within and beyond its periphery. Today, Asia has turned into a
‘safe haven’ for trafficking, producing, and marketing Fifth round
table Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in
Asia 103of both small arms and drugs. Being one of the largest
and fastest-growing narcotics market in the world, it is no longer
restricted to drug smuggling and trafficking to Europe and
America. Drug consumption, especially among the young, has
increased sharply over the years. ‘Asia’s rising economic tide has
made the drug problem worse, since the demand for narcotics
increases with higher income levels. Higher incomes also lead to
more variety in drug consumption.’ 16 In the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, for example, addicts consume almost half
of the estimated 200 metric tonnes of opium produced in the
country each year, most of which used to be exported. There are
1.2 million heroine addicts in Thailand and 400,000 in Burma,
and 500,000 registered heroine addicts in China. 17 In India, there
are an estimated 5 million drug users, but the worst victim is
14 Anti-personnel Mines: An Overview, Geneva, International Committee of the
Red Cross, August 1997.
15 Ibid.
16 James Shinn, ‘Asia’s Drug Menace and the Poverty of Diplomacy’, Current
History, April 1998, p. 174.
17 Ibid.
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Pakistan which now has the largest heroine consumer market in
the South- West Asian region. 18
Trafficking of women and children
Trafficking in and violence against women and children is
directly related to the social and economic realities of each of the
countries of Asia. It has greatly undermined and would continue
to cause increasingly greater harm to families and individuals.
The misery and agony of trafficking so many human lives
throughout the world do not only have an impact on those
involved but on society as a whole.
Trafficking of women and children is rampant in the
entire region, not only in South Asia. In the last two decades,
there has been an alarming increase in trafficking of women and
children from regions of South Asia and South-East Asia. On
average around 10,000 Nepalese girls, most between the ages of
9 and 16, are sold to brothels in India every year. Researchers
believe that more than 200,000 Nepalese girls are involved in the
Indian sex trade. A report in Asiaweek 19 shows that approximately
4 million under-age prostitutes operate in the bars and brothels
of Thailand. It further states that of the 2 million street children
in the Philippines, about 60,000 are involved in the flesh trade.
Japan, however, is the biggest market for Asian women.
Trafficking has taken the form of organized crime. There
has been a tendency to stress the sexual exploitation aspect.
While it cannot be denied that an overwhelming number of
trafficked persons end up in brothels or are used in prostitution,
pornography, sex tourism, etc., at the same time relatively recent
trends such as organ sales and camel racing using young boys as
jockeys also demand equal attention.
18 ul Haq, op. cit., p. 13.
19 Asiaweek, 7 February 1997.
212

Gender violence and human rights violations
Another threat to human security emanates from gender
violence and violations of human rights. Increasingly, women in
all parts of Asia are becoming vulnerable to various forms of
violence. Rape, gang rape and murder, physical torture, honour
killing, dowry-related violence, pyre-burning, acid-throwing,
forced prostitution, disappearance, physical abuse and death in
custody are some of the forms of violence against women. About
74 million women are quite simply missing in South Asia. 20
Human rights are typically understood as equal and
inalienable rights held by every person. 21 The manifestation of
human rights violations can vary from country to country and
society to society. Broadly, human rights violations in Asia cover
state repression, death in police custody, oppression of
minorities, women and children. In many parts of Asia,
awareness of individual rights and dignity is very low, either
because of illiteracy or lack of comprehension of the very term
‘human rights’. The protection of human rights in Asia, where
most of the population live below the poverty line and face
illiteracy and socio-economic inequalities, is indeed a very
complex task.
3 Conclusion
Asia’s main challenge is to identify the sources of human
insecurity in the light of the miseries that punctuate the daily
lives of its people. Unless social and political institutions are
improved and strengthened, it will be difficult to ensure human
security. Effort is required at both governmental and nongovernmental
levels if human security is to be promoted. There
is no denying the fact that these issues should have been
20 ul Haq, op. cit., p. 24.
21 Donnelly, op. cit., p. 387.
213

addressed decades ago. The problems may be internal but they
have an external dimension because no country can deal with
them alone. In Asia, we have not yet learnt to act as a collective
force; we talk of East Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia as
separate continents. The time has come for the countries of Asia
to deal with these challenges in collaboration. Since human
security requires the nurturing of more stable and cooperative
relationships among nations, and depends on greater cohesion
among classes and societies, it cannot be achieved unilaterally.
Now that human existence has come to be increasingly shaped by
global and local trends, national policies need to be
complemented by enhanced international cooperation among
countries and by the strengthening of civil societies everywhere.
We need more discussion, more studies and more exchanges of
ideas and resources in order to overcome the threats of the past
century that unfortunately linger on into the twenty-first
century.
From the above discussion it is clear that peace and human
security need a shift from militarization to living economies that
have the potential to meet people’s basic needs and provide dayto-day
security. True, traditional thinking will not wither away
overnight. It will take sustained education and empowerment at
the grass-roots level, and enlightened leadership, to overcome the
biggest stumbling block to change of all, the human mind. Since
wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the
defences of peace must be constructed.
214

Closing Session

Reports on the debates of the five Round Tables
The main challenges facing the promotion
of human security and peace
First Round Table
Africa
by Mr Mambaelele Mankoto,
Programme Specialist, Division of Ecological Sciences, UNESCO
On the basis of the two main lectures concerning the region,
the discussions focused on the following issues:
– The question of the need to reinforce state-building
versus the strengthening of civil society with a view to adequately
ensuring human security was discussed in depth. Consensus was
reached on the question of the responsibility of the state in
creating an adequate context for the strengthening of civil society
organizations, particularly in rural areas, and on the need to
foster pluralism in the framework of the strengthening of
democratic processes in Africa. It was also emphasized that
international organizations should contribute to enhance the role
and the capacities of NGOs in development and in the
strengthening of democracy.
– The need to reinforce education for peace, in particular
in the framework of the International Decade for a Culture of
Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World,
proclaimed by the UN General Assembly, was stressed. Particular
emphasis was placed on the responsibility of UNESCO in this
field, in the light of its wideranging experience in promoting a
culture of peace and citizenship education.
– Various remarks were made concerning the role of
religion and tribalism as factors of division within societies: the
217

majority of the participants considered that religion and tribal
origin are often used by governing elites to create crisis within
societies with a view to maintaining their grip on the state.
– Much stress was laid on the need to support African
initiatives and the national, subregional and regional ownership of
conflict prevention and human security initiatives and programmes.
– The interlinkages between environmental and natural
resources protection and human security were repeatedly
stressed, in particular concerning prevention of conflicts over
natural resources in densely populated areas.
– Particular stress was placed on ensuring national
ownership of poverty reduction strategies, taking into account
the negative impact of initiatives based on conditionalities.
Second Round Table
Europe
by Ms Antonella Verdiani,
Programme Specialist, Education for Universal Values Section, UNESCO
On the basis of the main lecture concerning the region, the
discussions focused on the following issues:
– A comparative analysis was made of challenges to human
security in Africa and Europe: questions of scale and in particular
of urgency were discussed in depth. In that context, various
speakers dealt at length with the human security dimensions of
the crisis in the Balkans.
– Many participants referred to the importance of the
action of NGOs in the field, in particular those working in
education.
– On the basis of a communication made by Ms
Jacqueline Morineau (Mediation and Training for Mediation
218

Centre, Paris) the participants debated the lessons drawn from
field experience in Macedonia on mediation, and the need to
accept the realities of the different insecurities affecting civilian
populations in order to take into account all the factors having an
impact on personal and individual behaviour.
– The impact of globalization on human security was also
stressed, in particular the new divisions and fractures it is
creating. The role of the weapons trade was also analysed in
depth, in particular regarding the relations between the moredeveloped
and the less-developed countries.
– Stress was laid on the need to work closely with civil
society, enhancing the role of NGOs and field projects in the
building of human security.
– It was also suggested that the creation of social science
observatories would be most useful for monitoring, studying and
resolving major problems related to human security, in particular
in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies.
– The importance of networking was repeatedly stressed,
in particular through the strengthening of the SecuriPax Forum
launched by UNESCO.
Third Round Table
Latin America and the Caribbean
by Ms Suzanne Diop,
Programme Specialist, Division for Intercultural Projects, UNESCO
On the basis of the three main lectures concerning the region,
the discussions focused on the following issues:
– The obstacles facing demobilization after civil strife and
the need for effective implementation of social, economic and
cultural programmes following the signing of peace agreements.
219

– The need to reinforce the capacities of civil society to
deal with growing insecurity within states, in particular in urban
and peri-urban areas.
– The need to reinforce citizenship education, with a view
to deconstructing the culture of violence.
– The importance of confidence-building measures in the
region and the need for strengthening regional cooperation
mechanisms.
– The need to refocus academic research as a basis for the
formulation of alternative conflict-prevention mechanisms.
– The need to increase dialogue between universities,
research institutions and the armed and security forces with a
view to enhancing peace and stability.
– Major emphasis was placed on the impact of both
poverty and exclusion on the most vulnerable populations and
the consequences for internal stability.
– Emphasis was also placed on the complexities of
reconciliation processes, based on the different reports of truth
and justice commissions in the countries of the region.
Fourth Round Table
Arab States
by Mr Luis Salamanques,
Programme Specialist, Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO
On the basis of the main lecture concerning the region, the
discussions focused on the following issues:
– Challenges to human security from within the state,
such as population growth, economic growth, water supply and
food security, human resources and environmental issues; and
raising public awareness on the impact of these developments.
220

– Challenges to human security from the international
system: globalization, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and the neglect of cultural diversity, which is a major problem in the
Arab region both internally and from an external perspective.
– The negative consequences of sanctions and embargoes
and the need for further international dialogue and cooperation
on both of these issues.
– The framework for the future: globalization trends
which would give new scope for security in terms of
democratization, evolution of the role of the armed and security
forces, and increased participation of civil society.
– The respect for and development of international law, in
particular concerning water resources management and further
regional integration, emphasizing conflict-resolution mechanisms.
– The need to enhance the intellectual role of peace
research and training institution networks in order to devise
early-warning mechanisms related to human security issues and
the development of alternative paradigms on peace, in the light
of the ongoing discussions of Huntington’s and Kaplan’s works.
Fifth Round Table
Asia and the Pacific
by Mr Quang Nam Thai,
Programme Specialist, Division of Human Rights,
Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
On the basis of the two main lectures concerning the region,
the discussions focused on the following issues:
– In recent times human security is threatened
everywhere, Asia being no exception. This part of the world has
its own characteristics that give rise to its own variety of problems
221

and challenges. The concept of security therefore varies in
different parts of Asia – East Asia, South Asia or Central Asia –
as reflected in the presentations.
– During the two last decades, the remarkable economic
performance of the East Asian countries has considerably
widened the gap between this subregion, on the one hand, and
South Asia and Central Asia, on the other. But the question
could be raised whether, with the high GDP and high level of
income in East Asia, human security is ensured in its totality?
The answer is obviously no. Although East Asian economic
prosperity has contributed to human development in terms of
wealth, basic education, health care, employment, poverty
reduction (as recognized by the World Bank); human security
and the very social structure of these societies are severely
threatened by new factors, such as gun-related crime, drug abuse,
domestic violence, and political unrest. Indeed, these countries
are also threatened by other factors assimilated to ecological
insecurity, political instability and social disintegration.
– According to security experts (here we refer to the
presentation of Major-General Ahsan from Bangladesh), human
security in Asia is threatened by poverty and underdevelopment;
small arms and light weapons; landmines; drug abuse and
trafficking; trafficking of women and children; and gender
violence and human rights violations. Here, we come back to the
concept of comprehensive security, a balanced approach between
peace and human security mentioned by Mr Syed from Pakistan.
Poverty affects all aspects of human security and represents
the most serious and persistent threat to it. Although urban
poverty is increasing, poverty in the Asia and Pacific region
continues to be primarily a rural problem.
Small arms and light weapons in recent years have been shown
to have one of the most dangerous impacts on human security.
The impact of landmines goes beyond the physical
suffering of the wounded, as in the long term the whole of society
has to pay the price.
222

Drug abuse and trafficking: Asia, as one of the largest and
fastest-growing narcotics market in the world, has turned into a
‘safe haven’ for trafficking, producing and marketing of both
small arms and drugs.
Trafficking of women and children has shown an unhealthy
increase in the last two decades and has taken the form of
organized crime.
Gender violence and human rights violations are another
threat to human security, as women in all parts of Asia are
becoming vulnerable to various forms of violence and the
awareness of individual rights and dignity is very low.
What makes Asia so different compared with other regions
is that an unprecedented crisis has occurred, the ‘Asian Crisis’
following the ‘Asian Miracle’ of the late 1990s, which
transformed the character of ‘security’ issues and discourse
throughout Asia as well as prospects for and optimism about
regional cooperation and integration. The result has been a
transformation in the definition of and debates about security
within the region towards a more positive, inclusive and
comprehensive notion of ‘human security’, which has to
overcome the threats mentioned above.
– Thinking and reflection in Asia on security matters go
far beyond what happens in other regions since there is an Asian
regional dialogue through three channels:
‘Track One’: which deals with official, inter-state
diplomacy related to conventional notions of national security;
‘Track Two’: composed of diplomats, academics and
researchers who focus their approach on functional and technical
matters (such as communications, disasters, energy, oceans);
‘Track Three’: with non-state actors such as local and
national, regional and global NGOs together with think-tanks
and the media. The focus is on long-term, non-traditional issues
of cultural, economic, ecological, personal, social and
technological threats to human development and human
security.
223

– The need for good governance for human security: the
crisis of the late 1990s shook confidence in Asian values and
revealed the fragility of links between the region’s economies,
politics and societies. Pressures for first political and then
economic liberalization, perceived as a means of overcoming the
crisis, helped to change the balance between state and non-state
actors throughout the region, leading to new patterns of
governance between them. In this context, good governance in
Asia in the future requires a set of mechanisms which will ensure
the appropriate roles of companies and civil societies as well as of
states in policy- and decision-making on all issues, including
peace, security and development.
224

Final Recommendations
presented by Ms Moufida Goucha, Rapporteur-General, Director,
Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights,
Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
1. Human security can be considered today as a paradigm
in the making, for ensuring both a better knowledge of the
rapidly evolving largescale risks and threats that can have a major
impact on individuals and populations, and a strengthened
mobilization of the wide array of actors actually involved in
participative policy formulation in the various fields it
encompasses today. As such, it is an adequate framework for:
• accelerating the transition from past restrictive notions of
security, tending to identify it solely with defence issues, to a much
more comprehensive multidimensional concept of security, based
on the respect for all human rights and democratic principles;
• contributing to sustainable development and especially
to the eradication of extreme poverty, which is a denial of all
human rights;
• reinforcing the prevention at the root of the different
forms of violence, discrimination, conflict and internal strife that
are taking a heavy toll on mainly civilian populations in all
regions of the world without exception;
• providing a unifying theme for multilateral action to the
benefit of the populations most affected by partial and
interrelated insecurities. The importance should be underlined of
the multilateral initiatives taken in this respect by Canada and
Japan as well as by other countries.
2. The ongoing globalization process offers new opportunities
for the strengthening of large coalitions working to further
human security, at the multilateral and national levels, and in
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particular at local level involving all actors of society. This in
turn requires a much stronger participation of peace research and
training institutions, institutes for security studies, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and other bodies dedicated
to the promotion of peace and human security, with a view to
enhancing the involvement of civil society in all aspects of policy
formulation and implementation of actions aimed at enhancing
human security at the local, national, regional and international
levels.
3. The promotion of human security today therefore
requires an enhanced exchange of best experiences, practices
and initiatives in the fields of research, training, mobilization
and policy formulation, in which UNESCO can play a major
role as a facilitator, forum and amplifier of proactive human
security initiatives, in particular in the framework of the
UNESCO SecuriPax Forum website launched in September
2000 for that purpose (http://www.unesco.org/securipax)
4. The strengthening of the action of the United
Nations and, in particular, of UNESCO in favour of human
security is essential today, taking into account the objectives set
out in the UN Millennium Summit Declaration and Programme
of Action on a Culture of Peace, and the Declaration and Plan for
an International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-
Violence for the Children of the World (2001–2010),
proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly, as well as
on the measures being taken to reach internationally agreed
development targets, in particular in the fields of poverty
eradication; education for all; the preservation of the
environment and notably of water resources; and the struggle
against AIDS.
5. The compounded impact of a growing number of
threats to the security of populations requires the establishment
of innovative interdisciplinary approaches geared to the
requirements of inducing participative preventive action,
involving all social actors. The intimate links that should exist
226

etween research projects and policy formulation in the field of
prevention must also be stressed from the outset, taking into
account the fact that current research on various dimensions of
security is still largely dissociated from the existing policy
formulation mechanisms, particularly at the national and
subregional levels. On the basis of a common agenda for action,
the peace research and training institutions, institutes for security
studies and the NGOs working in related fields can play an
essential role in creating these links, building bridges between the
academic world and the policy formulation mechanisms,
contributing to the establishment of such mechanisms wherever
necessary, identifying priority fields to be tackled and the
populations that merit particular and urgent attention.
6. Regional and subregional approaches should be
elaborated for the promotion of human security in order to more
precisely identify the nature, scope and impact of the risks and
threats that can affect populations in the medium and long term.
UNESCO should contribute to the elaboration of these regional
and subregional approaches, in cooperation with national and
regional organizations and institutions and on the basis of the
regional round tables (on Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the
Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean) held during
the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research
and Training Institutions. Urgent attention should be paid to the
reinforcement of the struggle against AIDS, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, which is a real threat to peace and security, as
stated by the United Nations Security Council.
7. Special attention should be paid to the most highly
populated countries, given the fact that in these countries the
interrelationship between population growth, diminishing
natural resources, environmental degradation and the overall
impact of ongoing globalization processes is of great complexity
and must consequently be dealt with, in particular in terms of
designing local approaches focusing on specific population
groups.
227

8. The development of human resources is a key factor,
if not the most important, for ensuring human security. Basic
education for all and the building of capacities at the national
level must therefore be placed high on the human security
agenda. Institutes for peace and human security can play an
important role in national capacity building in fields such as the
setting up of earlywarning mechanisms related to major risks and
threats to human security; and high-level training for the
elaboration of regional and subregional long-term approaches for
ensuring human security and the formulation of preventive
action policies.
9. Critical post-conflict issues such as reconciliation
processes and mechanisms and the often harsh impact of
sanctions on populations merit more in-depth analysis in terms
of human security, in the framework of an enhanced respect for
international instruments, in particular of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Concerning reconciliation
processes and mechanisms, due attention should be paid to the
adequate dissemination of best experiences and practices and to
the comparative analysis of these experiences and practices,
especially of the work of the various truth and justice
commissions set up in the last two decades in various countries.
Concerning the impact of sanctions on populations, note should
be taken of ongoing initiatives within the United Nations in
order to review the modalities of the imposition of such sanctions
and the action of UN Specialized Agencies to alleviate their
impact on civilian populations.
10. The impact on human security of migrations and of
movements of populations displaced due to conflict should be
highlighted. Concerning migrations, attention should be paid to
countering practices in host countries that discriminate against
legal immigrants, and in the case of populations displaced due to
conflict, the efforts of the international community should be
reinforced, especially when the displacements take on a
semipermanent character.
228

11. Due attention should be paid to countering the
impact of negative paradigms (such as ‘clash of civilizations’,
‘African anarchy’, etc.), based on stereotypes and simplistic
analyses of the interactions between cultures, societies and
civilizations and which aim at fostering new divisions and
fractures at the international and regional levels. The principles
underlying the notions of cultural diversity, cultural pluralism,
tolerance and non-discrimination should be stressed and due
attention should be paid to the follow-up to the Plan of Action
of the World Conference against Racism and Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban,
South Africa, 2001).
12. The role of the state in the promotion of human
security must be addressed on the basis of an exhaustive analysis
of challenges in matters relating to human security, both from
within to ensure sustainable development, and from the rapidly
evolving international processes linked to economic and financial
globalization. States should be encouraged to establish ways of
enlarging their cooperation with civil society, in particular with
those NGOs and institutions that can contribute effectively to
policy formulation and collaborative action in the field.
229

Agenda for Action
of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion
of Human Security and Peace
The participants in the First International Meeting of
Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, organized
by UNESCO on 27 and 28 November 2000, on the theme:
‘What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?’;
Thank UNESCO for this initiative which allowed
numerous peace research and training institutions to take part in
the proceedings by means of a direct and fruitful dialogue;
Unanimously note that current and future human security
considerations are taking on global proportions, and that all factors
in the human security equation are interacting on a world scale, in
such a way that the need to understand them as one single theme
is a cognitive step that increasingly needs to be taken everywhere,
based on an intensive sharing of everyone’s contributions;
Aware that peace research and training institutions, through
their function as centres of training, analysis and policy elaboration,
have a special responsibility in this respect, undertake to increase
their cooperation in a common research effort to propose better
ways to achieve peace, human security, development, respect for
human rights and the promotion of democratic principles;
Anxious to disseminate their conclusions as widely as
possible, adopt as the basis of their continuing project the
following Agenda for Action:
• Human security is indivisible. A general dynamic of
equitable and balanced development is its best cornerstone. The growing
interaction of societies on a worldwide scale increasingly demonstrates
the overall need for human security, though it is not yet enough to
231

prevent all forms of violence or conflict. The world’s future depends
upon a growing need for human security and a better understanding of
all the risks and threats that affect populations and individuals;
• Awareness of the global and universal nature of human
security necessary to all forms of progress and acknowledgement of the
appropriate role of the peace research and training institutions in this
respect, call for a considerable evolution in people’s minds;
• The representatives of peace research and training
institutions share an important responsibility in this field, through
their capacity to bring into dynamic interaction a realistic analysis of
the world in its current state, a clear perception of the changes awaiting
it and a constructive vision of the actions to be undertaken in order to
provide general progress with the conditions necessary for human
security, that is to say the possibility of its being of a lasting nature.
Consequently, the participants in the First International
Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions,
• Decide to create the International SecuriPax Network for
the Promotion of Human Security and Peace in order to remain
united for the purpose of future activities;
• Welcome UNESCO’s proposal to assign to the Network they have
thus created, the SecuriPax Forum (http://www.unesco.org/securipax),
aimed at facilitating the exchange of information and best experiences and
practices in the field of human security;
• Decide to work together with a view to contributing to the
promotion of concrete actions of general interest, ranging from joint efforts
to define human security indicators to high-level training activities;
• Decide also to work together to mobilize multiple capacities,
and this on the basis of all the contributions and recommendations
made at this First International Meeting of Directors of Peace
Research and Training Institutions;
• Express their willingness to organize regional and
subregional meetings in the coming years in the framework of the
International SecuriPax Network;
• Invite similar institutions interested in this Agenda for Action
to join them in the Network created and to share efforts with them.
232

Appendices

Organizing committee
of the first international meeting of directors
of Peace Research and training institutions
Ms Moufida Goucha
Responsible for Organization of the Meeting
Director, Peace and Human Security Programme Division
of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance (UNESCO)
Ms Claudia Maresia
Responsible for Coordination of the Meeting
Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights,
Democracy, Peace and Tolerance (UNESCO)
Ms Mercedes Aldrete
Secretariat of the Meeting Peace and Human Security
Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy,
Peace and Tolerance (UNESCO)
With the assistance of:
Mr René Zapata
Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring
and Reporting Bureau of Strategic Planning (UNESCO)
Mr Russ Russell
Responsible for the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum
Bureau of Strategic Planning (UNESCO)
235

Programme
First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research
and Training Institutions
General objectives
What Agenda for Human Security
in the Twenty-first Century?
UNESCO, Paris
27–28 November 2000
‘Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men
that the defences of peace must be constructed’ (UNESCO Constitution)
In its transdisciplinary programme ‘Towards a Culture of
Peace’, UNESCO advocates the notion of human security as a
matrix in which matters pertaining to peace and human security
could be addressed in an ongoing manner by all the various forces
in society. Security and conflict-prevention specialists – whether
independent or operating within universities and institutions
concerned with defence, security or strategic studies – have a
major part to play, specifically with a view to securing fuller
acknowledgement of the real peace and security needs of peoples.
The meeting, scheduled for 27 and 28 November, is intended:
(1) to bring together Directors of institutions concerned
with peace research and training who are representative of
several countries and regions, in order that they may present the
priorities of their action-oriented research programmes;
(2) to prompt reflection among them resulting in joint
programmes aimed at promoting peace and human security;
237

(3) to lay the foundations of steadier cooperation among
such institutions in the form of networks;
(4) to make plans for practical projects, particularly in the
field of education and training for peace and human security.
Special attention will be paid to educational content and to
UNESCO Chairs.
Monday, 27 November 2000
Programme 1
8.30 a.m. Reception of participants
9.00 a.m. Opening Ceremony
Inaugural speech
by Mr Koïchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO
read by Mr Ali Kazancigil, Assistant Director-
General for Social and Human Sciences a.i.
Keynote address on the promotion of human security
within the United Nations by Mr Hassen Fodha,
Director, United Nations Information Centre
(UNIC), Paris, France
Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen
human security by H.E. Mr Louis Hamel, Ambassador,
Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO
9.45 a.m. Coffee break
10.10 a.m. Presentation of the International Year for the
Culture of Peace by Mr Enzo Fazzino, Programme
Specialist, International Year for the Culture of Peace,
UNESCO
1 Working languages were English and French.
238

10.20 a.m. Presentation of the SecuriPax Forum 2 by Mr Russ
Russell, Programme Specialist, Bureau of Strategic
Planning, UNESCO
10.30 a.m.– First Round Table
12.30 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of
human security and peace in Africa
Moderator: Mr Bertrand Badie, Graduate Programme Director,
Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, France
Rapporteur: Mr Mambaelele Mankoto, Programme Specialist,
Division of Ecological Sciences, UNESCO
Lecturers: 3 Mr Gabriel Siakeu, President, World Association for
the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP), Yaoundé,
Cameroon
Mr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute
for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa
12.30 p.m. Free time
2.30 p.m.– Second Round Table
4.30 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of
human security and peace in Europe
Moderator: Mr Philippe Ratte, Senior Programme Planning
Officer, UNESCO
Rapporteur: Ms Antonella Verdiani, Programme Specialist,
Education for Universal Values Section, UNESCO
Lecturer: 3 Mr Bjørn Møller, Former Secretary-General,
International Peace Research Association (IPRA),
Copenhagen, Denmark
4.30 p.m. Coffee break
2 The UNESCO SecuriPax Forum was open to the participants during the meeting.
3 The lecturers’ presentations were followed by a debate open to all the participants.
239

5.00 p.m.– Third Round Table
7.00 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of
human security and peace in Latin America and the
Caribbean
Moderator: Ms Kaisa Savolainen, Director, Division for the
Promotion of Quality Education, UNESCO
Rapporteur: Ms Suzanne Diop, Programme Specialist, Division
for Intercultural Projects, UNESCO
Lecturers: 3 Mr Alejandro Bendaña, President, Centro de
Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Managua, Nicaragua
Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena, Director, Facultad
Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)
Santiago, Chile
General Juan Alberto Lezama, Director, Centro
de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN),
Montevideo, Uruguay
7.00 p.m. Reception for participants offered by Mr A. Kazancigil,
ADG/SHS a.i., UNESCO
Tuesday, 28 November 2000
9.00 a.m.– Fourth Round Table
10.30 a.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of
human security and peace in the Arab States
Moderator: Mr René Zapata, Director, Division of Programme
Planning, Monitoring and Reporting, UNESCO
Rapporteur: Mr Luis Salamanques, Programme Specialist,
Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO
Lecturer: 3 Ms Ghada Ali Moussa, National Center for
Middle East Studies (NCMES), Cairo, Egypt
10.30 a.m. Coffee break
3 The lecturers’ presentations were followed by a debate open to all the participants.
240

11.00 a.m.– Fifth Round Table
1.00 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of
human security and peace in Asia and the Pacific
Moderator: Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos, Assistant Director-
General, ‘Priority Africa’ Department, UNESCO
Rapporteur: Mr Quang Nam Thai, Programme Specialist,
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and
Tolerance, UNESCO
Lecturers: 3 Mr Timothy M. Shaw, Director, Dalhousie
University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies,
Canada; Visiting Professor, Aalborg University,
Denmark
Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan, Director-
General, Bangladesh Institute of International and
Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, Bangladesh
1.00 p.m. Free time
2.30 p.m.– Clossing Session
5.30 p.m. Reports on the debates of the five round tables
presented by Ms Moufida Goucha, Rapporteur-
General, Director, Peace and Human Security
Programme, Division of Human Rights, Democracy,
Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
Proposed establishment of a SecuriPax Network
Adoption of the Agenda for Action of the
International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion
of Human Security and Peace
3 The lecturers’ presentations were followed by a debate open to all the participants.
241

Working Document
The promotion of human security:
The state of play
Drawn up by the
Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
Peace and Human Security Programme
Several attempts have been made since the end of the Cold
War to extend the concept of security. In general, the authors
proceed simply by accumulation, adding on various non-military
dimensions of security to traditional military parameters. Such
efforts are mainly based on a conception of security that gives
precedence to national security, which in most cases is no more
than a defence policy.
1 A new concept?
Of all the attempts to formulate a new concept of security,
two, in our opinion, deserve to be studied in greater detail.
The first is the notion of human security, as presented in
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human
Development Report 1994, while the second is the notion of
democratic security, as promoted notably by the Council of
Europe since 1993, but which has been developed to a remarkable
degree in the Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America,
a little-known but none the less basic document.
The merit of these two concepts – human security and
democratic security – is that they are first and foremost
integrative concepts of a special kind, in that they seek from the
outset to define security around a core of non-military parameters.
243

Accordingly, human security, as set out in the UNDP
Report of 1994, falls within the context of the promotion of
human development defined as a process of widening the range
of people’s choices.
Democratic security, as promoted by the Council of
Europe and other European institutions, seeks to found security
on common values, in particular the rule of law, observance of
human rights and the separation of powers. In other documents,
for example the Charter of Paris (Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe – CSCE), the principles of the
philosophy of liberal democracy and the rule of law, featuring
adherence to a single system of political values as the major
parameter of collective security, are presented as the foundation
of a broader vision of security.
These two concepts are in agreement in one vital area, that
of respect for human rights. However, despite this common
element which seeks to give full support to the protection of
individuals and fundamental rights, they are far apart when it
comes to defining the scope of security for individuals and
peoples.
2 From human insecurity to human security
The UNDP Report of 1994 lists the threats to human
security under seven main categories – threats to economic
security, food security, health security, environmental security,
personal security, community security and political security –
while the various texts on democratic security refer mainly to the
democratic organization of public life – modelled on the
Western, and especially European, democracies – to the rule of
law and to human rights.
It will be recalled that in the pioneering approach of the
UNDP, human security is the outcome of two fundamental lines
of action, themselves based on two key principles of the Charter
of the United Nations: from fear to freedom and from want to
244

freedom, or freedom from fear and freedom from want. The
content of the concept of human security in fact corresponds to
the solutions and measures that are needed to forestall the various
kinds of threats and risks perceived as obstacles to human
development and to the capacity of human beings to use their
potential to the full. The different aspects of human security are
therefore as follows: economic security (unemployment, job
insecurity, disparities in income and resources, poverty and
homelessness); food security (expressed in terms of the
quantitative and qualitative availability of food); health security
(diseases, new viruses, including AIDS, respiratory diseases
caused by air pollution); environmental security (air, water, soil
and forest degradation); personal security (conflicts, poverty, drugrelated
crime, violence against women and children, terrorism);
community security (ethnic and cultural conflicts); and political
security (violation of human rights). Many of these threats to
human security have an international or global dimension in that
they stem from events or processes occurring beyond territorial
boundaries. Lastly, human security is meant to create favourable
conditions for the flourishing of human development, another
UNDP approach that was logistical and innovative for its time.
3 A new linkage?
It is tempting to combine the two notions of human
security and democratic security. The first to attempt this was the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy, in a
document entitled ‘Human Security: Safety for People in a
Changing World’, which he submitted for consideration by an
informal group of diplomats from eleven countries, meeting on
19 and 20 May 1999 in Bergen, Norway. The aim of the
document was to give the human security concept an operational
character and to establish a precise political agenda.
The contribution by Bertrand Badie, launching the
UNESCO SecuriPax Forum in September 2000, defines the
245

notion of human security by noting that the distinction between
national security and international security is now meaningless
and that there can be no international security when civil peace
is uncertain. The article goes on to say that peace is no longer
guaranteed by military power alone, but is dependent upon
development, protection of the environment, respect for human
rights, etc.
The main distinguishing feature of human security is that
it addresses the issue of war, violence and physical or
psychological constraint from a human perspective, centred on
the individual, unlike the traditional perspective which takes a
state, national or social approach.
4 A new approach involving the role of freedom
in development and human security
The notion of ‘freedom’ has always existed in conventional
economic and political schools of thought. But more than any
other basic text, the Charter of the United Nations, particularly in
its preamble, lays the foundations of the notion of ‘freedom’: ‘We
the peoples of the United Nations determined … to promote
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’.
Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stresses that
‘Member States have pledged themselves to achieve … the
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms’. On this basis, the work done,
more specifically by Amartya Sen, winner of the 1999 Nobel Prize
for Economics, represents an important stage in the investigation
and theory of development as freedom. In Sen’s opinion, the
essential point is the intrinsic value of human freedom, which must
be the ultimate goal of development (see Development As Freedom:
Human Capability and Global Need, Sen, 1999).
This new approach to freedom, which is no longer
abstract but centred on human beings and their actual relations
with society, is also inseparable from human security. In fact, over
246

the last few years, the approach to security has shifted from the
concept of ‘national security’, based on the military defence of
the state, to that of ‘human security’, which concerns human
beings and their welfare. Human security therefore has two
aspects: in negative terms, it refers to freedom, liberation from
certain threats and risks such as the lack of basic necessities,
hunger, natural disasters, torture, imprisonment without a fair
trial, discrimination, etc.; while in positive terms, human security
aims at freedom to achieve a goal or the ability or opportunity for
every individual to enjoy life as fully as possible, starting with
such basic needs as the best possible access to water, food, shelter
and education. This approach to human security covers all
political, economic, social, cultural and environmental
dimensions and the many necessary links between them. It also
leads to other approaches and measures involving action by the
entire United Nations system, including UNESCO, in conflictprevention
and post-conflict peace-building.
* * *
In the context of ever-greater globalization, whose adverse
consequences – outweighing the positive effects – further impair
and perpetuate what are now known in international cooperation
circles (the United Nations, development non-governmental
organizations, regional organizations, etc.) as ‘risk societies’,
within which there is more and more talk of ‘human
vulnerability’, the integrative and profoundly humanistic concept
of ‘human security’ can contribute, through innovative and
exemplary activities, to peace and development.
247

Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan
Director-General
Bangladesh Institute of International
and Strategic Studies (BIISS)
1/46 Elephant Road
Dhaka 1000
Bangladesh
Tel: + 880 – 2 – 831 58 08/831 26 09
Fax: + 880 – 2 – 831 26 25
E-mail: dgbiiss@bd.drik.net
Internet: http://www.biiss.org
Ms Mercedes Aldrete
Secretariat of the Meeting
Peace and Human Security
Programme
Division of Human Rights,
Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 45 53
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 52
E-mail: m.aldrete@unesco.org
Mr Joaquín Antuña León
President
Fundación Paz y Cooperación
C/ Meléndez Valdés, 68, 4°
28015 Madrid
Spain
Tel: + 34 – 91 – 549 61 56
Fax: + 34 – 91 – 543 52 82
E-mail: pazycoop@eurosur.org
List of Participants
249
Mr Bernard Aussedat
General Verification Coordinator
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Karntnerring 5-7
1010 Vienna
Austria
Tel: + 43 – 1 – 51 31 630 17
Fax: + 43 – 1 – 51 31 630 32/-33
E-mail: oscear24@atnet.at
Mr Ramdane Babadyt
Consultant
École Instrument de Paix (EIP)
5, rue du Simplon
Geneva
Switzerland
Tel: + 41 – 22 – 735 24 22
Fax: + 41 – 22 – 735 06 53
E-mail: cifedhop@mail-box.ch
Mr Bertrand Badie
Director, Graduate Programme in
International Relations
Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris
27, rue Saint-Guillaume
75007 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 39 39 75/
+ 33 – 1 45 49 50 90/-92
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 48 04 41/
+ 33 – 1 42 22 40 26
E-mail: bertrand.badie@sciences-po.fr

Mr Alejandro Bendaña
President
Centro de Estudios Internacionales
(CEI)
Apartado Postal 1747
Managua
Nicaragua
Tel: + 505 – 278 54 13
Fax: + 505 – 267 05 17
E-mail: pedro47@aol.com
Internet:
http://www.ceinicaragua.org.ni
Ms Marlena Bouche-Osochowska
International Consultant
47-49, rue du Père Corentin
75014 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 43 37 28
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 43 37 28
E-mail: mbouche@infonie.fr
Mr Robert Bussière
Fondation pour la Recherche
Stratégique (FRS)
18, rue du Pressoir
75020 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 46 36 29 07
Fax: + 33 – 1 46 36 29 07
E-mail: r.bussiere@wanadoo.fr
Mr Luis Cardenas
President
Corporación Servicio Paz y Justicia
SERPAJ-CHILE
Cienfuegos 85
Santiago
Chile
Tel: + 56 – 2 – 697 20 01
Fax: + 56 – 2 – 672 76 08
E-mail: serpaj@cmet.net
250
Mr Christophe Carle
Deputy Director, Director of
Research
United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR)
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva
Switzerland
Tel: + 41 – 22 – 917 17 93
Fax: + 41 – 22 – 917 01 76
E-mail: ccarle@unog.ch
Ms Gabriela Castillo
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Delegation of Costa Rica
to UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 25 73
Fax: + 33 – 1 42 73 16 45
E-mail: g.castillo@unesco.org
Ms Caterina Casullo
Head
Office in Europe
United Nations University
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75015 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 30 08
Fax: + 33 – 1 40 65 91 86
E-mail: unuoe@unesco.org
Ms Myriam Chantereau
88, rue de la République
95100 Argenteuil
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 34 10 93 80
E-mail: mchantereau@hotmail.com

Mr Jean-Paul Charnay
President
Centre de Philosophie de la Stratégie
(CPS)
20, rue de Beaune
75007 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 42 61 06 81
Mr Dumitri Chitoran
Consultant
Higher Education Division
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 41 07
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 58 14
E-mail: d.chitoran@unesco.org
Mr Adrián Ciancio
Coordinator
UNESCO Chair on Peace
Philosophy
Enmedio 82
12001 Castellón
Spain
Tel: + 34 – 964 – 23 25 51
Fax: + 34 – 964 – 23 02 12
E-mail: caraball@guest.uji.es
Mr Jakkie Cilliers
Executive Director
Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
PO Box 1787
Brooklyn Square
0075 Pretoria
South Africa
Tel: + 27 – 12 – 346 95 00/-2
Fax: + 27 – 12 – 460 09 98
E-mail: jkc@iss.co.za
Internet: http://www.iss.co.za
251
Mr Philippe Cocquebert
Institut des Hautes Études de Défense
Nationale (IHEDN-DEPFC)
BP 41
00445 Armées France
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 42 31 88
Fax: + 33 – 1 44 42 46 16
E-mail: etudes@ihedn.fr
Ms Christine Cuvelier
Université de la Paix
4, Bd. du Nord
5000 Namur
Belgium
Tel: + 32 – 81 – 22 61 02
Fax: + 32 – 81 – 23 18 82
E-mail: universite.de.paix@skynet.be
Internet:
http://www.universitedepaix.org
Mr Fernando De Salas López
Director
Sociedad de Estudios Internacionales (SEI)
Hortaleza, 104-2 Izda
28004 Madrid
Spain
Tel: + 34 – 91 – 308 49 34/411 18 28
Fax: + 34 – 91 – 308 49 34/411 18 28
E-mail: sei@seimadrid.org
fernandosei@terra.es
Ms Suzanne Diop
Programme Specialist
Division for Intercultural Projects
(CLT/ICP)
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 47 68
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 88
E-mail: s.diop@unesco.org

Mr Alfredo Dombe
Instituto de Ralaçoes Internacionais (IRI)
Largo do Partido
Edificio do Mirex, 7º andar
Luanda
Angola
Tel: + 244 – 2 – 32 17 17
Fax: + 244 – 2 – 32 17 17
E-mail: mre.isri@netangola.com
dombealfredo@hotmail.com
Mr Daniel Durand
National Secretary
Mouvement pour la Paix
139, avenue Victor Hugo
93400 St-Ouen
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 40 12 09 12
Fax: + 33 – 1 40 11 57 87
E-mail: ddurand@mvtpaix.org
Mr Tahir Faradov
Director
Center for Peace and Conflict Studies
Nizami Street, 12, Apt. 33
370001 Baku
Azerbaijan
Tel: + 994 – 12 – 92 27 34
Fax: + 994 – 12 – 93 85 28/90 11 80
E-mail: tfaradov@yahoo.com
tfaradov@iatp.baku.az
Mr Enzo Fazzino
Programme Specialist
International Year for the Culture of
Peace (BSP/IYCP)
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 05 68
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 57
E-mail: e.fazzino@unesco.org
Internet: http://www.unesco.org/iycp
252
Mr Vicenç Fisas Armengol
UNESCO Chair on Human Rights
Escola de Cultura de Pau
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Edifici G-6 – Campus de la UAB
08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del
Vallès- Barcelona)
Spain
Tel: + 34 – 93 – 581 24 14
Fax: + 34 – 93 – 581 32 94
E-mail: unescopau@pangea.org
Mr Hassen Fodha
Director
United Nations Information Centre
(UNIC)
c/o UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 49 00/-3
Fax: + 33 – 1 43 06 46 78
E-mail: h.fodha@unesco.org
unic.paris@unesco.org
Internet: http://www.onu.fr
Mr Fernando Gonzalez Davison
Deputy Director
Instituto de Relaciones
Internacionales e Investigaciones
para la Paz (IRIPAZ)
1a, Calle 9-52 Zona 1
01001 Ciudad de Guatemala
Guatemala
Tel: + 502 – 250 04 21/232 82 60
Fax: + 502 – 253 15 32
E-mail: iripaz@internetdetelgua.com.gt

Ms Moufida Goucha
Director, Peace and Human Security
Programme
Division of Human Rights,
Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 45 52
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 52
E-mail: m.goucha@unesco.org
peace&security@unesco.org
Mr Gabriel Guímaraes
Third Secretary
Embassy of Angola
19, avenue Foch
75116 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 01 58 20
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 00 33 71
E-mail: anginfos@club-internet.fr
H.E. Mr Louis Hamel
Ambassador
Permanent Delegate of Canada to
UNESCO
Permanent Delegation of Canada to
UNESCO
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 35 17
Fax: + 33 – 1 43 06 87 27
E-mail: louis.hamel@dfaitmaeci.gc.ca
pesco@dfait-maeci.gc.ca
253
Ms Brigitte Huissiet
Auditor
8, Allée des Pins
78730 Saint-Arnoult en Yvelines
France
Mr Mangesh T. Karad
World Peace Centre
Maeer’s Mit
S. No. 124, Paund Road, Kothrud
Pune 411 038
Maharastra State
India
Tel: + 91 – 20 – 543 76 81
Fax: + 91 – 20 – 544 27 70
E-mail: wpcpune@hotmail.com
Mr Ali Kazancigil
Assistant Director-General for Social
and Human Sciences a.i.
Director, Division of Social Science
Research and Policies (SHS/SRP)
Sector for Social and Human Sciences
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 37 98
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 57 20
E-mail: a.kazancigil@unesco.org
Mr Fatehyab Ali Khan
Chairman
Pakistan Institute of International
Affairs (PIIA)
Aiwan-e-Sadar Road
PO Box 1447
Karachi-74200
Pakistan
Tel: + 92 – 21 – 568 28 91/568 60 69
Fax: + 92 – 21 – 568 60 69
E-mail: piia@cyber.net.pk

Mr Alwin Kramp
Senior Programme Specialist
Division for Intercultural Projects
(CLT/ICP)
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75752 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 37 57
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 88
E-mail: a.kramp@unesco.org
Mr Balkrishna Kurvey
President
Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament
and Environmental Protection
537, Sakkardara Road
Nagpur 440 009
India
Tel: + 91 – 712 – 74 58 06
Fax: + 91 – 712 – 74 36 64
E-mail: iipdep@nagpur.dot.net.in
Ms Imogen Lamb
Journalist
Radio France International (RFI)
104, avenue du Président Kennedy
75016 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 30 83 54
Fax: + 33 – 1 44 30 87 57
E-mail: imogene.lamb@rfi.fr
Mr Patrick Lecomte
Coordinator of the UNESCO Chair
on Culture of Peace
École de la Paix de Grenoble
9, rue des Jardins
38420 Domène
France
Tel: + 33 – 4 76 77 15 69
Fax: + 33 – 4 76 77 15 69
E-mail: Patrick.Lecomte@univ-lyon2.fr
254
Mr Jacques Le Dauphin
Research Director
Institut de Documentation et de
Recherche sur la Paix (IDRP)
22, impasse des Champs Fleuris
92320 Châtillon
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 46 55 06 86
Fax: + 33 – 1 40 11 57 87
E-mail: jacques.le_dauphin@libertysurf.fr
Mr Antoine Leonetti
Institut du Droit de la Paix et du
Developpement (IDPD)
39, av. Emile Henriot
06050 Nice Cedex 1
France
Tel: + 33 – 4 92 15 71 99
Fax: + 33 – 4 92 15 71 97
E-mail: balmond@unice.fr
Ms Dominique Levasseur
Political Officer
Permanent Delegation of Canada to
UNESCO
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15 France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 35 17
Fax: + 33 – 1 43 06 87 27
E-mail: dominique.levasseur@dfaitmaeci.gc.ca
General Juan Alberto Lezama
Director
Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN)
Br. Artigas 1488
Montevideo
Uruguay
Tel: + 598 – 2 – 709 17 76
+ 598 – 2 – 709 49 88/709 89 18
Fax: + 598 – 2 – 707 53 14
E-mail: calen@adinet.com.uy
Internet: http://www.calen.gub.uy

Mr François Mabille
Deputy Director
Centre de la Recherche sur la Paix (CRP)
Institut Catholique de Paris
24, rue Cassette
75006 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 39 84 99
Fax: + 33 – 1 44 39 52 86
E-mail: fasse@icp.fr
Mr Joseph Maïla
Dean
Faculty of Social and Economic
Sciences (IFOMENE-CRP)
Institut Catholique de Paris
24, rue Cassette
75006 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 39 52 06
Fax: + 33 – 1 44 39 52 86
E-mail: fasse@icp.fr
Mr Jean-Gabriel Makong
President
Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de la
Personne (LCDP)
BP 1514 Yaoundé
Cameroon
Tel: + 237 – 22 47 04/23 48 65/31 66 29
Fax: + 237 – 22 62 62/-3
E-mail: lcdp@iccnet.cm
Mr Mambaelele Mankoto
Programme Specialist
Division of Ecological Sciences (SC/ECO)
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 40 37
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 58 04
E-mail: m.mankoto@unesco.org
255
Mr F. Marchand
President
Institut de Recherche sur la
Résolution Nonviolente des
Conflits (IRNC)
14, rue des Meuniers
93100 Montreuil
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 42 87 94 69
Fax: + 33 – 1 48 57 92 97
E-mail: irnc@multimania.com
Ms Claudia Maresia
Responsible for Coordination of the
Meeting
Peace and Human Security
Programme
Division of Human Rights,
Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 45 54
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 52
E-mail: c.maresia@unesco.org
peace&security@unesco.org
Mr Jean Marichez
Director
Action Civile et Defense
45, chemin de la Pérouse
73800 Arbin
France
Tel: + 33 – 4 79 65 22 82
Fax: + 33 – 4 79 65 22 11
E-mail: act.civ.def@wanadoo.fr

Ms Caroline Martinez
Peace and Human Security Programme
Division of Human Rights,
Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15 France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 45 52
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 52
E-mail: peace&security@unesco.org
Mr Vicent Martinez Guzmán
Director
UNESCO Chair on Peace Philosophy
Enmedio 82
12001 Castellón
Spain
Tel: + 34 – 964 – 23 25 51
Fax: + 34 – 964 – 23 02 12
E-mail: martguz@fis.uji.es
Ms Nicola McBean
Expert on China
Cambodian Institute for
Cooperation and Peace (CICP)
34, rue Hamelin
75016 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 47 23 44 76
Fax: + 33 – 1 47 23 59 80
E-mail: cicpmp@sky.fr
Mr Tuomo Melasuo
Docent, Research Director
Tampereen Peace Research Institute
(TAPRI)
University of Tampere
33014 Tampere
Finland
Tel: + 358 – 3 – 215 76 92
Fax: + 358 – 3 – 223 66 20
E-mail: yttume@uta.fi
256
Ms Djalma Miala
Third Secretary
Permanent Delegation of Angola to
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 29 75
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 67 57 48
E-mail:
del.angounesco@gofornet.com
Ms Pascale Molho
Center for Non-Violent
Communication (CNVC)
28, rue Parmentier
92200 Neuilly-sur-Seine
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 41 34 04 42
Fax: + 33 – 1 41 34 04 52
E-mail: pascale.molho@online.fr
cnvc@compuserve.com
Mr Bjørn Møller
Former Secretary-General
International Peace Research
Association (IPRA)
c/o Copenhagen Peace Research
Institute (COPRI)
Fredericiagade 18
DK-1310 Copenhagen K
Denmark
Tel: + 45 – 33 45 50 52
Fax: + 45 – 33 45 50 60
E-mail: bmoeller@copri.dk
Internet:
http://www.copri.dk/ipra/bm.html

Mr Rodrigo Montaluisa Vivas
International Executive Director
Fundacion Ecuatoriana de Relaciones
Internacionales y Estrategicas
(FERIS)
97, Bd. Carl-Vogt
1205 Geneva
Switzerland
c/o Facultad Latino Americana de
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)
Paez #118 y Av. Patria
Quito
Ecuador
Tel: + 41 – 22 – 320 83 79
Fax: + 41 – 22 – 320 83 79
E-mail: feris.ge@bluewin.ch
Ms Colette Morichard
Centre de Mediation et de
Formation à la Mediation
(CMFM)
9, rue de La Fayette
7800 Versailles
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 39 49 40 34
Fax: + 33 – 1 39 49 40 34
Ms Jacqueline Morineau
Founder
Centre de Mediation et de
Formation à la Mediation
(CMFM)
24, rue Tournefort
75005 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 43 36 70 07
Fax: + 33 – 1 47 07 57 15
E-mail: cmfm@easynet.fr
257
Ms Ghada Ali Moussa
Researcher
National Center for Middle East
Studies (NCMES)
1 Kasr El Nile Street
Bab El Louk
PO Box 18
Cairo 11513
Egypt
Tel: + 20 – 2 – 577 00 41/-2
+ 20 – 2 – 577 11 25/337 33 02
Fax: + 20 – 2 – 577 00 63
E-mail: ghada92@hotmail.com
afakhr@idsc.gov.eg
Mr Jean-Denis Mouton
Scientific Director
Centre Mondial de la Paix (Verdun)
Centre Européen Universitaire
15, place Carnot
54042 Nancy Cedex
France
Tel: + 33 – 3 83 19 27 80
Fax: + 33 – 3 83 19 27 87
E-mail: mouton@droit-eco.univnancy2.fr
Mr David Mutimer
Deputy Director
York Centre for International and
Security Studies (YCISS)
3rd Floor, 363 York Lanes, York
University
4700 Keele Str.
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada
Tel: + 1 – 416 – 736 51 56
Fax: + 1 – 416 – 736 57 52
E-mail: dmutimer@yorku.ca

Ms Paula-Ramona Napirlica
Programme Coordinator
Human Ecological Association (GEEA)
CP 1634, OP 7
6600 Iasi
Romania
Tel: + 40 – 32 – 21 32 79
Fax: + 40 – 32 – 21 32 79
E-mail: apgro@mail.dntis.ro
Mr Martin Ortega
Research Expert
Institut d’Études de Sécurité de
l’UEO
43, avenue du Président Wilson
75016 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 53 67 22 13
Fax: + 33 – 1 47 20 81 78
E-mail: m.ortega@iss-weu.com
Mr Christos Papadimitriou
Deputy Commandant (Major-
General)
Hellenic National Defense College
Moustoxidi & Evelpidon Str.
Athens 11473
Greece
Tel: + 30 – 1 – 882 41 66
Fax: + 30 – 1 – 883 75 27
E-mail: hndc@ath.forthnet.gr
Mr Richard Petris
Director
École de la Paix de Grenoble
7, rue Très Cloîtres
38000 Grenoble
France
Tel: + 33 – 4 76 63 81 41
Fax: + 33 – 4 76 63 81 42
E-mail: richardpetris@ecoledelapaix.org
258
Mr Daniil Pikouza
Governing Member Programs Leader
Belarus Peace Foundation
H-80, Apt. 28
Brestskaya str.
220099 Minsk
Belarus
Tel: + 375 – 17 – 278 70 01
Fax: + 375 – 17 – 232 92 93
E-mail: egorov_marat@mail.ru
Mr Alexandre Plevako
Second Secretary
Permanent Delegation of Ukraine to
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 26 60
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 26 61
E-mail: dl_ukraine@unesco.org
Ms Marina Pok
Member of the Board of Directors
Cambodian Institute for
Cooperation and Peace (CICP)
34, rue Hamelin
75016 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 47 23 44 76
Fax: + 33 – 1 47 23 59 80
E-mail: cicpmp@sky.fr
PO Box 1007
Phnom Penh
Cambodia
Tel: + 855 – 23 – 72 27 59
Fax: + 855 – 23 – 36 25 20
E-mail: cicp@camnet.com.kh

Mr Giuliano Pontara
President International University of
People’s Institutions for Peace (IUPIP)
Palazzo Adami
Piazza San Marco, 7
38068 Rovereto (Trento)
Italy
Tel: + 39 – 0464 – 42 42 88
Fax: + 39 – 0464 – 42 42 99
E-mail: iupip@unimondo.org
Ms Claire Poulin
Counsellor for Political Affairs
Canadian Embassy
35, avenue Montaigne
75008 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 43 22 62
Fax: + 33 – 1 44 43 29 95
E-mail: claire.poulin@dfaitmaeci.gc.ca
Ms Monique Prindezis
Secretary-General
École Instrument de Paix (EIP)
5, rue du Simplon
Geneva
Switzerland
Tel: + 41 – 22 – 735 24 22
Fax: + 41 – 22 – 735 06 53
E-mail: cifedhop@mail-box.ch
Mr Philippe Ratte
Senior Programme Planning Officer
Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP/BP)
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 12 16
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 21
E-mail: p.ratte@unesco.org
259
Mr Jean Ridoux
President Association Internationale des
Educateurs à la Paix (AIEP/IAEP)
13, Allée Maximilien Robespierre
92290 Chatenay Malabry
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 46 30 61 26
Fax: + 33 – 1 46 30 61 26
E-mail: iaep@infonie.fr
Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena
Director Facultad Latino Americana de
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-Chile)
Leopoldo Urrutia 1950, Ñuñoa-
Casilla 3213, Correo Central
Santiago
Chile
Tel: + 56 – 2 – 204 52 06
+ 56 – 2 – 225 69 55/225 99 38
Fax: + 56 – 2 – 274 10 04
E-mail: frrojas@flacso.cl
Internet: http://www.flacso.cl
Ms Judit Rónai
Director László Németh Central-
European Folk Academy
PO Box 40
9400 Sopron
Hungary
Tel: + 36 – 99 – 31 69 89/288 81 81
Fax: + 36 – 99 – 31 69 89
E-mail: jronai@sopron.hu
Ms Isabelle Roy
Counsellor for Political Affairs
Canadian Embassy
35, av. Montaigne
75008 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 44 43 22 64
Fax: + 33 – 1 44 43 29 95
E-mail: isabelle.roy@dfaitmaeci.gc.ca

Mr F. W. (Russ) Russell
Responsible for the UNESCO
SecuriPax Forum
Programme Specialist
Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP)
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 12 19
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 57
E-mail: f.russell@unesco.org
Mr Stephen Ryan
Magee College, Peace Studies Programme
University of Ulster
Londonderry BT48 7JL
Northern Ireland
United Kingdom
Tel: + 44 – 2871 – 37 13 71
Fax: + 44 – 2871 – 37 52 07
E-mail: s.ryan@ulst.ac.uk
Mr Luis Salamanques
Programme Specialist
Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP)
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 14 39
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 21
E-mail: l.salamanques@unesco.org
Mr Miguel Sales Figueroa
Senior Programme Specialist
Programme for Freedom of Expression,
Democracy and Peace (CI/FED)
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 42 01
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 84
E-mail: m.sales@unesco.org
260
Mr Pedro San Ginés Aguilar
Instituto de la Paz y los Conflictos
Universidad de Granada
Rector Lopez Argueta, S.N.
18071 Granada
Spain
Tel: + 34 – 958 – 24 41 42
Fax: + 34 – 958 – 24 89 74
E-mail: eirene@ugr.es / psgines@ugr.es
Mr Eric Sapin
Director
Citoyens, Défense et Paix
16, rue Jean Giono
91000 Evry
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 64 97 83 46
Fax: + 33 – 1 60 78 28 61
E-mail: cidp@free.fr
Ms Mady Sarfati
Consultant in Health
Communication
10, rue des Bourdonnais
75003 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 55 80 72 93
Fax: + 33 – 1 55 80 72 92
E-mail: mady.sarfati@free.fr
Ms Kaisa Savolainen
Director
Division for the Promotion of
Quality Education (ED/PEQ)
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 10 99
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 56 39
E-mail: k.savolainen@unesco.org

Mr Timothy M. Shaw
Visiting Professor, Development and
International Relations
Aalborg University
Fibigerstraede 2
DK-9220 Aalborg East
Denmark
Tel: + 45 – 96 35 83 49/-92 12
Fax: + 45 – 98 15 32 98
E-mail: shaw@i4.auc.dk
Director
Dalhousie University Centre for
Foreign Policy Studies
Department of Political Science
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4H6
Canada
Tel: + 1 – 902 – 494 66 30
Fax: + 1 – 902 – 494 38 25
E-mail: centre@is.dal.ca
Mr Gabriel Siakeu
President
Association Mondiale pour l’École
Instrument de Paix (EIP
Cameroun)
BP 7715
Yaoundé
Cameroon
Tel: + 237 – 98 02 06/91 83 09/70
27 75
Fax: + 237 – 22 62 62/22 62 63
E-mail: eipcam@hotmail.com
Mr Peter Stania
Secretary-General
International Institute for Peace (IIP)
Möllwaldpl. 5
1040 Vienna
Austria
Tel: + 43 – 1 – 505 32 36
Fax: + 43 – 1 – 504 64 37
E-mail: iip@aon.at
261
Ms Carolyn Stephenson
Associate Professor of Political Science
Matsunaga Institute for Peace
University of Hawaii at Manoa
Program of Conflict Resolution
Honolulu, HI 96822
United States
Tel: + 1 – 808 – 956 81 95
Fax: + 1 – 808 – 956 68 77
E-mail: c.stephen@hawaii.edu
Ms Elmira Suleymanova
President
Azerbaijan Alliance for Peace and
Development
3/6, S. Rustamov St.
370001 Baku
Azerbaijan
Tel: + 994 – 12 – 92 79 20
Fax: + 994 – 12 – 97 20 73
E-mail: elmira@awdc.baku.az
Mr Fasahat H. Syed
Senior Research Fellow
Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
20-A, College Road, F-7/2
Islamabad
Pakistan
Tel: + 92 – 51 – 922 28 13/-6
Fax: + 92 – 51 – 920 12 04
E-mail: fasahat@ipri-pak.org
Internet: http://www.ipri-pak.org
Mr Marian Tamas
Vice-President
Human Ecological Association (GEEA)
CP 1634, OP 7
6600 Iasi
Romania
Tel: + 40 – 32 – 21 32 79
Fax: + 40 – 32 – 21 32 79
E-mail: apgro@mail.dntis.ro

Mr Quang Nam Thai
Programme Specialist
Division of Human Rights,
Democracy, Peace and Tolerance
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15 France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 39 20
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 57 20
E-mail: n.thai@unesco.org
Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos
Assistant Director-General
‘Priority Africa’ Department (AFR)
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 15 35
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 44
E-mail: n.tidjani-serpos@unesco.org
Mr Batbuyan Tsend
Counsellor
Embassy of Mongolia
5, avenue Robert Schuman
92100 Boulogne-Billancourt
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 46 05 23 18
Fax: + 33 – 1 46 05 30 16
E-mail: 106513.2672@compuserve.com
Ms Nicole Valenta
Associate Programme Officer
United Nations Institute for Training
and Research (UNITAR)
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland
Tel: + 41 – 22 – 917 84 51
Fax: + 41 – 22 – 917 80 47
E-mail: nicole.valenta@unitar.org
262
Mr Victor M. Valle
Consultant
United Nations University for Peace
Finca del Rodeo – Ciudad Colón
Apartado Postal 138-6100
San José
Costa Rica
Tel: + 506 – 205 90 00
Fax: + 506 – 249 19 29
E-mail: victoval@hotmail.com
Ms Laure Veirler
Consultant
Division of Cultural Policies (CLT/CP)
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 40 32
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 97
E-mail: mediationbalkans@unesco.org
Ms Antonella Verdiani
Programme Specialist
Education for Universal Values
Section (ED/PEQ/EUV)
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 11 77
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 56 33
E-mail: a.verdiani@unesco.org
Mr Patrick B. Vidal
Director
Bowman Technologies
30, avenue Franklin Roosevelt
75008 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 53 83 91 47
Fax: + 33 – 1 42 89 97 96
E-mail: pbvidal@free.fr

Mr George Wachira
Director
Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa
(NPI – Africa)
5th floor, New Waumini-House –
Westlands
PO Box 14894
Nairobi
Kenya
Tel: + 254 – 2 - 44 14 44 / 44 00 98
Fax: + 254 – 2 - 44 00 97
E-mail: npi@africaonline.co.ke
wachirag@africaonline.co.ke
Ms Karen Weisblatt
Executive Director
Rotari Centre
Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris
27, rue Saint Guillaume
75007 Paris
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 49 50 67
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 49 51 42
E-mail: karen.weisblatt@sciencespo.fr
Mr Marat Yegorov
President
Belarus Peace Foundation
H-54, Block 2, Apt. 46
Kalinovskogo str. 220086
Minsk
Belarus
Tel: + 375 – 17 – 239 19 37/264 65 24
Fax: + 375 – 17 – 269 09 54/239 19 37
E-mail: egorov_marat@mail.ru
263
Mr Akira Yoshikawa
Deputy Permanent Delegate of Japan
to UNESCO
Permanent Delegation of Japan to
UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 35 23
Fax: + 33 – 1 47 34 46 70
E-mail: deljpn.ed@unesco.org
Ms Claudia Zampieri
Counsellor
Permanent Delegation of Argentina
to UNESCO
1, rue Miollis 75732
Paris Cedex 15
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 34 38
Fax: + 33 – 1 43 06 60 35
E-mail: c.zampieri@unesco.org
Mr René Zapata
Director
Division of Programme Planning,
Monitoring and Reporting
(BSP/PMR)
Bureau of Strategic Planning
UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75352 Paris 07 SP
France
Tel: + 33 – 1 45 68 12 77
Fax: + 33 – 1 45 68 55 21
E-mail: r.zapata@unesco.org

Bio-sketches of the lecturers
Opening Ceremony
Mr Hassen Fodha
Tunisia
Mr Fodha began his career as Chargé de Mission in the
Cabinet of the Tunisian Minister for Information (1969–70) and
as Chef de Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1970–74).
He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oman in January
1974 as a diplomatic counsellor and was named Minister
Plenipotentiary, Chargé d’Affaires of Oman in Vienna,
representing Oman in Austria and at the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). He served as
Ambassador of Oman to the United Nations Office in Geneva
(1975–84) and concurrently as Consul-General of Oman in
Switzerland.
He was a delegate to the 1970 and 1983 UN General
Assembly sessions. As head of the Permanent Mission of Oman
and Chairman of the Arab Group in Geneva, he participated in
the 1983 International Conference against Racism and Racial
Discrimination. He also served as Chief of the Omani delegation
to the International Conference on the Law of the Sea, the
International Conference on the Question of Palestine and the
first International Conference on African Refugees.
Mr Fodha joined the United Nations Secretariat in March
1985 as Director of the Information Centre in Brussels, and since
1989 he has been Director of the United Nations Information
Centre (UNIC) in Paris.
265

H.E. Mr Louis Hamel
Canada
Mr Hamel joined the Canadian Department of External
Affairs in 1973 and has served in Brussels, Tokyo, and Paris,
where he was Deputy Director of the Canadian Cultural Centre
(1985–89), and again in Tokyo as Consul from 1992 to 1997.
In Ottawa, he has held a number of positions: Cultural
Affairs Division (1977–79); North Asia Relations Division
(1989–92); Director of Promotion of the Arts and Cultural
Industries (1997–2000).
He is currently Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of
Canada to UNESCO.
First Round Table
Mr Gabriel Siakeu
Cameroon
Mr Siakeu, co-founder of the Cameroon Association of
Children’s Rights (ACDE) and Director of the Center for Children’s
Rights within ACDE, organized the first national training session in
children’s rights in 1992. In 1993 he set up the Cameroon Branch of
the World Association for School as an Instrument of Peace
(EIPCameroon), and in 1995 the Cameroon Committee of Children’s
Rights (COCADE) of which he was elected Secretary-General.
Posted to the Cameroon Ministry of National Education
(Department of Health and Extra-curricular School Activities) in
1998, he was facilitator in a number of training sessions on human
rights education and peace held from 1998–2000 in Burundi. In
1999 he participated in an international meeting organized by the
ANAIS network on the Internet and development, and in 2000 he
was elected as vice-regional coordinator of education and training
programmes and activities of ANAIS-Cameroon.
The author of many articles on education and peace, he
has also edited the magazine La Tribune des Enfants.
266

Mr Jakkie Cilliers
South Africa
Following his resignation from the South African armed
forces in 1988, Mr Cilliers co-founded the Institute for Defence
Policy, subsequently renamed the Institute for Security Studies
(ISS), during 1990, and since 1993 he has served as its executive
director. By 2000 the Institute had become the largest independent
body dealing with security issues in southern Africa, playing a
leading role in the transformation of the armed forces and the
institution of civilian control over the military. Its present activities
revolve around small arms, early warning of conflict, peace
missions, crime, policing, corruption and good governance issues.
Mr Cilliers has presented numerous papers at conferences and
seminars, is a frequent commentator in the local and international
media and participator at international conferences. He also regularly
lectures on security issues and has published, edited and contributed
to a large number of journals, books and other publications. His most
recent book, edited together with Christian Dietrich, is Angola’s
Resource War – The Role of Oil and Diamonds (2000).
Second Round Table
Mr Bjørn Moller
Denmark
Since 1985, Mr Møller has been (senior) research fellow,
subsequently programme director and board member at the
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre
for Peace and Conflict Research), where he is also editor of the
international research newsletter NOD & Conversion.
He served as Secretary-General of the International Peace
Research Association (IPRA) from 1997 to 2000, and as External
Lecturer at the Institute of Political Studies, University of
Copenhagen, since 1994.
267

In addition to being the author of numerous articles and
editor of six anthologies, he has published three books: Resolving
the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-
Offensive Defence (1991); Common Security and Non-offensive
Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (1992); and Dictionary of
Alternative Defense (1995).
Third Round Table
Mr Alejandro Bendaña
Nicaragua
Founder and former Director of the Centro de Estudios
Internacionales in Managua, Nicaragua, between 1979 and 1990
Mr Bendaña served as Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry,
Ambassador to the United Nations, and official spokesperson for
the Nicaraguan Government. In 1993, he was Visiting Professor of
History at the University of Chicago and in 1996 at the Conflict
Transformation Program of the Eastern Mennonite University.
His most recent books are Demobilization and
Reintegration in Central America: A Peace-Building Perspective
(1999) and US Domination in the New Global Order (1996).
He currently serves on the coordinating bodies of the
International Networks on Small Arms (IANSA), Forum on Early
Warning (Fewer), Jubilee South, the International South Group
Network and on the International Advisory Council of the Hague
Appeal for Peace, as well as co-chairing the Ethics and Justice
Working Group of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena
Chile
Mr Rojas-Aravena, specialist in international relations and
international security, is Director of FLACSO-Chile, Director of
the International Relations and Military Studies Area of the
268

Faculty and Co-Director of the Program Peace and Security in
the Americas. A former Professor of international relations,
security and negotiation in diverse universities in Latin America
and Spain, as well as Fulbright Visiting Professor at the Latin
American and Caribbean Center at Florida International
University, Miami, he currently teaches at the University of
Stanford in Santiago and San Diego State University. He has also
been an adviser and consultant to different international
organizations and regional governments.
Director of the review Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad and
member of the Editorial Commission of the review Estudios
Internacionales (Guatemala) and the Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs (University of Miami), he is the author
and editor of several books and has published articles in
specialized journals of various countries. His most recent
publications are Cooperación y seguridad internacional en las
Américas (1999); Argentina, Brasil y Chile: integración y seguridad
(1999); Globalización, América Latina y diplomacia de Cumbres
(1998); Chile-MERCOSUR, una alianza estratégica (1997, with
Paz Milet and Gabriel Gaspar).
General Juan Alberto Lezama
Uruguay
General Lezama is currently Director of the Centro de
Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN), where he was a student
himself. He is co-author of Testimonios de una nación agredida
[Testimony of an Attacked Nation].
He took part in the operations of the combined peace
forces (1996, Panama) and has since participated in a number of
national and international conferences and seminars, including
‘Peace Missions to the XXI Century’, organized by the
Uruguayan National Defence Ministry (1997, Punta del Este);
the II Interamericana Conference of Directors of High Strategic
Studies (1997, El Salvador); a seminar on ‘Civic-Military
269

Relations between the Americas for the XXI Century’ (1997,
Santa Fé); a seminar on ‘Civic- Military Relations, Supporting
Democracy with Cooperation’ (1998, Buenos Aires); the III
Interamericana Conference of Directors of High Strategic Studies
(1999, Buenos Aires); and an Iberoamerican College Meeting
(1999, Madrid).
As Director of CALEN, he signed an agreement with the
Uruguayan National Connection Committee of UNESCO’s
Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme
and participated in a seminar on ‘Human Security and
Development at the beginning of the 21st century’ organized
with the collaboration of the Committee (1999); followed by a
cycle of debates on ‘National Debt and Hemispheric Security’
(2000, Rio de Janeiro) where he signed an agreement between
CALEN and the Escuela Superior de Guerra of Brazil.
Fourth Round Table
Ms Ghada Ali Moussa
Egypt
A researcher at the National Center for Middle East
Studies (NCMES) and Assistant Researcher at the Faculty of
Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Ms Moussa
has taken part in many conferences within Egypt and abroad. She
has recently presented papers at such conferences as Women in
Politics in the USA; Learning to Live Together: Coexistence in
the Middle East; The Economic Situation in the Former Soviet
Union Republics: The Slavic Republic and Estonia; The
Challenges to Egyptian Women; Free Trade Zone in the Middle
East.
She was also the facilitator of a series of workshops
concerning the implementation of methods of conflict resolution
in Egypt, held at Cairo University and the NCMES in the 1990s.
270

Fifth Round Table
Mr Timothy M. Shaw
Canada
Mr Shaw, currently Director of the Dalhousie University
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada; and Visiting Professor
at Aalborg University, Denmark, has been Professor at the
Dalhousie University Department of Political Science since
1971, and at its Centre for International Development Studies
since 1990. Having lectured in international politics and
development at a number of African universities, he also served
as Director of the Centre for African Studies at Dalhousie
(1977–78 and 1983–89) and as Director of its Centre for
Foreign Policy Studies (1993–2000).
General Editor of the International Political Economy Series
(Palgrave, previously Macmillan/St Martin’s Presses) since 1985,
and Series Editor of International Political Economy of New
Regionalisms (Ashgate Publishing) since 1998, he has also been
coordinator of the International Political Science Association
Research Commission #40 on ‘New World Orders?’ since 1994.
Mr Shaw’s most recent publications include contributions
to such journals as Third World Quarterly, Politeia, UNU Work in
Progress, New Political Economy, and to a number of books:
‘Oceans Governance and Human Security Towards the End of
the Century: Regional Approaches’, with Glen Herbert, in The
Aegean Sea after the Cold War: Security and Law of the Sea
Issues (2000); ‘NGOs and Peace-building in the Great Lakes
Region: States, Civil Societies and Companies at the Turn of the
Millennium’, with Pamela Mbabazi, in New Roles and Relevance:
Non-governmental Organisations and the Search for Development
Alternatives (2000); ‘Conflicts in Africa at the Turn of the
Century: More of the Same?’ in Les Conflits dans le
Monde/Conflicts around the World 1999–2000 (2000).
271

Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan
Bangladesh
Major-General Ahsan is currently Director-General of the
Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies
(BIISS) in Dhaka, a think-tank on international affairs and
security under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Decorated with
the gallantry award, Bir Protik, in the War of Liberation of 1971,
he has also served as Chief Instructor at the School of Military
Intelligence in Bangladesh (1983–84); Director of Staff at the
Defence Services Command and Staff College (1986–88); and
Director-General of a Special Security Force assigned to the
President and the Prime Minister (1991–96); His areas of interest
are security and strategic issues with specific relevance to
Bangladesh conflict studies, peace-keeping, and nuclear issues.
Chief Editor of the BIISS Journal, a quarterly publication
of the institute, Major-General Ahsan has participated in a
number of international meetings: Peace-keeping (Austria,
1987); Senior Defence Management Course (India, 1990);
Pacific Area Senior Officers’ Logistics Seminar (New Zealand,
1998); and various national, regional and international courses
on military tactics, weapons and intelligence. He also presented a
paper at a seminar on ‘Small Arms in South Asia’ (Sri Lanka, June
2000).
272

Securipax Forum
UNESCO Virtual Forum on human security
www.unesco.org/securipax
Taking preventive action
Welcome to the UNESCO Forum on Human Security.
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topical issues.
You can share your opinions on the subject of human
security, ask or answer questions, begin or join a discussion, or
simply describe the action that you would like to see in order to
achieve greater human security for all. You can also send a
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If you have never taken part in a discussion forum on-line
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273

To contribute, all you need to do is send an e-mail to:
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For further information, please contact:
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UNESCO
1, rue Miollis
75732 Paris Cedex 15 France
Tel: +33 (0)1 45 68 45 52 / 54
Fax: +33 (0)1 45 68 55 52
E-mail: peace&security@unesco.org
For technical assistance, please contact: f.russell@unesco.org
274

Resolution adopted by the general assembly
53/243. Declaration and Programme of Action
on a Culture of Peace
A
Declaration on a Culture of Peace
The General Assembly,
Recalling the Charter of the United Nations, including the
purposes and principles embodied therein,
Recalling also the Constitution of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, which states that
“since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of
men that the defences of peace must be constructed”,
Recalling further the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1 and
other relevant international instruments of the United
Nations system,
Recognizing that peace not only is the absence of conflict, but also
requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where
dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit
of mutual understanding and cooperation,
Recognizing also that the end of the cold war has widened
possibilities for strengthening a culture of peace,
Expressing deep concern about the persistence and proliferation of
violence and conflict in various parts of the world,
Recognizing the need to eliminate all forms of discrimination and
intolerance, including those based on race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic
or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status,
1 Resolution 217 A (III).
275

Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997, by which it
proclaimed the year 2000 as the “International Year for the
Culture of Peace”, and its resolution 53/25 of 10
November 1998, by which it proclaimed the period
2001–2010 as the “International Decade for a Culture of
Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World”,
Recognizing the important role that the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
continues to play in the promotion of a culture of peace,
Solemnly proclaims the present Declaration on a Culture of Peace
to the end that Governments, international organizations
and civil society may be guided in their activity by its
provisions to promote and strengthen a culture of peace in
the new millennium:
Article 1
A culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions
and modes of behaviour and ways of life based on:
(a) Respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and
practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and
cooperation;
(b) Full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of States and nonintervention
in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and international law;
(c) Full respect for and promotion of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms;
(d) Commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts;
(e) Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental
needs of present and future generations;
(f) Respect for and promotion of the right to development;
(g) Respect for and promotion of equal rights and
opportunities for women and men;
276

(h) Respect for and promotion of the right of everyone to
freedom of expression, opinion and information;
(i) Adherence to the principles of freedom, justice,
democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism,
cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels
of society and among nations;
and fostered by an enabling national and international
environment conducive to peace.
Article 2
Progress in the fuller development of a culture of peace
comes about through values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and
ways of life conducive to the promotion of peace among
individuals, groups and nations.
Article 3
The fuller development of a culture of peace is integrally
linked to:
(a) Promoting peaceful settlement of conflicts, mutual respect
and understanding and international cooperation;
(b) Complying with international obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations and international law;
(c) Promoting democracy, development and universal respect
for and observance of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms;
(d) Enabling people at all levels to develop skills of dialogue,
negotiation, consensus-building and peaceful resolution of
differences;
(e) Strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring full
participation in the development process;
(f) Eradicating poverty and illiteracy and reducing
inequalities within and among nations;
(g) Promoting sustainable economic and social development;
277

(h) Eliminating all forms of discrimination against women
through their empowerment and equal representation at
all levels of decisionmaking;
(i) Ensuring respect for and promotion and protection of the
rights of children;
(j) Ensuring free flow of information at all levels and
enhancing access thereto;
(k) Increasing transparency and accountability in governance;
(l) Eliminating all forms of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance;
(m) Advancing understanding, tolerance and solidarity among
all civilizations, peoples and cultures, including towards
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities;
(n) Realizing fully the right of all peoples, including those
living under colonial or other forms of alien domination
or foreign occupation, to self-determination enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations and embodied in the
International Covenants on Human Rights, 2 as well as in
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General
Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.
Article 4
Education at all levels is one of the principal means to
build a culture of peace. In this context, human rights education
is of particular importance.
Article 5
Governments have an essential role in promoting and
strengthening a culture of peace.
2 Resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
278

Article 6
Civil society needs to be fully engaged in fuller
development of a culture of peace.
Article 7
The educative and informative role of the media
contributes to the promotion of a culture of peace.
Article 8
A key role in the promotion of a culture of peace belongs
to parents, teachers, politicians, journalists, religious bodies and
groups, intellectuals, those engaged in scientific, philosophical
and creative and artistic activities, health and humanitarian
workers, social workers, managers at various levels as well as to
non-governmental organizations.
Article 9
The United Nations should continue to play a critical role
in the promotion and strengthening of a culture of peace
worldwide.
279
107th plenary meeting
13 September 1999

B
Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace
The General Assembly,
Bearing in mind the Declaration on a Culture of Peace adopted
on 13 September 1999,
Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997, by which it
proclaimed the year 2000 as the “International Year for the
Culture of Peace”, and its resolution 53/25 of 10
November 1998, by which it proclaimed the period
2001–2010 as the “International Decade for a Culture of
Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World”;
Adopts the following Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace:
A. Aims, strategies and main actors
1. The Programme of Action should serve as the basis for the
International Year for the Culture of Peace and the
International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence
for the Children of the World.
2. Member States are encouraged to take actions for
promoting a culture of peace at the national level as well
as at the regional and international levels.
3. Civil society should be involved at the local, regional and
national levels to widen the scope of activities on a culture
of peace.
4. The United Nations system should strengthen its ongoing
efforts to promote a culture of peace.
5. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization should continue to play its important role in
and make major contributions to the promotion of a
culture of peace.
280

6. Partnerships between and among the various actors as set
out in the Declaration should be encouraged and
strengthened for a global movement for a culture of peace.
7. A culture of peace could be promoted through sharing of
information among actors on their initiatives in this regard.
8. Effective implementation of the Programme of Action
requires mobilization of resources, including financial
resources, by interested Governments, organizations and
individuals.
B. Strengthening actions at the national, regional
and international levels by all relevant actors
9. Actions to foster a culture of peace through education:
(a) Reinvigorate national efforts and international
cooperation to promote the goals of education for all
with a view to achieving human, social and economic
development and for promoting a culture of peace;
(b) Ensure that children, from an early age, benefit from
education on the values, attitudes, modes of behaviour
and ways of life to enable them to resolve any dispute
peacefully and in a spirit of respect for human dignity
and of tolerance and non-discrimination;
(c) Involve children in activities designed to instill in them
the values and goals of a culture of peace;
(d) Ensure equality of access to education for women,
especially girls;
(e) Encourage revision of educational curricula, including
textbooks, bearing in mind the 1995 Declaration and
Integrated Framework of Action on Education for
Peace, Human Rights and Democracy 3 for which
3 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Records of
the General Conference, Twentyeighth Session, Paris, 25 October–16 November 1995,
vol. 1: Resolutions, resolution 5.4, annexes.
281

technical cooperation should be provided by the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization upon request;
(f) Encourage and strengthen efforts by actors as identified
in the Declaration, in particular the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
aimed at developing values and skills conducive to a
culture of peace, including education and training in
promoting dialogue and consensus-building;
(g) Strengthen the ongoing efforts of the relevant entities
of the United Nations system aimed at training and
education, where appropriate, in the areas of conflict
prevention and crisis management, peaceful settlement
of disputes, as well as in post-conflict peace-building;
(h) Expand initiatives to promote a culture of peace
undertaken by institutions of higher education in
various parts of the world, including the United
Nations University, the University for Peace and the
project for twinning universities and the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization Chairs Programme.
10. Actions to promote sustainable economic and social
development:
(a) Undertake comprehensive actions on the basis of
appropriate strategies and agreed targets to eradicate
poverty through national and international efforts,
including through international cooperation;
(b) Strengthen the national capacity for implementation of
policies and programmes designed to reduce economic
and social inequalities within nations through, inter
alia, international cooperation;
(c) Promote effective and equitable developmentoriented
and durable solutions to the external debt and debtservicing
problems of developing countries through,
inter alia, debt relief;
282

(d) Reinforce actions at all levels to implement national
strategies for sustainable food security, including the
development of actions to mobilize and optimize the
allocation and utilization of resources from all sources,
including through international cooperation, such as
resources coming from debt relief;
(e) Undertake further efforts to ensure that the
development process is participatory and that
development projects involve the full participation of
all;
(f) Include a gender perspective and empowerment of
women and girls as an integral part of the development
process;
(g) Include in development strategies special measures
focusing on needs of women and children as well as
groups with special needs;
(h) Strengthen, through development assistance in postconflict
situations, rehabilitation, reintegration and
reconciliation processes involving all engaged in
conflicts;
(i) Incorporate capacity-building in development
strategies and projects to ensure environmental
sustainability, including preservation and regeneration
of the natural resource base;
(j) Remove obstacles to the realization of the right of
peoples to self-determination, in particular of peoples
living under colonial or other forms of alien
domination or foreign occupation, which adversely
affect their social and economic development.
11. Actions to promote respect for all human rights:
(a) Full implementation of the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action; 4
4 A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III.
283

(b) Encouragement of development of national plans of
action for the promotion and protection of all human
rights;
(c) Strengthening of national institutions and capacities in
the field of human rights, including through national
human rights institutions;
(d)Realization and implementation of the right to
development, as established in the Declaration on the
Right to Development 5 and the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action;
(e) Achievement of the goals of the United Nations
Decade for Human Rights Education (1995–2004); 6
(f)Dissemination and promotion of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights at all levels;
(g) Further support to the activities of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights in the
fulfilment of her or his mandate as established in
General Assembly resolution 48/141 of 20 December
1993, as well as the responsibilities set by subsequent
resolutions and decisions.
12. Actions to ensure equality between women and men:
(a) Integration of a gender perspective into the
implementation of all relevant international
instruments;
(b) Further implementation of international instruments
that promote equality between women and men;
(c) Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action
adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, 7
with adequate resources and political will, and
5 Resolution 41/128, annex.
6 See A/49/261–E/1994/110/Add.1, annex.
7 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13), chap. I, resolution 1, annex II.
284

through, inter alia, the elaboration, implementation
and follow-up of the national plans of action;
(d) Promotion of equality between women and men in
economic, social and political decision-making;
(e) Further strengthening of efforts by the relevant entities
of the United Nations system for the elimination of all
forms of discrimination and violence against women;
(f) Provision of support and assistance to women who have
become victims of any forms of violence, including in
the home, workplace and during armed conflicts.
13. Actions to foster democratic participation:
(a) Reinforcement of the full range of actions to promote
democratic principles and practices;
(b)Special emphasis on democratic principles and
practices at all levels of formal, informal and nonformal
education;
(c) Establishment and strengthening of national
institutions and processes that promote and sustain
democracy through, inter alia, training and capacitybuilding
of public officials;
(d) Strengthening of democratic participation through,
inter alia, the provision of electoral assistance upon the
request of States concerned and based on relevant
United Nations guidelines;
(e) Combating of terrorism, organized crime, corruption
as well as production, trafficking and consumption of
illicit drugs and money laundering, as they undermine
democracies and impede the fuller development of a
culture of peace.
14. Actions to advance understanding, tolerance and
solidarity:
(a) Implement the Declaration of Principles on Tolerance
and the Follow-up Plan of Action for the United
Nations Year for Tolerance 8 (1995);
8 A/51/201, appendix I.
285

(b) Support activities in the context of the United Nations
Year of Dialogue among Civilizations in the year 2001;
(c) Study further the local or indigenous practices and
traditions of dispute settlement and promotion of
tolerance with the objective of learning from them;
(d) Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance
and solidarity throughout society, in particular with
vulnerable groups;
(e) Further support the attainment of the goals of the
International Decade of the World’s Indigenous
People;
(f) Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity
with refugees and displaced persons, bearing in mind
the objective of facilitating their voluntary return and
social integration;
(g) Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity
with migrants;
(h) Promote increased understanding, tolerance and
cooperation among all peoples through, inter alia,
appropriate use of new technologies and dissemination
of information;
(i) Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance,
solidarity and cooperation among peoples and within
and among nations.
15. Actions to support participatory communication and the
free flow of information and knowledge:
(a) Support the important role of the media in the
promotion of a culture of peace;
(b)Ensure freedom of the press and freedom of
information and communication; (c) Make effective
use of the media for advocacy and dissemination of
information on a culture of peace involving, as
appropriate, the United Nations and relevant regional,
national and local mechanisms;
286

(d)Promote mass communication that enables
communities to express their needs and participate in
decision-making;
(e) Take measures to address the issue of violence in the
media, including new communication technologies,
inter alia, the Internet;
(f) Increase efforts to promote the sharing of information
on new information technologies, including the
Internet.
16. Actions to promote international peace and security:
(a) Promote general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control, taking into
account the priorities established by the United
Nations in the field of disarmament;
(b) Draw, where appropriate, on lessons conducive to a
culture of peace learned from “military conversion”
efforts as evidenced in some countries of the world;
(c) Emphasize the inadmissibility of acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and
lasting peace in all parts of the world;
(d) Encourage confidence-building measures and efforts
for negotiating peaceful settlements;
(e) Take measures to eliminate illicit production and
traffic of small arms and light weapons;
(f)Support initiatives, at the national, regional and
international levels, to address concrete problems
arising from post-conflict situations, such as
demobilization, reintegration of former combatants
into society, as well as refugees and displaced persons,
weapon collection programmes, exchange of
information and confidence-building;
(g) Discourage the adoption of and refrain from any
unilateral measure, not in accordance with
international law and the Charter of the United
Nations, that impedes the full achievement of
287

economic and social development by the population of
the affected countries, in particular women and
children, that hinders their well-being, that creates
obstacles to the full enjoyment of their human rights,
including the right of everyone to a standard of living
adequate for their health and well-being and their right
to food, medical care and the necessary social services,
while reaffirming that food and medicine must not be
used as a tool for political pressure;
(h) Refrain from military, political, economic or any other
form of coercion, not in accordance with international
law and the Charter, aimed against the political
independence or territorial integrity of any State;
(i) Recommend proper consideration for the issue of the
humanitarian impact of sanctions, in particular on
women and children, with a view to minimizing the
humanitarian effects of sanctions;
(j) Promote greater involvement of women in prevention
and resolution of conflicts and, in particular, in
activities promoting a culture of peace in post-conflict
situations;
(k) Promote initiatives in conflict situations such as days of
tranquillity to carry out immunization and medicine
distribution campaigns, corridors of peace to ensure
delivery of humanitarian supplies and sanctuaries of
peace to respect the central role of health and medical
institutions such as hospitals and clinics;
(l) Encourage training in techniques for the
understanding, prevention and resolution of conflict
for the concerned staff of the United Nations, relevant
regional organizations and Member States, upon
request, where appropriate.
288
107th plenary meeting
13 September 1999

Resolution adopted by the general assembly
International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence
for the Children of the World (2001–2010)
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997 and
Economic and Social Council resolution 1997/47 of 22
July 1997 proclaiming the year 2000 as the International
Year for the Culture of Peace, 1 as well as its resolution
52/13 off 20 November 1997 on a culture of peace,
Taking into account Commission on Human Rights resolution
1998/54 of 17 April 1998 entitled “Towards a culture of
peace”, 2
Recalling the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the
Commission on Human Rights concerning the United
Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995–2004),
Taking into account the project of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization entitled
“Towards a culture of peace”,
Aware that the task of the United Nations to save future
generations from the scourge of war requires
transformation towards a culture of peace, which consists
of values, attitudes and behaviours that reflect and inspire
social interaction and sharing based on the principles of
freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights,
tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavour
to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve
1 Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1997, Supplement No. 1
(E/1997/97).
2 Ibid., 1998, Supplement No. 3 (E/1998/23), chap. II, sect. A.
289

problems through dialogue and negotiation and that
guarantee the full exercise of all rights and the means to
participate fully in the development process of their
society,
Recognizing that enormous harm and suffering are caused to
children through different forms of violence at every level
of society throughout the world and that a culture of peace
and non-violence promotes respect for the life and dignity
of every human being without prejudice or discrimination
of any kind,
Recognizing also the role of education in constructing a culture of
peace and non-violence, in particular the teaching of the
practice of peace and non-violence to children, which will
promote the purposes and principles embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations,
Emphasizing that the promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence,
by which children learn to live together in peace
and harmony that will contribute to the strengthening of
international peace and cooperation, should emanate from
adults and be instilled in children,
Underlining that the proposed international decade for a culture
of peace and non-violence for the children of the world
will contribute to the promotion of a culture of peace
based on the principles embodied in the Charter and on
respect for human rights, democracy and tolerance, the
promotion of development, education for peace, the free
flow of information and the wider participation of women
as an integral approach to preventing violence and
conflicts, and efforts aimed at the creation of conditions
for peace and its consolidation,
Convinced that such a decade, at the beginning of the new
millennium, would greatly assist the efforts of the
international community to foster peace, harmony, all
human rights, democracy and development throughout
the world,
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1. Proclaims the period 2001–20010 as the International
Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the
Children of the World;
2. Invites the Secretary-General to submit, in consultation
with Member States, relevant United Nations bodies and
non-governmental organizations, a report to the General
Assembly at its fifty-fifth session and a draft programme of
action to promote the implementation of the Decade at
local, national regional and international levels, and to
coordinate the activities of the Decade;
3. Invites Member States to take the necessary steps to ensure
that the practice of peace and nonviolence is taught at all
levels in their respective societies, including in educational
institutions;
4. Calls upon the relevant United Nations bodies, in
particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization and the United Nations Children’s
Fund, and invites non-governmental organizations,
religious bodies and groups, educational institutions,
artists and the media actively to support the Decade for
the benefit of every child of the world;
5. Decides to consider, at its fifty-fifth session the question of
the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-
Violence for the Children of the World (2001–2010),
under the agenda item entitled “Culture of peace”.
291
55th plenary meeting
10 November 1998

Other UNESCO publications of interest
I Publications on the culture of peace and the new approach
to security
The New Page, by Federico Mayor. 1995. Co-published by Dartmouth University
Press and UNESCO Publishing, 180 pp.
Non-military Aspects of International Security. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 260 pp.
Peace!, by the Nobel prizewinners. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 570 pp.
Peace and War: Social and Cultural Aspects, by Hakan Wiberg. 1995. Bel Corp
Publishers, Warsaw. 125 pp.
UNESCO and a Culture of Peace. Promoting a Global Movement. 1996. CAB-
95/WS/1. UNESCO Publishing. 206 pp.
The Venice Deliberations – Transformations in the Meaning of ‘Security’: Practical Steps
Toward a New Security Culture. The Venice Papers 1. 1996. CAB-96 WS/1.
UNESCO Publishing. 125 pp.
Final Report of the Second International Forum on the Culture of Peace (The Manila
Forum) ‘Transformation Towards a Culture of Peace’, 23–30 November 1995.
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Manila, Philippines. 1996.
103 pp.
Security for Peace – A Synopsis of the Inter-American Symposium on Peace-building and
Peace-keeping (organized jointly by the Organization of American States and
UNESCO). The Venice Papers 2. 1996. CAB-96 WS/2. UNESCO Publishing.
32 pp.
Actes du colloque international sur le droit à l’assistance humanitaire (Paris, 25–27
January 1995). 1996. SHS-96/WS/9. UNESCO Publishing. 218 pp.
From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace. 1996. UNESCO Publishing.
276 pp.
UNESCO: An Ideal in Action, by Federico Mayor. 1996. UNESCO Publishing. 131
pp.
What Kind of Security? 1997. CAB-97/WS/3. UNESCO Publishing. 156 pp.
(French, English)
Proceedings of the International Symposium ‘From Partial Insecurity to Global Security’
(organized jointly by UNESCO, IHEDN, CASD, CESEDEN and the Institute for
Security Studies of the WEU). 1997. CAB-97/WS/1. UNESCO Publishing. 208
pp. (French, English)
Actas del primer foro militar centro-americano para la cultura de la paz (San Salvador,
26–27 June 1996). UNESCO Office, El Salvador. 1997. 151 pp.
293

Professional Peacebuilding. A preliminary guide developed in an International
Workshop and Simulation. The Venice Papers 3. 1998. CAB- 98/WS/04.
UNESCO Publishing.
Peace, Security and Conflict Prevention. SIPRIUNESCO Handbook. 1998. Oxford
University Press. 230 pp.
Cultura de paz y gestión de conflictos, by Vicenc Fisas, Introduction by Federico
Mayor. 1998. UNESCO Publications and Icaria Antrazyt, Barcelona. 406 pp.
Proceedings of the Regional Symposium ‘Cooperative Peace in Southeast Asia’ (organized
jointly by UNESCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN).
1999. CAB-99/WS/1. UNESCO Publishing. 220 pp. (English)
The Unit for Peace and the New Dimensions of Security. December 1999. CAB-
99/WS/5. UNESCO Publishing. 57 pp. (French, English, Spanish)
Letter to Future Generations. 1999. Droit, Roger Pol; Series: Culture of Peace.
171 pp. (English)
The Culture of Peace: A New Beginning. 1999. UNESCO Publishing/Oxford & IBH
Publishing.
Towards a Women’s Agenda for a Culture of Peace, by Ingeborg Breines, Donota
Griercycz and Betty A. Reardon. 1999. UN Division for the Advancement for
Women; Series: Culture of Peace. 265 pp. (English)
Women Say No to War, by Ingeborg Breines, Breda Pavlic and Roger, Dominique.
1999. Series: Women Plus. 81 pp. (English-French)
Olives from Jericho: Peace in Winter Gardens, by Anees Jung. 1999. UNESCO
Publishing; Series: Culture of Peace. 166 pp. (English)
Conflict Resolution: New Approaches and Methods. 2000. UNESCO documents;
Series: Peace and Conflict Issues. 167 pp. (English, ISBN 92-3- 103640-8)
Male Roles, Masculinities and Violence: A Culture of Peace Perspective, by Ingeborg
Breines, Robert W. Connell and Ingrid Eide. 2000. UNESCO Publishing; Series:
Culture of Peace. 288 pp. (English)
Rethinking Development: Putting an End to Poverty, by Henri Bartoli. 2000.
UNESCO Publishing. 183 pp. (English-French)
World Culture Report 2000: Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism, by Lourdes
Arizpe. 2000. UNESCO Publishing. 416 pp. (English-French-Spanish)
World Order and Peace in the New Millennium, edited by Tai-joon Kwon and Dong-
Sung Kim. 2000. Korean National Commission for UNESCO, Seoul. 357 pp.
2000 World Directory of Peace Research and Training Institutions/Répertoire mondial
des institutions de recherche et de formation sur la paix/Repertorio mundial de
instituciones de investigación y de formación sobre la paz. 9th edition. 2000. UNESCO
Publishing. 300 pp.
The World Ahead: Our Future in the Making, by Jérôme Blindé; Jean Yves Le Saux
and Raquar Gudmundssan. 2001. Zed Books. 496 pp. (English- French-Spanish)
UNESCO Prize for Peace Education 2000. 2001. UNESCO Publishing. 56 pp.
(French, English)
294

Report on the Seminar on the Dialogue between the Three Monotheistic Religions:
Towards a Culture of Peace. Organized under the High Patronage of His Majesty, King
Hassan II, by the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Culture, and
UNESCO, Rabat, Morocco, February 1998. 1998. (English-French-Arabic)
II Publications on science and peace
Science and Power, by Federico Mayor and Augusto Forti. 1995. UNESCO
Publishing. 230 pp. (English, French, Italian)
Peace in the Oceans – Ocean Governance and the Agenda for Peace. 1997. SC-
97/WS/30. UNESCO Publishing. 266 pp.
Genoa Forum of UNESCO on Science and Society – Genoa Declaration on Science and
Society. First Reflection Meeting: International Symposium on Science and Power,
Genoa, Italy, edited by V. Kouzminov, S. Biggin and R. Santesso. 1995. UNESCO
Office, Venice. 183 pp.
Science for Peace Series
Volume 1 Proceedings of the International Meeting on Military Conversion and
Science: Utilisation/ Disposal of the Excess Weapon Plutonium: Scientific, Technological
and Socio-Economic Aspects, Como, Italy, edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and
R. Santesso. 1996. UNESCO Office, Venice. 469 pp.
Volume 2 Forum ‘Science for Peace’ – Session of the Genoa Forum of UNESCO on
Science and Society ‘Science Ethics’ – Workshop ‘Science, Technology and National
Systems of Innovation’, Como, Italy, edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and
R. Santesso. 1997. UNESCO Office, Venice. 181 pp.
Volume 3 International Symposia on Science for Peace (First Symposium 11 December
1995; Second Symposium 20–23 January 1997), Jerusalem, Israel, edited by Y. Becker,
V. Kouzminov and R. Santesso 1997. UNESCO Office, Venice. 306 pp.
Volume 4 Illegal Nuclear Traffic: Risks, Safeguards and Countermeasures, Como, Italy,
edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO Office,
Venice. 159 pp.
Volume 5 Nuclear and Biological Decommissioning: Management of Global Security
Threats, edited by G. Aslanian, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1998.
UNESCO Office, Venice. 276 pp.
Volume 6 Inauguration of the UNESCO International School of Science for Peace, First
Forum of the International Scientific Panel on the Possible Consequences of the Misuse
of Biological Sciences, edited by Y. Becke, A. Falaschi, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini
and R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO Office, Venice. 574 pp.
Volume 7 Energy Security in the Third Millennium: Scientific and Technological Issues,
edited by G. Aslanian, U. Farinelli, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso.
1999. UNESCO Office, Venice. 720 pp.
295

Volume 8 Nuclear Disarmament, Safe Disposal of Nuclear Material for New Weapons
Developments? Where are the National Laboratories Going?, edited by G. Gherard, V.
Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO Office, Venice.
603 pp.
Volume 9 Water Security in the Third Millennium: Mediterranean Countries Toward
Regional Vision, edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini, R. Santesso and A. Tilche.
1999. UNESCO Office, Venice. 499 pp.
Volume 10 Nuclearization of South Asia: Problems and Solutions, edited by P. Cotta-
Ramusino, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1999. UNESCO Office,
Venice. 388 pp.
296