tidwell-brief

“California is not merely geographically proximate to the areas of
issue---those areas are within its boundaries. In a case involving a
challenge to a Forest Service decision to allow logging in the Sierra Nevada
Forest, the Ninth Circuit held that ‘special solicitude’ should be afforded
California’s stake in its natural resources’. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 516
F.3d 1228 (9 th Cir. 2008)”. . .
“Congress plainly recognized and endorsed the respective states’
interests in the management of national forests by enacting the provision of
the NFMA requiring the Forest Service to coordinate forest planning with
state resource management processes. See 16 USC Section 1604(a). In
light of this statutory recognition, it would be odd indeed to hold that
California has no concrete interest in activities in the national forests.
California has a concrete interest in the management of national forests
within its borders.” (Fn. 2)
This decision applies equally to each of the local government entities in this
Case. Each is directly proximate to the areas of the Forest that lie within its
boundaries. Each has the same “special solicitude” as to its stake in the
condition of its natural resources. And as to all plaintiffs, Congress
“recognized and endorsed” their interests by requiring the Service to
coordinate with “local government”. The same statute relied on by California
recognizes the same standing of local governments---in the very same
section of the statute.
The Court also ruled against the Forest Service on its argument that under
Chevron, the Court should defer to its position that coordination requires
only that the Service “talk to state entities and consider their views.” First,
the Court said that Chevron did not require deference to the Forest Service’s
interpretation of a statute or a statutory term, citing Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
Further, the Court held that even if the Service were to be allowed to
interpret the statutory meaning of “coordination”, the interpretation would
not be that given by counsel in litigation, but that given in regulatory fashion
by the Secretary of Agriculture. It held that the 1982 Planning Rules
provided an interpretation of coordination that far exceeded the mere duty
to “talk. . .and consider. . .views.”
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