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BUSINESS A.M. FEBRUARY, MONDAY <strong>05</strong> - SUNDAY 11, 20<strong>18</strong><br />

COMMENT<br />

7<br />

Maybe central banks are too independent<br />

EDITORIAL<br />

NARAYANA<br />

KOCHERLAKOTA<br />

Throughout the<br />

developed world,<br />

central banks enjoy<br />

a large measure<br />

of independence.<br />

This is considered<br />

desirable because it guards<br />

against elected officials’ preference<br />

for overly easy monetary<br />

policy, as a means to<br />

generating jobs and votes.<br />

But what if the central<br />

bank wants easier money<br />

than politicians do? This has<br />

been the case in the U.S. for<br />

much of the past decade, and<br />

it raises important questions<br />

about how independence<br />

should be defined.<br />

Matched photo of Nigeria<br />

Central Bank Logo and A<br />

conundrum of governance,<br />

Federal Reserve<br />

Consider the situation in<br />

late 2010. The Republican<br />

party won a huge victory in<br />

the midterm congressional<br />

elections, at least in part<br />

thanks to voters’ unease with<br />

the $800 billion fiscal stimulus<br />

package that the Obama<br />

administration adopted the<br />

previous year. The newly<br />

elected Republicans largely<br />

opposed additional stimulus<br />

as a way of addressing the<br />

protracted recession.<br />

Yet one day after the election,<br />

with unemployment<br />

still close to 10 percent and<br />

inflation falling toward 1<br />

percent, the Federal Reserve<br />

began a new round of bondbuying<br />

designed to provide<br />

added economic stimulus<br />

(a policy that I, as a Fed official<br />

at the time, supported).<br />

This was no isolated event.<br />

Throughout the recovery,<br />

the Fed systematically sought<br />

to boost growth and inflation<br />

even as Congress made<br />

choices — such as the budget<br />

sequestration of 2013 — that<br />

seemed deliberately intended<br />

to constrain them.<br />

At first glance, the Fed’s<br />

policy choices could be seen<br />

as a great example of how an<br />

independent central bank<br />

works: By design, it acts in<br />

isolation of, and possibly in<br />

contradiction to, the wishes<br />

of the public’s elected representatives.<br />

The stimulus<br />

was amply justified given the<br />

Fed’s mandate to seek maximum<br />

employment and price<br />

stability. Indeed, I’ve argued<br />

that it could and should have<br />

done more. It was right about<br />

the economy and Congress<br />

was wrong.<br />

Still, there’s something<br />

wrong with this picture. It has<br />

to do with the governance of<br />

central bank policy. Congress<br />

has given the Fed — a group<br />

of unelected technocrats —<br />

the power to pursue a more<br />

pro-inflation and pro-growth<br />

policy than the public’s elected<br />

representatives desire.<br />

What is the justification for<br />

this delegation?<br />

As far as I know, the vast<br />

theoretical and empirical<br />

academic literature addresses<br />

central bank independence<br />

only as a way to counter the<br />

short-term pro-inflation biases<br />

of elected officials. It<br />

doesn’t explain why central<br />

banks should be allowed to<br />

do the opposite.<br />

One argument, I suppose,<br />

could be expertise: The unelected<br />

technocrats just know<br />

a lot more about monetary<br />

policy than Congress does.<br />

But, as someone who’s been<br />

one of those technocrats, I’m<br />

leery of this argument. The<br />

aura of expertise can end up<br />

being a way to hide political<br />

biases — biases that should<br />

really be up to the electorate<br />

to adjudicate.<br />

To arrive at a more defensible<br />

approach, Congress<br />

might have to rethink central<br />

bank independence as it is<br />

enshrined in the Federal<br />

Reserve Act. It could, for example,<br />

periodically establish<br />

a lower bound for the level<br />

of interest rates and an upper<br />

bound for asset holdings,<br />

leaving the Fed free to<br />

choose a higher interest rate<br />

and a smaller balance sheet.<br />

This would give the central<br />

bank ample power to keep<br />

inflation in check but would<br />

prevent monetary policy from<br />

being too much easier than<br />

what Congress and the voters<br />

desire.<br />

To be sure, this could on<br />

occasion prevent the Fed<br />

from doing the right thing<br />

when Congress is wrong —<br />

as it did in 2010. But over the<br />

longer term, it would preserve<br />

the most important part of the<br />

central bank’s independence,<br />

shielding it from accusations<br />

that it has become too unaccountable<br />

to the people.<br />

Courtesy Bloomberg<br />

The vast<br />

theoretical<br />

and empirical<br />

academic<br />

literature addresses<br />

central<br />

bank independence<br />

only as a way<br />

to counter the<br />

short-term<br />

pro-inflation<br />

biases of<br />

elected officials.<br />

It<br />

doesn’t explain<br />

why<br />

central banks<br />

should be<br />

allowed to do<br />

the opposite<br />

EXECUTIVE EDITOR<br />

Phillip Isakpa<br />

Tel.: 0809 400 0<strong>02</strong>5<br />

phillipi@businessamlive.com<br />

MANAGING EDITOR<br />

Steve Omanufeme<br />

Tel.: 08<strong>02</strong> 501 3<strong>05</strong>9<br />

steveo@businessamlive.com<br />

REPORTERS<br />

Andy Nssien<br />

Ajose Sehindemi<br />

Bukola Odufade<br />

ONLINE<br />

Goddey Odin<br />

GRAPHICS<br />

Christopher Ikosa<br />

_____________________________<br />

Businessnewscorp Limited<br />

Phillip Isakpa<br />

Steve Omanufeme<br />

Amadi Iheukwumere<br />

Adedotun Akande<br />

Bobby Igwe<br />

Tiamiyu Adio<br />

Isaac Jayeola<br />

87, Oduduwa Crescent,<br />

GRA Ikeja, Lagos, Nigeria.<br />

Tel.: +234 907 986 3875<br />

Email: info@businessamlive.com<br />

Website: www.businessamlive.com

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