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The e-Advocate<br />

Quarterly Magazine<br />

<strong>ReEngineering</strong><br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Proverbs 22:6 | Proverbs 13:20<br />

Psalm 1<br />

“Helping Individuals, Organizations & Communities<br />

Achieve Their Full Potential”<br />

Vol. XIII, Issue LVII – Q-1 January| February| March 2027


The Advocacy Foundation, Inc.<br />

Helping Individuals, Organizations & Communities<br />

Achieve Their Full Potential<br />

Since its founding in 2003, The Advocacy Foundation has become recognized as an effective<br />

provider of support to those who receive our services, having real impact within the communities<br />

we serve. We are currently engaged in many community and faith-based collaborative<br />

initiatives, having the overall objective of eradicating all forms of youth violence and correcting<br />

injustices everywhere. In carrying-out these initiatives, we have adopted the evidence-based<br />

strategic framework developed and implemented by the Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> &<br />

Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).<br />

The stated objectives are:<br />

1. Community Mobilization;<br />

2. Social Intervention;<br />

3. Provision of Opportunities;<br />

4. Organizational Change and Development;<br />

5. Suppression [of illegal activities].<br />

Moreover, it is our most fundamental belief that in order to be effective, prevention and<br />

intervention strategies must generally be Community Specific, Culturally Relevant, Evidence-<br />

Based, and Collaborative. The Violence Prevention and Intervention programming we employ<br />

in implementing this community-enhancing framework include the programs further described<br />

throughout our publications, programs and special projects both domestically and internationally.<br />

www.TheAdvocacyFoundation.org<br />

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......... Printed in the USA<br />

Advocacy Foundation Publishers<br />

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Dedication<br />

______<br />

Every publication in our many series‘ is dedicated to everyone, absolutely everyone, who by<br />

virtue of their calling, by Divine inspiration, direction and guidance, is on the battlefield dayafter-day<br />

striving to follow God‘s will and purpose for their lives. And this is with particular<br />

affinity for those Spiritual warriors who are being transformed into excellence through daily<br />

academic, professional, familial, and other challenges.<br />

We pray that you will bear in mind:<br />

Matthew 19:26 (NIV)<br />

Jesus looked at them and said, "With man this is impossible,<br />

but with God all things are possible." (Emphasis added)<br />

To all of us who daily look past our circumstances, and naysayers, to what the Lord says we will<br />

accomplish:<br />

Blessings!<br />

- The Advocacy Foundation, Inc.<br />

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The Advocacy Foundation, Inc.<br />

Helping Individuals, Organizations & Communities<br />

Achieve Their Full Potential<br />

The e-Advocate Quarterly<br />

<strong>ReEngineering</strong> <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

“Helping Individuals, Organizations & Communities<br />

Achieve Their Full Potential<br />

1735 Market Street, Suite 3750 | 100 Edgewood Avenue, Suite 1690<br />

Philadelphia, PA 19102 Atlanta, GA 30303<br />

John C Johnson III<br />

Founder & CEO<br />

(878) 222-0100<br />

Voice | Data | SMS<br />

www.TheAdvocacyFoundation.org<br />

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Biblical Authority<br />

______<br />

Proverbs 22:6 (NIV)<br />

6<br />

Start children off on the way they should go,<br />

and even when they are old they will not turn from it.<br />

______<br />

Proverbs 13:20 (NIV)<br />

20<br />

Walk with the wise and become wise,<br />

for a companion of fools suffers harm.<br />

______<br />

Psalm 1 (NIV)<br />

1<br />

Blessed is the one<br />

who does not walk in step with the wicked<br />

or stand in the way that sinners take<br />

or sit in the company of mockers,<br />

2<br />

but whose delight is in the law of the LORD,<br />

and who meditates on his law day and night.<br />

3<br />

That person is like a tree planted by streams of water,<br />

which yields its fruit in season<br />

and whose leaf does not wither—<br />

whatever they do prospers.<br />

4<br />

Not so the wicked!<br />

They are like chaff<br />

that the wind blows away.<br />

5<br />

Therefore the wicked will not stand in the judgment,<br />

nor sinners in the assembly of the righteous.<br />

6<br />

For the LORD watches over the way of the righteous,<br />

but the way of the wicked leads to destruction.<br />

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Table of Contents<br />

The e-Advocate Quarterly<br />

<strong>ReEngineering</strong> <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

I. Introduction<br />

Biblical Authority<br />

II.<br />

III.<br />

IV.<br />

The <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Problem in America<br />

The Cost to Taxpayers for <strong>Juvenile</strong> Confinement<br />

The Return on Investment for Youth Programming<br />

V. Risk Factors That Lead To Delinquency<br />

VI.<br />

Protective Factors That Guard Against Delinquency<br />

VII. The Multidisciplinary Approach to <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

VIII. Restorative <strong>Justice</strong><br />

IX.<br />

Youth Court<br />

X. References<br />

Attachments<br />

A. The History of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> In America<br />

B. A <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System for the 21st Century<br />

C. The Cost of <strong>Juvenile</strong> Confinement<br />

D. Cost-Benefit Analysis for <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Programming<br />

Copyright © 2015 The Advocacy Foundation, Inc. All Rights Reserved.<br />

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Introduction<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency refers to criminal acts<br />

committed by children or teenagers,<br />

specifically anyone below the age of<br />

eighteen. Common sentiment on this issue is<br />

that the crimes they commit hurt society and<br />

hurt the children themselves. Much research<br />

and debate revolves around the problem of<br />

juvenile delinquency in the US. The research<br />

is mainly focused on the causes of juvenile<br />

delinquency and which strategies have<br />

successfully diminished crime rates among<br />

the youth population. Though the causes are<br />

debated and controversial as well, much of<br />

the debate revolves around the punishment<br />

and rehabilitation of juveniles in a youth<br />

detention center or elsewhere.<br />

______<br />

The American <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System is the primary system used to address and deal with<br />

youth who are caught and convicted of crimes. The juvenile justice system intervenes in<br />

delinquent behavior through police, court and correctional involvement, and is largely punitive.<br />

Youth and their parents or guardians can face a variety of consequences including Probation,<br />

Community Service, Youth Court, Youth Incarceration and alternative schooling. The juvenile<br />

justice system, similar to the adult system, operates from a belief that intervening early in<br />

delinquent behavior will deter adolescents from engaging in criminal behavior as adults,<br />

however critics often point to research indicating that it is the certainty of a punishment that<br />

results in deterrence, not the severity of it.<br />

Pre-1900<br />

History and Background<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> delinquency punishments trace back to the Middle Ages when crimes were severely<br />

punished by the Church. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, few legal differences existed<br />

between children and adults. Children as young as six and seven years were considered<br />

productive members of the family and their labor contributed to family income. In court, children<br />

as young as seven were treated as adults and could receive the death penalty. Early debates<br />

questioned whether there should be a separate legal system for punishing juveniles, or if<br />

juveniles should be sentenced in the same manner as adults<br />

With the changing demographic, social and economic context of the 19th century resulting<br />

largely from industrialization, ―the social construction of childhood...as a period of dependency<br />

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and exclusion from the adult world‖ was institutionalized. This century saw the opening of the<br />

first programs targeting juvenile delinquency. Barry Krisberg and James F. Austin note that the<br />

first ever institution dedicated to juvenile delinquency was the New York House of Refuge in<br />

1825. Other programs, described by Finley, included: ―houses of refuge‖, which emphasized<br />

moral rehabilitation; ―reform schools‖, which had widespread reputations for mistreatment of the<br />

children living there; and ―child saving organizations‖, social charity agencies dedicated to<br />

reforming poor and delinquent children. These ‗child-saving efforts‘ were early attempts at<br />

differentiating between delinquents and abandoned youth.<br />

Prior to this ideological shift, the application of parens patrea was restricted to protecting the<br />

interests of children, deciding guardianship and commitment of the mentally ill. In the 1839<br />

landmark case Ex parte Crouse, the court allowed use of parens patrea to detain young people for<br />

non-criminal acts in the name of rehabilitation. Since these decisions were carried out ―in the<br />

best interest of the child,‖ the due process protections afforded adult criminals were not extended<br />

to juveniles.<br />

Early 1900s<br />

The nation's first juvenile court formed in Illinois in 1899 and provided a legal distinction<br />

between juvenile abandonment and crime. Establishing a juvenile court helped reframe cultural<br />

and legal interpretations of ―the best interests of the child.‖ ―The underlying assumption of the<br />

original juvenile system, and one that continues to prevail, was that juveniles were generally<br />

more amenable to rehabilitation than adult criminals. This new application of Parens Patrea<br />

and the development of a separate juvenile court formed the foundation for the modern juvenile<br />

justice system.<br />

1960s-1980s<br />

Debate about morality and effectiveness surrounded juvenile courts until the 1950s. The 1960s<br />

through the 1980s saw a rise in attention to and speculation about juvenile delinquency, as well<br />

as concern about the court system as a social issue. This era was characterized by distinctly harsh<br />

punishments for youths. There was also a new focus on providing minors with due process and<br />

legal counsel in court. Criticism in this era focused on racial discrimination, gender disparities,<br />

and discrimination towards children with mental health problems or learning disabilities. While<br />

still recommending harsher punishments for serious crimes, ―community-based programs,<br />

diversion, and deinstitutionalization became the banners of juvenile justice policy in the 1970‘s‖.<br />

However, these alternative approaches were short lived. The rising crime rates of the 1960s and<br />

media misrepresentation of this crime throughout the 1970s and 80s, paved the way for Reagan‘s<br />

War on Drugs and subsequent ―tough-on-crime‖ policies. Heightened fears of a ‗youth problem‘<br />

―revealed white, middle- and upper-class anxieties about growing social unrest and the potential<br />

volatility stemming from social and economic inequality‖. Public perception of juvenile deviance<br />

was such that at the 1999 <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Hearings, Bill McCollum claimed ―simply and sadly<br />

put: Today in America no population poses a larger threat to public safety than juvenile<br />

offenders‖. In the late 1980s, the United States experienced a large increase in crime, and<br />

juvenile crime was brought into public view (<strong>Juvenile</strong> delinquency in the United States).<br />

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Americans feared a "juvenile super-predator", and this fear was met by the government with<br />

harsher policies for juvenile crime.<br />

1990s-Present-Day<br />

In the 1990s, juvenile crime – especially violent crime – decreased, although policies remained<br />

the same. Schools and politicians adopted zero tolerance policies with regard to crime, and<br />

argued that rehabilitative approaches were less effective than strict punishment. The increased<br />

ease in trying juveniles as adults became a defining feature of ―tough-on-crime‖ policies in the<br />

1990s.<br />

As Loyola law professor Sacha Coupet argues,<br />

―[o]ne way in which "get tough" advocates have<br />

supported a merger between the adult criminal and<br />

juvenile systems is by expanding the scope of<br />

transfer provisions or waivers that bring children<br />

under the jurisdiction of the adult criminal system‖.<br />

Some states moved specific classes of crimes from<br />

the juvenile court to adult criminal court while<br />

others gave this power to judges or prosecutors on a<br />

case-by-case basis. Still others require the courts to<br />

treat offending youth like adults, but within the<br />

juvenile system. In some states, adjudicated<br />

offenders face mandatory sentences. By 1997, all<br />

but three states had passed a combination of laws<br />

that eased use of transfer provisions, provided<br />

courts with expanded sentencing options and<br />

removed the confidentiality tradition of the juvenile<br />

court. <strong>Juvenile</strong> courts were transformed to more<br />

easily allow for prosecution of juveniles adults at<br />

the same time the adult system was re-defining<br />

which acts constituted a ―serious crime.‖ The ―three strikes laws‖ that began in 1993<br />

fundamentally altered the criminal offenses that resulted in detention, imprisonment and even a<br />

life sentence, for both youth and adults. ―Three strikes laws‖ were not specific to juvenile<br />

offenders, but they were enacted during a period when the lines between juvenile and adult court<br />

were becoming increasingly blurred. The War on Drugs and ―tough-on-crime‖ policies like<br />

Three Strikes resulted in an explosion in the number of incarcerated individuals.<br />

Implementation of the Gun Free School Act (GFSA) in 1994 is one example of a "tough on<br />

crime" policy that has contributed to increased numbers of young people being arrested and<br />

detained. It was intended to prosecute young offenders for serious crimes like gun possession on<br />

school property, but many states interpreted this law to include less dangerous weapons and drug<br />

possession. Many schools even interpreted GFSA to include ―infractions that pose no safety<br />

concern, such as ‗disobeying [school] rules, ‗insubordination,‘ and ‗disruption‖. These offenses<br />

can now warrant suspension, expulsion and involvement with juvenile justice courts. Schools<br />

have become the primary stage for juvenile arrest and the charges brought against them and<br />

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punishments they face are increasing in severity. Today this is frequently referred to as the<br />

School to prison pipeline.<br />

Demographics<br />

Demographic information for youth involved in the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> system is somewhat difficult<br />

to collect, as most data is collected at state, county, and city levels. Although the office of<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention publishes national numbers that breakdown the<br />

racial make-up of youth involved in the juvenile justice system, this data provides an incomplete<br />

picture, as it excludes Hispanic youth in its demographic calculations.<br />

A demographic breakdown of youth in the United States.<br />

According to the Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency<br />

Prevention, in 2011 there were a total of 1,236,200 cases<br />

handled by the juvenile courts. 891,100 cases dealt with<br />

males, compared with 345,100 for females. The most<br />

prominent age group represented in the courts is 13 to 15<br />

years, which make up 552,000 of the total cases. 410,900 of<br />

the cases involved Black adolescents, which represents about one-third of the total court cases.<br />

The number of cases handled by the juvenile courts in the United States was 1,159,000 in 1985,<br />

and increased steadily until 1998, reaching a high point of 1,872,700. After this point, the<br />

number of cases steadily declined until 2011.<br />

A demographic breakdown of youth involved<br />

in juvenile court in the United States.<br />

In the 1,236,200 cases settled in 2011, 60% of the juveniles<br />

had a previous background of criminal history in their<br />

families and 96% of the juveniles had substance abuse<br />

problems, often related to parental/guardian substance<br />

abuse. In 1999, juveniles accounted for 16% of all violent crime arrests, and 32% of all property<br />

crime. They also accounted for 54% of all arson arrests, 42% of vandalism arrests, 31% of<br />

larceny-theft arrests, and 33% of burglary arrests.<br />

Racial Discrepancies<br />

Since 1995, the rate of confinement has dropped by 41%, and the rate has decreased among all<br />

major racial groups in the US. However, disparities by race remain apparent: in 2010, 225 youths<br />

per 100,000 were in confinement. When separated by race, there were 605 African-Americans,<br />

127 Non-Hispanic Whites, 229 Hispanics, 367 Native Americans, and 47 Asian/Pacific Islanders<br />

in confinement per 100,000. African-Americans are close to five times more likely to be<br />

confined than white youths, while Latino and Native Americans are two to three times more<br />

Page 15 of 113


likely to be confined than white youths. Racial disparities in confinement are relatively constant<br />

across states.<br />

According to the Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention, females constitute 14%<br />

of juveniles in residential placement in 2011. Of these females, 61% belong to racial minority<br />

groups.<br />

The Annie E. Casey Foundation provides additional information about the demographics of the<br />

juvenile justice system.<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong>s in Residential Placement<br />

Residential placement refers to any facility in which an adolescent remains on-site 24 hours a<br />

day. These facilities include detention centers, group homes, shelters, correctional facilities, or<br />

reform schools. According to census data of <strong>Juvenile</strong>s in residential placement and the Annie E.<br />

Casey Foundation, the number of youths in juvenile detention centers in the United States has<br />

declined in the past two decades. The number of adolescents incarcerated peaked in 1995, with<br />

107,637 in confinement in a single day. In contrast, there were fewer than 62,000 adolescents in<br />

residential placement in October 2011. <strong>Juvenile</strong> offenders are placed either in public facilities<br />

operated by the State or local government, or private, for-profit facilities operated by separate<br />

corporations and organizations. Private facilities are smaller than public facilities. Half of all<br />

juvenile placement facilities in the US are privately operated, and these facilities hold nearly<br />

one-third of juvenile offenders.<br />

Since 1997, 44 states and the District of Columbia have experienced a decrease in incarceration<br />

of adolescents. As of 2010, only 1 in 4 juveniles in confinement were incarcerated as a result of a<br />

violent crime (homicide, robbery, sexual assault, aggravated assault). Additionally, 40% of<br />

juvenile delinquency cases and detentions are a result of offenses that are not considered threats<br />

to public safety. These include underage possession of alcohol, truancy, drug possession, lowlevel<br />

property offenses, and probation violations. The most common age of offenders was 17<br />

years old, with 17,500 in placement in 2011. <strong>Juvenile</strong>s aged 12 and under accounted for 1% of<br />

all youth in placement.<br />

Criticisms<br />

The current debate on juvenile justice reform in the United States focuses on the root of racial<br />

and economic discrepancies in the incarcerated youth population. The school to prison pipeline<br />

has been described as one mechanism that targets young people in schools and funnels them into<br />

the juvenile justice system. Zero tolerance policies in schools have increased the numbers of<br />

young people facing detention. Low-income youth, youth of color and youth with learning and<br />

cognitive disabilities are over-represented in the justice system and disproportionately targeted<br />

by zero tolerance policies.<br />

Much of the criticism about the American juvenile justice system revolves around its<br />

effectiveness in rehabilitating juvenile delinquents. Research on juvenile incarceration and<br />

prosecution indicates that criminal activity is influenced by positive and negative life transitions<br />

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egarding the completion of education, entering the workforce, and marrying and beginning<br />

families. According to certain developmental theories, adolescents who are involved in the court<br />

system are more likely to experience disruption in their life transitions, leading them to engage in<br />

delinquent behavior as adults.<br />

Lois M. Davis et al. argue that adolescents are affected by a juvenile system that does not have<br />

effective public policies. Currently the juvenile system has failed to ensure that all youth in the<br />

system with learning disabilities or mental health issues, and from lower-class individuals and<br />

racial minorities are provided with the benefits for a productive life once out of the system. In<br />

2013 30% of youth in system have a learning disability and nearly 50% test below grade level.<br />

They argue that the juvenile justice system should be restructured to more effectively lower the<br />

chances of future crime among youth, and advocate for increased educational programs for<br />

incarcerated youth as the most important method to reduce recidivism.<br />

Proposed Reforms<br />

Many scholars stress the importance of reforming the juvenile justice system to increase its<br />

effectiveness and avoid discrimination. Finley argues for early intervention in juvenile<br />

delinquency, and advocates for the development of programs that are more centered on<br />

rehabilitation rather than punishment. James C. Howell et al. argue that zero tolerance policies<br />

overwhelm the juvenile justice system with low risk offenders and should be eliminated. They<br />

also argue that the most effective ways to reform the juvenile justice system would be to reduce<br />

the overrepresentation of minorites and eliminate the transfer of juveniles to the criminal justice<br />

system. Zimring and Tannenhaus also discuss the future of the juvenile justice system in the<br />

United States. They argue that educational reentry programs should be developed and given high<br />

importance alongside policies of dropout prevention. Reentry programs focus on providing care<br />

and support to juveniles after being released from detention facilities, and encouraging family<br />

support to help adolescents during this adjustment period. They also argue for the elimination of<br />

juvenile sex offender registration requirements, and the reform of criminal record information for<br />

juvenile offenders.<br />

Some popular suggested reforms to juvenile detention programs include changing policies<br />

regarding incarceration and funding. One recommendation from the Annie E. Casey Foundation<br />

is restricting the offenses that are punishable by incarceration, so that only youth who present a<br />

threat to public safety are confined. Other suggestions include investing in alternatives to<br />

incarceration, changing economic incentives that favor incarceration, and establishing smaller,<br />

more humane and treatment-oriented detention centers for the small number who are confined.<br />

Positive Youth Development and the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System<br />

Positive Youth Development (PYD) encompasses the intentional efforts of other youth, adults,<br />

communities, government agencies and schools to provide opportunities for youth to enhance<br />

their interests, skills, and abilities.<br />

The justice system offers specific services to youth facing significant mental health and<br />

substance use challenges, but the majority of youth do not qualify for these targeted programs<br />

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and interventions. Butts, et. al suggest that the integration of positive youth development into the<br />

juvenile justice system would benefit youth charged with nonviolent, less serious offenses.<br />

Widespread implementation of PYD approaches in the juvenile justice system faces many<br />

challenges. Philosophically however, the PYD framework resembles the progressive era ideals<br />

that informed the creation of the first juvenile court. As Butts, Mayer and Ruther describe, "The<br />

concepts underlying PYD resemble those that led to the founding of the american juvenile justice<br />

system more than a century ago. [...] Organizers of the first juvenile courts saw the solution to<br />

delinquency in better schools, community organizations, public health measures, and family<br />

supports. They believed an improved social environmental would encourage youth to embrace<br />

pro-social norms."<br />

Integration of PYD into the juvenile justice system is informed by Social learning theory and<br />

Social control theory. Taken together, these theories suggest that ―youth are less attracted to<br />

criminal behavior when they are involved with others, learning useful skills, being rewarded for<br />

using those skills, enjoying strong relationships and forming attachments, and earning the respect<br />

of their communities‖. This is in stark contrast to the theories of Deterrence and Retributive<br />

justice espoused by the current justice system.<br />

Youth Court<br />

Youth Courts are programs in which youth sentence their peers for minor delinquent and status<br />

offenses and other problem behaviors. The program philosophy is to hold youth responsible for<br />

problem behavior, educate youth about the legal and judicial systems, and empower youth to be<br />

active in solving problems in their community. Youth courts function to determine fair and<br />

restorative sentences or dispositions for the youth respondent. Youth court programs can be<br />

administered by juvenile courts, juvenile probation departments, law enforcement, private<br />

nonprofit organizations, and schools. Youth court programs operate under four primary models:<br />

Adult Judge, Youth Judge, Peer Jury, and Youth Tribunal Models. Under the adult judge<br />

model, an adult volunteer serves as the judge while youth volunteers serve as prosecuting and<br />

defense attorneys, jurors, clerks, and bailiffs. Under the youth judge model, youth volunteers fill<br />

all roles, including judge. Under a peer jury model, youth jurors question the respondents and<br />

make sentencing determinations. Under a youth tribunal model, youth serve as prosecuting and<br />

defense attorneys, and present their cases to a panel of youth judges, who then make a sentencing<br />

Page 18 of 113


determination. To date, there are no comprehensive national guidelines for youth courts, but<br />

rather, courts operate under and are tailored to their local jurisdictions. To date, there are more<br />

than 675 youth courts in the United States.<br />

East Palo Alto, CA and Boston, MA have implemented youth courts. The East Palo Alto, CA<br />

youth court is based on restorative justice principles. Eligible youth must must admit the facts of<br />

the case, after which youth attorneys explain the facts of the case to a youth jury. In Boston, MA,<br />

youth court is available to first time, low level offenders. It is based on a restorative justice<br />

framework.<br />

Restorative <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Restorative justice is an approach to justice that focuses on the needs of the victims and the<br />

offenders, and the involved community, rather than punishing the offender. Victims and<br />

offenders both take an active role in the process, with the latter being encouraged to take<br />

responsibility for their actions. Doing so is an attempt by offenders to repair the harm they've<br />

done and also provides help for the offender in order to prevent future offenses. Restorative<br />

justice is based on a theory of justice that views crime to be an offense against an individual<br />

and/or a community, versus the state. Programs that promote dialogue between victim and<br />

offender demonstrate the highest rates of victim satisfaction and offender accountability.<br />

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The <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Problem<br />

in America<br />

There are many factors that cause juvenile<br />

delinquency. Sometimes children want to test<br />

their parents' limits, or society's limits. Some<br />

people believe that imposing strict laws such as<br />

curfews will cause a drop in juvenile<br />

delinquency rates, but sometimes imposing<br />

strict rules merely give the children more of an<br />

incentive to break them. However, sometimes<br />

juvenile crimes do in fact occur due to the exact<br />

opposite reason, that is, a lack of rules and<br />

supervision. One example of this is that children<br />

many times commit crimes after school and<br />

while their parents are at work or preoccupied.<br />

Statistics that are mentioned below explain the peak hours of juvenile crime rates and<br />

conceptualize this very cause. Additionally, mental illness and substance abuse are large<br />

contributing factors. 15-20% of juveniles convicted of crimes have serious mental illnesses, and<br />

the percentages increase to 30-90% of convicted juveniles when the scope of mental illnesses<br />

considered widens. Also, many people believe that a child's environment and family are greatly<br />

related to their juvenile delinquency record. For example, the dynamics of a family can affect a<br />

child‘s well being and delinquency rate.<br />

Crime rates vary due to the living situations of children; examples of this could be a child whose<br />

parents are together, divorced, or a child with only one parents, particularly a teen mom. This is<br />

largely due to the fact that living arrangements are directly related to increases and decreases of<br />

poverty levels. Poverty level is another factor that is related to the chances a child has of<br />

becoming a juvenile delinquent. Statistics on living arrangements, poverty level and other<br />

influential factors can be found in a later section. Others believe that the environment and<br />

external factors are not at play when it comes to crime; they suggest that criminals are faced with<br />

rational choice decisions in which they chose to follow the irrational path. Finally, another cause<br />

could be the relationships a child develops in school or outside of school. A positive or negative<br />

friendship can have a great influence on the chances of children becoming delinquents. Peer<br />

pressure is also at play. Relationships and friendships can lead to gangs, which are major<br />

contributors of violent crimes among teens. These are just some of the causes of juvenile<br />

delinquency.<br />

Demographics<br />

Recent Statistics<br />

There are roughly 75 million juveniles in The United States as of 2013. That is, one in four<br />

Americans have the potential of being labeled as juvenile delinquents (because they are<br />

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considered juveniles). More specifically, in 2009 there were 74.5 million juveniles in the US,<br />

which was 2 million more than in the year 2007 which was 72.5 million due to sexual child<br />

abuse. The population of juveniles in the US is projected to increase until 2015, at least. In fact,<br />

the Federal Interagency on Child and Family Statistics reported that the number of juveniles<br />

might reach 101.6 million by 2050. If the juveniles delinquency rates were to increase with the<br />

population, or even plateau, this would translate into thousands of more juvenile delinquents.<br />

Also in 2009, the three different classifications of age groups among children, being 0-5, 6-11<br />

and 12-17, were roughly equal. As reported in 2009 by the Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and<br />

Delinquency Prevention, 57% percent of all juveniles are White, 10% Black, 1% American<br />

Indian, 5% Asian, and 22% Hispanic. Poverty, which is also directly connected to a child's<br />

chances of becoming a juvenile delinquent, varies by numerous factors. The poverty level of a<br />

child can vary by race and living arrangement (and other factors which are not mentioned here).<br />

For instance, in 2009, Black and Hispanic children were about three times more likely than<br />

White children of being poor. Additionally, in 2010, 21% of all children were living in poverty.<br />

13% of these poverty stricken children lived in a two parent household, 40% lived with one<br />

single parent, 43% lived with just a mother figure, 22% lived with just a father figure, and 43%<br />

of the poverty-stricken children lived with no parents at all. These statistics show that poverty<br />

levels increase as the child lives with fewer parental figures. The demographic statistics<br />

mentioned above pertain specifically to juveniles, which in turn, is closely related to juvenile<br />

delinquency. Many of the demographics mentioned above change on state level; to look up statespecific<br />

juvenile delinquency rates in general, or by race/poverty level/living arrangement, visit<br />

the Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> and Delinquency Prevention website.<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency Statistnd Delinquency Prevention, the juvenile violent crime rate index<br />

dropped for the second consecutive year in 2010, and is now 5% lower that it was in 2006.<br />

Additionally, the Children's Defense Fund communicates that boys are five times more likely<br />

than girls to become juvenile delinquents (this statistic is further explained below). Also on the<br />

Children Defense Fund website are statistics pertaining to Black and Latino boys and their<br />

juvenile delinquency rates.<br />

1 of Every 3 Black Boys Is At Risk Of Incarceration,<br />

As Well As 1 of Every 6 Latino Boys.<br />

Traveling back to the statistics provided by the OJJDP, their website also says that in 2008,<br />

juveniles were the offenders in 908 cases of murder, which constitutes 9% of all murders<br />

committed that year. Also related to homicides, in the 1980s 25% of the murders that involved<br />

juvenile delinquents as the offenders also involved an adult offender. This percentage rose to<br />

31% in the 90's, and averaged at 37% between 2000 and 2008. The time of day juvenile<br />

delinquents commit their crimes is the times they are not in school. On average, juvenile crimes<br />

begin occurring most frequently after the school is let out, peaking from 7 pm to 9pm (usually<br />

night time), after dark. Violent juvenile crimes involving a firearm follow the same peak a little<br />

later, from 8pm to 10pm. According to the OJJDP, the time of day that a crime occurs does not<br />

differ greatly on a non-school day (for example, if the children have a day off school, the crimes<br />

will not occur any earlier). This could be related to the fact that many of the days that children<br />

are out of school are national holidays, so their parents or parent might be home from work and<br />

supervising them. This is assuming that their parents are employed and that all children are in<br />

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school and never skip school, which is in fact not true. For more statistics, please visit the OJJDP<br />

website.<br />

The Male Phenomenon<br />

The male phenomenon refers to the fact that a large majority of juvenile delinquents are men, or<br />

boys. In the United States, boys are five times more likely than girls to become juvenile<br />

delinquents.<br />

Moreover, there are many suggested explanations as to why it is that boys commit more crimes<br />

than girls. One comes from theorists who believe men and boys are naturally more aggressive<br />

than women and girls. Another theory communicates the idea that men and boys commit more<br />

crimes because of societal pressures to be masculine and aggressive. A third theory suggests that<br />

the manner in which boys are treated by their families calls for more criminal action. The crime<br />

rates vary across boys of different races. They are mentioned in the 'juvenile delinquency<br />

statistics' section above, as well as in the 'cradle to prison pipeline' section below, but to<br />

review,African-American boys are more likely to become juvenile delinquents than White and<br />

Latino boys. Latino boys are more likely to become juvenile delinquents than White boys are.<br />

One clear way to explain this difference in crime rates among different races of boys is by<br />

looking at their poverty rates.<br />

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Changes in Statistics<br />

Changes in these statistics can be attributed to many fluctuations. Negative changes in the<br />

economy greatly affect all crime rates because people are more likely to find themselves in<br />

pressing situation like unemployment. Changes in population affect juvenile delinquency rates as<br />

well because changes in population translate into more or less juveniles. Shifts in population<br />

could also mean more general societal shift, like a wave of immigration. An influx of new people<br />

who are unfamiliar with the legal system could negative affect the juvenile crime rates. Other<br />

social changes, such as educational or health reforms, could have a large impact on juvenile<br />

crime rates if they create a larger population of at-risk children.<br />

Cradle to Prison Pipeline<br />

This term refers to the population of boys and girls who live in conditions that cause them to be<br />

channeled into prison from birth. The pipeline suggests that there are factors such as a lack of<br />

parental supervision, poverty, and a lack of education that makes these people helpless and<br />

unable to change their situations. Though this idea might not be appealing to the those that<br />

believe crime is solely the failure of a rational choice decision, this phenomenon has caught the<br />

attention of many Americans. This pipeline, so to speak, disproportionately affects minority<br />

children living in under-served community, such as Blacks and Latinos.<br />

According to the Children's Defense Fund, 1 out of every 3 Black boys and 1 out of every 3<br />

Hispanic boys are at risk of becoming delinquents in their lifetime, and therefore at risk of being<br />

sucked into this pipeline in which prison is the only option at the end of the tunnel. Of course<br />

some people that are affected by the pipeline commit crimes and are imprisoned when they are<br />

older, say 20. However, if the delinquency cause by the pipeline were to occur before the age of<br />

eighteen, the boy/girls would then become juvenile delinquents.<br />

Keeping in mind the existence of the male phenomenon, one can safely say that the pipeline<br />

affects more boys than girls. The Children's Defense Fund has created a campaign to try to halt<br />

the spread of this phenomenon that is ruining the lives of so many poverty-stricken families and<br />

minorities. The campaign is called the 'Cradle to Prison Pipeline Campaign' and was launched in<br />

2008 in Washington DC, at Howard University. Howard University is a historically black<br />

university.<br />

The campaign argues that the US government spends more money on incarcerated people than<br />

on each child in the public school system. Their vision is that if this budgeting were reversed, the<br />

number of juvenile delinquents would greatly decrease. The ultimate goal of this campaign is to<br />

increase support for preventive measures and resources that children need to stay on the right<br />

path. Some of the programs this campaign includes increasing early childhood education and<br />

guidance, as well as increasing health and mental health coverage and counseling. To date, many<br />

states have responded to this campaign by forming coalitions and holding conventions in which<br />

they formulate ideas and tactics to dismantle the pipeline.<br />

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<strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency and the Law<br />

Below is very valuable information on legal changes that have been made in regards to juvenile<br />

delinquents and juvenile delinquency. For a more thorough and detailed outline of juvenile<br />

delinquency law in the United States, please see this link.<br />

The United States federal<br />

government enacted legislation to<br />

unify the handling of juvenile<br />

delinquents, the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and<br />

Delinquency Act of 1974. The act<br />

created the Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

and Delinquency Prevention<br />

(OJJDP) within the <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Department to administer grants for<br />

juvenile crime-combating programs<br />

(currently only about 900,000<br />

dollars a year), gather national<br />

statistics on juvenile crime, fund<br />

research on youth crime and<br />

administer four anticonfinement<br />

mandates regarding juvenile<br />

custody. Specifically, the act orders:<br />

<br />

Deinstitutionalization:<br />

Youths charged with "status"<br />

offenses that would not be<br />

crimes if committed by<br />

adults, such as truancy,<br />

running away and being<br />

caught with alcohol or<br />

tobacco, must be<br />

"deinstitutionalized," which<br />

in this case really means that, with certain exceptions (e.g., minor in possession of a<br />

handgun), status offenders may not be detained by police or confined. Alleged problems<br />

with this mandate are that it overrides state and local law, limits the discretion of law<br />

enforcement officers and prevents the authorities' ability to reunify an offender with his<br />

family.<br />

Segregation: Arrested youths must be strictly segregated from adults in custody. Under<br />

this "out of sight and sound" mandate, juveniles cannot be served food by anyone who<br />

serves jailed adults nor can a juvenile walk down a corridor past a room where an adult is<br />

being interrogated. This requirement forces local authorities to either free juveniles or<br />

maintain expensive duplicate facilities and personnel. Small cities, towns and rural areas<br />

are especially hard hit, drastically raising those taxpayers' criminal justice costs.<br />

Supporters of the system point to lower sexual assault rates when adults and children are<br />

separated.<br />

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Jail and Lockup Removal: As a general rule, youths subject to the original jurisdiction of<br />

juvenile courts cannot be held in jails and lockups in which adults may be detained. The<br />

act provides for a six-hour exception for identification, processing, interrogation and<br />

transfer to juvenile facilities, court or detention pending release to parents. The act also<br />

provides an exception of 24 hours for rural areas only.<br />

Over representation of minority youths: States must systematically try to reduce<br />

confinement of minority youths to the proportion of those groups in the population.<br />

One of the most notable causes of juvenile delinquency is fiat, i.e. the declaration that a juvenile<br />

is delinquent by the juvenile court system without any trial, and upon finding only probable<br />

cause. Many states have laws that presuppose the less harsh treatment of juvenile delinquents<br />

than adult counterparts‘ treatment. In return, the juvenile surrenders certain constitutional rights,<br />

such as a right to trial by jury, the right to cross-examine, and even the right to a speedy trial.<br />

Notable writings by reformers such as Jerome G. Miller show that very few juvenile delinquents<br />

actually broke any law. Most were simply rounded up by the police after some event that<br />

possibly involved criminal action. They were brought before juvenile court judges who made<br />

findings of delinquency, simply because the police action established probable cause.<br />

In 1967, the United States Supreme Court decided the case In re Gault, that established the<br />

protection of many, but not all, procedural rights of juveniles in court proceedings, such as the<br />

right to counsel and right to refuse self-incrimination.<br />

Preventing <strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency<br />

An effective way of preventing juvenile delinquency and keeping at-risk children away from<br />

crime is to tackle the problem before it happens. This entails looking at the causes of crime<br />

among teens and making an effort to reduce or eliminate said causes. Some causes, though hard<br />

to eliminate, seem plausible. An example of this is improving the environment at home, through<br />

employment opportunities for the parents, educational opportunities for the children, and<br />

counseling and rehabilitation services if need be. These changes would not only promote a more<br />

positive environment at home, but would also work towards pulling at-risk families out of<br />

poverty. A cause that is more difficult to eliminate is mental illness, because sometimes these<br />

illnesses are present at birth. Still, counseling and rehabilitation might aid in reducing the<br />

negative affects of these illness, such as irrational and violent behavior. One cause that seems<br />

almost impossible to eliminate is the rational and irrational choice idea. As mentioned above,<br />

some people believe that all crime comes down to a single situation in which an individual must<br />

make a rational or irrational decision, to commit the crime, or to not. Those that believe that this<br />

rational choice option is tied to the very immutable nature of the person would have a hard time<br />

believing that there is any way to control the choices children make and eliminate the causes of<br />

juvenile delinquency.<br />

There are many foundations and organizations around the United States that have dedicated<br />

themselves to the reduction and elimination of juvenile delinquency. Many of these<br />

organizations spend their time and money controlling for the causes of juvenile delinquency<br />

mentioned above. Below are a few agencies that work on preventing juvenile delinquency,<br />

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though this list is not all encompassing by any means. Links for these foundations and<br />

organizations can be found in the #External links section below.<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention: Forming part of the US<br />

Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, this prevention agency is a governmental organization focuses on<br />

all types of research, prevention programs, and rehabilitation programs for juveniles as<br />

offenders and victims. Through collaboration, this organizations aims to improve juvenile<br />

justice policies and practices and create safer communities and neighborhoods. The<br />

OJJDP helps victims of kidnapping, as well as victims of sexual exploitation. Currently,<br />

the OJJDP is working to prevent gang involvement/crime, girl's delinquency, and the<br />

under-aged consumption of alcohol. This foundation is important because it guides reallife<br />

policy changes that pertain to juvenile justice and juvenile delinquency.<br />

The Innocence Project: The main goal of this organization is not to reduce juvenile<br />

delinquency, but rather, to liberate juveniles that were falsely convicted of crimes.<br />

Though this foundation is not primarily focused on reducing juvenile delinquency, it has<br />

done a good job of freeing falsely convicted teens in the past.<br />

Annie E Casie Foundation: The goal of this foundation is to provide a brighter and safer<br />

future for children from under-served communities around the US. Its major initiatives<br />

include: child welfare strategy group, civic sites, family economic success, juvenile<br />

detention alternatives initiative (JDAI), KIDS COUNT, leadership development, and<br />

making connections. The KIDS COUNT initiative collects annual data on the well being<br />

of children all round the US and publishes state-specific reports as well as state<br />

comparisons. The JDAI focuses on providing a bright and healthy future as adults for<br />

children involved in the juvenile justice system.<br />

National Gang Center: This a website that provides anyone on the web with information<br />

about the gang problem in the US. It includes research done by the NGC and FAQ's.<br />

There is also a list of resources on how to identify if your city has a gang problem and<br />

how to combat this problem. This foundation helps the people within the struggling<br />

communities be the ones to solve their own gang problems.<br />

Best Friends Organization: This organization focuses on the overall well-being of<br />

children in the US. It focuses on physical and emotional well-being and helps children<br />

develop healthy relationships and useful skills. This organization is an example of an<br />

organization that works towards preventing problems before they occur. Instead of<br />

focusing on the elimination of current juvenile delinquency, this organization works on<br />

creating healthy and happy children that will not resort to crime.<br />

Page 27 of 113


Page 28 of 113


The Cost to Taxpayers<br />

for <strong>Juvenile</strong> Confinement<br />

What Youth Incarceration Costs Taxpayers<br />

US News & World Report<br />

Circa December 9, 2014<br />

A New Report Finds Jailing Young People Costs State And Local<br />

Governments As Much As $21 Billion Annually.<br />

When youths pay for crime by being incarcerated, taxpayers, too, bear some of the burden.<br />

Locking up a juvenile costs states an average of $407.58 per person per day and $148,767 per<br />

person per year when the most expensive option is used, according to a new report by the <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Policy Institute. As the country debates the cost-effectiveness of mass incarceration, the report<br />

notes that jailing youths carries its own exorbitant price tag.<br />

The <strong>Justice</strong> Policy Institute surveyed 46 states, looking at what governments spent on confining<br />

young people.<br />

Many states have implemented measures to decrease their youth incarceration rates, and overall,<br />

the number of young people that were committed to confinement shrunk by 45 percent between<br />

2001 and 2011. Hawaii recently enacted a justice reform bill it expects will cut the<br />

state's confined youth population by half, while Georgia and Kentucky also retooled the way<br />

their justice systems treat youths, with approaches expected to save taxpayers millions of dollars.<br />

(Some states, like New York, saw per-youth incarceration costs rise as their populations declined<br />

but resources were used less efficiently.)<br />

Sending fewer young people to prison has not had the effect of raising youth crime; rather, the<br />

youth crime rate also has dropped.<br />

Aside from the direct costs of incarcerating juveniles – such as the funds required for operating<br />

detention facilities – taxpayers pay in the long term as well in the form of lost future earnings,<br />

lost tax revenue and other ripple effects that the <strong>Justice</strong> Policy Institute estimates costs state and<br />

local governments nationwide somewhere between $8 billion and $21 billion annually.<br />

Research varies as to whether incarcerating young people makes them more likely to commit<br />

crimes in the future, but one study found that juvenile incarceration increases a person‘s chances<br />

of going to jail again by 22 to 26 percent.<br />

Furthermore, young people who go to prison are less likely to graduate high school, according to<br />

a 2008 analysis, by as much as 26 percent.<br />

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The difference in the median salary of a high school graduate versus a non-high school graduate<br />

amounts to $630,000 over a person‘s lifetime, according to the U.S. Labor Department Statistics.<br />

.<br />

On Monday, the U.S. <strong>Justice</strong> and Education departments sent letters to state correctional<br />

education officials reminding them of their responsibilities to educate all young people in<br />

correctional facilities regardless of race, color, national origin, sex, religion or disability. A 2013<br />

Rand Corp. study showed when prisoners participated in educational or vocational programs,<br />

their probability of returning to prison decreased by 43 percent.<br />

In addition to improving educational opportunities within juvenile prisons, the <strong>Justice</strong> Policy<br />

Institute recommends states looks into policy reforms that would limit the number of youths in<br />

correctional facilities in the first place.<br />

Those efforts could include reconsidering mandatory sentencing policies and shifting funding<br />

toward options that involve home or community-based supervision of convicted youths,<br />

particularly as 62 percent of the young people in confinement in 2011 had committed nonviolent<br />

offenses.<br />

http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/12/09/what-youth-incarceration-costs-taxpayers<br />

______<br />

Youth Incarceration<br />

Through the juvenile courts and the adult criminal justice system, the United States incarcerates<br />

more of its youth than any other country in the world, a reflection of the larger trends in<br />

incarceration practices in the United States. In 2010, approximately 70,800 juveniles were<br />

incarcerated in youth detention facilities alone. Approximately 500,000 youth are brought to<br />

detention centers in a given year. This data does not reflect juveniles tried as adults. Around 40%<br />

are incarcerated in privatized, for-profit facilities.<br />

The <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention Act<br />

The system that is currently operational in the United States was created under the 1974 <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention Act.<br />

The <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention Act called for a "deinstitutionalization" of<br />

juvenile delinquents. It required that states holding youth within adult prisons for status offenses<br />

remove them within a span of two years (this timeframe was adjusted over time). The act also<br />

provided program grants to states, based on their youth populations, and created the Office of<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).<br />

Through reauthorization amendments, additional programs have been added to the original<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention Act. The following list highlights a few of these<br />

additions:<br />

Page 30 of 113


1977 - Programs were developed to assist children with learning disabilities who entered the<br />

juvenile justice system.<br />

1984 - A new missing and exploited children program was added.<br />

1984 - Strong support was given to programs that strengthened families.<br />

1988 - Studies on prison conditions within the Indian justice system.<br />

1990 - The OJJDP began funding child abuse training programs to instruct judicial personnel and<br />

prosecutors.<br />

1992 - A juvenile boot camp program was designed to introduce delinquent youth to a lifestyle<br />

of structure and discipline.<br />

1992 - A community prevention grants program gave start-up money to communities for local<br />

juvenile crime prevention plans.<br />

Types of incarceration<br />

Some inmates of juvenile system are or were "status offenders," children who committed acts<br />

that are not crimes for adults, but can get juveniles in trouble with the law. Status offenses<br />

include consensual sexual acts, truancy from school, smoking cigarettes, curfew violations,<br />

drinking alcohol, running away from one's residence, chronic disobedience of parents and/or<br />

guardians and/or other authority figures, waywardness, and ungovernability.<br />

Trends as of 2000<br />

Recently, forty seven states have made it easier to be tried as an adult, calling attention to the<br />

growing trend away from the original model for treatment of juveniles in the justice system. A<br />

recent study of pretrial services for youth tried as adults in 18 of the country‘s largest<br />

jurisdictions found that the decision to try young offenders as adults was made much more often<br />

by legislators and prosecutors (at a rate of 85%) than by judges, the people originally endowed<br />

with the responsibility for such discretion.<br />

The decreasing distinction between how youth and adults are tried in the criminal justice system<br />

has caused many within the legal system, as well as other activists and organizers, to be critical<br />

of the juvenile justice system.<br />

The ―tough on crime‖ attitudes of these recent legislative events reflect the popularity of such a<br />

stance in public opinion. This is true of the majority of criminal justice reform policies of the<br />

past couple decades, including California‘s infamous Three Strikes Law.<br />

Reforms in criminal justice reforms, and juvenile justice in particular, are often fought in the<br />

court of public opinion. The popular news media have played a crucial role in promoting the<br />

myth of a new generation of young ―super-predators‖ threatening the public. Despite<br />

Page 31 of 113


documented decreases in youth<br />

crime, particularly in violent<br />

crime, indicating a 68% decline<br />

in youth homicide in the 1990s,<br />

overall media coverage of<br />

youth crime is increasing.<br />

Despite evidence to the<br />

contrary, 62% of respondents<br />

to a 1999 survey on youth<br />

delinquency believed that<br />

youth crime was up. Advocates<br />

for juvenile justice reform<br />

focus considerable attention on<br />

amending public opinion and<br />

adjusting the gap between what<br />

threats people perceive and the<br />

reality of youth offending.<br />

Profiles of Youth in<br />

Custody<br />

A report by the federal Office<br />

of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and<br />

Deliquency Prevention and<br />

U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>,<br />

―Survey of Youth in<br />

Residential Placement: Youth‘s<br />

Needs and Services," used data from more than 7,000 youth in custody gathered during<br />

interviews. The report's findings include: 70% of youth in custody reported that they had ―had<br />

something very bad or terrifying‖ happen to them in their lives. 67% reported having seen<br />

someone severely injured or killed; 26% of those surveyed said felt as if ―life was not worth<br />

living," and 22% reported having tried to commit suicide at some point in their lives; 84% of the<br />

youth surveyed said they had used marijuana, compared to a rate of 30% among their peers in the<br />

general population; 30% reported having used crack or cocaine, compared with only 6% in the<br />

general population. The report noted a significant gap between the profiles of boys and girls,<br />

with girls often reporting more pronounced difficulties: 63% of girls reported having problems<br />

with anger, whereas 47% of boys did; 49% of girls reported having hallucinatory experiences,<br />

whereas only 16% of boys did; 37% of girls reported having suicidal thoughts and feelings,<br />

whereas only 18% of boys did. Facilities that treat such youth also were shown to be inadequate<br />

in some core areas, according to the <strong>Justice</strong> Department. Among youth who reported four or<br />

more recent substance-related problems, only about 60% said they had been provided with<br />

substance abuse counseling in their current facility. Many youth in custody reported having<br />

attention problems and difficulties in school. Once in custody, only 45% report spending 6 hours<br />

a day or more in school, meaning that their learning time is below that of the general population.<br />

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Quantel Lotts<br />

According to the Equal <strong>Justice</strong> Initiative, an organization advocating for incarcerated youth,<br />

Quantel Lotts is an inmate whose circumstances are emblematic of problems regarding youth<br />

incarceration in the United States. Lotts is an inmate at the maximum security prison in<br />

Charleston, Missouri, serving a life sentence for murder, committed during a fight with his<br />

brother when Lotts was 14 years old. Lotts' sentence forbids parole; the 2010 United States<br />

supreme court case Graham v. Florida prohibits life sentences to minors, except in cases<br />

involving homicides.<br />

Lotts was born October 24, 1985, in a poor suburb of St. Louis, Missouri. According to<br />

testimony before the United States House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Lotts' mother used<br />

and sold crack cocaine from their house during his childhood. Lotts was taken from his home<br />

when he was eight, smelling of urine, with rotting teeth, and with scars all over his body from<br />

beatings. Lotts was also molested as a child. After living in a series of homes Lotts moved in<br />

with his father in St. Francois County, which is rural and predominantly white.<br />

Lotts witnessed his uncle shot to death in drug-related violence when he was 11 years old. While<br />

Lotts states that his childhood was violent, retrospectively from prison he states it was often a<br />

happy one.<br />

In November 1999 Lotts killed his stepbrother Michael Barton during a fight involving first a<br />

blowgun, then a bow, and finally a hunting knife, in St. Francois County, Missouri. Lotts states<br />

that he has little memory of the event and did not intend to kill his brother. Lotts was convicted<br />

of first degree murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, by<br />

Missouri's St. Francois County Circuit Court in 2002. His mother states that race was a factor in<br />

her son's trial, since he is black, and her stepson was white.<br />

As of 2009, Lotts was one of 2,000 people serving life sentences without parole for crimes<br />

committed while they were minors, and according to the Equal <strong>Justice</strong> Initiative, one of 73<br />

serving such sentences for crimes committed while only 13 or 14 year old. Laws in the United<br />

States began sentencing juveniles with far greater severity following an increase in juvenile<br />

crime during the 1970s and 1980s.<br />

Criticism of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Critics of the juvenile justice system, like those in the wider prison abolition movement, identify<br />

three main markers of the system for critique and reform. They hold that the juvenile justice<br />

system is unjust, ineffective, and counter-productive in terms of fulfilling the promise of the<br />

prison system, namely the protection of the public from violent offenders.<br />

Criticisms of Racism<br />

Critics of the juvenile justice system believe that the system is unfairly stacked against minority<br />

youth. Minority youth are disproportionately represented in incarcerated populations relative to<br />

their representation in the general population. A recent report from the National Council on<br />

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Crime and delinquency found that minority youth are treated more severely than white youth at<br />

every point of contact with the system—from arrest, to detention, to adjudication, to<br />

incarceration—even when charged with the same crime. In 1995, African American youths made<br />

up 12% of the population, but were arrested at rates double those for Caucasian youths. The<br />

trend towards adult adjudication has had implications for the racial make-up of the juvenile<br />

prison population as well. Minority youth tried in adult courts are much more likely to be<br />

sentenced to serve prison time than white youth offenders arrested for similar crimes.<br />

Criticisms Based on Adverse Effects<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> detention facilities are often overcrowded and understaffed. The most infamous<br />

example of this trend is Cheltenham center in Maryland, which at one point crowded 100 boys<br />

into cottages sanctioned for maximum capacity of 24, with only 3-4 adults supervising. Young<br />

people in these environments are subject to brutal violence from their peers as well as staff, who<br />

are often overworked, underpaid and under stress. The violence that incarcerated youth<br />

experience—fights, stabbings, rapes—is well known to those who work in the criminal justice<br />

system, and those who oppose it.<br />

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Congregating delinquent youth has a negative impact on behavior—it actually serves to make<br />

them more deviant and more of a threat to themselves and others. Social scientists call the<br />

phenomenon ―peer delinquency training‖, and have found significantly higher levels of<br />

substance abuse, school difficulties, delinquency, violence, and adjustment difficulties in<br />

adulthood for offenders detained in congregated settings versus those that were offered treatment<br />

in another setting.<br />

Incarceration can aggravate mental illness. According to detention center administrators who<br />

testified to United States Congress in a 2004 Special Investigation by the House of<br />

Representatives, many incarcerated youths could have avoided incarceration had they received<br />

mental health treatment. Detention centers do not promote normal cognitive and emotional<br />

development. A recent report indicated that for up to one-third of incarcerated youth suffering<br />

from depression, the onset of depression occurred after their transfer to a detention center. These<br />

youth face a greater risk of self-injury and suicide. Researchers have found that incarcerated<br />

youth engage in self-injurious behaviors at a rate two to four times higher than the general youth<br />

population. Furthermore, prison administrative policy often intensifies the risk by responding to<br />

suicidal threats in ways that endanger the detainees, such as putting them in solitary confinement.<br />

Detained youth with special needs often fail to return to school upon release. Among those<br />

young students receiving remedial education during their detention, roughly 43% do not return to<br />

school. Among those that do re-enroll, between two-thirds to three-quarters drop out within a<br />

year. Not only does this pose a serious threat to the ex-offender‘s well-being—high school dropouts<br />

face high unemployment, poor health, shorter life spans, and low income—it also poses a<br />

threat to public safety. According to the United States Department of Education, high school<br />

drop-outs are 3.5 times more likely to be arrested than High School Graduates.<br />

Formally incarcerated youth face less success in the labor market. On average youth that have<br />

spent any amount of time in a youth detention facility work 3–5 weeks less than the average<br />

employee over the course of a year. Their interrupted education makes them less competitive,<br />

and their experience of incarceration may change them into less stable employees. This lack of<br />

success in the workplace is a threat to personal well-being as well as to communities whose<br />

youth are incarcerated in large numbers, such as African Americans.<br />

Criticisms Based on Effectiveness<br />

Studies indicate that incarcerating young offenders is not the most effective way of curbing<br />

delinquency and reducing crime. The relationship between detention of young offenders and the<br />

rate of overall youth criminality is not evident. A study of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's<br />

arrest data for the 1990s reveals that the rise in detention was unrelated to crime rates. That is,<br />

detention as a tactic of controlling young offenders has little to nothing to do with the rate of<br />

crime or the ―threat‖ that youth pose to the public.<br />

While there may be an individual need to incarcerate violent or high-risk youth, most of the<br />

young people in prisons, jails and detention centers today—up to 70%—are serving time for<br />

nonviolent offenses.<br />

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Not all delinquent youth are incarcerated—in fact, as many as one-third of all Americans might<br />

engage in delinquent behavior at some point in their youth. But those that are detained or<br />

imprisoned are less likely to grow out of their delinquency than those that are not. Criminologists<br />

recognize a natural process of desistance called ―aging out‖ of delinquency, through which a<br />

person desists their delinquent behavior through maturation and experience. Detaining or<br />

incarcerating youth can interrupt or slow down the aging out process, resulting in a longer period<br />

of delinquency.<br />

The harm done to the emotional, mental and social development of incarcerated youth, combined<br />

with the separation from family and community and the congregation of offenders makes<br />

previous incarceration the leading indicator for a repeat offence among young offenders. It is a<br />

greater predictor even than weapon possession, gang membership and bad relationships with<br />

parents. What these studies tell us is that, far from increasing the public safety and curbing youth<br />

crime, detaining and incarcerating young offenders is actually leading to more criminality among<br />

youth, and more serious crimes.<br />

As the country grapples with the impact of a growing recession, a cost-benefit analysis of our<br />

criminal justice system is especially germane. The cost effectiveness of detention and<br />

incarceration scores very low compared with alternative approaches to youth delinquency in a<br />

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cost-benefit analysis. A 2002 government commissioned study in Washington State revealed that<br />

for every one dollar spent on juvenile detention systems, a benefit return of $1.98 in terms of<br />

reduced crime and cost of crime to taxpayers was achieved. They found benefit returns ranging<br />

from $3.36- $13 for a series of detention alternatives. This study indicates that alternative models<br />

are more effective in reducing youth offending in practical and economic terms.<br />

The Movement to End Youth Incarceration<br />

The movement to reduce and end youth incarceration is a widespread collection of thousands of<br />

activists, lawyers, community organizers, educators, artists, and youth working on specific<br />

legislative and localized initiatives.<br />

Movement goals include shutting down particularly bad prisons and detention centers,<br />

demanding better treatment for youth in the system, providing and demanding better<br />

representation for young people in court, affecting legislation to curb youth incarceration,<br />

working to abolish arrest warrants for young people, and promoting alternatives to incarceration.<br />

There are national organizations and local ones, opposition from inside the criminal justice<br />

system and from outside of it. The movement is diverse in many ways, and is difficult to<br />

encapsulate in a single entry. Listed below are some examples of movement struggles:<br />

The Maryland Campaign to Close Cheltenham<br />

The Cheltenham <strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Center in Maryland was one of the nation's most infamous<br />

prisons for boys. Started in 1872 as the House of Reformation for Colored Boys, Cheltenham<br />

was home to a wildly overrepresented population of minority youth. But the racial injustice<br />

inside the notorious prison was not what ultimately led to its demise.<br />

The conditions at Cheltenham were deplorable. Overcrowded and understaffed, Cheltenham was<br />

also flagged by fire safety inspectors as one of the least safe buildings in the state. The antiquated<br />

prison structure—each cell had to be individually unlocked, and at times prison staff could not<br />

present keys to some cells—was also the site of an enormous amount of brutality and violence.<br />

Local citizens in the Maryland <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Coalition developed the Maryland Campaign to<br />

Close Cheltenham in 2001. The campaign involved parents of incarcerated youth, youth<br />

activists, and faith leaders from across the state. Through a targeted media campaign to shift<br />

public opinion, the Campaign succeed in passing legislation through the annual budget to phase<br />

out and close Cheltenham, and to increase state spending on community-based alternative<br />

programs for youth offenders.<br />

Taking on Tallulah<br />

The Tallulah Correction Center for Youth in Louisiana had been open for only three years when<br />

it was first sued by the United States Department of <strong>Justice</strong> (in collaboration with local activists<br />

in the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Project of Louisiana) for violating the civil rights of youth held in its<br />

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confines—marking the first time in U.S. history that the federal government has actively sued a<br />

state over the conditions of its juvenile detention facilities.<br />

That same year the filthy conditions, brutal violence and chronic understaffing earned the center<br />

a citation as "the worst in the nation." In 1999, even after the federal government had taken over<br />

partial responsibility for improving conditions, things were so unsafe for the youth that the staff<br />

of the center walked out, leaving 400 boys completely unsupervised.<br />

Youth and adult activists appealed to the state legislature to shut down the prison once and for<br />

all. But their aspirations didn't stop with the abolition of one prison—they sought to redefine the<br />

juvenile justice system in the state, to change it from one based almost entirely on incarceration<br />

and punishment to a new system focusing on community-based alternatives to incarceration. [39]<br />

In 2003 the state of Louisiana became nationally recognized for its leadership in reforming a<br />

broken juvenile justice system. With the passage of the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Reform Act of 2003 (Act<br />

1225), then Governor Kathleen Blanco and the Louisiana State Legislature ushered in a period of<br />

reform in which the notoriously brutal Tallulah prison for youth was shut down, conditions were<br />

improved in other abusive youth prisons throughout the state, and a commitment was made to<br />

both the increased use of alternatives to incarceration for youth and to revamping secure care<br />

prisons to be small, therapeutic facilities that were regionalized to keep children closer to their<br />

families.<br />

Before the passage of Act 1225, over two thousand children were held in prison in Louisiana.<br />

Today the system holds just over 500 children state-wide. In 1998 the rate of recidivism, or<br />

children returning to prison after release, was 56% as compared to 11% today. This decrease in<br />

the number of children incarcerated has contributed to an increase in public safety.<br />

Proposition 21 in California<br />

In 2001 California residents passed Proposition 21, a multi-faceted proposition designed to be<br />

tough on youth crime, incorporating many youth offenders into the adult criminal justice<br />

jurisdiction.<br />

Opponents to this law included activists from Californians for <strong>Justice</strong>, Critical Resistance, the<br />

Youth Force Coalition, the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights, and the American Civil<br />

Liberties Union. Advocates in the ACLU challenged many portions of the law, including a<br />

provision automatically sentencing youth 14–17 years old in adult court. This portion of the law<br />

was struck down by the California Courts of Appeal in 2001.<br />

Opposing Zero-Tolerance Policies<br />

The term "zero tolerance" is not defined in law or regulation; nor is there a single widely<br />

accepted practice definition. The United States Department of Education, National Center for<br />

Education Statistics, defined zero tolerance as "a policy that mandates predetermined<br />

consequences or punishments for specified offenses". The purpose of zero-tolerance policies,<br />

according to their proponents, is to send a message that certain kinds of behaviors are not<br />

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tolerable on school grounds. About 94% of public schools in the United States have zerotolerance<br />

policies for guns; 91% for other weapons; 88% for drugs; 87% for alcohol and 79% for<br />

tobacco.<br />

Opposition to zero-tolerance policies, especially at the local level, focus on critiques including<br />

charges that the program is discriminatory, unconstitutional, harmful to schools and students,<br />

ineptly implemented, and provides harsh punishment (suspension of education) for minor<br />

offenses (possession of tobacco).<br />

A few infamous cases have been used by opposition groups, such as Amnesty International, to<br />

further their case against the policy. The Center for <strong>Juvenile</strong> and Criminal <strong>Justice</strong> released a story<br />

in 2003 about a 13 year old girl in Tuscaloosa, Alabama arrested and detained for 5 weeks for<br />

possession of what was thought to be marijuana, but turned out to be oregano. The zero-tolerance<br />

practice in Illinois of sending any youth charged with drug crimes within 1,000 feet of any<br />

school or public housing project directly to adult court has resulted in the largest racial disparity<br />

in the country—over 99% of youth affected by this policy were minority youth.<br />

Opposition to zero-tolerance policies nationwide and locally is broad and growing.<br />

Organizational leadership has been provided nationally by Amnesty International and the<br />

American Bar Association, who has officially opposed such policies since 2001.<br />

Promoting Alternatives: The JDAI<br />

Most activists in the movement to end youth incarceration believe that the best way to mitigate<br />

the impact of detention and incarceration on our youth is to reduce the number of youth that pass<br />

through the system. By providing credible alternatives to incarceration, this portion of the<br />

movement provides opportunities for communities to treat, rather than punish, young<br />

offenders—much the way that the juvenile justice system was founded to do.<br />

The <strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) is a private-public partnership being<br />

implemented nationwide, with pilot programs in California, Oregon, New Mexico and Illinois.<br />

Their goal is to make sure that locked detention is used only when absolutely necessary. The<br />

JDAI has produced some promising results from their programs. Detention center populations<br />

fell by between 14% and 88% in JDAI counties over the course of 7 years (1996-2003). These<br />

same counties saw declines in juvenile arrests (an indicator of overall juvenile crime rates)<br />

during the same time period ranging from 37-54%.<br />

The School to Prison Pipeline<br />

The term "school-to-prison pipeline" is a phrase that is used by scholars and education reform<br />

activists and organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Policy Center, Advancement Project, and the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) to<br />

describe what they view as a widespread pattern in the United States of pushing students,<br />

especially those who are already at a disadvantage, out of school and into the American criminal<br />

justice system. They argue that this "pipeline" is the result of public institutions being neglectful<br />

or derelict in properly addressing students as individuals who might need extra educational or<br />

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social assistance, or being unable to do so<br />

because of staffing shortages or statutory<br />

mandates. The resulting miseducation and<br />

mass incarceration are said to create a vicious<br />

circle for individuals and communities.<br />

Advocates claim that the school-to-prison<br />

pipeline operates at all levels of US<br />

government (federal, state, county, city and<br />

school district) both directly as a result of zero<br />

tolerance policies, and indirectly due to<br />

exclusion from the school system.<br />

Components<br />

Educational researcher Christine Christle and<br />

her colleagues have determined that schoollevel<br />

practices correlate to delinquency and<br />

incarceration. These practices include<br />

searches of students, strict rules outlined in the<br />

school handbook and code of student conduct,<br />

excessive policing at schools, and high-stakes<br />

testing that slates students for failure, grade retention, and dropping out of school.<br />

Zero-Tolerance Policies<br />

Zero-tolerance disciplinary policies are often the first step in a child‘s journey through the<br />

pipeline. Such policies impose severe discipline on students. The American Bar Association has<br />

been critical of these policies, calling them a "one-size-fits-all solution" that "has redefined<br />

students as criminals."<br />

In 2011, a study by the National Education Policy Center found that zero-tolerance policies<br />

across the nation were increasing suspension rates, with students being accused of offenses such<br />

as attendance violations, dress code violations, cell phone use, and other minor offenses. They<br />

found that zero-tolerance policies put children, particularly black and Latino children, on a path<br />

of truancy and likely incarceration. Black students are 3.5 times more likely to be suspended than<br />

White students and are held responsible for 70% of arrests while attending school.<br />

Simultaneously Latino students are 1.5 times more likely to be suspended than their White<br />

classmates.<br />

Michelle Fine believes zero-tolerance school policies are part of a banal public schoolprivatization<br />

agenda which, in seeking to redirect and profit from public-school dollars,<br />

transforms low-income youth into a disenfranchised class of prisoners.<br />

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Excessive Policing<br />

According to the ACLU, many schools rely on poorly trained police, rather than teachers and<br />

administrators, to handle minor school misconduct. The reality is that public schools have in the<br />

last 15 years undergone mass changes in school security policies. Video surveillance, drugsniffing<br />

dogs, and sworn-in security officers are now commonplace fixtures in most public<br />

schools in the United States. Scholars argue that this increase in security measures is a result of<br />

rising fears about violence in schools. One highly publicized example is the 1999 Columbine<br />

High School Shooting. The irony of the increase in security after the Columbine Shooting is that<br />

armed police officers were stationed at the Columbine High School at the time of the massacre,<br />

yet they were still unable to stop it. Now that police are more present in public schools, the line<br />

between disciplining under a schools' general policy standards versus disciplining by law<br />

enforcement standards is getting blurred.<br />

A 2012 school "lockdown" in Casa Grande, Arizona, included employees of the private<br />

Corrections Corporation of America company—unusual participants in a government policing<br />

action. Caroline Isaacs of the Tucson American Friends Service Committee said of the event:<br />

"To invite for-profit prison guards to conduct law enforcement actions in a high school is<br />

perhaps the most direct expression of the 'schools-to-prison pipeline' I've ever seen."<br />

High-Stakes Testing<br />

More and more schools are being sanctioned for poor performance under the No Child Left<br />

Behind Act; as a result, teachers in these schools must bend to the standardized tests that are used<br />

for evaluations. Opponents of these tests argue that they undermine teachers and students, that<br />

they take up too much time, and that they promote rote memorization rather than critical<br />

thinking.<br />

Minority students are disproportionately subject to exit examinations that determine whether<br />

they can graduate from high school. These same students are likely to be in schools that have less<br />

funding and larger class sizes. Furthermore, their schools are often suffering—due to being<br />

punished for low test scores.<br />

Institutional Similarity<br />

Another facet of the school-to-prison pipeline involves overlapping patterns of institutional<br />

structure. These include disciplinary and bureaucratic practices for storing human beings in<br />

buildings, as well as institutional culture that degrades the people affected. A simple but<br />

widespread example of this culture is the division of students into "good kids" and "bad kids,"<br />

which paves the way for the promotion of some and the abandonment of others (often resulting<br />

in identification with "badness").<br />

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Systemic Problems<br />

Critiques of the school-to-prison pipeline attempt to show how it falls into larger systems of<br />

domination such as racism, ableism, and capitalism. An unfair distribution of educational<br />

resources make students less likely to learn, less likely to find good jobs, and more likely to end<br />

up in prison. The more<br />

people in disadvantaged<br />

communities that go to<br />

prison, the more alienated<br />

and economically<br />

disadvantaged these<br />

communities become.<br />

The pipeline can also be<br />

critiqued in terms of<br />

neoliberalism, the idea that<br />

market forces can organize<br />

every facet of society.<br />

Because prisons can be<br />

privatized and run for<br />

profit, and traditional public<br />

schools cannot, the market<br />

favors sending people to<br />

prisons rather than<br />

schools—particularly if<br />

they are not destined to<br />

become part of the high-skilled workforce. (As prisoners, people can be compelled to perform<br />

labor anyway.) In keeping with this system, school budgets have shrunk while prison budgets<br />

have expanded massively, while even within schools more funding goes to police and less to<br />

teachers and children. The feedback loop between standardized testing and school funding is<br />

seen by some as another facet of neoliberalism, creating competition between students and<br />

teachers who need good test scores to keep their jobs.<br />

According to an article from www.blackagendareport.com, the criminal justice system dedicated<br />

to controlling and arresting members of poorer populations is a necessary counterpart to the "free<br />

market" policies that constitute neoliberalism's public face.<br />

Criticism of The "School-To-Prison Pipeline" Theory<br />

An article published in the New Jersey Law Journal, reacting to the ABA's opposition of zerotolerance<br />

policies, argued that even with these rules in effect, schools had enough flexibility to<br />

determine whether a student ought to stay in school.<br />

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Activism<br />

Resistance to the school-to-prison pipeline takes many forms because of the scope of the systems<br />

involved. Some groups, such as Rethinking Prisons, see the school-to-prison pipeline as one<br />

direct target around which the general struggle for social justice can coalesce.<br />

Advancement Project is another group active in the area of resisting the school-to-prison<br />

pipeline. The racial justice nonprofit has authored several reports on the issue including:<br />

―Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School<br />

Discipline‖ and ―Derailed: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track.‖ These reports deal with the<br />

criminalization of students of color by their districts. Advancement Project co-director Judith<br />

Browne Dianis also addressed a Congressional hearing organized by Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL)<br />

in 2012 on the devastating effects of the school-to-prison pipeline.<br />

Dianis said:<br />

“In recent years, we have seen increased rates of suspension, expulsion, and arrest because adult<br />

– and not student – behavior has changed. Adults are treating young people like criminals, and<br />

are responding to typical student behavior that has no bearing on safety with discipline that defies<br />

common sense. Schools have redefined developmentally appropriate behaviors as crimes. Pushing<br />

and shoving in the schoolyard is now a battery, and talking back is now disorderly conduct.”<br />

Some success stories in the effort to curb the school-to-prison pipeline include:<br />

New York<br />

To address skyrocketing suspensions of youth of color in Buffalo, New York, Citizen Action<br />

New York and the Alliance for Quality Education led a successful campaign for a new school<br />

discipline code of conduct.<br />

Colorado<br />

The Denver, Colorado youth and parent group Padres y Jovenes Unidos helped facilitate a<br />

historic agreement between Denver Public Schools and the Denver Police Department to clarify<br />

and significantly limit the role of police in schools. Advancement Project attorneys served as a<br />

resource partner with Padres. The Intergovernmental Agreement also supports practices known<br />

as ―restorative justice‖ that helps students learn from mistakes and make amends for misconduct,<br />

rather than a narrow focus on punitive discipline.<br />

Florida<br />

Florida‘s Fort Lauderdale/Broward Branch of the NAACP worked with Broward Public Schools<br />

Superintendent Robert Runcie, along with other groups, to pass a Collaborative Agreement with<br />

the local police department and a new Code of Conduct & Alternative Programs. The new policy<br />

impedes the over-criminalization of youth by instead offering students counseling and other<br />

assistance aimed at addressing the root of behavioral problems.<br />

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Litigation<br />

In January 2010, the NYCLU, ACLU and the law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP filed a federal<br />

class action lawsuit challenging the New York City Police Department‘s practice of wrongfully<br />

arresting and using excessive force against children in New York City schools.<br />

In August 2012, the U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong> released a letter of findings determining that the<br />

Lauderdale County Youth Court, the Meridian Police Department (MPD), and the Mississippi<br />

Division of Youth Services (DYS) are violating the constitutional rights of juveniles in Meridian,<br />

Mississippi. The department‘s investigation showed that the agencies have helped to operate a<br />

school-to-prison pipeline whereby children arrested in local schools become entangled in a cycle<br />

of incarceration without substantive and procedural protections required by the U.S. Constitution<br />

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The Return on Investment<br />

for Youth Programming<br />

Return-on-Investment analysis (ROI) is the formal method economists use to compare the dollar<br />

value of the benefits of programs to the programs‘ costs. The formula is simply: Return-on-<br />

Investment = $ value of Benefits/ $ Cost of program. This analysis results in a number that<br />

indicates how many dollars of benefit are returned for every dollar used to pay for a program.<br />

How is Return on Investment Estimated?<br />

First, economists measure the COST of all<br />

the resources used to operate an<br />

afterschool program—from public costs to<br />

private costs to donated costs (including<br />

volunteer time and resources). Recent<br />

estimates of costs in Minnesota and<br />

elsewhere suggest the cost per youth is<br />

between $1000 to $5000 per year range<br />

with $3000 a reasonable estimate of the<br />

costs for an average program.<br />

Currently public funding is often leveraged<br />

with private and donated resources as well<br />

as fees paid by families. This leveraging<br />

further enhances the return on investment<br />

for public dollars.<br />

Second, potential OUTCOMES from<br />

afterschool programs are estimated.<br />

The outcomes based on research fall into<br />

several categories:<br />

• reduced juvenile and adult crime<br />

• reduced need of social services and<br />

• improved health outcomes<br />

• improved school performance<br />

• increased workforce preparedness<br />

Third, economists convert specific outcomes into BENEFITS measured in dollars and cents. For<br />

example,<br />

• The present value of graduating from high school instead of dropping out is estimated to be<br />

$263,000 in income and $98,000 in taxes paid.<br />

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• The saved social cost of avoiding a year of residential treatment in a juvenile correctional<br />

facility is $75,300.<br />

To calculate total benefits, economists need outcomes data from program evaluations that show<br />

how many more children graduated from high school or how much juvenile crime was avoided.<br />

New research indicates that afterschool programs can have significant impact on these types of<br />

outcomes.<br />

Longitudinal research on longer-term and economically valued outcomes is underway and will<br />

yield improved<br />

estimates of the full range of benefits from these types of programs.<br />

Fourth, these estimates of the benefits and costs are used to calculate the SOCIAL<br />

RETURN ON INVESTMENT.<br />

For example, if a program for 100 youth costing $3,000 per youth is able to help just one youth<br />

graduate who would not otherwise [if] that program [had not existed] returns a $1.20 for every<br />

dollar invested. If half the investment comes from private or donated sources, the return on<br />

investment for public dollars is $2.40. If one assumes the program also helped raise grade point<br />

averages or keeps even one youth out of residential treatment, the return goes up even higher.<br />

[The] Bottom Line<br />

Recent studies of high quality programs show positive return-on-investment, though they often<br />

use only a partial list of benefits and/or sometimes conservative estimates of the benefits of<br />

different outcomes. For example,<br />

• A UCLA analysis of an afterschool program in Los Angeles estimated benefits of $2.50 for<br />

every dollar spent, but counted only reduced crime benefits.<br />

• A statewide study estimated $2.72 of benefits per dollar of spending on quality youth<br />

mentoring programs.<br />

• Another statewide study estimated $4.89 of benefits per dollar of spending on quality early<br />

intervention programs with high-risk youth.<br />

As more careful program evaluations are conducted, more complete and accurate return-oninvestment<br />

studies will be completed.<br />

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Risk Factors<br />

That Lead To Delinquency 9<br />

Several juvenile justice researchers have linked risk factors to delinquency (Hawkins et al., 1998;<br />

Lipsey and Derzon, 1998), and many have also noted a multiplicative effect if several risk<br />

factors are present. Herrenkohl and colleagues (2000) report that a 10-year-old exposed to six or<br />

more risk factors is 10 times as likely to commit a violent act by age 18 as a 10-year-old exposed<br />

to only one risk factor.<br />

Similarly, the age range or developmental period during which a youth is exposed to a specific<br />

risk factor is important to individuals working to tailor prevention programs to specific factors.<br />

Youth Violence: A Report of the Surgeon General (2001 (chapter 4)) elaborates:<br />

Violence prevention and intervention efforts hinge on identifying risk and protective<br />

factors and determining when in the course of development they emerge. To be effective,<br />

such efforts must be appropriate to a youth's stage of development. A program that is<br />

effective in childhood may be ineffective in adolescence and vice versa. Moreover, the risk<br />

and protective factors targeted by violence prevention may be different from those targeted by<br />

intervention programs which are designed to prevent the recurrence of violence.<br />

The study of risk factors, therefore, is critical to the enhancement of prevention programs that<br />

frequently have limited staffing and funding. Identifying which risk factors may cause<br />

delinquency for particular sets of youth at specific stages of their development may help<br />

programs target their efforts in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. The table, which<br />

was adapted from a report by the Office of the Surgeon General, categorizes risk factors by age<br />

of onset of delinquency and identifies corresponding protective factors.<br />

Risk and Protective Factors, by Domain<br />

Risk Factor<br />

Domain Early Onset (ages 6-11) Late Onset (ages 12-14) Protective Factor*<br />

Individual<br />

General offenses Substance use<br />

Being male<br />

Aggression**<br />

Hyperactivity<br />

Problem (antisocial) behavior<br />

Exposure to television<br />

violence<br />

Medical, physical problems<br />

Low IQ<br />

Antisocial attitudes, beliefs<br />

Dishonesty**<br />

General offenses<br />

Restlessness<br />

Difficulty concentrating**<br />

Risk taking<br />

Aggression**<br />

Being male<br />

Physical violence<br />

Antisocial attitudes, beliefs<br />

Crimes against persons<br />

Problem (antisocial)<br />

behavior<br />

Low IQ<br />

Substance use<br />

Intolerant attitude toward<br />

deviance<br />

High IQ<br />

Being female<br />

Positive social orientation<br />

Perceived sanctions for<br />

transgressions<br />

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Family<br />

Low socioeconomic<br />

status/poverty<br />

Antisocial parents<br />

Poor parent-child relationship<br />

Harsh, lax, or inconsistent<br />

discipline<br />

Broken home<br />

Separation from parents<br />

Other conditions<br />

Abusive parents<br />

Neglect<br />

Poor parent-child<br />

relationship<br />

Harsh or lax discipline<br />

Poor monitoring,<br />

supervision<br />

Low parental involvement<br />

Antisocial parents<br />

Broken home<br />

Low socioeconomic<br />

status/poverty<br />

Abusive parents<br />

Family conflict**<br />

Warm, supportive<br />

relationships with<br />

parents or other adults<br />

Parents' positive<br />

evaluation of peers<br />

Parental monitoring<br />

School Poor attitude, performance Poor attitude, performance<br />

Academic failure<br />

Commitment to school<br />

Recognition for<br />

involvement in<br />

conventional activities<br />

Peer group<br />

Weak social ties<br />

Antisocial peers<br />

Weak social ties<br />

Antisocial, delinquent peers<br />

Gang membership<br />

Friends who engage in<br />

conventional behavior<br />

Community<br />

Neighborhood crime, drugs<br />

Neighborhood<br />

disorganization<br />

* Age of onset not known.<br />

** Males only.<br />

Source: Adapted from Office of the Surgeon General, 2001.<br />

Various researchers categorize risk factors in different ways. For the purposes of this article, risk<br />

factors fall under three broad categories: individual, social, and community. Each of these<br />

categories includes several subcategories (e.g., family- and peer-related risk factors are grouped<br />

under the social category). Because an exhaustive review of all known risk factors linked to<br />

delinquency is beyond the scope of this article, the following summarizes the major risk factors<br />

associated with juvenile delinquency and violence.<br />

Individual-Level Factors<br />

Prenatal and Perinatal Factors. Several studies have linked prenatal and perinatal<br />

complications with later delinquent or criminal behavior (Kandel et al., 1989; Kandel and<br />

Mednick, 1991; Raine, Brennan, and Mednick, 1994). Prenatal and perinatal complications can<br />

lead to a range of health problems that negatively influence development (McCord, Widom, and<br />

Crowell, 2001). In a prospective study of youth at high risk for delinquency, Kandel and<br />

Mednick (1991) found that 80 percent of violent offenders rated high in delivery complications<br />

compared with 47 percent of nonoffenders.<br />

However, some of the evidence regarding the association between pregnancy and delivery<br />

complications and delinquency has been conflicting (Hawkins et al., 1998). For example, neither<br />

Denno's (1990) study of Philadelphia youth nor Farrington's (1997) Cambridge study found a<br />

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connection between pregnancy and delivery complications and violence. Mednick and Kandel<br />

(1988) linked pregnancy and delivery complications to violent behavior, but not to nonviolent<br />

criminal behavior. In addition, some studies have shown that children whose mothers smoked<br />

cigarettes frequently during pregnancy were more likely to display conduct disorders and other<br />

problem behaviors (Fergusson, Horwood, and Lynskey, 1993; Wakschlag et al., 1997). Although<br />

the results are inconsistent, the available data illustrate the need to study further the relationship<br />

between prenatal care, delivery complications, and the resulting health problems and juvenile<br />

delinquency (Hawkins et al., 1998).<br />

Psychological, Behavioral, and Mental Characteristics. Several individual-specific<br />

characteristics are linked to delinquency. Tremblay and LeMarquand (2001:141) remarked that<br />

"the best social behavior characteristic to predict delinquent behavior before age 13 appears to be<br />

aggression." In addition, Hawkins and colleagues (1998:113) reviewed several studies and<br />

reported "a positive relationship between hyperactivity, concentration or attention problems,<br />

impulsivity and risk taking and later violent behavior." Low verbal IQ and delayed language<br />

development have both been linked to delinquency; these links remain even after controlling for<br />

race and class (Moffitt, Lynam, and Silva, 1994; Seguin et al., 1995). Similarly, problems at<br />

school can lead to delinquency. Herrenkohl and colleagues (2001:223) noted that "children with<br />

low academic performance, low commitment to school, and low educational aspirations during<br />

the elementary and middle school grades are at higher risk for child delinquency than are other<br />

children."<br />

Social Factors<br />

Family Structure. Family characteristics such as poor parenting skills, family size, home<br />

discord, child maltreatment, and antisocial parents are risk factors linked to juvenile delinquency<br />

(Derzon and Lipsey, 2000; Wasserman and Seracini, 2001). McCord's (1979) study of 250 boys<br />

found that among boys at age 10, the strongest predictors of later convictions for violent offenses<br />

(up to age 45) were poor parental supervision, parental conflict, and parental aggression,<br />

including harsh, punitive discipline. Some research has linked being raised in a single-parent<br />

family with increased delinquency (McCord, Widom, and Crowell, 2001); however, when<br />

researchers control for socioeconomic conditions, these differences are minimized (Austin, 1978;<br />

Crockett, Eggebeen, and Hawkins, 1993). Some research has shown that children from families<br />

with four or more children have an increased chance of offending (Wasserman and Seracini,<br />

2001; West and Farrington, 1973).<br />

Peer Influences. Several studies have found a consistent relationship between involvement in a<br />

delinquent peer group and delinquent behavior. Lipsey and Derzon (1998) noted that for youth<br />

ages 12–14, a key predictor variable for delinquency is the presence of antisocial peers.<br />

According to McCord and colleagues (2001:80), "Factors such as peer delinquent behavior, peer<br />

approval of delinquent behavior, attachment or allegiance to peers, time spent with peers, and<br />

peer pressure for deviance have all been associated with adolescent antisocial behavior."<br />

Conversely, Elliot (1994) reported that spending time with peers who disapprove of delinquent<br />

behavior may curb later violence. The influence of peers and their acceptance of delinquent<br />

behavior is significant, and this relationship is magnified when youth have little interaction with<br />

their parents (Steinberg, 1987).<br />

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Community Factors<br />

Farrington (2000:5) noted that "only in the 1990's have the longitudinal researchers begun to pay<br />

sufficient attention to neighborhood and community factors, and there is still a great need for<br />

them to investigate immediate situational influences on offending." As described below, the<br />

environment in which youth are reared can influence the likelihood of delinquency.<br />

School Policies. The National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine reviewed the<br />

impact of school policies concerning grade retention, 4 suspension and expulsion, and school<br />

tracking of juvenile delinquency. These organizations reported that such policies, which<br />

disproportionately affect minorities, have negative consequences for at-risk youth (McCord,<br />

Widom, and Crowell, 2001). For example, suspension and expulsion do not appear to reduce<br />

undesirable behavior, and both are linked to increased delinquent behavior. In addition, Heal's<br />

(1978) cross-sectional study of primary and secondary schools in England found that large<br />

schools with formal and severe punishment structures in place had more incidents of students<br />

misbehaving.<br />

Neighborhood. Existing research points to a powerful connection between residing in an<br />

adverse environment and participating in criminal acts (McCord, Widom, and Crowell, 2001).<br />

Sociological theories of deviance hypothesize that "disorganized neighborhoods have weak<br />

social control networks; that weak social control, resulting from isolation among residents and<br />

high residential turnover, allows criminal activity to go unmonitored" (Herrenkohl et al.,<br />

2001:221). Although researchers debate the interaction between environmental and personal<br />

factors, most agree that "living in a neighborhood where there are high levels of poverty and<br />

crime increases the risk of involvement in serious crime for all children growing up there"<br />

(McCord, Widom, and Crowell, 2001:89).<br />

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Conclusion<br />

The risk factor paradigm is a promising approach to understanding the problem of juvenile<br />

delinquency. The Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency, partially<br />

funded by OJJDP, is one example of a longitudinal study of youth that is helping to detect the<br />

importance of various risk factors for delinquency. Future research should continue to study the<br />

interrelationships between risk factors and delinquency and attempt to clarify how risk factors<br />

interact to create a cumulative effect. Similarly, researchers should continue studying the<br />

interaction between risk and protective factors and exploring why some youth exposed to<br />

multiple risk factors do not commit delinquent acts.<br />

The development of the risk factor model, however, has its problems. Farrington (2000:16)<br />

remarks that "the main problems lie in the definition and identification of risk and protective<br />

factors, in establishing what are causes, in choosing interventions based on identified risk and<br />

protective factors, in evaluating multiple component and area-based interventions, and in<br />

assessing the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of components of interventions."<br />

One question confronting those who would develop delinquency prevention programs based on<br />

risk factor research is whether a given risk factor can easily be changed. For example, research<br />

has shown that low socioeconomic status is associated with increased levels of delinquency.<br />

Although socioeconomic conditions may be hard to change, programs may seek to increase<br />

certain protective factors to offset the risk. Other risk factors are more amenable to change. Poor<br />

parenting, for example, can be addressed by programs that teach parenting skills and provide<br />

family support services.<br />

The prevention of delinquency is a complex problem with no simple solutions. Risk factor<br />

analysis offers a way to determine which youth are most likely to become delinquent. The<br />

approach also allows practitioners to tailor prevention programs to the unique needs of individual<br />

youth and communities.<br />

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Protective Factors<br />

That Guard Against Delinquency<br />

Protective Factors for the Perpetration of Youth Violence 10<br />

Protective factors buffer young people from the risks of becoming violent. These factors exist at<br />

various levels. To date, protective factors have not been studied as extensively or rigorously as<br />

risk factors. However, identifying and understanding protective factors are equally as important<br />

as researching risk factors.<br />

Most research is preliminary. Studies propose the following protective factors:<br />

Individual Protective Factors<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Intolerant attitude toward deviance<br />

High IQ<br />

High grade point average (as an indicator of high academic achievement)<br />

Positive social orientation<br />

Highly developed social skills/competencies<br />

Highly developed skills for realistic planning<br />

Religiosity<br />

Family Protective Factors<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Connectedness to family or adults outside the family<br />

Ability to discuss problems with parents<br />

Perceived parental expectations about school performance are high<br />

Frequent shared activities with parents<br />

Consistent presence of parent during at least one of the following: when awakening,<br />

when arriving home from school, at evening mealtime or going to bed<br />

Involvement in social activities<br />

Parental / family use of constructive strategies for coping with problems (provision of<br />

models of constructive coping)<br />

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Peer and Social Protective Factors<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Possession of affective relationships with those at school that are strong, close, and<br />

prosocially oriented<br />

Commitment to school (an investment in school and in doing well at school)<br />

Close relationships with non-deviant peers<br />

Membership in peer groups that do not condone antisocial behavior<br />

Involvement in prosocial activities<br />

Exposure to school climates that characterized by:<br />

o Intensive supervision<br />

o Clear behavior rules<br />

o Consistent negative reinforcement of aggression<br />

o Engagement of parents and teachers<br />

______<br />

Protective factors help us to better understand the characteristics and situations that protect and<br />

distance youth from delinquent behavior. Protective factors are characteristics or conditions that<br />

act as risk moderators, i.e., they help reduce the negative effects associated with risk factors and<br />

help youth better handle their situation.<br />

Protective factors are cumulative and interactive. However, they are not necessarily always the<br />

opposite of risk factors; for example, growing up in a poor area can be attenuated by parental<br />

involvement, participation and support.<br />

Table 2 illustrates the protective factors associated with family; some examples are listed below.<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Adequate parental practices are a significant protective factor against deviant behavior<br />

such as delinquency and drug/alcohol abuse.<br />

The quality of family ties is a protective factor against delinquency for girls and boys of<br />

all age groups.<br />

The integration of families into the life of their community, the involvement of families<br />

in extracurricular and scholastic activities, and the availability of resources and services<br />

are also considered to be protective factors.<br />

Protective Factors Associated with Family<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Family Dynamic and<br />

Functioning<br />

Relationship based on<br />

family bond<br />

Positive support within the<br />

family<br />

Adequate parental<br />

supervision<br />

At Every Age<br />

Family Characteristics<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Parental level of<br />

education<br />

Financial stability<br />

Stability of the<br />

family unit<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Area of Residence<br />

Integration of families into<br />

the life of the community<br />

Relationships established<br />

with neighbours<br />

School activities involving<br />

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Family Dynamic and<br />

Functioning<br />

Respect for friends by<br />

parents<br />

Closeness between parents<br />

and children (affection)<br />

Consistent disciplinary<br />

methods<br />

Adequate parental<br />

behaviour and practices<br />

At Every Age<br />

Family Characteristics<br />

Area of Residence<br />

the family<br />

Conclusion<br />

Families that present risk factors for juvenile delinquency must be considered as a complex<br />

reality, influenced by various risk factors. The concept of the "at-risk" family must be understood<br />

as a whole. Furthermore, we must not forget that family is at the crossroads of many other areas<br />

of influence: circle of friends, school and the community.<br />

Families play a key role in the development of children and adolescents. It is therefore important<br />

to address those who are at risk by focusing on protective factors and offering training to parents<br />

and youth, family therapy, integrated treatment plans or other effective strategies to prevent and<br />

reduce juvenile delinquency.<br />

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The Multidisciplinary Approach<br />

to <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Comprehensive Reform 8<br />

One way to address the issue of the large numbers of youth with mental substance use disorders<br />

in the juvenile justice system is to reform the entire system using a variety of approaches.<br />

Administrative Strategy<br />

This model identifies four cornerstones to enhanced delivery of mental health services to youth<br />

in contact with the juvenile justice system and identifies areas for reform. The four cornerstones<br />

are:<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

collaboration between the juvenile justice and mental health systems;<br />

identification of youth mental health needs;<br />

diversion of youth into community-based mental health treatment when<br />

appropriate; and<br />

treatment.<br />

California Healthy Returns Initiative<br />

This 2005-2009 initiative was designed to strengthen county juvenile justice systems‘ ability to<br />

provide health and mental health services for youth and continuity of care when they returned to<br />

the community. The following practices were recognized as critical to any systems reform effort<br />

to serve this population:<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

screening using validated mental health screening tools;<br />

multidisciplinary teams;<br />

connecting youth and families to benefits and resources, including health care,<br />

housing assistance, and food stamps;<br />

collaboration and integration across services; and<br />

funding and resources to sustain multi-disciplinary, collaborative, holistic<br />

approaches.<br />

Comprehensive Systems Change Initiative (CSCI)<br />

The initiative is a collaborative strategic planning model that brings together juvenile justice and<br />

mental health systems to identify youth with mental health needs at their earliest point of contact<br />

with the juvenile justice system to develop an effective service delivery system to meet their<br />

needs. The framework includes:<br />

o<br />

collaboration among all relevant youth-serving agencies and families;<br />

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o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

identification of youth with mental health needs through use of standardized<br />

screening and assessment tools;<br />

diversion of youth from the justice system to community programs where<br />

possible; and<br />

treatment for youth who remain in the system using a continuum of evidencebased<br />

mental health services.<br />

Three Pennsylvania counties – Allegheny, Chester, and Erie – began implementing the CSCI<br />

model in 2004.<br />

Reclaiming Futures<br />

The Reclaiming Futures model unites juvenile courts, probation, adolescent substance abuse<br />

treatment, and the community to work together to improve drug and alcohol treatment and<br />

connect teens to positive activities and caring adults. The model has six steps (with process and<br />

outcome measures attached). They are:<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

screening youth for substance abuse problems as soon as possible after they are<br />

referred to the juvenile justice system;<br />

assessment of youth with possible substance abuse problems, using a reputable<br />

tool;<br />

service coordination, using intervention plans designed and coordinated by<br />

community teams, including families and agencies;<br />

―initiation,‖ defined as at least one service contract within 14 days of a full<br />

assessment;<br />

―engagement,‖ defined as at least three successful service contacts within 30 days<br />

of a youth‘s full assessment;<br />

―transition,‖ when a youth completes the service plan and agency-based services<br />

are gradually withdrawn and youth and families are connected with long-term<br />

supports.<br />

Integrated Co-Occurring Treatment Model (ICT)<br />

Originating in Akron, Ohio, this is a program for youth with mental health and substance use<br />

disorders in the juvenile justice system. Youth are diverted to the program by the court. They are<br />

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assessed and provided with individual and family therapy, based on a ―system of care<br />

philosophy‖ that engages the youth and the family in an intensive home-based treatment<br />

program.<br />

ICT has been implemented in the following sites: Akron, Ohio; Cuyahoga County, Ohio;<br />

Kalamazoo, Michigan; McHenry County, Illinois; and in Salinas, California (past site).<br />

Wraparound Milwaukee<br />

This program is recognized as a model for collaboration. It is a multi-service approach to<br />

meeting youth‘s needs through the collaboration of the mental health, juvenile justice, child<br />

welfare, and education systems and pooled funding. It focuses on the strengths of the family,<br />

neighborhood, and community.<br />

Legislation<br />

Comprehensive Community Mental Health Services for Children and their Families<br />

Initiative (“Systems of Care Model”)<br />

In 1992, Congress passed legislation creating this program with the goal of creating a<br />

comprehensive array of community-based mental health services and supports that are more<br />

effectively delivered to children and their families.<br />

The program is implemented by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services<br />

Administration (SAMHSA) and encourages multi-agency partnerships between the mental<br />

health, juvenile justice, child welfare, and education systems.<br />

Some communities have used this funding to improve the delivery of services to justice-involved<br />

youth, such as Wrap-Around Milwaukee.<br />

o<br />

o<br />

In 2007, Washington State passed legislation to implement a wraparound model<br />

(HB 1088).<br />

California passed legislation requiring the Department of Youth Authority and the<br />

Department of Mental Health to collaborate on training, treatment and medication<br />

guidelines for youth with mental illness under the jurisdiction of the Youth<br />

Authority.<br />

Mental Health Screenings<br />

Numerous states have passed legislation that require mental health screenings and assessments.<br />

Go here for examples.<br />

Multi-Disciplinary Teams (MDT)<br />

Legislation promoting multi-disciplinary teams in juvenile justice was passed in California in<br />

2005 (SB 570). It established an optional procedure within county juvenile courts to handle<br />

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youth with serious mental, emotional, or developmental disabilities, and included case review by<br />

an MDT.<br />

West Virginia law requires the Division of <strong>Juvenile</strong> Services to convene multi-disciplinary<br />

treatment teams for youth that have been adjudicated delinquent and are in their custody for a<br />

period of examination in the juvenile diagnostic center. The team includes a juvenile probation<br />

officer, social worker, parents or guardians, attorneys, school officials, and can include child<br />

advocates.<br />

Litigation<br />

Litigation has been used as an effective tool for change in many states where conditions in the<br />

juvenile facilities were egregious. Some of the resulting consent decrees and settlement<br />

agreements have focused on or included youth with mental health needs. Below is an example of<br />

one case in which the court ordered comprehensive remedial plans to be implemented to correct<br />

many problems in the system, including mental health treatment.<br />

California<br />

o<br />

In the case of Farrell v. Allen, the California Youth Authority (CYA) (now the California<br />

Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>) was sued due to serious on-going problems with conditions<br />

in CYA‘s facilities, and entered into a consent decree in 2004. Subsequently, the Department<br />

of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> (DJJ) developed several remediation plans, one of which concerned<br />

mental health, and the court ordered that it be implemented. This plan contained many<br />

elements including:<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

Mental health screenings required at intake and follow-up assessments where<br />

significant mental health problems indicated;<br />

Staff training in evidence-based psycho-social treatment with selected<br />

individuals trained in evidence-based treatment interventions.<br />

Mental health leaders in DJJ required to stay current with developments in the<br />

field of evidence-based treatments.<br />

DJJ required to take measures to support the involvement of families. One<br />

evidence-based model recommended was the Family Engagement Model<br />

developed by McKay et al. (McKay & Bannon, 2005)<br />

Support should be provided to youth with mental health needs who are<br />

returning to the community. One model recommended was the Family<br />

Integrated Transitions program.<br />

DJJ is to develop a training program for mental and behavioral health staff.<br />

Illinois<br />

o<br />

In the Illinois case of RJ, BW, DF, DG, and MD v. Bishop, youth who were confined in<br />

secure Illinois youth centers filed a class action lawsuit against the state Department of<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> alleging that the poor conditions and treatment violated their constitutional<br />

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ights. The complaint specifically addressed mental health treatment problems. The court<br />

ordered a remedial plan, which included the following regarding mental health services [18] :<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

screening and assessment upon intake<br />

appropriate treatment planning<br />

provision of mental health services as determined by the youth‘s mental health<br />

treatment plan<br />

prompt access to mental health professionals<br />

appropriate suicide prevention<br />

prompt hospitalization of youth when required<br />

appropriate substance abuse diagnosis and treatment<br />

appropriate aftercare and discharge planning<br />

Ohio<br />

o<br />

In the case of S.H. v. Stickrath, a class action was brought against the Ohio Department<br />

of Youth Services (DYS) alleging a system-wide failure regarding conditions of confinement<br />

within DYS facilities that led to numerous problems, including depriving youth of adequate<br />

mental health care. In a stipulated judgment resolving the claims, DYS was required to [19] :<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

develop and implement a continuum-of-care mental health system that<br />

incorporates evidence-based or research-supported promising practices for the<br />

assessment and treatment of each youth;<br />

ensure that youth have access to necessary inpatient psychiatric treatment at<br />

an appropriate facility;<br />

redesign and restructure mental health screening, assessment, and referral<br />

processes to ensure youth are identified and referred for appropriate, prompt,<br />

and effective care;<br />

provide youth who are not on the mental health caseload with access to staff<br />

trained in identifying mental health needs and providing mental health<br />

services to these youth as needed; and<br />

expand and strengthen contact with families and clinical staff.<br />

______<br />

Diversion from Confinement<br />

Diverting Youth from the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System or from Secure Confinement<br />

Many recent reform efforts have focused on ways to treat youth with mental health needs and/or<br />

substance use disorders in the community instead of the juvenile justice system.<br />

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School-Based Diversion<br />

Schools frequently use the police to handle even minor discipline problems, sending many youth<br />

into the justice system. Often a student‘s unruly behavior is at least in part due to a mental health<br />

disorder.<br />

Training school staff and police officers to identify and appropriately respond to youth with<br />

mental health needs can decrease referrals to juvenile court, especially when coupled with<br />

alternative community-based mental health resources to which youth can be referred instead.<br />

Mobile Urgent Treatment Team Project (MUTT)<br />

<br />

This project, pioneered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, as part of its wraparound program, uses a<br />

―mobile urgent response‖ to school-based incidents involving youth with mental health<br />

issues. The program‘s key elements are:<br />

• Training school officials on how to deal with youth with mental health issues;<br />

and<br />

• Ensuring that the mental health system instead of law enforcement responds to<br />

incidents by linking schools with mobile mental health crisis teams and<br />

community providers.<br />

• The Mental Health/<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Action Network of the Models for Change<br />

initiative has worked with states in the network to develop school-based<br />

diversion initiatives based on the MUTT model.<br />

• Connecticut developed a school-based diversion initiative to provide mental<br />

health crisis teams in three middle schools. They developed a standardized<br />

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Written Protocols<br />

curriculum to train school officials based on the MUTT program that included<br />

crisis de-escalation and community referral sources.<br />

• Ohio implemented their diversion initiative in several schools in two counties.<br />

• Washington implemented a diversion program in three middle schools for the<br />

2009-2010 school year but did not receive funding to continue it.<br />

• Program manuals to guide replication of these models have been developed in<br />

Connecticut and Ohio.<br />

<br />

In this approach, schools develop a written protocol on handling student offenses that<br />

includes referrals to resources other than law enforcement. The protocol should specify<br />

procedures to follow when a student has a special need such as a mental health problem,<br />

substance abuse disorder, or developmental disability.<br />

Law Enforcement Diversion<br />

It is possible to decrease the unnecessary arrest and processing of youth with mental health<br />

disorders when law enforcement officers are trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of<br />

mental illness, substance abuse, and developmental disabilities in youth and to de-escalate their<br />

interactions with them; and by providing access to mental health services and supports for these<br />

youth.<br />

Crisis Intervention Teams<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Crisis Intervention Teams (CIT) are composed of officers specially trained to respond to<br />

crisis calls involving individuals that may have mental health disorders. Studies have<br />

found that CIT programs decrease the need for more aggressive law enforcement<br />

responses, reduce officer injuries, and increase referrals to emergency health care.<br />

Although the teams were developed for adults, the model has been expanded to youth.<br />

Colorado, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania worked with national experts to create a Crisis<br />

Intervention Team for Youth (CIT-Y) training program.<br />

All of the school resource officers in Jefferson Parish, LA, received CIT training in 2010<br />

and referrals on minor charges declined by 58 percent.<br />

Intake Diversion<br />

• An ideal time to screen, identify, and divert youth with mental and/or substance use<br />

disorders, is when they go through intake with a juvenile probation officer -- one of their<br />

earliest points of contact with the juvenile justice system. However, it is important not to<br />

―widen the net,‖ or to keep youth in the justice system just to receive treatment.<br />

• In this model, intake probation officers should receive training to recognize the signs and<br />

symptoms of mental illness, substance use disorders, and developmental disabilities.<br />

Page 65 of 113


Front-End Diversion Initiative (FEDI)<br />

Texas has created a specialized probation diversion program for youth with mental health needs<br />

known as the ―Front-End Diversion Initiative.‖ It has been implemented in five demonstration<br />

sites in the state and aims to divert youth with identified mental health needs from being<br />

adjudicated delinquent.<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

The initiative uses specialized juvenile probation officers to work with the youth. They have<br />

limited caseloads, undergo substantial mental health training and certification, and provide<br />

intense supervision, crisis planning, community service Links, and aftercare planning.<br />

The program is for youth who have committed their first offense. If they complete the sixmonth<br />

program successfully, they are not adjudicated delinquent.<br />

A study of the initiative‘s preliminary outcomes found promising results, and researchers<br />

recommended further study.<br />

Diversion from Secure Detention Prior to Trial<br />

<br />

<br />

Youth remain in the system, but are provided with community alternatives so they do not<br />

have to be confined prior to trial in a secure detention facility. These alternatives may not<br />

be specifically geared to youth with mental health and substance use disorders, but can be<br />

utilized to keep them in the community.<br />

Alternatives include outright release or supervised release, with programs such as home<br />

detention, electronic monitoring, intensive supervision, day and evening reporting<br />

centers, and local residential and treatment programs.<br />

The <strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI)<br />

<br />

The JDAI initiative of the Annie E. Casey Foundation has been quite successful at<br />

reducing the number of youth in secure detention in communities all over the country.<br />

Diversion from Incarceration Following Trial<br />

<br />

Many effective evidence-based programs have been developed to provide treatment to<br />

youth with mental health and substance use disorders in the juvenile justice system.<br />

These programs can often be provided in the community in place of securely confining<br />

youth in juvenile institutions.<br />

Specialty Courts<br />

<br />

Specialty courts are designed to handle a special docket, such as youth with substance<br />

abuse or mental health disorders, or both. Youth may be diverted prior to adjudication or<br />

after.<br />

Page 66 of 113


<strong>Juvenile</strong> Mental Health Courts<br />

<br />

These courts focus on treatment rather than punishment with the goal of diverting mentally ill<br />

youth from detention to community-based mental health services by providing intensive case<br />

management and the collaboration of many system stakeholders, including representatives<br />

from the juvenile court, probation, prosecution and defense, mental health service providers,<br />

and the youth and their families.<br />

o A study funded by the National Institute of <strong>Justice</strong> on the benefits and costs of<br />

juvenile mental health courts, and their efficacy in preventing further involvement in<br />

the juvenile justice system, is currently underway.<br />

o York County, PA, established the first mental health court for minors in Pennsylvania<br />

in 1998. There are now 41 juvenile mental health courts in fifteen states.<br />

o King County, Washington (Seattle) created a mental health treatment court in 2003 to<br />

focus on youth with co-occuring mental health and substance use disorders in order to<br />

provide a continuum of assessment, treatment, and support for these youth.<br />

o The National Center for Youth Law has a <strong>Juvenile</strong> Mental Health Court Initiative in<br />

Alameda County, CA that focuses on treatment of these youth and diverting them<br />

from jails to community-based alternatives.<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> Drug Courts<br />

<br />

The number of juvenile drug courts has mushroomed in the last twenty years and there<br />

are now 476 juvenile drug courts in operation.<br />

Effectiveness<br />

<br />

Studies of juvenile drug courts have been mixed. Some have been encouraging, showing<br />

lower recidivism rates and less substance abuse. However, a recent meta-analysis found<br />

that while adult drug courts significantly lowered recidivism rates, juvenile drug courts<br />

had relatively small effects on recidivism.<br />

Concerns<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

Drug court programs may expose first- or second-time juvenile offenders to peers who<br />

have more serious substance abuse addictions and therefore might have a negative<br />

influence on recovery.<br />

Few studies have examined the long-term effects of drug courts on participants, so it‘s<br />

unclear if positive results last.<br />

Drug courts may widen the net of the justice system.<br />

Litigation<br />

Litigation over extremely poor conditions in juvenile facilities has led to requirements to use<br />

more alternatives to incarceration in some cases.<br />

Page 67 of 113


Lauderdale County, Mississippi<br />

<br />

Disability Rights Mississippi filed a lawsuit to gain access to the Lauderdale County<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Center (LCJDC) in Lauderdale County, Mississippi. After<br />

documenting concerns regarding the policies and practices at the detention center, a<br />

settlement agreement was reached that included the following:<br />

• When youth violate a court order, court staff must consider alternative<br />

sanctions to secure detention.<br />

• Lauderdale County was directed to apply to join Annie E. Casey‘s<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) to reduce the use of<br />

secure detention.<br />

Improving Access to Health Care Coverage<br />

______<br />

Funding<br />

<br />

Youth who enter, leave, or move within the juvenile justice system may not have health<br />

coverage or risk losing it because of these transitions. Reforms are detailed below that<br />

can help to improve access to mental health and substance abuse coverage for these<br />

youth.<br />

Page 68 of 113


The recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 could<br />

lead to significant changes in health care delivery that could impact the delivery of<br />

mental health care to justice-involved youth.<br />

Enroll Youth In Medicaid and CHIP<br />

When they enter the justice system, many youth who are eligible for Medicaid and CHIP are not<br />

currently enrolled. Screening them at intake for eligibility, assisting families to enroll, and<br />

expediting the process can help these youth to get coverage as early as possible.<br />

<br />

The Texas <strong>Juvenile</strong> Probation Commission screens youth for Medicaid eligibility at two<br />

points – arrest and during the trial process.<br />

Avoid Gaps in Medicaid and CHIP Coverage<br />

During transitions in custody, youth often lose Medicaid and CHIP coverage because of the<br />

paperwork and documentation requirements and confusion over whether coverage can be<br />

maintained.<br />

States can help youth avoid gaps in coverage in a variety of ways:<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

Suspend, rather than terminate, coverage of youth in the juvenile justice system so that<br />

their coverage can be reinstated more easily at discharge.<br />

Continue Medicaid and/or CHIP coverage for youth in detention who are awaiting trial.<br />

Provide a grace period before enrollment lapses so that families have time to collect the<br />

necessary information and documentation to maintain coverage.<br />

Implement the continuous eligibility option that Medicaid allows to keep youth enrolled<br />

for 12 months during transitional periods.<br />

Washington State provides 12-month continuous coverage to youth so that youth who<br />

enter and leave a detention facility within a 12-month period remain Medicaid-eligible<br />

after release.<br />

Better Coordination of Coverage with Partner Agencies<br />

At a minimum, state juvenile justice agencies can use the federal matching funds allowed to non-<br />

Medicaid agencies to work with Medicaid departments to identify and enroll youth in Medicaid.<br />

Medicaid agencies can train juvenile justice staff on the Medicaid eligibility process so they can<br />

assist youth with enrollment and integrate applications for health care coverage into youth<br />

discharge planning.<br />

King County, WA<br />

o<br />

The King County, Washington <strong>Juvenile</strong> Court Services Division has used the administrative<br />

funds option to reach out to youth and enroll them in Medicaid with the support of the state‘s<br />

Medicaid department since 1997.<br />

Page 69 of 113


New Mexico<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

Staff at the state Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD) who work with justiceinvolved<br />

youth receive training to determine if they are temporarily eligible for Medicaid.<br />

In 2007, the department created a network of regional transition coordinators to work with<br />

justice-involved youth from intake through release. They can help youth and their families<br />

determine if they are eligible for Medicaid on a temporary basis and complete full<br />

applications for coverage.<br />

New Mexico has also streamlined the application process for youth exiting juvenile facilities.<br />

An ideal approach is to educate agency staff about how the Medicaid, juvenile, and mental health<br />

systems work at the state and local levels, including what juvenile justice services Medicaid<br />

covers, and coverage eligibility for youth at different points of the juvenile justice system.<br />

In addition, at least one state has sought to augment coordination through restructuring.<br />

Illinois<br />

o<br />

The state established the Bureau of Interagency Coordination (BIC) in 1999, which created a<br />

central point of contact within the Medicaid department for state agencies and counties that<br />

provide services to individuals covered by Medicaid.<br />

Legislation<br />

Improve Medicaid Coverage for Youth in the <strong>Justice</strong> System<br />

States can also legislate changes to their Medicaid system that help youth in the justice system<br />

get coverage for treatment.<br />

California<br />

<br />

<br />

In 2006, California passed SB 1469 to help youth in the juvenile justice system obtain<br />

Medicaid coverage before they are released from secure lockup.<br />

For all youth committed to a county juvenile detention facility for more than 30 days, the<br />

facility must inform the state Medicaid agency of the child‘s name and scheduled date of<br />

release, and the agency then must process their application.<br />

Washington State<br />

<br />

<br />

In 2007, Washington State passed legislation that directed the Department of Social and<br />

Health Services to explore the feasibility of Medicaid payment for youth temporarily placed<br />

in a juvenile detention facility.<br />

The law also provided a number of additional mechanisms to assist with enrolling youth or<br />

reinstating their medical assistance coverage after their release from a facility.<br />

______<br />

Page 70 of 113


Legal Representation of <strong>Juvenile</strong>s<br />

When youth are screened or assessed – either for mental health and/or substance abuse issues, or<br />

for competency to stand trial – it raises serious issues about how to protect their legal rights.<br />

Screening and assessment can affect their constitutional right to avoid self-incrimination in court,<br />

their control over who sees sensitive information about them and when, and their right to<br />

comprehend the significance of court proceedings.<br />

Fortunately, procedures and protocols can be put in place that protect their legal rights while<br />

ensuring that their mental health and other needs are met.<br />

A. Confidentiality/Information-Sharing<br />

In the course of mental health screening, assessment, evaluation, or treatment, youth disclose<br />

sensitive information that may be self-incriminating, such as information on drug use, violent<br />

behavior, sexual deviancy, victimization, abuse, and weapons offenses.<br />

Youth have a constitutional right to protection from self-incrimination. But unless policies are<br />

implemented to protect their legal interests, the information gleaned through mental health<br />

screenings and assessments could be used against them in court to find them guilty of an offense<br />

or to increase their punishment.<br />

Most states currently don‘t have these protective policies or legislation in place.<br />

Procedural Guidelines<br />

Formal Agreements and Court Orders<br />

o<br />

o<br />

Where no legal protections are in place to protect youth from self-incrimination, memoranda<br />

of understanding can be developed with the stakeholders—e.g., the court, prosecutor‘s office,<br />

public defenders, juvenile services, public and private mental health agencies—to safeguard<br />

youth‘s legal interests.<br />

In Santa Clara County, CA, members of a multi-disciplinary team that meet weekly for<br />

children with behavioral health needs developed a formal process for information-sharing<br />

across the range of providers involved with the youth. Other counties have established<br />

standing court orders to facilitate the sharing of information.<br />

Limiting the Use of Screening/Assessment Tools<br />

<br />

Another option is to select screening/assessment tools whose questions will minimize the<br />

harm of self-incrimination to youth as much as possible, or to avoid administering certain<br />

portions of the tool being used.<br />

Competency to Stand Trial<br />

Page 71 of 113


A young person‘s competency to stand trial may be called into question during a mental<br />

health screening or assessment (though a competency evaluation is necessary to arrive at a<br />

conclusive determination).<br />

All states except Oklahoma recognize that youth that are before a juvenile court must be<br />

competent to stand trial. While some states have tried to use adult competency standards for<br />

youth, this is generally insufficient because there are reasons for incompetence that are<br />

unique to youth, such as their developmental immaturity.<br />

It is also important to be aware that a young person‘s ongoing development may further<br />

hamper their competency when coupled with mental illness and/or intellectual disabilities,<br />

and can make diagnosis challenging.<br />

Defense attorneys have been raising the issue of juvenile competency to stand trial with<br />

increasing frequency in the past decade. During this time period, studies have shown widespread<br />

impairments in certain categories of youth, particularly younger individuals and those with low<br />

IQs, supporting the need for guidance for courts on how to handle juvenile competency.<br />

Model Statutory Language<br />

Most states have not developed statutory guidance for courts on how to determine competency<br />

and handle the disposition of incompetent youth. However, as of 2007, at least ten states had<br />

passed legislation addressing juvenile competency: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,<br />

Minnesota, Nebraska, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin.<br />

Page 72 of 113


Enacted Legislation<br />

Below are examples of legislation enacted on some of the many issues concerning juvenile<br />

competency.<br />

Developmental Immaturity<br />

o<br />

o<br />

Not all states accept developmental immaturity as a reason for incompetence, but California<br />

is one of the states that does.<br />

Virginia does not permit a finding of incompetency based solely on age or developmental<br />

factors.<br />

Factors in Determining Competency<br />

<br />

<br />

Alaska‘s statute on youth competency specifically outlines the youth‘s functional abilities<br />

that the court should consider in making a competency determination.<br />

Maryland‘s statute defines broader ―cognitive concepts‖ the court should consider, rather<br />

than functional abilities.<br />

Counsel for <strong>Juvenile</strong>s<br />

<br />

Louisiana law entitles youth to counsel prior to and during competency evaluations.<br />

Self-incriminating Information<br />

<br />

Louisiana and Alaska provide protections for youth from the use of self-incriminating<br />

statements they may have made during competency evaluations in court proceedings against<br />

them.<br />

Legislation<br />

The most secure way to protect youth‘s rights against self-incrimination is to enact legislation or<br />

court rules that specifically require that information obtained by youth through screening,<br />

assessment, evaluation, or treatment as part of their juvenile court case cannot be used against<br />

them at any stage of a juvenile or criminal court case.<br />

While a number of states have passed legislation to protect youth‘s rights, most states do not<br />

have comprehensive protections against youth self-incrimination during mental health screening,<br />

assessment, evaluation, and treatment that cover all stages of the juvenile justice process.<br />

Model Statutory Language<br />

The <strong>Juvenile</strong> Law Center has developed model statutory language to protect youth from selfincrimination<br />

when undergoing screening, assessment, and treatment in the juvenile justice<br />

system.<br />

Page 73 of 113


Enacted Legislation<br />

In their 2007 publication on this topic, the <strong>Juvenile</strong> Law Center identified four states—Texas,<br />

Maryland, Missouri, and Connecticut—that had comprehensive statutory protections or court<br />

rules that could be used as models for state legislation.<br />

Recent examples of legislation enacted to protect youth from self-incrimination include<br />

Pennsylvania‘s 2008 legislation and legislation enacted in Illinois in 2010.<br />

______<br />

Implement Standardized Screening<br />

and Assessment Tools<br />

To Identify and Treat Youth with Mental and Substance Abuse Issues<br />

States have taken different approaches to ensure youth in the justice system with mental health<br />

and substance use treatment needs are screened, assessed, and treated.<br />

A systematic approach (through administrative changes, judicial mechanisms, or legislative<br />

action) reliably identifies local mental health and substance abuse treatment needs and uses local<br />

prevalence data to inform policy and funding.<br />

Administrative<br />

Many states are now using standardized mental health screenings and assessments.<br />

<br />

<br />

Two thousand sites in 47 states have registered to use the Massachusetts Youth Screening<br />

Instrument – Second Version (MAYSI-2) and of these states 44 are using the MAYSI-2<br />

statewide in all intake, detention, and/or juvenile corrections programs facilities. [79] It is also<br />

being used in other countries and has been translated into 15 languages. [80]<br />

The Voice Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children (Voice DISC) was being used in<br />

juvenile justice settings in 13 states as of 2007.<br />

Legislative<br />

A number of states have passed legislation that requires mental health screenings and<br />

assessments. Some examples:<br />

Minnesota<br />

<br />

Minnesota requires statewide mental health screening for all youth in the juvenile justice<br />

system found to be delinquent. Where indicated, a diagnostic assessment must then be<br />

conducted.<br />

Page 74 of 113


Nevada<br />

<br />

Nevada requires detained youth to be screened for mental health and substance use disorders<br />

while awaiting a detention hearing. The screening method must be ―based on research‖ and<br />

be ―reliable and valid.‖<br />

Texas<br />

<br />

Texas requires juvenile probation departments throughout the state to administer a mental<br />

health screening instrument that they select to all youth who have been formally referred to<br />

the probation department. The Department uses the MAYSI-2 assessment instrument within<br />

48 hours of admission to detention.<br />

Litigation<br />

In a number of states, the conditions inside juvenile facilities were so bad that lawsuits were filed<br />

to force needed changes. In several cases, this resulted in new requirements for mental health<br />

screening and assessment.<br />

California<br />

o<br />

In the case of Farrell v. Allen, the California Youth Authority (CYA) (now the California<br />

Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>) was sued due to serious on-going problems with conditions<br />

in CYA‘s facilities, and entered into a consent decree in 2004. Subsequently, the Department<br />

of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> (DJJ) developed several remediation plans, one of which concerned<br />

mental health, and the court ordered that it be implemented. The following actions had to be<br />

taken regarding screening and assessment:<br />

o All youth must receive a mental health screening within 48 hours of intake to<br />

identify mental health issues and other treatment needs.<br />

o Results must be reviewed by a psychologist no later than the next business<br />

day.<br />

o If the mental health screening indicates significant mental health problems,<br />

then a clinical evaluation must be completed by a mental health professional<br />

to assess further treatment needs.<br />

o A number of standardized, validated instruments were recommended, though<br />

not required, including the MAYSI-2, Suicide Ideation Questionnaires, and<br />

VOICE-DISC.<br />

Illinois<br />

o<br />

In the case of RJ, BW, DF, DG, and MD v. Bishop, youth who were confined in secure<br />

Illinois Youth Centers filed a class action lawsuit against the Illinois Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> alleging that alleging that the poor conditions and treatment violated their<br />

constitutional rights. The complaint specifically addressed mental health treatment problems.<br />

The Court ordered a remedial plan created and this plan included a requirement that<br />

screening and assessment be done upon reception of the youth in the facility.<br />

Page 75 of 113


Lauderdale County, Mississippi<br />

o<br />

Disability Rights Mississippi filed a lawsuit to gain access to the Lauderdale County <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

Detention Center (LCJDC) in Lauderdale County, Mississippi. After documenting concerns<br />

regarding the policies and practices at the detention center, a settlement agreement was<br />

reached that included the following requirements:<br />

o All youth must have a MAYSI-2 screening immediately upon admission.<br />

o If youth have urgent mental health issues, they must be immediately evaluated<br />

by a mental health professional or taken to the emergency room.<br />

o Adequate mental health services must be provided to all youth with a mental<br />

health diagnosis or serious mental health need, as indicated by the MAYSI-2.<br />

New Orleans, Louisiana<br />

o<br />

In 2009, a class action suit was brought against the city of New Orleans for federal<br />

constitutional and statutory violations due to extremely unsafe and unsanitary conditions at<br />

the Youth Study Center (YSC) in New Orleans. A consent decree was reached in 2010, and<br />

then further modified in 2011, requiring that YSC take a number of actions, including the<br />

following steps related to screening and assessment:<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

All admissions staff be trained on administering the MAYSI-2 screening<br />

instrument.<br />

Staff will properly file the results of the MAYSI-2 and flag for follow-up<br />

where appropriate.<br />

A psychiatrist or appropriately credentialed medical practitioner will assess all<br />

youth who score in a problematic range on the MAYSI-2 and assess all youth<br />

who have major psychotic issues.<br />

Page 76 of 113


o<br />

All youth with behavioral health needs will be referred for interventions in a<br />

timely fashion.<br />

New York<br />

o<br />

The Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of <strong>Justice</strong> sued the state of New<br />

York over conditions of confinement at four juvenile facilities in New York. They entered<br />

into a settlement agreement with New York, which required the state to:<br />

o<br />

o<br />

o<br />

have a qualified mental health professional screen each youth admitted to a<br />

facility;<br />

assess each youth for mental health issues, if indicated as necessary by their<br />

screening; and<br />

refer youth at immediate risk of harm to a mental health professional without<br />

delay.<br />

______<br />

Evidence-Based Treatment Programs<br />

Evidence-based treatment programs are primarily designed for use in the community instead of<br />

institutional settings, most have been adapted for use in both settings. Studies have found many<br />

of these programs are more effective at reducing recidivism (and cost significantly less) than<br />

incarceration.<br />

Intensive Family-Based Treatment<br />

Numerous community-based treatment programs have been studied and found to be more<br />

effective than secure confinement in reducing the number of youth who reoffend. Some effective<br />

evidence-based models for youth with mental health needs and/or substance abuse disorders<br />

include:<br />

Multisystemic Therapy (MST)<br />

An intensive family- and community-based treatment program for chronic and violent juvenile<br />

offenders. Therapists work with the family to address all the environmental systems affecting the<br />

youth --their homes and families, schools and teachers, neighborhoods and friends. In its 2012<br />

report, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) found that MST had a net<br />

benefit for Washington taxpayers of $24,751 per youth treated.<br />

Functional Family Therapy (FFT)<br />

A family-based treatment program for delinquent youth at risk for placement in a juvenile<br />

facility. FFT focuses on improving family communication and supportiveness, while decreasing<br />

intense dysfunctional behavior patterns. In its 2012 report, Washington State Institute for Public<br />

Page 77 of 113


Policy (WSIPP) found that FFT had a net benefit for Washington taxpayers of $30,706 per<br />

treated youth.<br />

Multi-Dimensional Treatment Foster Care (MDTFC)<br />

A foster program used as an alternative to institutionalization where community families are<br />

recruited, trained, and closely supervised to provide youth with treatment and intensive<br />

supervision at home, in school, and in the community. MDTFC uses a behavior modification<br />

program and provides youth with structured daily feedback. In its 2012 report, the Washington<br />

State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) found that MDTFC had a net benefit for Washington<br />

taxpayers of $31,276 per treated youth.<br />

Psychosocial Therapies<br />

Various types of psychosocial therapy are also being used to treat youth with mental health<br />

needs. The therapy is generally provided by trained professionals such as psychiatrists,<br />

psychologists, social workers, or counselors. Some examples of effective programs include:<br />

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)<br />

A psychotherapy treatment program that is a problem-focused approach to help youth identify<br />

and change the dysfunctional beliefs, thoughts, and patterns of behavior that contribute to their<br />

behavior. Studies have found CBT to be effective in changing problem behavior and reducing<br />

recidivism.<br />

Aggression Replacement Therapy (ART)<br />

This program is targeted to youth with a history of serious aggression and anti-social behavior. It<br />

teaches youth techniques to control impulsiveness and anger and use more appropriate pro-social<br />

behavior. Studies have found ART to be effective in reducing recidivism and problem behavior<br />

and increasing social skills.<br />

Medication<br />

Medication has been found to be effective in treating certain disorders in youth, such as attention<br />

deficit hyperactivity disorders (ADHD), depression, and certain anxiety disorders. This treatment<br />

can enable many youth to remain in the community safely.<br />

Trauma Care<br />

A traumatic experience is an event that threatens one‘s life, safety, or well-being, including<br />

emotional and physical assaults, abuse, and neglect. Many youth in the juvenile justice system<br />

have been exposed to community and family violence and/or been threatened with or been the<br />

direct target of violence. This trauma can impact children‘s development and health throughout<br />

their lives and needs to be considered when selecting effective treatment for youth in the juvenile<br />

justice system.<br />

Page 78 of 113


Identifying Youth with Trauma<br />

Assessments have been developed to identify and track trauma histories, such as the Traumatic<br />

Events Screening Inventory (Davis et al., 2000; Ford et al., 2000), and to identify mental health<br />

and behavior symptoms and disorders related to traumatic experiences, such as the UCLA<br />

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Reaction Index (Steinberg, Brymer, Decker, and Pynoos, 2004).<br />

Treating Trauma<br />

A number of evidence-based practices have been developed specifically to treat youth impacted<br />

by trauma. Cognitive behavioral treatment models are considered to be one of the best by the<br />

Centers for Disease Control. Click to download a comprehensive list of treatment programs.<br />

Improving Care for Traumatized Youth<br />

Congress established the National Child Traumatic Stress Network in 2000 to raise the standard<br />

of care and improve access to services for child victims of trauma.<br />

Administrative<br />

Many jurisdictions are now using evidence-based practices. Below is a sampling of some using<br />

particular programs or who have adopted specific policies on evidence-based practices:<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Washington State‘s <strong>Juvenile</strong> Rehabilitation Administration (JRA) created the ―Integrated<br />

Treatment Model‖ to address the mental health needs of their youth. The model incorporated<br />

evidence-based components of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Dialectical Behavior Therapy,<br />

and Functional Family Therapy to treat youth from the time of entry to a secure facility until<br />

release. The JRA also redesigned its aftercare program to focus on families and trained<br />

parole counselors in Functional Family Parole, which is based on Functional Family<br />

Therapy.<br />

Several states, including Connecticut, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Colorado, have created<br />

centers to increase the use of evidence-based practices in treating youth with mental health<br />

disorders. They help communities by providing information, assistance, and training.<br />

Many of the comprehensive reform programs utilized in several states make use of evidencebased<br />

practices.<br />

Legislation<br />

Oregon<br />

o<br />

Oregon requires that certain state agencies, including the Oregon Youth Authority, spend at<br />

least 75% of state money that they receive for programs on ―evidence-based programs.‖<br />

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Pennsylvania<br />

<br />

In 2012, Pennsylvania amended the Purpose Clause of its <strong>Juvenile</strong> Act to emphasize<br />

evidence-based practices, stating that evidence-based practices should be employed<br />

―whenever possible and, in the case of a delinquent child, by using the least restrictive<br />

intervention that is consistent with the protection of the community, the imposition of<br />

accountability for offenses committed and the rehabilitation, supervision and treatment needs<br />

of the child.‖<br />

Tennessee<br />

<br />

Tennessee passed a law in 2007 requiring state agencies to ensure that state-funds for<br />

juvenile justice programs are spent only on evidence-based programs.<br />

Washington<br />

<br />

Washington State has been in the forefront of states aggressively moving towards the use of<br />

evidence-based treatment programs for youth in the mental health, child welfare, and juvenile<br />

justice systems. Most recently, Washington enacted into law H.B. 2536 in 2012.<br />

• The specific intent of the law was to increase the use of ―evidence-based and<br />

research-based practices‖ for youth in the above-referenced systems.<br />

• It directs that a baseline assessment be done of the evidence and researchbased<br />

programs currently being used, their cost, and recommendations for a<br />

reallocation of resources towards such programs.<br />

• It also provides for monitoring and quality control to ensure fidelity to the<br />

evidence and research-based programs.<br />

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Litigation<br />

In lawsuits arising out of extremely poor conditions in juvenile facilities, some settlement<br />

agreements have mandated particular types of treatment programs.<br />

New York<br />

<br />

The Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of <strong>Justice</strong> sued the state of New<br />

York over conditions of confinement at four juvenile facilities in New York. They entered<br />

into a settlement agreement with New York which specified that the state had to provide an<br />

effective behavioral treatment program based on evidence-based principles for youth with<br />

mental health needs. It also required those treating the youth to consider a history of trauma<br />

in treatment planning<br />

______<br />

Improving Services<br />

Mechanisms to Improve Services for Youth with Mental Health and Substance Abuse<br />

Needs in the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System<br />

Some youth with mental and substance use disorders remain in the juvenile justice system even<br />

in communities that divert a lot of youth. Unfortunately, many agencies working with youth in<br />

the juvenile justice system do not receive education on basic mental health issues or on how to<br />

handle youth with these needs. This can pose significant challenges for staff, and can lead to<br />

more harmful treatment of youth, such as the use of physical force, restraints, and isolation.<br />

Below are some programs designed to improve their treatment so they can live healthy lives and<br />

not return to the justice system.<br />

Administration<br />

Mental Health Training, Education, and Workforce Enhancement Initiative<br />

Cross-State Initiative<br />

<br />

The MacArthur Models for Workforce Development Strategic Innovation Group (SIG) is<br />

developing a mental health education and training package for juvenile justice agency staff to<br />

improve their basic understanding of mental illness in youth and their skills in dealing with<br />

youth with mental health issues. Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, and Washington will<br />

implement the program in at least one juvenile justice setting – probation, juvenile court,<br />

detention, or corrections.<br />

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Workforce Collaborative on Evidence-Based Practices<br />

Louisiana<br />

<br />

Louisiana, as part of the MacArthur Models for Workforce Development SIG, is creating a<br />

multi-system collaborative to meet the challenges of recruiting, retaining, training, and<br />

educating individuals working with children at risk of or involved in the juvenile justice<br />

system.<br />

______<br />

Mental Health and Substance Abuse<br />

Treatment: Aftercare<br />

Aftercare treatment for youth with mental and substance use disorders can help keep them from<br />

returning to the justice system.<br />

Legislation<br />

Virginia<br />

<br />

Virginia legislation requires the state Board of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> to develop regulations to plan<br />

for mental health, substance abuse, and other therapeutic treatment services for youth<br />

returning from a commitment to a juvenile justice facility.<br />

______<br />

Family Engagement<br />

All young people need the support of their families, and this is especially vital for at-risk youth.<br />

There is increasing recognition that family involvement can be integral to youth success.<br />

Administration<br />

National<br />

<br />

Many jurisdictions have chosen to implement intensive treatment services for youth with<br />

mental health issues, such as Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) and Functional Family Therapy<br />

(FFT), which have proven successful with justice-involved youth.<br />

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Pennsylvania<br />

<br />

<br />

―Peer advocates‖ are being used in the Pennsylvania juvenile justice systems and in other<br />

states. This service uses peers to help family members of justice-involved youth navigate the<br />

system.<br />

In Philadelphia, the Mental Health Association in Southeast Pennsylvania‘s Parent Involved<br />

Network (PIN), provides several services to help families navigate the child-serving systems<br />

and to orient juvenile probation officers on working with families.<br />

Legislation<br />

Colorado<br />

<br />

Colorado passed HB 07-1057 in 2007, which established three family advocacy<br />

demonstration programs for youth with mental health or co-occurring disorders who are atrisk<br />

or already involved in the juvenile justice system.<br />

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Page 84 of 113


Restorative <strong>Justice</strong> 12<br />

Restorative <strong>Justice</strong> is an approach to justice that focuses on the needs of the victims and the<br />

offenders, as well as the involved community, instead of satisfying abstract legal principles or<br />

punishing the offender. Victims take an active role in the process, while offenders are<br />

encouraged to take responsibility for their actions, "to repair the harm they've done—by<br />

apologizing, returning stolen money, or community service". In addition, it provides help for the<br />

offender in order to avoid future offences. It is based on a theory of justice that considers crime<br />

and wrongdoing to be an offence against an individual or community, rather than the state.<br />

Restorative justice that fosters dialogue between victim and offender shows the highest rates of<br />

victim satisfaction and offender accountability.<br />

According to John Braithwaite (2004), restorative justice is:<br />

...a process where all stakeholders affected by an injustice have an opportunity to discuss how<br />

they have been affected by the injustice and to decide what should be done to repair the harm.<br />

With crime, restorative justice is about the idea that because crime hurts, justice should heal. It<br />

follows that conversations with those who have been hurt and with those who have inflicted the<br />

harm must be central to the process.<br />

The process of restorative justice necessitates a shift in responsibility for addressing crime. In a<br />

restorative justice process, the citizens who have been affected by a crime must take an active<br />

role in addressing that crime. Although law professionals may have secondary roles in<br />

facilitating the restorative justice process, it is the citizens who must take up the majority of the<br />

responsibility in healing the pains caused by crime.<br />

Dr. Carolyn Boyes-Watson (2014) at Suffolk University's Center for Restorative <strong>Justice</strong> defines<br />

restorative justice as:<br />

...a growing social movement to institutionalize peaceful approaches to harm, problem-solving<br />

and violations of legal and human rights. These range from international peacemaking tribunals<br />

such as the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission to innovations within the<br />

criminal and juvenile justice systems, schools, social services and communities. Rather than<br />

privileging the law, professionals and the state, restorative resolutions engage those who are<br />

harmed, wrongdoers and their affected communities in search of solutions that promote repair,<br />

reconciliation and the rebuilding of relationships. Restorative justice seeks to build partnerships<br />

to reestablish mutual responsibility for constructive responses to wrongdoing within our<br />

communities. Restorative approaches seek a balanced approach to the needs of the victim,<br />

wrongdoer and community through processes that preserve the safety and dignity of all."<br />

Howard Zehr describes the difference between restorative justice and traditional criminal justice<br />

in terms of the guiding questions each system asks. In Changing Lenses, Zehr asserts that<br />

restorative justice asks:<br />

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1. Who has been hurt?<br />

2. What are their needs?<br />

3. Whose obligations are these?<br />

4. What are the causes?<br />

5. Who has a stake in the situation?<br />

6. What is the appropriate process to involve stakeholders in an effort to address causes and<br />

put things right?<br />

This contrasts with the traditional criminal justice, which seeks answers to three questions:<br />

1. What laws have been broken?<br />

2. Who did it?<br />

3. What do the offender(s) deserve?<br />

Restorative justice is very<br />

different from either the<br />

adversarial legal process or<br />

that of civil litigation. J.<br />

Braithwaite writes, "Courtannexed<br />

ADR (alternative<br />

dispute resolution) and<br />

restorative justice could not<br />

be philosophically further<br />

apart", because the former<br />

seeks to address only legally<br />

relevant issues and to protect<br />

both parties' rights, whereas<br />

restorative justice seeks<br />

"expanding the issues beyond<br />

those that are legally<br />

relevant, especially into<br />

underlying relationships."<br />

Similarly, citing Greif,<br />

Liebmann wrote<br />

number of different tensions:<br />

a way of looking at<br />

restorative justice is to think<br />

of it as a balance among a<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

a balance between the therapeutic and the retributive models of justice<br />

a balance between the rights of offenders and the needs of victims<br />

a balance between the need to rehabilitate offenders and the duty to protect the<br />

public.<br />

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Restorative Practices<br />

The restorative practices (RP) concept has its roots in RJ. RP is an emerging field of practice and<br />

study devoted to building social capital and achieving social discipline through participatory<br />

learning and decision-making. RP ties together theory, research and practice in fields such as<br />

education, counseling, criminal justice, social work and organizational management. The<br />

unifying hypothesis of restorative practices is that human beings are happier, more cooperative<br />

and productive, and more likely to make positive behavioural changes when others do things<br />

with them (via collaboration), rather than to them (via coercion) or for them (via independent<br />

action).<br />

In criminal justice, RP circles and conferences allow involved parties to resolve offenses<br />

collaboratively. In social work, RP family group decision-making (FGDM) and FGC support<br />

collaboration within families, e.g., to protect children. In education, student circles and groups<br />

collaborate to peacefully resolve disputes.<br />

The criminal justice field uses the phrase "restorative justice"; social workers say<br />

"empowerment"; educators prefer "positive discipline" or "the responsive classroom"; while<br />

leadership consultants choose "horizontal management".<br />

RP is spreading in multiple countries, in education, criminal justice, family and youth andserving<br />

and workplace applications.<br />

RJ has not currently succeeded when applied to drug offences, sexual assault and domestic<br />

violence. South Australia and New Zealand have attempted RJ with juvenile sexual offenders.<br />

Indigenous regions of Canada have tentatively implemented circle sentencing to deal with<br />

domestic violence. Advocates believe that it may be applicable to these indigenous communities<br />

because it relates to traditional cultural values of restoring balance in the community. In addition,<br />

First Nations have low regard for the local (punitive) court system, in which their people are<br />

over-represented in court and in prison.<br />

Since 2000, Kahnawake, a Kanien'kehá:ka reserve, has introduced the use of restorative justice<br />

to intervene before an arrest occurs, and to prevent one. Feeling ill-served by the adversarial<br />

Canadian system, the community is particularly interested in incorporating restorative justice to<br />

work with its younger members and help prevent future offenses. Some Native American nations<br />

have also begun to adopt Restorative <strong>Justice</strong> practices; the Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge<br />

Reservation is planning a tribal justice center to include a courtroom for Restorative <strong>Justice</strong>.<br />

The Restorative <strong>Justice</strong> Facilitator<br />

The role of the facilitator is key to a successful restorative justice conference outcome for both<br />

victim and offender. In 2010 John Bacon submitted, in part fulfilment of the requirement of the<br />

University of Cambridge Master of Studies degree in Criminology, his thesis Making Progress<br />

in Restorative <strong>Justice</strong>: a qualitative study. This study is cited as a key part of the research<br />

Page 87 of 113


evidence used to inform the Restorative <strong>Justice</strong> Council's Best Practice Guidance for Restorative<br />

Practice (2011:30).<br />

This study reveals for the first time the key skills, techniques and characteristics necessary to<br />

make progress in restorative justice conferencing practice and from which an ideal candidate<br />

profile can be compiled which would assist in the recruitment, training and supervision of future<br />

facilitators.<br />

The study also revealed a number of practical and logistical obstacles to making progress which<br />

require a strategic and operational response if future restorative justice projects are to fulfill their<br />

remit.<br />

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Youth Court 13<br />

Teen Courts are problem-solving courts authorized by law in many states in America. The terms<br />

Teen Court, Youth Court, and Peer Court are used interchangeably. Their purpose is to<br />

provide an alternative disposition for juveniles who have committed a delinquent act, have<br />

committed a minor offense, or have been charged with a misdemeanor, and are otherwise eligible<br />

for diversion. Depending on their training, community support, and agreements with traditional<br />

court systems, most teen or youth courts are recognized as valid, legal venues for the process of<br />

hearing cases, sentencing and sentence fulfillment.<br />

Court Structure<br />

Teen courts are staffed by youth volunteers who<br />

serve in various capacities within the program,<br />

trained and acting in the roles of jurors, lawyers,<br />

bailiffs, clerks and judges. Teen courts usually<br />

function in cooperation with local juvenile courts<br />

and youth detention centers, middle and high<br />

schools, and/or community organizations such as<br />

the YMCA. Most teen courts are sentencing<br />

courts in which the offender has already admitted guilt or pled no contest.<br />

Many teen courts operate much like a traditional court, holding hearings before a judge and jury<br />

with the jury deliberating to determine an appropriate disposition. Other courts employ different<br />

structures, such as a judge-panel model which includes a panel of 3 to 6 youth judges who<br />

collectively hear, deliberate, and sentence the offender.<br />

Often, sentences will involve the defendant's making restitution to someone harmed or<br />

inconvenienced by their actions, or creating an informational awareness project about health,<br />

safety, respect, or another topic relevant to the offense. One of the more common sentences is<br />

community service. In many jury-based programs it is mandatory that the offender serve on a<br />

teen court jury. In some cases, educational workshops are required as part of the sentence,<br />

usually in cases involving alcohol or drug charges.<br />

Youth volunteers may be eligible for school or community service credits through their schools,<br />

and community awards such as the President's Volunteer Service Award. Adult volunteers serve<br />

as trainers, advisors and coordinators of the teen courts; some courts have a small paid staff.<br />

Principles & Results<br />

Teen or youth courts provide an alternative court system through which juvenile offenders can be<br />

heard and judged by their peers. Most teen courts have strict guidelines for youth volunteers who<br />

participate in the sentencing process, which generally includes training, a modified bar exam,<br />

Page 90 of 113


peer mentoring and compliance with a code of conduct. Many youth courts establish a youth bar<br />

association or ethics body which helps to set guidelines for ethical and fair procedure.<br />

Because cases heard by teen courts are real cases, participants in teen court programs are<br />

required to sign an oath of confidentiality regarding any information which comes to their<br />

knowledge in the course of the teen court case presentation.<br />

State-approved teen courts implement restorative justice and attempt to reintegrate the youth<br />

offender to the community while sending appropriate messages to the offender regarding<br />

unacceptable behavior. The basic principles of restorative justice are community protection,<br />

competency development, and accountability. This system seeks to address the root causes of<br />

juvenile offenses and to reduce recidivism. The recidivism rates for standard programs in several<br />

states range from 6%-9%, which is less than half of the traditional recidivism rate for juvenile<br />

offenders, which hovers around 20%.<br />

Restorative justice principles require the offender to make amends to the victim and/or the<br />

community and provide opportunities for victims and community members to participate in the<br />

juvenile justice process, providing valued input in decision making. Because of the active role<br />

the victim plays, qualitative assessments can be made into victim impact and victim satisfaction.<br />

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References<br />

______<br />

1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/<strong>Juvenile</strong>_delinquency_in_the_United_States<br />

2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_juvenile_justice_system<br />

3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youth_incarceration_in_the_United_States<br />

4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/School-to-prison_pipeline<br />

5. http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/12/09/what-youthincarceration-costs-taxpayers<br />

6. http://www.extension.umn.edu/youth/research/youthprograms/docs/economic-return-afterschool-programs.pdf<br />

7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attachment_parenting<br />

8. http://jjie.org/hub/mental-health-and-substance-abuse/reform-trends/<br />

9. https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/jjjournal_2003_2/page3.html<br />

10. http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/riskprotectivefactors.<br />

html<br />

11. http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/wht-knw/index-eng.aspx<br />

12. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restorative_justice<br />

13. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teen_court<br />

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Notes<br />

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Page 97 of 113


Attachment A<br />

The History of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

In America<br />

Page 98 of 113


PART 1<br />

The History of<br />

JUVENILE JUSTICE<br />

If you are a young person under the age of 18 and get into<br />

trouble with the law, you will probably have your case heard<br />

in the juvenile justice system. But this was not always the case.<br />

The idea of a separate justice system for juveniles is just over<br />

one hundred years old.<br />

ORIGINS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM<br />

The law has long defined a line between juvenile and adult offenders,<br />

but that line has been drawn at different places, for different reasons.<br />

Early in United States history, the law was heavily influenced by the common<br />

law of England, which governed the American colonies. One of the<br />

most important English lawyers of the time was William Blackstone.<br />

Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, first published in the<br />

late 1760s, were widely read and admired by our nation’s founders.<br />

“Infants” and “Adults” at Common Law<br />

In one section of his Commentaries, Blackstone identified people who<br />

were incapable of committing a crime. Two things were required to hold<br />

someone accountable for a crime. First, the person had to have a<br />

“vicious will” (that is, the intent to commit a crime). Second, the person<br />

had to commit an unlawful act. If either the will or the act was lacking,<br />

no crime was committed. The first group of people Blackstone identified<br />

as incapable of committing a crime were “infants.” These were not<br />

infants in the modern sense of the word, but children too young to fully<br />

understand their actions.<br />

Blackstone and his contemporaries drew the line between “infant”<br />

and “adult” at the point where one could understood one’s actions.<br />

Children under the age of seven were as a rule classified as infants who<br />

could not be guilty of a felony (a felony is a serious crime such as burglary,<br />

kidnapping, or murder). Children over the age of 14 were liable to<br />

suffer as adults if found guilty of a crime.<br />

Between the ages of seven and fourteen was a gray zone. A child in<br />

this age range would be presumed incapable of crime. If, however, it<br />

appeared that the child understood the difference between right and<br />

wrong, the child could be convicted and suffer the full consequences of<br />

the crime. These consequences could include death in a capital crime. (A<br />

capital crime is a crime for which one might be executed. For examples<br />

of children sentenced to death in Blackstone’s time, see the sidebar<br />

“Malice Supplies the Age.”)<br />

4 | ABA Division for Public Education


MALICE SUPPLIES THE AGE<br />

In this excerpt, 18th-century English lawyer William Blackstone describes the<br />

English common law doctrine “malice supplies the age.”<br />

But by the law, as it now stands, . . . the capacity of<br />

doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so much measured<br />

by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent’s<br />

understanding and judgment. For one lad of<br />

eleven years old may have as much cunning as another<br />

of fourteen; and in these cases our maxim is, that malitia<br />

supplet aetatem [“malice supplies the age”]. Under<br />

seven years of age indeed an infant cannot be guilty of<br />

felony; for then a felonious discretion is almost an<br />

impossibility in nature: but at eight years old he may be<br />

guilty of felony. Also, under fourteen . . . if it appear to<br />

the court and jury, that he . . . could discern between<br />

good and evil, he may be convicted and suffer death.<br />

Thus a girl of thirteen has been burnt for killing her mistress:<br />

and one boy of ten, and another of nine years old,<br />

William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV, Chapter 2<br />

(“Of the Persons Capable of Committing Crimes”)<br />

who had killed their companions, have been sentenced<br />

to death, and he of ten years actually hanged; because<br />

it appeared upon their trials, that the one hid himself,<br />

and the other hid the body he had killed; which hiding<br />

manifested a consciousness of guilt, and a discretion to<br />

discern between good and evil. . . . Thus also, in very<br />

modern times, a boy of ten years old was convicted on<br />

own confession of murdering his bedfellow; there<br />

appearing in his whole behaviour plain tokens of a mischievous<br />

discretion: and, as the sparing this boy merely<br />

on account of his tender years might be of dangerous<br />

consequence to the public, by propagating a notion<br />

that children might commit such atrocious crimes with<br />

impunity, it was unanimously agreed by all the judges<br />

that he was a proper subject of capital punishment.<br />

A New System of <strong>Justice</strong> for <strong>Juvenile</strong>s<br />

During the nineteenth century, the treatment of juveniles<br />

in the United States started to change. Social reformers<br />

began to create special facilities for troubled juveniles,<br />

especially in large cities. In New York City, the Society for<br />

the Prevention of <strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency established the<br />

New York House of Refuge to house juvenile delinquents<br />

in 1825. The Chicago Reform School opened in 1855. The<br />

reformers who supported these institutions sought to protect<br />

juvenile offenders by separating them from adult<br />

offenders. They also focused on rehabilitation—trying to<br />

help young offenders avoid a future life of crime.<br />

In 1899, the first juvenile court in the United States was<br />

established in Cook County, Illinois. The idea quickly<br />

caught on, and within twenty-five years, most states had<br />

set up juvenile court systems. The early juvenile courts<br />

shared with reform schools the same desire to rehabilitate<br />

ORIGINAL GOALS OF THE JUVENILE COURTS<br />

In 1909, Judge Julian Mack, one of the first judges to<br />

preside over the nation’s first juvenile court in Cook<br />

County, Illinois, described the goals of the juvenile court:<br />

rather than of punish juvenile offenders. They were based<br />

on the legal doctrine of parens patriae (a Latin term that<br />

means “parent of the country”). The parens patriae doctrine<br />

gives the state the power to serve as the guardian (or<br />

parent) of those with legal disabilities, including juveniles.<br />

In line with their “parental” role, juvenile courts tried to<br />

focus on the “best interests of the child.” They emphasized<br />

an informal, nonadversarial, and flexible approach to<br />

cases—there were few procedural rules that the courts<br />

were required to follow (see sidebar “Original Goals of the<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> Courts”). Cases were treated as civil (noncriminal)<br />

actions, and the ultimate goal was to guide a juvenile<br />

offender toward life as a responsible, law-abiding adult.<br />

The juvenile courts could, however, order that young<br />

offenders be removed from their homes and placed in<br />

juvenile reform institutions as part of their rehabilitation<br />

program.<br />

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW<br />

1. What is the significance of the English<br />

common law doctrine, “malice supplies the age”?<br />

2. What were the goals of the early juvenile courts?<br />

The child who must be brought into court should, of<br />

course, be made to know that he is face to face with the<br />

power of the state, but he should at the same time, and<br />

more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of<br />

its care and solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the courtroom<br />

are out of place in such hearings. The judge on a<br />

bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar, can<br />

never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk,<br />

with the child at his side, where he can on occasion put his<br />

arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the<br />

judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain<br />

immensely in the effectiveness of his work.<br />

Julian Mack, “The <strong>Juvenile</strong> Court,” Harvard Law Review,<br />

vol. 23 (1909), 120.]<br />

Dialogue on Youth and <strong>Justice</strong> | 5


JUVENILE JUSTICE<br />

AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW<br />

Beginning in the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court<br />

heard a number of cases that would profoundly change<br />

proceedings in the juvenile courts. The first of these cases<br />

was Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Morris<br />

Kent first entered the juvenile court system at the age of<br />

14, following several housebreakings and an attempted<br />

purse snatching. Two years later, his fingerprints were<br />

found in the apartment of a woman who had been<br />

robbed and raped. He was detained and interrogated by<br />

police and admitted to the crimes. Kent’s mother hired a<br />

lawyer, who arranged for a psychiatric examination of the<br />

boy. That examination concluded that Kent suffered from<br />

“severe psychopathology” and recommended that he be<br />

placed in a psychiatric hospital for observation.<br />

The juvenile court judge had authority to “waive jurisdiction”<br />

in Kent’s case to a criminal court, where Kent<br />

would be tried as an adult. Kent’s lawyer opposed the<br />

waiver and offered to prove that if Kent were given proper<br />

hospital treatment, he would be a candidate for rehabilitation.<br />

The juvenile court did not respond to the<br />

motions made by Kent’s lawyer and, without a hearing,<br />

waived jurisdiction to the criminal court.<br />

The Worst of Both Worlds?<br />

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Kent’s case and<br />

in a majority opinion authored by <strong>Justice</strong> Fortas, ruled<br />

that Kent was entitled to a hearing and to a statement of<br />

the reasons for the juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction.<br />

In its opinion, the majority also expressed concerns<br />

that the juvenile courts were not living up to their<br />

promise. In fact, the majority speculated “that there may<br />

be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst<br />

of both worlds [in juvenile courts]: that he gets neither the<br />

protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and<br />

regenerative treatment postulated for children.” A particular<br />

concern was whether juvenile courts had received the<br />

resources, personnel, and facilities they needed to adequately<br />

serve youth charged with violations of the law.<br />

A year after the Kent decision, the case of Gerald<br />

Gault, a 15-year-old Arizona boy, led to a major change in<br />

the way young people’s cases were processed by the<br />

juvenile courts. Gerald was accused of making an indecent<br />

phone call to a neighbor. At the time, he was also<br />

under 6-months’ probation because he had been with<br />

another boy who stole a wallet from a woman’s purse.<br />

When Gerald’s neighbor complained of the call, police<br />

arrived at his home and took him into custody. They left<br />

no notice for Gerald’s parents.<br />

Before Gerald’s hearings, neither Gerald nor his parents<br />

received notice of the specific charges against him.<br />

At the hearings, there were no sworn witnesses and no<br />

record was made of the proceedings. Not even the neighbor<br />

who had made the complaint about the phone call<br />

was present. At the end of the hearings, the judge committed<br />

Gerald to Arizona’s State Industrial School until he<br />

turned 21, unless he was discharged earlier by “due<br />

process of law.” This meant that Gerald might have to<br />

spend up to six years at the school. An adult convicted of<br />

6 | ABA Division for Public Education<br />

using vulgar or obscene language would have received a<br />

maximum penalty of a $50 fine and imprisonment for no<br />

more than two months.<br />

Gerald’s parents petitioned for their son’s release. They<br />

argued that he had been denied due process of the law<br />

(see sidebar “What Is Due Process?”) and that his constitutional<br />

rights to a fair trial had been violated. The case<br />

eventually made its way to the Supreme Court, which<br />

ruled in favor of Gerald in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).<br />

WHAT IS DUE PROCESS?<br />

Due process of law means that every person who is party<br />

to a legal proceeding is entitled to certain safeguards<br />

designed to ensure that the proceeding is fair and impartial.<br />

The Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution defines<br />

many due process rights, including:<br />

■<br />

The Fifth Amendment’s guarantees that<br />

■<br />

No one can be deprived of life, liberty, or<br />

property without due process of law.<br />

■<br />

No one can be compelled to be a witness against<br />

herself or himself (self-incrimination) in a criminal<br />

trial.<br />

■<br />

No one can be tried for a serious crime unless<br />

indicted by a grand jury.<br />

■<br />

The Sixth Amendment’s rights to<br />

■<br />

A speedy and public trial.<br />

■<br />

An impartial jury.<br />

■<br />

Notice of the nature and cause of an accusation.<br />

■<br />

Confrontation of adverse witnesses (the right to<br />

cross-examine witnesses)<br />

■Compel witnesses in one’s favor to appear in court.<br />

■<br />

Assistance of legal counsel for one’s defense.<br />

■<br />

The Seventh Amendment’s right to trial by jury in<br />

most civil (noncriminal) cases.<br />

■<br />

The Eighth Amendment’s protections against<br />

■<br />

Excessive bail.<br />

■<br />

Cruel and unusual punishments.<br />

Beginning in 1967, with its decision in In re Gault,<br />

the U.S. Supreme Court extended many, but not all, of<br />

these due process rights to young people involved in<br />

juvenile court proceedings.


Writing for the majority of the Court, <strong>Justice</strong> Fortas<br />

stated that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the<br />

Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” <strong>Juvenile</strong>s subject to<br />

delinquency hearings were entitled to key elements of<br />

due process to ensure the fairness of their hearings,<br />

including:<br />

■ Notice of the charges against them.<br />

■ A right to legal counsel.<br />

■ The right against self-incrimination.<br />

■ The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.<br />

Blurring the Lines Between <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

and Criminal <strong>Justice</strong><br />

The Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault was not unanimous.<br />

In a dissent, <strong>Justice</strong> Stewart warned that by requiring<br />

many of the same due process guarantees in juvenile<br />

cases that are required in criminal cases, the Court was<br />

converting juvenile proceedings into criminal proceedings.<br />

In doing so, he argued, the Court was missing an important<br />

distinction. The object of juvenile proceedings was<br />

the “correction of a condition.” The proceedings were not<br />

adversarial; juvenile courts functioned as public social<br />

agencies striving to find the right solution to the problem<br />

of juvenile delinquency. The object of criminal courts, in<br />

contrast, was conviction and punishment of those who<br />

commit wrongful acts.<br />

<strong>Justice</strong> Stewart noted that in the nineteenth century,<br />

before juvenile courts were established, juveniles tried in<br />

criminal courts were given the same due process as<br />

adults. They were also subject to the harshest punishments<br />

for their crimes, including the death penalty.<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> courts were not perfect, <strong>Justice</strong> Stewart agreed.<br />

But by blurring the distinctions between juvenile proceedings<br />

and criminal proceedings, the Court was “invit[ing] a<br />

long step backwards into the nineteenth century.”<br />

Three years after the Gault decision, the Court took<br />

another step toward making procedure in the juvenile<br />

courts more like criminal courts. In re Winship, 397 U.S.<br />

358 (1970), involved a 12-year-old boy charged with stealing<br />

a $112 from a woman’s purse. The juvenile court<br />

decided that “a preponderance of the evidence” established<br />

that the boy had committed the theft. To say that<br />

someone is guilty of a crime by a “preponderance of the<br />

evidence” means that the available evidence (for example,<br />

the testimony of witnesses) makes it more likely than<br />

not that the person committed the crime. In a standard<br />

criminal trial, however, the government has to prove<br />

“beyond a reasonable doubt” that the accused committed<br />

the crime. “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is a higher<br />

standard than “preponderance of the evidence”—it<br />

means that the available evidence leaves you firmly convinced<br />

of a defendant’s guilt.<br />

One reason that the “beyond a reasonable doubt”<br />

standard of proof is required in criminal cases is that a<br />

person convicted of a crime can be sentenced to serve<br />

time in prison. In the Winship case, the boy charged with<br />

stealing from the purse faced up to six years in a juvenile<br />

training school. In defending use of the “preponderance<br />

of the evidence” standard, supporters of the juvenile<br />

court emphasized that the purpose of the training school<br />

was not to punish but to rehabilitate the boy. They also<br />

argued that it is not necessarily in the best interests of a<br />

troubled juvenile to “win” a case if the juvenile is truly in<br />

need of a court’s intervention. A majority of the Court<br />

rejected these arguments, stating that “good intentions<br />

do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due<br />

process safeguards in juvenile courts.” This was particularly<br />

true in cases where the juvenile’s loss of liberty during<br />

confinement in a juvenile training school would be comparable<br />

to the punishment of imprisonment imposed<br />

when an adult is convicted of a crime.<br />

Dialogue on Youth and <strong>Justice</strong> | 7


Chief <strong>Justice</strong> Burger dissented from the majority opinion,<br />

joined by <strong>Justice</strong> Stewart. By moving the juvenile<br />

courts closer to procedures used in the criminal trials of<br />

adults, the dissenters argued, the Court was also moving<br />

away from the original idea of juvenile courts as benevolent<br />

and less formal institutions equipped to deal flexibly with<br />

the unique needs of juvenile offenders. “I cannot regard it<br />

as a manifestation of progress,” Chief <strong>Justice</strong> Burger asserted,<br />

“to transform juvenile courts into criminal courts, which<br />

is what we are well on the way to accomplishing.”<br />

Trial by Jury and <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

The trend toward extending the due process rights of<br />

adult criminal trials to juvenile court proceedings slowed<br />

in 1971, with the Supreme Court’s ruling in McKeiver v.<br />

Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). In McKeiver, the Court<br />

ruled that juveniles are not entitled to trial by jury in a<br />

juvenile court proceeding.<br />

An important factor in the Court’s decision was its<br />

refusal to fully equate a juvenile proceeding with a criminal<br />

proceeding, even if the juvenile’s case involved<br />

offenses that would be felonies or misdemeanors under<br />

the state’s criminal laws and the juvenile court ordered<br />

the youth confined to a secure rehabilitation facility. The<br />

Court acknowledged that juvenile courts had not lived up<br />

to their promise, in part because of a lack of adequate<br />

resources. But the Court was also “reluctant to disallow<br />

the States to experiment further and to seek in new and<br />

different ways the elusive answers to the problems of the<br />

young.” Trial by jury, the Court feared, would effectively<br />

abolish any significant distinction between juvenile and<br />

criminal proceedings. “If the formalities of the criminal<br />

adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the<br />

juvenile court system,” the majority opinion concluded,<br />

“there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps<br />

that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for<br />

the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.”<br />

Three justices joined a dissenting opinion in McKeiver.<br />

They argued that when a juvenile is tried for offenses<br />

based on violations of a state’s criminal law, and when the<br />

juvenile faces possible commitment to a state institution<br />

for delinquents, a jury trial should be required. “Where a<br />

State uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a<br />

juvenile for a criminal act and to order ‘confinement’ until<br />

the child reaches 21 years of age. . . ,” the dissenters<br />

stated, “then [the juvenile] is entitled to the same procedural<br />

protection as an adult.”<br />

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW<br />

1. What is meant by the term “due process”?<br />

2. Why did the Supreme Court decide not to give<br />

juveniles the right to trial by jury?<br />

3. Why were dissenting justices concerned about the<br />

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS FOR PART I<br />

TAKE A STAND<br />

Begin your discussion of the issues raised in Part I by<br />

asking participants to “take a stand” on the following<br />

statements. Designate corners of the room for participants<br />

who agree, disagree, or are not sure of their<br />

opinion. For each question, ask the participants to<br />

move to the corner of the room that reflects their<br />

opinion. After your dialogue on the Discussion<br />

Questions, you can repeat the “take a stand” activity<br />

to see if anyone’s opinions have changed.<br />

“Take a stand” indicating whether you agree, disagree,<br />

or are not sure of your opinion on these statements:<br />

■<br />

The juvenile justice system should emphasize<br />

rehabilitation, not punishment, of juvenile offenders.<br />

■<br />

There is a difference between confining someone<br />

for rehabilitation and confining someone for<br />

punishment.<br />

■<br />

A judge should have flexibility in determining how<br />

long a juvenile offender may need to be confined<br />

for rehabilitation.<br />

■<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong>s should be entitled to a trial by jury.<br />

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS<br />

1. Early treatment of juvenile offenders who were<br />

deemed capable of understanding their crime<br />

emphasized punishment. The juvenile court system,<br />

in contrast, was founded on the belief that society<br />

should try to rehabilitate, not punish, juvenile offenders.<br />

In the due process cases of the 1960s and ’70s,<br />

the Supreme Court often questioned whether the<br />

juvenile courts had been successful in their efforts to<br />

address the problems of young offenders. Should<br />

rehabilitation of juvenile offenders still be considered<br />

an important goal of the juvenile justice system?<br />

Why or why not?<br />

2. If the goal of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation,<br />

shouldn’t a juvenile court judge have latitude to<br />

try different approaches and apply different standards<br />

to individual juveniles? Do rights to due<br />

process, in other words, put too many constraints on<br />

the ability of juvenile judges to address the unique<br />

problems and needs of individual offenders? Why or<br />

why not?<br />

3. If you, as a juvenile, were accused of committing a<br />

criminal offense, would you rather be tried by a jury<br />

of adults from your community or have your case<br />

heard by a judge? Would your answer differ if you<br />

were tried by a jury of young people? Why or why<br />

not?<br />

4. Is there a significant distinction between confinement<br />

of a juvenile in an institution meant to help rehabilitate<br />

juvenile offenders and confinement of convicted<br />

criminal for punishment in a prison? In other words,<br />

should we be less worried about depriving juveniles<br />

of their liberty if the focus of their confinement is<br />

rehabilitation, not punishment?<br />

8 | ABA Division for Public Education


Attachment B<br />

A <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System<br />

for the 21st Century<br />

Page 99 of 113


If you have issues viewing or accessing this file, please contact us at NCJRS.gov.<br />

U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Office of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs<br />

Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention<br />

A <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

System for the<br />

21 st Centu ry<br />

Shay Bilchik<br />

The growth of violent juvenile crime<br />

over the past decade has stirred signifi-<br />

,ate on the viability and effecof<br />

this Nation's juvenile justice<br />

system. Between 1988 and 1994, juvenile<br />

arrests for violent crimes increased more<br />

than 50 percent. These increases have<br />

strained the juvenile justice system beyond<br />

capacity, from intake and detention<br />

to court and correctional services. The<br />

result, in many jurisdictions, is a system<br />

that does not consistently serve the<br />

public safety, hold juveniles accountable,<br />

or meet the treatment and rehabilitation<br />

needs of each juvenile offender. With<br />

generally inadequate funding and fluctuating<br />

public support, the juvenile justice<br />

system has fallen short of meeting the<br />

challenge presented during the past<br />

decade.<br />

Recently, the U.S. Department of<br />

<strong>Justice</strong> announced new national statistics<br />

showing a decline in arrests for<br />

juvenile violent crime (6 percent), led by<br />

a decline in murder arrests (14 percent),<br />

between 1995 and 1996. While this is a<br />

promising sign, juvenile violence remains<br />

unacceptably high. As the 100th anniversary<br />

of the juvenile court approaches, it<br />

Oarlier uersion of this Bulletin was published in<br />

"~rlme & Delinquency 44(1):89-101, 1998, Sage<br />

Publications, Inc.<br />

is time to examine how the juvenile<br />

justice system can operate more effectively<br />

to reduce juvenile crime, particularly<br />

violent crime, and meet system<br />

goals. The juvenile justice system needs<br />

to be revitalized so that it will ensure<br />

immediate and appropriate sanctions,<br />

provide effective treatment, reverse<br />

trends in juvenile violence, and rebuild<br />

public confidence in and support for<br />

the system.<br />

Since the first juvenile court was established<br />

in Chicago, 1L, in 1899, a variety<br />

of strategies have been pursued to<br />

address the particular issues posed by<br />

juvenile offenders. Results have been<br />

mixed. Young people need to know that<br />

if they break the law, they will be held<br />

accountable. They also need to be put<br />

on a path toward responsible adulthood.<br />

The Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency<br />

Prevention (OJJDP) has developed<br />

a strategy, set forth in the publication<br />

Comprehensive Strategy for Serious,<br />

Violent, and Chronic <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders ~<br />

(Comprehensive Strategy), to help communities<br />

prevent delinquency and establish<br />

a juvenile justice system based on<br />

graduated sanctions that combine accountability<br />

with increasingly intensive<br />

treatment services. The Comprehensive<br />

Strategy calls for immediate interventions<br />

when high-risk or delinquent behavior<br />

first occurs.<br />

From the Administrator<br />

The challenges of the next century<br />

will include significant problems that<br />

face us today and that we will need<br />

to continue to address. Building a<br />

juvenile justice system that protects<br />

our communities and ensures that all<br />

youth become productive, contributing<br />

adults will be high on that list.<br />

Considerable progress has been<br />

made since the birth of the juvenile<br />

justice system at the end of the last<br />

century. The investment of time and<br />

labor by countless juvenile justice<br />

and youth service professionals has<br />

paid promising dividends. Nevertheless,<br />

some individuals question<br />

whether a separate juvenile justice<br />

system best serves the welfare of our<br />

children and our communities, and<br />

others ask whether the resources<br />

provided for juvenile justice have<br />

been adequate to the task at hand.<br />

The fact is that much remains to be<br />

done if we are to construct a juvenile<br />

justice system that will meet both the<br />

challenges remaining from the 20th<br />

century and those that will arise in<br />

the future. To create an effective<br />

juvenile justice system for the 21 st<br />

century, we must take to heart the<br />

lessons learned from this century--<br />

many of which are set forth in this<br />

Bulletin--and redouble our efforts on<br />

behalf of America's children.<br />

Shay Bilchik<br />

Administrator


...... iii<br />

The juvenile justice system called for<br />

in the Comprehensive Strategy is based<br />

on decades of research, statistics, and<br />

evaluations in the fields of criminal and<br />

juvenile justice, public health, and youth<br />

development. To assist communities in<br />

creating a stronger juvenile justice system,<br />

OJJDP, through the National Council<br />

on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) and<br />

Developmental Research and Programs,<br />

Inc. (DRP), identified specific tools that<br />

can be used to improve the operation of<br />

the juvenile justice system--such as risk<br />

and needs assessment instruments--and<br />

a range of programs that have been found<br />

effective in preventing delinquency and<br />

reducing recidivism. 2 This Bulletin describes<br />

the objectives and elements of an<br />

effective juvenile justice system and suggests<br />

legislative and administrative strategies<br />

for its implementation.<br />

Objectives of an<br />

Effective <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> System<br />

An effective juvenile justice system<br />

must meet three objectives: (1) hold the<br />

juvenile offender accountable; (2) enable<br />

the juvenile to become a capable, productive,<br />

and responsible citizen; and (3) ensure<br />

the safety of the community)<br />

These objectives are best met when a<br />

community's key leaders, including representatives<br />

from the juvenile justice<br />

system, health and mental health systems,<br />

schools, law enforcement, social<br />

services, and other systems, are jointly<br />

engaged in the planning, development,<br />

and operation of the juvenile justice<br />

system. Reform of the juvenile justice<br />

system must be part of a broad, compre-<br />

hensive, communitywide effort to eliminate<br />

factors that place juveniles at risk<br />

of delinquency and victimization, enhance<br />

factors that protect them from<br />

engaging in delinquent behavior, and<br />

use the full range of resources and programs<br />

within the community to meet<br />

their varying needs. 4 It is essential that<br />

in engaging the community in this undertaking,<br />

the juvenile justice system<br />

also include greater public access to<br />

both court proceedings and system operations.<br />

Enhancing public involvement<br />

in the juvenile justice system will ensure<br />

an appropriate role for victims, a greater<br />

understanding of court operations, and a<br />

higher level of system accountability to<br />

the public.<br />

Elements of an<br />

Effective <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> System<br />

The most effective juvenile justice<br />

interventions are swift, certain, consistent,<br />

and appropriate. To meet these objectives,<br />

an effective juvenile justice system must:<br />

Include a mechanism for comprehensively<br />

assessing a juvenile when he or<br />

she first enters the system, in order to<br />

determine both the risk to the community<br />

and appropriate interventions and<br />

sanctions.<br />

Have the capacity to provide a range<br />

of treatment services, from family<br />

counseling to outpatient drug treatment<br />

to out-of-home care.<br />

Incorporate increasingly severe<br />

sanctions and enhanced treatment<br />

services when a juvenile fails to<br />

respond to initial interventions or<br />

is involved in a particularly serious<br />

or violent offense as a first-time<br />

offender.<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong>s must be aware that the juvenile<br />

justice system will hold them accountable<br />

for their delinquent misconduct<br />

and that continued violations of the<br />

law will subject them to increasingly severe<br />

sanctions, including secure confinement.<br />

An effective system of graduated<br />

sanctions should also include the option<br />

of transfer to the criminal justice system<br />

for those serious, violent, or chronic juvenile<br />

offenders who are not amenable to<br />

treatment in the juvenile justice system<br />

or whose misconduct inherently justifies<br />

transfer.<br />

A successful juvenile justice system<br />

requires specialized programs to adequately<br />

address the unique needs of<br />

each juvenile offender and the challenges<br />

posed by some juveniles, including<br />

gang members, sex offenders, drug<br />

offenders, members of racial and cultural<br />

minorities, female offenders, and juveniles<br />

with disabilities. In addition, the<br />

system needs trained staff at all levels<br />

and a monitoring/evaluation system to<br />

track its success.<br />

Effective, fair, and appropriate gradu-i~<br />

ated sanctions that hold juvenile offenddIp<br />

accountable, particularly communitybased<br />

programs and services, help juvenile<br />

offenders avoid continued involvement<br />

in delinquency and crime and are<br />

usually less expensive than incarceration.<br />

The Comprehensive Strategy describes<br />

promising and effective programs at<br />

each of these graduated sanction levels<br />

(immediate, intermediate, and secure<br />

confinement).s<br />

An effective juvenile justice system<br />

does not use detention as a sanction,<br />

instead using detention resources only<br />

for those preadjudicated juveniles who<br />

must be detained, based on their risk of<br />

reoffending, harming themselves or others,<br />

or failing to appear at future proceedings,<br />

factors that can be assessed<br />

through the application of objective criteria.<br />

For adjudicated delinquents, an<br />

effective juvenile justice system includes<br />

a full range of graduated sanctions that<br />

begins with comprehensive risk and<br />

needs assessments and includes aftercare<br />

for juveniles returning to the community<br />

from out-of-home placements.<br />

The entire process needs to be corn<br />

mented by quality case managemen<br />

Each of these critical components is<br />

described below.


Teadjudicated Detention<br />

he use of preadjudication detention of<br />

luveniles is becoming one of the most difficult<br />

problems for the juvenile justice system.<br />

As the number of juveniles taken into<br />

custody has increased, so has the rate of<br />

detention. Detention facilities in many jurisdictions<br />

are filled beyond capacity. To<br />

control the large increase of juveniles admitted<br />

to juvenile detention programs and<br />

facilities, objective risk assessment criteria<br />

must be developed to assist courts in ensuring<br />

that only dangerous youth and<br />

those most likely to flee are placed in intensive<br />

pretrial supervision programs,<br />

monitored by electronic or other forms of<br />

home detention, or detained in facilities.<br />

Innovative alternatives to traditional detention<br />

need to be developed. In addition,<br />

every effort should be made to reduce the<br />

length of detention. State laws and procedures<br />

should provide for adjudicatory<br />

hearings within expedited but appropriate<br />

9 periods for all juveniles, particularly those<br />

who are detained. 6 Adjudicated delinquents,<br />

including those who are going to<br />

be placed, should be moved to placement<br />

options with as little delay as possible.<br />

This means that placement options need<br />

bde expanded as part of a system of<br />

uated sanctions.<br />

Overcrowding and length of time held<br />

are only part of the preadjudication detention<br />

issue. Many detention facilities also<br />

have untrained staff, inadequate educational<br />

programming, and a lack of medical,<br />

mental health, recreation, and social services.<br />

Additional resources should be devoted<br />

to providing diagnostic services in<br />

Immediate Intervention: Mentoring<br />

Immediate Intervention: Restitution and Community<br />

Service<br />

A study of Utah's juvenile court conducted by the National Center for <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

for OJJDP shows that for informally handled and adjudicated cases involving robbery,<br />

assault, burglary, theft, auto theft, and vandalism, recidivism is lower for juveniles<br />

placed on formal probation and ordered to make restitution than for juveniles placed<br />

on probation without a restitution order. This study is consistent with an earlier<br />

OJJDP-funded national evaluation of restitution, which found such programs effective<br />

in reducing delinquency. These programs also respond to some key needs of victims<br />

by holding juvenile offenders accountable and restoring their loss. OJJDP has<br />

expanded the principles underlying restitution and community service into a system<br />

improvement model called Balanced and Restorative <strong>Justice</strong>. (See J.A. Butts and<br />

H.N. Snyder, Restitution and <strong>Juvenile</strong> Recidivism: Update on Research, Washington,<br />

DC: U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

and Delinquency Prevention, September 1992 (NCJ 137774).)<br />

detention programs and facilities and offering<br />

short-term therapeutic services to<br />

this population. Accomplishing these goals<br />

will require the commitment of all parties<br />

in the system and legislative authorities to<br />

ensure that the necessary resources and<br />

system changes are developed and put in<br />

place. Once this is done, detention populations<br />

can be reduced and shortened periods<br />

of detention can be put to productive<br />

use for those juveniles who require detention<br />

prior to adjudication.<br />

Graduated Sanctions for<br />

Adjudicated Delinquents<br />

Comprehensive risk and needs<br />

assessments. In order to achieve both<br />

accountability and rehabilitation, an<br />

effective juvenile justice system assesses<br />

each adjudicated juvenile offender to<br />

A rigorous experimental design evaluation of the Big Brothers Big Sisters<br />

mentoring program matched 487 treatment youth with 472 control youth in 6<br />

outcome areas: antisocial activities; academic performance, attitudes, and behaviors;<br />

relationships with family; relationships with friends; self-concept; and social<br />

and cultural enrichment. Numerous positive results were documented: participants<br />

were 46 percent less likely to start using illegal drugs, 27 percent less likely to<br />

start drinking alcohol, and 32 percent less likely to hit someone; they were 52<br />

percent less likely to skip a day of school and 37 percent less likely to skip a class;<br />

they improved their academic performance slightly; and they improved their<br />

relationships with their parents and peers. These differences between program<br />

and nonprogram youth were found to exist 18 months after the program youth<br />

began their involvement in the program and indicate that properly designed and<br />

implemented mentoring programs can have a positive impact on youth. (See J.P.<br />

Tierney and J.B. Grossman, Making a Difference: An Impact Study, Philadelphia,<br />

~<br />

PA: Public/Private Ventures, 1995; and J.B. Grossman and E.M. Garry,<br />

Mentoring--A Proven Delinquency Prevention Strategy, Bulletin, Washington, DC:<br />

U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

and Delinquency Prevention, April 1997 (NCJ 164834).)<br />

determine a treatment plan based both<br />

on need and on offender risk to the<br />

community. This requires a balancing of<br />

criteria that focus on the seriousness of<br />

the delinquent act, the potential risk for<br />

reoffending, the risk to public safety, and<br />

the offender's rehabilitation needs. The<br />

needs assessment must be thorough<br />

enough to determine the set of issues<br />

that system services can help the juvenile<br />

address within the context of family,<br />

school, peer group, and community settings.<br />

In some situations, the assessment<br />

of a juvenile offender may lead to probation<br />

or placement in a community-based<br />

program. In all cases, assessment should<br />

lead to a clearer understanding of appropriate<br />

system responses that ensure the<br />

public safety.<br />

Immediate intervention. The vast<br />

majority of juvenile court appearances<br />

are for nonviolent offenses. In 1996, 4.7<br />

percent (approximately 135,100) of all<br />

juvenile arrests were for violent crimes<br />

(murder, rape, robbery, or aggravated assault).<br />

For minor offenders (misdemeanors),<br />

some serious offenders (nonviolent<br />

felonies), and many repeat minor offenders,<br />

the juvenile justice system requires a<br />

variety of resources, including mentoring,<br />

restitution and community service, nonresidential<br />

programs and services such<br />

as day treatment, and community-based<br />

facilities that are designed to reduce<br />

the probability of reoffending. These<br />

community-based facilities should be<br />

small and open, located near juveniles'<br />

homes, and involve participants in program<br />

planning, operation, and evaluation.<br />

Intervention programs should foster family<br />

participation in treatment and facilitate<br />

the establishment of law-abiding patterns<br />

of behavior.


Immediate Intervention:<br />

Day Treatment<br />

The Bethesda Day Treatment Center<br />

Program in West Milton, PA, is a<br />

model day treatment program.<br />

Initiated with OJJDP formula grant<br />

funds, the program is currently funded<br />

through county service contracts. The<br />

center's services include intensive<br />

supervision, counseling, and coordination<br />

of a range of services necessary<br />

for youth to develop skills to<br />

function effectively in the community.<br />

The program provides delinquent and<br />

dependent youth, ages 10 to 17, with<br />

up to 55 hours of services a week<br />

without removing them from their<br />

homes. A unique program feature<br />

requires work experience for all<br />

working age clients, with 75 percent of<br />

their paychecks directed toward<br />

payment of fines, court costs, and<br />

restitution. A preliminary study<br />

revealed recidivism rates far lower<br />

than State and national norms.<br />

Intermediate sanctions. Intermediate<br />

sanctions are appropriate for some violent<br />

offenders, juveniles involved in drug<br />

trafficking, or offenders who reoffend<br />

despite immediate interventions. These<br />

sanctions, which may be residential or<br />

nonresidential, include weekend detention,<br />

inpatient alcohol and drug abuse<br />

treatment, community-based residential<br />

treatment, and boot camps. For some<br />

serious and violent offenders, placement<br />

in an intensive supervision or another<br />

intensive service program may be<br />

appropriate.<br />

Secure corrections. The criminal behavior<br />

of some serious, violent, and<br />

chronic juvenile offenders requires the<br />

imposition of secure sanctions to hold<br />

them accountable for their offenses, protect<br />

the public, and provide a structured<br />

treatment environment. Large congregatecare<br />

juvenile facilities, such as training<br />

schools, have been found to be the least<br />

effective secure options. 7 While the continued<br />

use of these facilities will likely remain<br />

a necessary alternative for juveniles who<br />

require enhanced security to protect the<br />

public, small community-based facilities<br />

providing intensive treatment services and<br />

special programming in a secure environment<br />

offer the best environment for successful<br />

treatment of juveniles who require<br />

confinement. These services include indi-<br />

Intermediate Sanctions: Delinquency Treatment Program<br />

Multisystemic Therapy (MST), a nonresidential delinquency treatment program<br />

developed by Dr. Scott Henggeler of the Medical University of South Carolina, views<br />

individuals as being "nested" within a complex of interconnected systems, including<br />

the family, community, school, and peers. The MST treatment team may target<br />

problems in any of these systems for change and use the individual's strengths in<br />

these systems to effect that change. Treatment teams, which usually involve three<br />

counselors, provide services over a 4-month period for about 50 families per year. In<br />

one evaluation, the rearrest rate for the MST group was found to be about half that<br />

of the group receiving traditional services. In another, the recidivism rate 4 years<br />

after treatment was 22 percent for MST youth, 72 percent for youth receiving<br />

individual counseling, and 87 percent for youth who refused either treatment. These<br />

evaluation results are a strong indicator of program effectiveness.<br />

vidual and group counseling, educational<br />

and training programs, medical services,<br />

and intensive staff supervision. Proximity<br />

to the community permits direct, regular<br />

family involvement in the treatment<br />

process, phased reentry into the community)<br />

and independent living, where<br />

necessary.<br />

Targeted transfer of serious, violent,<br />

and chronic juvenile offenders.<br />

Although the vast majority of juvenile<br />

offenders can be effectively treated in<br />

the juvenile justice system, serious, violent,<br />

or chronic offenders may require<br />

transfer to criminal court. Transfer<br />

decisions should be based on factors<br />

such as age, presenting offense, and<br />

offense history. In addition, for some<br />

of these juvenile offenders, the use of<br />

youthful offender facilities and blended<br />

sentencing approaches are recent developments<br />

that merit State consideration.<br />

These facilities and sentencing approaches,<br />

along with more traditional<br />

practices, should be structured to allow<br />

criminal and juvenile courts to use a<br />

sentencing option that is appropriate to<br />

the offender's age, presenting offense,<br />

offense history, and potential danger to<br />

the community. The trend toward increased<br />

transfers of juveniles to cri[<br />

court 9 should strengthen the countr<br />

resolve to prevent delinquency and<br />

intervene at the earliest possible time<br />

to decrease the risk of future delinquent<br />

and criminal behavior.<br />

Intermediate Sanctions: Residential Program<br />

The Thomas O'Farrell Youth Center (TOYC), located in rural Maryland, is a 38-<br />

bed, unlocked, staff-secure residential program for male youth committed to the<br />

Maryland Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> Services. The typical TOYC youth has many<br />

prior court referrals, generally for property crimes and drug offenses. On average,<br />

youth stay at the center for 9 months and then receive 6 months of community<br />

aftercare. The TOYC philosophy is to create a community of dignity and respect for<br />

all its members. This positive social environment is at the core of all TOYC activities.<br />

Each youth who completes the TOYC residential program has a specialized<br />

aftercare plan and receives postrelease services from two aftercare workers--<br />

including assistance in reentering school, vocational counseling, crisis intervention,<br />

family counseling, transportation, and mentoring. Aftercare workers contact<br />

the youth at least 12 days per month during the aftercare period.<br />

An NCCD evaluation found that the majority (55 percent) of the first 56 TOYC<br />

graduates had no further court referrals in the postrelease period (an average of<br />

11.6 months). The study also showed a dramatic decline in the number of offenses<br />

committed by youth after their stay at TOYC. In the 12 months prior to placement<br />

in TOYC, the 56 youth were charged with 219 offenses, an average of almost 4<br />

court referrals each. However, in the year after leaving TOYC, these youth were<br />

charged with just 51 offenses, a decline of 77 percent. NCCD also observed that<br />

youth who committed new crimes after leaving TOYC were likely to commit less<br />

serious offenses than before.<br />

4


~Secure Corrections<br />

The Florida Environmental Institute<br />

(FEI), also known as 'q-he Last<br />

Chance Ranch," targets some of the<br />

State's most serious and violent<br />

juvenile offenders. Located in a<br />

remote area of the Florida Everglades,<br />

FEI offers both a residential<br />

phase and a nonresidential aftercare<br />

program. Two-thirds of the youth<br />

referred to FEI are adjudicated<br />

delinquents from the criminal justice<br />

system. Yet, because of FEI's strong<br />

emphasis on education, hard work,<br />

social bonding, and aftercare,<br />

recidivism rates of juveniles who<br />

have gone through the program are<br />

substantially less than those of youth<br />

who have completed traditional<br />

training school programs: 30 percent<br />

as compared with 50--70 percent.<br />

Intensive aftercare. Intensive aftercare,<br />

or "community care," programs,<br />

which provide appropriate levels of social<br />

control and treatment services for juveles<br />

returning to the community from<br />

Lt-of-home placements, are an essential<br />

Lrt of the continuum of services and<br />

sanctions that form an effective juvenile<br />

justice system. Properly implemented,<br />

aftercare can serve to protect public<br />

safety by monitoring the juvenile's reintegration<br />

into the community while developing<br />

his or her capacity to overcome<br />

negative influences (risk factors for delinquency)<br />

by enhancing the skills needed<br />

to become a productive and law-abiding<br />

member of society.<br />

Standard aftercare programs, staffed<br />

by overburdened parole officers or aftercare<br />

personnel who focus solely on social<br />

control, are ineffective in modifying the<br />

behavior of high-risk juvenile "parolees"<br />

over the long term.t~ who successfully<br />

complete institutional programs<br />

should not be abruptly returned to the<br />

environment where the misconduct occurred<br />

without high levels of supervision<br />

and transitional support. Successful<br />

aftercare programs begin developing an<br />

offender's aftercare plan early in the residential<br />

placement, create links to the<br />

youth's family and school throughout<br />

treatment, and provide high levels of both<br />

:ontrol and treatment services.<br />

principles characterize model intensive<br />

aftercare:<br />

9 Prepare youth for progressive responsibility<br />

and freedom in the community.<br />

9 Facilitate youth-community interaction<br />

and involvement.<br />

9 Work both with the offender and with<br />

targeted community support systems,<br />

such as families, peer groups, schools,<br />

and the workplace, to facilitate the<br />

youth's constructive interaction with<br />

these groups and gradual community<br />

adjustment.<br />

9 Coordinate needed resources and<br />

opportunities, and develop community<br />

support.<br />

9 Monitor reintegration into the community<br />

to ensure its success.<br />

Quality Case Management<br />

and Service Integration<br />

Throughout this system of detention,<br />

comprehensive risk and needs assessment,<br />

graduated sanctions, and aftercare,<br />

an effective case management process<br />

should coordinate services for each offender.<br />

Effective rehabilitation requires<br />

maximum use of a broad range of public<br />

and community resources, including<br />

health and mental health care, social<br />

services, recreation, education, and employment<br />

and training services.<br />

A case management team that integrates<br />

services and follows each juvenile<br />

offender from the point of intake and initial<br />

risk and needs assessment through the<br />

court process, probation, incarceration,<br />

and aftercare is able to monitor progress<br />

and adjust the treatment plan appropriately.<br />

Each member of the team must be<br />

knowledgeable about individual differences<br />

that can stem from race, gender, culture,<br />

and ethnicity. Central to this team<br />

approach is the ability to refer each jure-<br />

Aftercare: Community Reintegration<br />

nile, including serious and violent offenders,<br />

to available programs and services<br />

that address identified needs and integrate<br />

the family and community support mechanisms<br />

into the treatment plan while maintaining<br />

public safety. This approach is<br />

designed to prevent a youth's further involvement<br />

in the system by promoting<br />

law-abiding behavior as early as possible<br />

through a combination of appropriate<br />

sanctions and treatment.<br />

Implementation of an<br />

Effective <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> System<br />

An effective juvenile justice system<br />

complements effective prevention u with<br />

early intervention and graduated sanctions<br />

and uses tools available to improve<br />

system operation. The implementation<br />

of such a system can be supported and<br />

strengthened by a State and local statutory<br />

and administrative framework, which<br />

should do the following:<br />

9 Include the overall principles of prevention,<br />

early intervention, and graduated<br />

sanctions in the purpose clause of<br />

the State's juvenile code.<br />

9 Provide for appropriate interagency<br />

oversight and management structures<br />

to support the juvenile justice system,<br />

including assistance in program implementation,<br />

data collection, information<br />

sharing, and evaluation.<br />

9 Provide adequate funding at both the<br />

State and local levels.<br />

Several basic elements characterize sound<br />

juvenile justice system administration:<br />

9 A State-level interagency coordinating/<br />

oversight entity that focuses on juvenile<br />

justice matters.<br />

OJJDP is demonstrating the principles of intensive aftercare in three communities<br />

(Denver, CO; Las Vegas, NV; and Norfolk, VA). The Virginia Department of Youth and<br />

Family Services applies this model to its Intensive Parole Program. The program<br />

consists of an interdisciplinary screening process and treatment plan; a complete<br />

assessment (physical, psychological, educational); intensive counseling and<br />

treatment team meetings with parents; a reintegration plan that identifies services<br />

and service providers; increased surveillance and judicial reviews; adolescent and<br />

parent groups in the community; and incentives. (Program description provided by<br />

Norfolk Court Service Unit/Beaumont <strong>Juvenile</strong> Correctional Center, December<br />

1995.) (See D.M. Altschuler and T.L. Armstrong, Intensive Aftercare for High-Risk<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong>s: A Community Care Model Program Summary, Washington, DC: U.S.<br />

Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and<br />

Delinquency Prevention, September 1994 (NCJ 147575).)<br />

5


Case Management and<br />

Service Integration<br />

The Norfolk (Virginia) Interagency<br />

Consortium (NIC) sets policy on<br />

placements for high-risk youth and is<br />

a promising example of using<br />

interagency assessment teams to<br />

make placements. NIC exists under<br />

Norfolk's Police Assisted Community<br />

Enforcement (PACE) program, which<br />

was designed to involve community<br />

resources in solving problems and<br />

working with police. NIC and PACE<br />

are governed by a board of representatives<br />

of health agencies, social<br />

services, police, education, juvenile<br />

services, and other agencies--in<br />

addition to parents and private<br />

citizens. The consortium ensures<br />

coordinated delivery of comprehensive<br />

services, including access to a<br />

pool of State funds.<br />

Although NIC has not been systematically<br />

evaluated, statistics show<br />

that crime has dropped markedly in<br />

neighborhoods targeted by the<br />

umbrella PACE program. According<br />

to one 1993 report, crime decreased<br />

by 29 percent in target areas, police<br />

reported fewer service calls, and onstreet<br />

drug trafficking and gunfire<br />

dropped significantly. Participants<br />

also believed the program had<br />

reduced fear of crime in target<br />

neighborhoods. (See R.C. Cronin,<br />

Innovative Community Partnerships:<br />

Working Together for Change,<br />

Program Summary, Washington, DC:<br />

U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of<br />

<strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention,<br />

May 1994 (NCJ 147483).)<br />

9 Regional/local advisory boards and<br />

regional offices within the State juvenile<br />

justice agency responsible for developing<br />

and implementing local juvenile<br />

justice plans and managing local<br />

service delivery systems.<br />

9 Uniform funding mechanisms for<br />

county and city juvenile justice system<br />

facilities, programs, and services<br />

that foster the pooling of resources.<br />

This would be done through a fund<br />

distribution formula that is based<br />

on a statewide analysis of juvenile<br />

delinquency by adjudications and<br />

commitments to State programs and<br />

facilities. This formula also factors<br />

in the current per diem cost of a<br />

commitment to a State institution.<br />

Local juvenile justice systems should<br />

be given fiscal incentives to reduce<br />

the number of commitments to costly<br />

State institutions or out-of-State programs<br />

and facilities for juveniles who<br />

could be appropriately placed in<br />

local community-based programs<br />

and services.<br />

Conclusion<br />

OJJDP's intensive review of juvenile<br />

justice programs that work, coupled<br />

with the findings of 30 years of studies<br />

by premier researchers such as Alfred<br />

Blumstein, Gil Botvin, Richard Catalano,<br />

Delbert Elliott, Jeffrey Fagan, David<br />

Farrington, J. David Hawkins, James C.<br />

Howell, David Huizinga, Candace Kane,<br />

Barry Krisberg, Mark Lipsey, Rolf Loeber,<br />

Cheryl Maxson, Walter Miller, David Olds,<br />

Howard Snyder, Cathy Spatz-Widom, Irving<br />

Spergel, Terence Thornberry, and Gail<br />

Wasserman, among many others, points<br />

the way toward understanding the crucial<br />

elements for success in State juvenile justice<br />

systemsJ 2 A carefully conceived,<br />

properly implemented, and adequately<br />

funded juvenile justice system in the 21st<br />

century can be expected to bring about<br />

the following benefits:<br />

9 Increased juvenile justice system responsiveness.<br />

The system will provide<br />

additional referral and dispositional<br />

resources for law enforcement, juvenile<br />

courts, and juvenile corrections.<br />

It will also require system components<br />

to increase their ability to identify,<br />

process, evaluate, refer, and track<br />

juvenile offenders.<br />

9 Increased accountability. <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

offenders will be held accountable<br />

for their behavior, decreasing the<br />

likelihood of their development into<br />

serious, violent, or chronic offenders<br />

and tomorrow's adult criminals. The<br />

juvenile justice system will be held<br />

accountable for controlling serious<br />

and chronic delinquency while also<br />

protecting society. Communities will<br />

be held accountable for providing<br />

community-based prevention and<br />

treatment programs and competency<br />

and life-skills development resources<br />

for juveniles.<br />

9 Increased community involvement.<br />

Involving the community in the juvenile<br />

justice system makes it more visible,<br />

understandable, and effective and enables<br />

the system to deliver justice more<br />

swiftly and more appropriately--critic<br />

factors for decreasing recidivism.<br />

9 Decreased costs of juvenile correclions.<br />

Applying the appropriate assessment<br />

and graduated sanctions and<br />

developing the required communitybased<br />

resources should significantly<br />

reduce the need for more high-cost<br />

beds in training schools and make existing<br />

beds available for the most serious<br />

and violent offenders. Savings<br />

could be used to fund treatment in<br />

community-based services, programs,<br />

and facilities and to support additional<br />

prevention programs.<br />

9 Increased program effectiveness. A<br />

body of knowledge has been gathered<br />

about the characteristics of serious,<br />

violent, and chronic offenders and<br />

about what works in treatment and<br />

rehabilitation) 3 However, successful<br />

intervention in the delinquent and<br />

criminal careers of juvenile offenders<br />

will require more information about<br />

what works best, for whom, and under<br />

what circumstances. Followup research<br />

and rigorous evaluation of programs<br />

implemented as a part of this<br />

strategy should produce valuable data.<br />

The most effective long-term respo[<br />

to the problem of juvenile delinquency<br />

violence lies in improving the juvenile justice<br />

system and working to prevent delinquency<br />

before it occurs. A balanced and<br />

responsible approach to juvenile crime<br />

that coordinates law enforcement, courts,<br />

detention and corrections, treatment, and<br />

prevention resources in a cost-effective<br />

manner can serve to reduce juvenile crime<br />

and make the Nation's communities safer<br />

and better places to live.<br />

Additional Information<br />

For additional information on training<br />

and technical assistance for a range of juvenile<br />

justice improvements and for training<br />

guides, Reports, Bulletins, and Fact<br />

Sheets on effective delinquency prevention<br />

and intervention programs, contact the<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Clearinghouse at 800-638-<br />

8736 or send your request via e-mail to<br />

askncjrs@ncjrs.org or www.ncjrs.org/<br />

ojjhome.htm.<br />

Endnotes<br />

1. J.J. Wilson and J.C. Howell, Comprehensive<br />

Strategy for Serious, Violent, and<br />

Chronic <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders, Program<br />

mary, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of<br />

<strong>Justice</strong>, Office of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office


of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Pre-<br />

December 1993 (NCJ 143453).<br />

'a December 1993 OJJDP grant,<br />

NCCD, in partnership with DRP, conducted<br />

an exhaustive search of empirically<br />

evaluated prevention and intervention<br />

programs. The program search yielded<br />

information on 209 promising or effective<br />

programs. The most promising programs--based<br />

on both descriptive information<br />

and evaluation data--are identified<br />

in OJJDP's Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive<br />

Strategy for Serious, Violent, and<br />

Chronic <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders, Washington,<br />

DC: U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of<br />

<strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

and Delinquency Prevention, May 1995<br />

(NCJ 153681).<br />

3. These three goals form the basis of the<br />

balanced and restorative justice framework<br />

being adopted by jurisdictions across<br />

the country to balance the needs of victims,<br />

the community, and the juvenile. (See<br />

G. Bazemore and M. Umbreit, Balanced<br />

and Restorative <strong>Justice</strong>, Program Summary,<br />

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>,<br />

Office of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention,<br />

1994 (NCJ 149727).)<br />

any juvenile justice systems incorposome<br />

of the Comprehensive Strategy's<br />

programs and policies, but none has<br />

brought this approach to scale by committing<br />

the necessary resources.<br />

5. J.J. Wilson and J.C. Howell, 1993. See<br />

also J.C. Howell, ed., Guide for Implementing<br />

the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious,<br />

Violent, and Chronic <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders,<br />

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>,<br />

Office of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office of<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention,<br />

May 1995 (NCJ 153681).<br />

6. J.A. Butts and G.J. Halemba, Waiting for<br />

<strong>Justice</strong>: Moving Young Offenders Through<br />

the <strong>Juvenile</strong> Court Process, Pittsburgh, PA:<br />

National Center for <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, 1996.<br />

7. J.J. Wilson and J.C. Howell, 1993.<br />

8. Since closing its traditional training<br />

schools in 1972, Massachusetts has relied<br />

on a sophisticated network of small, secure<br />

programs for violent youth coupled<br />

with a broad range of highly structured,<br />

community-based programs for most<br />

committed youth. Secure facilities are<br />

reserved for the most serious offenders.<br />

A study revealed recidivism rates equal to<br />

er than those of other jurisdictions.<br />

chusetts has also saved an esti-<br />

$11 million yearly by relying on<br />

community-based sanctions.<br />

9. P. Torbet, R. Gable, H. Hurst, I. Montgomery,<br />

L. Szymanskl, and D. Thomas, State<br />

Responses to Serious and Violent <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

Crime, Research Report, Washington, DC:<br />

U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Programs, Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

and Delinquency Prevention, July 1996<br />

(NCJ 161565).<br />

10. J.J. Wilson and J.C. Howell, 1993.<br />

11. Countless prevention programs have<br />

proven effective in reducing the factors<br />

in a child's life that can lead to delinquency.<br />

The Program of Prenatal and<br />

Early Childhood Home Visitation by<br />

Nurses helps women improve their healthrelated<br />

behaviors and their quality of infant<br />

care-giving and also increase their<br />

personal development. Interim results<br />

from an extensive 15-year longitudinal<br />

study are quite positive. Program participants<br />

posted a 75-percent reduction in<br />

State-verified cases of child abuse and<br />

neglect, a 32-percent reduction in emergency<br />

room visits during the second year<br />

of life, an 80-percent increase in unmarried<br />

women participating in the workforce, and<br />

a 43-percent reduction in subsequent children<br />

borne by unmarried women as compared<br />

with counterparts assigned to<br />

comparable services. Similarly, the High/<br />

Scope Perry Preschool Program fosters<br />

social and intellectual development in children<br />

ages 3 to 4 and strengthens the family<br />

unit through parent training and vocational<br />

assistance. The Research Foundation<br />

reports that by the time the<br />

participating children reached the age<br />

of 19--14 years after they completed this<br />

2-year program of developmental preschool<br />

and weekly home visits--only 31<br />

percent had ever been arrested, as cam-<br />

pared with 51 percent of a control group.<br />

In addition, by the time the Perry participants<br />

turned 27, the number who had<br />

been arrested five times or more was onefifth<br />

that of the control group.<br />

12. OJJDP has recently initiated an intensive<br />

training partnership with five States<br />

(Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Rhode Island, and<br />

Texas) to demonstrate the Comprehensive<br />

Strategy in up to six sites in each State.<br />

13. A report from OJJDP's Study Group on<br />

Serious and Violent <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders is<br />

forthcoming.<br />

References<br />

Albanese, J.S. 1993. Dealing With Delinquency:<br />

The Future of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>. Chicago,<br />

IL: Nelson-Hall Publishers.<br />

Armstrong, T.L., ed. 1991. Intensive Interventions<br />

With High-Risk Youths: Promising<br />

Approaches in <strong>Juvenile</strong> Probation and Parole.<br />

Monsey, NY: Criminal <strong>Justice</strong> Press Division<br />

of Willow Tree Press, Inc.<br />

Champion, D.J., and Mays, G.L. 1991.<br />

Transferring <strong>Juvenile</strong>s to Criminal Courts:<br />

Trends and Implications for Criminal <strong>Justice</strong>.<br />

New York, NY: Praeger Publishers.<br />

Elliott, D.S., Huizinga, D., and Menard, S.<br />

1989. Multiple Problem Youth: Delinquency,<br />

Substance Use, and Mental Health Problems.<br />

New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.<br />

Fagan, J. 1988. Social and Legal Policy Dimensions<br />

of Violent <strong>Juvenile</strong> Crime. Washington,<br />

DC: U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of<br />

<strong>Justice</strong> Programs, National Institute for <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention.<br />

Flicker, B. 1994. Taking the ABA <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> Standards to the 21st Century." <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> Reform for the "90s. Washington, DC:<br />

American Bar Association Criminal <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Section.<br />

7


Hawkins, J.D., ed. 1996. Delinquency and<br />

Crime: Current Theories. New York, NY: Cambridge<br />

University Press.<br />

Hawkins, J.D., and Catalano, R.E, Jr. 1992.<br />

Communities That Care: Action for Drug<br />

Abuse Prevention. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-<br />

Bass, Inc.<br />

Howell, J.C. 1997. <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> & Youth<br />

Violence. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications,<br />

Inc.<br />

Howell, J.C., Krisberg, B., Hawkins, J.D.,<br />

and Wilson, J.J., eds. 1995. A Sourcebook:<br />

Serious, Violent, and Chronic <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

Offenders. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage<br />

Publications, Inc.<br />

Huizinga, D., Loeher, R., and Thornberry,<br />

T.P. 1995. Recent Findings From the Program of<br />

Research on the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency.<br />

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of<br />

<strong>Justice</strong>, Office of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office of<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention.<br />

Jones, M.A., and Krisberg, B. 1994. Image<br />

and Reality." <strong>Juvenile</strong> Crime, Youth Violence<br />

and Public Policy. Washington, DC: National<br />

Council on Crime and Delinquency.<br />

Klein, M.W., Maxson, C.L., and Miller, J.<br />

1995. Modern Gang Reader. Los Angeles, CA:<br />

Roxbury Publishing Company.<br />

Krisberg, B. 1992. <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>:<br />

Improving the Quality of Care. San Francisco,<br />

CA: National Council on Crime and<br />

Delinquency.<br />

Krisberg, B., and Austin, J.E 1993. Reinventing<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>. Newbury Park, CA:<br />

Sage Publications, Inc.<br />

Leonard, K.K., Pope, C.E., and Feyerherm,<br />

W., eds. 1995. Minorities in <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>.<br />

Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.<br />

Mathias, R.A., DeMuro, P., and Allinson,<br />

R.S., eds. 1984. Violent <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders--<br />

An Anthology. San Francisco, CA: National<br />

Council on Crime and Delinquency.<br />

National Criminal <strong>Justice</strong> Association.<br />

1997 (October). <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Reform<br />

Initiatives in the States: 1994-1996. Program<br />

Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department<br />

of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs,<br />

Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency<br />

Prevention.<br />

Puritz, P., Burrell, S., Schwartz, R., Soler, M.,<br />

and Warboys, L. 1995. A Call for <strong>Justice</strong>: An<br />

Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of<br />

Representation in Delinquency Proceedings.<br />

Washington, DC: American Bar Association.<br />

Robins, L., and Rutter, M., eds. 1990.<br />

Straight and Devious Pathways From Child-<br />

hood to Adulthood. New York, NY: Cambridge<br />

University Press.<br />

Schwartz, I.M., ed. 1992. <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

and Public Policy." Toward a National<br />

Agenda. New York, NY: Macmillan.<br />

Singer, S.I. 1996. Recriminalizing Delinquency."<br />

Violent <strong>Juvenile</strong> Crimes and <strong>Juvenile</strong><br />

<strong>Justice</strong> Reform. New York, NY: Cambridge<br />

University Press.<br />

Spergel, I.A. 1995. Youth Gang Problem: A<br />

Community Approach. New York, NY: Oxford<br />

University Press.<br />

Sarah Ingersoll, Special Assistant to the<br />

Administrator, assisted in the preparation of<br />

this Bulletin.<br />

The Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency<br />

Prevention is a component of the Office<br />

of <strong>Justice</strong> Programs, which also includes<br />

the Bureau of <strong>Justice</strong> Assistance, the Bureau<br />

of <strong>Justice</strong> Statistics, the National Institute of<br />

<strong>Justice</strong>, and the Office for Victims of Crime.<br />

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Attachment C<br />

The Cost of <strong>Juvenile</strong> Confinement<br />

Page 100 of 113


The <strong>Justice</strong> Policy Institute<br />

is dedicated to ending<br />

society’s reliance on<br />

incarceration and<br />

promoting effective and just<br />

solutions to social problems.<br />

Board of Directors<br />

Tara Andrews<br />

At-Large<br />

David C. Fathi<br />

Board Chair<br />

Katharine Huffman<br />

At-Large<br />

Peter Leone, Ph.D.<br />

Board Treasurer<br />

Administrative Staff<br />

Tracy Velázquez<br />

Executive Director<br />

Debra Glapion<br />

Administrative Director<br />

Research and Program Staff<br />

Amanda Petteruti<br />

Research & Publications<br />

Associate<br />

Nastassia Walsh<br />

Research Associate<br />

Ellen Tuzzolo<br />

Associate Director<br />

Southern Initiatives<br />

Communications Staff<br />

LaWanda Johnson<br />

Communications Director<br />

Laura Jones<br />

Communications Advisor<br />

Emily Sydnor<br />

Communications Assistant<br />

1003 K Street, NW, Suite 500<br />

Washington, DC 20001<br />

Phone: 202-558-7974<br />

Fax: 202-558-7978<br />

www.justicepolicy.org<br />

The Costs of Confinement: Why Good <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Policies<br />

Make Good Fiscal Sense<br />

May 2009<br />

Introduction<br />

Approximately 93,000 young people are held in juvenile justice facilities across<br />

the United States. 1 Seventy percent of these youth are held in state-funded, postadjudication,<br />

residential facilities, at an average cost of $240.99 per day per<br />

youth. 2 With states facing serious budgetary constraints, it is an opportune time<br />

for policymakers to consider ways to reduce juvenile justice spending that won’t<br />

compromise public safety.<br />

This policy brief details how states can see a net reduction in costs by moving<br />

expenditures away from large, congruent care facilities (often called “training<br />

schools”) for youth and investing in community-based alternatives. Such a<br />

resource realignment can reap better results for communities, taxpayers, and<br />

children. Evidence is growing that there are cost-effective policies and programs<br />

for intervening in the lives of delinquent youth which actually improve<br />

community safety and outcomes for children. While there is no silver bullet that<br />

will guarantee reductions in crime, policies that include prevention and<br />

intervention for youth in the community have been shown to have a positive<br />

public safety benefit. Major findings and recommendations for reform include:<br />

• States needlessly spend billions of dollars a year incarcerating<br />

nonviolent youth. States spend about $5.7 billion each year imprisoning<br />

youth, even though the majority are held for nonviolent offenses and could<br />

be managed safely in the community.<br />

• The biggest states are realigning fiscal resources away from ineffective<br />

and expensive state institutions, and towards more effective communitybased<br />

services. California, Illinois, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and<br />

other large states are redirecting funds once spent on large residential<br />

facilities, and spending those dollars on less expensive, more effective<br />

programs to curb reoffending and reduce youth crime.<br />

• Holding more youth in secure juvenile facilities can lead to costly<br />

litigation for states. Unacceptable conditions not only have serious negative<br />

consequences on the youth who experience them, but can also lead to courtordered<br />

reforms which in some cases have cost millions of dollars.<br />

• Imprisoning youth can have severe detrimental effects on youth, their<br />

long-term economic productivity and economic health of communities.<br />

Youth who are imprisoned have higher recidivism rates than youth who<br />

remain in communities, both due to suspended opportunities for education<br />

and a disruption in the process that normally allows many youth to “age-out”<br />

of crime. See Appendix A for more information on the negative effects of<br />

incarceration on youth.<br />

1


• Policies that lock up more youth do not necessarily improve public safety. Ten years of<br />

data on incarceration and crime trends show that states that increased the number of youth in<br />

juvenile facilities did not necessarily experience a decrease in crime during the same time<br />

period.<br />

• Community-based programs increase public safety. The most effective programs at<br />

reducing recidivism rates and promoting positive life outcomes for youth are administered in<br />

the community, outside of the criminal or juvenile justice systems. Some of these programs<br />

have been shown to reduce recidivism by up to 22 percent.<br />

• Community-based programs for youth are more cost-effective than incarceration. Some<br />

programs like multi-systemic therapy and functional family therapy have been shown to yield<br />

up to $13 in benefits to public safety for every dollar spent. These programs are more cost<br />

effective and produce more public safety benefits than detaining and incarcerating youth. See<br />

Appendix B for more information on cost-effective programs that work with youth.<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Definitions<br />

Adjudication: The hearing at which the judgment of whether the youth is or is not responsible<br />

for the offense he or she is charged with is made. It is the equivalent of the trial in the criminal<br />

court process where the guilt or innocence of an adult is determined.<br />

Detention: The holding of youth, upon arrest, in a juvenile detention facility for two main<br />

purposes: to ensure the youth appears for all court hearings and to protect the community<br />

from future offending. Youth may also be detained while awaiting disposition of an adjudicated<br />

case.<br />

Disposition: Similar to the sentencing hearing the adult criminal justice system. The judge<br />

decides what action or treatment plan to impose upon the adjudicated youth.<br />

Residential Placement: After a youth is adjudicated delinquent, the court can order placement<br />

in a residential facility. Such facilities can be secure and prison-like or have a more open setting,<br />

like group homes or foster care.<br />

Secure Residential Facilities: Sometimes also referred to as training schools, residential<br />

confinement facilities, or youth prisons, secure residential facilities are for youth who have<br />

been adjudicated delinquent to the custody of correctional facilities. These facilities are statefunded<br />

are often very large and would be comparable to a prison in the adult criminal justice<br />

system.<br />

Status Offense: An offense that would not be considered a crime for adults. Status offenses are<br />

offenses that are only illegal for people 18 years old or younger such as curfew violations,<br />

running away, truancy, and underage drinking.<br />

For details on how to cut costs in the criminal justice system, please see the <strong>Justice</strong> Policy<br />

Institute’s companion brief, Pruning Prisons: How Cutting Corrections Can Save Money and<br />

Protect Public Safety, available at www.justicepolicy.org.


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Current trend: More youth are being caught up in the juvenile justice system<br />

The types and number of offenses being formally handled by the juvenile court has changed in the<br />

last 10 years. In 2005, 28 percent of all delinquent cases handled by the juvenile court were public<br />

order offenses (e.g. disorderly conduct, obstruction of justice, and liquor law violations). 3 This is an<br />

increase of 8 percentage points from 10 years ago. 4 And two out of every three (67 percent) cases<br />

involved non-person offenses. Despite recent improvements in some jurisdictions, the caseload of the<br />

juvenile justice system has increased by over half a million cases in the last 20 years. 5 This increase<br />

is not only a burden on an already over-crowded juvenile justice system, it is also a detriment to<br />

youth who may be better served in the community and without the intervention of the courts.<br />

Several theories have emerged as possible causes of the increase in the number of youth<br />

processed by the juvenile justice system. Among them is the idea that jurisdictions, fueled by<br />

assertions that the nation is besieged by young gang members, have expanded policies aimed at<br />

regulating youth behavior and strengthening penalties for noncompliance. For example, zero<br />

tolerance policies and more police in schools -- policies intended to reduce school violence --<br />

have also increased the likelihood that an incident that previously would have been handled<br />

informally or by the school now results in arrest. 6 This is contributing to the clogging of an<br />

already overburdened juvenile justice system. Between 2000 and 2004, for instance, Denver<br />

experienced a 71 percent increase in school-based referrals to law enforcement. 7<br />

Confinement Statistics<br />

On any given day, there are more than 90,000 youth in juvenile justice facilities across the<br />

country. 8 About 28 percent of youth in these facilities are being detained pre-adjudication or predisposition,<br />

and 70 percent were sentenced to facilities post-disposition. 9 In 2005, 22 percent of<br />

all adjudicated delinquency cases -- over 140,000 youth -- were ordered to a juvenile justice<br />

placement.<br />

70 percent of youth in residential<br />

facilities are committed by the courts<br />

Committed<br />

64,558<br />

70%<br />

Detained<br />

26,344<br />

28%<br />

Diverted<br />

1,865<br />

2%<br />

Note: Diversion includes youth sent to a residential facility in lieu of adjudication as part of<br />

a diversion agreement.<br />

Source: M. Sickmund, T.J. Sladky, W. Kang, and C. Puzzanchera, Easy Access to the<br />

Census of <strong>Juvenile</strong>s in Residential Placement (Washington, D.C.: Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

and Delinquency Prevention, 2008) http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/display.asp<br />

2


The Costs of Confinement<br />

The majority of youth in residential facilities have been adjudicated for nonviolent offenses,<br />

including drugs (8.6 percent), technical violations (13.3 percent) * and status offenses (6.6<br />

percent), which include offenses that would not be a crime if committed by an adult. Sixty-six<br />

percent of committed youth were adjudicated for non-person offenses such as these. †<br />

Valid Court Orders<br />

Although federal law under the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) requires the<br />

deinstitutionalization of youth charged with status offenses, courts are allowed to make exceptions,<br />

called valid court orders, in certain cases. The use of the valid court order mechanism contributes to the<br />

approximately 2,000 youth that are held in residential facilities for status offenses. Taking the lead in<br />

ending the use of valid court orders to hold youth adjudicated of status offenses are states like Alabama<br />

that, in 2008, prohibited the commitment of youth charged with status offenses could further reduce<br />

the numbers of youth held in state-funded secure confinement. If youth are held an average of 30 days<br />

each, at the rate of $240.99 per day, 10 states could be spending approximately $14.5 million locking up<br />

youth for status offenses per month.<br />

The majority of youth are adjudicated and<br />

committed for nonperson offenses.<br />

Technical<br />

violations<br />

13.3%<br />

Status<br />

6.6%<br />

Public<br />

Order<br />

10.8%<br />

Drug<br />

8.6%<br />

Property<br />

27.2%<br />

Person<br />

33.5%<br />

Source: M. Sickmund, T.J. Sladky, W. Kang, and C. Puzzanchera, Easy<br />

Access to the Census of <strong>Juvenile</strong>s in Residential Placement (Washington,<br />

D.C.: Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention, 2008)<br />

http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/display.asp<br />

* About 25 percent of youth in detention are in for technical violations, which include breaking the rules of<br />

probation or parole, such as not making appointments, not passing drug tests and other conditions of probation.<br />

† Person offenses include: aggravated assault, criminal homicide, robbery, simple assault, violent sexual assault and<br />

other person offenses such as kidnapping and harassment.<br />

3


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Locking up youth can be costly for states<br />

States spent about $5.7 billion in 2007 to imprison 64,558 youth committed to residential<br />

facilities. 11 The per diem costs of locking up one young person in a juvenile facility ranges from<br />

$24 in Wyoming to $726 in Connecticut, but the American Correctional Association estimates<br />

that, on average, it costs states $240.99 per day -- around $88,000 a year -- for every youth in a<br />

juvenile facility. 12 .<br />

Reporting states spent an average of $7.1 million per day locking up youth in residential<br />

facilities.<br />

State<br />

Youth in<br />

Residential<br />

Placement<br />

Cost per day per<br />

youth<br />

Total cost per day<br />

based on total<br />

population<br />

Alabama 1,251 $137.21 $171,649.71<br />

Alaska 198 $252 $49,896<br />

Arizona 1,083 $314 $340,062<br />

California 8,955 $67.51 $604,552.05<br />

Colorado 1,617 $161 $260,337<br />

Connecticut 312 $726 $226,512<br />

Georgia 1,398 $200.68 $280,550.64<br />

Indiana 1,866 $153.78 $286,953.48<br />

Louisiana 807 $387.12 $312,405.84<br />

Maine 159 $412.05 $65,515.95<br />

Maryland 525 $229 $120,298.50<br />

Michigan 2,115 $391 $827,451.45<br />

Mississippi 219 $426.51 $93,405.69<br />

Missouri 825 $133 $109,791<br />

Nebraska 252 $173 $43,596<br />

New Jersey 870 $174 $151,380<br />

North Carolina 804 $262 $210,648<br />

North Dakota 222 $146.64 $32,554.08<br />

Ohio 2,898 $216 $624,924.72<br />

Oklahoma 624 $158.96 $99,191.04<br />

Pennsylvania 3,318 $362 $1,201,116<br />

Rhode Island 330 $58.95 $19,453.50<br />

South Dakota 474 $219.79 $104,180.46<br />

Utah 606 $195 $118,170<br />

Virginia 1,455 $280 $407,400<br />

West Virginia 417 $227 $94,659<br />

Wisconsin 1,092 $259 $282,828<br />

Wyoming 288 $24.44 $7,038.72<br />

Total for States Reporting 34,980 $7,146,521<br />

Note: Data not available for Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,<br />

Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington.<br />

Source: Melissa Sickmund, T. J. Sladky and Wei Kang. (2008) “Census of <strong>Juvenile</strong>s in Residential<br />

Placement Databook.” http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/cjrp/asp/State_Adj.asp; American Correctional<br />

Association, 2008 Directory: Adult and <strong>Juvenile</strong> Correctional Departments, Institutions, Agencies, and<br />

Probation and Parole Authorities (Alexandria, VA: American Correctional Association, 2008).<br />

4


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Shifting the fiscal architecture of state juvenile justice systems can save<br />

money and improve outcomes<br />

In many states, there is no financial incentive for counties to invest in alternatives to secure<br />

residential placement for youth because state governments generally fund residential placement<br />

for youth that are adjudicated delinquent. Counties have to pay for alternatives to incarceration,<br />

like those mentioned in subsequent sections, but they do not have to pay for state-funded secure<br />

residential confinement.<br />

To eliminate or reduce the financial incentive of sending youth to state-funded secure care,<br />

several states have altered the fiscal architecture of the juvenile justice system. Some states<br />

provide financial reimbursement for costs incurred by counties to manage youth locally, while<br />

requiring the county to pay part of the cost of confining a child in a state institution. Other states<br />

have simply increased the costs for counties to send youth to state institutions, and programs<br />

have grown naturally in localities where there had previously been no incentive to develop them<br />

before. These changes have been funded either with dedicated state funding streams, or through<br />

the increased ability to pull down federal dollars to fund more local juvenile justice<br />

programming.<br />

By rethinking how they fund their juvenile justice systems, states and localities can succeed in<br />

keeping more youth at home, reduce the number of youth incarcerated, promote better outcomes<br />

for young people moving through these systems, and potentially show significant savings to<br />

taxpayers. Below are some notable state examples.<br />

Ohio—“RECLAIM Ohio”<br />

• Ohio created a system that allocates money to counties for juvenile justice based on<br />

delinquency levels and population. The county uses the same pool of money whether it<br />

utilizes community-based alternatives or state commitment. Community-based<br />

alternatives are cheaper, thus encouraging the county to invest in those initiatives.<br />

• Between RECLAIM Ohio’s enactment in 1992 and 2009, the number of young people<br />

committed to secure state care in Ohio fell 42 percent. 13<br />

• According to a fiscal analysis by the Ohio Department of Youth Services, for every dollar<br />

spent on the RECLAIM program, the state saves from $11 to $45 in commitment and<br />

processing costs, depending on the risk level of the youth. 14<br />

Illinois—“Redeploy Illinois”<br />

• Under Redeploy Illinois, participating counties agree to cut the number of youth they<br />

send to state secure facilities by at least 25 percent below the average of the previous<br />

three years. The reduction can be seen in the overall population or in any specific<br />

population. In return, the state reimburses the counties for funds they spend managing the<br />

adjudicated youth locally. 15<br />

• Since starting in mid-2004, Redeploy pilot sites included the 2nd Judicial District (containing<br />

12 rural counties) and St. Clair, Peoria, and Macon counties. In its first three years of<br />

implementation, the pilot sites diverted 382 youth from commitment, saved an estimated<br />

$18.7 million in costs, and lowered the number of commitments by 51 percent. 16 In April<br />

2009, Illinois made Redeploy a permanent initiative to be expanded in other counties.<br />

5


The Costs of Confinement<br />

New York – “Re-direct New York”<br />

• In February 2009, New York State closed six youth residential facilities, downsized two,<br />

and closed three evening reporting centers. The projected savings of closing these<br />

facilities is approximately $16.4 million and the funds will be redirected to counties to<br />

strengthen alternatives to incarceration. 17<br />

• Coinciding with state residential facility closures, legislators will introduce Re-direct<br />

New York, which would create a fiscal incentive for counties to utilize alternatives to<br />

incarceration rather than state-run residential facilities for youth or local detention<br />

facilities. The law would reimburse counties for 65 percent of the cost of using<br />

alternatives to incarceration, reinvest half of the savings in alternatives to communitybased<br />

alternatives, and fund only evidence-based alternatives. 18<br />

Pennsylvania—“Act 148”<br />

• Pennsylvania reimburses 80 percent of the county cost of community-based juvenile<br />

justice services. The county pays the state 40 percent of the cost of state youth<br />

confinement.<br />

• Three years after Act 148 was enacted in the late 1970s, there was a 75 percent increase<br />

in state subsidies for county programs; by the early 1980s, secure placements for youth<br />

dropped 24 percent. In 2006, only 14 percent of committed youth were placed in state<br />

facilities. 19<br />

California—SB 81<br />

• In 2007, as part of a budget “trailer bill,” the governor signed legislation that bans<br />

commitments of youth adjudicated of nonviolent offenses to state-run residential<br />

facilities.<br />

• Block grants established under the bill will provide an average of $130,000 per youth<br />

eligible to be placed in community-based alternatives.<br />

• The state projected that the number of youth placed in state residential facilities would<br />

decrease from about 2,500 to about 1,500 within two years. 20<br />

Wisconsin—“Youth Aids”<br />

• Instead of Wisconsin funding the state-run secure residential confinement facilities<br />

directly, it allocates a certain amount of money to each county for each bed used in the<br />

facility. The county uses some of the money for the state-run facility or it can use it for<br />

less expensive, community-based alternatives. 21<br />

• A year after Youth Aids was enacted in 1980, 25 counties shared $26 million in funding<br />

plus state capacity-building money for community alternative programs. Between 1997<br />

and 2006, the number of state commitments fell by 43 percent. 22<br />

6


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Conditions litigation can be a costly result of mass incarceration of youth<br />

“In the worst case scenario, crowded facilities can lead to increased institutional violence,<br />

higher operational costs, and significant vulnerabilities to litigation to improve the conditions<br />

of confinement.” 23 James Austin, Kelly Dedel Johnson, and Ronald Weitzer<br />

While society often refers to youth as its “most important asset,” the high costs of incarcerating<br />

youth can have the result of creating conditions of confinement that are not only nonrehabilitative,<br />

but are dangerous and can lead to costly litigation. Below are some cases that<br />

illustrate why large, congruent care facilities – which are the most likely to be the subject of<br />

conditions lawsuits – can in fact be an even poorer choice from a fiscal standpoint than the “per<br />

diem” costs indicate.<br />

California: In 2003, Margaret Farrell sued the California Youth Authority (CYA) for using tax<br />

payers dollars to fund poor and illegal conditions in its facilities. In 2004, a series of expert<br />

reports were filed on the problems of access for people with disabilities, mental health and<br />

substance abuse treatment, health services, education programs, sex offender treatment and<br />

general conditions in the CYA facilities. In 2005, this led to an agreement on a schedule for<br />

reforming the juvenile justice system and later, led the Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, which<br />

took charge of the CYA, to set forth a set of remedial plans which are reported on quarterly to<br />

track any progress they have made. 24 The Budget Act for FY 06-07 added approximately $90<br />

million to the Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> budget so that it might comply with the costs of<br />

remedial plans that resulted from the Farrell case. 25<br />

Ohio: In 2007, a class action lawsuit charged the Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS)<br />

with excessive use of force and isolation, inadequate health care, mental health care, and<br />

educational services for youth, poorly trained staff, an unsafe living environment and an<br />

inadequate grievance system. A settlement was reached in April 2008 which requires better<br />

mental health services, more educational opportunities, better medical and dental services,<br />

increased training for employees as well as hiring up to 115 more juvenile correctional officers,<br />

revising the use of force and isolation and supporting evidence-based community programs for<br />

low-risk offenders. The cost of carrying out these changes is not yet known, but the Youth Law<br />

Center estimates that it will increase the DYS budget by $20 to $30 million a year. 26<br />

Louisiana: In 2006, an 8-year lawsuit concerning the conditions of juvenile facilities in<br />

Louisiana was dismissed. This lawsuit was only a part of the litigation that has been going on for<br />

35 years in that state. United States v. Louisiana began in 1998 when the first charge was filed<br />

against the state. The lawsuit focused on the conditions of four facilities and accused Louisiana<br />

of failing to provide safe conditions as well as adequate educational, medical, mental health and<br />

rehabilitative services in these state facilities. 27 The case was first filed in 1998 and the first<br />

settlement was in 2000, followed by two more in 2003 and 2004 before the case was finally<br />

dismissed by consensus of both parties in 2006. 28 The American Correctional Association<br />

estimates that by 2000, Louisiana had spent over a million dollars in plaintiff and defense fees<br />

and expert fees since 1998 and almost $3 million in attorney, expert and medical service fees for<br />

adult and juvenile lawsuits since 1994. In addition, the juvenile settlement agreement in 2000<br />

7


The Costs of Confinement<br />

required the state to spent $20 million in three years to better the educational and medical care<br />

services and to decrease violence in four juvenile facilities. 29<br />

While policymakers might believe that the key to reducing overcrowded conditions is to expand<br />

facilities, history has shown that adding more beds is likely to result in a “build it and they will<br />

come” outcome, only exacerbating the problem. Although estimates are not available for staterun<br />

residential facilities, we do know that over a 20-year period the cost to taxpayers of one local<br />

detention bed can reach up to $1.5 million. 30<br />

Building new facilities and paying to operate them reduces money that might otherwise support<br />

crucial services that provide long-term benefits to youth and the community at-large, like<br />

education and community services. A public safety investment that is focused on the most<br />

expensive, least effective options, such as building new facilities, removes the system’s ability to<br />

fund the kind of less expensive and more effective options that intermediate supervision,<br />

treatment and services can offer. Additionally, locking up youth who do not need to be<br />

incarcerated takes away resources from youth for whom a secure residential facility is the most<br />

appropriate option.<br />

8


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Confinement can have negative consequences for youth and communities<br />

“[C]onfining youth may widen the gulf between the youth and positive influences such as<br />

family and school.” James Austin, Kelly Dedel, and Ronald Weitzer 31<br />

Secure residential facilities for young people were originally intended to be places for<br />

rehabilitation and support for youth to learn from their mistakes while being held accountable for<br />

their actions. However, the rise in the number of youth held in these facilities has contributed to<br />

overcrowding and changed the philosophy of some facilities from one of rehabilitation to one of<br />

punishment.<br />

The most current national data show that 1,069 facilities (36 percent of all juvenile facilities) are<br />

at or over capacity or relying on some sort of makeshift beds to house additional youth. 32 Reports<br />

of increased suicidal behavior, stress-related illness and psychiatric problems 33 accompany the<br />

harsh and stressful conditions of overcrowded facilities. Large facilities that hold more than 100<br />

youth are the most likely to experience problems with overcrowding. 34 Facilities of this size hold<br />

nearly half of all youth in facilities. Texas, California, Maryland and a number of other states<br />

have been cited for poor conditions of confinement due to overcrowding, resulting in lawsuits<br />

and multi-million dollar settlements.<br />

Even in facilities without overcrowding problems, youth in secure confinement often do not<br />

develop social skills, such as self-control and conflict resolution as well as those who remain in<br />

the community. Youth who spend time in facilities have higher recidivism rates; are less likely to<br />

naturally age out of illegal behavior; suffer from more mental illness and are at a higher risk of<br />

suicide; they are less likely to succeed at education and employment at the same level as youth<br />

who were never incarcerated. More information on each of these areas is included in the<br />

appendix to this report.<br />

Missouri’s Department of Youth Services has become a national model for juvenile justice<br />

systems. Their emphasis on small facilities (only three of the state’s 32 residential facilities has<br />

more than 33 beds) 35 and focus on support and rehabilitation have had positive effects on youth<br />

and public safety. Youth in these facilities meet educational benchmarks at similar rates to youth<br />

who are not imprisoned, 36 and recidivism rates are around 8.7 percent. 37 Although communitybased<br />

programs are the most effective way to treat youth in conflict with the law, if a young<br />

person must be confined, the Missouri Model is one of the most effective methods of providing<br />

secure care for youth.<br />

See Appendix A for more information on the negative effects of incarceration on youth.<br />

9


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Locking up more youth does not improve public safety<br />

Over the last decade the majority of states have witnessed falling crime rates, which can be<br />

attributed to a number of different factors, including the economy, changes in spending priorities,<br />

changes to policies that affect public safety, and myriad other reasons. Researchers who have<br />

critically evaluated the adult criminal justice system have found little if any correlation between<br />

increasing prison populations and lower crime rates. Bruce Western at Harvard University<br />

recently found that only 10 percent of the crime decline in the 1990s was due to increased use of<br />

incarceration. 38 Concurrently, data shows that states that increased the number of youth in<br />

facilities did not necessarily see a bigger drop in crime than states that lowered juvenile<br />

correctional populations.<br />

A comparison of youth incarceration rates and violent crime rates does not necessarily support<br />

such policies. A review of the last 10 years of data on incarceration and crime trends shows no<br />

correlation between states that increase the number of youth in juvenile facilities and crime. In<br />

other words, there is no evidence that locking up more youth will definitively improve public<br />

safety. On the other hand, states that significantly lowered the number of youth incarcerated were<br />

more likely to see bigger drops in crime than states that increased their correctional populations.<br />

Top 10 States that lowered the number of youth in juvenile justice facilities from 1997 to<br />

2006. Seven of the 10 states that reduced the number of youth in juvenile justice facilities saw<br />

drops in the total number of violent offenses reported to law enforcement.<br />

State<br />

Percent change in<br />

number of youth in<br />

juvenile facilities<br />

Percent change in<br />

total number of<br />

violent offenses<br />

reported<br />

Percent change in<br />

number of<br />

property offenses<br />

reported<br />

Louisiana -57% -20% -30%<br />

Mississippi -41% -32% -18%<br />

New Mexico -39% -15% -27%<br />

Washington -34% -11% -7%<br />

Maine -34% 2% -11%<br />

Wisconsin -33% 13% -11%<br />

Tennessee -33% 8% -2%<br />

Georgia -27% -3% -6%<br />

Connecticut -27% -23% -25%<br />

Maryland -26% -12% -20%<br />

Average -35% -9% -16%<br />

US Total -12% -13% -14%<br />

10


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Bottom 10 States that increased the number of youth in juvenile justice facilities from 1997<br />

to 2006. Six of the 10 states that increased the number of youth in juvenile justice facilities saw<br />

increases in the total number of violent offenses reported to law enforcement.<br />

State<br />

Percent change in<br />

number of youth in<br />

juvenile facilities<br />

Percent change in<br />

total number of<br />

violent offenses<br />

reported<br />

Percent change in<br />

number of<br />

property offenses<br />

reported<br />

Vermont 13% 21% -10%<br />

South Dakota 13% -8% -44%<br />

Oklahoma 14% -4% -21%<br />

Kentucky 15% -11% -3%<br />

Texas 20% 4% 1%<br />

Florida 22% -14% -21%<br />

Colorado 23% 32% -2%<br />

Arkansas 35% 17% 5%<br />

West Virginia 45% 28% 17%<br />

Idaho 115% 17% -20%<br />

Average 31% 8% -10%<br />

US Total -12% -13% -14%<br />

Note: The number of youth in correctional facilities includes detained, committed and diverted youth.<br />

Sources: Correctional Facilities: M. Sickmund, T.J. Sladky, W. Kang, and C. Puzzanchera, Easy Access<br />

to the Census of <strong>Juvenile</strong>s in Residential Placement (Washington, D.C.: Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and<br />

Delinquency Prevention, 2008) http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/display.asp; Crime: FBI<br />

Uniform Crime Report, Crime in the United States, 1997 and 2006, www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm, Table 5<br />

While this may be counterintuitive, research has shown significant negative impacts of<br />

incarceration on youth that can impact public safety. Research on the impact of incarcerating or<br />

grouping youth together for treatment in facilities has found that it can reduce their educational<br />

and vocational outcomes, 39 disrupt their families, introduce them to delinquent peers they may<br />

not have met otherwise 40 and expose them to traumatic experiences. All of these factors can<br />

increase the likelihood of engagement in later illegal behavior. Research also shows that most<br />

youth “age out” of crime, diminishing even further the public safety impact of incarceration. 41<br />

Finally, while the media and some system stakeholders purport that young people drive violent<br />

crime trends, this contention is not supported by national crime trends. Youth account for 18<br />

percent of all arrests for violent offenses. 42<br />

11


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Community-based programs are proven, cost-effective alternatives to<br />

imprisonment<br />

When intervention is recommended for a young person, the most effective programs in terms of<br />

reducing recidivism rates and promoting positive life outcomes are those administered in the<br />

community, outside of the criminal or juvenile justice systems. Some of these programs have<br />

been shown to reduce recidivism by up to 22 percent, at a cost significantly lower than<br />

imprisonment. 43<br />

Researchers examining the effects of institutional versus community-based interventions have<br />

found positive outcomes for youth treated outside secure facilities. In one study, researchers’<br />

meta-analysis found that while “appropriate treatment” works in both institutional and<br />

community settings, the rate of success was higher in the community-based treatment models.<br />

Comparing community programs with large residential programs, researchers determined that<br />

residential facilities “dampen the positive effects of appropriate service while augmenting the<br />

negative impact of inappropriate service.” 44<br />

The Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP), a non-partisan research entity for the<br />

Washington legislature, has done a cost-benefit analysis of juvenile justice programs. It showed<br />

that programs like those endorsed by the University of Colorado’s Center for the Study and<br />

Prevention of Violence in their Blueprints for Violence Prevention 45 are the best ways to improve<br />

public safety and are the most cost-effective ways to work with youth in need of behavioral<br />

intervention. More information on each of these programs is provided in the appendix.<br />

Alternatives to incarceration for youth can reduce recidivism by up to 22<br />

percent<br />

-22%<br />

-15.9%<br />

-8.7%<br />

-10.5%<br />

Source: Elizabeth Drake, Evidence-Based <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offender Programs: Program Description, Quality Assurance,<br />

and Cost (Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2007) www.wsipp.wa.gov<br />

WSIPP was also commissioned by the Washington state legislature to determine how many adult<br />

beds and how much money could be saved by the year 2030 by investing in alternatives to<br />

incarceration for youth such as those in the graph above. WSIPP used three scenarios of<br />

investments in alternatives to incarceration to show how the prison population could be reduced<br />

from the projected 2030 levels. 46<br />

-7.3%<br />

-3.5%<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> drug courts<br />

Restorative justice for low-risk offenders<br />

Aggression Replacement Training<br />

Multi-systemic Therapy<br />

Functional Family Therapy on probation<br />

Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care<br />

-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0<br />

Percent Change in Recidivism Rate (%)<br />

12


The Costs of Confinement<br />

An aggressive approach to investing in alternatives to incarceration would yield the biggest<br />

savings for taxpayers in Washington.<br />

Definition<br />

Incarceration<br />

Rate<br />

Return on<br />

investment for<br />

taxpayers<br />

Felonies<br />

per 1,000<br />

Current<br />

Moderate<br />

Funded at current level and<br />

provided to the same percent of<br />

eligible participants<br />

Expanded to include 20 percent of<br />

remaining eligible participants<br />

7.3 24 46<br />

6.6 27 47<br />

Aggressive<br />

Expanded to include 40 percent of<br />

remaining participants<br />

5.8 28 48<br />

Source: Steve Aos, Marna Miller, and Elizabeth Drake, Evidence-Based Public Policy Options to Reduce Future<br />

Prison Construction, Criminal <strong>Justice</strong> Costs, and Crime Rates (Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public<br />

Policy, 2006).<br />

As the chart shows, investing in alternatives to incarceration for youth today will reap significant<br />

savings in the potential costs of tomorrow.<br />

California: The costs of locking up youth with mental illness<br />

In 2007, a study prepared for the Chief Probation Officers of California and the California<br />

Mental Health Directors Association surveyed 18 counties regarding youth with mental illness<br />

in their juvenile detention facilities. 47 This study found that a young person with mental illness<br />

can cost at least $18,800 more than other youth, taking into account reported estimates of the<br />

average differences in length of stay. This estimate assumes the average reported facility rate,<br />

and provisions of basic mental health services reported in the survey. In addition, for each stay<br />

the total cost of psychotropic medications averages $4,387 per youth. About 12.5 percent of<br />

youth in detention in these counties were on psychotropic medication. An analysis published in<br />

the Journal of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Detention Services suggests that poor mental health and the<br />

conditions of detention conspire together to generate higher rates of depression and suicide<br />

idealization. 48<br />

See Appendix B for more information on cost-effective programs that work with youth.<br />

13


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Recommendations<br />

The best available research suggests that community alternatives to incarceration like the<br />

evidence-based programs mentioned in this report, and investments in front-end services like<br />

education and employment, are the best ways to improve public safety while saving money.<br />

States like Ohio, Illinois, and California show that shifting the financial architecture away from<br />

state-funded secure residential confinement forces counties to invest in evidence-based<br />

programs. Below are some recommendations for policymakers seeking to improve outcomes<br />

and best utilize scarce public resources.<br />

“Investing in programs and practices that reduce future criminal behavior ceases to be a good<br />

idea and becomes a very good idea when reductions in justice system costs exceed the cost of<br />

the program.” 49 California State Commission on <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Incentivize counties to send fewer youth to secure residential facilities by shifting the fiscal<br />

architecture of the state juvenile justice system. The six states profiled in this brief have<br />

encouraged counties to invest in alternatives to incarcerating youth in secure residential facilities<br />

by making it financially undesirable for counties to rely on the states to confine youth who could<br />

be better served in the community by evidence-based practices.<br />

Invest in intermediate interventions, not buildings. While maintaining conditions of<br />

confinement that meet the needs of young people are important, during lean budget times, the<br />

most expensive parts of the juvenile justice continuum—detention centers, residential facilities<br />

and other forms of secure congregate care—tend to win out in local budget battles. As the federal<br />

government and states plan new ways to invest in cost effective forms of delinquency<br />

prevention, they should focus funding streams on intermediate forms of community-based<br />

supervision. Some of the cost savings from downsizing detention centers and secure residential<br />

facilities can be invested in improving conditions, with the remaining funds invested in<br />

community-based services that are more effective and less expensive than juvenile prisons.<br />

Invest in proven approaches to reduce crime and recidivism among young people.<br />

Evidence-based practices, which have undergone rigorous experimental inquiry, have been<br />

shown to work with violent and seriously delinquent youth. Such practices are more costeffective<br />

and produce more benefits than traditional punitive measures. States should expand<br />

upon existing evidence-based alternatives to incarceration for youth.<br />

Develop, support and evaluate new and different approaches to reduce crime and<br />

recidivism among young people. Localities across the country have developed smaller, tailored<br />

initiatives that have a great deal of community buy-in. Many of these initiatives are based on the<br />

basic principles of the more science-based approaches, but have not been evaluated. A search for<br />

new initiatives would add to the toolbox of available interventions and alternatives.<br />

Re-examine policies and practices that have the consequence of sending more youth to the<br />

juvenile justice system. The increase of school-based referrals over the last two decades has<br />

increased the likelihood that a student is sent to residential placement for infractions that had<br />

14


The Costs of Confinement<br />

been previously handled by the school. The result is an overburdened juvenile justice system and<br />

overcrowded secure residential facilities.<br />

Create and fund research organizations to evaluate effective programs and policies in<br />

juvenile justice. In some states, non-partisan, legislatively-mandated organizations can provide<br />

policymakers with information on what truly works in juvenile justice. States and localities<br />

should support research groups that work to evaluate programs across the country for costeffectiveness<br />

and recommend effective programs as a valuable way to lower costs and ensure<br />

that policymakers are funding the best possible programs and policies. These research groups can<br />

be state-based, or the federal government can increase their capacity to do this research work<br />

nationally.<br />

Policymakers should take care to not rely on the “tough-on-crime” rhetoric of the past, but<br />

instead on the research that shows that locking up more youth does not keep our<br />

communities safe. Incarceration of youth has been linked to a number of negative outcomes,<br />

including increased recidivism and criminal behavior, lack of educational and employment<br />

opportunities, and association with more delinquent peers. Implementing community-based<br />

programs is the smart way to improve public safety while saving money.<br />

Invest in policies that increase employment, educational attainment and treatment for<br />

those who need it.<br />

• The Alliance for Excellent Education reported in 2006 that a 5 percent increase in male<br />

high school graduation rates would produce an annual savings of almost $5 billion in<br />

crime-related expenses. Coupled with annual earnings of those who graduated, the U.S.<br />

would receive $7.7 billion in benefits. 50<br />

• A study published in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology found that youth<br />

involvement in crime seems to be especially affected by employment. This study has<br />

indicated that employed youth are less likely to be engaged in property crimes. 51<br />

• Making treatment available in communities to address mental illness, substance abuse,<br />

and emotional distress resulting from trauma is the best way to ensure that youth are<br />

getting what they need to live healthy, productive lives. For youth already in the juvenile<br />

justice system, jurisdictions should better implement processes for a continuation of care<br />

for youth transitioning back to the community. This includes making arrangements for<br />

housing and other supports for youth and their families upon release.<br />

Acknowledgements<br />

This policy brief was researched and written by Amanda Petteruti, Nastassia Walsh, and Tracy<br />

Velázquez, with considerable research support from Ashley King. This report would not have<br />

been possible without generous support from the Public Welfare Foundation and the Open<br />

Society Institute.<br />

15


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Appendix A: Negative impacts of confinement<br />

Incarceration can increase recidivism<br />

Youth recidivism rates within states are often reported at 50 percent or higher for individuals<br />

who remain in secure facilities. 52 Further, court records show that youth experience a greater<br />

likelihood of returning to court after each criminal referral they receive. 53 As many as 50 to 70<br />

percent of youth who were previously in residential placement facilities were rearrested within<br />

two years of their release. 54<br />

Several studies have shown that youth who are incarcerated are more likely to recidivate than<br />

youth who are supervised in a community-based setting, or not detained at all.<br />

• A study of youth incarcerated in Arkansas found not only a high recidivism rate, but that<br />

the experience of incarceration is the most significant factor in increasing the odds of<br />

recidivism. 55 Sixty percent of the youth studied were returned to the Department of Youth<br />

Services (DYS) within three years. The odds of returning to DYS increased 13.5 times<br />

for youth with a prior commitment, which was more than carrying a weapon (3.3 times),<br />

gang membership (2 times) or poor parental relationship (0.6 times).<br />

• In Texas, researchers found that young people in community-based placement are 14<br />

percent less likely to participate in illegal behavior than youth that have been<br />

incarcerated. 56<br />

• Researchers found that in 63.4 percent of 443 studies about the juvenile justice system,<br />

young people who received interventions emphasizing community-based treatment and<br />

other alternatives to incarceration were less likely to recidivate than those who did not<br />

receive an intervention. For example, 32 to 37 percent of young people given<br />

employment and behavioral programs were estimated to recidivate, as compared to a 50<br />

percent recidivism rate for the group of youth not given this intervention. 57<br />

Studies of recidivism from large residential correctional facilities, including training schools,<br />

show that the percentage is uniformly high.<br />

• A follow-up study on youth released from Minnesota’s two training schools in 1991<br />

found that 91 percent were re-arrested within five years of release.<br />

• In Maryland, a study of 947 youths released from correctional facilities in 1994 found<br />

that 82 percent were referred to juvenile or criminal courts within two and one-half years<br />

after release. 58<br />

• In Washington, 59 percent of incarcerated youth re-offended within one year and 68<br />

percent within two years. 59<br />

These studies from a number of different states and juvenile justice systems show a recurring<br />

pattern. Alternatives to incarceration for youth can be more effective and have more public<br />

safety benefits that locking up youth.<br />

16


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Residential placement can slow the natural “aging out” process of delinquency<br />

Research and data show that most youth will naturally “age out” of delinquent and illegal<br />

behavior on their own, without the intervention of the juvenile or criminal justice systems.<br />

However, involvement of one or both of these systems can impede development and may reduce<br />

the chance that a youth will successfully transition to adulthood since confinement disrupts<br />

natural engagement with families, school, and work. 60 New research has shown that confinement<br />

is not only more likely to reinforce delinquent behavior in those already at-risk, but may also add<br />

to more delinquent skills than if they are treated individually in the community. Furthermore,<br />

secure confinement can reinforce a young person’s sense that they are not part of mainstream<br />

society, further ostracizing them, and leading them to associate with other delinquent peers who<br />

also feel that they have been socially isolated. 61<br />

According to a study by the Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention, the more<br />

contact youth have with juvenile courts, the more likely they are to return. 62 Among youth with<br />

no prior referrals to juvenile court, 41 percent will return to juvenile court after their first referral.<br />

In other words, 59 percent of youth who are referred to juvenile court for the first time will not<br />

return. But this number jumps significantly after their first contact and subsequently with each<br />

additional referral.<br />

The natural developmental process behind completing an education and gaining meaningful<br />

employment can be hindered by incarceration because it cuts a youth off from the conventional<br />

norms and opportunities for growth that youth who remain in the community receive. The<br />

inability to develop these attachments is associated with reduced recidivism. A 1993 study<br />

showed that even after controlling for adolescent crime and delinquency, job stability for youth<br />

from ages 17 to 25 significantly reduced crime during those years. 63 Due to the disruptions in<br />

education, employment opportunities, and natural life processes that allow young people to “ageout”<br />

of crime, researchers argued, “the process of incarceration could actually change an<br />

individual into a less stable employee.” 64<br />

Incarceration does not meet the mental and developmental needs of youth<br />

Often youth are more at risk of contact with the juvenile justice system as a result of unmet<br />

mental health needs. Some behaviors that cause youth to be arrested are manifestations of a<br />

disorder in need of treatment. 65 While researchers estimate that upwards of two-thirds of young<br />

people in detention centers could meet the criteria for having a mental disorder, a little more than<br />

a third need ongoing clinical care—a figure twice the rate of the general adolescent population. 66<br />

Youth with mental health disorders are more likely to serve time in a facility and spend longer<br />

time behind bars than youth without mental health disorders. 67 A combination of factors,<br />

including inadequate “front door” screening, lack of staff training, an over-reliance on isolation<br />

to control youth behavior, inadequacies of specialized mental health services, poor<br />

communication between probation and providers, and gaps in community services and placement<br />

alternatives can affect length of stay for these youth. 68<br />

17


The Costs of Confinement<br />

“Given the disproportionate use of juvenile detention facilities for youth of color one<br />

explanation [for the high incidence of youth with mental health disorders in facilities] may be<br />

that the juvenile justice system has become a de facto mental health system for poor and<br />

minority youth who are unable to access care through the formal mental health system.” 69<br />

Because of the large number of overcrowded facilities, which often breed an environment of<br />

violence and chaos for young people, far from receiving effective treatment, young people with<br />

behavioral health problems may get worse in detention, not better. 70 Most juvenile justice<br />

systems do not have the facilities to properly screen or treat a young person with a mental health<br />

disorder, and if these young people are incarcerated the risks of victimization, self-injury, and<br />

suicide are high. 71 One academic study found that for one-third of incarcerated youth diagnosed<br />

with depression, the onset of the depression occurred after they began their incarceration.” 72 An<br />

article published in the medical journal, Pediatrics, concluded that, “The transition into<br />

incarceration itself may be responsible for some of the observed [increased mental illness in<br />

detention] effect.” 73 When youth do not receive the mental health treatment that they need within<br />

facilities, their conditions only worsen.<br />

While some researchers have found that the rate of suicide in juvenile facilities is about the same<br />

as the community at large, 74 others have found that incarcerated youth experience from double to<br />

four times the suicide rate of youth in community. 75 The Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and<br />

Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) reports that 11,000 youth engage in more than 17,000 acts of<br />

suicidal behavior in the juvenile justice system annually. 76 Another monograph published by<br />

OJJDP found that juvenile correctional facilities often incorporate responses to suicidal threats<br />

and behavior in ways that endanger the youth further, such as placing the youth in isolation. 77<br />

The U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>’s investigation of juvenile and correctional facilities has<br />

acknowledged the failure of residential facilities to respond to the mental health needs of the<br />

youth in custody. 78 Generally, youth suffering with serious mental health problems should<br />

participate in family and community-based treatments, because research has found them to be the<br />

most effective at treating mental illness and reducing recidivism. 79<br />

The most promising mental health programs reduce recidivism anywhere from 25 to 80<br />

percent. 80 These programs place an emphasis on behavior change, decision-making, and the<br />

development of social skills among different groups. 81 The best programs tend to be those that<br />

focus on family-centered interventions that allow families to help develop treatment options and<br />

receive progress reports. Since research shows that a lack of family involvement may be<br />

associated with delinquency, it is essential that families participate in the treatment process. 82<br />

Incarceration may impact education and employment opportunities for youth upon release<br />

Research continually links education and the likelihood of participating in illegal behavior or<br />

ending up in prison. Forty-one percent of adults in prisons and jails do not have a high school<br />

diploma 83 and the U.S. Department of Education reports that dropouts are 3.5 times more likely<br />

than high school graduates to be arrested. 84 Locking up youth can interrupt the learning process,<br />

even when educational opportunities are available behind bars. Rarely is there a contiguous<br />

transition from a juvenile facility to education in the community, and when there is, there is a<br />

high likelihood that youth will not complete their education. 85<br />

18


The Costs of Confinement<br />

• One researcher found that most incarcerated 9th graders return to school after<br />

incarceration, but within a year of re-enrolling two-thirds to three-fourths withdraw or<br />

drop out of school. After four years, less than 15 percent of these incarcerated 9th graders<br />

had completed their secondary education. 86<br />

• A Department of Education study showed that 43 percent of youth receiving remedial<br />

education services in a juvenile detention facility did not return to school after release,<br />

and another 16 percent enrolled in school but dropped out after only five months. 87<br />

Incarceration can also negatively impact future employment.<br />

• A study by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that jailing youth (age 16-<br />

25) reduced work time over the next decade by 25-30 percent. 88<br />

• Looking at youth age 14 to 24, Princeton University researchers found that youth who<br />

spent some time incarcerated in a youth facility experienced three weeks less work a year<br />

(for African American youth, five weeks less work a year) as compared to youth who had<br />

no history of incarceration. 89<br />

Secure confinement contributes to barriers to education and employment that limit a person’s<br />

ability to positively contribute to society, which may negatively impact public safety in the long<br />

term.<br />

19


The Costs of Confinement<br />

Appendix B: Community-based programs that work<br />

Functional Family Therapy (FFT): This family-based program works as both prevention and<br />

intervention. It is a multi-level eight to 12 week program that seeks to address family<br />

dysfunction, acknowledging that in the long run, removing the youth from his or her family and<br />

community may not fix the root problem behind the behavior. The FFT program can lower<br />

recidivism by up to 38 percent, averaging around 16 percent, and has $10.69 in benefits for each<br />

dollar of cost when administered by trained therapists. 90<br />

Lowered recidivism: 15.9 percent<br />

Cost benefits: $10.69 in benefits for every dollar spent<br />

Aggression Replacement Training (ART): This program is designed for youth who exhibit<br />

aggressive tendencies and anti-social behavior and are therefore considered to be at a high risk of<br />

reoffending. ART is a 10-week, 30-hour intervention administered to groups of eight to 12 youth<br />

who have committed an offense. 91 ART has been found to reduce recidivism after 18 months by<br />

up to 24 percent, averaging around 7 percent, and has $11.66 benefits per $1 costs. 92<br />

Lowered recidivism: 7.3 percent<br />

Cost benefits: $11.66 in benefits for every dollar spent<br />

Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST): MST works with the family to address the underlying causes<br />

of illegal and delinquent behavior and the role that families play in a young person’s behavior.<br />

Families are taught how to build healthy relationships and use appropriate methods of<br />

discipline. 93 MST works to achieve behavioral change at home, rather than in a correctional<br />

facility. MST has shown to reduce long-term rates of re-arrest by 25-70 percent, 94 and has an<br />

average reduction of re-arrest of around 10.5 percent. 95 States that use MST can see $13.36 in<br />

benefits to public safety for every dollar spent on the program. 96<br />

Lowered recidivism: 10.5 percent<br />

Cost benefits: $13.36 in benefits for every dollar spent<br />

Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC): MTFC is an alternative to group homes or<br />

detention facilities for youth. Rather than place youth into a group, each foster family has one<br />

youth at a time which allows them to tailor programming to that specific individual’s needs. The<br />

individual treatment also allows the child to be closely monitored. At first, the youth is with the<br />

foster parent at all times but as the youth shows good behavior, the restrictions are loosened and<br />

he or she is given more freedom. Aside from close monitoring by the foster parents, the youth<br />

also receives job and social skills training from a professional therapist and the birth parents and<br />

child receive family therapy where the parents learn how to properly discipline their child. 97<br />

MTFC has been shown to reduce recidivism rates for youth by 22 percent on average, and has a<br />

cost-benefit ratio of $10.88 in benefits for every dollar spent. 98<br />

Lowered recidivism: 22 percent<br />

Cost benefits: $10.88 in benefits for every dollar spent<br />

20


The Costs of Confinement<br />

1 M. Sickmund, T.J. Sladky, W. Kang, and C. Puzzanchera, Easy Access to the Census of <strong>Juvenile</strong>s in Residential<br />

Placement (Washington, D.C.: Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention, 2008)<br />

http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/display.asp<br />

2 American Correctional Association, 2008 Directory: Adult and <strong>Juvenile</strong> Correctional Departments, Institutions,<br />

Agencies, and Probation and Parole Authorities (Alexandria, VA: American Correctional Association, 2008).<br />

3 C. Puzzanchera and M. Sickmund, OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book: <strong>Juvenile</strong> Court Statistics 2005 (Washington,<br />

D.C.: Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention, 2008)<br />

http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/court/qa06206.asp?qaDate=2005.<br />

4 C. Puzzanchera and others, 2008.<br />

5 A. Stahl, T. Finnegan and W. Kang, National <strong>Juvenile</strong> Court Data Archive: <strong>Juvenile</strong> Court Case Records 1985-<br />

2004 (Pittsburgh, PA: National Center for <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, 2007). http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs/.<br />

6 Advancement Project, Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero-Tolerance and School<br />

Discipline (Washington, D.C.: Advancement Project, 2000) www.advancementproject.org/reports/opsusp.pdf<br />

7 Advancement Project, Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track (Washington, D.C.:<br />

Advancement Project, 2005) www.advancementproject.org/reports/FINALEOLrep.pdf<br />

8 M. Sickmund and others, 2008<br />

9 M. Sickmund and others, 2008<br />

10 American Correctional Association, 2008.<br />

11 M. Sickmund and others, 2008<br />

12 American Correctional Association, 2008.<br />

13 Ohio Department of Youth Services, “Reclaim Ohio.”<br />

www.dys.ohio.gov/dnn/Community/ReclaimOhio/tabid/131/Default.aspx<br />

14 Christopher Lowenkamp and Edward Latessa, Evaluation of Ohio’s RECLAIM funded programs, community<br />

correctional facilities, and DYS facilities: Cost Benefit Analysis Supplemental Report (Cincinnati, OH: University of<br />

Cincinnati, 2005).<br />

15 Jasmine Tyler, Jason Ziedenberg, and Eric Lotke, Cost Effective Corrections: The Fiscal Architecture of Rational<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Systems (Washington, D.C.: <strong>Justice</strong> Policy Institute, 2006).<br />

www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-03_REP_CostEffective_JJ.pdf<br />

16 Illinois Department of Human Services, Redeploy Illinois Annual Report: Implementation and Impact November<br />

2008. www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=41157<br />

17 Personal Correspondence from Mishi Faruqee, Correctional Association of New York, April 1, 2009.<br />

18 New York <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Coalition, RE-DIRECT NEWYORK: Reinvesting Detention Resources in Community<br />

Treatment (New York, NY: New York <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Coalition, 2009).<br />

19 M. Sickmund and others, 2008<br />

20 Commonweal <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Project, “SPECIAL REPORT: California Governor Signs Major <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Reform Bill— Nearly half of the state’s youth corrections population will now be “realigned” to county programs<br />

and facilities,” September 4, 2007. www.preventviolence.org/CALJuv<strong>Justice</strong>ReformSignedbyGovernorSep4.pdf<br />

21 Wisconsin Department of Corrections, “State <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System Funding: Youth Aids and Community<br />

Intervention Program,” 2008. www.wi-doc.com/DJC_funding.htm<br />

22 M. Sickmund and others, 2008<br />

23 James Austin, Kelly Dedel Johnson, and Ronald Weitzer, Alternatives to the Secure Detention and Confinement of<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders (Washington, D.C.: Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention, 2005)<br />

www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/208804.pdf, page 2.<br />

24 Prison Law Office, “Major Cases & Achievements,” (San Quentin, CA: Prison Law Office, March 2009).<br />

www.prisonlaw.com/cases.php#juvi<br />

25 Commonweal, “Commonweal: The <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Programs: Outcomes for <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Bills in 2006,”<br />

(Bolinas, CA: Commonweal, March 2009). www.commonweal.org/cgi-<br />

bin/hse/HomepageSearchEngine.cgi?url=http://69.94.47.172/programs/jjp-reports/Leg-<br />

Outcomes2006.html;geturl=d+highlightmatches+gotofirstmatch;terms=farrell;enc=farrell;utf8=off#firstmatch<br />

26 Youth Law Center, “S.H. v. Stickrath (formerly S.H. v Taft) (San Francisco, CA: Youth Law Center, March<br />

2009). www.ylc.org/viewDetails.php?id=63<br />

27 Louisiana Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, “News Release: Louisiana <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System Dismissed from Federal<br />

Oversight.” Press Release from Louisiana governor’s office on May 1, 2006. www.oyd.louisiana.gov/test/05-01-<br />

2006.asp<br />

28 The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, “Case Profile: United States v. Louisiana” (St. Louis, MO: March<br />

2009). http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/detail.php?id=333<br />

21


The Costs of Confinement<br />

29 Jennifer Harry, “Costly <strong>Juvenile</strong> Prison Litigation for Louisiana,” Corrections Today. 62, no. 7 (2000): 23.<br />

30 Sue Burrell, Paul DeMuro, Earl Dunlap, C. Sanniti and L. Warboys, Crowding in <strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Facilities: A<br />

Problem Solving Manual (Richmond, KY: National <strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Association and Youth Law Center, 1998).<br />

31 James Austin and others, 2005, page 2<br />

32 Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report (Washington,<br />

DC: National Center for <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, 2006). http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf<br />

33 Sue Burrell, P. DeMuro, E. Dunlap, C. Sanniti and L. Warboys, Crowding in <strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Facilities: A<br />

Problem Solving Manual (Richmond, KY: National <strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Association and Youth Law Center, 1998).<br />

34 Howard N. Snyder and others, 2006<br />

35 Missouri <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Association, Celebrating 100 Years of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> in Missouri 1903-2003.<br />

(Jefferson City, MO: 2003). http://mjja.org/images/100Years.pdf<br />

36 Missouri <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Association, 2003<br />

37 Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Youth Services Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 2006<br />

(Jefferson City, MO: 2006) www.dss.mo.gov/re/pdf/dys/dysfy06.pdf<br />

38 Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006).<br />

39 A. Golub, The Termination Rate of Adult Criminal Careers (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon, 1990)<br />

40 Robert A. Sampson and John H. Laub, Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points through Life<br />

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1993)<br />

41 Robert A. Sampson and others,1993<br />

42 FBI Uniform Crime Report, Crime in the United States, 2007 www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm<br />

43 Elizabeth Drake, Evidence-Based <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offender Programs: Program Description, Quality Assurance and<br />

Cost. (Olympia WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2007) www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-06-<br />

1201.pdf<br />

44 Andrews, D.A., Zinger, I., Hoge, R.D., Bonta, J., Gendreau, P. and Cullen, F.R. “Does Correctional treatment<br />

work? A clinically relevant and psychologically informed meta-analysis,” Criminology 28, no. 3 (1990): 369-404.<br />

45 Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence at the University of Colorado at Boulder, “Blueprints for<br />

Violence Prevention,” Accessed March 12, 2009, www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/<br />

46 Steve Aos, Marna Miller, and Elizabeth Drake, Evidence-Based Public Policy Options to Reduce Future Prison<br />

Construction, Criminal <strong>Justice</strong> Costs, and Crime Rates (Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy,<br />

2006).<br />

47 Chief Probation Officers of California and California Mental Health Directors Association, Costs of Incarcerating<br />

Youth with Mental Illness (CA: Chief Probation Officers of California and California Mental Health Directors<br />

Association, 2008)<br />

48 D. Mace, P. Rohde, and V. Gnau, “Psychological Patterns of Depression and Suicidal Behavior of Adolescents in<br />

a <strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention Facility,” Journal of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Detention Services 12, No. 1 (1997): 18-23.<br />

49 <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Operational Master Plan, Blueprint for an Outcome Oriented <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System; State<br />

Commission on <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, January 2009<br />

50 Alliance for Excellent Education, Saving Futures, Saving Dollars: The Impact of Education on Crime Reduction<br />

and Earnings (Washington, D.C., 2006) www.all4ed.org/publications/SavingFutures.pdf<br />

51 Chester L. Britt, “Reconsidering the Unemployment and Crime Relationship: Variation by Age Group and<br />

Historical Period,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 13, no.4 (1997): 405-428.<br />

52 Virginia Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, <strong>Juvenile</strong> Recidivism in Virginia, DJJ Research Quarterly (Richmond,<br />

VA: VDJJ, 2005) cited in Howard N. Snyder and others, 2006<br />

53 H. Snyder, Court Careers of <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of<br />

<strong>Justice</strong> Programs, Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention, 1988).<br />

www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/1f/95/84.pdf.<br />

54 James Austin and others, 2005<br />

55 B.B. Benda and C.L. Tollet, “A Study of Recidivism of Serious and Persistent Offenders among Adolescents.”<br />

Journal of Criminal <strong>Justice</strong> 27, No. 2 (1999): 111-126.<br />

56 In a 12-year study that compared the outcomes of 266 juvenile defenders in Texas placed in correctional centers<br />

and alternatives to detention centers, Fendrich and Archer found that the recidivism rate of youth in alternatives was<br />

65 percent, whereas the recidivism rate of those placed in correctional facilities was 71 percent. Michael Fendrich<br />

and Melanie Archer, “Long-Term Re-Arrest Rates in a Sample of Adjudicated Delinquents: Evaluating the Impact<br />

of Alternative Programs,” The Prison Journal 78, no. 4 (1998): 360-389.<br />

22


The Costs of Confinement<br />

57 Mark W. Lipsey, “<strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency Treatment: A Meta-Analytic Inquiry into the Variability of Effects,” in<br />

Meta-Analysis for Explanation: A Casebook, ed. T.D. Cook, H. Cooper, D.S. Cordray, H. Hartmann, L.V. Hedges,<br />

R.J. Light, T.A. Louis, and F. Mosteller (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992).<br />

58 Maryland Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> ,Maryland Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Recidivism Analyses: A<br />

Program By Program Review of Recidivism Measures at Major Facilities for Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Youths<br />

(Baltimore, MD: Maryland Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, 1997), p.8.<br />

59 Cited by Feld, B.C., Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the <strong>Juvenile</strong> Court (New York: Oxford<br />

University Press, 1999), p.280.<br />

60 A. Golub, 1990<br />

61 Dishion, T.J., J. McCord, and F. Poulin. “When Interventions Harm: Peer Groups and Problem Behavior,”<br />

American Psychologist 54, no. 9 (1999): 755-764; Barry Holman and Jason Ziedenberg, The Dangers of Detention:<br />

The Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure Facilities (Washington, D.C.: <strong>Justice</strong> Policy<br />

Institute, 2006)<br />

62 Howard N. Snyder and others, 2006, p.235.<br />

63 Robert A. Sampson and others,1993<br />

64 S.D. Bushway, “The Impact of an Arrest on the Job Stability of Young White American Men,” Journal of<br />

Research in Crime and Delinquency 34, no. 4 (1998).<br />

65 Thomas Grisso, “Adolescent Offenders with Mental Disorders,” The Future of Children 18, no. 2 (2008): 143-<br />

164.<br />

66 Thomas Grisso, Double Jeopardy: Adolescent Offenders with Mental Disorders (University of Chicago Press,<br />

2004)<br />

67 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform. Incarceration of youth who are waiting for<br />

community mental health services in the United States (Washington, D.C.: 2004)<br />

68 Sue Burrell and A. Bussiere, “Difficult to place”: Youth with Mental Health Needs in California <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

(San Francisco, CA: Youth Law Center, 2005)<br />

69 Chief Probation Officers of California and California Mental Health Directors Association, 2008, Page iii.<br />

70 Coalition for <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, Handle with Care: Meeting the Mental Health Needs of Young Offenders, CJJ 2000<br />

Annual Report to the President, Congress and OJJDP (Washington, D.C.: CJJ, 2001)<br />

71 National Mental Health Association, Mental health treatment for youth in the juvenile justice system: A<br />

compendium of promising practices. (Alexandria, VA: National Mental Health Association, 2004)<br />

72 J.H. Kashani, G.W. Manning, D.H. McKnew, L. Cytryn, J.F. Simonds, and P.C. Wooderson, “Depression Among<br />

Incarcerated Delinquents,” Psychiatry Resources 3 (1980): 185-191.<br />

73 C.B. Forrest, E. Tambor, A.W. Riley, M.E. Ensminger, and B. Starfield, “The Health Profile of Incarcerated Male<br />

Youths,” Pediatrics 105, no. 1 (2000): 286-291.<br />

74 Howard Synder, “Is Suicide More Common Inside Or Outside of <strong>Juvenile</strong> Facilities,” Corrections Today, 2005;<br />

Catherine A. Gallagher and Adam Dobrin, “The Comparative Risk of Suicide in <strong>Juvenile</strong> Facilities and the General<br />

Population: The Problem of Rate Calculations in High Turnover Institutions.” (forthcoming). Criminal <strong>Justice</strong> and<br />

Behavior.<br />

75 D.G. Parent, V. Leiter, S. Kennedy, L. Livens, D. Wentworth, and S. Wilcox, Conditions of Confinement:<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> Detention and Corrections Facilities (Washington, D.C.: Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency<br />

Prevention, 1994).<br />

76 D.G. Parent and others, 1994.<br />

77 L.M. Hayes, Suicide Prevention in <strong>Juvenile</strong> Correction and Detention Facilities (Washington, D.C.: U.S.<br />

Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention, 1999)<br />

78 United States Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, Department of <strong>Justice</strong> Activities Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized<br />

Persons Act: Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington D.C.: United States Department of <strong>Justice</strong>, 2005)<br />

www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/document/split_cripa04pdf.<br />

79 Kathleen Skowyra and Susan Davidson Powell, <strong>Juvenile</strong> Diversion: Programs for <strong>Justice</strong>-Involved Youth with<br />

Mental Health Disorders (Delmar, NY: National Center for Mental Health and <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong>, 2006).<br />

80 Paul Gendreau and Claire Goggin, “The Principles of Effective Intervention with Offenders,” in Choosing<br />

Correctional Options that Work (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996).<br />

81 David Altschuler, “Immediate Sanctions and Community Treatment for Serious and Violent <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders,”<br />

in Serious and Violent <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998).<br />

82 National Mental Health Association, 2004<br />

83 Caroline W. Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of <strong>Justice</strong> Statistics,<br />

2003) Table 1. www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf<br />

23


The Costs of Confinement<br />

84 U.S. Department of Education, Mini-digest of Education Statistics (Washington, D.C.: National Center for<br />

Education Statistics, 1994)<br />

85 VA Legislature requires that kids are entitled to re-enrollment planning and to re-enrollment in school within 2<br />

days of release. JustChildren has found no evidence that this is happening successfully.<br />

www.justice4all.org/files/Reentry%20Presentation11%2007_0.ppt#305,16,Legal Rights to Successful Reentry<br />

86 R. Balfanz, K. Spiridakis, R. Neild, and N. Legters, “Neighborhood Schools and the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System: How<br />

Neither Helps the Other and How that Could Change.” Presented at the School to Jail Pipeline Conference, Harvard<br />

University, 2003.<br />

87 LeBlanc, Unlocking Learning; Chapter 1 in Correctional Facilities (Washington, D.C.: US Department of<br />

Education, 1991)<br />

88 R.B. Freeman, Crime and the Employment Disadvantage of Youth (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of<br />

Economic Research, 1991)<br />

89 Bruce Western and Katherine Beckett, “How Unregulated Is the U.S. Labor Market?: The Penal System as a<br />

Labor Market Institution,” The American Journal of Sociology 104 (1999): 1030-1060.<br />

90 Robert Barnoski, Outcome evaluation of Washington State’s Research-Based Programs for <strong>Juvenile</strong> Offenders.<br />

(Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2004). www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/04-01-1201-ES.pdf<br />

91 Elizabeth Drake, 2007<br />

92 Robert Barnoski, 2004<br />

93 Elizabeth Drake, 2007<br />

94 Office of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> and Delinquency Prevention, “OJJDP Model Programs Guide: Multisystemic Therapy”<br />

February 2009.<br />

95 Steve Aos, The <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> System in Washington State: Recommendations to Improve Cost-Effectiveness.<br />

(Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2002) www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/WhatWorksJuv.pdf<br />

96 Steve Aos, 2002<br />

97 TFC Consultants: Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care, “MTFC Program Overview,” March 2009.<br />

www.mtfc.com/overview.html<br />

98 Elizabeth Drake, 2007<br />

24


Attachment D<br />

Cost-Benefit Analysis<br />

for <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Programming<br />

Page 101 of 113


Cost-Benefit Analysis of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Programs<br />

Cost-Benefit Analysis of<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Programs<br />

<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Guide Book for Legislators


Cost-Benefit Analysis of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Programs<br />

Introduction<br />

To reach the best decisions for their constituents, lawmakers<br />

constantly assess the advantages and disadvantages of various<br />

courses of action. Sometimes these choices are simple, and<br />

rigorous analysis is not necessary. Often, however, the various<br />

costs and outcomes of policy decisions are difficult to project.<br />

In response to these challenges, a growing number of states<br />

are turning to data-driven cost assessment techniques to inform<br />

their policies. One such device, cost-benefit analysis (CBA), is<br />

gaining national attention due to its success providing valuable<br />

information to government leaders.<br />

The Vera Institute of <strong>Justice</strong> (Vera) identifies the five basic steps of cost-benefit analysis as:<br />

1<br />

2<br />

3<br />

4<br />

5<br />

Determine the effects of the initiative,<br />

Determine whose perspectives matter,<br />

(e.g. Who will be affected by each policy alternative?)<br />

Measure costs in dollars and cents,<br />

Measure benefits in dollars and cents, and<br />

Compare the costs and benefits.<br />

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<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Guide Book for Legislators<br />

Cost-Benefit Analysis Defined<br />

According to Vera, cost-benefit analysis is a<br />

systemic tool for evaluating public policy. It<br />

allows lawmakers to weigh multiple options and<br />

determine which will achieve the greatest results<br />

for the lowest cost.<br />

Because cost-benefit analysis turns all outcomes into<br />

monetary values, it allows evaluators to compare<br />

programs that have different goals—for example,<br />

program A aims to reduce crime, while program B<br />

aims to curb substance abuse—in order to find the<br />

option with the greatest net societal benefit. It must<br />

be noted, however, that CBA determines only a<br />

program’s cost-effectiveness, not its overall success.<br />

To understand the value of each option, CBA data<br />

must be assessed together with separately conducted<br />

program success evaluations. Reliable program<br />

assessments, combined with CBA analysis can help<br />

leaders identify the best policy options.<br />

3


Cost-Benefit Analysis of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Programs<br />

Development of<br />

Cost-Benefit Analysis<br />

Cost-benefit analysis of public programs is gaining<br />

national attention thanks in large part to the work<br />

of Steve Aos and his colleagues at the Washington<br />

State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP). WSIPP<br />

has advised the Washington Legislature on researchbased<br />

approaches to public policy for the last 15<br />

years on issues ranging from public health and<br />

education to housing and criminal justice. One such<br />

WSIPP cost-benefit analysis addressed Washington’s<br />

problem with crime and overcrowded prisons.<br />

In 2005, Washington was faced with a growing<br />

prison population that would necessitate the<br />

construction of three new prisons by 2030 at a<br />

cost of $750 million. In response, the Legislature<br />

appropriated funds through its capital budget bill<br />

for WSIPP to study evidence-based programs so<br />

investments could be made to reduce crime and<br />

save Washington money over the long-term.<br />

WSIPP’s study reviewed and analyzed 571<br />

comparison group evaluations of adult corrections,<br />

juvenile corrections and prevention programs.<br />

In 2005, Washington was faced<br />

with a growing prison population<br />

that would necessitate the<br />

construction of three new prisons<br />

by 2030 at a cost of $750 million.<br />

Each study included met a strict set of criteria—such<br />

as only using programs currently being used in the<br />

field, not models, and having someone other than<br />

the program’s developer conduct the assessment—to<br />

avoid conflicts of interest. WSIPP established these<br />

standards before their financial assessment began to<br />

ensure that they were relying on the best possible<br />

program data. The report, released in 2006, found<br />

that the state could save $2 billion and reduce crime<br />

by using evidence-based alternatives to incarceration.<br />

A follow-up study from WSIPP, reported on in<br />

2009, found that Washington is having success<br />

implementing the cost saving recommendations.<br />

The state invested $48 million in evidence-based<br />

programs in 2007 and has reduced its forecasted<br />

expenditures in prison construction.<br />

Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied<br />

to <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

In January 2004, WSIPP released a report assessing<br />

the Community <strong>Juvenile</strong> Accountability Act, a 1997<br />

Washington law that focused on reducing the state’s<br />

juvenile crime by implementing evidence-based<br />

programs in the juvenile court system.<br />

In this study, WSIPP found that programs such as<br />

functional family therapy (FFT is a family-based<br />

intervention program that focuses on improving<br />

protective factors and reducing risk factors for<br />

juvenile delinquent behavior) and aggression<br />

replacement training (ART is an intervention<br />

program that helps youths develop skills to control<br />

anger and use appropriate behavior) reduced<br />

recidivism and saved taxpayer dollars. In the case<br />

of aggression replacement training, $11.66 was<br />

saved for each $1 spent, and the rate of participants<br />

committing another felony within 18 months<br />

dropped by 24 percent.<br />

In addition to Washington, other states—including<br />

Florida, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin—have used<br />

cost-benefit analysis to evaluate programs within<br />

their juvenile justice systems. A few of these states,<br />

including Pennsylvania, have borrowed elements of<br />

Washington’s cost-benefit model to apply to their<br />

own state’s data.<br />

4


<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Guide Book for Legislators<br />

Florida<br />

In Florida, legislators were searching for ways to<br />

reduce the amount of money spent housing juveniles<br />

in detention facilities. According to Florida’s Office<br />

of Program Policy Analysis and Government<br />

Accountability (OPPAGA), 76 percent of juveniles<br />

in state detention centers were in need of mental<br />

health, substance abuse or psychiatric treatment,<br />

and 42 percent of those in detention were charged<br />

with misdemeanors or parole violations. OPPAGA<br />

found that these treatments and problems could be<br />

more effectively handled in diversion programs, and,<br />

between 2005 and 2008, 2,033 juveniles successfully<br />

completed such programs. To house these juveniles<br />

in detention centers would have cost $50.8 million.<br />

With the redirection program, however, the cost<br />

was $14.4 million. By using these programs, Florida<br />

gained a cost benefit of $36.4 million.<br />

OPPAGA emphasized that, to realize benefits<br />

through diversion programs, cost-benefit analysis<br />

of evidence-based programs must be rigorous so<br />

projections match the realities. Separate assessments<br />

of program effectiveness must have been previously<br />

conducted. In this example, the juveniles who<br />

completed the diversion program were 46 percent<br />

less likely to be convicted of a felony in the future<br />

than those placed in detention facilities.<br />

Pennsylvania<br />

In 2008, the Prevention Research Center of Human<br />

Development, with funding from Pennsylvania’s<br />

Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD),<br />

issued a report detailing their study of Pennsylvania’s<br />

return on investment for seven juvenile programs<br />

used throughout the state. The study found that<br />

these programs saved Pennsylvania $317 million<br />

in reduced criminal justice costs and salaries. The<br />

benefits per $1 invested ranged from $1 to $25<br />

depending upon the program. The “LifeSkills<br />

Training” program, for example, benefitted $25.72<br />

per $1 spent, saving Pennsylvanians $16.160 million<br />

over the course of its operation.<br />

The benefits per $1 invested<br />

ranged from $1 to $25 depending<br />

upon the program.<br />

Report authors concluded that, given the significant<br />

cost benefits realized by these programs, other<br />

agencies should take a more active role in comparing,<br />

assessing and using cost-effectiveness data.<br />

Wisconsin<br />

What Works, Wisconsin!, a study requested by the<br />

Wisconsin Governor’s <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Commission<br />

to examine evidence-based programs with growing<br />

delinquency prevention evidence, provides another<br />

example of cost-benefit analysis. What Works,<br />

Wisconsin! found that, in 2004, it cost $68,255 to<br />

house a juvenile offender in a corrections facility<br />

in Wisconsin for 12 months. The study analyzed<br />

many potentially beneficial programs, including<br />

Wraparound Milwaukee. This program coordinates<br />

treatment and services for delinquent and nondelinquent<br />

youth with mental health disorders,<br />

with the goal of keeping youth in the community<br />

and with their families when possible. Wraparound<br />

Milwaukee allows families to select from an array<br />

of services and provides “care coordination” to<br />

ensure the best use of resources. Although rigorous<br />

evidence-based studies have not been conducted<br />

for Wraparound Milwaukee, it reported in 2000<br />

that 650 youth were served in the community at<br />

5


Cost-Benefit Analysis of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Programs<br />

a monthly cost of about $3,300 per participant;<br />

traditional incarceration would have cost $5,000.<br />

The findings in What Works, Wisconsin! claim that<br />

the two biggest barriers to appropriately funding<br />

effective evidence-based programs are a lack of<br />

information available to policymakers and prohibitive<br />

start-up costs. If these obstacles can be overcome, the<br />

authors believe the benefits of using evidence-based<br />

programs will be substantial.<br />

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis<br />

Cost-benefit analysis is not the only cost<br />

assessment tool used by the states. Costeffectiveness<br />

analysis also compares the<br />

relative costs and outcomes of two or more<br />

courses of action, but is different from<br />

cost-benefit analysis in that it does not turn<br />

all results into monetary values. Due to this<br />

limitation, cost-effectiveness analyses are<br />

generally only used to compare programs<br />

with similar goals.<br />

Illinois’ use of a cost-effective assessment<br />

helped the state save money and reduce<br />

crime rates by implementing evidence-based<br />

programs. The Redeploy Illinois initiative,<br />

passed by the Illinois legislature in 2004, is<br />

predicated on the belief that non-violent<br />

youth offenders are less likely to be involved<br />

in future delinquent behavior if they remain in<br />

their home communities to receive treatment<br />

instead of being sent to a detention facility.<br />

The programs also are less expensive than<br />

housing a juvenile in a detention center.<br />

The annual cost of housing one juvenile in<br />

a detention center was $70,827 in 2005.<br />

The Redeploy Illinois initiative gives counties<br />

financial support to provide comprehensive<br />

services to delinquent youth in their home<br />

communities who might otherwise be sent<br />

to the Illinois Department of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

(IDJJ). In the first two years of implementation,<br />

the Redeploy Illinois pilot sites, on average,<br />

reduced their commitments to IDJJ by 44<br />

percent. As of January 2010, Redeploy<br />

Illinois has nine programs serving juveniles<br />

in 20 counties. So far, for every $1 million<br />

spent by Redeploy Illinois pilot sites, IDJJ<br />

has had a cost avoidance of $3.55 million on<br />

juvenile incarceration.<br />

The success of Redeploy Illinois has prompted<br />

its oversight board to recommend an increased<br />

financial investment to expand services to the<br />

entire state. The board also recommended<br />

that a cost-benefit analysis of Redeploy Illinois<br />

be conducted in addition to the program<br />

assessments to help understand its true value.<br />

As of January 2010, some of the program<br />

assessments had begun.<br />

6


<strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Guide Book for Legislators<br />

...the two biggest barriers to<br />

appropriately funding effective<br />

evidence-based programs are a<br />

lack of information available to<br />

policymakers and prohibitive<br />

start-up costs.<br />

Conclusion<br />

Although cost-benefit analysis may<br />

appear complicated, it is important to<br />

remember that the goal is simply to<br />

weigh the advantages and disadvantages<br />

of one course of action over another.<br />

For legislators interested in learning how<br />

These include identifying programs with the best<br />

results, enabling states and localities to spend<br />

their limited resources effectively and allowing<br />

lawmakers to make decisions based on a calculated,<br />

supportable analysis.<br />

Moving Forward<br />

The success of these examples has increased national<br />

interest in replicating cost-benefit analysis and similar<br />

program assessments. To inform practitioners, Vera<br />

initiated a project to centralize information on the<br />

topic in the National Knowledge Bank for Cost-<br />

Benefit Analysis in Criminal <strong>Justice</strong> (CBKB.org). The<br />

website serves as a clearinghouse for resources and<br />

research and is also a center for active practitioners.<br />

It includes podcasts, videos and a cost-benefit toolkit<br />

developed specifically to provide general education<br />

and training on criminal justice cost-benefit analysis<br />

to various audiences.<br />

cost-benefit analysis can be applied in<br />

their state, there are many developing<br />

resources to turn to. With this<br />

educational assistance, state leaders will<br />

be better able to decide how to value<br />

information derived from cost analyses.<br />

For references and additional resources, please<br />

see the References, Glossary & Resources section.<br />

Another project designed to increase the accessibility<br />

of cost-benefit analysis is the Results First Initiative.<br />

WSIPP partnered with the Pew Charitable Trusts<br />

and the MacArthur Foundation to develop a costbenefit<br />

tool that can be applied to data collected<br />

from programs in other states. The project will<br />

include a software designed to help states identify<br />

evidence-based policies that maximize the return on<br />

investment for taxpayers.<br />

7


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Vol. II - 2018<br />

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The e-Advocate <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Report<br />

Vol. I – <strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency in The US<br />

Vol. II. – The Prison Industrial Complex<br />

Vol. III – Restorative/ Transformative <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Vol. IV – The Sixth Amendment Right to The Effective Assistance of Counsel<br />

Vol. V – The Theological Foundations of <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong><br />

Vol. VI – Collaborating to Eradicate <strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency<br />

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Genesis of the Problem<br />

Family Structure<br />

Societal Influences<br />

Evidence-Based Programming<br />

Strengthening Assets v. Eliminating Deficits<br />

Introduction/Ideology/Key Values<br />

Philosophy/Application & Practice<br />

Expungement & Pardons<br />

Pardons & Clemency<br />

Examples/Best Practices<br />

The e-Advocate Newsletter<br />

2012 - <strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency in the US<br />

2013 - Restorative <strong>Justice</strong> in the US<br />

2014 - The Prison Industrial Complex<br />

25% of the World's Inmates Are In the US<br />

The Economics of Prison Enterprise<br />

The Federal Bureau of Prisons<br />

The After-Effects of Incarceration/Individual/Societal<br />

The Fourth Amendment Project<br />

The Sixth Amendment Project<br />

The Eighth Amendment Project<br />

The Adolescent Law Group<br />

2015 - US Constitutional Issues In The New Millennium<br />

2016 - The Theological Law Firm Academy<br />

The Theological Foundations of US Law & Government<br />

The Economic Consequences of Legal Decision-Making<br />

The <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> Legislative Reform Initiative<br />

The EB-5 International Investors Initiative<br />

The Board of Directors<br />

The Inner Circle<br />

Staff & Management<br />

2017 - Organizational Development<br />

Page 109 of 113


Succession Planning<br />

Bonus #1 The Budget<br />

Bonus #2 Data-Driven Resource Allocation<br />

2018 - Sustainability<br />

The Data-Driven Resource Allocation Process<br />

The Quality Assurance Initiative<br />

The Advocacy Foundation Endowments Initiative<br />

The Community Engagement Strategy<br />

2019 - Collaboration<br />

Critical Thinking for Transformative <strong>Justice</strong><br />

International Labor Relations<br />

Immigration<br />

God's Will & The 21st Century Democratic Process<br />

The Community Engagement Strategy<br />

The 21st Century Charter Schools Initiative<br />

The 501(c)(3) Acquisition Process<br />

The Board of Directors<br />

The Gladiator Mentality<br />

Strategic Planning<br />

Fundraising<br />

501(c)(3) Reinstatements<br />

2020 - Community Engagement<br />

Extras<br />

The NonProfit Advisors Group Newsletters<br />

The Collaborative US/ International Newsletters<br />

How You Think Is Everything<br />

The Reciprocal Nature of Business Relationships<br />

Accelerate Your Professional Development<br />

The Competitive Nature of Grant Writing<br />

Assessing The Risks<br />

Page 110 of 113


About The Author<br />

John C (Jack) Johnson III<br />

Founder & CEO<br />

Having become disillusioned with the inner-workings of the ―Cradle-to-Prison‖ pipeline, former practicing attorney Johnson set<br />

out, in 2001, to try to help usher-in fundamental changes in the area of <strong>Juvenile</strong> and Transformative <strong>Justice</strong>.<br />

Educated at Temple University, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Rutgers Law School, in Camden, New Jersey, Jack moved to<br />

Atlanta, Georgia to pursue greater opportunities to provide Advocacy and Preventive Programmatic services for at-risk/ atpromise<br />

young persons, their families, and <strong>Justice</strong> Professionals embedded in the <strong>Juvenile</strong> <strong>Justice</strong> process in order to help<br />

facilitate its transcendence into the 21 st Century.<br />

There, along with a small group of community and faith-based professionals, ―The Advocacy Foundation, Inc." was conceived<br />

and implemented over roughly a thirteen year period, originally chartered as a <strong>Juvenile</strong> Delinquency Prevention and Educational<br />

Support Services organization consisting of Mentoring, Tutoring, Counseling, Character Development, Community Change<br />

Management, Practitioner Re-Education & Training, and a host of related components.<br />

The Foundation‘s Overarching Mission is “To help Individuals, Organizations, & Communities Achieve Their Full Potential”,<br />

by implementing a wide array of evidence-based proactive multi-disciplinary "Restorative & Transformative <strong>Justice</strong>" programs &<br />

projects currently throughout the northeast, southeast, and western international-waters regions, providing prevention and support<br />

services to at-risk/ at-promise youth, to young adults, to their families, and to Social Service, <strong>Justice</strong> and Mental<br />

Health professionals‖ everywhere. The Foundation has since relocated its headquarters to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and been<br />

expanded to include a three-tier mission.<br />

In addition to his work with the Foundation, Jack also served as an Adjunct Professor of Law & Business at National-Louis<br />

University of Atlanta (where he taught Political Science, Business & Legal Ethics, Labor & Employment Relations, and Critical<br />

Thinking courses to undergraduate and graduate level students). Jack has also served as Board President for a host of wellestablished<br />

and up & coming nonprofit organizations throughout the region, including ―Visions Unlimited Community<br />

Development Systems, Inc.‖, a multi-million dollar, award-winning, Violence Prevention and Gang Intervention Social Service<br />

organization in Atlanta, as well as Vice-Chair of the Georgia/ Metropolitan Atlanta Violence Prevention Partnership, a state-wide<br />

300 organizational member violence prevention group led by the Morehouse School of Medicine, Emory University and The<br />

Atlanta-Based Martin Luther King Center.<br />

Attorney Johnson‘s prior accomplishments include a wide-array of Professional Legal practice areas, including Private Firm,<br />

Corporate and Government postings, just about all of which yielded significant professional awards & accolades, the history and<br />

chronology of which are available for review online.<br />

www.TheAdvocacyFoundation.org<br />

Clayton County Youth Services Partnership, Inc. – Chair; Georgia Violence Prevention Partnership, Inc – Vice Chair; Fayette<br />

County NAACP - Legal Redress Committee Chairman; Clayton County Fatherhood Initiative Partnership – Principal<br />

Investigator; Morehouse School of Medicine School of Community Health Feasibility Study - Steering Committee; Atlanta<br />

Violence Prevention Capacity Building Project – Project Partner; Clayton County Minister‘s Conference, President 2006-2007;<br />

Liberty In Life Ministries, Inc. – Board Secretary; Young Adults Talk, Inc. – Board of Directors; ROYAL, Inc - Board of<br />

Directors; Temple University Alumni Association; Rutgers Law School Alumni Association; Sertoma International; Our<br />

Common Welfare Board of Directors – President)2003-2005; River‘s Edge Elementary School PTA (Co-President); Summerhill<br />

Community Ministries; Outstanding Young Men of America; Employee of the Year; Academic All-American - Basketball;<br />

Church Trustee.<br />

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www.TheAdvocacyFoundation.org<br />

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Page 113 of 113

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