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A CSIS SPECIAL REPORT
THE ROAD AHEAD:
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE
BERLIN DONOR CONFERENCE FOR AFGHANISTAN
MARCH 31-APRIL 1, 2004
Authors
Amy Frumin
Morgan Courtney
Rebecca Linder
Project Directors
Frederick Barton
Bathsheba Crocker

ABOUT CSIS
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A CSIS SPECIAL REPORT
THE ROAD AHEAD:
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE
BERLIN DONOR CONFERENCE FOR AFGHANISTAN
MARCH 31-APRIL 1, 2004
Authors
Amy Frumin
Morgan Courtney
Rebecca Linder
Project Directors
Frederick Barton
Bathsheba Crocker

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

CONTENTS
Acknowledgements……………………………………..……… ii
Project Team……………………………………………………. iii
Introduction…………………………………………………….. 1
Pillar One: Expanding Social and Human Capital…………… 2
Health……………………………………………………... 2
Education…………………………………………………. 5
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons………………... 10
Pillar Two: Rebuilding Infrastructure…………………………… 12
Transportation…………………………………………….... 12
Communications…………………………………………... 18
The Enabling Environment: Security and Governance…...……. 20
Governance and Participation………………………………. 20
Security……………………………………………………... 22
Conclusion………………………………………………………… 25
Appendices……………………………….………………………... 26
About the Project Directors.........………………………….……… 34
Bibliography………………………………………………………. 35
THE ROAD AHEAD i

ii THE ROAD AHEAD
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors of this report would like to especially thank Elisabeth Kvitashvili, Melissa Fernandez,
Jason Aplon, Nick Manning, Tom Nicastro, and David Lockwood for their invaluable contributions.
We are also deeply grateful for the insight of several individuals: Nancy Lindborg, Jennifer Noyon,
Sima Wali, Suraya Sadeed, Mark Schneider, Ginette Baerten, Peter Manikas, Sara Amiryar, Humayun
Hamidzada, Abby Stoddard, Kenneth Payumo, and Julie Myers.
Project Directors Frederick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker provided tremendous guidance at all
stages of the report, and during its numerous incarnations. We cannot adequately express our
gratitude for their unwavering support and good humor over the past several months. We are also
indebted to Jeff Kojac, Ben Rowswell, and Doug Henry for their advice, assistance, and
encouragement.
The authors are immensely grateful to the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United
Nations, the U.S. Department of State, and the NGO community for their assistance along the way.
This report was made possible by the generous support of the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation, the United Nations Foundation, and the Better World Fund.
The report authors are entirely responsible for the content and judgments in this report.

PROJECT TEAM
PROJECT DIRECTORS
Frederick Barton
Bathsheba Crocker
REPORT AUTHORS
Amy Frumin
Morgan Courtney
Rebecca Linder
PROJECT STAFF
Jeffrey Kojac
Doug Henry
Elizabeth Mackin
THE ROAD AHEAD iii

INTRODUCTION
THE ROAD AHEAD 1
This special report provides an overview of certain areas that will be addressed at the upcoming
donor conference for Afghanistan, to be held in Berlin from March 31 – April 1, 2004. 1 This will be
the second donor conference for Afghanistan. The first was held in Tokyo from January 21 to 22,
2002, during which donors pledged $4.5 billion over five years, less than half of the $10 billion the
Afghan government requested at that meeting. 2
At Berlin, the Afghan government will request nearly $28 billion over seven years, for reconstruction
and development activities, or around $4 billion per year. 3 That request is outlined in a strategy
document entitled “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path
Forward,” which in turn is based on the April 2002 National Development Framework (NDF).
‘Securing Afghanistan’s Future” offers a comprehensive description of the progress made to date in
meeting the NDF’s goals and lays out the Afghan government’s priorities for the coming decade.
Early indications are that donors will not meet the $28 billion request. 4 Afghanistan is hoping that
donors at the conference will commit to cover at least the first three years, or $12 billion, including
by pledging $4.5 billion for the coming year. 5
The National Development Framework was based upon a needs assessment carried out by the Asian
Development Bank, the World Bank, and the UN Development Program and approved by the
Afghan transitional government. It represents the government’s attempt to assert ownership over
the reconstruction process. It identifies three main pillars of activity that the Afghan leaders have
prioritized as essential to the development of a stable, secure, and democratic society and a selfsustaining
economy: expanding human and social capital (Pillar I); rebuilding infrastructure (Pillar
II); and developing an indigenous private sector that can fuel growth and create opportunities (Pillar
III).
The body of this report addresses issues in the following sectors: health, education, refugees and
internally displaced persons, transport, communications, governance and participation, and security.
The report includes the following appendices: Appendix A, a note on elections; Appendix B, an
analysis of fulfillment of the Bonn Agreement; Appendix C, funding charts; and Appendix D, a list
of Afghanistan’s interim government ministers.
1 The research that fed into development of this report included internet research, discussions with experts on
Afghanistan, humanitarian aid workers, and UN and U.S. government personnel; our research was not informed by a
field visit.
2 It should be noted that there was a meeting in Dubai, UAE on September 21, 2003, at which some additional amounts
were confirmed or newly announced. See Energy, Mining, and Telecommunication Consultative Group, “MINUTES-18
October 2003,” (accessed March 31, 2004).
3 "Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, Consultation Draft," Afghan
Government/International Agency Report, January 29, 2004,
(accessed March 10, 2004) [hereinafter “Securing Afghanistan’s Future”]. Afghanistan’s budgetary requests
are included in two different documents: the national development budget and the regular (or recurrent) budget.
“Securing Afghanistan’s Future” covers both of these requests. The charts included in appendix C outline the various
budget requests.
4 Hugh Williamson, “Conference Set to Disappoint Kabul’s Financial Hopes,” Financial Times, March 24, 2004.
5 See “Afghans to Seek $4.5 Billion in New Assistance,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2004, A16.

2 THE ROAD AHEAD
PILLAR I OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK:
EXPANDING SOCIAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL
The Afghan government has identified expanding social and human capital as the first pillar of the
NDF with the goal of facilitating not only basic survival, but of enabling the Afghan people to
become productive and contributing members of society. The Afghan government is requesting
$6.9 billion in donor support for this pillar, which covers five priority programs: health, education,
returnee reintegration, livelihoods, and culture, media and sport. This report will examine the first
three.
HEALTH
Status Report
Two years after the start of massive international humanitarian relief efforts in December 2001, the
majority of the Afghan population still lacks reliable access to health care. Children and women
suffer most acutely from this deficiency.
• Childbirth is particularly risky in Afghanistan, with approximately 165 infants and 16 women
dying for every 1,000 births. 6
• Afghanistan’s infant mortality rate is the highest in Asia and one of the highest in the world,
and the maternal mortality rate is the second highest in the world.
• Poor pre-and post-natal care means that children who do survive infancy encounter serious
health problems later in life.
o 90 percent of women do not have access to prenatal care. 7
o 70 percent of primary care clinics are unable to provide basic maternal and infant
services. 8
• One-quarter of Afghan children die before the age of five.
• Forty percent of Afghanistan’s children die from preventable causes such as diarrhea, often
caused by lack of access to sanitation and clean drinking water.
• Chronic malnutrition is estimated to afflict between 45 and 59 percent of children.
The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) has created an overall framework for the country’s health
sector. Its National Health and Nutrition Program lays out the objective of “reducing the high
levels of mortality and morbidity, especially among women and children, through the development
of equitable, effective and efficient health services that address priority health and nutrition
problems, and by developing the capacity to deliver necessary services.” 9
6 “Maternal Mortality in Afghanistan: Magnitude, Causes, Risk Factors and Preventability,” Summary Findings of the
Afghan Ministry of Public Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, November 6, 2002,
(accessed November 28, 2003).
7 The World Bank, “AFGHANISTAN-Afghanistan Health Sector Emergency Rehabilitation,” InfoShop Initial Project
Information Document (PID) No. AB12, April 2, 2003,
(accessed December 12,
2003).
8 “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward. Health and Nutrition Technical
Annex,” Afghan Government/International Agency Report, January 2004,
(accessed February 15, 2004) [hereinafter “Health and Nutrition Technical Annex”].
9 Health and Nutrition Technical Annex.

Problems
Lack of Administrative Capacity
THE ROAD AHEAD 3
The MoPH has budget authority over the health sector, and outsources the majority of the public
health functions to international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). At present, NGOs
deliver 80 percent of all health care services in the country. 10 The lack of administrative capacity in
the MoPH has created bottlenecks in Kabul, hampering service delivery. 11 The MoPH has also been
unable to coordinate the activities of the numerous groups operating in the health care sector,
meaning the multitude of organizations providing health care are not necessarily coordinating with
each other or meeting the Afghan government’s priorities.
Lack of Trained Afghan Capacity
The health care sector suffered severely from “brain drain” following several decades of war.
Convincing doctors to return is difficult because of security problems and low wages. Doctors earn
between $4-6 a month in Afghanistan, much less than in neighboring or Western countries. 12
Although the MoPH aims to replace the large numbers of international health care workers with
trained Afghans by 2010, it will continue to be dependent on NGOs to provide most health services
throughout the country for years to come.
Lack of Access to Health Care
Most Afghans are dependent on basic health centers (BHCs) to receive health care. Most BHCs are
located within 40 minutes’ walking distance of a primary road. 13 Although a significant percentage of
the Afghan population lives within 50 kilometers of a primary road, that distance still takes an
inordinate amount of time to traverse. As a result, these health centers remain inaccessible to a large
majority of the people. 14 Health care centers also tend to be concentrated in urban areas, and there
are simply not enough of them. Afghanistan currently has just over 800 BHCs in total, but health
experts have estimated that it needs almost 6,000, given its population size (approximately 25
million). 15 Moreover, only 34 percent of BHCs have electricity and clean water, and sanitation
remains a major concern. 16
10 Ibid.
11 Afghanistan Reconstruction Roundtable, Panel discussion at CSIS, October 17, 2003.
12 “The Current Healthcare Situation in Afghanistan,” Save the Afghan Children report, August 21, 2003,
(accessed January 8, 2004) [hereinafter “Save
the Afghan Children report”].
13 Health and Nutrition Technical Annex.
14 “Afghans Celebrate Phase I Completion of Kabul to Kandahar Highway,” USAID press release, December 16, 2003,
(accessed December 18, 2003).
15 Save the Afghan Children report.
16 UNICEF, “Afghanistan: Water and Sanitation Services Under Fire,”
(accessed March 1, 2004).

4 THE ROAD AHEAD
Barriers to Health Care for Women
Afghanistan’s culture and history have created particular constraints on already-strained efforts to
provide for women’s health. Many women are simply unaware that they now have access to health
care, after so many years without. Muslim tradition also dictates in favor of women being seen by
female doctors and nurses, but the majority of the country’s female health care practitioners left
during the Taliban regime. Only 40 percent of all BHCs presently have female staff. 17 Only 28
percent of facilities that provide maternal and newborn care employ a female health worker. 18
Challenges Ahead
The Afghan government has offered some means of addressing the present obstacles.
• The MoPH’s Interim Health Strategy calls for focusing all efforts in the sector on national
strategic priorities such as basic health services for Afghans living in rural communities. The
two-year program (2002-2004) is meant to ensure that donors are not tempted to fund high
profile tertiary care hospitals, which have less of an impact on vulnerable populations. 19
• The MoPH’s Health and Nutrition Sector Development Program lays out longer-term goals
in service provision. 20 The Afghan government aims to provide (through subcontractors)
maternal and infant health care, child health and immunization, nutrition, and vaccinations
for communicable diseases for the entire population in the next three to seven years.
Services will be delivered through health posts, basic health centers, comprehensive health
centers, and district hospitals.
The government’s program falls short in several areas.
First, the government and donors must prioritize paying reasonably competitive salaries for health care workers and
addressing the issue of “brain drain” in the health care profession. Government documents supporting the
NDF do not specifically address the “brain drain” issue as pertains to the health sector. The
government envisions that community health workers, many of whom will be working in rural areas,
will either work for free or be remunerated through community financing, 21 a system that is not
likely to be sustainable. Efforts since December 2001 to entice health care workers to return, such
as offering rent-free accommodations, have shown only modest success. 22 A more concerted effort
will be needed to help fill the dearth of qualified Afghan health care providers.
17 Dr. Ferozudeen Feroz, Remarks at Congressional Briefing, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Health System: What’s Next?”
December 11, 2002.
18 Health and Nutrition Technical Annex.
19 Ibid. As an example, Kuwaiti charities built a state-of-the-art, well-stocked hospital in 1999 in the rural Paktika
province, but it has never been used, for lack of trained professionals. See Pamela Constable, “Anti-Terror Efforts Put
Vise on Afghan Region,” The Washington Post, March 15, 2004, A16.
20 The Health and Nutrition Sector Development Program includes 5 areas: 1) Basic Package of Health Services, 2)
Special Programs, 3) Improving Quality of Hospital Services, 4) Human Resource Development, and 5) Administrative
Reform and Capacity Building. See Health and Nutrition Technical Annex.
21 Ibid.
22 “Working Draft: Assessing Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Early Observations and Recommendations for
Action,” World Bank and Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit report, March 13, 2003,
(accessed
November 13, 2003).

THE ROAD AHEAD 5
Second, the international community’s commitment to basic health care should be matched with adequate funding. At
present, external funding for the government’s budget request for basic health services covers only
40 percent of the population. 23
Third, the government and donors should build upon innovative programs that have shown some success thus far.
• UNICEF ran a highly successful immunization campaign in 2002. During that campaign,
UNICEF was able to immunize 96 percent of Afghan children against polio and measles.
The program’s success was driven in large part by the role played by local mosques in every
province, which acted as conduits of information between aid organizations and the
people. 24
• The Afghan Government and the international community should also expand the
Emergency Medical Teams (EMTs) run by the International Committee of the Red
Cross/Red Crescent. There are currently eight Afghan Red Crescent EMTs, each of which
comprises a doctor, a driver, a pharmacist, and a nurse. Teams work in pairs, each forming
an emergency medical unit, and see about 100 patients a day. 25 This appears to be a far more
effective system than reliance on BHCs, particularly in the short term. Records of BHCs
before 1978 show that the government employed 25,000 people to run the system, but
BHCs typically saw no more than 10 to 20 people per day. 26
Fourth, the government must begin to address the cultural and traditional barriers to improving women’s access to
health care. These issues will take significantly longer to address. The government has taken some
preliminary steps to increase the number of female health professionals and rural health centers.
Measures must also be taken to increase awareness among women that health services are available
to them, as those who are able to receive health care do not know to access it.
EDUCATION
Status Report
The Afghan government’s policy is to extend education to all children, regardless of their ethnicity,
gender, geographic location, or educational ideology. 27 The target is to bring two million more
children into the education system within the next two years. In the longer-term, the Ministry of
23 The term “Basic Health Services” refers to the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), a subprogram of the Health
and Nutrition Development Sector Program. The Afghan government projects that it will need $87.4 million in 2004 to
implement the BPHS; donors have committed only $42.9 million. See Health and Nutrition Technical Annex; “Cabinet
Approved National Development Budget 1382,” December 7, 2003,
(accessed January 20, 2004) [hereinafter “National Development Budget”].
24 Centers for Disease Control, “Nationwide Measles Vaccination Campaign for Children Aged 6 Months-12 Years-
Afghanistan, 2002,” April 25, 2003, (accessed
November 26, 2003).
25 Jessica Berry, “Mobile Teams Bring Health Care To Remote Afghan Villages,” International Federation of Red
Cross/Red Crescent Societies, October 20, 2003, (accessed October
31, 2003).
26 Health and Nutrition Technical Annex.
27 “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Way Forward. Education Technical Annex,” Afghan
Government/International Agency Report, January 2004,
(accessed February 27, 2004) [hereinafter “Education Technical Annex”].

6 THE ROAD AHEAD
Education aims “to provide opportunities for secondary and higher education of international
standard to build human resources which are able to meet private-sector driven national
development, social and reconstruction objectives.” 28
To achieve such lofty goals, huge strides must be made in education levels and school enrollment.
• Afghanistan has the lowest literacy rate in Asia, an estimated 36 percent (51 percent male, 21
percent female). 29 UNICEF estimates that the current female literacy rate is actually closer
to 10 percent. 30
• The current girls’ enrollment as a percentage of total children enrolled in primary school is
roughly 40 percent, as compared to 3 percent in 1999 under Taliban rule, and 35 percent in
1995, before the Taliban takeover. 31 Yet the overall percentage of girls attending primary
school is misleading; in the more religiously conservative southern and eastern regions of
Afghanistan, girls’ enrollment is far lower than elsewhere in the country.
Girls’ Enrollment (2003)
Primary School Middle School High School University
1,300,000 68,000 31,000 5,800
Source: “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Way Forward. Education: Technical Annex,” January 2004.
• According to UNICEF, the education sector is functioning in all of Afghanistan’s 32
provinces and 329 districts. 32
o In 2002, the Afghan government and its partners in the education sector expected
1.7 million students to enroll. Instead, more than three million students were
enrolled in grades 1-12 that year.
o In March 2003, enrollment rose to four million. Of those, 90 percent are in primary
school, and about 60 percent are in grades one and two alone. 33
• Enrollment and interest in higher education has increased since the fall of the Taliban,
during which time curriculum was concentrated on Islamic Studies. 34
o In 2003, 31,000 students enrolled in Afghanistan’s 17 higher education institutions,
up from 4,000 in 2001. Nearly 70 percent of the students are in the first two years
of study. 35
o The Ministry of Higher Education aims to increase the number of higher education
students to 100,000 by 2015. With a 20-year-old curriculum and just over half of
28 Ibid.
29 UNICEF, “Afghanistan: At a Glance Statistics,”
(accessed December 14, 2003). Figures cited represent the 2000 estimated literacy rate.
30 UNICEF, “Draft: UNICEF Girls Education Program (GEP) Afghanistan 2003-2004,” November 26, 2003.
31 “A New Start for Afghanistan’s Education Sector,” Asian Development Bank report, April 2003,
(accessed November 5, 2003).
32 UNICEF, “Rebuilding Hope in Afghanistan,” November 2003,
(accessed December 5, 2003).
33 Education Technical Annex. This demographic bubble is due to the interruption in schooling during the Taliban, and
will migrate through the school system as children matriculate.
34 “A New Start for Afghanistan’s Education Sector,” April 2003, Asian Development Bank report,
(accessed November 5, 2003) [hereinafter “Asian Development Bank report”].
35 Education Technical Annex.

Problems
Lack of infrastructure
THE ROAD AHEAD 7
the faculty having only a Bachelor’s degree, the quality of the country’s university
system is questionable. 36
Afghanistan’s educational infrastructure is insufficient to handle the huge influx of new students.
An estimated 1.5 million Afghan children are effectively denied access to education due to the lack
of schools or teachers. 37 Over 50 percent of Afghanistan’s schools do not have access to water, 38
and only one-fourth have sanitation facilities, a crucial requirement in convincing adolescent girls to
attend school. Students in rural areas suffer most from the lack of infrastructure, as most education
services are concentrated in urban centers. Enrollment in rural areas stands at 47 percent of the
eligible population, while 80 percent of eligible students in urban areas are enrolled. 39
Lack of qualified teachers
The lack of teachers is another pressing problem, especially as the demographic bubble of students
currently in grades one and two matriculates through the system. During the Taliban era, women—
who comprised 70 percent of the teacher corps—were forbidden from teaching. As a result,
thousands fled the country, and have been slow to return. 40 The current teacher-pupil ratio varies
widely by region; in rural and urban areas, the ratio varies from one teacher to 20 and 100 students,
respectively. The Afghan government aims to achieve a target ratio of 1:40 at the primary level and
1:30 at the secondary level. 41
Barriers to girls’ and women’s education
Education for girls and women presents a host of cultural problems that must be addressed in order
to bring women back into productive society. Parents typically do not allow their daughters to travel
long distances to attend school, and there are fewer education facilities for girls than for boys.
Historically, the Afghan education system has been gender-segregated, and it is unlikely that
coeducation will be considered acceptable in the foreseeable future. In some provinces of the
religiously conservative south and southeast, girls’ net enrollment rate has been estimated to be an
alarming one percent. 42 Security concerns, cultural and traditional opposition to girls’ schooling, and
economic realities all impact parents’ willingness to send girls to school.
36 Ibid.
37 Annie Schleicher, “Rebuilding the Education System,” PBS Online Newshour Report, August 2003,
(accessed October 12, 2003).
38 It should be noted that one of the most pressing needs in the education sector is a frequent and comprehensive
assessment of resources. As numbers fluctuate, it is hard to determine with any certainty the number of schools at any
time; this estimate was derived from the total of number of schools constructed in 2003, number of schools to be newly
built (“already exist but no structure”), number of schools which require major repairs, and number of schools which
require minor repairs, as defined by the Technical Annex on Education prepared for the Transitional Islamic State of
Afghanistan, January 2004. See Education Technical Annex.
39 Ibid.
40 Training teachers has also been difficult, as only two of 14 teacher-training colleges that existed before the Taliban are
currently operational. See Asian Development Bank report.
41 Education Technical Annex.
42 Ibid. These provinces are Badghes and Zabul.

8 THE ROAD AHEAD
Economic realities
The abysmal Afghan economy affects the education sector in at least two ways. First, a large sector
of the population requires vocational training in order to rejoin the workforce. Before the rise of
the Taliban, Afghanistan had a technical and vocational educational system, but presently there are
no government ministries or NGOs responsible for training vocational education teachers. 43
Second, economic considerations have deterred parents from sending children to school, preferring
instead to put them to work to supplement household income. This will be an important factor to
consider as the government undertakes to enroll millions more children in the coming years.
Challenges Ahead
In recognition of the need to capitalize on the enthusiasm for education in this post-Taliban phase,
the Afghan government has developed creative short-term solutions to accommodate all the new
students in the primary and secondary levels.
• Tents and rented buildings are being used in lieu of proper schoolhouses.
• Classes are being held in shifts, and contract teachers who do not satisfy the usual
qualifications are being used as an interim measure. 44
• The international community has been funding an effort for more sustainable infrastructure,
by constructing new schools. 45
• The government has requested $41 million for the upcoming year, to fund 17 projects to
rehabilitate Ministry buildings and other education centers for 2004-2005. (It is worth
noting that in the 2003 budget year, the government requested $104 million from
international donors for this need, but received only $2.1 million.)
Still, the government’s programs fall short in several areas.
First, the Afghan government must prioritize increasing the number of teachers. Thus far, the government has
called for a strategy of a fiscally disciplined education budget including increased, competitive, but
affordable salaries for teachers. 46 The national development budget includes requests for the
rehabilitation of teacher training colleges and the creation of new colleges. It requests $3.3 million
for teacher development. 47 Building and rehabilitating teacher training schools is an important
element of improving education. As “Securing Afghanistan’s Future” notes, however, investment in
infrastructure “cannot outrun capacity,” 48 and the number of teachers already lags behind the
number of schools. Without economic incentives, teachers will not be convinced to return to
Afghanistan, become teachers, and remain in the education sector.
Second, the government and international donors should build on successful community-based education models. One
of the most successful examples of non-traditional education coping mechanisms is informal classes
held in villagers' homes. Studies have shown that students in these informal classes perform as well
43 Asian Development Bank report.
44 Education Technical Annex.
45 National Development Budget.
46 Education Technical Annex.
47 National Development Budget.
48 Education Technical Annex.

THE ROAD AHEAD 9
as students in formal classes. 49 In the strategy document to be presented at the Berlin donor
conference, the Government emphasizes strengthening the role of schools and communities in
education. It notes that the Government plans to offer financial support for local coping
mechanisms, which have sustained the education system in communities through decades of war
and repression. 50 However, the national development budget includes a request for only $1.06
million for community organized primary education. A comparable request in the last budget year
went unfunded. 51
Third, the government and international donors must prioritize education for women and girls. The Government
of Afghanistan identifies women’s education as a priority, and its budget includes funding requests
for girls’ literacy programs, accelerated learning for girls, and media campaigns to promote education
and literacy of Afghan women and girls. For the 2003 budget year, the Government requested $6.15
million for these activities, but only $1.1 million was committed. 52 Several NGOs and international
organizations are working independently on the promotion of women’s education. Creating inviting
and culturally accessible learning environments for women must be addressed separately from other
education considerations, and will require separate funding streams, but up until now, the Afghan
government has not adequately pursued the funding that will be necessary to reestablish women’s
role in Afghan society.
Fourth, the government must increase vocational training opportunities. The Afghan Government should
prioritize absorbing those parts of the population that will require vocational training, including
demobilized youth, ex-combatants and returnees, in order to reintegrate them into civil society. It is
important that these groups do not become spoilers in the reconstruction process, frustrated at the
lack of opportunity. The government is requesting $6.47 million for 2004 in support of four
vocational training projects. It is also hoping to create a market-driven vocational training system.
With the rate of growth needed and desired in the Afghan market, however, the current training
programs may be too slow.
The government should accelerate its plans for short-term apprenticeships with the private sector.
It is planning to develop programs aimed at short-term training for reconstruction projects in order
to build capacity, foster a sense of local ownership, and potentially empower disenfranchised
populations. 53 There have been several successful small-scale training programs involving
international companies, universities and specialized organizations. Such programs facilitate
economic growth by creating a skilled workforce and fostering community development; they can
also improve the status of women. 54
49 Asian Development Bank report.
50 Education Technical Annex.
51 National Development Budget.
52 Ibid.
53 Education Technical Annex.
54 To encourage the training of women, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is constructing Women’s
Development Centers in 14 provinces selected by the Minister of Women’s Affairs with funding from USAID. These
centers will provide classroom space, libraries, and day care centers, and will also serve as provincial offices of the
Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Informational meetings as well as vocational training and educational courses will be
provided, allowing women with little to no formal education or training the ability to acquire new skills.
Correspondence with Ginette Baerten, Gender Program Officer, IOM Kabul, January 10, 2004.

10 THE ROAD AHEAD
REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS)
Status Report
Afghans comprise the second largest number of refugees and IDPs in the world; it is estimated that
one of every three Afghans was a refugee or an IDP at one time. Since the fall of the Taliban
regime in 2001, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), 55 working with the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has facilitated the return of 2.4 million Afghans, mostly
from Pakistan and Iran. 56 600,000 IDPs have also returned to their areas of origin. Despite this
progress, approximately 3.4 million Afghan refugees and 200,000 IDPs have yet to return. The
dramatic surge in population has the potential to catalyze health, food and security crises.
Problems
Security
Many returnees are refusing to return to their native areas, citing insecurity, the lack of land to which
to return, and potential ethnic conflict or tension. Forty-five percent of returning refugees went to
central Afghanistan; 22 percent went to northern Afghanistan; and 21 percent went to the eastern
part of the country. Returns to the southern and southeastern regions of Afghanistan have been
lower than all other areas of Afghanistan, reflecting the poor security situation in those areas.
Urban Saturation
Overall, 42 percent of returning refugees have settled in urban areas, where there are more health
centers, schools, and job opportunities. 750,000 Afghans have flooded into Kabul in the past 18
months, and Kabul’s population has doubled to 3 million people over the past two years. Urban
areas throughout the country have almost reached saturation.
Inadequate Financial Support
Returnees requesting repatriation assistance through UNHCR are registered at Voluntary
Repatriation Centers (VRCs) established throughout Pakistan and Iran. Upon registration, the
returnee receives a Voluntary Repatriation Form, which is used to secure a transport grant upon
arrival in Afghanistan. In addition, children are inoculated, and an aid kit is provided to families.
According to Amnesty International, the cash grant is not sufficient to cover returnees’ travel, and as
a result, it has been difficult, if not impossible, for refugees to return to their home areas. 57 UNHCR
reports that the VRCs are functioning smoothly and efficiently, but that funding is lacking for longterm
economic aid to help returnees enhance their livelihood.
55 The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation’s priorities are: 1) Refugee and IDP repatriation and return; 2) Assistance
to the residual IDP population; 3) Initial returnee reintegration; 4) Refugee and IDP protection and social services, and
5) Refugee and IDP capacity.
56 Amnesty International has reported that Pakistan and Iran are increasingly experiencing asylum fatigue, forcing
refugees to repatriate and closing borders to incoming refugees. “Afghanistan: Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Fate of
the Afghan Returnees,” Amnesty International report, June 2003,
(accessed
November 25, 2003) [hereinafter “Amnesty International report”].
57 Amnesty International report.

Challenges Ahead
THE ROAD AHEAD 11
The international community’s efforts to repatriate returnees have been impressive, although
funding lags. Of the $164 million requested in 2003 by the Afghan government for refugee and IDP
return, donors committed only $77.9 million, and only $55.7 million was disbursed. Most of these
funds contributed to protection, transport, and returnee packages for refugees and IDPs, as well as
shelter provision and relief and recovery operations. For 2004-2011, the Afghan government is
requesting $155 million for refugee return and reintegration. Over the course of the next seven
years, the government aims to establish a framework for controlled migration, provide incentives to
encourage returnees to settle, continue to provide assistance to returnees, and create a legal
framework to resolve property rights issues.
Significant challenges remain.
First, the government and donors should focus on the long-term solution of providing incentives for returnees to settle in
rural areas. There has been increased focus on improving urban conditions, but Afghanistan’s cities
will not be able to sustain the huge influx of expected refugee returns and IDP movements. Those
returning to rural areas have had difficulties finding jobs and farming on land damaged by war,
disuse, and drought. 58
Second, the government must prioritize land redistribution. The single most pressing issue in refugee
repatriation is property ownership. In 2002, 74 percent of returnees said that they did not have
farmland to which to return. 59 To benefit from shelter projects, a returnee must own a title to a
parcel of land or his community must vouch for his ownership. Returnees seeking land have
worked through the traditional dispute-settlement village councils, or shuras. A new Land Disputes
Court system has been established to take on this responsibility, but it has had limited success and
lacks credibility among the Afghan people. Further, there is a weak land law and no land policy. 60
Third, the government and donors should strengthen job creation programs for returnees. Forty percent of
returnees are of working age (18-60), and another 40 percent will soon reach working age (5-17).
The Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) is encouraging job creation
through the employment of returnees on infrastructure reconstruction projects. 61 UNHCR is also
supervising a “cash for work” program in which returnees are employed in agricultural activities,
irrigation projects, and road and bridge rehabilitation, with an eye toward encouraging the training
and employment of women. Creating jobs for returnees will be essential to protect against their
becoming spoilers.
58 See Pamela Constable, “Returnees Struggle on Dry Afghan Plain,” Washington Post, March 26, 2004, A14.
59 Amnesty International report.
60 Liz Alden Wily, “Land and the Constitution: Current Land Issues in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit Policy Brief, August 2003,
(accessed October
23, 2003).
61 “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Way Forward. Refugees and Internally Displaced:
Technical Annex,” Afghan Government/International Agency Report, January 2004,
(accessed February 27, 2004).

12 THE ROAD AHEAD
PILLAR TWO OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK:
REBUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE
The second pillar of the NDF addresses physical infrastructure and natural resources. The aim of
this pillar is to leverage external assistance to build or rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure, and to
develop its natural resources in order to lay the foundation for sustainable growth led by the private
sector. Fifty-two percent of the total $27.6 billion requested by the government in its 2004-2011
national development budget is for development in this sector. 62 As envisioned by the Afghan
government, the activities and programs that fall under this pillar are: transport and
communications, water and sanitation, energy, urban management, and natural resource
management. The government has prioritized funding for the transport and communications
sectors—$7.5 billion out of the total pillar II request of $14.4 billion—and those are the two issues
covered here. Seventy-nine percent of the funds requested for the transport sector are for road
rehabilitation.
Ethnic conflicts, geographic terrain, factionalism, and different languages all contribute to
fragmentation within Afghan society. Connectivity, both internally and externally, is a central theme
in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan. Indeed, the natural strategic potential of Afghanistan
lies in its position as a trans-Asian link. As Afghanistan’s vice-president, Hedayat Amin Arsala, has
said, “My dream is for Afghanistan to rediscover its role as a bridge.” 63
TRANSPORTATION
The NDF focuses on restoring and creating basic transport infrastructure to allow better operation
of necessary public and private transport services in all areas of the country. The government hopes
that international linkages will facilitate economic development by improving access to markets,
potentially impacting Afghan poverty levels. The program focuses on specific interventions in
primary and secondary roads, civil aviation infrastructure, and essential public transport.
Exploiting its geographic location as a trans-Asian trade and transportation route would establish
Afghanistan as a viable international player, contributing to its prosperity and to regional political
and economic development. Afghanistan will not realize its economic potential until goods can be
more easily and reliably transported through the country. Transportation systems will also enhance
the ability of customs officials to monitor and tax goods moving through the country.
Physically connecting the disparate ethnic groups in Afghanistan, separated by language, geography
and varying local governance structures will decrease levels of fear and tension between the groups
and will be essential to the central government’s efforts to assert its role. Ministers in Kabul rarely
leave the city limits, as travel within the country is unsafe and time-consuming. The recent
assassination in Herat of the minister of civil aviation and tourism is the second assassination of a
minister of civil aviation and tourism, and the third assassination of a minister in two years. 64 (It
followed a failed assassination attempt on Ismail Khan, Herat province’s governor and Sadiq’s
father.)
62 See Appendix C for a sector breakdown of the 2004-2011 National Development Budget.
63 Raja C. Mohan, “India and Afghan Railroads,” The Hindu, February 20, 2003,
.
64 Amy Waldman, “Official Killed as Strife Grows in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, March 22, 2004.

Roads
Status Report
THE ROAD AHEAD 13
The Afghan government identified roads as its highest priority for large donor infrastructure
investment, and despite initial setbacks, much progress has been reported. The remnants of Soviet
and American-built roads from previous eras have deteriorated after decades of neglect; most are
barely passable at best. The United States, Japan, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank,
Italy, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and the European Union are all engaged in road-building
activities. (See following page for a map of road projects in Afghanistan. 65 ) Donors are
implementing the strategy laid out by the Afghan government to create a countrywide network of
highways, consisting of:
• A ring highway linking major urban centers;
• Highways from the ring roads to major border points;
• A cross-country highway, linking Kabul to Herat; and
• Secondary and tertiary roads providing farm-to-market access.
Despite the emphasis on roads running to Kabul, the highway system benefits Afghans throughout
the country.
• Sixty-six percent of the population lives within 50 kilometers of the ring highway.
• One-third of Afghans live within 50 kilometers of the Kabul-Kandahar highway, the first
completed section of the ring highway. 66
• Twenty-five years ago, it took 4 hours to travel from Kabul to Kandahar; in 2002, after years
of war damage and neglect, it took 14. 67 Since the completion of the first phase of the road
project, the journey can once again be completed in just a few hours.
• The Salang Tunnel, a 2.6 kilometer tunnel linking the northern part of the country (often
inaccessible during winter) to Kabul was reopened on December 28, 2003. The tunnel’s
opening has reduced travel time between the north and south by two days. 68
The Kabul-Kandahar highway has been the poster project of the U.S. and Afghan governments. It
officially opened on December 16, 2003, in a highly publicized ribbon-cutting ceremony with
President Karzai. The second phase of the road project—additional layers of asphalt, highway
shoulders, and signage and road markings—is due to begin in the spring of 2004.
65 Source: Afghanistan Information Management Service, Map of Afghanistan Road Reconstruction, June 2003,
(accessed November 21, 2003).
66 “Afghans Celebrate Phase I Completion of Kabul to Kandahar Highway,” USAID press release, December 16, 2003,
(accessed December 18, 2003).
67 “Afghanistan’s National Programme for Reconstruction,” Government of Afghanistan, December 2002,
(accessed October 17, 2003).
68 “Completion of the Salang Tunnel,” U.S. Department of State press statement, December 28, 2003,
.

for further information contact AIMS
e-mail: info@aims.org.pk
Pakistan
60 0 60 120 180 240 Kilometers
The boundaries and names on the maps
do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the United Nations.
Iran
N
NOTE:
EU / SIDA
Iran & ADB
WB
Gowaran
JPN , SA & USA
Shorawak
#S
Iran & India
Char Burjak
#S
#Y
Naqil-e Dehshu
Quetta
#S
USA
#S
Khanishin
NIMROZ
HILMAND
Saudi & USA
KANDAHAR
#Y
Spin Boldak
#S
Darweshn (Garmser)
Japan
Chakhansur
#S
Zaranj
#S
Kang
#S
Khalech (Hazaraz)
Shiga
#S
ADB
Lokhi
#S
Panjwai
#S
#Y
#S
Kishk-e Nakhod
#Y
#S
Daman
#S
Khogiani
#S
Khogiani
#S
Sayyid Halim
Kandahar #S
Baba Wali Sahib
#S
Dand
#S
Lash-e Jowain
Lashkar Gah
Nad-e Ali
#S
Atghar
Italia
#S
Shar-e Safa
#S
Girishk
#S
Ghorak
#S
Ziarat Shamaqsud
#S
Shinkai
Shamalzai
#S
DONORS
Sangin
#S
Qala-e Kah#S
#S
Sultan-e Bakwa
#S
Mizan
#Y
Wor Mamay
#S
Track
#S
Washir
#S
#S
Kajaki
Qalat
Waza Khwa
#S
#S
Nawa
#Y
ZABUL
#S
FARAH
Naw Zad
Dinar Khel
#S
Musa Qala
#S
#S
PAKTIKA
All weather secondary
#S
Naw Farah Deh
Bala Buluk
#S
#S
#S
#S
#Y
Bailogh
Qal'a-i Kuhna
Shar-e Naw
#S
#S
Chora
#S
#S
Baghran Khola
Uruzgan
#S
Purchaman
#S
#S
#S
URUZGAN
Gezab
#S
#S
Ghor
#S
#S
#S
Khesraw
#S
Farsi
#S
#S
Tulak
#S
#S
#S
#S
#S
#S
#S
#S #S
#S
#S
#S
#S
#S
#S
#S #S
#S
#S
#S
#S
#S
Zenya
Rokha #S
#S
#S
#S
NURISTAN
Paja
Kiraman
#S
Ezat Khel Sufla
#S
#S
#S
Qaq Shal
Haji Khel
#Y
PARWAN #S Eshqabad
#S
Saqa
#S #Y #Y
#S Siyagerd
#S
#S
#S
#S
Bagram Alasai
Nijrab
#S
#S Qara Bagh
LAGHMAN
#S
Salahzada
#S
Tagab
#Y
#S
#Y
Istalif Mullah Mohd Khel
#S
#S
#S
#S
Mir Bacha Kot Kalakan KAPISA
#S
#S
BAMYAN
Shakar Dara
Sorubi #Y
#S
Paghman Tara Khel
#S
#S
#S
Zar Kharid Tajikha
#S
Kota-e Ashro %[
#S
KABUL
#Y Deh Qazi Hussain Khel
#S #Y #S
#S
#S
#S
Khord Kabul
#S
WARDAK
Qala-e Naim
Behsud
Khan-e Ezat
#S
#S
#S #S #S #S
#S #S #S
#S
Muhammad Agha #S
Miran
#S
LOGAR
#S
#S
Azro
#S
#S
#S
Kolangar
#S
Chak-e Wardak
Khoshi
#S
#S
#S
#S #Y
Ali Khel NANGARHAR
Du Abi
#S
#S
Baraki Barak
Ghondai #S
Sayyidabad
Hassan Khel Chaparai
Kalan Deh
#S
Qala-e Amruddin
Lazha #S
Sayyid Karam Shar-e Naw
Khwaja Omri
#S
#S
Dado
#S
#S
Jani Khel
#S
GHAZNI
#S
#Y Zur Kot
#S
#Y
#S
#S
#S
Jaghatuy Ghazni
#S Zambar
Zarmal
#S
PAKTYA
Ramak
#S #S
Khost-e Maila
Shawak
#S
Waza
Alisher
#S
Matun
#S
Dadwal
Malistan #S
Shamal #S #S #S #Y KHOST
Miri
Mata Khan #S
#S
Kapari #S Shaikh Amir
#S
#S
#S
#S
#Y
Tani
Qara Bagh
Neka #S
Pana #S
#S
Speyra
Sang-e Masha
Surai
Sultani
Haji Khel #S
Yusuf Khel
Yahya Khel
#S
#S Urgon
#S Ster Gayan
Moqor
Zarghun Shar #S Ahmad Wal
#S
Jani Khel
#S
Sarobi
#S
Gilan
#S Khoshamand
#S
Barmal
#S
#S
#S
Gomal
Wolma
Kamdesh
Bazare Tala
Du Ab Mikh Zarin
Chaharikar Mahmud Raqi
Saighan
Asadabad Asmar
Bamyan
Dawlat Shah
Nangaraj
Kandai
Mano Gai
Dangam
Shibar
Mihtarlam Alingar
Sarkani
Yakawlang
Narang
Alishing Panja Khel Chawki
Nur Gal
Kabul
Jalalabad Shewa Khas Konar
Kabul
Lal Khan Abad Behsud
Panjab
Sangar Sarai
Sultanpur
Ragha
Goshta
Chaparhar
Batsawul Lalpur
Shahi Kot
Mama Khel Kazha
Puli Alam
Nadir Shah Kot
Waras
Agam
Ghanikhel
Sar Qala
Kotwal Durbaba
Nazian
Gardez
Ghazni
Jaji Maidan
Sangar
Khost (Matun) Bak
Sharan
Siyagaz
Shah Jui
All weather primary
Anar Dara
Tirin Kot
ROADS
Kajran
Shindand
#Y
Potential
Adraskan
Saghar
Pasaband
#S
District
Peshawar
HIRAT
Khadir
#Y
#Y
Province
#S
Shahrak
GHOR
Zenda Jan
#S
Enjil
#S #S
Rawza Bagh Gim
#S #S
#Y
#S
Sar-e Kucha
%[
Capital
Ghurian
Chesht-e Sharif
#S
Hirat
Mahala-e Bala
#S
#Y
Lal o Sar Jangal
#S
SETTLEMENTS
#S
Kohsan
Chaghcharan
Kushk #S
Kushk-e Kohna
#S
Qadis
Province
#S
#Y
#S
Char Taq
#S
International
Gulran
#S
Qala-I-Naw
KUNAR
BADGHIS
#S
Narai
Qala
#S
BOUNDARIES
Bala Murghab
#S
Tarkhoj
#S
#S
#S
Doshi
Khinjan
#S
#S
Banu
#S
Ghormach
Qaisar
#S
FARYAB
#S
Sarchakan
SARI PUL
Ruy-e Du Ab
Pasni
Barg-e Matal
#S
#S
Tukzar
#S
#S
#Y
#S
SAMANGAN
#Y
#S
#S
Pul-e Khumri
#S
#S
Dahana-e Ghori
BAGHLAN
Turkmenabad
Dewana Khana
Dehi
LEGEND
Keshendeh (Aq Kopruk)
Bashi Qala
Nuristan
Darzab
#S
Du Abi
#S
#S
Sekwa
Maymana
#S
#S
#Y
#S
Islam Qala
Sar-e Pul
#S
#Y
#S
Bagh-e Dasht
#S
Mashhad
#Y
BALKH
#Y
Burka
Baghlan
Qazi Boi Qala
Ishkamesh
#S
Sari Pul
Baba Ewaz
#S
#S
#S
#S
Char Kent
Samangan #S
Hazrat-e Sultan
#S
Aliabad
In cooperation with
Ministry of Public Works
Chal
#S
#S
Farkhar
BADAKHSHAN
#S Zebak
Dehdadi
#Y
#S
#S
Nahr-e Shahi
#Y
#S
#S
Char Dara
Khanabad
Khulm
#Y
#S
Bangi
#S
#Y
#S
Mazari Sharif
Balkh
#S
Ishkashim
Kalafgan
#S
#S
Keshem
Qaramqul
#S
Char Bolak
#S
Chimtal
#S
KUNDUZ
Jurm
#S
Qurghan
#S
Char Shingaw
Mardian
#S
Khan-e Charbagh
#S #S
Aqcha #S
Andkhoi JAWZJAN
Shibirghan
Faizabad
#S
#S
Khanaqa
Taluqan
Kunduz
TAKHAR
#S
Qala-e Zal
#S
Khandud
Dawlatabad
#S
#S
Chichka
Khwaja Ghar
#S
Faizabad
#S
Baharak
Kaldar
#S
Imam Saheb
#S
Rustaq
#Y
#S
#S
Buz Erugh
#Y
Choghli Tepa #S
Khan Tepa
Termez
#S
Yangi Qala
#S
Darqad
#S
#S
Chah Ab
#S
Murch
Shar-e Buzurg
#S
Shighnan
#S
ROAD RECONSTRUCTION
JUNE 2003
#S
Khwahan
AFGHANISTAN
ROUTE MAP
#S
Nusai
AIMS

THE ROAD AHEAD 15
The second section of the road, from Kandahar to Herat, is also due to start this spring. Initially
built by the Soviets, this section of the road will take longer to rehabilitate because of logistical
barriers to reconstruction.
Problems
Security
Security concerns have caused serious delays and absorbed large percentages of funding for
infrastructure projects. The Kabul-Kandahar road project has been fraught with security problems,
including kidnappings and murders of Afghan workers and foreign engineers. In fact, the newly
built Kabul-Kandahar highway remains one of the least safe places in the country. 69
High costs
There has been a consistent underestimation of construction costs for infrastructure projects, largely
because such projects have been redesigned after the initial estimates were made. For example,
initial pledges for construction of the Kabul-Kandahar road totaled $180 million, but just the
preliminary paving of the road ended up costing $270 million. In many places, there is only one
layer of asphalt, not enough to withstand heavy use or more than one harsh winter. Initial estimates
were made by people outside of the country, and did not accurately reflect local prices. 70 Security
problems, emergency humanitarian relief, refusal to procure supplies from neighboring countries
due to political issues, and premature deadlines for political reasons all contributed to escalated
costs.
Environmental Concerns
Environmental factors are another challenging component; frequent dust storms make importation
of supplies, particularly asphalt, ahead of time all but impossible. The “just in time” model that
must be employed inevitably results in delays.
Challenges Ahead
Road construction has been the Karzai government’s most effective showing thus far in terms of
capitalizing on its close links with the international community. Considering the difficulties
discussed above, progress on the construction of roads has been impressive. The important
question going forward, though, is whether the Afghans and their international partners will focus
on the longer-term sustainability of the roads.
The Afghan government and international donors must prioritize longer-term road maintenance. In addition to
continuing work on the Kandahar-Herat highway, the United States has recently re-affirmed its
commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan’s road system, pledging to construct over 1,300 kilometers of
provincial roads in Afghanistan. These roads should benefit over one-third of the Afghan
69 Andrew Higgins, “U.S. Ambitions Run Into Reality on an Afghan Road,” The Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2004.
70 Elizabeth Price, “G7: Afghanistan To Seek $28.5 Billion At March Donor Meeting,” Dow Jones Newswire, February 9,
2004.

16 THE ROAD AHEAD
population. 71 While this is a worthy start, it will be important that donor funds are used not only to
construct new roads but also to ensure that those already constructed are adequately paved to
withstand weather and time, and undergo routine maintenance.
It is anticipated that once the road construction is complete, the Afghan government should have
some increased capacity for road maintenance, which is expected to cost $80 million per year.
Assessments suggest that without such maintenance, the roads will suffer major destruction in five
to ten years. 72
Air Transport
Status Report
There are twenty-two airports in Afghanistan, many of which are being serviced once again by
Ariana, the national airline. 73
• The main international airport is in Kabul. It is poorly located and difficult to navigate into.
• The Kandahar airport also provides international services. It is used mainly by the coalition
military forces.
• The airport at Mazar-e-Sharif has asphalt-paved runways that are in poor condition due to
bombings.
• The Kunduz airport is relatively inaccessible because an unpaved 10-kilometer road connects
the airport to the city center.
Problems
Airports are in need of massive repair and are poorly located
Afghanistan’s air transport sector is barely functional: there are no functioning navigation aids or
meteorological facilities, and none of the airports are up to international standards. 74 At present, the
international community provides its own flight safety operations in the areas in which it operates.
The main international airport in Kabul is poorly located. Nestled between treacherous mountains,
it is very difficult to navigate. There are plans underway to relocate the Kabul airport. Repairing
sub-par infrastructure and building a new, international airport will be extremely costly.
71 “Government of Afghanistan and USAID Announce Construction of Roads,” U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, Press
Release, February 11, 2004.
72 “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward. Transport Technical Annex.”
Afghan Government/International Agency Report, January 2004,
(accessed
February 15, 2004) [hereinafter “Transport Technical Annex”].
73 “Afghanistan Civil Aviation Sector Definitional Mission Study,” The Berkeley Group report, November 2002,
(accessed November 15, 2003) [hereinafter
“Berkeley Group report”].
74 Transport Technical Annex.

The national airline is heavily subsidized
THE ROAD AHEAD 17
The Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism oversees Ariana Airlines. 75 The Ministry of Finance
supports the airline by paying its personnel costs directly. It is not officially a state-owned business,
however, and the company itself maintains all of its revenues. The government has also provided
benefits to Ariana in the form of not having demanded landing and civil aviation fees for 15 years.
Challenges Ahead
The government’s emphasis in this sector is on revitalizing the international airports at Kabul and
Kandahar and the regional airports. Thus far, it has committed $37 million for air transport needs,
more than 50 percent of which is targeted for the Kabul international airport. The Berlin document
requests a further $375 million for airport rehabilitation and development.
The government’s priorities in this sector are worth revisiting, however.
First, the government should shift focus away from rehabilitation of the current Kabul airport. Because of its
difficult location, the government is planning to eventually build an entirely new international airport
in nearby Logar, and is setting aside some monies for the construction of this airport in ten years’
time. 76 Rather than pouring money into the Kabul airport, whose location presents a difficulty that
even renovations cannot overcome, it would be more productive to focus what little funds are
available on building the new airport at Logar.
Second, the government should shift funds in this sector toward transport projects that would provide benefit to a greater
proportion of the population, or more economic benefit to the country. Few Afghans—other than a small elite
and some of those making the Hajj—can afford air travel. Repairing the damaged airports will not
have a big impact on the well-being of the majority of Afghans, although it will permit international
aid workers to access otherwise inaccessible parts of the country. 77 Greater focus on building
secondary roads and rail transport would provide more benefit to the country’s people and
economy.
Third, the government should clarify the relationship between itself and Ariana Airlines to avoid an unnecessary drain
on its stretched budgets. Eventually, the airline itself has to create a strategic business plan, much like
other industries in the transportation sector in Afghanistan.
Rails
Status Report
Afghanistan has only a few miles of rails. In the mid-1970s, a feasibility study was conducted
assessing the advantages of countrywide railways, but nothing further was done.
76 Berkeley Group report.
77 Although weather is a major hindrance to travel in Afghanistan, security remains the main reason that much of the
country is inaccessible. Improved security would do much more to open up the country than repairing airports.

18 THE ROAD AHEAD
The Government has offered no firm commitment to developing rail infrastructure, despite
acknowledging its potential benefits. Even just the few functioning miles of rails in Afghanistan
have far greater capacity to transport food and humanitarian supplies than roads. In 2002, for
instance, 86,000 tons of cargo were imported by rail despite the mere five kilometers of track to
Turkmenistan and the single rail access over a bridge to Uzbekistan. 78 Even with this very limited
system, a large proportion of freight between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia is
shipped by rail. Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran have existing rail systems that could
be connected to a trans-Afghanistan railway. Several countries have expressed interest in investing
in a rail initiative in Afghanistan, including Russia. 79 Additionally, there are hopes that Afghanistan
will eventually be linked by rail to Iran, which connects to both Central Asia and Europe. India has
agreed to participate in building trans-Afghanistan road and rail links between Uzbekistan's Termez
to Iran's Chahbahar Port in the Persian Gulf. 80
In addition to bolstering international trade, an improved rail network would also benefit domestic
markets. The World Food Program has concluded that rails in Afghanistan move ten times faster
and transport 50 times more cargo than roads. 81
Challenges Ahead
The Afghan government should place a higher priority, including by shifting funding requests, on expanding the
country’s rail network. The government has placed rails low on its list of priorities in the transport
sector. It is requesting just $124 million for the development of rails, compared to the nearly $400
million for the aviation sector over a seven-year period. 82 Yet air transport will service a significantly
smaller proportion of the Afghan population.
COMMUNICATIONS
Status Report
The communications sector has seen some improvement since the fall of the Taliban. Afghanistan
still has one of the lowest telephone densities in the world, and its telecommunications system is
inadequate to connect a country of an estimated 25 million people. But Afghanistan’s population
has widespread access to radio. 83 Its availability and regional focus is one of the primary means for
Afghanistan’s largely illiterate population to stay informed.
• There are 1.6 telephones per 1,000 people. 84
• Afghanistan’s telecommunications network operates about 57,000 telephone lines in five
major cities, two-thirds of which are in Kabul. The rest of the country is largely without
phone service. 85
78 Dario Thuburn, “Russian Railways Company Eyes Afghanistan,” World Markets Analysis, November 21, 2003.
79 “RZD Looks to Help Build Afghan Railway,” Moscow Times, November 21, 2003,
(accessed December 15, 2003).
80 “India to take Part in Building Trans-Afghan Road, Rail Links,” India Express Bureau, November 8, 2003,
(accessed December 15, 2003).
81 Ibid.
82 Transport Technical Annex.
83 Afghanistan Reconstruction Roundtable, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) panel discussion,
October 17, 2003.
84 "Securing Afghanistan's Future."

THE ROAD AHEAD 19
• As of December 2003, 135,000 Afghans had subscribed to mobile telephone service. 86
• International organizations, the United Nations, USAID, and various NGOs 87 have taken
advantage of the widespread radio coverage and introduced programming aimed at various
sectors of the population, including a UNHCR/BBC Radio Program for Afghan refugees,
IDPs and returnees that discusses security and development activities. 88
• Radio instruction, particularly through BBC programs, but also through NGO digital
broadcasting, has been widely used by child and adult learners. 89
• Women are running a variety of radio programs, permitting an otherwise marginalized group
to address its particular concerns and further integrate into productive society. 90
The inadequate telecommunications infrastructure is hampering the central government’s ability to
function. As it stands, the central government is largely unable to communicate its policies outside
of Kabul; it has limited, if any, access to its regional offices, which are intended to implement
government policy throughout the country.
Challenges Ahead
The government hopes to spur private investment in its communications networks, including
through plans to set up a telecommunications regulatory authority and the establishment of a
Telecommunications Development Fund to support growth in areas less desirable to private
investors.
First, the government should place greater emphasis on non-traditional means of communications, including the
enhancement of the country’s cellular network. Improved communications infrastructure in Afghanistan
would help spur private investment and allow the government to operate more effectively. 91 But
given the country’s size and lack of basic telecommunications infrastructure, innovative models
should be the priority.
Second, the government and donors should prioritize expanding radio programming as a creative means of accessing
and connecting to the Afghan population. Innovative programs already begun in this area have proven and
successful at reaching rural and illiterate populations.
85 “Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 15.7 Million to the Transitional Islamic State of
Afghanistan for an Emergency Communications Development Project,” World Bank, September 5, 2003.
86 "Securing Afghanistan's Future."
87 The NGOs include Internews, the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS), and the Afghan Women in
Media Network.
88 UNHCR Return Information Update, October 16-31, 2003,
(accessed November 2, 2003).
89 Asian Development Bank report.
90 IRIN News, “Focus on Women’s Status in Third Post-Conflict Year,” March 8, 2004,
(accessed March 26, 2004).
91 “Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 15.7 Million to the Transitional Islamic State of
Afghanistan for an Emergency Communications Development Project,” World Bank, September 5, 2003.

20 THE ROAD AHEAD
THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT: SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE
The NDF lays out a clear role for the state: to provide security, invest in human capital, provide for
the vulnerable, and create an enabling environment for a private sector to flourish. 92 This will
require an “effective central government that reestablishes the national unity…on the basis of strong
institutions, while building community level participation and effective management at the local
level.” 93 Two fundamental issues will enable the government to fulfill this role: governance and
participation and security.
GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION
There has been progress in establishing a central government. The Bonn agreement, signed on
December 5, 2001, laid out a path toward democratic self-government for Afghanistan, including a
plan to hold two loya jirgas, which have both been held according to Bonn’s timetable. (A
description of some of Bonn’s provisions and their implementation is included in appendix B.)
Participants in the first loya jirga, held from June 10-16, 2002, elected Hamid Karzai as interim
President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan (ITSA), set out the formation of the
transitional government, and agreed upon a schedule for drafting a constitution and holding
permanent elections.
At the second loya jirga, held on January 3, 2004, participants approved the new Afghan constitution.
The constitution mandates a strong central government with a democratically elected president and
two vice-presidents. There will be a two-chamber national assembly and an independent judiciary.
Women are recognized as equal citizens and are guaranteed 25 percent of the seats in the lower
house of the national assembly. 94 Islam is the state religion, but the constitution guarantees broad
religious freedom. It has been called “one of the most enlightened [constitutions] … in the Islamic
world.” 95
Transforming the constitution into a “living reality” is the next great challenge. 96 National
presidential and parliamentary elections, originally scheduled to occur by June of this year, will be
delayed until September. 97 Physical insecurity has slowed the pace of voter registration. 98
Establishing the legal grounding of the central government is an achievement. Afghanistan’s civil
administration now includes 29 ministries, 12 independent bodies, and other central government
agencies. Yet, these institutions have little reach beyond Kabul. The central government in Kabul
makes policy decisions—large and small—for the 32 provincial and 329 district-level
92 “National Development Framework, Version 2,” Kabul, April 2002,
(accessed January 13, 2004).
93 “National Development Framework, Version 2.”
94 Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Council Gives Approval to Constitution,” New York Times, January 5, 2004, A1.
95 Zalmay Khalilzad, “Afghanistan’s Milestone,” Washington Post, January 8, 2004.
96 Manoel de Almeida e Silva, spokesperson for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan,
press briefing, January 5, 2004, (accessed
December 12, 2003).
97 Farhan Bokhari, “Afghan Elections in September,” Financial Times, March 28, 2004.
98 See Appendix A.

THE ROAD AHEAD 21
administrations, but the practical challenges to communicating and implementing these decisions are
great. (See appendix D for a list of Afghanistan’s interim government officials.)
Despite examples of the central government developing elaborate budget planning, collecting tax
revenue from reluctant local officials, enforcing remittance requirements, or replacing uncooperative
governors, warlords retain control of vast regions of the country. 99 The split between Kabul and
regional fiefdoms hampers revenue raising schemes, payroll processing, and distribution of funds.
Challenges Ahead
Some basic reforms are underway. Legislation has been established that will allow individual
government ministries to restructure. The Public Administration Reform Program provides a
framework to build a sound legal, administrative, and physical environment for efficient and
effective public service provision. Launched in July 2003, the Priority Reform and Restructuring
Program rationalizes the responsibilities of employees and labor market pay scales.
The Berlin document describes a decade-long plan to build a civil service that is better equipped,
skilled, and managed, while more representative of Afghan society. Ambitious targets include a
merit-based and transparent system of civil service appointments that will cover 90 percent of the
entire system by March 2015. Another goal is to increase the percentage of civil service staff based
outside Kabul (currently 63 percent) in order to decentralize and provide services to the provinces
and districts. 100 For its strategic vision of economic management, public administration, and
technical assistance, the Afghan government is requesting $201 million this year, and $1.1 billion
over a seven-year period. 101
Although a good start, there is more to be done.
First, the government must move more quickly to decentralize decision-making and service provision throughout the
country. The highly centralized nature of decision-making is problematic considering the security,
communications, and transportation problems in Afghanistan.
Second, timely and reliable payment of civil servants must become one of the first measures of government competence.
While acknowledged in the government’s strategy document, Kabul must prioritize the payment of
civil servants in Afghanistan’s provinces and districts. Currently, such payment occurs only after a
complex chain of events, including a series of requests from district finance ministries to provincial
finance ministries to provincial governors to the Ministry of Finance in Kabul. Payments are often
delayed due to security, transportation, and communications problems.
99 Amit A. Pandya, “Security, Reconstruction and Political Normalization in Afghanistan —Falling Short,” American
Progress, January 12, 2004,
(accessed January 15, 2004).
100 "Securing Afghanistan's Future.”
101 Ibid.

22 THE ROAD AHEAD
SECURITY
The NDF emphasizes the need to create a secure environment, to encourage private investment and
allow the rule of law to develop. But security has actually deteriorated since the beginning of the
reconstruction effort in December 2001, in particular over the summer and fall of 2003. 102
The security problems stem from at least three sources: a resurgence of Taliban and al-Qaeda
activity in southeastern Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan; a huge increase in poppy
production and trade; and the dearth of reconstruction progress throughout the country. The
continued existence and legitimacy of warlords throughout Afghanistan compounds all three of
these security problems.
The UN Security Coordinator has declared more than one-third of the country off-limits to UN
workers. 103 Refugee welcome centers in the most troubled regions of Afghanistan, in the south and
east, were closed in late 2003 after the murder of a young UNHCR staff member. 104 Daily incidents
continue: 20 wounded in a bomb explosion in Kandahar; two Indian workers kidnapped while
working on the Kabul-Kandahar highway; Afghan census-takers ambushed in Farah, resulting in one
death, and the list goes on. 105 In October 2003, it was estimated that there were fifteen attacks per
day on American soldiers. 106 In August 2003 alone, 90 Afghans were killed in violence attributed to
the increase in attacks by Taliban forces. 107
Increased narcotics production is also contributing to the worsening security situation.
It has been estimated that Afghanistan provides 76 percent of the world’s heroin. 108 Afghanistan
produced 18 times more poppy in 2002 than in the last year of the Taliban rule. 109 Worryingly,
Afghanistan has begun refining the poppy in country, making a large portion of the production
apparatus domestic. 110 In 2002, revenues from the drug trade were estimated to be worth $1.2
billion, equivalent to the total amount of international assistance in that year. 111
There is evidence that the Taliban continues to be funded through the drug trade. 112 As explained
by the U.S. government, “The drug trade funds terrorist activities, undermines central government
authority, and contributes to the instability that allows extremists elements inimical to the U.S. to
102 For more information on the security situation in Afghanistan, see “Building a New Afghanistan: The Value of
Success, the Cost of Failure,” New York University’s Center on International Cooperation report, March 25, 2004,
[hereinafter “CIC report”].
103 Mark Sedra, “Afghanistan in Search of Security,” Foreign Policy in Focus, October 2003,
(accessed October 8, 2003).
104 Victoria Burnett, “UN Agency Pulls out of Afghan Trouble Spots,” Financial Times, November 19, 2003, 7.
105 Pandya, “Security, Reconstruction and Political Normalization in Afghanistan—Falling Short;” CIC report.
106 Sedra, “Afghanistan in Search of Security.”
107 Maureen Hoch, “The Security Challenge,” PBS Online Newshour, August 2003,
(accessed October 8, 2003).
108 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Afghanistan Country Report,” August 2003.
109 “Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?” Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society, Chairman’s Report of
an Independent Task Force, June 2003 [hereinafter “Council on Foreign Relations report”].
110 Sedra, “Afghanistan in Search of Security.”
111 Lauren Brodsky, “Congressional Hearing Outlines Challenges to Afghan Reconstruction”, State Department news
item, June 23, 2003, (accessed
October 9, 2003).
112 Asa Hutchinson, “Narco -Terror: The International Connection Between Drugs and Terror,” speech given at the
Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., April 2, 2002.

THE ROAD AHEAD 23
operate.” 113 Yet failed attempts by the British to offer viable alternatives crops to poppy producers
only prove how difficult it is to combat this problem.
The international response on the security front includes: 13,800 U.S.-led coalition troops to root
out remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces; 114 an estimated 5,000 international troops as part of
NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is currently led by Canada; and the
rebuilding of Afghanistan’s army and police force. On October 14, 2003, the United Nations
Security Council decided to expand ISAF beyond Kabul. On March 11, 2004 a formal NATO plan
called for NATO to take responsibility for security in northern and western Afghanistan, soon to
expand to the entire country. 115
Seven Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) with 200 military and humanitarian personnel each
are currently operational in Afghanistan, and an additional ten will be deployed in 2004, to focus on
troubled areas in the southern and southeastern regions of the country. 116 These will represent the
main vehicle to bring NATO forces outside Kabul. The PRTs have been criticized as being too
slow to assert their security mission, 117 and NGOs have expressed concern that they blur the
distinction between enforcing security and delivering community assistance. The former Special
Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, welcomed the
work of the PRTs but noted that expanding ISAF would be more effective from a security
perspective. 118
Development of the local capacity in the security sector is progressing slowly. Approximately 6,000
of the target 70,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers have been trained by a mix of
international partners, including the United States, France, and others. 119 In 2003, the Afghan Police
Training facilities trained more than 2,000 policemen; increased funding should result in 20,000
more police officers being trained in 2004; and donors have set a goal of 50,000 police trained by
December 2005. With donor assistance, Afghanistan has also developed a nationwide
communications system for the police for the first time in its history. 120
Challenges Ahead
Ultimate success in terms of the goals laid out in the NDF and across all reconstruction activities
will depend upon a vastly improved security situation. The Afghan government estimates that it will
take three years for indigenous security forces to reach capacity. International forces will have to fill
the vacuum, and until now, their numbers have been far too thin. Without substantial international
113 “Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2005,”
(accessed February 11, 2003) [hereinafter “FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification”].
114 CIC report, 15.
115 Judy Dempsey, “NATO Ready to Take Wider Role in Afghanistan,” Financial Times, March 11, 2004, p.4.
116 Dempsey, “NATO Ready to Take Wider Role in Afghanistan;” General James Jones, “Afghan Stabilization and
Reconstruction,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 27, 2004.
117 “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security,” UN Security Council Report
of the Secretary-General, S/2003/1212, December 20, 2003.
118 Lakhdar Brahimi, UN Foundation Press Conference, January 27, 2004.
119 FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification.
120 Ibid.

24 THE ROAD AHEAD
support, the Afghan government has predicted that violence will resume, terrorist groups will once
again find a safe haven, and the country will descend into a narco-mafia state. 121
First, donors must make the necessary long-term commitment to rebuilding an effective Afghan security sector. The
Berlin document lays out a short, medium and long-term strategy to create a security sector under
the control of the civilian democratic leadership. The Afghan government estimates that over the
medium term, from the 2004-2005 budget year until the 2010-2011 budget year, a total of $645
million will be required for police and law enforcement, $1.77 billion for the Afghan National Army
(ANA), and $164 million for counter-narcotics operations. 122
Second, the international community should urgently move forward with the long overdue commitment to expand forces
outside Kabul. Expanding the number of PRTs will not in and of itself address Afghanistan’s security
problems.
Third, donors must better coordinate their security-related activities. Different donors are leading the various
security-related activities discussed above: the United States has taken the lead on the ANA,
Germany on the Afghan National Police, the United Kingdom on counter-narcotics, and Italy on
judicial reform. While this design was meant to ensure long-term engagement by a multitude of
countries, it has served in practice to create a disjointed and less effective security sector. Donors
must synchronize these efforts to ensure consistency of purpose and improve the overall results.
The Afghan government is calling for the creation of a Unified National Security Framework, which
would provide much-needed national ownership, guidance, and coordination.
Fourth, the international community should use diplomatic and other measures to discourage Afghanistan’s neighbors
from harboring spoilers and terrorists. The U.S. government should seek to reaffirm the non-interference
commitment made by all of Afghanistan’s neighbors in December 2002, something the Berlin
document notes. The signatories to that pledge agreed to not supply arms and military equipment,
and to respect the borders of Afghanistan (including the disputed Durand Line frontier with
Pakistan). 123
121 "Securing Afghanistan's Future."
122 Ibid.
123 Council on Foreign Relations report.

CONCLUSION
THE ROAD AHEAD 25
The sustainability of the National Development Framework is contingent upon long-term donor
commitment, in terms of increased resources, greater numbers and coverage of international security
forces, sustained diplomatic attention, and civilian reconstruction efforts. The Afghan government
and the international community have constructed an admirable plan that captures the near and midterm
needs of the Afghan people.
With NGOs, bilateral donors, international financial institutions, multilateral organizations, and
others all offering their input into the reconstruction and development process, it is vital that the
Afghan government be at the center of the coordination and delivery process, one important goal of
the NDF. The viability and self-sustainability of Afghanistan’s plans for its future will depend upon
the government playing that role. But this will only happen if donors sustain and enhance their
support for the government’s goals, as laid out in the NDF and the government’s submission for the
Berlin donor conference, “Securing Afghanistan’s Future.”
Reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan thus far do not provide much room for hope. Those efforts
have been plagued by woefully inadequate security measures and funding commitments from the
international community. Donors must reverse this trend, starting at the upcoming Berlin
conference. Without a dramatic increase in international focus and resources, Afghanistan could
deteriorate into that which the international community has been working to prevent—a failed state
serving as a breeding ground for terrorists and narco-traffickers.

26 THE ROAD AHEAD
APPENDIX A
ELECTIONS
On March 28, 2004, Interim President Hamid Karzai made a statement officially postponing
presidential elections until September 2004, such that they may be held around the same time as
parliamentary elections. This is several months later than the deadline established by the Bonn
Agreement, which dictated that elections were to be held no later than June 2004. As the newly
passed Afghan constitution supercedes all other laws and decrees (including the Bonn Agreement),
the postponement of elections was legal. 124 As outlined in the constitution, the president of the
transitional administration will continue to run Afghanistan until a new president is elected.
The postponement of elections provides a much-needed extended timeframe for election
preparations. The difficulties in registering voters (Afghans 18 years of age or older) abound. The
security situation remains dire; only 1.6 million out of the potential voting pool of 10.5 million
people have been registered, 125 and the budget for registration falls short by $8 million. 126 Diverse
ethnic backgrounds, cultures, and inhospitable geography make accessing voters a challenge; for
example, in the winter, 1.7 million eligible voters were accessible only by donkey, helicopter, or
plane. 127 Further, the security situation is such that one-third of the country is off-limits for UN and
other international workers. The government is unable to provide even minimal security for
elections, and international security forces in Afghanistan have not yet been mandated to monitor
elections. These hurdles, exacerbated by the lack of coordination and cooperation between the
various agencies involved in voter registration and the absence of a registration strategy, have led to
extreme difficulty in election preparations.
New estimates of costs associated with the September elections have not yet been released, but as
parliamentary elections will require a census and the demarcation of electoral districts, figures will
likely exceed the June estimates. For a presidential election in June, the registration process was
estimated to cost approximately $76 million, 128 and the election itself was expected to cost $130
million. 129
124 The Afghan Constitution was passed on January 4, 2004 and is available at
.
125 Glenn Kessler and Pamela Constable, “Afghan Elections Face Delay, Karzai Says,” The Washington Post , March 18,
2004, A28; “Press Briefing by Manoel de Almeida e Silva,” March 28, 2004,
(accessed March 28, 2004).
126 Remarks by Lakhdar Brahimi, at the Donor Meeting on Afghanistan, Dubai, UAE, September 21, 2003.
127 “Afghan elections: The Great Gamble,” Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Briefing Paper, November
2003, (accessed January 15, 2004).
128 Remarks by Lakhdar Brahimi, at the Donor Meeting on Afghanistan, Dubai, UAE, September 21, 2003.
129 “Afghan elections: The Great Gamble,” Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Briefing Paper, November
2003, (accessed January 15, 2004).

APPENDIX B
BONN AGREEMENT: CHECKLIST OF SELECTED PROVISIONS 130
THE ROAD AHEAD 27
Bonn Agreement Provision Accomplished Note
I-1.) Establish Interim Authority. Yes. On December 22, 2001 the internationally recognized
government of President Rabbani handed over power to the
Interim Afghan Administration, headed by Hamid Karzai, as
I-4.) Emergency Loya Jirga to be convened by end
June 2002 and to decide on the Transitional Authority.
I-4.) The Transitional Authority will govern until a
government can be elected by free and fair elections
no later than June 2004.
I-6.) A Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened by
December 2003.
I-6.) By August 2002 the Transitional Authority
should establish a Constitutional Commission to
prepare the Constitution to be proposed at the
established in the Bonn Agreement.
Yes. Met on time in June 2002. About 1,700 people representing
a cross-section of Afghan society met in Kabul to discuss the
future of Afghanistan.
Pending. Concern as to whether all necessary preparations can be
made for free and fair elections by June 2004.
Yes. The Constitutional Loya Jirga met December 14, 2003.
Originally it was scheduled to take place in October, but was
changed to December in order to allow for redrafting and an
extensive community consultation process.
Yes. The Constitutional Drafting Commission was inaugurated on
November 3, 2003. Vice-President Ustad Nimatollah
Shahroni is its chairman. Other Commission members
130 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, signed on December 5, 2001 in
Bonn, Germany, < http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/infoservice/download/pdf/friedenspolitik/afghanistan/agreement.pdf> (accessed October 29, 2003).
131 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Political Affairs,” (accessed
December 19, 2003).

28 THE ROAD AHEAD
Constitutional Loya Jirga. include legal scholars and jurists. Two are women. 131
II-2.) The Interim Administration shall establish a
Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic justice
system.
III-C-5.) The Interim Administration shall establish
an independent Civil Service Commission.
III-C-6.) The Interim Administration shall establish
an independent Human Rights Commission.
IV-1.) A Special Independent Commission for the
Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga shall be
established by the end of January 2002.
IV-3.) The Special Independent Commission shall
publish and disseminate the rules and procedures for
the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga at least ten
weeks before the Emergency Loya Jirga convenes.
Yes. On November 28, 2003 a new Judicial Commission was
inaugurated. The Commission includes two women. 132
Much time was lost with the previous Judicial Commission,
which was dismantled due to the fact that it was considered
insufficiently independent. 133
Yes. Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission was reconstituted by
decree in June 2002. Its first meeting did not take place until
April 29, 2003. The head of the Commission is Heyadat
Amin Arsala. 134
Yes. The Afghanistan Human Rights Commission (AHRC) was
established on June 6, 2002. Dr. Sima Samar was appointed
Yes.
director. 135
No. The rules of procedure were released only one day before the
Emergency Loya Jirga. This delay meant that organizers and
activists did not have an opportunity to learn and use the
rules. The first few days of the Loya Jirga lacked an agenda
and were considered chaotic. 136
132 “’Much to be Proud of’ in Afghanistan One Year after Bonn Agreement, but World Community Cannot Afford Complacency, Security Council Told,” UN press
release (SC/7599), December 13, 2003, < http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7599.doc.htm> (accessed January 12, 2004).
133 “Afghanistan Has Made Remarkable Progress, but Reconciliation, Continued International Attention Needed, Security Council Told,” UN press release (SC/7553),
October 30, 2003, < http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7553.doc.htm> (accessed January 12, 2004).
134 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) press briefing, May 1, 2003,
(accessed December 19, 2003).
135 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) press briefing, June 30, 2003,
(accessed December 19, 2003).
136 International Crisis Group, “The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and Perils,” July 30, 2002,
(accessed November 12, 2003).

IV-4.) The Special Independent Commission shall
adopt and implement procedures for monitoring the
process of nomination of individuals to the
Emergency Loya Jirga to ensure that the process of
indirect election or selection is transparent and fair.
V-1.) Upon the official transfer of power, all
mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in
Afghanistan shall come under the command of the
Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the
requirements of the new Afghan security and armed
forces.
137 International Crisis Group, “The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and Perils.”
THE ROAD AHEAD 29
No. In the days preceding the Emergency Loya Jirga, and in
direct violation of the procedures for the election of
members to the Emergency Loya Jirga, approximately 100
government officials and 32 provincial governors were added
to the list of participants. 137
No. Independent and private security forces continue to operate
outside the command of President Karzai’s government.

30 THE ROAD AHEAD
APPENDIX C
FUNDING CHARTS
REQUESTED EXTERNAL FUNDING ASSISTANCE AND FUNDS COMMITTED FOR 2002-03
(US$ MILLIONS)
Sub-sector 2002-03
Requested 138
2002-03
Committed
Education 250.000 70.173 28%
Health 172.495 130.779 76%
2002-03
Percentage
Committed
Transport 253.600 531.471 210%
Energy, Mining and
Telecommunications
162.360 68.029 42%
Public
Administration and
Economic
96.977 71.681 74%
Management 139
National Police and
Law Enforcement
98.410 13.820 14%
National Army 0.000 140 240.246 n/a
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED EXPENDITURES AND FINANCING FOR AFGHANISTAN
Dates 03/03-03/04 03/04-03/05 03/05-03/06 03/06-03/07
Expenditures in US $ Millions 141
Recurrent
550 602 753 940
Expenditures 142
Capital and Development
Budget 143
1,817 4,065 3,379 3,446
Total Expenditure 2,367 4,666 4,131 4,387
Financing in US $ Millions
Domestic Revenues 200 242 341 467
External Financing 2,167 4,424 3,790 3,919
Total Financing 2,367 4,666 4,131 4,387
• The Afghan government itself will only fund approximately eight percent of the total
expenditures over the next three years.
138 National Development Budget. This chart does not include “ordinary” (or recurrent) expenditures.
139 This includes technical assistance.
140 Support for the Afghan National Army is recorded outside the National Development Budget report.
141 Numbers for this chart taken from “Securing Afghanistan’s Future.”
142 Recurrent expenditures are wage expenditures and non-salary operations and maintenance.
143 The Capital and Development Budget covers the three pillars of the NDF.

THE ROAD AHEAD 31
• External financing will comprise 94 percent of the total financing in 2004-2005, and will drop
to 89% percent in 2006-2007.
• The recurrent costs of the government, largely representing wages, will nearly double over the
next three years as pay reform is implemented. The reform aims to create a more skilled,
motivated, and delivery-focused bureaucracy. It is expected that after 2007 the wage growth
will decline. 144
Physical Infrastructure and Natural Resources: 14,408
Transport and Telecommunications 7,485
Sectoral Component of the Development Budget
(USD Millions) (2004-2011)
Total Request: $27.6 Billion
57%
27%
16%
From the Afghan Government/International Agency Report, “Securing Afghanistan’s Future:
Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, Consultation Draft,” January 29, 2004.
144 “Securing Afghanistan’s Future.”
Human and Social Protection: 6,922
Refugee Return 155
Education 2,746
Health and Nutrition 1,350
Security and Private Investment: 4,117
Public Administration 960
Police and Law Enforcement 645
National Army 1,043

32 THE ROAD AHEAD
APPENDIX D
AFGHANISTAN’S INTERIM GOVERNMENT 145
President Hamid Karzai
Vice-president and Minister of Defense Mohammad Fahim Khan 146
Vice-president Mohammad Karim Khalili
Vice-president Hedayat Amin Arsala
Vice-president Nimatollah Shahroni
Deputy Security Advisor Rasool Amin
Advisor on Tribal Issues Taj Mohammad Wardak
Ministries
Minister of Agriculture Sayed Hussain Anwary
Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs Mohammad Aref Noorzai
(Ministry of Frontiers)
Minister of Air Transport and Tourism [unfilled] 147
Minister of Commerce Sayed Mustafa Kazemi
Minister of Communications Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai
Minister of Education Mohammad Yunos Qanuni
and Presidential Adviser on National Security
Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai
Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Abdullah
Minister of Hajj and Religious Affairs Mohammad Amin Naseryar
Minister of Higher Education Mohammad Sharif Fayez
Minister of Information and Culture Sayad Raheen Makhdoom
Minister of Interior Ahmad Ali Jalali
Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources S. Yosef Nooristani
Minister of Justice Abdul Rahim Karimi
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Noor M. Qirqeen
Minister of Mines and Industries To be determined
Minister of Martyrs and Disabled Abdullah Wardak
Minister for the Return of Refugees Innayatullah Nazari
Minister of Planning Ramazan Bashardoost
Minister of Public Health Dr. Suhaila Seddiqi
Minister of Public Works Abdullah Ali
Minister of Reconstruction Mohammad Amin Farhang
Minister of Rural Development M. Haneef Atmar
145 This list was current as of the date of publication.
146 Formerly the deputy to the late Ahmed Shad Masood, Khan was the military leader of Northern Alliance after
Masood was assassinated on Sept. 9, 2003. He operates in a semi-autonomous manner and has factional supporters
from Panjsher Valley. The Deputy Minister of Defense is Abdur Rasheed Dostum, who refuses to abandon his power
base in the north to come to Kabul to take up his post. See Rahimullah Ysufzai, “Karzai’s Government Reshuffle: Better
Late than Never,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, August 27, 2003,
(accessed December 2, 2003).
147 The previous minister, Mirwais Sadiq, was killed in factional clashes on March 21, 2004 while traveling in Herat
Province.

Minister of Transport Sayeed M Ali Jawid
Minister of Urban Development M. Yousuf Pashtoon
Minister of Water and Electricity Mohammad Shaker Kargar
Minister of Women’s Affairs Habiba Sarabi
Independent Bodies
Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA)
Central Statistics Office (including the Afghan Computer Center)
Geodesy and Cartography Office
National Security Agency
Narcotics Eradication Agency
Office of the Attorney General
Science Academy
National Olympics Committee
Repatriates Agency
Supreme Court Fazel Hadi Shinwari, (Chief Justice)
THE ROAD AHEAD 33
Oversight Commissions
Civil Service Commission
Human Rights Commission Sima Samar, (Head of Human Rights
Commission)

34 THE ROAD AHEAD
ABOUT THE PROJECT DIRECTORS
FREDERICK D. BARTON
Frederick Barton currently serves as a Senior Adviser in the International Security Program and Co-
Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at CSIS. Mr. Barton is also a visiting lecturer
at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, where he was previously the Frederick H.
Schultz Professor of Economic Policy. Prior to that, as UN Deputy High Commissioner for
Refugees in Geneva (1999-2001), Mr. Barton worked to protect and find durable solutions for 22
million uprooted people in 130 countries. He was the first director of the Office of Transition
Initiatives at the U.S. Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C. (1994-1999),
where he helped to start political development programs in over 20 war-torn regions, from the
Philippines to Rwanda, from Bosnia to Haiti. He was also president of Barton & Gingold in
Portland, Maine (1983-1994), providing services in strategic planning, marketing, crisis management,
and organizational development to commercial, governmental, and nonprofit clients. Mr. Barton
served Secretaries Joseph Califano and Patricia Roberts Harris (HEW and HHS, respectively) as
New England Director of Public Affairs in Boston (1978-1981). He has served as chairman of the
Maine Democratic Party and on the Democratic National Committee. A graduate of Harvard
College (1971), Mr. Barton earned his M.B.A. from Boston University (1982), with an emphasis on
public management, and received an honorary doctor of humane letters from Wheaton College of
Massachusetts (2001).
BATHSHEBA N. CROCKER
Bathsheba Crocker is a Fellow and Co-Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. From 2002-2003, she was
a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, working on post-conflict
reconstruction issues at CSIS. She has co-authored three CSIS reports on post-conflict
reconstruction in Iraq and was a member of a CSIS-led reconstruction assessment team that went to
Iraq in July 2003 at the request of the U.S. Department of Defense. She also co-authored Winning
the Peace in Iraq, which appeared in the Spring 2003 edition of The Washington Quarterly. She has
written chapters on post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo, Iraq, and Sierra Leone, which will
appear in a forthcoming book to be published in the spring of 2004. Ms. Crocker is also a visiting
professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Before joining
CSIS, Ms. Crocker worked as an attorney-adviser in the Legal Adviser’s Office at the U.S.
Department of State, where she focused on foreign assistance, appropriations law, and economic
sanctions issues. Prior to that, she served as the Deputy U.S. Special Representative for the
Southeast Europe Initiative in Rome, Italy, working on economic reconstruction in the Balkans. She
has previously served as the executive assistant to the Deputy National Security Advisor at the White
House. She received a B.A. from Stanford University, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a
Masters in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

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