AFGHANISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
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<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL<br />
MAY 2007<br />
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for<br />
International Development. It was prepared by ARD, Inc.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong><br />
GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE<br />
PROJECT (ALGAP)<br />
LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
Acknowledgments<br />
This Lessons Learned Review of the Afghanistan Local Governance Assistance Project (ALGAP) resulted<br />
from collaboration among the project staff and the ARD home office. The Review was written by Kim<br />
G. Glenn and produced by ARD, Inc. ARD would like to acknowledge a number of people who<br />
contributed substantively to the Review. They include Douglas Grube, the chief of party for ALGAP<br />
who brings a comprehensive understanding of all the project activities and the project history from its<br />
inception. The ALGAP staff contributed notably candid observations and insights rooted in their firsthand<br />
understanding of the project activities in the field and the context of the Afghan culture and reality.<br />
USAID implementing partners associated with national and subnational governance made substantial<br />
contribution through their meetings with Mr. Glenn. Mr. Glenn also met with representatives of<br />
Provincial Councils and government in the provinces of Baghlan, Kunduz, and Samangan whose<br />
observations and comments added depth, credibility, and context. See Appendix B for a list of key<br />
interviewees. Recognition also goes to ARD’s Senior Technical Advisor, Steve Reid, and the USAID<br />
Cognizant Technical Officer, Mohamed Zahar, who gave valuable guidance and support.<br />
Prepared for the United States Agency for International Development, USAID Contract Number<br />
AEP-1-809-00-00016-00, Task Order 809, under the Technical Services to Support USAID Global<br />
Bureau's Center for Democracy and Governance (G/DG) in Strengthening Democracy and Good<br />
Governance: Decentralization, Participatory Government, and Public Management (Decentralization)<br />
Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC).<br />
Implemented by:<br />
ARD, Inc.<br />
P.O. Box 1397<br />
Burlington, VT 05402<br />
COVER PHOTO: The Provincial Council: A Bridge for the People. Courtesy Sayara Media and Communication,<br />
Afghanistan (http://www.sayara-media.com)
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL<br />
GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE<br />
PROJECT (ALGAP)<br />
LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW<br />
MAY 2007<br />
DISCLAIMER<br />
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United<br />
States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
CONTENTS<br />
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................ iii<br />
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... v<br />
1.0 METHODOLOGY......................................................................................................... 1<br />
2.0 GOVERNANCE IN <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong>: AN OVERVIEW .......................................... 3<br />
2.1 GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES....................................................................................................... 3<br />
2.2 SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS ........................................................................ 4<br />
2.3 EMERGING TRENDS IN GOVERNANCE ........................................................................................ 5<br />
3.0 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT: AN<br />
OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................... 7<br />
3.1 PURPOSE....................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
3.2 EVOLUTION FROM THE <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> STABILIZATION PROGRAM (ASP) ERA..................... 7<br />
3.3 APPROACH................................................................................................................................... 8<br />
3.4 COMPONENTS ............................................................................................................................. 9<br />
3.4.1 Capacity Building....................................................................................................... 9<br />
3.4.2 Civic Education........................................................................................................10<br />
3.4.3 Facilitation Development ......................................................................................11<br />
4.0 FINDINGS ................................................................................................................... 13<br />
4.1 PROVINCIAL COUNCILS............................................................................................................13<br />
4.1.1 Resolve Disputes.....................................................................................................13<br />
4.1.2 Act as an Oversight Body .....................................................................................14<br />
4.1.3 Are the Voice of the People.................................................................................15<br />
4.1.4 Add Local Leadership for Addressing National Issues....................................15<br />
4.2 CAPACITY BUILDING ACTIVITIES..............................................................................................15<br />
4.2.1 Lessons from Workshops.....................................................................................16<br />
4.2.2 Consultation Tours, Possibly the Most Important Activity ...........................17<br />
4.2.3 Conferences and Provincial Exchanges; Sometimes “Conferring” is Enough<br />
....................................................................................................................................17<br />
4.3 CIVIC EDUCATION ACTIVITIES.................................................................................................17<br />
4.3.1 Roundtables: Radio and TV Require Special Formats.....................................18<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW i
4.3.2 Lessons from the Successful Mobile Theater....................................................18<br />
4.3.3 Lessons Regarding Mass Media ............................................................................18<br />
4.4 PROJECT MANAGEMENT ...........................................................................................................19<br />
4.4.1 Fly Without a Pilot .................................................................................................19<br />
4.4.2 Recruit Locally.........................................................................................................19<br />
4.4.3 Avoid Field-Based Project Offices.......................................................................20<br />
4.4.4 Proceed with or without a National Government Counterpart..................20<br />
4.4.5 Build Capacity at District Levels..........................................................................20<br />
4.4.6 Extend Support to Provincial Government Actors.........................................21<br />
4.4.7 Anticipate Need to Build Capacity Everywhere...............................................21<br />
4.5 GENDER......................................................................................................................................21<br />
4.5.1 Budget and Plan for Maharam ..............................................................................21<br />
4.5.2 Provide Gender Training for Project Staff and Activity Participants............22<br />
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................... 23<br />
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................... 25<br />
APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................. A-1<br />
APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES................................................................... B-1<br />
APPENDIX C: PROVINCIAL COUNCIL LAW ARTICLE 4 .................................... C-1<br />
ii <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
ACRONYMS AND<br />
ABBREVIATIONS<br />
ALGAP Afghanistan Local Governance Assistance Project<br />
APM Advanced Participatory Methods<br />
AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit<br />
ASP Afghanistan Stabilization Program<br />
CDC Community Development Committee<br />
COP Chief of party<br />
CSO Civil society organization<br />
CTO Cognizant technical officer<br />
FCCS Foundation for Culture and Civil Society<br />
ISAF International Security Assistance Force<br />
MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development<br />
NGO Nongovernmental organization<br />
NSP National Solidarity Program<br />
PBF Province-based facilitator<br />
PDC Provincial Development Committee<br />
UNDP United Nations Development Program<br />
USAID United States Agency for International Development<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW iii
INTRODUCTION<br />
After more than 25 years of almost constant war, Afghanistan is re-creating itself politically, economically,<br />
socially, culturally, and governmentally. Part of this re-development calls for unprecedented representative<br />
subnational governance with revitalized or new structures. These include Provincial, District, and Village<br />
Councils. Accompanying these structures are opportunities and mechanisms for greater citizen participation in<br />
governance within provinces.<br />
ALGAP’s mission between November 2005 and June 2007 has been to support the development of the<br />
capacity of the newly-elected and formed Provincial Councils to fulfill their roles and responsibilities. In the<br />
process, ALGAP has contributed to the development of an environment in which the government, councils,<br />
public, civil society, and businesses, can begin to work together effectively.<br />
ALGAP organized a civic education campaign prior to the September 2005 Provincial Council elections,<br />
designed to inform the public and the candidates for Provincial Councils about the legal status and role of the<br />
Councils in accordance with the Constitution and the newly promulgated Provincial Council Law.<br />
Immediately following the election and the swearing in of the successful Council members, ALGAP provided<br />
an orientation and organization program for the Council members. Subsequently, ALGAP has carried out a<br />
wide array of training and technical assistance activities aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Councils to<br />
fulfill their roles and responsibilities. At the request of the Provincial Councils and other provincial governance<br />
actors, ALGAP has expanded its technical support program over the past year to include participants from the<br />
various government ministries working at the provincial and district levels. The project also initiated a national<br />
civic education campaign to promote greater citizen participation in governance within the provinces.<br />
With a few months left in the project, USAID encouraged ARD to assess the technical and administrative<br />
aspects of the ALGAP project that did and did not “work,” in order to provide recommendations for similar<br />
future USAID programs. For the purposes of this Review, we define something that “worked” as a project<br />
activity, policy, or approach that met its intended purpose particularly well and is worth considering in other<br />
project contexts. Something that did not “work,” in this sense, is something that failed in a surprising or<br />
notable fashion, which is also worth considering in other project contexts.<br />
At the request of USAID, this Lessons Learned Review also addresses the broad question of support to the<br />
Provincial Councils: whether or to what extent they should continue to receive support from USAID, the<br />
Afghan government, or from other donors. The governance context in Afghanistan is in rapid transition and<br />
the strategic questions surrounding subnational governance are critical. Further, during the 18 months of<br />
ALGAP’s implementation, Afghan government support for Provincial Councils and for provincial governance<br />
in general has been erratic. In taking stock of efforts to improve governance and state-building in Afghanistan,<br />
donors have recognized the need for a more coherent strategy for subnational governance and for better<br />
coordination of initiatives. Therefore, in addition to lessons on project implementation, USAID specifically<br />
requested, to the extent that the Review findings support them, clear conclusions and recommendations<br />
regarding immediate and future support to subnational governance in Afghanistan.<br />
This report concludes that the Provincial Councils, despite limited resources and mandated authorities, are<br />
making a useful contribution to subnational governance in a number of areas, including conflict and dispute<br />
mediation, and oversight of provincial government activities. Furthermore, the Councils appear to be filling a<br />
critical role as representatives of the population in the provinces, communicating their needs to government<br />
administration, and advocating for improved security, public services, and infrastructure. Though they show<br />
early promise, the Provincial Councils are currently at a very rudimentary stage in their evolution. Carefully<br />
targeted, well-designed training and technical assistance to the Provincial Councils over the next several years,<br />
combined with civic education campaigns aimed at the general public, would do much to speed their evolution<br />
and improve their effectiveness.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW v
1.0 METHODOLOGY<br />
A “lesson learned” for this exercise derives from an activity, policy,<br />
or approach that is either reported or observed as having<br />
“worked”; that is to say, it seems to have been well received or<br />
effective in achieving its intended goals or outcomes. Alternatively,<br />
a “lesson learned” may derive from an activity, policy, or approach<br />
that notably did not work. In both cases, the “lesson learned” could<br />
reasonably be recommended for use in future projects in<br />
subnational governance in general, or for projects specifically in<br />
Afghanistan regardless of the project objectives.<br />
The Review took a multi-faceted approach to obtain answers and<br />
insights into ALGAP, its goals, processes, and accomplishments.<br />
The approach involved the review of program documents and<br />
records, and individual and group interviews with ALGAP staff,<br />
Provincial Council members, provincial government officials, and<br />
other provincial governance actors. The consultant made two field<br />
visits to observe ALGAP-implemented workshops. He also<br />
conducted individual and group interviews and discussions with<br />
ARD home office staff and USAID/Afghanistan personnel.<br />
The major documents reviewed were:<br />
• annual work plans and reports;<br />
• monthly and quarterly activity and progress reports;<br />
• ad hoc and formal studies or evaluations 1;<br />
• success stories prepared in March 2007; and,<br />
• short-term technical assistance consulting reports.<br />
At the outset of the Review, the consultant identified the key elements of the ALGAP design, implementation<br />
challenges, primary operational processes, and major programmatic successes. The consultant met with the<br />
USAID cognizant technical officer (CTO), and key project staff to discuss the results of the initial review and<br />
interviews and to identify the chief areas of importance. The six major areas identified were: project<br />
management, gender, workshops, consultation tours, conferences, and civic education.<br />
This Lessons Learned Review attempted to answer three simple questions with regard to technical assistance to<br />
the Provincial Councils and the civic education activities. Broadly speaking, the responses from nearly everyone<br />
associated with the project, as well as the documentation reviewed, provided correspondingly simple answers:<br />
1. What worked? Everything.<br />
2. What didn’t work? Nothing.<br />
3. What next? More of the same.<br />
Before the offices of the Jawzjan<br />
Provincial Council, from left:<br />
Council Secretary Alifsha Khan<br />
and Council President Molawi<br />
Abdul Ghani.<br />
1 See the bibliography in Appendix A for a list of key documents contributing to this Lessons Learned Review.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 1<br />
PHOTO COURTESY OF ALGAP PROJECT
On the surface these responses suggest great successes. Yet the relative progress towards meeting the immense<br />
needs of Afghanistan remains extremely limited. Building a healthy subnational governance environment in<br />
Afghanistan, in the broad sense, remains a very long-term goal towards which ALGAP has made significant,<br />
but necessarily initial, “baby” steps.<br />
It was necessary to undertake extensive probing to reveal anything that could be considered a “lesson learned”<br />
and not simply an observation. Just because something “worked” doesn’t necessarily carry with it a lesson that<br />
can be applied elsewhere. Two major reasons for this cautious approach were discovered.<br />
• ALGAP was responding to such a clear and dramatic need that beneficiaries, especially the Provincial<br />
Councils, valued and appreciated its activities highly. To a starving person, almost any food will taste good.<br />
• In any circumstance, but especially within the Afghan culture, it is hard to persuade people to be critical, to<br />
admit that something did not work as expected, and to analyze why, and thereby extract a lesson.<br />
The circumstances in Afghanistan are so unusual and so fluid that any lesson learned will not easily be<br />
applicable to other projects elsewhere, or even subsequent projects in Afghanistan.<br />
2 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
2.0 GOVERNANCE IN<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong>: AN OVERVIEW<br />
The Afghanistan Local Governance Assistance Project has operated in a complex, fluid, and emerging<br />
governance environment. The national government, as well as the overall governance processes and actors, are<br />
undergoing significant change. The central government is seeking to increase its capacity to fulfill its<br />
responsibilities. These changes involve regular reviews and efforts to restructure the government, initiatives to<br />
increase the capacity of individuals and organizations within the government, and reconsideration of some<br />
traditional government roles.<br />
At the same time, the transition environment is forming new governance bodies and modifying the role and<br />
function of traditional bodies. Major changes include, but are not limited to, the formation of a new National<br />
Assembly as well as the formation of Provincial Councils as provided for in the constitution that was adopted<br />
in 2004.<br />
2.1 GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES<br />
National government: The central government, of course, remains a major governance actor at both the<br />
center and in the provinces. Indeed, in terms of decision making the central government has been the major<br />
actor, although it has been relatively weak in terms of enforcing policies and laws.<br />
National Assembly: Governance in Afghanistan encompasses a host of new formal structures as well as the<br />
traditional and semi-formal structures and processes. The National Assembly 2 is a legislative body that was<br />
elected in September 2005. The National Assembly is comprised of two houses and represents the provinces,<br />
enacts legislation, and must approve the appointment of ministers and other key government officials.<br />
Provincial Council: Provincial Councils, also elected in 2005, primarily have an advisory role. Their major<br />
authority under the Provincial Council Law promulgated in 2005 is the election of one of their members to the<br />
Mishrano Jirga, the upper house of the National Assembly. Other roles include facilitating communication<br />
between the government and the people and participating in or supporting a broad range of provincial<br />
activities.<br />
District and Village Councils: Also provided for in the Constitution is the election of District and Village<br />
Councils. The roles and responsibilities of these bodies is not clearly stated in the Constitution nor has there<br />
been enabling legislation to define these. Like the Provincial Councils, the District Councils will have the<br />
authority to elect one-third of the members of the Mishrano Jirga. Initially, it was intended that the District<br />
Councils would also be elected in 2005 along with the National Assembly and the Provincial Councils. This<br />
election was not held, however, and no date has been fixed to hold it.<br />
Traditional shuras, jirgas, and leaders: Governance in Afghanistan, at all levels, typically includes informal<br />
or semi-formal councils (shuras in Arabic and Dari, and jirgas in Pashto), commonly comprised of elders,<br />
mullahs, local commanders, and other respected male members of the country, province, district, or village, as<br />
well as respected individual leaders. While these shuras and jirgas, and the traditional leaders forming them, do<br />
2 Reference is frequently made in Afghanistan to the “parliament”. Officially, however, there is a National Assembly and a presidential form of<br />
government rather than a parliamentary form of government.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 3
not have formal authority within the governance structure, they have and continue to exercise significant<br />
influence on decisions affecting their respective villages, districts, and provinces. Additionally, some traditional<br />
leaders have direct informal ties and relations with both the central administration and with the National<br />
Assembly. At times the shuras and jirgas fulfill primary decision-making functions and are called upon to help<br />
resolve disputes between individuals, groups, tribes, and even provinces.<br />
Civil society, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and others: A variety of civil society<br />
organizations (CSOs) and NGOs, professional associations, and others are emerging in Afghanistan as<br />
governance actors. The project did not work extensively with them. However, in some instances Provincial<br />
Councils, recognizing their importance, included them in the workshops and other ALGAP-supported<br />
activities. These actors merit mention as an emerging part of governance throughout Afghanistan.<br />
Provinces, districts, villages, and municipalities: Administratively and politically Afghanistan is comprised<br />
of 34 provinces, approximately 239 3 districts, approximately 30,000 villages, and 217 municipalities. The<br />
provinces have been grouped by international agencies and the central government into regions (often eight,<br />
but sometimes fewer). These regions currently have little, if any, administrative or governance significance. The<br />
government is comprised of 26 ministries and a variety of independent bodies, e.g., the Administrative Reform<br />
and Civil Service Commission.<br />
2.2 SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS<br />
The central government is represented in provinces by a governor who is appointed by the president and<br />
reports to him through the Ministry of Interior. Each province typically has an office for some or all of the<br />
other line ministries. Large provinces are likely to have more offices than the 26 corresponding ministries, with<br />
multiple offices from one ministry and representation from independent agencies.<br />
The governor, the deputy governor, and the director of administration exercise substantial power and authority<br />
over events within the provinces and the actions of other government offices within their province.<br />
The provincial offices of line ministries formally report directly to their respective ministries in Kabul and not<br />
to the governor. They are, however, subject to influence from the governor and typically seek his or her<br />
approval or concurrence on major activities.<br />
A similar structure exists, in principle, at the district level. However, the number of district offices of line<br />
ministries is typically fewer than at the provincial level. The district governor 4 reports and is responsible<br />
directly to the provincial governor. The line ministry offices in the districts report indirectly to the district<br />
governor and directly to the provincial-level line ministry offices.<br />
The result of the centralized structure is that officially very few governance decisions are made at the province,<br />
district, or village levels. Program priorities and questions are referred up the chain of command of each line<br />
ministry for a decision, albeit with some recommendation from the provincial governor. The provincial<br />
governor is likely to be able to exert some influence on decisions even at the ministerial level, due to his or her<br />
relationship with, and appointment by, the president. 5<br />
Governance has been largely closed to direct or extensive citizen participation. The major avenues for public<br />
involvement have been through the traditional shuras or jirgas, and traditional leaders of a district, province, or<br />
other entity (in many cases a tribal grouping).<br />
3 The number of districts is in flux since some district boundaries have not been finally established. Similarly, references are made periodically<br />
to the possible creation of new provinces, with at least two provinces having been created within the past five years.<br />
4 The position is referred by various terms: governor, director, and administrator.<br />
5 There are a host of other factors that can influence the power and authority of a governor, including ethnicity and language as well as ties<br />
with other influential persons or with members of the National Assembly.<br />
4 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
2.3 EMERGING TRENDS IN GOVERNANCE<br />
While there is a clear emphasis in Afghanistan on a strong central government, and a highly centralized form of<br />
government in general, trends during the ALGAP project show some clear progress toward subnational<br />
governance. These trends may be reinforced by historic and traditional local governance structures. The<br />
Constitution provides for both some degree of delegation of authority and an increase in public participation in<br />
decision making, at least with respect to development.<br />
The government, while preserving the principle of centralism, shall delegate certain authorities to<br />
local administration units 6 for the purpose of expediting and promoting economic, social, and<br />
cultural affairs, and increasing the participation of people in the development of the nation. (Article<br />
137, 2004 Constitution)<br />
The Constitution, adopted by the Loya Jirga on 4 January 2004 (Afghan year 1382), affirms a “unitary state”<br />
government in Afghanistan with highly centralized administration and decision making.<br />
Many government leaders tend to subscribe to a belief that a centralized government structure is required for<br />
development and security. They note that while the government is officially centralized in terms of decision<br />
making, it is in fact weak in many ways. For example, difficulties have been encountered in transferring tax<br />
revenues from the provinces to the central government. It is also difficult to obtain and implement<br />
comprehensive plans or policies within the provinces. Moreover, some governors function with a high degree<br />
of autonomy and with little loyalty to, or support from, the central government.<br />
The international aid community places a similar emphasis on the development and maintenance of a strong<br />
centralized government. Many among them feel that only a strong central government can deliver the<br />
important reconstruction necessary to rebuild the country.<br />
The central government, with the support and encouragement of donors, is placing a high priority on the<br />
development of the capacity of the central ministries. It is common practice for central ministries to have, for<br />
example, large cadres of expatriate and local advisors and thereby to obtain financial assistance for equipment<br />
and materials to reinforce or further develop them.<br />
Articles 138 and 139 provide for an increase in citizen participation in governance through the establishment<br />
of Provincial Councils by free, direct, secret ballot.<br />
The provincial council takes part in securing the developmental targets of the state and improving its<br />
affairs in a way stated in the law, and gives advice on important issues falling within the domain of the<br />
province. Provincial councils perform their duties in cooperation with the provincial administration.<br />
(Article 139)<br />
The roles, functions, and authorities of the Provincial Councils, as defined in the Provincial Council Law<br />
promulgated in August 2005, are vague and limited. Nevertheless, the Councils are clearly intended to be an<br />
avenue for communication between the government and the people and a mechanism for citizen access to and<br />
participation in governance. (See Appendix C for Article 4 of the Provincial Council Law itemizing the<br />
principal duties and responsibilities of the Councils.)<br />
Additional opportunity for citizen participation is provided in Article 140 of the Constitution. This articles calls<br />
for the establishment of district and village councils through direct elections. Elections for the District<br />
Councils, also originally scheduled for September 2005, have been postponed. It is not yet clear when, or<br />
whether, they will be take place, nor is it clear what roles and responsibilities the District Councils might have.<br />
Elections for the Village Councils are not yet scheduled.<br />
6 “Local Administration Units” are the local offices of the line ministries.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 5
Traditionally, direct citizen involvement in governance has been minimal, exercised through shuras and jirgas<br />
whose membership comprised those (i.e., exclusively men) who had de facto power and authority, if not respect,<br />
among the local population. Women typically have been excluded from participation and this pattern persists,<br />
although some efforts are being made to correct the situation. Notably, by law, 30 percent of a Provincial<br />
Council’s members must be female.<br />
Some structures are being developed by the government and by donors to provide greater opportunity for<br />
public participation in development planning and implementation. Community development committees<br />
(CDCs) have been formed with NGO or international donor encouragement and support. The purpose of<br />
these CDCs has been to include citizens in both identifying community needs and in implementing projects<br />
developed to address those needs.<br />
Religious leaders have traditionally played an important role in local governance and they continue to do so. In<br />
areas where radio and television are not available or where illiteracy is widespread, a mullah’s voice may be the<br />
only form of “mass media” available. Indeed, even today, mullahs are often solicited by government or other<br />
parties to help spread messages or rally action by the public. Recent research suggests, however, that many<br />
Afghans do not consider their mullahs well-versed in teachings of the Koran and feel that they lack<br />
understanding of other Islamic sects. 7 Unless they receive training and are included in development activities,<br />
they may not be prepared to tolerate, let alone support, changes in custom whether those changes are<br />
motivated locally or from outside influences. Such changes would include the role of women and the<br />
application of democratic governance.<br />
Popular support for the new Provincial Councils, at least in principle, has been evident among local voters.<br />
Studies by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) indicate that, at least in parts of<br />
Afghanistan, citizens increasingly accept and want more locally representative and inclusive structures. Voting<br />
patterns reflected in the Constitutional Loya Jirga (Assembly) and the National Solidarity Program’s community<br />
development committees (CDCs) suggest that when people are confident that their vote will be kept secret,<br />
they tend to elect people other than traditional leaders, especially when those leaders are viewed as corrupt or<br />
linked with criminal activities. 8<br />
Thus, on the one hand, we have a strong popular and constitutional emphasis on central government and<br />
authority. And on the other hand, we have specific provision in the constitution for local governance<br />
combined with a strong tradition of local governance customs. The emergence of the Provincial Councils has<br />
taken place within this conflicted context.<br />
7 Fidai, M. Halim. “How Afghans View Civil Society.” February 2006.<br />
8 Lister, Sarah. “Caught in Confusion: Local Governance Structures in Afghanistan.” March 2005.<br />
6 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
3.0 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL<br />
GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE<br />
PROJECT: AN OVERVIEW<br />
3.1 PURPOSE<br />
While ALGAP has undergone several modifications, its broad purpose has been consistent––to strengthen<br />
subnational government and governance. This has been interpreted to mean increasing the technical<br />
capabilities of government officials, and later and for most of the project, increasing the technical capabilities<br />
of Provincial Council members as well as other provincial governance actors 9.<br />
The purpose of the project as it became increasingly focused on Provincial Councils and provincial governance<br />
was to help develop the ability of Provincial Council members to recognize and fulfill their roles and<br />
responsibilities. An integral dimension of this was developing their ability to effectively relate with the<br />
government and other non-government actors and to establish and maintain the Provincial Councils’ positions<br />
as the only directly-elected bodies in Afghanistan.<br />
Of necessity, a collateral ALGAP purpose has been to contribute to the development of capacity-building<br />
resources in Afghanistan. ALGAP needed a group of individuals with training and facilitation skills, including<br />
the ability to assess needs, design work-based learning opportunities, facilitate workshops and other group<br />
learning events, and to be able to mentor other, less-experienced trainers and facilitators, as well as to utilize<br />
their abilities in support of Provincial Councils. It became clear at the outset of the project that it simply was<br />
not possible to locate individuals with the level of experience required. Thus ALGAP determined that it would<br />
be necessary to “grow its own” professional staff. In the long run, taking this approach had the advantage of<br />
contributing to the overall training/facilitation capacity within the country.<br />
3.2 EVOLUTION FROM THE <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> STABILIZATION PROGRAM<br />
(ASP) ERA<br />
The ALGAP focus underwent significant change between October 2004 and October 2005. Initially ALGAP<br />
was to support the Afghanistan Stabilization Program (ASP) and the development of district administration.<br />
This support was to include the supervision of construction being undertaken by ASP in the districts. Within<br />
this broad mandate the project was to provide technical assistance to ASP in the area of training, capacity<br />
building, and administrative reform. Due to internal ASP and Ministry of Interior conditions it proved to be<br />
unrealistic to pursue this assignment. During the first year, USAID also asked ALGAP to assist with the<br />
development of alternative livelihood programs, counter-narcotics programs, and to provide technical advice<br />
9 In Afghanistan citizens do not consider Provincial Councils as “government” and their members as “government officials.” ALGAP support<br />
to government officials refers to provincial governors and line ministry officials.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 7
with respect to some Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s (MRRD) National Solidarity<br />
Program (NSP) efforts to develop community development committees. While short-term assistance was<br />
provided, ARD and the USAID Democracy and Governance Office defined a focus that was more directly<br />
relevant to the initial purpose of the project:. Concerted preparation for providing on-going direct technical<br />
assistance to the Provincial Councils began in December 2005.<br />
Before the election, ALGAP had become involved with Provincial Council issues related to the election<br />
process. This initial assistance was in the form of organizing and conducting a pre-election nationwide<br />
information program regarding the newly-passed Provincial Law and the role and function of Provincial<br />
Councils. At that time, the major election focus was on the National Assembly with very little attention being<br />
given to the Provincial Council elections. ALGAP was able to help fill this void.<br />
The ALGAP public information program was directed primarily toward the Provincial Council candidates. The<br />
intent was to assist them in acquiring a clearer concept of the position for which they were running.<br />
Simultaneously, but with less emphasis, ALGAP sponsored public information spots on radio and television to<br />
help the public become informed about the Provincial Council election and its importance for them.<br />
In November 2005, shortly after the election, ALGAP prepared and implemented Provincial Council<br />
orientation and organization workshops in 33 of 34 provinces for newly elected Council members. 10 The<br />
donors and government realized that no real provisions had been made for the Provincial Councils following<br />
the elections. Indeed no provision had been made to swear in the councilors, to provide office or meeting<br />
space for them, or to insure that they had any operating resources.<br />
With encouragement from the Afghan government, USAID, and other international donors, ALGAP began to<br />
identify, develop, and provide needed technical assistance and support to Provincial Councils. After<br />
approximately six months of activity, a logical modification was made to the ALGAP Provincial Council<br />
assistance efforts. Provincial line ministry offices (administrative departments), governors’ offices, and<br />
Provincial Councils requested that technical assistance also be provided to a broader range of provincial<br />
governance actors. These requests came as ALGAP and the Provincial Councils more fully recognized that it<br />
was necessary for the Councils to build solid working relationships with the provincial administration<br />
(provincial governor, line ministry offices, and other actors within the province).<br />
Thus, since late 2006, ALGAP made technical assistance available to other provincial governance actors. This<br />
expanded the scope of the ALGAP work but enabled it to increase the use of the workshop materials and skills<br />
that were being developed.<br />
3.3 APPROACH<br />
To support Provincial Council members in developing the skills and abilities required to fulfill their roles,<br />
responsibilities, and functions as specified in the Provincial Council Law, ALGAP developed and has used a<br />
broad range of activities. Underlying these activities has been a commitment to several principles:<br />
1. Demand driven. To the extent possible, ALGAP has tried to respond to needs articulated by Provincial<br />
Councils and later by some government and other provincial governance actors. The intent, if not always<br />
the practice, has been to tailor capacity-building to specific, real, work-related needs<br />
2. Work-focused. The various capacity development opportunities have been focused on tasks or<br />
responsibilities being undertaken by the Councils or other provincial governance actors. At the outset of<br />
the project some of these were identified by ALGAP on the basis of an assessment of the Provincial Law<br />
and the skills required for the Councils to fulfill their roles and responsibilities.<br />
10 Thirty of the 33 orientation workshops were conducted simultaneously in the respective provinces. Three were conducted within a few<br />
days after the election and installation of the provincial council members and following the resolution of some election challenges. For<br />
security reasons it was not possible to conduct the workshop in Uruzgan, the 34 th province.<br />
8 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
3. Learn by doing. For most of the capacity-building activities, the Provincial Councils were asked and<br />
expected to assume some responsibility for planning and implementing them, for example, provincial<br />
consultations.<br />
4. Work nationally. In part out of necessity and in part by design, ALGAP assumed what many viewed as a<br />
high-risk approach—i.e., working in all provinces. The advantage of this approach is that no one was left<br />
out. The determining factor for levels of assistance from ALGAP was the extent to which Provincial<br />
Councils exercised their initiative and manifested a desire to obtain technical assistance.<br />
Following these principles, ALGAP provided various forms of technical assistance and support for the 34<br />
Councils 11 to develop the skills and abilities required to retain their independence while being a positive actor<br />
in provincial governance within the terms of the Constitution and the Provincial Council Law 12.<br />
3.4 COMPONENTS<br />
To fulfill project objectives, ALGAP developed three major program components: capacity building, civic<br />
education, and facilitation development.<br />
3.4.1 Capacity Building<br />
ALGAP’s capacity building component has encompassed a broad range of “learning and doing” activities.<br />
Six basic workshop modules were developed to respond to the needs of Provincial Council members to<br />
fulfill their responsibilities under the Provincial Council Law, the Provincial Council, and its relationships. The<br />
modules included:<br />
• PC and its Relationships,<br />
• Information Gathering for Planning,<br />
• Basic Administration Skills,<br />
• Meeting Management and Facilitation,<br />
• Action Planning, and<br />
• Introduction to the Budget Process.<br />
Supplemental workshop modules were outlined and<br />
utilized at the initiative of the province-based facilitators<br />
(PBFs) as they responded to needs expressed by the<br />
Provincial Councils, including:<br />
• Security,<br />
• Violence against Women, and<br />
• Media Relations.<br />
Kandahar Provincial Councilor, Haji M.<br />
Qasim, during PC Organization/<br />
Orientation Workshop, 23 November<br />
2005.<br />
11 ALGAP continued to seek ways to work with all 34 provinces. It was, however, not possible to provide assistance to Uruzgan Province due<br />
to security conditions that greatly restricted travel to or from the province.<br />
12 A revision of the 2005 Provincial Council Law has been approved by both houses of the National Assembly and is, as of March 2007,<br />
reportedly ready for signing by the president. This revision gives provincial councils greater formal responsibility and power.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 9<br />
PHOTO COURTESY OF ALGAP PROJECT
Consultation visits by Provincial Council members to districts within their province. An early request from<br />
Provincial Councils was for assistance in visiting the districts within their provinces. A repeated comment from<br />
Provincial Council members was that while they were from the province, most of them had little firsthand<br />
knowledge about it. Indeed, most had not traveled widely within the province even during the election<br />
campaign. ALGAP provided the Councils with technical assistance in planning the visits and in preparing<br />
formats for recording and analyzing the information they would gather.<br />
The first round of ALGAP-supported consultations was undertaken in the period of April-June 2006. These<br />
included only Provincial Council members and were of short duration. The provincial consultations were<br />
modified for a second round in 2007. For these consultations the Provincial Councils could and did invite<br />
provincial administration and other provincial governance actors to participate. ALGAP provided financial<br />
support for all of the participants, within the guidelines it had established.<br />
Basic office equipment and supplies were provided early in the Provincial Council term to enable them to<br />
begin to operate. The Provincial Councils lacked even the most basic equipment and supplies and were not yet<br />
receiving any operating funds. In addition to pens, paper, markers, envelopes and other clerical supplies,<br />
ALGAP provided each Council with a filing cabinet and a choice of three cell phones with $50 pre-paid calling<br />
per phone, or a satellite phone for provinces without cellular network access. The project issued five satellite<br />
phones and 84 cell phones to 33 of the 34 provinces (Uruzgan excepted). Effective communication for the<br />
Councils was an important component of project support.<br />
Conference support: Since their formation, the Councils as well as the central government have solicited<br />
ALGAP for support in organizing, conducting, and financing conferences in order to exchange information<br />
and ideas on problems of common interest and to work together to forge solutions. Specific assistance<br />
provided was as follows:<br />
• Technical and financial assistance for a national conference of Provincial Council members in March 2005,<br />
convened by the president of Afghanistan. ALGAP worked with the Office of Administrative Affairs to<br />
prepare the conference. The project contracted master facilitators for the event and took responsibility for<br />
reproducing conference materials and preparing participant packets. ALGAP contributed financially to the<br />
repair of dormitory facilities for the conference attendees.<br />
• At the request of Provincial Councils, ALGAP provided technical and financial assistance for regional<br />
conferences in which both Provincial Council members and other governance actors participated. These<br />
conferences were planned and conducted in late spring and summer of 2005. The preparation of the<br />
conferences was undertaken by a regional committee that worked with the ALGAP province-based<br />
facilitators.<br />
Provincial exchanges: During the final months of the project, assistance was provided for provincial<br />
exchanges involving Provincial Council members and other provincial governance actors, including local or<br />
tribal elders and mullahs. The Provincial Councils had expressed an interest in these and requested financial<br />
assistance for them.<br />
3.4.2 Civic Education<br />
ALGAP initiated a provincial governance-focused Civic Education Program during the fall of 2006. The<br />
purpose of this program has been to contribute to efforts to foster a social and political environment in which<br />
broad-based participatory governance might grow. As noted above, prior to the election ALGAP carried out<br />
an information and education program designed to create awareness of the Provincial Council Law and the<br />
roles and functions of Provincial Councils.<br />
The ALGAP Civic Education Program following the election has been comprised of four different elements:<br />
10 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
1. Provincial Council roundtable discussions which were organized and broadcast in nearly all provinces.<br />
The purpose of these roundtables was to increase awareness of and familiarity with Provincial Councils<br />
and their roles and functions.<br />
2. A national mobile theater production was<br />
developed and presented to introduce the<br />
concepts of citizen participation and<br />
collaboration with Provincial Councils and<br />
provincial governance actors. A major theme<br />
of the production was that citizen<br />
participation was not only a right, but a<br />
responsibility that could benefit the entire<br />
province and country.<br />
3. A radio and television adaptation of<br />
mobile theater production was made in<br />
both Dari and Pashto. This activity was<br />
undertaken as a direct result of the response<br />
to the mobile theater and to requests that the<br />
production be made available in more<br />
remote areas or in areas where the security<br />
situation made it impossible for the mobile<br />
theater to perform.<br />
4. BBC New Home New Life production.<br />
To reach a larger audience with messages<br />
about provincial governance, ALGAP<br />
contracted with BBC/Afghan Education<br />
Projects (BBC/AEP) to incorporate<br />
provincial governance themes into its<br />
Mobile Theater performance in the provinces.<br />
popular radio drama series “New<br />
Home/New Life”, “People Talk” and “Village Voice” for broadcast throughout Afghanistan from early<br />
May through June 2007. In addition to the radio programs, provincial governance messages are being<br />
depicted in the BBC/AEP monthly cartoon magazine distributed nationally. Depending upon listener and<br />
reader response to the provincial governance themes, BBC/AEP could determine the themes will become<br />
an integral component of the program scripts of the ongoing radio broadcasts and the monthly magazine<br />
productions.<br />
The unifying message in these the civic education activities is that people and organizations can become<br />
involved in provincial decision-making processes. The campaign also introduced the public to means for<br />
becoming involved and to recognize the benefits of such involvement.<br />
3.4.3 Facilitation Development<br />
As ALGAP began to expand its program of assistance to the Provincial Councils, it faced the challenge of<br />
identifying a pool of qualified facilitators and trainers. It rapidly became clear that the project would have to<br />
devote a significant effort to developing its own human resources. The kind of staff ALGAP required simply<br />
was not available.<br />
Thus ALGAP developed a cadre of Afghan facilitators (province-based facilitators or PBFs) located in the<br />
provinces to coordinate or provide technical assistance and to facilitate the development of an active and<br />
inclusive provincial governance process that includes the involvement of the public—individually and through<br />
groups––as well as government officials and staff.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 11<br />
PHOTO COURTESY OF ALGAP PROJECT
With the recruitment of the field and headquarters staff it was necessary to undertake and maintain a program<br />
of skill enhancement to enable staff members to be able to fulfill their responsibilities. In addition, as part of<br />
the facilitation development process, ALGAP organized training of trainers sessions to orient PBFs to new<br />
workshop modules as they were developed. Three international training consultants worked with the<br />
facilitators and ALGAP program associates in designing, reviewing, and revising workshop modules.<br />
12 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
4.0 FINDINGS<br />
As noted earlier in this report, the circumstances in Afghanistan are unusual and fluid. Lessons learned will not<br />
necessarily be applicable to projects in other countries, or even to subsequent projects in Afghanistan. These<br />
lessons are not large building blocks whose weight and shape will contribute greatly to the foundation of other<br />
projects. At best, they will be small stones or even pebbles that the reader may pick up easily and consider for<br />
filling in a possible gap or to contribute to balance or shape in other project structures.<br />
4.1 PROVINCIAL COUNCILS<br />
Prior to, during, and after their election there was much debate and analysis about how the Provincial Councils<br />
could possibly work given their vague mandate and virtually no authority, as well as their lack of resources. The<br />
only specific Provincial Council authority is to elect from their membership one-third of the Meshrano Jirga<br />
(Upper House of National Assembly) 13. All other roles and responsibilities are advisory in nature.<br />
Some experts advocated holding off on electing Councils until a full legal and regulatory framework could be<br />
put in place, and recommended that the government lead a dialogue to clarify in advance the coordinating<br />
mechanisms and roles of the Councils with other subnational governance bodies.<br />
In spite of these expressions of caution, candidates ran, voters voted, and the Councils met. ALGAP provided<br />
support. Some in the government worried that the project was supporting “34 new mouthpieces,” that were<br />
getting involved in local matters and making demands of the government, which had nothing to offer them.<br />
This Lesson Learned Review indicates that those fears have been largely unfounded; many Provincial Councils<br />
are developing the necessary capacities––skills and knowledge––to work with other provincial governance<br />
entities to fulfill their duties and exercise their authorities, although the degree varies depending on the<br />
province.<br />
Taken together, the findings documented here suggest some strong lessons about the positive influence of the<br />
Provincial Councils in particular and recommendations for continued support for the development of<br />
subnational governance in general in Afghanistan.<br />
During the course of this Lessons Learned Review the author has found substantial evidence to show that the<br />
Councils are succeeding in defining a true and meaningful role for themselves in responding to provincial<br />
needs. The sections that follow detail four specific areas in which Provincial Councils are making a tangible<br />
contribution to provincial governance.<br />
4.1.1 Resolve Disputes<br />
This critical service of the Provincial Councils corresponds directly to Article 4 of the Provincial Council Law,<br />
items 3 and 5. Anecdotes and reports of this highly successful role abound among ALGAP project staff as well<br />
as Council members from Nimroz to Takhar. In chilling details, we hear reports corroborated by Councils<br />
themselves of protracted disputes between individuals, families, districts, even provinces. In all cases heard so<br />
13 In this first election, the provincial councils elected two-thirds of the members of the Meshrano Jirga since the district councils have not<br />
been elected and thus could not select one-third.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 13
far, Councils succeed even where such disputes span decades and have defied efforts by the government and<br />
traditional structures to resolve them.<br />
In one instance, a government ministry intended to sell off pasture land over which families in the area held<br />
customary rights to graze livestock. The conflict led to serious threats of violence. The families feeling<br />
threatened with loss of important pasture land called on the Council to make their case with the Ministry<br />
involved. The Ministry dropped its plan.<br />
In another instance, three local commanders were in conflict and came to the Council to help resolve their<br />
dispute, notably because they do not consider the Provincial Council to be “government.” Indeed, we hear a number of<br />
reports of constituents coming to the Council with conflicts precisely because they felt that the Council, being<br />
elected, would be fair and impartial, whereas they feared “government” representatives would not.<br />
ALGAP staff reported the case of a recent and tragic incident in Jalalabad 14 that risked provoking a major<br />
violent uprising. However, the Provincial Council spoke to the community involved and persuaded them not<br />
to respond with violence. While this report is uncorroborated, it is notable that indeed there was no violent<br />
uprising. Also, this kind of Council role is consistent with many other reports; they are seen as a true “bridge”<br />
between the people and the government, an authority whose allegiance is to their constituents, a neutral body<br />
which has the de facto if not de jure power to facilitate and mediate conflicts and to represent their constituents’<br />
interests to the government. In some cases, the Provincial Councils and their members serve as surrogates for<br />
the traditional bodies and elders.<br />
Tribal disputes also are being brought before Councils. One Council even reported incidents of murder being<br />
brought before them for action, suggesting that the Councils are filling a quasi-judicial void. The processes that<br />
Councils use to resolve disputes seem to be 15 traditional ones that draw on respected local elders, mullahs,<br />
ulemas 16, and others to participate in jirgas or shuras or other meetings during which the matters are aired until a<br />
consensus resolution is reached. Specialists in rule of law might argue that this is an extra-legal mechanism that<br />
erodes important development objectives. However, given the absence of a functioning judicial system in many<br />
parts of Afghanistan, the volatility of the country, and the long tradition of local resolution of disputes through<br />
consensus, it would appear that this role is not only valid but critical at this time.<br />
4.1.2 Act as an Oversight Body<br />
Council members express a commitment to and responsibility for monitoring the activities within their<br />
Provinces to protect the interests of the people. This corresponds directly to their legally-defined duties under<br />
Article 4 of the Provincial Council Law. They interpret this to mean they have responsibility to confirm that<br />
the many donor- and government-funded projects active in their area are proceeding as intended. While they<br />
have no authority to act in those instances where they may find cause for complaint, they have a clear role as a<br />
“bridge” between the people and the government.<br />
The oversight function is being linked to the Councils’ communication roles. Some of the Councils are already<br />
taking the initiative to publish newsletters. While these newsletters are few and are targeted toward limited,<br />
often governmental audiences, they are airing problems and issues that need attention. Further, the Councils<br />
have strong links to the Meshrano Jirga and, both formally and informally, are relating problems to them for<br />
possible support or resolution. Many Councils also have good relations with the governor and line ministry<br />
14 In early March 2007 an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldier fired on and killed a number of civilians along the Jalalabad<br />
road.<br />
15 This Lessons Learned Review does not pretend to be a systematic research into this question. See Section 1.0 on lessons learned<br />
methodology.<br />
16 Religious scholars.<br />
14 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
epresentatives to whom they can report their findings. There has been a small, but significant number of<br />
Councils requesting technical assistance from ALGAP to work more effectively with mass media to inform<br />
their constituents and to support additional newsletters or other means of disseminating information.<br />
In addition, any private citizen who may have cause for complaint about a project can bring it to the Council’s<br />
attention because he does not consider the Council to be government. In one dispute that somewhat indirectly illustrates<br />
this lesson learned, a donor-funded food-for-work program came under criticism by local participants who<br />
complained that the amount of food was insufficient for the work involved. The Council explained that the<br />
road they were constructing is the balance of the benefit they receive in addition to the food, and taken<br />
together they are receiving fair compensation for their efforts. The project proceeded. The Council, at least in<br />
this case, not only acted to verify the legitimacy of an activity, but defended it from unwarranted resistance and<br />
criticism. There is no other entity that seems to bridge so nicely between “government” and the people.<br />
4.1.3 Are the Voice of the People<br />
One governor explained that Afghanistan’s enemies have powerful propaganda machines that criticize the<br />
government and its allies. As Councils mediate disputes and monitor reconstruction or other activities in their<br />
provinces, they are in a good position to explain to their constituents the facts. They have the trust and<br />
creditability to do so, whereas “government” actors would not.<br />
As noted above, ALGAP’s workshops are including such topics as how to communicate with the public and<br />
how to work with the media. The Councils already have demonstrated the ability to convene meetings based<br />
on more traditional concepts, during which they can listen to and talk to their constituents. Councils convened<br />
gatherings that exceeded 500 people during their consultation tours. These are important opportunities for<br />
informing the general population of progress, as well for allowing them to air concerns and grievances.<br />
4.1.4 Add Local Leadership for Addressing National Issues<br />
During early spring 2007, a few Councils were taking initiatives to assist the fight against poppy production and<br />
to increase security for their provinces. ALGAP is providing, with USAID concurrence, technical and limited<br />
financial support for additional provincial consultations that will focus specifically on poppy production. In<br />
addition, several Councils are seeking assistance in organizing and conducting information-sharing and<br />
awareness-raising seminars or workshops, and in developing their ability to monitor and report the actions of<br />
government with respect to security and poppy production.<br />
4.2 CAPACITY-BUILDING ACTIVITIES<br />
ALGAP has used four main activities through which the Councils could build their capacity to fulfill their roles<br />
and responsibilities: workshops, provincial consultation tours, conferences, and provincial exchanges. All four<br />
types of activity are reported to have been highly effective and valued by the Councils; the consultation tours<br />
seem to be a clear favorite.<br />
The perceived value of the consultations appears to stem from the direct and personal way it introduced the<br />
Councils to their constituents. In addition, the consultations fostered lines of communication and cooperation<br />
between the Council and other subnational governance actors.<br />
Within each of these groups of activities, we identify specific lessons learned. However, for all lessons learned, we feel<br />
compelled (the chief of party [COP] and the author) to emphasize one that specifically relates to building capacity, cutting across all<br />
groups of activities:<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 15
Building capacity in Afghanistan is a long-term endeavor. ALGAP seemed to be in the right place at the<br />
right time to provide specific capacity-building activities that met real needs in a meaningful way. However,<br />
ongoing interactions with the Council and other subnational governance actors indicate unequivocally that any<br />
successes these activities realize, barely scratch the surface of the problem. Helping Councils to master the<br />
most basic skills in analyzing, planning, organizing, coordinating, following through, and a host of others that<br />
we may take for granted, will require continued attention, support, and exercise.<br />
It is hard to fully appreciate the challenges the Provincial Council members face as individuals as well as teams.<br />
Much of the Afghan society is illiterate, as are many Council members. Even those who have university<br />
educations often lack practical experience working within any sort of business or organization. Keeping<br />
records of their decisions, drafting a letter from the Council, filing correspondence in a way that makes it easy<br />
to retrieve, and responding formally to inquiries and requests for help, are all examples of activities for which<br />
Councils must develop procedures and abilities without any precedent or foundation.<br />
4.2.1 Lessons from Workshops<br />
Provide participants with hands-on training. Workshops began in November 2005 with a basic orientation,<br />
and then evolved to address other topics of immediate relevance. The initial workshop was an orientation to the<br />
law regarding the Provincial Council and its roles and responsibilities as described by the law. ALGAP<br />
developed and conducted the workshop with little direct substantive comment from Provincial Council<br />
members who had just been elected. Subsequent workshops, however, were developed with input from the<br />
province-based facilitators (PBFs) based on direct observations of the Councils. ALGAP staff also met with<br />
small groups of PBFs and Council members to discuss specific modules as these were being developed.<br />
Participation and interest remained high. Admittedly, ALGAP technical staff remained actively engaged to help<br />
identify possible topics of relevance, as participants were in a position of “not knowing what they didn’t<br />
know.”<br />
As time passed, provincial councilors and other workshop participants accepted increasing responsibility for<br />
identifying workshop topics. Some special focus topics included security, anti-corruption, violence against<br />
women, eliminating poppy production, and writing concept papers and proposals. Council members also<br />
identified English language and computer literacy as important topics for building their capacities.<br />
Participatory format works? ARD has developed and used Advanced Participatory Methods (APM)<br />
worldwide in many circumstances and finds it to be a universally effective workshop approach. Some<br />
questioned whether APM would be acceptable in a culture characterized by a conservative perspective or<br />
unaccustomed to a more informal and interactive style of group work. Indeed, these techniques are radically<br />
new in most Afghan contexts but proved popular according to ALGAP’s Afghan staff, as measured by the<br />
feedback as well as the commitment of some, if not all, workshop participants. In balance, it takes a long time<br />
and constant reinforcement, coaching, and mentoring before facilitators can use these methods effectively.<br />
Results with APM are generally better when two or three facilitators can work in a team. Because these<br />
conditions (time, mentoring, facilitator teams) were not always available, it is difficult to determine how well<br />
PBFs were able to fully master and deploy APM techniques in their work with the Provincial Councils.<br />
Multiple-day events are feasible and effective. As workshops were developed and scheduled, an emphasis<br />
was given to one-day events. In part this was due to travel and security concerns as well as an attempt to<br />
recognize constraints on women traveling in some provinces. However, the tendency toward one-day<br />
workshops stemmed in part from comments from Provincial Council members that long-term workshops<br />
created a hardship for them since they had other work to do. Further, their schedules were frequently<br />
interrupted by calls from the government for meetings in Kabul. Over time it became clear that slightly longer<br />
workshops were likely to have greater learning impact. It is also possible that one-day workshops could be<br />
conducted at more frequent intervals.<br />
16 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
4.2.2 Consultation Tours, Possibly the Most Important Activity<br />
Rural Afghanistan often lacks electricity, radio, and telephone, and its population is at least partly illiterate. For<br />
the Councils to serve as a bridge from the people to the government, face-to-face contact is important. Indeed,<br />
this one activity seems almost universally to be the top priority for Councils, and support for their continuation<br />
is emphasized. ALGAP’s support for consultation tours emphasized technical assistance in planning them.<br />
Financial support to cover travel-related expenses is also necessary, in the absence of any operating budget<br />
from the government.<br />
From the first tours, the Provincial Council members and provincial governance participants ascertained that<br />
the information gathered during the trips needed to be shared with authorities responsible for provincial<br />
planning. Reports from the consultation tours indicate that in many instances, councilors did in fact transmit<br />
requests or needs from districts or villages visited to the appropriate line ministry offices within the province<br />
for action. In some isolated cases the Provincial Council members also reported that they followed up the<br />
requests to the ministerial level in Kabul. Thus the consultations had some real benefit for the people and for<br />
the government.<br />
Reports from the field indicate that a major value of the consultations was that they brought attention to<br />
remote areas that few, if any, government or other officials had previously visited. This was a recurring<br />
comment reported by participants in the consultations.<br />
4.2.3 Conferences and Provincial Exchanges; Sometimes “Conferring” is Enough<br />
With ALGAP’s support, the Provincial Councils met both regionally and nationally. Afghanistan’s provinces<br />
have widely varying subcultures, norms, and language differences. Dari and Pashto are the dominant languages,<br />
and also define two populations that compete for attention and authority.<br />
These initial conferences may have helped to bridge some of these barriers and to establish solidarity and sense<br />
of common purpose among the Provincial Councils. The objectives and agendas for the conferences were not<br />
always action-oriented. However, all the participants felt these conferences were extremely important and they<br />
took an active part in them.<br />
Provincial Councils continue to request support for such conferences, and ALGAP has increasingly pressed<br />
for more specific conference objectives and action-oriented agendas. ALGAP is encouraging the Councils to<br />
apply techniques learned from the popular Meeting Management and the Action Planning workshops as they<br />
organize and conduct provincial and regional meetings.<br />
Nevertheless, we must recognize that to some degree, in this culture and environment, just meeting provides<br />
significant benefits to Councils in establishing lines of communication, mutual respect, and trust. What is<br />
agreed upon may be less important than establishing the process of communication.<br />
4.3 CIVIC EDUCATION ACTIVITIES<br />
The ALGAP civic education campaign used a variety of activities that had already proven successful in<br />
Afghanistan. Reputable research institutions had used roundtable discussions and focus groups to illuminate<br />
public opinion. The Election Commission had used mobile theater productions to promote the elections as<br />
well as to inform the population. Radio and TV remain among the most cost-effective means for reaching<br />
broad segments of the population, although remote areas may not have access to them. Print media still has a<br />
place, even among a significantly illiterate population.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 17
4.3.1 Roundtables: Radio and TV Require Special Formats<br />
ALGAP contracted with an Afghan NGO, the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS), to conduct<br />
and record roundtable discussions in the provinces and then edit them for 30-minute radio broadcasts. While<br />
FCCS had extensive experience conducting roundtable discussions, it had limited experience conducting them<br />
specifically for broadcast over radio and TV. Several difficulties were encountered. Facilities in the provinces<br />
where the events were held were rudimentary. In some instances, local roundtable hosts lacked adequate<br />
experience in this type of forum. Participants in the events also lacked experience in the roundtable format as<br />
well as with radio and TV broadcast events. While ultimately these roundtable events were deemed highly<br />
successful given the circumstances, better preparation of facilities, hosts, and participants is needed to improve<br />
their effectiveness.<br />
4.3.2 Lessons from the Successful Mobile Theater<br />
In general, the mobile theater performances conducted by ALGAP through a subcontract with Sayara Media<br />
and Communication were extremely successful, attracting large audiences of all ages throughout the country. In<br />
addition, these performances brought an important entertainment value to otherwise dry and possibly<br />
threatening subjects. Many performances attracted over 500 people, and in some cases the audiences topped<br />
1,000. The lessons learned, while worth remembering, represent relatively minor glitches.<br />
Weather matters. Due to various circumstances, the mobile theater campaign was carried out in winter.<br />
Where performances were done outside (as they often were), audiences and performers endured cold weather.<br />
Winter also compromised travel schedules and made it hard, in some instances, to respect performance dates<br />
and times that had been announced in advance.<br />
Pay attention to local cultural sensitivities. Humor here––as almost anywhere––is an important element of<br />
a live theater production. In general, this worked very well. There were a few instances, however, in which the<br />
performers could not fully appreciate local cultural sensitivities, and the humor fell flat or even offended the<br />
audience.<br />
Give away the story. ALGAP developed a colorfully-illustrated printed version of the story for distribution at<br />
every performance. The illustrations, format, and design appealed to literate and illiterate members of the<br />
audience. This helped spread the story and its accompanying message about the role of the Provincial Council<br />
throughout the country, reinforcing it with those who attended a performance, as well as extending it to those<br />
who did not. While not supported by any formal survey, it appears that the reference to the Provincial Councils<br />
as being a “bridge” between the government and the people has become a widely-shared concept and is likely<br />
to have been enhanced by the extensive mobile theater performances and the broad distribution of the<br />
booklet.<br />
4.3.3 Lessons Regarding Mass Media<br />
Where available, radio and TV are effective. Afghans listen to the radio. This is the most widely used and<br />
available mass medium. Where available, TV is popular as well. However, there remain significant populations<br />
that either cannot or do not use either medium. TV and even radio broadcasts do not reach many remote<br />
villages, especially in mountainous areas.<br />
Don’t assume printed materials won’t work in an illiterate context. Afghanistan has a strong history of<br />
literature that has resulted in a profound respect by Afghans for the written word. In communities where<br />
many are illiterate, a common pastime is to have someone read to groups of people. Even if they are illiterate,<br />
Afghans will generally respect and safeguard written material and will find someone to read it to them. In<br />
18 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
addition, where written material is scarce, such as in remote areas, any written material available is read by<br />
many, both by the fully literate as well as those looking for practice.<br />
4.4 PROJECT MANAGEMENT<br />
All projects in Afghanistan face similar difficult circumstances, including security risks, lack of infrastructure, a<br />
limited pool of skilled local human resources, language, and cultural barriers. ALGAP’s nationwide scope and<br />
focus on subnational governance presented particular challenges contributing to the lessons learned detailed<br />
below.<br />
4.4.1 Fly Without a Pilot<br />
ALGAP initially considered prioritizing provinces, testing methodologies, and phasing in technical assistance<br />
activities. Given the breadth and urgency of Afghanistan’s needs, however, and the volume of requests<br />
received from all the provinces, provincial reconstruction teams, and others for the assistance, a “pilot”<br />
approach was deemed unworkable. ALGAP thus committed to supporting all Provincial Councils equally, to<br />
the limit that security restrictions allowed. Indeed, ALGAP initiated work with the provinces as it was still<br />
developing its own staff and program.<br />
In fact, the nationwide approach worked very well. No Council felt slighted and all received equal attention, if<br />
not treatment (within the constraints of security issues). ALGAP’s nationwide presence gave it credibility with<br />
the Councils and often with the governors.<br />
While some implementing partners advocate “pilot testing” future approaches to supporting Provincial<br />
Councils, it should be noted that the selection of a limited number of Provincial Councils for exclusive support<br />
can have unintended, negative effects. It can lead to elitism among Councils, creating conditions that erode any<br />
sense of nationwide pride, integrity, and identity among all Provincial Councils. Pilot approaches can also result<br />
in protracted, if not interminable, debates about what works and what doesn’t work, at the expense of moving<br />
forward with desperately-needed support to all Councils.<br />
4.4.2 Recruit Locally<br />
The project made a conscious and intentional decision to recruit and deploy province-based facilitators to<br />
provide direct technical assistance to the Provincial Councils. In most instances the PBFs were from the<br />
province in which they were assigned. This was a condition of employment, unless it was not possible to find<br />
an adequately prepared person from a specific province.<br />
This approach generally worked well for a number of reasons. First of all, given the security context in the<br />
country, travel from Kabul to the provinces was difficult, and using individuals based in the provinces limited<br />
the effect of those restrictions to a degree. More importantly, the PBFs generally were already known to and<br />
respected by the Council members. This made it easy for the PBFs to establish working relationships with<br />
them.<br />
Admittedly, the pool of PBF candidates did not include many persons with the training and experience<br />
necessary for the position. ALGAP had to invest heavily in building staff capacity by providing formal training,<br />
on-the-job training, and mentoring. Even so, at initial hiring, PBFs were often barely a step ahead of those to<br />
whom they were expected to provide technical assistance.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 19
4.4.3 Avoid Field-based Project Offices<br />
PBFs initially worked part-time, and then later were converted to full-time employment. Their work required<br />
them to interact directly and personally with the Councils. For a number of reasons, including prohibitive<br />
costs, ALGAP opted not to establish field project offices for them. For one thing, such offices would have<br />
highlighted the plight of the Councils who, in many cases, had no offices themselves. It would also have<br />
provided an almost irresistible temptation to PBFs to “show up for work” at the project office rather than<br />
reach out directly to the Councils. Even regional offices were deemed to be unacceptable since they would<br />
detract from the intensive provincial attention that ALGAP was promoting.<br />
On balance, though, this approach was not without its downside. ALGAP’s Kabul-based project personnel<br />
found it difficult to supervise the PBFs. Communications with them were difficult (Internet and e-mail often<br />
were not available or reliable). It was hard to know just where PBFs were spending their time and much had to<br />
be assumed on faith. To plan and document their activities, PBFs had to make do without basic administrative<br />
resources (e.g., computers, printers, e-mail) that we generally take for granted.<br />
4.4.4 Proceed with or without a National Government Counterpart<br />
Though ALGAP was an active participant and contributor to a working group on provincial governance, and<br />
informed the government regularly of its activities, it had no officially-mandated national government partner<br />
with which to work effectively. The Ministry of Interior’s interest, authority, and responsibilities for Provincial<br />
Councils were vague, conflicting, and dysfunctional. As such, ALGAP could not look to them as a sounding<br />
board for its activities, nor to build capacity for sustainable ongoing support. At one point, the newly-formed<br />
Ministry of State for Parliamentary Affairs asserted that it had responsibility for the Provincial Councils. Only<br />
recently, as ALGAP entered its final months of activity, the Office of Administrative Affairs was given formal<br />
responsibility for supporting the Provincial Councils. If there is a lesson learned here, it is that desperate times<br />
required desperate measures and ALGAP’s activities worked well, even without a government partner.<br />
Looking more towards the future, the COP and this author both speculate that the independence of the<br />
Provincial Councils may be at risk if they end up reporting directly to a national government body. This is a<br />
point for USAID and other donors to consider in developing future support activities for the Provincial<br />
Councils. Future assistance might be directed toward some sort of association of Provincial Councils should a<br />
credible one be established at the Councils’ own initiative.<br />
4.4.5 Build Capacity at District Levels<br />
While they don’t yet have elected councils, districts nevertheless have some–– although generally very limited–<br />
–governance structures and desperate needs for capacity building. ALGAP’s mandate and resources did not<br />
fully reach to that level. It had to decline many requests for assistance that came from the districts.<br />
Nevertheless, ALGAP’s workshops in particular, attracted a great deal of interest and attention from districtlevel<br />
governance actors, both formal and informal, and they were included wherever possible.<br />
Future support for subnational governance in Afghanistan should expand to include District Councils.<br />
ALGAP’s experience with support to the Provincial Councils suggests strongly that candidates and voters<br />
benefit from orientation to the roles and duties of Councils. 17 When elected, the Councils will need technical<br />
assistance to acquire the capacity to fulfill their roles and perform their duties. When elections finally take place<br />
17 An likely immediate need is an orientation and action planning workshop to fully take into account the new responsibilities and<br />
opportunities presented by the revised Provincial Council Law. This could also be an outstanding opportunity to reinforce practices and<br />
skills developed during the first year-and-a-half and to further develop understanding and cooperative working relations with provincial<br />
governance actors.<br />
20 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
at the district level, the Councils will require training and technical assistance similar to what ALGAP provided<br />
to the Provincial Councils.<br />
Civic education at the district level can help prepare the voters and candidates for a District Council in<br />
advance of the elections.<br />
4.4.6 Extend Support to Provincial Government Actors<br />
The second round of highly popular consultation tours that ALGAP supported, specifically encouraged the<br />
participation of provincial government actors (the governor and representatives of line ministries) in order to<br />
foster good relations and a modus operandi with the Provincial Councils. Participation of these other actors in the<br />
workshops and conferences helped build capacity overall, while fostering healthy working relationships.<br />
4.4.7 Anticipate Need to Build Capacity Everywhere<br />
However obvious this may seem, it nevertheless needs to be emphasized. Conditions for implementing<br />
development projects in Afghanistan remain extremely challenging. Experienced, educated, and skilled human<br />
resources are scarce and in great demand. Building this base will take many years. In addition to the need to<br />
train staff almost from scratch, local subcontractors in Afghanistan also generally lack experience working in<br />
any sort of business environment and have great difficulty complying with US government acquisition<br />
regulations, negotiating reasonable contracts, and fulfilling contract terms.<br />
4.5 GENDER<br />
Gender refers to social and cultural roles assigned to males and females. While the focus is often on the roles<br />
assigned to women, gender considerations apply to men as well. Gender is a cross-cutting consideration, for<br />
project management as well as for project activity planning and implementation.<br />
Development projects everywhere, whether intentionally or unintentionally, take either an active or a passive<br />
approach to gender issues. An active approach will appraise and assess gender roles with regard to achieving<br />
project objectives and, with thoughtful and proactive intention, design project activities to either preserve local<br />
gender roles or to influence them in a definite manner. A passive approach will focus on project objectives<br />
without specific regard to gender roles, accommodating local customs as necessary, and monitoring what, if<br />
any, impact the project activities may have on them.<br />
ALGAP’s project objectives did not include any specific gender-related aspects, and so the project took a<br />
largely passive approach. This is not to say it was insensitive to gender issues, especially with regard to women<br />
in Afghanistan. It would be hard to ignore the very high profile given to certain customs. The review of<br />
ALGAP’s activities suggest that the project with its focus on participation, communication, and public service,<br />
contributed to a trend of change in roles and customs related to both genders, while accommodating the<br />
preservation of other customs.<br />
4.5.1 Budget and Plan for Maharam<br />
Maharam refers to a blood relative, usually a male member of a family, who may accompany female members<br />
on activities away from home. Local custom, village mores, and an individual family’s choice may require that a<br />
female have a maharam relative accompany her for certain or all activities outside the home. Obviously, this<br />
would include overnight travel, but could also include daytime travel or occasions in which a woman is<br />
required to be in the company of other men, or even just to be in public. The circumstances requiring maharam<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 21
is variable depending on the location in the country. Urban areas are not as strict as rural areas, with Kabul<br />
possibly being the most lenient.<br />
Projects in Afghanistan need to budget and plan for maharam both for female project staff and beneficiaries.<br />
ALGAP budgeted for maharam to accompany female participants on consultation tours, as well as female<br />
project staff who needed to travel. ALGAP’s personnel policy did not specifically address this provision, and it<br />
proved difficult at times to know where to draw a line between accommodating maharam-related customs and<br />
being exploited by them. A family may require that a maharam relative accompany a female member on her<br />
travels, for example, but balk at the expense when the relative must then take time off from his job to do so. In<br />
this case, the family may ask that the project compensate the relative for his time as well as cover his travel<br />
expenses (a request ALGAP did not feel it could accommodate). Projects must also make careful decisions<br />
such that the accommodation of maharam customs does not unintentionally promote or preserve the custom<br />
against the wishes of a female staff member or activity participant.<br />
4.5.2 Provide Gender Training for Project Staff and Activity Participants<br />
Whether the project takes a passive or an active approach to gender in its staffing and activities, sensitivity to<br />
the topic is important in the context of the tensions and transitions in Afghanistan today. By law, women play<br />
a role on Provincial Councils.<br />
In one case, a female Council member explained to the author that several of her fellow Council members<br />
were former commanders who in the past enforced strict prohibitions against public activities of women. She<br />
confessed to having been afraid of these individuals when she was forced to face them in person on the<br />
Council. Much to her surprise and to her satisfaction, however, as well as the expressed satisfaction of these<br />
former commanders, she has lost her fear of them and they have come to appreciate and recognize the<br />
importance of women serving on the Council.<br />
In another case, several female Council members when attending the first ALGAP workshop asked the<br />
facilitator if they were supposed to actually sit in the same room with the men (contrary to local custom). The<br />
ALGAP facilitator replied that to serve on the Council it did seem as if this would be both required and<br />
acceptable. Both the men and the women on the Council chose for themselves to accept the change in custom.<br />
Afghanistan’s own laws, including the Provincial Council Law, are taking active approaches to changing<br />
specific gender-related customs, including eliminating forced marriages and the exchange of females for<br />
settlement of disputes. Provincial Councils and government actors are requesting workshops specifically on<br />
how to reduce violence against women and children in their communities.<br />
22 <strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND<br />
RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
Provincial Councils appear to be here to stay. While their roles and responsibilities and the mechanisms by<br />
which they will work are still fluid and uncertain, they are––to one degree or another––functioning, and they<br />
are becoming increasingly well-known among the general population. District and Village Councils are on<br />
their way, having a constitutional mandate. These three entities, along with Municipal Councils, will constitute<br />
subnational representative governance forces that will be an important balance to the strong central<br />
government.<br />
Provincial Councils are already playing a critical role in a number of areas, aside from the important function of<br />
electing two-thirds of the Meshrano Jirga (when elected, District Councils will select one-third and Provincial<br />
Councils will select one-third). This role includes conflict and dispute mediation and oversight of provincial<br />
government activities.<br />
Through a variety of training and technical assistance activities and a civic education campaign, USAID––<br />
through the ALGAP project––has promoted the legitimate role of the Provincial Councils and helped to build<br />
initial capacity by which they can fulfill it.<br />
Subnational governance in Afghanistan is in transition, incorporating traditional mechanisms with more formal<br />
government mechanisms. It is a chaotic and “messy” time. To a large extent, the government and the<br />
international community cannot control it, nor predict how it will develop. The Afghans are demonstrating<br />
both the willingness and ability to sort it out, in their own way and in their own time. To succeed, however,<br />
their fragile new institutions will need long-term commitments from international partners to provide carefullydesigned,<br />
negotiated, and coordinated assistance––both technical and material––tailored to their evolving<br />
needs and capabilities.<br />
Recommendation: Based on the encouraging results already obtained by ALGAP in an extremely short time<br />
period, this report recommends that USAID capitalize on the important investment it has already made in<br />
subnational governance, by pursuing its support of Provincial Councils, while advocating that they remain<br />
independent of central government control. In this way, the Councils will also remain voices of their<br />
constituents, as well as peaceful recourses for settling conflicts and disputes. The establishment of capable and<br />
functional Provincial Councils would provide a strong model and anchor for the eventual establishment of<br />
representative governance at other levels as well.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 23
APPENDICES<br />
APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES<br />
APPENDIX C: PROVINCIAL COUNCIL LAW ARTICLE 4
APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
From the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU http://www.areu.org.af)<br />
• “A Guide to Government in Afghanistan,” Evans, Anne et al. 2004.<br />
• “Caught in Confusion: Local Governance Structures in Afghanistan,” Lister, Sarah. March 2005.<br />
• “Provincial Governance Structures in Afghanistan: From Confusion to Vision?” Lister, Sarah and<br />
Nixon, Hamish. May 2006.<br />
From Counterpart International’s USAID-funded Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society (I-PACS<br />
http://www.counterpart.org)<br />
• “Afghanistan Civil Society Assessment,” Ayrapetyants, Anika, Assessment Team Leader. May 2005.<br />
• “How Afghans View Civil Society: Roundtable Discussion Report,” Fidai, M. Halim. February 2006.<br />
“Formative Research for Civic Education Programs on Elections: Focus Group Discussions in the North,<br />
West, Southeast, and South of Afghanistan” from Altai Consulting and The Asia Foundation with funding<br />
support from USAID. August 2005. http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/AltaiTAFfinalreport.pdf.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW A-1
APPENDIX B: LIST OF<br />
INTERVIEWEES<br />
• Dawlat Rafiee, Deputy Governor, Baghlan Province<br />
• Mahboobulah Mahboob, Director of Ministry of Economy Office, Baghlan<br />
• Baghlan Provincial Council:<br />
o Molawi Naqibulah Sajad, President<br />
o Noorya Hamidi, Deputy President<br />
o Shokrulah Ashrafyan, Member<br />
o Shokria Asil, Member<br />
o Habiburahman Jahed, Member<br />
• Kunduz Provincial Council:<br />
o Mawlawi Abdulah, President<br />
o Haji Abdulah, Member<br />
o Mohamad Jamal, Member<br />
• Samangan Provincial Council<br />
o Haji Sarajudin, President<br />
o Sohaila Rahimi, Deputy President<br />
o Haji Abdulah, Member<br />
o Mulah Sheer Mohd, Member<br />
o Almaskhan, Member<br />
• Allan Freedman, Country Director, National Democratic Institute (NDI)<br />
• Mohd Haroon Nasrat, Kunduz General Manager, NDI<br />
• Jon L. Summers, PhD, Country Representative, The Asia Foundation<br />
• Fazel Rabi Haqbeen, Senior Program Officer, The Asia Foundation<br />
• Afzal Qayoumi, Civil Engineer; Chief of Party, International City Managers’ Association<br />
• Tilly Reed, Chief of Party, Counterpart International<br />
• Barbara Burroughs, Chief of Party, ARD, Inc.<br />
• Kim Kim Yee, USAID Field Program Officer, Mazar-e-Sharif, Provincial Reconstruction Team.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW B-1
APPENDIX C: PROVINCIAL<br />
COUNCIL LAW ARTICLE 4<br />
Provincial Council Law Article 4––Principle Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority<br />
of Provincial Councils<br />
1. Participate in determining the development objectives of government such as economic, social,<br />
health, education, reconstruction, and contribute to improve other affairs of the related province.<br />
2. Provide consultation on effective usage of revenues of the province.<br />
3. Participate in settlement of ethnic and local disputes through holding of correctional assemblies.<br />
4. Provide consultation to design the development plan of province and anticipated plan before<br />
proposing to government.<br />
5. Participate actively and in possible ways in elimination of the customs and traditions contrary to<br />
the law and Islamic Sharia such as forced marriages, exchange of females for settlement of<br />
disputes, and efforts to ensure Human Rights.<br />
6. Visit the areas lacking freedom by taking permission of related authorities, analyze and evaluate<br />
the actions of law enforcement bodies, and provide related report to provincial administration.<br />
7. Participate actively and effectively to ban the poppy cultivation, drug and narcotic production<br />
and addiction to them by providing awareness regarding the danger of using the substances, and<br />
attracting the cooperation of people and institutions involved in campaign against drugs.<br />
8. Acquire information on the proceedings and work plan of the provincial administration and<br />
related branches.<br />
9. Appraise the development plan and annual expenditure process of provincial administration, and<br />
provide report to the respective inhabitants of province through media.<br />
10. Consult the inhabitants of province in general consultative meetings at least once every three<br />
months, and the governor and related department authorities at least once a month.<br />
<strong>AFGHANISTAN</strong> LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE PROJECT (ALGAP)––LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW C-1
U.S. Agency for International Development<br />
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW<br />
Washington, DC 20523<br />
Tel: (202) 712-0000<br />
Fax: (202) 216-3524<br />
www.usaid.gov