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DTI ECONOMICS PAPER NO.14<br />
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>:<br />
<strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
SEPTEMBER 2005
The DTI drives our ambition of<br />
‘prosperity <strong>for</strong> all’ by working to create<br />
the best environment <strong>for</strong> business<br />
success in the UK. We help people<br />
and companies become more productive<br />
by promoting enterprise, innovation<br />
and creativity.<br />
We champion UK business at home and<br />
abroad. We invest heavily in world-class<br />
science and technology. We protect the<br />
rights of working people and consumers.<br />
And we stand up <strong>for</strong> fair and open<br />
markets in the UK, Europe and the world.
DTI ECONOMICS PAPER NO.14<br />
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong><br />
<strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Robert Hahn<br />
Justin Coombs<br />
Ciara Kalmus<br />
Carlos Razo<br />
Katherine Curry<br />
LECG<br />
SEPTEMBER 2005
DTI Economics Papers<br />
The reviews of the DTI in Autumn 2001 placed analysis at the heart of policymaking.<br />
As part of this process the <strong>Department</strong> has decided to make its analysis<br />
and evidence base more publicly available through the publication of a series of<br />
DTI Economics Papers that will set out the thinking underpinning policy<br />
development. Previous titles include:<br />
1 Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects, Professor Barry Nalebuff (Yale<br />
University), February 2003<br />
2 A Comparative Study of the British and Italian Clothing and Textile<br />
Industries, Nicholas Owen (DTI), Alan Canon Jones (London College of<br />
Fashion), April 2003<br />
3 UK Competitiveness: Moving to the next stage, Professor Michael Porter and<br />
Christian H M Ketels (Institute of Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard<br />
Business School), May 2003<br />
4 Options <strong>for</strong> a Low Carbon Future, June 2003<br />
5 DTI Strategy – The Analysis, November 2003<br />
6 UK Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators 2003, November 2003<br />
7 Competing in the Global Economy – The Innovation Challenge,<br />
November 2003<br />
8 Raising UK Productivity – Developing the Evidence Base <strong>for</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>,<br />
March 2004<br />
9 The Benefits from Competition – some Illustrative UK Cases, Professor<br />
Stephen Davies, Heather Coles, Matthew Olczak, Christopher Pike and<br />
Christopher Wilson (Centre <strong>for</strong> Competition <strong>Policy</strong>, University of East Anglia),<br />
July 2004<br />
10 Liberalisation and Globalisation: Maximising the Benefits of International<br />
Trade and Investment, July 2004<br />
11 R&D Intensive Businesses in the UK, March 2005<br />
12 The Empirical Economics of Standards, May 2005<br />
13 Corporate Governance, Human Resource Management and Firm<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance, August 2005<br />
The views expressed within DTI Economics Papers are those of the authors and<br />
should not be treated as Government policy. We welcome feedback on the<br />
issues raised by the DTI Economics Papers, and comments should be sent to<br />
dti.economics@dti.gsi.gov.uk<br />
ii
Contents<br />
Acknowledgements vi<br />
Foreword 1<br />
PART I INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 3<br />
Section 1<br />
Introduction and summary 4<br />
Introduction 4<br />
How we carried out this study 4<br />
Key lessons 5<br />
Case studies 6<br />
Structure of the report 12<br />
PART II LESSONS AND GUIDANCE FOR POLICY MAKERS 13<br />
Section 2<br />
<strong>Using</strong> market mechanisms 14<br />
Continuing role <strong>for</strong> the public sector<br />
<strong>Market</strong>-based mechanisms produce benefits compared to<br />
14<br />
traditional policy designs 18<br />
<strong>Market</strong>-based mechanisms require creative thinking 19<br />
Importance of design and implementation 19<br />
Section 3<br />
Lessons <strong>for</strong> the design and implementation of specific mechanisms 22<br />
Competitive tendering 22<br />
User choice 25<br />
Tradable permits 27<br />
Conclusion 29<br />
PART III LITERATURE REVIEW 31<br />
Section 4<br />
Introduction 32<br />
Section 5<br />
<strong>Market</strong> failures and the role of the public sector 33<br />
<strong>Market</strong>s and market failures 34<br />
Social objectives and inequality 37<br />
Section 6<br />
Government Failure 39<br />
iii
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Section 7<br />
<strong>Market</strong> Mechanisms 42<br />
Competitive tendering of service provision 43<br />
User choice 49<br />
<strong>Market</strong>able permits 56<br />
Taxes and subsidies 62<br />
Opening-up access to natural monopolies 66<br />
Limitations on the use of market mechanisms 69<br />
Section 8<br />
Framework <strong>for</strong> assessing market mechanisms 70<br />
The choice of market-based mechanism 70<br />
Implementation issues 71<br />
Summary 71<br />
PART IV CASE STUDIES 73<br />
Section 9<br />
Competitive Tendering of Prisons 74<br />
Introduction 74<br />
<strong>Market</strong> Background 75<br />
<strong>Policy</strong> history and timetable 76<br />
Introduction of a market mechanism 79<br />
Potential problems 87<br />
Controlling Service Quality 95<br />
Outcome of market mechanism 103<br />
Overall Assessment 108<br />
Section 10<br />
Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing 112<br />
Introduction 112<br />
<strong>Market</strong> Background 113<br />
Introduction of market mechanism 117<br />
Potential problems 127<br />
Outcome of market mechanism 135<br />
Overall Assessment 144<br />
iv
Contents<br />
Section 11<br />
Emissions Trading 147<br />
Introduction 147<br />
Background 147<br />
Introduction of a market mechanism 148<br />
Potential problems 155<br />
Outcome of market mechanism 160<br />
Overall Assessment 165<br />
PART V ANNEX 169<br />
Section 12<br />
Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms 170<br />
Competitive tendering of service provision 170<br />
User choice 184<br />
<strong>Market</strong>able permits (‘Cap and Trade’) 188<br />
Taxes and subsidies 191<br />
Opening access to natural monopolies 193<br />
References 195<br />
v
Authors<br />
vi<br />
Robert Hahn<br />
Justin Coombs<br />
Ciara Kalmus<br />
Carlos Razo<br />
Katherine Curry<br />
LECG<br />
Acknowledgements<br />
We are grateful <strong>for</strong> comments and suggestions from Elaine Bailey, Richard<br />
Beaton, Myriam Borgi, Fazleen Ismail, Alina Jardine, Adam Land, Andrea Lee,<br />
Sasha Maguire, Christopher Moir, Amy Newland, Siobhan Pointer, Sheetal<br />
Radia, Andrew Rees, and Frances Walker. We are also grateful <strong>for</strong> the cooperation<br />
and assistance of the various organisations and companies<br />
interviewed during this research: Camden Council, the <strong>Department</strong> <strong>for</strong><br />
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Harborough District Council, Kirklees<br />
Metropolitan Council, the Home Office, the National Offender Management<br />
Service, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Premier-Serco, SGS United<br />
Kingdom Ltd and Twin Valley Homes. This research was supported by funding<br />
from the DTI and the Office of Fair Trading.
Foreword<br />
There is increasing interest in how market based approaches can be used to<br />
meet public policy goals. Economic theory suggests that more market-based<br />
mechanisms can have advantages over more traditional policy designs. This<br />
report, commissioned by the DTI and OFT and completed by a team at LECG,<br />
examines how competition and market <strong>for</strong>ces can be used to improve the way<br />
that public policy is implemented. It develops the evidence, base surrounding<br />
the benefits and pitfalls of using competition and market-based approaches and<br />
draws out practical lessons that will help policy makers in future policy<br />
development.<br />
The analysis presented here is relevant to a wide audience. It draws upon<br />
economic research and the experiences of officials, from the Home Office, ODPM,<br />
DTI and DEFRA and other stakeholders, such as local government officials and<br />
representatives of business. I am particularly grateful <strong>for</strong> the co-operation of all<br />
those who contributed their experiences, insights and funding to this study. I am<br />
also grateful to the Competition Forum, which provided the motivation <strong>for</strong> this<br />
work and has, since its establishment in 2004, helped bring together Government<br />
<strong>Department</strong>s and the independent Competition Authorities to promote a shared<br />
understanding of UK and EU competition issues.<br />
This report contains several important messages. Significant benefits can be<br />
realised from the use of market mechanisms, even in apparently unpromising<br />
policy areas. But the scale of these benefits depends on how the mechanism is<br />
implemented. For this reason, it is important that the lessons of this study are<br />
used in order to capture these benefits.<br />
Vicky Pryce<br />
Chief Economic Adviser and Director General,<br />
Economics <strong>Department</strong> of Trade and Industry<br />
1
Part I<br />
Introduction and Summary<br />
3
SECTION 1<br />
Introduction and summary<br />
Introduction<br />
This report, commissioned by the <strong>Department</strong> of Trade and Industry, examines<br />
how competition and market <strong>for</strong>ces can be used to improve the way that public<br />
policy is implemented.<br />
<strong>Public</strong> policy often involves either the direct provision of services by the public<br />
sector, or the public sector regulating how the private sector behaves. For some<br />
services, this has involved replacing the market with administration by the<br />
public sector, so that public-sector officials ultimately decide how much of a<br />
service is provided. However, public policy interventions can instead be<br />
designed in ways that:<br />
● introduce competition between service providers;<br />
● allow individuals a degree of choice over the services they receive and who<br />
provides them; or<br />
● create markets where rights and obligations can be traded.<br />
We call these policy designs ‘market-based mechanisms’.<br />
Economic theory suggests that market-based mechanisms can have advantages<br />
over more traditional policy designs. In this report we draw out the main<br />
conclusions from economic theory and examine whether the expected benefits<br />
from using market-based mechanisms have been realised in practice. We also<br />
examine the practical problems that can arise when implementing market-based<br />
mechanisms, and suggest how these issues can be addressed to maximise the<br />
benefits from using a market-based mechanism.<br />
How we carried out this study<br />
This study has involved reviewing previous research and conducting a series of<br />
case studies of the use of market-based mechanisms in the UK. We have<br />
reviewed research on the theory of market-based mechanisms, and also<br />
previous studies on the use of market-based mechanisms in the UK and other<br />
countries. We then examined three examples of the use of market-based<br />
mechanisms in the UK to assess whether the outcomes in these cases matched<br />
the expectations we would draw from economic theory and previous<br />
experience.<br />
For each case study we interviewed Government officials involved in the design<br />
and implementation of each mechanism. We also interviewed private-sector<br />
firms and organisations that were affected by the mechanism. In addition, we<br />
4
eviewed previous reports and studies on the effects of the market mechanism.<br />
We believe that the combination of these different viewpoints has enabled us to<br />
take a balanced view of the overall effects of each mechanism.<br />
The three case studies involved three types of market-based mechanisms, which<br />
are typical of the mechanisms used in the UK and other countries.<br />
● Competitive tendering: where private-sector providers are invited to compete<br />
to become the provider of a particular public service. We examine the<br />
competitive tendering of prison services in England and Wales.<br />
● User choice: rather than providers competing to become the monopoly<br />
suppliers of a particular public service, the users of the service are allowed to<br />
choose among the rival suppliers of the service. We examine a novel example<br />
of this mechanism, where potential tenants of social housing have been given<br />
the opportunity to bid <strong>for</strong> vacant properties. This scheme is known as ‘choicebased<br />
lettings’ in the UK; and<br />
● Tradable permits: firms subject to regulation are given certain rights that they<br />
can trade amongst themselves. This mechanism has been used in some<br />
cases to control pollution. Firms are given tradable permits that allow them<br />
to produce a given level of pollution. Firms that can control their emissions<br />
more cheaply can profit from doing so by selling their excess permits to other<br />
firms. We examine the UK emissions trading scheme, which involves the<br />
trading of permits to emit greenhouse gases.<br />
In each case, we examine:<br />
● the underlying rationale <strong>for</strong> public policy intervention;<br />
● how the mechanism was implemented;<br />
● practical implementation issues and how these were resolved;<br />
● benefits from the use of a market-based mechanism; and<br />
● lessons <strong>for</strong> the future use of similar mechanisms.<br />
Key lessons<br />
Section 1 – Introduction and summary<br />
<strong>Using</strong> a market-based mechanism in place of traditional policy designs can<br />
create significant benefits, in the <strong>for</strong>m of lower costs and better services. These<br />
benefits come from greater competition among suppliers and greater choice <strong>for</strong><br />
consumers.<br />
5
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
● Benefits of competition among suppliers: introducing competition among<br />
suppliers can lead to lower costs and better quality services. For example,<br />
competitive tendering of UK prison services has led to cost savings of around<br />
10 to 22 per cent. These benefits can arise even when provision of the service<br />
remains in the public sector, provided it is subject to the discipline of<br />
competition. We also found that when competition is introduced in one area,<br />
it can lead to cost savings in other areas where competition has not been<br />
introduced through the transfer of best practice.<br />
In emissions trading, the choice of how emissions are to be reduced is decided<br />
by competition among suppliers, rather than by government decree as in a<br />
conventional administrative scheme. It is estimated that this had led to costs<br />
savings of up to $800 million per year in the US.<br />
● Benefits of greater consumer choice: the ability of firms and individuals to<br />
make choices can lead to a better allocation of goods and services. The use<br />
of choice-based lettings in UK social housing has led to a better allocation of<br />
properties, reducing the time that properties remain vacant by 37 per cent <strong>for</strong><br />
a sample we examined.<br />
<strong>Market</strong>-based mechanisms can also create other benefits such as increasing<br />
transparency and accountability. For example, a tradable permit scheme makes<br />
the cost of reducing emissions more transparent.<br />
Introducing these mechanisms still leaves an important role <strong>for</strong> the state<br />
because market mechanisms will typically need to be designed and managed in<br />
some way. For example, when a competitive tender is introduced, the public<br />
sector still needs to manage the contract with the private-sector supplier.<br />
While market mechanisms can lead to significant benefits, the scale of these<br />
benefits depends crucially on how the mechanism is implemented. We found<br />
that the competitive tendering of prisons has been more successful in the UK<br />
than it has been in the US as a result of differences in implementation. There<br />
may also be a need <strong>for</strong> creative thinking in order to adapt a market mechanism<br />
to the particular public-policy issue being tackled.<br />
In Part II we offer specific lessons <strong>for</strong> the implementation of each mechanism we<br />
have considered. These lessons are drawn in large part from the three case<br />
studies we carried out, which we briefly summarise below.<br />
Case studies<br />
COMPETITIVE TENDERING OF PRISONS<br />
Prison services in England and Wales have been subject to competitive<br />
tendering in one of two ways:<br />
6
Section 1 – Introduction and summary<br />
● management-only contracts: which involve tendering the management of an<br />
existing prison; and<br />
● design, construction, management and finance contracts: which involve<br />
tendering the construction and subsequent operation of a new prison in a<br />
single contract.<br />
The first management-only contract started in 1992 and the first full design,<br />
construction, management and finance contract in 1995.<br />
Competitive tendering was introduced in order to improve efficiency and<br />
innovation in the provision of prison services. It coincided with a need to replace<br />
and expand the existing stock of prisons in the UK and it was expected that the<br />
private sector would be able to achieve this expansion more efficiently than the<br />
public sector. Initial contracts were open only to private-sector bidders but<br />
subsequent tenders have been open to in-house public-sector suppliers.<br />
Tenders have attracted enough bidders to generate competition, with four or<br />
more bidders in most cases. Different contracts have been won both by privatesector<br />
and by public-sector bidders. There are currently four different private<br />
firms managing prisons in England and Wales. The contracting process appears<br />
to have worked well. We found no evidence either of collusion or of incumbents<br />
having an unfair advantage in subsequent tenders.<br />
One of the main concerns regarding competitive tendering is the impact it can<br />
have on the quality of service provided. Quality of service can be difficult to<br />
specify and write into a contract with a private-sector supplier. When services<br />
are subject to a competitive tender the public sector can find itself locked into a<br />
contract which makes it difficult to address unanticipated problems regarding<br />
quality of services. This issue has been important in the provision of prison<br />
services given that experience in the US has involved a number of significant<br />
failures.<br />
The UK has avoided many of the problems seen in the US. There are a number<br />
of reasons <strong>for</strong> this improvement. First, quality has been an important part of the<br />
process <strong>for</strong> assessing tenders. Tenders are not automatically won by the lowest<br />
bidder. Instead price is only one factor in the decision process. Second,<br />
significant ef<strong>for</strong>t has been devoted to setting explicit per<strong>for</strong>mance measures,<br />
which are monitored and en<strong>for</strong>ced through financial penalties <strong>for</strong> poor<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance. More recently, contracts have also allowed <strong>for</strong> financial rewards to<br />
encourage improvements in quality above the stated per<strong>for</strong>mance target. Third,<br />
the UK Government has learned from experience, both experience in other<br />
countries and experience gained from operating competitive tenders in the UK.<br />
For example, the number of per<strong>for</strong>mance measures has been rationalised over<br />
time, with more focus on outputs (e.g., the skills that prisoners have learned)<br />
rather than inputs (e.g., the amount of time prisoners spend in classes).<br />
7
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
There is some evidence that private-sector prisons may in fact achieve better<br />
quality of service in some areas than publicly-run prisons. There is evidence, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, that private-sector prisons have better relations between staff and<br />
prisoners than publicly-run prisons. However, staff in public-sector prisons tend<br />
to have much more experience and are better paid than those in private prisons<br />
and inexperience has occasionally been cited as a problem with private prisons.<br />
Competitive tendering of prisons has been successful in improving cost<br />
efficiency. Two independent studies have estimated cost savings of between 10<br />
and 15 per cent and between 13 and 22 per cent. These estimates are based on<br />
comparisons between the costs of privately-run prisons and the costs of<br />
comparable publicly-run prisons. They are likely to under-estimate overall cost<br />
savings because evidence suggests that competitive tendering has led to cost<br />
reductions in those prisons that remain under public-sector management, and<br />
even those that are not subject to competitive tendering, due to the diffusion of<br />
best practice.<br />
CHOICE-BASED LETTING IN SOCIAL HOUSING<br />
Choice-based lettings has been used to introduce user choice in the provision of<br />
social housing – housing which is made available by ‘not <strong>for</strong> profit’ bodies at<br />
below market rents.<br />
The common feature of all schemes is that applicants can indicate which<br />
properties they would like to be considered <strong>for</strong>, rather than waiting to be<br />
allocated a property that they might not want.<br />
The traditional method <strong>for</strong> allocating social housing has been as follows.<br />
Applicants <strong>for</strong> social housing join a waiting list administered by the local<br />
authority, or other social landlord. They will then be allocated points based on<br />
their assessed housing need (<strong>for</strong> example, whether they are homeless or living in<br />
overcrowded or unsatisfactory housing conditions) and the time they have been<br />
waiting on the list. When an applicant reaches the top of the list, in terms of the<br />
points they hold, the social landlord will offer them one of its vacant properties.<br />
The applicant will normally be allowed a limited number of opportunities to reject<br />
a property be<strong>for</strong>e they lose their place at the top of this list.<br />
Choice-based lettings introduces a limited market in social housing, analogous<br />
to the private housing market. Typically all vacant properties on a social<br />
landlord’s books are advertised to all applicants who have registered with it.<br />
These applicants then bid <strong>for</strong> individual properties. Where more than one<br />
applicant bids <strong>for</strong> the same property, it is allocated in one of a number of<br />
different ways, depending on the design of the scheme. The two most common<br />
approaches are points or a banding system.<br />
● In a points-based scheme, applicants are allocated points based on assessed<br />
housing need and the time they have been waiting <strong>for</strong> a property. The<br />
property is then allocated to the applicant with the most points.<br />
8
Section 1 – Introduction and summary<br />
● In a banding system, applicants are allocated to certain bands based on their<br />
assessed housing need and other relevant circumstances. The property is<br />
then allocated to the applicant in the highest-priority band, and within that<br />
band to the applicant who has been waiting longest <strong>for</strong> a property.<br />
Choice-based letting schemes in the UK were inspired by the use of similar<br />
schemes in the Delft region of the Netherlands. In the UK, <strong>Market</strong> Harborough<br />
District Council introduced a district-wide scheme in April 2000, and Mansfield<br />
District Council introduced a more limited scheme at around the same time.<br />
Subsequently, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister introduced a pilot scheme<br />
involving 27 authorities which ran from April 2001 until March 2003. A number<br />
of other authorities have subsequently adopted choice-based lettings, and by<br />
April 2004, 20 per cent of local authorities had adopted the approach. The<br />
Government has a target <strong>for</strong> all local authorities to adopt choice-based letting<br />
schemes by 2010.<br />
In introducing choice-based lettings, local authorities have had to address a<br />
number of implementation issues. First, they had to make significant<br />
investments in systems to advertise properties to potential tenants and provide<br />
them with enough in<strong>for</strong>mation to make an in<strong>for</strong>med choice. Second, positive<br />
action was taken to ensure that all applicants had reasonable access to this<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation and were equally well equipped to make a choice. The local<br />
authority provided in<strong>for</strong>mation in different languages and provided support and<br />
advice. Consequently, the total resources needed to administer the schemes are<br />
similar to previous allocation schemes. Indeed, the administrative staff<br />
previously needed to allocate properties are now tackling these issues of<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation and equality of access.<br />
Choice-based lettings appear to have addressed a number of perceived<br />
problems with traditional allocation methods:<br />
● Allocation lacked transparency: in traditional schemes, applicants did not<br />
know which properties were vacant and on what basis they were allocated to<br />
potential tenants. Choice-based lettings allows all applicants to see which<br />
properties are available, and to bid <strong>for</strong> those properties. In<strong>for</strong>mation is also<br />
produced on successful bidders <strong>for</strong> previous properties (how many points<br />
they had or how long they had been waiting).<br />
● Perceptions of unfairness: in traditional schemes, allocation appeared to<br />
applicants to be at the discretion of local authority housing officers. Choicebased<br />
lettings introduced a transparent and objective allocation mechanism.<br />
● Lack of empowerment: in traditional schemes, applicants had no influence<br />
over the process, whereas choice-based lettings allows them to take the<br />
initiative in selecting and bidding <strong>for</strong> properties.<br />
● Undesirable incentives: in traditional schemes, applicants had an incentive to<br />
lobby local authority officers to move up the waiting list. The use of a more<br />
objective points scheme and the potential to obtain a property earlier by<br />
9
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
choosing a less desirable property may have reduced some of the potential<br />
to engage in lobbying activity.<br />
Choice-based lettings has not, so far, involved introducing competition between<br />
different social landlords – although this is an option which might be considered<br />
in the future. Its benefits have there<strong>for</strong>e arisen mostly on the ‘demand’ side, in<br />
terms of improving the allocation of properties. One factor which indicates<br />
greater efficiency, however, has been a reduction in vacancy rates, as properties<br />
are re-let more quickly.<br />
The main benefit of choice-based lettings has been that potential tenants are<br />
more likely to occupy a property that meets their needs. Surveys of users have<br />
shown a high degree of satisfaction with the outcome of the process relative to<br />
the previous administrative system. It was also suggested to us that when<br />
tenants choose their own property they are more likely to take greater care of the<br />
property and will be more committed to their community.<br />
THE UK EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME<br />
The UK, along with many other countries, has committed itself to reduce<br />
emissions of greenhouse gases. These gases are believed to be contributing to<br />
climate change, which is a threat to human health and sustainable development.<br />
The UK climate change programme involves a number of measures designed to<br />
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We examined one of these: the UK emissions<br />
trading scheme.<br />
This scheme created a market in permits to emit greenhouse gases. Participation<br />
is voluntary, and firms could choose to enter the scheme and obtain permits in<br />
one of four ways.<br />
● First, the Government held an auction where firms offered emission<br />
reductions relative to current levels in return <strong>for</strong> Government funding. Firms<br />
that were successful in this auction (known as ‘direct participants’) could use<br />
the market to sell permits generated from an over achievement relative to this<br />
target or buy permits to cover any under-achievement.<br />
● Second, firms could enter into a ‘climate change agreement’. This involved<br />
agreeing to an emission reduction target with the Government which reduced<br />
the level of the climate change levy they were liable to pay. (The climate<br />
change levy is a tax on greenhouse gas emissions that is a separate<br />
instrument under the climate change programme). These firms could<br />
similarly use the market to sell permits generated from an over achievement<br />
relative to this target or buy permits to cover any under-achievement.<br />
● Third, other firms emitting greenhouse gases could enter into separate<br />
arrangements to obtain permits in return <strong>for</strong> emission reductions. In practice,<br />
this option was never fully developed because of the then <strong>for</strong>thcoming EU<br />
Emissions Trading Scheme, so this option has not been available <strong>for</strong><br />
organisations to use.<br />
10
Section 1 – Introduction and summary<br />
● Lastly, firms or individuals could participate as traders in permits, buying and<br />
selling in the market.<br />
In summary, participating firms agree to emission reduction targets with the<br />
Government. They receive allowances in return <strong>for</strong> exceeding these targets or<br />
can buy permits from other participants to make up any shortfall. If participants<br />
go beyond their targets they can sell allowances on the market. In effect this<br />
involved what is known as ‘grandfathering’, where firms receive an allowance<br />
based on their historic emission levels, and have to buy permits only if their<br />
emissions exceed these levels. While other tradable permit schemes involve<br />
firms buying permits from the Government, so they have to pay to maintain<br />
existing emission levels, the UK ETS involved direct participants offering<br />
emission reductions to the Government in the initial auction, and receiving<br />
allowances if they met these targets. This runs counter to some economic theory<br />
that suggests firms should have to pay to pollute. However, the ETS was a<br />
voluntary scheme and it was there<strong>for</strong>e felt necessary to provide an incentive <strong>for</strong><br />
firms to participate.<br />
It appears that the initial auction was not as efficient as it might have been, since<br />
it led to the Government purchasing emission reductions <strong>for</strong> £18 per tonne of<br />
carbon dioxide when permits were later trading in the market <strong>for</strong> only £2-£4 per<br />
tonne of carbon dioxide. The Government argues that the high prices paid were<br />
not due to the auction design but to the fixed costs associated with participation<br />
in the scheme. The commitment that was undertaken by the voluntary participants<br />
included significant fixed costs, e.g. baseline monitoring and verification<br />
agreements, and the cost of instituting a new approach to carbon management.<br />
These costs suggest that the level of incentive would probably need to be<br />
significantly above the price at which permits traded in the secondary market.<br />
Overall, the scheme has been successful in terms of reducing emissions at low<br />
cost. It has created a liquid market in emission permits, and has provided UK<br />
firms with experience which will be valuable, <strong>for</strong> example, when they participate<br />
in the EU emissions trading scheme. The cost of reducing emissions under this<br />
scheme has been found by the UK National Audit Office to compare favourably<br />
with other Government schemes aimed at reducing emissions such as the<br />
‘renewables obligation’. 1 It has also established a centre of expertise in emission<br />
trading schemes in the UK which will be well placed to exploit this expertise in<br />
the EU scheme and elsewhere.<br />
Participating firms have significantly exceeded their targets in the initial years of<br />
the scheme. The scheme has stimulated many firms to become more aware of<br />
their total energy consumption and opportunities to improve their energy<br />
efficiency which are economically viable, as well as beneficial to the<br />
environment.<br />
1 The ‘renewables obligation’ requires electricity supply companies to purchase a specified quantity of their<br />
electricity from government approved renewable sources.<br />
11
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Structure of the report<br />
In Part II below we identify the main lessons <strong>for</strong> policy makers drawn from our<br />
research. It includes lessons from economic theory, from previous empirical<br />
studies and from our three case studies. We divide these lessons into those<br />
which are applicable to the use of market-based mechanisms in general and<br />
implementation issues which are specific to individual mechanisms.<br />
In Part III we review the economic literature on the use of market-based<br />
instruments. This includes both the theory of market-based mechanisms and<br />
studies of their per<strong>for</strong>mance in a variety of situations.<br />
In Part IV we set out the findings from each of our three case studies.<br />
Annex A contains a more detailed assessment of the economic literature on the<br />
use of market-based mechanisms and Annex B contains a bibliography of<br />
references used in this report.<br />
12
Part II<br />
Lessons and guidance<br />
<strong>for</strong> policy makers<br />
13
SECTION 2<br />
<strong>Using</strong> market mechanisms<br />
<strong>Using</strong> a market-based mechanism in place of traditional policy designs can<br />
create significant benefits, in the <strong>for</strong>m of lower costs and better services, but<br />
only if sufficient care is given to their design and implementation.<br />
This part of our report identifies the main lessons from our analysis. Through the<br />
case studies, in particular, we have gleaned practical insights as to how marketbased<br />
mechanisms can be best designed and made to work successfully. These<br />
lessons provide valuable insights <strong>for</strong> policy-makers across government as to<br />
how competition-based policies can achieve a range of policy objectives more<br />
effectively.<br />
This part of our report is structured as follows: we first describe our generic<br />
conclusions on applying such mechanisms; we then discuss specific lessons <strong>for</strong><br />
the three particular mechanisms studied: competitive tendering, user choice and<br />
tradable permits.<br />
Continuing role <strong>for</strong> the public sector<br />
Our first lesson may seem paradoxical. <strong>Market</strong>-based mechanisms – even where<br />
a service is contracted out to private sector providers – do not remove the role<br />
of the public sector in managing or regulating how services are provided.<br />
Instead, they involve a different kind of government intervention. When a service<br />
is transferred to the private sector through a competitive tender, <strong>for</strong> example, the<br />
public sector still has to manage the contract with the external supplier. Total<br />
public-sector resource requirements may be more, less or the same as be<strong>for</strong>e,<br />
but they are likely to be of a different kind.<br />
There is often a sound rationale <strong>for</strong> government intervention in a market.<br />
Without government, certain goods may not exist at all. Others may be provided<br />
only to a minority of users, in an undesirable quantity or at an excessive price.<br />
Without compulsory taxation, <strong>for</strong> example, prisons may not exist. While all (lawabiding)<br />
citizens benefit from the protection provided by their existence,<br />
individual citizens benefit whether or not they pay <strong>for</strong> them. In economic jargon,<br />
prisons are a public good as the service they provide to society is non-rival 2 (my<br />
neighbour’s consumption does not affect my consumption) and non-excludable<br />
(all benefit whether they contribute or not). Conversely, although the free market<br />
may provide education without government, this may be only <strong>for</strong> those able to<br />
pay <strong>for</strong> it. This might be considered unacceptable in a fair society and may<br />
conflict with the government’s social objectives.<br />
2 The same is not true of prisons themselves, which do display rivalry characteristics: one detained prisoner<br />
occupies a prisoner place that could have been used by another offender.<br />
14
Section 2 – <strong>Using</strong> market mechanisms<br />
Although a pure free-market may lead to too little education, it can lead to too<br />
much production of other products. Without government controls and<br />
restrictions, pollution would rise to unacceptable levels. In the absence of<br />
government intervention, <strong>for</strong> example, a factory owner will not bear the costs<br />
that pollution emitted from his factory imposes on others. As a result the factory<br />
may find it cheaper to use a technology that produces higher levels of pollution,<br />
despite the fact this leads to a higher cost <strong>for</strong> society. In economics, the impact<br />
of the factory’s decision on the rest of society is known as a negative externality. 3<br />
Other goods may again be provided by the market, but at excessive prices.<br />
Economies of scale in production may make it inefficient to have more than one<br />
national electricity grid. Without government intervention, the monopoly<br />
producer could take advantage of its market power by charging very high prices<br />
to consumers.<br />
These examples of market failure suggest there can be a legitimate role <strong>for</strong><br />
government in many sectors of the economy. 4 <strong>Market</strong> failure alone is a<br />
necessary but not sufficient condition <strong>for</strong> government intervention. In some<br />
cases government intervention may lead to other problems, such as inefficiency<br />
and corruption, that could outweigh the original market failure. If there is a<br />
government intervention that can reduce the market failure without giving rise<br />
to additional problems, then government intervention can be positively<br />
beneficial.<br />
However, state intervention can take many <strong>for</strong>ms. An administrative system can<br />
lead to services being provided at an excessively high cost or poor quality if the<br />
incentives to minimise costs and improve quality are weak. Services may also be<br />
provided in the wrong quantities if there is no signal to tell providers which<br />
goods are most popular and so should be produced in greater quantities. In the<br />
private sector rising demand encourages firms to produce more but under a<br />
pure ‘administrative’ system, it can just lead to longer queues.<br />
Careful use of market mechanisms by government can reduce or eliminate these<br />
problems. We emphasise “careful” since such mechanisms require the public<br />
sector to devote significant resources to their design, implementation and<br />
operation in order to achieve the desired result. In Table 1 we list a number of<br />
market-based mechanisms which can be used to address the problems with<br />
pure private provision identified above, while avoiding some of the inefficiencies<br />
of an administrative system. The choice regarding which market-based<br />
mechanism to use will depend on a number of factors. However, a useful<br />
starting point is the nature of the market failure that provides the rationale <strong>for</strong><br />
3 Externalities arise when the cost of a good to society is different from the cost to the individual. Pollution is a<br />
negative externality as the cost to society is greater than the private cost, education is a positive externality as the<br />
benefit to society can be greater than the private benefit.<br />
4 An additional rationale relates to the cost of obtaining relevant in<strong>for</strong>mation. For example, if consumers lack<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation on the quality of different products they may inadvertently purchase a poor-value product, or the risk<br />
of making such a mistake could mean that they do not make any purchase at all. Governments can alleviate this<br />
issue by trying to disclose in<strong>for</strong>mation. This is not dealt with at length in our report.<br />
15
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
government intervention in the first place. In Table 1 we link market failures to<br />
possible market-based mechanisms.<br />
Table 1:<br />
<strong>Market</strong> failures and market-based mechanisms<br />
<strong>Market</strong> failure Potential market-based mechanisms<br />
<strong>Market</strong> power Competitive tendering<br />
Removing entry barriers<br />
<strong>Public</strong> goods Competitive tendering<br />
User choice<br />
Externalities <strong>Market</strong>able permits<br />
Taxes and subsidies<br />
Social objectives Competitive tendering<br />
User choice<br />
The common feature of these market mechanisms is that they involve a different<br />
role <strong>for</strong> the public sector than be<strong>for</strong>e. This need not always be a reduced role.<br />
One of our case studies examined the experience of local authorities switching<br />
from an administrative system <strong>for</strong> allocating social housing to a more marketbased<br />
system of user choice. This new scheme removed the need to employ<br />
local authority officers to make decisions on which property to allocate to which<br />
potential tenant. However, it introduced new demands on local authorities’<br />
resources, which meant there was no reduction in the overall resources required<br />
to administer the provision of social housing. The scheme delivered other<br />
benefits instead: the new system was found to be more efficient in terms of the<br />
speed of response and also to be more popular with users.<br />
16
MAIN MECHANISMS REVIEWED<br />
Our case studies explored the practical application of three different marketbased<br />
mechanisms. These mechanisms are summarised below.<br />
Competitive tendering<br />
Where the public sector takes responsibility <strong>for</strong> providing a service – either<br />
because it is a public good, or to avoid problems arising from provision by a<br />
private sector monopolist – it may be possible to hold a competitive tender to<br />
choose the supplier of the service. This tender might allow both public-sector<br />
and private-sector suppliers to compete to become the chosen supplier.<br />
Competitive tendering allows the benefits of competition (such as improved<br />
efficiency and innovation) to be introduced to situations where there is a single<br />
supplier of the service. Competitive tendering can introduce competition <strong>for</strong><br />
the market where competition in the market might not be possible or<br />
desirable. We examined the competitive tendering of prison services.<br />
User choice<br />
In other situations it may be possible to introduce competition in the<br />
provision of public services by having competing suppliers of the public<br />
service. This competition can be between public service providers, privatesector<br />
suppliers, or both. In each case the individual users of the service are<br />
given the right to choose a service provider. The most popular providers<br />
gain users and the less popular lose them, creating incentives <strong>for</strong> providers<br />
to be more responsive to customer needs. User choice often provides users<br />
with a “voucher” or entitlement that can be exchanged <strong>for</strong> a specified<br />
service, although our case study on choice-based lettings involved a<br />
different approach.<br />
Tradable permits<br />
Section 2 – <strong>Using</strong> market mechanisms<br />
The examples above involve using market-based mechanisms in the<br />
provision of services by the public sector. Tradable permits are a means of<br />
introducing a market discipline to the regulation of private-sector activities.<br />
Regulation is often used to address problems of externalities, <strong>for</strong> example,<br />
by placing a control on the quantity of a pollutant that can be emitted, by<br />
individual firms. Tradable permits are often used in this context. They<br />
involve setting an overall limit on the total level of emissions by all firms,<br />
and issuing permits up to this limit. Firms can then trade these permits<br />
amongst themselves. Those firms with a high cost of cutting emissions will<br />
buy permits from firms with a low cost of cutting emissions. Trading permits<br />
in this way allows emission reductions to be focused on those firms who can<br />
reduce emissions most easily. These firms will also be rewarded financially<br />
<strong>for</strong> doing so by those firms that find it more expensive to cut emissions. Our<br />
case study examined the impact of the UK emissions trading scheme to<br />
control greenhouse gas emissions.<br />
17
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
<strong>Market</strong>-based mechanisms produce benefits compared to<br />
traditional policy designs<br />
Evidence, both from our case studies and from previous studies of the use of<br />
market-based mechanisms, shows that significant benefits can be achieved<br />
when traditional policy designs are replaced with a market-based mechanism.<br />
These benefits arise from two main sources.<br />
● Benefits of competition on the supply side: market-based mechanisms can be<br />
used to create competition between suppliers of public services. Introducing<br />
competition creates incentives <strong>for</strong> providers of public services to operate more<br />
efficiently and innovate in the way they provide services. This sharpening of<br />
incentives can lead to significant cost reductions. It can also encourage service<br />
providers to improve the quality of the services they provide, particularly when<br />
the end users of the service are given a direct choice over which service<br />
provider to use.<br />
– These benefits of competition can be achieved both when provision is<br />
transferred to the private sector and when provision stays within the<br />
public sector.<br />
– When competition is introduced in one area it can create benefits<br />
elsewhere. The techniques that are used to reduce costs or improve<br />
quality can be copied and applied even where competition has not been<br />
introduced.<br />
● Benefits of choice on the demand side: benefits can be achieved when<br />
individuals or firms are allowed to make in<strong>for</strong>med choices. For example, the<br />
recipients of public services can benefit from the ability to choose who<br />
provides them with a public service, such as which school or hospital they<br />
use. The mere fact that the user can make a choice will increase the likelihood<br />
that they receive the service they need in the way that is most convenient <strong>for</strong><br />
them. The exercise of user choice can also provide better in<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>for</strong> the<br />
public sector on which services are needed in which area.<br />
<strong>Market</strong>-based mechanisms can also create “softer” benefits that are difficult to<br />
measure but can be just as important as those listed above. <strong>Market</strong>-based<br />
mechanisms can introduce transparency and provide both policy makers and<br />
the public with greater in<strong>for</strong>mation. A tradable permit scheme can reveal the cost<br />
of reducing emissions, while a system of user choice can provide better<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation on the type of services users prefer and, if implemented correctly,<br />
provides users with in<strong>for</strong>mation on differences between service providers. This<br />
increase in transparency can improve the accountability of public-sector service<br />
providers and, by increasing efficiency, it can help make public policy objectives<br />
easier to achieve.<br />
18
<strong>Market</strong>-based mechanisms require creative thinking<br />
The allocation of social housing would at first glance appear to be a situation<br />
where market mechanisms could not be used. Social housing is provided<br />
entirely by ‘not-<strong>for</strong>-profit’ organisations, with supply fixed by the available social<br />
housing stock. Demand <strong>for</strong> social housing vastly exceeds supply in most parts<br />
of the UK. The price mechanism cannot be used to allocate this scarce resource<br />
because the government wishes to make social housing available to those in<br />
most need at below-market rents. These are not auspicious conditions <strong>for</strong><br />
introducing a market.<br />
However, creative thinking allows the more effective allocation of such housing.<br />
Traditionally, applicants <strong>for</strong> social housing had to wait until they reached the top<br />
of the waiting list, and were then told that they had been allocated a particular<br />
property selected by a public-sector official. Under the new arrangements,<br />
known as ‘choice-based lettings’, all vacant properties are advertised and<br />
marketed to all eligible applicants. These applicants view the properties and<br />
register their interest. The property is then allocated to the most eligible<br />
applicant, which is normally the applicant highest up the waiting list, although<br />
they could be far down the waiting list if the property has not attracted many<br />
other applicants. In practice, applicants can choose whether they wish to wait<br />
until a more desirable property becomes available or take a less desirable<br />
property in order to reduce their waiting time.<br />
Although the introduction of choice based lettings may seem a minor change, it<br />
has resulted in a more transparent system, a faster allocation of properties and<br />
greater satisfaction among users. There is anecdotal evidence that tenants<br />
allocated properties under this scheme keep them in better condition, which<br />
may be because they have ‘chosen’ their property themselves rather than<br />
someone else choosing it <strong>for</strong> them.<br />
Importance of design and implementation<br />
Section 2 – <strong>Using</strong> market mechanisms<br />
The benefits achieved by a market-based mechanism depend on how the<br />
mechanism is designed and implemented. A badly designed market mechanism<br />
can be worse than traditional alternatives. The importance of implementation is<br />
perhaps best illustrated by the contrast between the UK and US experience of<br />
competitive tendering of prison services. Several studies have pointed to<br />
failures in competitive tendering of prison services in the US. In contrast we<br />
found that competitive tendering of prison services in the UK has, on balance,<br />
been a success. The difference here seems to be due to differences in policy<br />
design and implementation rather than any inherent differences between the UK<br />
and US. In particular, UK policy makers have learned from the US experience<br />
and taken measures to address problems found there. Differences in UK and US<br />
experiences are explained in more detail in section 3.<br />
19
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Below we identify some lessons <strong>for</strong> policy design and implementation which are<br />
relevant to all, or most, market-based mechanisms. In section 3, we identify<br />
some lessons that are relevant to the specific market-based mechanisms we<br />
focus on in this report.<br />
EXPECTED COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A MARKET-BASED MECHANISM<br />
When a market-based mechanism is used, there should be a clear view on the<br />
net benefits that this is expected to deliver relative to a more traditional policy<br />
design. The benefits produced by market-based mechanisms were described<br />
above. The extent to which these will be realised depends on whether certain<br />
features are present: the benefits of competition will only be realised if there are<br />
sufficient competing providers to guarantee a competitive process; the benefits<br />
of choice will only be realised if users are able to exercise choice. Clarity on the<br />
expected benefits and costs will help policy makers to assess whether the<br />
conditions <strong>for</strong> achieving these benefits exist or, where they are not, how this<br />
problem can be addressed.<br />
Clarity on the expected benefits and costs will also make it easier to evaluate the<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance of the mechanism once it is in place. As with all public policy<br />
initiatives, the outcome of the market mechanism should be evaluated once<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation on its per<strong>for</strong>mance is available. Comparing actual per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
against expectations helps to identify any potential areas <strong>for</strong> improvement and<br />
lessons <strong>for</strong> future programmes.<br />
THE RIGHT PEOPLE NEED TO BE INVOLVED IN THE DESIGN<br />
When designing a market-based mechanism, it is essential that the design team<br />
includes people with an appropriate balance of skills. An inappropriately<br />
balanced team can lead to a process that does not take into account all the<br />
different skills and perspectives required <strong>for</strong> a successful solution. For example,<br />
the design team <strong>for</strong> a competitive tender process might need to include<br />
procurement specialists. Such specialists can bring experience from<br />
procurement in other areas in order to get the lowest price and best quality<br />
service <strong>for</strong> the public sector.<br />
The importance of quality makes it desirable <strong>for</strong> a design team to include people<br />
with experience in the day-to-day operation of the service. Such people can<br />
anticipate specific problems with the use of a market-based mechanism in that<br />
particular area that may not be apparent to outsiders. Moreover, even where<br />
problems can be easily identified, operational people can propose the most<br />
appropriate ways to overcome those problems. One of the lessons we drew<br />
from our case study on competitive tendering in prisons is the importance of<br />
maintaining service quality. The overall conclusion from our case study was that<br />
the large number of quality measures used by the Prison Service have been<br />
successful in keeping service quality at an appropriate level. However, not all<br />
service quality targets have been equally effective. One target required all<br />
20
Section 2 – <strong>Using</strong> market mechanisms<br />
broken items in the prison be replaced within 24 hours, and suppliers failing to<br />
meet the target incurred penalties. This target nearly undermined an initiative by<br />
one prison operator to provide toasters <strong>for</strong> prisoners, because a broken toaster<br />
accrued the same penalty as a more serous broken item.<br />
Similarly, the inclusion of operational staff in the design of per<strong>for</strong>mance targets<br />
can help to ensure that they are designed appropriately. Some of the benefits of<br />
competitive tendering come from new suppliers introducing fresh ideas into the<br />
provision of public services. Per<strong>for</strong>mance targets should safeguard quality while<br />
at the same time providing opportunities <strong>for</strong> innovation. In prisons, there has<br />
been a change in the type of per<strong>for</strong>mance target over time from targets that<br />
controlled virtually every aspect of prison life, to those that allow some room <strong>for</strong><br />
innovation while safeguarding quality. A target that measures the success of<br />
education in prison by exam results arguably provides better scope <strong>for</strong><br />
safeguarding quality and innovation than one that requires a set number of<br />
hours in the classroom.<br />
<strong>Policy</strong>-makers and economists should also be an integral part of design teams.<br />
<strong>Policy</strong>-makers can help ensure that the scheme is consistent with overall<br />
government policy. <strong>Policy</strong>-makers should seek to see that the rationale <strong>for</strong> the<br />
policy is clear, define the expected benefits and costs, set out how they will be<br />
achieved and ensure that the scheme is part of a coherent approach to dealing<br />
with an identified problem.<br />
Economists also have a valuable role to play. Economists can ensure that the<br />
mechanism and its implementation reflect the underlying market failure.<br />
Economists can also assist in predicting the likely effects of the mechanism and<br />
in evaluating the evidence on its per<strong>for</strong>mance.<br />
21
SECTION 3<br />
Lessons <strong>for</strong> the design and<br />
implementation of specific<br />
mechanisms<br />
This section summarises some of the main lessons drawn from our review of the<br />
theoretical and empirical literature and the three case studies we conducted. We<br />
focus on the three mechanisms covered by our case studies. More detail on<br />
these, and other mechanisms, can be found in Parts III and IV of our report.<br />
Competitive tendering<br />
Competitive tendering has been widely used in many countries in different areas<br />
of the public sector. The wide-ranging application of this mechanism means<br />
there is much experience to draw on in designing a system of competitive<br />
tendering. This experience suggests that two main issues are likely to arise:<br />
● market power of suppliers; and<br />
● maintaining the quality of the services provided.<br />
Some actions that reduce one of these problems may exacerbate the other.<br />
<strong>Policy</strong> makers may there<strong>for</strong>e need to take a view on the relative risks of these<br />
problems and decide which one takes priority.<br />
MARKET POWER<br />
Two market power issues can arise.<br />
The first market power issue is when an incumbent supplier has a significant<br />
advantage over potential competitors <strong>for</strong> a contract and, as a result, none of<br />
these potential competitors are willing to go to the trouble of bidding against it.<br />
This situation typically arises when the incumbent possesses in<strong>for</strong>mation that<br />
competitors lack, or owns assets that can be used to fulfil the tender that<br />
competitors do not possess.<br />
A number of actions can be taken to reduce incumbency advantages, some of<br />
which should be taken into account when the contract is initially let in order to<br />
avoid creating an incumbency advantage in the first place:<br />
22
Section 3 – Lessons <strong>for</strong> the design and implementation of specific mechanisms<br />
● ensuring that in<strong>for</strong>mation held by the incumbent is shared with potential<br />
bidders (this has been the case <strong>for</strong> prisons, where the incumbent has to share<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation on the costs of running a prison with rival bidders) and<br />
maintaining public ownership, or third-party ownership, of specific assets,<br />
will help to reduce the advantage possessed by an incumbent;<br />
● breaking up the contract into a series of smaller contracts, which are not all<br />
let to the same supplier, will ensure that there are a number of incumbents<br />
who will be potential competitors <strong>for</strong> each other’s existing contracts;<br />
● a longer contract period may encourage more firms to bid, since they are<br />
more likely to recover the fixed costs of bidding – although this may have<br />
implications <strong>for</strong> quality of service, as discussed below; and<br />
● it is generally desirable to transfer as much risk as possible to the supplier<br />
since this increases the incentive faced by the supplier to operate efficiently.<br />
Risk transfer could be achieved through contractual design, <strong>for</strong> example by<br />
ensuring that the supplier rather than the public sector bears the risk of cost<br />
overruns. However, where it is clear that the supplier cannot control some<br />
risks (where some input costs are beyond its control, <strong>for</strong> example) it may be<br />
beneficial <strong>for</strong> the public sector to bear, or share some of, these risks in order<br />
to encourage more suppliers to compete in the tender.<br />
The second market power issue is when there are a number of potential bidders<br />
but a high risk of collusion between them. Collusion is most likely to occur when:<br />
● there are a relatively small number of bidders, so that it is easy to organise a<br />
cartel, and there are barriers to entry that prevent new suppliers, outside of<br />
the cartel, from bidding;<br />
● there are a number of very similar contracts so that potential suppliers can<br />
share the contracts between each other in the expectation that each will<br />
generate similar profits; and<br />
● there is a transparent tendering process that allows the bidders to monitor<br />
each other and ensure that all are complying with the collusive agreement.<br />
Given these factors, the following actions might reduce the risk of collusion:<br />
● removing any unnecessary entry barriers, such as excessive or<br />
disproportionate pre-qualification criteria;<br />
● avoiding the creation of a series of identical contracts and instead creating<br />
contracts that vary in size; and<br />
● avoiding an auction design that is too transparent – a system of sealed-bid<br />
auctions may be preferable to an open auction if the risk of collusion is high,<br />
although this may also deter potential bidders in some circumstances. In<br />
general, auction design is a subject on which expert economic advice should<br />
be sought.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
COLLUSION IN FLORIDA AND TEXAS MILK CONTRACTS<br />
We did not find any suggestions that collusion had occurred in our case<br />
study of prison services in the UK. However, the tendering of school milk<br />
contracts in Florida and Texas provides an illustration of how a poorly<br />
designed public procurement process can create the ideal conditions <strong>for</strong><br />
collusion. A large number of very similar small contracts were created (in<br />
total several hundred a year between the two states). In each school district<br />
contracts were awarded independently of one another and at different dates.<br />
Each school district also published details of all bidders <strong>for</strong> the contract and<br />
the price bid by each. The transparency created by this system made it easy<br />
<strong>for</strong> bidders to collude (either on price or by sharing out contracts) and to<br />
detect when any firm cheated on a contract. The frequency of contracts<br />
deterred firms from breaking ranks and undercutting the cartel, both<br />
because the gains from doing so on any individual contract were likely to be<br />
small and because any such attempt could quickly be punished by the other<br />
cartel members undercutting on the next contract. 5<br />
QUALITY<br />
When services are contracted-out to a private-sector supplier, the supplier will<br />
normally have strong incentives to reduce costs. The introduction of incentives<br />
to minimise costs can raise concerns that costs will be reduced at the expense<br />
of quality of service. In principle, this concern can be addressed by specifying<br />
appropriate quality standards in the contract between the public sector and the<br />
supplier. However, experience suggests that this can be difficult to do: quality<br />
can be difficult to define and measure, and suppliers may have an incentive to<br />
focus on improving dimensions of quality that can be measured while ignoring<br />
other dimensions that may be more important.<br />
These problems are not unique to competitive tendering. Where there is no<br />
competitive tender it can still be difficult to measure quality and set appropriate<br />
targets <strong>for</strong> public-sector service providers, such as schools and hospitals. The<br />
difference is that when services remain wholly in the public sector, and there is<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e no legally-binding contract with the supplier, it can be easier to adjust<br />
measures and targets in the light of experience than it is to renegotiate a<br />
contract with a private-sector supplier.<br />
In practice, this problem is most likely to arise during the first round of tendered<br />
contracts. In subsequent tenders it should be possible to learn from experience<br />
in order to improve how quality is defined, measured and monitored as has been<br />
the case with the competitive tendering of prison services in the UK, which is<br />
discussed below. This problem suggests that in the first round of tenders it may<br />
be necessary to include some flexibility, allowing <strong>for</strong> quality measures to be<br />
5 Pesendorfer (2000) as quoted in Motta (2004), Competition <strong>Policy</strong>: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University<br />
Press.<br />
24
eviewed and improved, <strong>for</strong> example. Flexibility may, however, create<br />
uncertainty and costs <strong>for</strong> suppliers and deter investment if there is a risk that<br />
changes to the contract will make this investment unprofitable. It may there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
be desirable to have some element of flexibility in the first round of tenders, but<br />
phase this out as the public sector becomes more experienced at writing<br />
contracts.<br />
Even where it is not possible to fully define all aspects of quality, service<br />
providers will have an incentive to maintain or improve quality if they know that<br />
this aspect of their per<strong>for</strong>mance will be taken into account when the contract is<br />
re-tendered. This incentive, and the need to allow <strong>for</strong> contracts to be reviewed,<br />
suggests that tender lengths should not be too long, at least in the first round of<br />
tenders, if concerns regarding quality of service are high.<br />
User choice<br />
Section 3 – Lessons <strong>for</strong> the design and implementation of specific mechanisms<br />
PRISON SERVICES IN THE UK<br />
In the US, the private-sector provision of prison services has been associated<br />
with poor quality provision of services, which has led some commentators to<br />
suggest that prisons are not a suitable candidate <strong>for</strong> competitive tendering. In<br />
contrast, the UK experience has been successful, with few instances of the<br />
quality problems found in the US. A number of factors may have led to these<br />
different outcomes, but the following appear to be likely to have been<br />
important reasons <strong>for</strong> the relative success in the UK:<br />
● Problems in the US have often been associated with speculatively built<br />
prisons. In the UK, providers of prison services are selected by the public<br />
sector, and selection involves a strong emphasis on quality as well as cost.<br />
● Sophisticated measures of quality have been developed in the UK which<br />
have been closely monitored. These measures have developed over time,<br />
learning from experience.<br />
● Contract lengths in the UK were initially relatively short (five years).<br />
This approach allowed <strong>for</strong> contracts to be revised and improved although<br />
it may have had negative consequences <strong>for</strong> investment. Contracts are<br />
now longer but allow <strong>for</strong> some degree of renegotiation.<br />
● Contracts in the UK now include both penalties <strong>for</strong> poor per<strong>for</strong>mance and<br />
rewards <strong>for</strong> good per<strong>for</strong>mance.<br />
Experience in the application of user choice suggests the following issues may<br />
arise:<br />
● designing an allocation mechanism;<br />
● providing sufficient in<strong>for</strong>mation; and<br />
● risks of inequality of access.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
ALLOCATION MECHANISM<br />
Introducing user choice will not necessarily mean that all users will be able to<br />
exercise their first choice on all occasions. Capacity is likely to be limited. For<br />
example, it would be inefficient <strong>for</strong> every school to have the capacity to offer a<br />
place to every child in its education authority area. As a result school places are<br />
likely to be limited at the most popular schools and not every parent will be able<br />
to send their children to these schools.<br />
Given these capacity constraints, some mechanism is needed to ration the<br />
capacity of popular service providers between competing users. In private-sector<br />
markets this role is per<strong>for</strong>med by the price mechanism: those who are willing<br />
and able to pay more bid up the price until demand matches available supply.<br />
Since allocating places on the basis of willingness to pay may conflict with<br />
public policy objectives, it may be necessary to find an alternative allocation<br />
mechanism <strong>for</strong> public services. Users will need to understand that their ability to<br />
choose will be constrained by available capacity and they may have to accept<br />
something less than their first choice, which may still be preferable to no choice<br />
at all.<br />
CHOICE-BASED LETTINGS<br />
In the case of choice-based lettings a number of different mechanisms have<br />
been used to allocate properties between rival potential tenants. Some<br />
involve awarding points based on a number of objective factors (such as<br />
length of time waiting <strong>for</strong> a property and whether the person is disabled etc).<br />
Others simply rank applicants based on the length of time they have been<br />
waiting, but allow certain applicants priority <strong>for</strong> certain properties. In all<br />
cases applicants are awarded some <strong>for</strong>m of ‘currency’, such as points or a<br />
position on a waiting list. Properties are then let to the applicant possessing<br />
the most currency. A key difference with the traditional administrative<br />
system is that all eligible applicants can view the available properties. As the<br />
properties are advertised weekly in local media, applicants can choose<br />
properties that they prefer, rather than having a choice made <strong>for</strong> them. It also<br />
means that those lower down the waiting list are able to choose the less<br />
popular properties, which may be rejected by those at the top of the list, so<br />
that unpopular vacant properties can be re-let more quickly.<br />
Although capacity is likely to be fixed in the short run, it may be possible to alter<br />
it over the long run-by deciding whether or not to close one school and expand<br />
capacity at another, <strong>for</strong> example. User choice will provide in<strong>for</strong>mation on user<br />
preferences that we would expect to be used to influence these decisions.<br />
Incorporating in<strong>for</strong>mation from actual user choices may work best when users<br />
have the option of using private-sector providers. Private-sector providers are<br />
likely to have more freedom than public sector providers to raise the capital<br />
needed to finance an expansion in capacity. So involving private-sector<br />
providers may make supply more responsive to user preferences.<br />
26
INFORMATION<br />
Users can exercise an in<strong>for</strong>med choice only if they possess sufficient relevant<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation. A system of user choice there<strong>for</strong>e requires that the public sector<br />
devote resources to communicating in<strong>for</strong>mation on available choices to<br />
potential recipients.<br />
Care needs to be taken to provide in<strong>for</strong>mation that is easily understood and<br />
allows <strong>for</strong> comparisons between providers, without over simplifying complex<br />
differences in quality. For example, consider the problem of assessing school<br />
quality. Exam league-tables may to some extent reflect the quality of education<br />
provided by different schools, but exam results might not be a complete<br />
measure of the quality of education provided. Good results may simply reflect a<br />
school’s ability to attract bright pupils and users may there<strong>for</strong>e need guidance<br />
on how to interpret and use the in<strong>for</strong>mation provided.<br />
ENSURING EQUALITY OF ACCESS<br />
A related issue is that some users will find it easier than others to interpret<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation and exercise their right to choose. Those less able to exercise their<br />
right to choose might include users with less education, those <strong>for</strong> whom English<br />
is a second language and those who find it more difficult to access in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
because they live in a rural location with poor transport links, <strong>for</strong> example.<br />
Inequalities in the ability to choose may lead to inequality in the allocation of<br />
services, with the more advantaged participants receiving better services than<br />
those who are less able to exercise their right to choice.<br />
The experience of choice-based lettings shows that if these issues are<br />
recognised at the outset, then measures can be taken to assist any<br />
disadvantaged groups of participants. These measures include providing<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation in different languages, ensuring that in<strong>for</strong>mation reaches all<br />
potential users and employing staff to provide guidance and advice to users, <strong>for</strong><br />
example.<br />
TRADABLE PERMITS<br />
Tradable permit schemes have now been employed in a number of countries,<br />
mainly to control pollution emissions. Key implementation issues include:<br />
● allocating permits;<br />
Section 3 – Lessons <strong>for</strong> the design and implementation of specific mechanisms<br />
● differences in environmental impacts; and<br />
● the liquidity of permit markets.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
INITIAL ALLOCATION OF PERMITS<br />
Permits need to be allocated to firms or individuals. This allocation might be<br />
achieved through “grandfathering”, where permits to pollute are issued on the<br />
basis of existing levels of pollution or industrial output. Grandfathering has the<br />
merit that firms who previously had the right to produce pollution maintain that<br />
right without any direct cost, but now face an opportunity cost from continuing<br />
to pollute (this opportunity cost is the income they could receive from selling<br />
their permits). This system also tends to be easier to introduce.<br />
However, grandfathering may create perverse incentives, since it can, in effect,<br />
reward firms <strong>for</strong> past pollution and penalise those firms who have already<br />
reduced emissions. Grandfathering can also, in some circumstances, stifle<br />
competition if it creates market power by disadvantaging new entrants who will<br />
have to buy permits from incumbent firms.<br />
These problems are avoided if, at the outset of the scheme, permits are sold in<br />
some <strong>for</strong>m of auction. The auction allocates permits to those who value them<br />
most, but <strong>for</strong>ces them to pay <strong>for</strong> the right to pollute. However, care needs to be<br />
taken in the design of the auction to ensure that it produces a fair and efficient<br />
market price, and does not create any of the problems discussed below. Auction<br />
design is a complex subject, and the correct auction design is likely to vary from<br />
case to case. This is a subject on which expert advice should be sought.<br />
THE UK EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME<br />
The UK emissions trading scheme involved an auction in which firms bid to<br />
obtain funding in exchange <strong>for</strong> offering to make greenhouse gas emission<br />
reductions. The auction was designed by independent auction experts and<br />
subject to review by stakeholders be<strong>for</strong>e implementation. This initial auction<br />
resulted in the government purchasing emissions reductions at a price of<br />
£18 per tonne of carbon dioxide per year, which subsequent experience has<br />
shown is significantly above the market price <strong>for</strong> allowances (which were<br />
later trading in the range £2–£4 per tonne). A subsequent analysis by<br />
economists, commissioned by the National Audit Office, suggested an<br />
alternative auction design that might have reduced the initial payments<br />
made by the UK government.<br />
LIQUIDITY<br />
A successful tradable permits scheme requires that there is a liquid market in<br />
permits: by this we mean that it must be possible <strong>for</strong> buyers and sellers to trade<br />
permits at a price close to the underlying market price without significant delay.<br />
They should not need to wait <strong>for</strong> other traders to appear or pay a high penalty<br />
<strong>for</strong> trading quickly. Liquidity is likely to be highest if:<br />
28
● there are a large number of buyers and sellers, which suggests that tradable<br />
permit schemes should generally be large – one large scheme is likely to be<br />
more liquid than a number of smaller schemes;<br />
● a trading infrastructure exists, such as an exchange where buyers and sellers<br />
can meet; and<br />
● rules allow <strong>for</strong> trading by proprietary or arbitrage traders-traders who do not<br />
need permits <strong>for</strong> their own purposes, but buy and sell <strong>for</strong> profit. These traders<br />
can be an important source of liquidity.<br />
DIFFERENCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS<br />
Some pollutants have different impacts depending on where they are released.<br />
For example, emissions of effluents into rivers may have different impacts<br />
depending on the river where emissions take place or the location along the<br />
same river. For some other pollutants, such as greenhouse gases, location is not<br />
an issue, but some greenhouse gases have a more intensive effect on climate<br />
change than others.<br />
Where different impacts exist, they might suggest that separate schemes are<br />
needed to reflect these differences. However, as explained above, larger schemes<br />
are generally desirable because they increase liquidity. There is a trade-off here<br />
between environmental quality and efficiency objectives. It may be possible to<br />
resolve this tension and include emissions with different impacts within the same<br />
scheme if the differences in impact are predictable. This is the case with different<br />
greenhouse gasses, <strong>for</strong> example. The UK ETS there<strong>for</strong>e includes all types of<br />
greenhouses gases with set “exchange rates” to determine how permits can be<br />
used to meet obligations regarding different greenhouse gases.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Section 3 – Lessons <strong>for</strong> the design and implementation of specific mechanisms<br />
<strong>Using</strong> a market-based mechanism in place of traditional policy designs can<br />
create significant benefits, in the <strong>for</strong>m of lower costs and better services.<br />
However, the extent of these benefits will depend on how the mechanism is<br />
implemented. We have set out above a number lessons, drawn both from the<br />
theory of market-based mechanisms and the significant body of experience that<br />
now exists in many countries, which suggest how these benefits can be<br />
maximised.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
30
Part III<br />
Literature Review<br />
31
SECTION 4<br />
Introduction<br />
This part of the report reviews the economic literature on market mechanisms,<br />
and is organised as follows. We begin by describing the principal rationales <strong>for</strong><br />
government intervention in Section 5. We then outline the situations in which<br />
government intervention can create its own problems (‘government failure’)<br />
which may undermine, or at least reduce, the effectiveness of government<br />
intervention in Section 6. In section 7 we describe the market mechanisms that<br />
have been proposed as methods <strong>for</strong> reducing this government failure and issues<br />
that need to be considered when implementing these mechanisms. Lastly, in<br />
section 8 we present a framework <strong>for</strong> assessing the per<strong>for</strong>mance of these<br />
mechanisms.<br />
Additional in<strong>for</strong>mation and evidence drawn from our review of the literature is<br />
contained in Part V of the report.<br />
32
SECTION 5<br />
<strong>Market</strong> failures and the role<br />
of the public sector<br />
In this study we examine different ways in which the public sector can achieve<br />
its policy objectives. <strong>Public</strong> policy, <strong>for</strong> our purposes, includes:<br />
● the public sector providing services to the public (health care, education and<br />
the criminal justice system are examples of this in the UK); and<br />
● the public sector regulating, influencing or dictating how others provide services<br />
to the public (health and safety policy and environmental policy, <strong>for</strong> example).<br />
As a starting point, it is important to understand why we use the public sector,<br />
rather than private firms or individuals, to provide services to the public; and<br />
why the public sector regulates the behaviour of the private sector in some<br />
circumstances. Economists analyse this question by considering how an<br />
intervention affects the ‘welfare’ of society. Broadly speaking, welfare is<br />
measured as the difference between the value that consumers place on the<br />
goods and services they receive and the cost to society of producing those<br />
goods and services. <strong>Using</strong> this approach, it is possible to measure the welfare of<br />
individuals or the welfare of society as a whole. 6<br />
We distinguish below between two broad reasons <strong>for</strong> using the public sector to<br />
provide services, or regulate how others provide them:<br />
● because there is a market failure which, in some situations, means that the<br />
public sector would be better than the private sector at providing certain<br />
services, or that some regulation of private sector provision could increase<br />
the welfare of society; or<br />
● because leaving provision to an unregulated private sector would lead to<br />
outcomes which society would find undesirable because they conflict with<br />
wider social objectives, such as avoiding inequality in wealth, incomes or<br />
opportunities. In this situation an unregulated private sector might maximise<br />
the welfare of society as a whole but the resulting inequalities between<br />
different members of society might be considered unacceptable. 7<br />
6 Total welfare is the difference between the total value consumers place on a good and the physical cost of<br />
producing it. Consumer welfare is the difference between consumer’s valulation and the price they pay. Either of<br />
these measures can be used to in<strong>for</strong>m policy analysis. They are not without problems, primarily because of the<br />
need to make comparisons between the welfare of different individuals. For a seminal treatment, see Kenneth<br />
Arrow (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values, Yale University Press.<br />
7 Note that this situation could be viewed as a <strong>for</strong>m of market failure if, in calculating the welfare of society, higher<br />
weight were given to some individuals (the less wealthy) than to others.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Below we consider each of these two rationales in turn. We focus mainly on the<br />
first, which includes a number of distinct situations.<br />
<strong>Market</strong>s and market failures<br />
An important question that economics attempts to address is whether and when<br />
goods and services should be provided by the public sector or the private sector.<br />
A further related question is the extent to which provision by the private sector<br />
should be left to unregulated markets, or be subject to some degree of control<br />
or regulation by the public sector.<br />
If certain conditions are met, the private provision of goods and services in a<br />
competitive market will maximise social welfare. A market in which these<br />
conditions hold is called a perfectly competitive market.<br />
When the conditions <strong>for</strong> perfect competition do not hold, this is called a ‘market<br />
failure’. It means that private provision through a competitive market could fail<br />
to maximise social welfare. In these circumstances it may be that intervention by<br />
the public sector would improve the welfare of society.<br />
Economists have identified the following market failures, which are explained in<br />
more detail below:<br />
● market power;<br />
● public goods;<br />
● externalities; and<br />
● imperfect in<strong>for</strong>mation.<br />
MARKET POWER 8<br />
For a market to be perfectly competitive there must be a large number of<br />
competing buyers and sellers trading an identical product or service. In<br />
particular, no market participant should be so large that they possess ‘market<br />
power’, or the ability to influence the market price. When this condition is<br />
violated, a profit maximising firm will restrict output and charge a higher price<br />
than would prevail in a perfectly competitive market. This reduces consumer<br />
welfare because consumers pay a higher price to receive the same good. Social<br />
welfare is also reduced because the value placed on lost units of output exceeds<br />
the cost of producing them.<br />
There are many reasons why the condition that there are a large number of<br />
competing buyers and sellers does not hold in some markets, three of which are<br />
outlined below.<br />
8 The following discussion draws on Stiglitz, J.E. (2000) Economics of the <strong>Public</strong> Sector, Third Edition, W.W.Norton<br />
and Company, New York/London.<br />
34
Section 5 – <strong>Market</strong> failures and the role of the public sector<br />
First, firms may engage in behaviour that stifles competition. Examples of<br />
this include firms merging to reduce the number of competitors in the market<br />
or suppliers <strong>for</strong>ming cartels by agreeing a price to charge or which customers<br />
to serve. Firms might also engage in strategic behaviour to <strong>for</strong>ce their<br />
competitors from the market, 9 <strong>for</strong> example, by setting prices below cost with the<br />
intention of raising them above competitive levels once rivals have exited. 10 This<br />
problem is normally addressed through laws that prohibit such behaviour<br />
(competition laws).<br />
Second, the goods or services traded might not be identical. For example,<br />
consumers may have different tastes and there<strong>for</strong>e choose to buy slightly<br />
different products. This allows some producers to charge higher prices if their<br />
products are preferred by consumers. While such markets are not perfectly<br />
competitive, they do not generally provide a rationale <strong>for</strong> government<br />
intervention. The fact that some firms can charge higher prices by differentiating<br />
their products provides an incentive <strong>for</strong> firms to innovate and develop products<br />
better suited to consumers’ needs. The greater variety of products available<br />
enhances customer choice and tends to increase consumer welfare. Even if<br />
prices rise, the benefits of increased choice may outweigh the increase in price<br />
so that consumers are better off.<br />
Third, the cost structure of the industry may mean that it would not be efficient<br />
to have a large number of competing firms. In some industries, known as<br />
‘natural monopolies’, firms incur very large fixed costs (costs which do not vary<br />
as output expands) and very low variable costs (the costs which increase as<br />
output increases). 11 In this situation, having two firms in the industry incurring<br />
two sets of fixed costs may be more expensive than if there is only one firm in<br />
the industry. Examples of these natural monopolies include utilities such as<br />
natural gas pipeline networks, as well as some public transport networks, such<br />
as a railway system. Natural monopoly is an extreme case but there exist many<br />
other sectors where fixed costs are large in relation to variable costs, making a<br />
smaller number of suppliers the more efficient outcome.<br />
Where a natural monopoly exists, an unregulated profit-maximising provider<br />
will set prices at a higher level than would prevail in a perfectly competitive<br />
market, restricting output and reducing social welfare. Governments can<br />
overcome this problem in a number of ways. For example, they could become<br />
the monopoly supplier and attempt to charge the perfectly competitive price;<br />
they could regulate the price charged by the private sector monopolist to<br />
9 Such strategic behaviour is normally sustainable only in markets where there are significant entry barriers,<br />
otherwise any attempt to raise prices above competitive levels would attract new entrants who would compete<br />
the price back down to its competitive level.<br />
10 Similarly customers might <strong>for</strong>m cartels in order to drive prices down or undertake mergers which reduce<br />
competition on the buyers’ side of the market.<br />
11 Formally speaking, a natural monopoly is an industry where average total costs are declining at the level of<br />
output where the market clears. See Baumol, W., J. Panzar and D. Willig (1982) Contestable <strong>Market</strong>s and the<br />
Theory of Industry Structure, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
attempt to achieve the same outcome; 12 or they could sell the right to become<br />
the monopolist and capture any monopoly profits <strong>for</strong> the public purse. 13<br />
PUBLIC GOODS<br />
<strong>Public</strong> goods have two characteristics which differentiate them from other goods<br />
and services: non-rivalry and non-excludability.<br />
● Non-rival goods or services have a zero marginal cost: the cost of supplying<br />
the good or service does not increase when the number of consumers or the<br />
volume of output they consume increases. An example of a non-rival good is<br />
a terrestrially broadcast television or radio service.<br />
● Non-excludable goods are goods or services where it is not possible to limit<br />
the number of consumers. In particular, suppliers are not able to provide<br />
services only to those who pay <strong>for</strong> them: other consumers can ‘free-ride’<br />
using the same service even though they have not paid to receive it.<br />
Examples of non-excludable goods include national defence and street<br />
lighting.<br />
A good which is both non-rival and non-excludable might not be provided by the<br />
private sector, or might be provided at a lower quantity than would maximise<br />
social welfare. If the supplier cannot exclude free-riders there is no incentive <strong>for</strong><br />
consumers to pay <strong>for</strong> the service, so the supplier might not be able to earn<br />
sufficient revenues to cover its costs, even when society would value its<br />
provision. The public sector may there<strong>for</strong>e need to intervene to ensure that such<br />
goods and services are provided in sufficient quantities.<br />
EXTERNALITIES<br />
The consumption of a good or service by one set of individuals can in some<br />
circumstances affect the welfare of others. This effect is called an externality.<br />
Externalities can be positive or negative. An example of a negative externality is<br />
the pollution created from the use of fossil fuels; an example of a positive<br />
externality is the benefit that a homeowner with a carefully tended garden<br />
confers on his neighbours. 14<br />
In the presence of an externality, the welfare society gains from the consumption<br />
of a product is different (higher or lower) than the welfare received by the<br />
suppliers and direct consumers of the product. As a result, the amount that<br />
direct consumers chose to use will not be the same as the level of consumption<br />
12 For a useful introduction to the issues of regulating natural monopolies see Armstrong, M., S. Cowan and J.<br />
Vickers. (1999) Regulatory Re<strong>for</strong>m: Economic Analysis and British Experience, The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA;<br />
and Newbery, D. (1999) Privatisation, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Industries, The MIT Press:<br />
Cambridge, MA.<br />
13 See Demsetz, H. (1968) ‘Why Regulate Utilities?’, Journal of Law and Economics, <strong>for</strong> the first paper suggesting<br />
that competition <strong>for</strong> a market with natural monopoly characteristics could result in an efficient outcome.<br />
14 This concept is related to that of public goods in that non-excludable public goods (e.g. street lighting and<br />
policing) create positive externalities.<br />
36
that would maximise social welfare. In these circumstances the government<br />
may wish to require or encourage greater or less use in order to maximise social<br />
welfare.<br />
INFORMATION FAILURES<br />
Consumers may lack adequate in<strong>for</strong>mation about the products and services they<br />
are buying. For example, consumers of financial products may be unaware of<br />
the risks of the investments they are making, a purchaser of a car might not<br />
know how reliable the car is. These in<strong>for</strong>mation failures may lead consumers to<br />
make decisions they would not have made in the presence of better in<strong>for</strong>mation,<br />
such as making an investment that is too risky, or buying an unreliable car. These<br />
decisions will reduce their welfare.<br />
<strong>Market</strong>s can also fail when there is asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation, a situation in which<br />
one party to a transaction is better in<strong>for</strong>med than the other. If the more in<strong>for</strong>med<br />
party has an incentive to use his superior in<strong>for</strong>mation to act opportunistically,<br />
then this can lead to what are known as ‘moral hazard’ problems. For example,<br />
complete insurance on a rental car may lead to the driver driving more carelessly<br />
than they would do if they were liable to pay <strong>for</strong> any damage.<br />
Governments may wish to avoid this problem by regulating which products can<br />
and cannot be sold or requiring the disclosure of certain in<strong>for</strong>mation.<br />
In some situations in<strong>for</strong>mation failures can mean that markets fail to function<br />
and trades which would enhance welfare do not take place. 15 For example, if<br />
consumers are not able to judge whether or not an investment is risky they may<br />
assume that all financial products are risky and choose not to buy any of them.<br />
This behaviour may encourage the sort of government intervention described<br />
above. Another example is that firms may be unwilling to invest in research and<br />
development if they expect that competitors will be able to copy their<br />
innovations. This may lead governments to introduce patents and laws to<br />
protect intellectual property. 16<br />
Social objectives and inequality<br />
Section 5 – <strong>Market</strong> failures and the role of the public sector<br />
Where markets do not display the failures described above, society might still<br />
decide that the outcome of an unregulated market would not be desirable<br />
because it conflicts with wider social objectives. For example, society may be<br />
concerned to avoid significant levels of inequality in income, wealth or<br />
15 Seminal papers describing how in<strong>for</strong>mational failures may give rise to incomplete markets include:<br />
Akerloff, G. (1970) ‘The <strong>Market</strong> <strong>for</strong> Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the <strong>Market</strong> Mechanism’, The Quarterly<br />
Journal of Economics 84; Greenwald and J. Stiglitz (1986) ‘Externalities in Economies with Imperfect In<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
and Incomplete <strong>Market</strong>s’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics; and Rothschild, M. and J.E. Stiglitz (1976)<br />
‘Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance <strong>Market</strong>s: An Essay on the Economics of Incomplete In<strong>for</strong>mation’, The<br />
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90.<br />
16 Lastly, markets may fail if they fail to reach a stable equilibrium. This can occur in periods of high inflation, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, which provides a rationale <strong>for</strong> macro-economic policies designed to maintain price stability. This area of<br />
government intervention is beyond the scope of this report.<br />
37
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
opportunities between different members or groups within society. This might<br />
mean that outcomes which maximise social welfare are undesirable because of<br />
the inequality between different members of society that they create. 17 This<br />
could, <strong>for</strong> example, lead to government intervention in the provision of<br />
unemployment benefits or pensions if it is felt that purely private-sector<br />
provision would fail to achieve the desired level of equality.<br />
17 Arguably, this can be seen as a <strong>for</strong>m of market failure if ‘equality’ is seen as a public good.<br />
38
SECTION 6<br />
Government Failure<br />
The previous section explained why unregulated markets may fail to maximise<br />
social welfare, or lead to undesirable outcomes. In some cases the market itself<br />
may produce solutions to these failures. For example, in order to avoid problems<br />
of incomplete in<strong>for</strong>mation, firms may invest in developing a reputation <strong>for</strong><br />
quality. In other cases, such solutions may not emerge and this might lead to<br />
intervention by the government to correct the market failure. However,<br />
intervention by government can itself have consequences <strong>for</strong> social welfare.<br />
Government intervention might fail to completely solve the problem it is<br />
attempting to address. In some situations this ‘government failure’ could be<br />
worse than the problem the intervention was designed to correct, so that<br />
government intervention reduces rather than improves social welfare and/or<br />
equality.<br />
We set out below a number of reasons why government failures may arise.<br />
INFORMATION PROBLEMS<br />
In unregulated markets, the price mechanism can help producers to know<br />
whether or not they should be producing a certain good or service. If the price<br />
is higher than their marginal cost of production they know that the value<br />
consumers place on the product (as revealed by the price they are willing to pay)<br />
is greater than the cost of supplying more output. It is worthwhile expanding<br />
output. Similarly, if the market price is below their marginal cost of production<br />
then customers do not value the products they are producing enough to<br />
continue maintaining current output levels. This in<strong>for</strong>mation helps suppliers to<br />
know whether or not to expand or contract output (and helps potential suppliers<br />
know whether they should enter the market). The decisions they take are both<br />
privately profitable <strong>for</strong> those suppliers and also help maximise social welfare by<br />
ensuring that products are produced when, and only when, their value to<br />
consumers exceeds the cost of producing them.<br />
When services are provided directly to users by the government, rather than<br />
through a market, this price mechanism will not be present. Hence in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
on whether or not it is worthwhile (from society’s point of view) to increase or<br />
reduce output is lost. The public sector, acting outside of a market, is likely to<br />
produce either too much or too little, and would only by an unlikely coincidence<br />
produce the socially optimal level of output.<br />
INEFFICIENCY<br />
As well as determining how much is produced, markets also help select the most<br />
efficient suppliers. Suppose there are two firms supplying a market with an<br />
identical product and one has higher costs than the other. As explained above, the<br />
39
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
market mechanism ensures that output is produced up to the point where price<br />
equals marginal cost. If price equals the marginal cost of the expensive producer,<br />
the other supplier will be able to expand its output which will lead to a fall in the<br />
market price. This means that price is below cost <strong>for</strong> the more expensive producer<br />
who will there<strong>for</strong>e cut back output, and perhaps exit the market altogether. In this<br />
way firms with lower costs win business from those with higher costs.<br />
The market will also provide consumers with an opportunity to chose between<br />
firms producing higher or lower quality output. In general, unless there is a big<br />
enough difference in price, consumers will choose producers of high quality<br />
output over producers of low quality output. The market mechanism thus directs<br />
business towards producers with lower costs and/or higher quality output.<br />
Direct provision by the government removes this process and can lead to<br />
inefficient or poor quality services being provided.<br />
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS<br />
The government’s policy goals may not be perfectly aligned with the interests of<br />
the managers that are implementing its policies. 18 Individual departments may<br />
expand their size, activities and budgets beyond that which is efficient in order<br />
to increase their own importance. 19 The interests of principal and agent can also<br />
diverge when an individual official has the scope to pursue his own political<br />
agenda. Principal agent problems are found in both the public and the private<br />
sector, but designing an appropriate incentive contract to re-align interests can<br />
be more difficult in the public sector. 20 The public sector is limited in how it<br />
compensates employees and cannot fire workers or award bonuses to the same<br />
extent as the private sector. Furthermore, the pursuit of social welfare rather<br />
than profit maximisation gives rise to a complex set of objectives, some of which<br />
may be difficult to measure. An incentive contract in this case could lead to the<br />
agent focussing his ef<strong>for</strong>ts on the measurable output to the detriment of the<br />
other non-measurable objectives. 21<br />
CAPTURE<br />
Government officials may be ‘captured’ by special interest groups and act in<br />
ways that are in the interests of these groups, rather than society as a whole. 22<br />
For example, an official could be persuaded by domestic producers to impose an<br />
18 Although this problem may arise equally <strong>for</strong> principals and agents in the private sector, designing an appropriate<br />
incentive contract to re-align the interests of principal and agent may be more difficult in the public sector. This<br />
issue is addressed in Tirole, J. (1994) ‘The Internal Organisation of Government’, Ox<strong>for</strong>d Economic Papers 46.<br />
19 The classic literature relating to bureaucratic behaviour and agency size is contained in:<br />
Niskanen, W.A. (1977), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine-Atherton: Chicago and Tullock, G.<br />
(1965), The Politics of Bureaucracy, <strong>Public</strong> Affairs Press: Washington DC.<br />
20 This issue is addressed in Tirole, J. (1994) ‘The Internal Organisation of Government’, Ox<strong>for</strong>d Economic Papers<br />
46.<br />
21 See Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1991) ‘Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset<br />
Ownership and Job Design’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 7.<br />
22 See Stigler, G. (1971) ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management<br />
Science 2(1).<br />
40
Section 6 – Government Failure<br />
import quota that would harm consumers, or to continue an inefficient subsidy<br />
scheme by those receiving the transfers. Because government intervention is a<br />
potential resource to such groups there is an incentive <strong>for</strong> them to organise and<br />
lobby the official to act in their collective interest. This will cause social welfare<br />
to suffer when the benefit accruing to the interest group falls short of the cost<br />
imposed on society. The adversely affected party will not lobby against the<br />
regulation if the incentives to do so are too weak. For example, consumers may<br />
object to paying the higher prices resulting from an import quota but may find it<br />
difficult to organise themselves. Any benefits from lobbying must be shared<br />
with a large number of individuals, and the temptation to ‘free-ride’ on the<br />
activities of others is strong.<br />
Regulatory capture may also arise as a result of asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation. For<br />
example, an official regulating prices in an industry may be reliant upon firms in<br />
the industry to provide cost in<strong>for</strong>mation. If reported costs are not easily<br />
verifiable, this provides an incentive <strong>for</strong> firms to over-state their costs in order to<br />
obtain a higher regulated price.<br />
41
SECTION 7<br />
<strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
We have seen in the previous sections that market failures and social objectives<br />
lead to government involvement in sectors of the economy. We have also seen<br />
that government intervention can bring its own problems.<br />
One reaction to this problem is to ask whether, even when a market failure<br />
exists, an unregulated private sector may be more desirable than government<br />
intervention. Government failure might outweigh the market failure it is trying to<br />
correct. However, a third option may be to change the mechanism the publicsector<br />
uses.<br />
Government failure results from the loss of certain advantages of free-market<br />
provision: such as incentives <strong>for</strong> efficiency and the role of the price mechanism<br />
in allocating resources. One approach, there<strong>for</strong>e, is to try to introduce these<br />
disciplines into the mechanism the public-sector uses. We refer to such<br />
mechanisms as ‘market-based mechanisms’, which we define as mechanisms<br />
that attempt to use market <strong>for</strong>ces to reduce the problem of government failure.<br />
The use of market-based mechanisms is unlikely to completely eliminate the<br />
impact of government failure. Nor is it guaranteed that their use will reduce this<br />
problem; that depends on how well they are designed and implemented.<br />
However, the careful use of market-based mechanisms can help to overcome<br />
some government failures. For example, in many cases it is possible <strong>for</strong><br />
governments to achieve their objectives by setting obligations that private firms<br />
have to meet or, where it is decided to keep service provision entirely in the<br />
public sector, by introducing customer choice to give a more efficient allocation<br />
of resources.<br />
For our purposes we divide market mechanisms into five broad categories.<br />
However, any particular application may involve a combination of more than<br />
one of these categories. In this section we describe each of these mechanisms in<br />
turn, be<strong>for</strong>e noting the problems that need to be taken into account when<br />
considering the use of these mechanisms. The mechanisms we consider are:<br />
● competitive tendering of service provision;<br />
● introducing user choice;<br />
● marketable permits (‘cap and trade’;)<br />
● taxes and subsidies;<br />
● regulating access.<br />
In addition, we consider the use of auctions as a means to value scarce resources.<br />
42
Competitive tendering of service provision<br />
Some areas of public policy involve the public sector directly providing services<br />
to the public. For example, the criminal justice system has traditionally involved<br />
the public sector directly providing a number of services: a police <strong>for</strong>ce, courts<br />
and prisons.<br />
As noted in section 6, pure government provision of a service can lead to<br />
inefficiencies due to the absence of the discipline the profit motivation provides,<br />
and conflicts between the incentives of those working in the public sector and<br />
the overall goal of policy makers. In some cases, these problems can be resolved<br />
by tendering <strong>for</strong> the supply of the particular service. This is similar to the use of<br />
franchises in the private sector, where, although overall control may rest with a<br />
single firm, the operation of a particular activity is delegated to other firms or<br />
individuals.<br />
Competitive tendering of service provision is often possible as in many cases a<br />
government obligation to supply a particular service need not involve<br />
government delivery of the service. In many cases, governments can meet their<br />
objectives by using the private sector to undertake all or part of the actual<br />
delivery of the service. For example, even though the government has a<br />
commitment to provide prisons, this commitment can be met by using private<br />
sector firms to run these prisons.<br />
By placing the provision out to competitive tender, governments can introduce<br />
competition into areas of the economy that may previously have been insulated<br />
from this process. Moreover, this tender process need not only involve private<br />
sector firms. Research suggests that it is the introduction of competition,<br />
regardless of whether the winner is in the private or the public sector, which<br />
delivers the main benefit in improving the efficiency of service provision. 23<br />
BENEFITS OF THIS SYSTEM<br />
The benefits of competitive tendering can be divided into two main types:<br />
● the reduction of costs through incentives to increase efficiency; and<br />
● the introduction of ex ante competition <strong>for</strong> the market.<br />
The reduction of costs through incentives to increase efficiency<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
It was noted in section 6 that government delivery of services can suffer from a<br />
lack of efficiency as the incentives of individuals carrying out the delivery of the<br />
service may differ from the government’s overall objective. For example, if there<br />
is prestige attached to having a large department size, then this can directly<br />
conflict with the objective to provide a service on the most efficient basis. Even<br />
23 Domberger et al. (1995) ‘The determinants of price and quality in competitively tendered contracts’, Economic<br />
Journal; and Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986) ‘Competitive tendering and efficiency: the case of<br />
refuse collection’, Fiscal Studies 8.<br />
43
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
when individual incentives are aligned with the attainment of social objectives,<br />
public sector provision may be less effective than private sector provision.<br />
<strong>Market</strong>s provide sharper incentives <strong>for</strong> cost efficiency through the profit motive<br />
and are better able to disperse in<strong>for</strong>mation through the price mechanism.<br />
In contrast, placing the right to provide a service out to competitive tender<br />
provides a direct incentive to increase the efficiency of service provision.<br />
Provided that there is sufficient competition and that the requirements can be<br />
appropriately specified, then competitive tendering can give strong incentives to<br />
improve efficiency. There are many studies that have found that outsourcing<br />
reduces government expenditure, with savings typically estimated in the region<br />
of 20 per cent. 24 Examples of these reductions include:<br />
● savings of around 20 per cent after contracting out refuse collection in UK<br />
local government; 25<br />
● savings of around 34 per cent in hospital domestic service provision based on<br />
a sample of over 3,000 hospitals in the UK; 26<br />
● savings of between 11 and 19 per cent in refuse collection by municipalities<br />
in Sweden. 27<br />
A key question is whether these cost reductions are due to the introduction of<br />
competition or to the switch to using a private sector firm. Privatisation, the<br />
transfer of the service provider from public to private ownership, can be achieved<br />
without introducing competition. For example, the existing operation could be<br />
sold to the private sector without any provision <strong>for</strong> tendering of the contract <strong>for</strong><br />
provision of services. On the other hand, the use of a competitive tendering<br />
process might leave provision under public sector ownership, if the existing<br />
public sector operation wins the competitive tender. In order to identify the<br />
benefits of competition it is necessary to separate out the effect of privatisation<br />
from the effect of competitive tendering.<br />
Distinguishing between these two effects is not straight<strong>for</strong>ward. It can be<br />
difficult to isolate changes in costs due to changes in specifications and there<br />
may be problems with controlling <strong>for</strong> any changes in quality. 28 However, despite<br />
these qualifications, on balance, studies suggest that it is the introduction of<br />
competition rather than a change from public to private ownership that matters.<br />
24 See Edwards and Stevens (1978); Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thomspon (1986); Reeves and Barrow (2000);<br />
Nash, 1993; Reca and Zieg (1995); Ahlbrandt (1973); Edwards (1996) and Blom-Hansen (2003).<br />
25 Szymanski, S. and Wilkins, S. (1993) ‘Cheap rubbish? Competitive tendering and contracting out in refuse<br />
collection- 1981-88’, Fiscal Studies 14(3).<br />
26 Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson(1987) ‘The impact of competitive tendering on the costs of hospital<br />
domestic services’ Fiscal Studies 8(4). This estimate has been confirmed with more recent data by Milne and<br />
McGee (1992) ‘Compulsory Competitive Tendering in the NHS: a new look at some old estimates’, Fiscal Studies<br />
13(3).<br />
27 Ohlsson, H. (1998) ‘Ownership and production costs: Choosing between public production and contracting out’,<br />
Uppsala University, Working paper No.1998-6, Sweden.<br />
28 Jensen, P.H. and R.E. Stonecash, (2004) ‘The efficiency of public sector outsourcing contracts: a literature review’,<br />
Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2004n29, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social<br />
Research, The University of Melbourne.<br />
44
As Stonecash and Jensen (2004) observe, if the private sector were inherently<br />
more efficient than the public sector, outsourcing to private firms should result<br />
in larger savings than services outsourced to an in-house team. However, the<br />
balance of evidence shows that observed outsourcing savings are achieved<br />
whether the service provider winning the contract is public or private. 29 These<br />
savings come both from better management of resources and higher<br />
productivity of inputs, and in some cases also from lower wages <strong>for</strong> staff. 30<br />
Moreover, other studies have shown that simply changing from public to private<br />
ownership may yield little efficiency benefits if competition is not introduced at<br />
the same time. 31 Together this all suggests that it is the introduction of<br />
competition that leads to greater efficiency.<br />
The introduction of ex ante competition <strong>for</strong> the market<br />
Some services can be characterised as natural monopolies as the characteristics<br />
of demand and supply mean that they may be most efficiently supplied by one<br />
supplier. For example, on rural bus routes there may be insufficient demand to<br />
support more than one provider, or indeed in some circumstances the route may<br />
only be profitable at all with a subsidy. In such cases, where it is not possible to<br />
have competition ‘in’ the market, the use of tendering may make it possible to<br />
have competition ‘<strong>for</strong>’ the market where rival firms bid <strong>for</strong> the right to run the<br />
monopoly service. 32 Although this ex-ante competition is not a total substitute<br />
<strong>for</strong> competition ‘in’ the market, in circumstances where competition in the<br />
market is not possible it can yield many of its benefits. For example, it may not<br />
be economic to have two competing bus operators on a local bus route.<br />
However, by allowing competing companies to compete <strong>for</strong> the right to provide<br />
the monopoly service, some of the monopoly profits can be recouped ex-ante.<br />
In addition, this could be combined with limits on fares to prevent the<br />
exploitation of monopoly power.<br />
APPLICATIONS<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
Competitive tendering can be used in situations where a government obligation<br />
to provide a particular service can be separated from the actual delivery of the<br />
service. This has been used in a number of applications ranging from cleaning<br />
29 Domberger et al. (1995) ‘The determinants of price and quality in competitively tendered contracts’, Economic<br />
Journal. This study looks at contracts <strong>for</strong> cleaning services awarded through competitive tender, comparing those<br />
tendered with those not tendered, and those contracted out with those won by the in-house team. Domberger et<br />
al find it is the tendering of the contract <strong>for</strong> competition that leads to observed reductions in price, and conclude<br />
that contracting out rather than awarding contracts to an in-house team has a negligible impact on both price and<br />
quality; Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986) ‘Competitive tendering and efficiency: the case of refuse<br />
collection’ Fiscal Studies 8. This paper reports similar conclusions with respect to refuse collection, as savings<br />
from introducing competition through the tender process are of a similar order whether the contract is awarded<br />
to a private contractor or the in-house team.<br />
30 Cubbin, J. Domberger, S. and Meadowcroft, S. (1986) ‘Competitive tendering and refuse collection: identifying the<br />
sources of efficiency gains’, Fiscal Studies 8.<br />
31 Pollitt per<strong>for</strong>ms a social cost benefit analysis of the Scottish electricity generating companies and finds negligible<br />
benefits. He suggests that this is due to the lack of restructuring as remaining vertically integrated may have<br />
impeded entry by competitors into the home market. Pollitt, M. (1999) ‘The restructuring and privatisation of the<br />
electricity supply industry in Scotland’, Mimeo.<br />
32 Demsetz, H. (1968) ‘Why regulate utilities?’, Journal of Law and Economics.<br />
45
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
services and refuse collection to private prisons. Private prisons is one of the<br />
case studies considered in Part IV of this report.<br />
In addition, competitive tendering has proved successful as a means of<br />
allocating the right to provide a monopoly service. In the UK, the right to operate<br />
bus and train routes have all been allocated by competitive tender. Given the<br />
lack of financial viability of several of these routes, this has often been on the<br />
basis of which operator will accept the lowest subsidy.<br />
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES<br />
Economic theory and studies of past experience suggest that the following<br />
implementation issues can affect the success of competitive tendering:<br />
● market power;<br />
● incomplete contracts; and<br />
● asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation.<br />
The evidence on these issues which we have examined is set out in Part V. Below<br />
we summarise the main conclusions we have drawn from this evidence<br />
<strong>Market</strong> power<br />
<strong>Market</strong> power problems can occur <strong>for</strong> two reasons. First, there may be only one<br />
firm which is able to bid <strong>for</strong> the contract, in which case the benefits of<br />
competition would not be realised. This problem is most likely to arise where<br />
there is an incumbent supplier and potential competitors perceive that this<br />
incumbent has such an advantage that there is no point in bidding. If there<br />
genuinely is only one potential bidder then this might suggest that competitive<br />
tendering is not a desirable approach; but in practice it may be possible to<br />
redesign the contract put out to tender in order to encourage more firms to bid.<br />
We list below some ways to achieve this.<br />
● Breaking up the contract into a series of smaller contracts that are awarded to<br />
different bidders may avoid creating a dominant incumbent supplier. This<br />
might involve a restriction on the number of contracts that can be awarded to<br />
one firm. While this may create some costs in the short run (because<br />
economies of scale across contracts are lost, or because the most<br />
economically advantageous bid cannot be accepted <strong>for</strong> some contracts) these<br />
may be offset by the increase in competition <strong>for</strong> tenders over the longer run<br />
and the potential <strong>for</strong> yardstick competition in the interim.<br />
46
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
● Increasing the length of the contract term reduces the number of times the<br />
contract is re-tendered and competition takes place. If this means that<br />
opportunities to win a contract are rare, it could <strong>for</strong>ce unsuccessful firms to<br />
exit, reducing competition <strong>for</strong> future tenders. On the other hand, a longer<br />
contract term may in fact increase competition <strong>for</strong> each tender because it<br />
makes each contract potentially more profitable and there<strong>for</strong>e may<br />
encourage more firms to bid.<br />
● The terms of the contract can also affect the incentives to bid. A fixed-price<br />
contract will be desirable in one sense, because it transfers risk (the risk that<br />
costs might increase, <strong>for</strong> example) to the service provider who then has an<br />
incentive to manage and minimise these risks (keep costs under control, <strong>for</strong><br />
example). However, transferring this risk to the provider also reduces their<br />
incentive to participate. There<strong>for</strong>e, if there is concern over a lack of competition,<br />
it may be desirable to reduce the extent to which risk is transferred to the<br />
service provider (by the use of some element of cost-plus pricing).<br />
● One factor that might favour an incumbent is the switching costs that would<br />
be incurred by the public sector when switching providers. If the public sector<br />
commits to ignore these switching costs this might encourage other firms to<br />
bid. This would be sensible if the gains from encouraging competition are<br />
expected to outweigh the additional switching costs that might be incurred.<br />
Second, problems of market power can occur if there is collusion between<br />
potential bidders. This might involve an agreement over which tenders will be<br />
won by which firms, with other firms not bidding or bidding at high prices in<br />
order to avoid winning the tender. The nature of public procurement means that<br />
it is often susceptible to such collusive behaviour. For example, potential bidders<br />
will often have to meet certain criteria which limit the number of potential<br />
bidders and create barriers to entry <strong>for</strong> new participants. There is also likely to<br />
be transparency over the contracts that are available and who has won each<br />
contract, which helps firms to monitor whether competitors are complying with<br />
their collusive agreement.<br />
It may be possible to reduce the risks of collusion by addressing these factors:<br />
reducing any qualifying criteria <strong>for</strong> participants and reducing transparency over<br />
tender outcomes. However, this might not be possible: qualifying criteria may be<br />
important to maintain service quality, <strong>for</strong> example.<br />
It may also be possible to reduce the risks of collusion through the choice of<br />
auction design. For example, a sealed-bid auction (where participants submit<br />
their bids simultaneously in one round of bidding) will reduce transparency<br />
compared to an open auction (where participants are invited to make bids at a<br />
specified price which is then raised or lowered, depending on the type of<br />
auction). A sealed-bid auction may reduce efficiency but this might be<br />
considered acceptable where the risk of collusion would otherwise be high. Part<br />
V contains in<strong>for</strong>mation on how open auction design can be tailored to minimise<br />
the risks of collusion.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Incomplete contracts<br />
Ideally, when a service is contracted out to the private sector, the contract should<br />
specify not just the price but also the quality of service to be provided. In<br />
practice, however, it may be difficult to specify quality criteria that are<br />
comprehensive and capable of measurement. This can lead providers to<br />
sacrifice quality in order to minimise costs, or to focus only on measures of<br />
quality that can easily be measured. In general, contracting out will work best<br />
where the opportunities to reduce costs through reducing quality are small or<br />
the effect on quality can be easily measured.<br />
Partly this issue can be addressed by ensuring that contracts have well specified<br />
measures of quality, which are effectively monitored and en<strong>for</strong>ced, although it<br />
may not always be possible to devise and implement such measures. This can<br />
be rein<strong>for</strong>ced, however, if firms know that the quality of the service they provide<br />
(broadly defined) will affect whether they are successful in future tenders. This<br />
can create incentives to maintain quality standards even where they are not<br />
specified in the contract.<br />
Hold-up problem<br />
A related issue is the ‘hold-up’ problem. This problem occurs in contracts when<br />
an initial commitment by one party exposes it to ex post opportunism by the<br />
other. For example, when a contractor considers whether to undertake a large<br />
investment in a specific asset, it will take into account the incentives <strong>for</strong> the<br />
official managing the contract to renegotiate prices down once the investment<br />
has been undertaken. If the investment is irreversible and has no alternative use<br />
outside the public sector, the government could theoretically ‘hold-up’ the<br />
contractor and capture the entire benefits of the investment <strong>for</strong> itself without<br />
paying an appropriate transfer fee. This is a problem arising from incomplete<br />
contracts because, if the government could credibly commit to not acting in this<br />
manner, the contractor would face the correct incentives when making his<br />
investment decisions. However, where such commitment is not possible, the<br />
contractor will be aware of the potential <strong>for</strong> hold-up and consequently invest<br />
less.<br />
Asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
There may be circumstances where the public sector has less in<strong>for</strong>mation than<br />
potential service providers, or some service providers possess less in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
than others. Both of these cases can raise implementation issues.<br />
The first situation, which is related to incomplete contracts, arises when the<br />
public sector is not able to monitor the efficiency of the service provider. For<br />
example, if costs rise it may be difficult to know whether this is due to<br />
inefficiency on the part of the service provider or factors outside its control. To<br />
address this problem it may be desirable to transfer risk to the service provider<br />
(through a fixed-fee contract, <strong>for</strong> example) in order to increase its incentives to<br />
minimise costs – although this approach could increase short-run costs and may<br />
48
educe the level of participation, and there<strong>for</strong>e competition, in the tendering<br />
process. Where lack of competition is not a concern, the incentive benefits of<br />
transferring risk to the private sector are more likely to outweigh any short-run<br />
increase in costs.<br />
The second situation, where some potential service providers have less<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation than others, can give rise to a ‘winner’s curse’ problem. This arises<br />
when bidders do not know the true costs of providing the service and make<br />
different <strong>for</strong>ecasts. The bidder that wins the contract will be the one with the<br />
lowest <strong>for</strong>ecast, which is most likely to be below the true cost of providing the<br />
service. It might be expected that this will be a good result <strong>for</strong> the public sector,<br />
but it can result in firms feeling under pressure to cut quality, raising their<br />
bidding price in order to compensate <strong>for</strong> this risk or deciding not to participate<br />
since they expect the contract to prove unprofitable <strong>for</strong> the successful bidder.<br />
In general, the winner’s curse problem can be minimised by providing bidders<br />
with more in<strong>for</strong>mation so that they can make accurate <strong>for</strong>ecasts of their costs.<br />
An open auction can also assist this process since bidders can use in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
on competitors’ bids to adjust their own <strong>for</strong>ecasts. A smaller number of bidders<br />
will also reduce the likelihood of a winner’s curse. However, as explained above,<br />
all these factors can increase the risks of collusion.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
Competitive tendering allows the government to retain ownership of public<br />
assets whilst harnessing the sharper incentives <strong>for</strong> efficiency and innovation<br />
offered by the private sector. We have set out above a number of factors that<br />
could influence the way in which this is implemented. Clearly, there are tradeoffs<br />
to be made here – decisions which address concerns over asymmetric<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation may increase the likelihood of collusion between participants, <strong>for</strong><br />
example. Nevertheless, by considering the weight that should be attached to the<br />
risks identified above in any particular circumstance, it will be possible to<br />
identify which approaches are most likely to be successful in that particular case.<br />
The case study on competitive tendering of prison services in Part IV assesses<br />
the evidence on how competitive tendering in that case affected cost efficiency<br />
and innovation, and looks at whether the potential problems highlighted by<br />
theory have been encountered in practice. Specifically, we have examined<br />
whether problems of market power and incumbency advantage arose in the<br />
market <strong>for</strong> prison management services, and whether costs were cut at the<br />
expense of quality. We also considered how problems of asymmetric<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation have been overcome in the design of incentive contracts to avoid<br />
both ‘winner’s curse’ and ‘hold-up’ problems.<br />
User choice<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
In some cases, full competitive tendering of a service may not be considered an<br />
option. For example, quality may be difficult to control or competitive tendering<br />
49
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
would not be considered politically acceptable. However, even in these cases<br />
where the service is to remain in public hands, it can be possible to use carefully<br />
targeted market-based mechanisms to deliver a more efficient and customerresponsive<br />
service. This can be done by introducing what we term ‘user choice’.<br />
At one extreme (a so-called ‘command-and-control economy’), the government<br />
decides who gets which service, at which location and at what time. With this<br />
system, the citizen is effectively presented with a ‘take it or leave it’ choice. For<br />
example, consider the case of state-provided nurseries. In a command-andcontrol<br />
system, the state would tell parents which nursery their child has a place<br />
at. In such a system there is no competition between nurseries and parents have<br />
no choice where to send their child. As a consequence, there is little incentive <strong>for</strong><br />
efficiency on the part of nurseries, apart from any intrinsic reward in providing<br />
good services.<br />
The situation is significantly different under a ‘user-choice’ system. Under a<br />
user-choice system, resources follow the citizen rather than the citizen following<br />
the resources. Government commitments to supply given services (e.g. the<br />
government will provide free nursery places) are expressed in terms of citizen’s<br />
‘entitlements’ to a given good (i.e. each child is entitled to a nursery place) that<br />
have an (implicit) monetary value. In the example of nursery care, this can be<br />
seen as analogous to a system where each citizen has a ‘voucher’ (whether<br />
explicit or implicit), which can be exchanged in return <strong>for</strong> the specified service.<br />
User choice could be introduced in a system of purely public provision; it could<br />
be introduced by selecting providers from the private sector; or it could be<br />
introduced in a system that allows users to choose between both public and<br />
private sector providers. For example, the ‘nursery voucher’ could be exchanged<br />
<strong>for</strong> a place at either a state or privately run nursery. If the rationale <strong>for</strong><br />
intervention is to address concerns over the equity of provision, then this could<br />
be addressed by providing each child with a voucher (or possibly providing<br />
vouchers, or higher value vouchers, only to poorer children). There is no reason<br />
to restrict the use of the voucher to public sector providers. 33<br />
BENEFITS<br />
Introducing user choice can generate benefits through both the demand-side<br />
and the supply-side of the market <strong>for</strong> the publicly provided good or service<br />
concerned. The main benefit achieved through both channels is improved<br />
efficiency, and so it is worth briefly considering the different types of efficiency<br />
that can be achieved in an economic system. The first of these is allocative<br />
efficiency: 34 this refers to efficiency in the allocation of scarce resources amongst<br />
alternative uses. In an allocatively efficient outcome, no one can be made better<br />
33 Nor is it necessary to operate such a scheme by issuing physical vouchers to parents. A similar result can be<br />
achieved without vouchers if all nurseries, state and private-run, receive a given amount of funding per child.<br />
The only difference in this case is that private-run nurseries receiving funding must commit to not charging fees<br />
<strong>for</strong> places.<br />
34 Also known as Pareto efficiency.<br />
50
off by transferring resources from one activity to another without making<br />
someone else worse off. Productive efficiency is a pre-condition <strong>for</strong> allocative<br />
efficiency, and refers to efficiency in production. It occurs when a specific<br />
outcome or level of output is achieved using the most cost-effective means. An<br />
economy can achieve both allocative and productive efficiency in the short run<br />
whilst still being inefficient in the longer-run, <strong>for</strong> example by not spending<br />
enough money on research and development. Long run, or dynamic efficiency,<br />
refers to the efficient use of resources over time and ensures, <strong>for</strong> example, that<br />
new products are designed to meet evolving needs and new production<br />
methods are developed to lower future production costs.<br />
Supply-side benefits<br />
User choice provides direct incentives <strong>for</strong> public sector organisations to provide<br />
a service that responds to the needs of users. Many of the benefits from<br />
introducing choice derive from the competitive stimulus that choice applies to<br />
service providers. The benefits of competition have been discussed earlier in this<br />
report, and include improved resource allocation (allocative efficiency), an<br />
improved responsiveness of providers to user preferences, and sharper<br />
incentives <strong>for</strong> quality, productive efficiency and innovation (long-run efficiency).<br />
Providers offering a poor service will attract fewer customers and consequently<br />
fewer funds than those providing a superior service. The system consequently<br />
can give clear and direct feedback on the relative per<strong>for</strong>mance of a unit in a way<br />
that is not visible under a command-and-control system. This benefit can help<br />
solve the problem of a lack of comparable per<strong>for</strong>mance measures, which can be<br />
the case in the public sector. 35 Improving quality of public services is obviously<br />
of merit in itself, but may also lead to improvements in measured outcomes. For<br />
example, in the context of education, Hoxby (2003) notes that schools may be<br />
<strong>for</strong>ced to issue more in<strong>for</strong>mation in order to attract parents: better-in<strong>for</strong>med<br />
parents are then likely to become better ‘customers’ with positive impacts on<br />
student per<strong>for</strong>mance.<br />
Demand-side benefits<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
Even if the increase in competition created by a user-choice system is minimal,<br />
encouraging customer choice can improve allocative efficiency by revealing<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation that may not be immediately visible in a command and control<br />
system. For example, a centrally administered allocation of places may result in<br />
a suboptimal allocation of resources if it does not take individual preferences<br />
into account. As Bradley and Taylor (2002) note in the context of education, if<br />
parents and students have less control over their choice of school, there is a<br />
greater possibility of mismatch between student and school and there<strong>for</strong>e of<br />
poorer student per<strong>for</strong>mance. A system that involves a role <strong>for</strong> customer choice<br />
can help prevent this problem.<br />
35 Tirole, J. (1994) ‘The internal organisation of government’, Ox<strong>for</strong>d Economic Papers 46.<br />
51
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Empowering consumers by enabling them to exercise choice can be a goal in its<br />
own right, as in the case of choice-based lettings, which is examined in Part IV<br />
below. It may also lead to improvements in customer satisfaction. For example,<br />
having and exercising choice over primary care physicians has been associated<br />
with higher satisfaction with the care received. 36 Creating a sense of<br />
empowerment can also improve measured outcomes by creating incentives <strong>for</strong><br />
individuals to assume some of the responsibility <strong>for</strong> outcomes themselves. 37 For<br />
example, in the case of education, a parent who has selected a particular school<br />
<strong>for</strong> their child is more likely to remain involved in the rest of the child’s education<br />
process than a parent who felt they had no choice at the outset. This in turn is<br />
likely to be associated with better student per<strong>for</strong>mance.<br />
Evidence<br />
The impact of user choice on efficiency and standards has been evaluated in a<br />
number of studies, particularly in relation to the supply-side effects of<br />
introducing competition between education providers. Many of these studies<br />
use evidence from experiments with voucher schemes <strong>for</strong> education introduced<br />
in various locations in the US. In these voucher schemes, each parent is given a<br />
voucher <strong>for</strong> the value of a child’s education, which can be given either to a state<br />
or to a private school. For example, the Milwaukee (Wisconsin) Parental Choice<br />
Program was introduced in 1989 and offered low-income families state support<br />
<strong>for</strong> tuition costs of private schools. Evidence since 1998 shows competition has<br />
had positive impacts on state schools. Hoxby (2003) finds that where<br />
competition was strongest, state school test scores are 8 percentile points higher<br />
in maths and languages and 14 percentile points higher in science relative to<br />
areas untouched by competition. The scheme was also designed to reduce<br />
inequality. Competition was increased most where there were more children<br />
from less well-off backgrounds as more students in these areas qualified <strong>for</strong><br />
vouchers, and per<strong>for</strong>mance improved most where competition was strongest.<br />
APPLICATIONS<br />
Choice can be exercised in a variety of dimensions, including the quantity<br />
consumed, which provider delivers the service, and the type of product<br />
consumed. 38 Areas of public service provision into which consumer choice has<br />
been introduced include schools, health services and social housing.<br />
Educational Choice in the UK<br />
Since 1988, parents in England and Wales have been able to send their children<br />
to any school of their choosing, capacity constraints permitting. Improvements<br />
36 See Amyx, D., JC Mowen and R Hamm (2000) ‘Patient satisfaction: a matter of choice’, Journal of Services<br />
<strong>Market</strong>ing, 14, 7; Kalda, R., K. Polluste and M. Lember (2003) ‘Patient satisfaction with care is associated with<br />
personal choice of physician,’ Health <strong>Policy</strong> 64(1); Hsu, J., J. Schmittdiel, E Krupat , T Stein, D Thom, B Fireman<br />
and J Selby (2003) ‘Patient choice: a randomised controlled trial of provider selection’, Journal of General Internal<br />
Medicine, 18(5).<br />
37 See Osborne and Gaebler (1992) Op Cit.<br />
38 Where the good or service concerned can be horizontally differentiated.<br />
52
in outcomes are difficult to distinguish from other education re<strong>for</strong>ms enacted<br />
during the period. However, Bradley and Taylor (2002) find evidence to suggest<br />
that standards improved more sharply where there was greater competition<br />
between schools. They estimate that a 3 per cent improvement in the<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance of a secondary school’s competitors at GCSE level is associated<br />
with a 1 per cent improvement in the school’s own GCSE results, and find that<br />
new admissions are positively related to a school’s own per<strong>for</strong>mance and<br />
negatively to the exam per<strong>for</strong>mance of its competitors. Glennerster (2002) finds<br />
evidence that educational inequalities have narrowed under a system of choice,<br />
with the worse per<strong>for</strong>ming schools experiencing the largest improvements in<br />
students meeting target levels.<br />
Choice-based lettings<br />
The use of consumer choice in the provision of social housing in the UK is<br />
described as one of our case studies in Part IV.<br />
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES<br />
Economic theory and studies of past experience suggest that the following<br />
implementation issues can affect the success of consumer choice schemes:<br />
● capacity constraints;<br />
● inequality of access;<br />
● segregation;<br />
● in<strong>for</strong>mation; and<br />
● incentives to over-consume.<br />
The evidence on these issues which we have examined is set out in Part V. Below<br />
we summarise the main conclusions we have drawn from this evidence<br />
Capacity constraints<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
The introduction of consumer choice is likely to lead to capacity constraints <strong>for</strong><br />
those providers that are most popular with users. On the supply-side of the<br />
market, this problem can lead to the need <strong>for</strong> some <strong>for</strong>m of rationing between<br />
consumers, reintroducing some element of command and control. One rationing<br />
mechanism is <strong>for</strong> the provider to ‘cream skim’ the most desirable consumers. For<br />
example, schools may decide to allocate places to the most academically able<br />
pupils. This cream skimming can allow the school to improve its apparent<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance without increasing its actual per<strong>for</strong>mance. To some extent, the<br />
effect on apparent per<strong>for</strong>mance can be addressed if more sophisticated measures<br />
of per<strong>for</strong>mance are used (which adjust <strong>for</strong> differences in pupil intakes, <strong>for</strong><br />
example). The problem can also be dealt with by specifying the rationing<br />
mechanism to be used.<br />
53
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Capacity constraints can also influence outcomes through the demand-side of<br />
the market. Customers who are unable to exercise their right to choice due to the<br />
existence of capacity constraints may become despondent and consider the<br />
allocation process unfair. This will lead to reductions in customer satisfaction,<br />
and may reduce policy per<strong>for</strong>mance against other measures if, <strong>for</strong> example, it<br />
leads to customers disengaging from the processes concerned and ceasing to<br />
participate effectively.<br />
The underlying problem here is that supply does not expand to match increasing<br />
demand, as we would expect to happen in private-sector markets. To address<br />
this problem there would need to be some mechanism to ensure that investment<br />
decisions reflect in<strong>for</strong>mation revealed by the consumer choice ‘market’ rather<br />
than being made in isolation from the scheme.<br />
Inequality of access<br />
Where consumer choice is introduced it may be that certain members of society<br />
(those who are wealthier or better educated) may be better able to exercise their<br />
right to choose. For example, those with better access to transport may find it<br />
easier to use a hospital or school of their choice. Depending on the<br />
circumstances, this may still be a better outcome than when consumers had no<br />
choice – which in the case of education can lead to the better schools being, in<br />
effect, reserved to those who can af<strong>for</strong>d to buy houses near to the most<br />
desirable schools. The problem might be reduced by measures taken to improve<br />
consumers’ ability to choose: the provision of appropriate in<strong>for</strong>mation and<br />
access to transport, <strong>for</strong> example.<br />
Inequality can be distinguished into inequalities of opportunity and outcome<br />
inequality. Inequalities of opportunity include better access to transport links, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, and may give rise to inequalities in outcomes if those with better<br />
opportunities are able to use them to obtain a superior result. Inequalities in<br />
outcomes can arise between individuals or between geographical regions.<br />
Geographical inequality is more likely to occur when mobility is low and users<br />
are effectively locked into their local suppliers. This can allow the market to<br />
develop into sub-sectors of under-per<strong>for</strong>ming suppliers located in<br />
disadvantaged areas and excellent suppliers located in more advantaged areas,<br />
with users in disadvantaged areas unable to exercise their choice by switching<br />
to a better-per<strong>for</strong>ming provider.<br />
Segregation<br />
Introducing user choice can lead to an increase in segregation through both the<br />
supply and demand sides of the market. On the supply side, segregation may<br />
arise as a result of discrimination by providers. This problem is linked to<br />
the capacity constraint problems outlined above and can be limited using<br />
the same controls. On the demand side, increased segregation can occur either<br />
as a direct result of the exercise of choice by individuals of the same<br />
ethnic/working/educational background, or as an indirect result of any increase in<br />
54
inequality. Measures to limit increases in inequality can there<strong>for</strong>e be helpful in<br />
preventing further segregation. But direct controls, like quota systems, are likely<br />
to introduce other problems by reducing the amount of effective choice on offer.<br />
This suggests that a different market mechanism should be considered <strong>for</strong> cases<br />
in which segregation is both undesirable and likely to occur as a direct result<br />
of choice.<br />
In<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
For user choice to generate positive outcomes, consumers must be able to make<br />
rational decisions. They will be able to do so only if they posses sufficient<br />
relevant in<strong>for</strong>mation in a language and <strong>for</strong>mat they will be able to understand.<br />
Even then, consumers must still be willing to bear the costs of collecting and<br />
analysing this in<strong>for</strong>mation, which in some cases may be considerable.<br />
In<strong>for</strong>mation can impact outcomes through both the supply and demand sides of<br />
the market. On the supply side, service providers must face the correct<br />
incentives to provide appropriate in<strong>for</strong>mation to all consumers. On the demand<br />
side, consumers must be willing to gather and process the in<strong>for</strong>mation provided.<br />
The costs of introducing choice where consumers lack the necessary<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation or the ability to process it will be greatest <strong>for</strong> experience goods.<br />
These are goods where consumers only learn their actual quality after<br />
purchasing them, <strong>for</strong> example health care products. In the private sector,<br />
advertising can be used as a signal <strong>for</strong> quality to help prevent consumers making<br />
costly mistakes when purchasing such goods. Because consumers will make<br />
repeat purchases of goods only if they turn out to be of high quality, only high<br />
quality firms can generate sufficient revenue from advertising to make it<br />
compatible with a profit-maximising strategy. Consumers are aware of this, and<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e expect that an expensive advertisement campaign signals high<br />
quality. 39 However, the same is not true of the public sector, where funding is<br />
often independent of per<strong>for</strong>mance. <strong>Public</strong> sector providers must there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
develop alternative means of signalling quality, perhaps by providing more<br />
detailed in<strong>for</strong>mation regarding historical per<strong>for</strong>mance.<br />
With credence goods, 40 the provision of trustworthy in<strong>for</strong>mation becomes even<br />
more important. These are goods where the consumer cannot assess the quality<br />
of the product, even after consumption has taken place. For example,<br />
in healthcare services, a patient may recover following his doctor’s<br />
recommendations <strong>for</strong> other reasons and yet ascribe his recovery to the high<br />
quality service provided by his doctor. The ability of a consumer to make rational<br />
choices about credence goods is there<strong>for</strong>e limited even after they have<br />
consumed the good from that provider be<strong>for</strong>e.<br />
39 The concept of experience goods and the intuition behind advertising as a signal of quality was first developed<br />
by Nelson (1970, 1974). See Nelson, P. (1970) ‘In<strong>for</strong>mation and consumer behaviour’, Journal of Political Economy<br />
78 and Nelson, P. (1984) ‘Advertising as in<strong>for</strong>mation’, Journal of Political Economy 82.<br />
40 The concept of the credence good was first introduced in Darby, M. and E. Karni (1973) ‘Free Competition and the<br />
Optimal Amount of Fraud’, Journal of Law and Economics 16.<br />
55
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Incentives to over-consume<br />
Whilst rationing the availability of a public good or service can lead to problems<br />
of cream skimming and customer dissatisfaction, not rationing availability may<br />
also generate unfavourable outcomes. This will be the case when introducing<br />
choice creates incentives <strong>for</strong> individuals to consume more of the good or service<br />
than would be socially optimal. Some schemes have natural limits that can be<br />
applied to prevent this without restricting effective choice, <strong>for</strong> example allowing<br />
a child to be enrolled in a maximum of one school at any one point in time. In<br />
schemes where citizens can exercise choice over how much of a good or service<br />
they consume, however, this balance may be more difficult to strike.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
Introducing user choice to public services can lead to improved efficiency, a<br />
more customer-responsive service, and confer a sense of empowerment on<br />
consumers. However, it can also have adverse consequences in terms of<br />
inequality and segregation, and outcomes may suffer if there are in<strong>for</strong>mational<br />
failures. Our case study on choice-based lettings evaluates the evidence on all of<br />
these issues, and looks at how user choice has been successful in the area of<br />
social rented housing despite binding capacity constraints.<br />
<strong>Market</strong>able permits<br />
<strong>Market</strong>able permits have been used in the environmental sector as a means of<br />
controlling pollution. In this system the total amount of pollution allowed is<br />
‘capped’ and property rights are assigned to would-be polluters.<br />
The theory behind marketable permits stems from Coase’s intuition that<br />
problems caused by externalities can be resolved, without government<br />
intervention, if there are no transaction costs. 41 Coase noted that there is always<br />
someone who benefits and someone who loses from any given externality. For<br />
example, a factory that pollutes a river may damage the livelihood of farmers<br />
living downstream. If the property rights of the factory and farmers are welldefined<br />
then the externality can be addressed by a transaction between them. For<br />
example, if the farmers have a right to clean water then the factory owner buys<br />
from the farmers a right to pollute (which is rational provided the benefit to the<br />
factory exceeds the cost to the farmers). Conversely, if the factory owns a right to<br />
pollute the farmers can pay it to stop polluting (which is rational in the opposite<br />
case where the cost of pollution to the farmers exceeds the benefit to the factory).<br />
41 Coase, R. (1960)’ The problem of social costs’, The Journal of Law and Economics 3.<br />
56
However, the conditions required <strong>for</strong> this sort of trade are very restrictive and<br />
include well-defined property rights, low bargaining costs, perfect competition, 42<br />
perfect in<strong>for</strong>mation and the absence of wealth and income effects. These<br />
conditions rarely hold in the real world. For example, although the source of air<br />
pollution may be easy to identify, the victims are likely to be numerous.<br />
Reaching a solution between many individuals will not be straight<strong>for</strong>ward, and<br />
any solution may be vulnerable to ‘free rider’ problems: any individual could<br />
withhold his contribution, hoping that everyone else will contribute and he will<br />
benefit from their actions. Such a solution would there<strong>for</strong>e be difficult to en<strong>for</strong>ce<br />
without government intervention.<br />
Nevertheless, the intuition that private sector agents can arrive at an equilibrium<br />
outcome through bargaining, whatever the initial assignment of property rights, is<br />
central to the idea of marketable permit schemes. 43 Under marketable permits, the<br />
government sets a limit to the total amount of pollution allowed, and then assigns<br />
permits to firms which give them the right to produce set amounts of the pollutant.<br />
Firms are then allowed to trade permits among themselves, so that those who<br />
pollute less than their quota can sell the remainder. Firms will there<strong>for</strong>e sell<br />
permits as long as the marginal cost of reducing pollution is less than the market<br />
price of the permit. In equilibrium, there<strong>for</strong>e, every firm will pollute at a level such<br />
that the marginal cost of pollution reduction equals the market price of the permit.<br />
BENEFITS<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
Evidence suggests that this mechanism can achieve the desired objective with<br />
lower compliance costs and greater incentives <strong>for</strong> innovation than under the<br />
command-and-control alternative. 44 The use of marketable permits offers two<br />
main benefits compared with non-tradable quotas. These are that it allows<br />
pollution to be reduced at the lowest cost and that it allows the market to<br />
determine the appropriate price <strong>for</strong> pollution.<br />
42 Perfect competition is required <strong>for</strong> an efficient outcome to obtain that is independent of initial property right<br />
allocations. If one party to the trade enjoys bargaining power as an extension of market power, <strong>for</strong> example, an<br />
inefficient agreement is likely to be reached. Coase (1960) argued that assuming zero transactions costs was a<br />
suitable proxy <strong>for</strong> perfect competition, but this assumption does not preclude the existence or exercise of such<br />
bargaining power. Furthermore, firms operating in anything other than a perfectly competitive market will not<br />
necessarily face the same incentives to reduce inefficiency and are there<strong>for</strong>e unlikely to exhaust the entire gains<br />
from trade.<br />
43 Montgomery, D. (JET, 1972) ‘<strong>Market</strong>s in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs’, Journal of Economic<br />
Theory 5.<br />
44 Incentives <strong>for</strong> innovation are likely to be stronger than under a direct control or technological standard approach<br />
because firms can expect to keep some or all of the gains from innovation in the <strong>for</strong>m of reduced abatement<br />
costs and payments <strong>for</strong> permits. For example, Burtraw (2000) looks at how the sulphur dioxide allowance market<br />
in the US affected the nature and pace of innovation. He finds evidence that the incentives and flexibility<br />
provided by the scheme led to organisational innovation at firm, market and regulatory level as well as process<br />
innovation by electricity generators and upstream fuel suppliers.<br />
See also Downing, P. and L. White (1986) ‘Innovation in Pollution Control’, Journal of Environmental Economics<br />
and Management 13(1); Jung, C, K.Krutilla and R. Boyd (1996) ‘Incentives <strong>for</strong> Advanced Pollution Abatement<br />
Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of <strong>Policy</strong> Alternatives’, Journal of Environmental Economics and<br />
Management 30(1); Milliman, S. and R. Prince (1989) ‘Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change in<br />
Pollution Control’, Journal of Environmental economics and Management 17(3).<br />
57
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Pollution can be reduced at the minimum cost<br />
Stavins (2001) notes that imposing a blanket reduction across all firms may <strong>for</strong>ce<br />
some firms to control pollution through unduly expensive means. 45 Typically the<br />
cost of controlling emissions varies greatly among firms, and so the appropriate<br />
technology in one instance is likely to differ from others. <strong>Market</strong>-based<br />
instruments allow the desired environmental outcome to be attained at the<br />
lowest cost to society by providing incentives <strong>for</strong> the greatest reductions in<br />
pollution to be made by those firms that can achieve reductions most easily. This<br />
is achieved without the government having to obtain in<strong>for</strong>mation regarding<br />
firms’ compliance costs.<br />
Rapid discovery of the appropriate price<br />
By contrast with a system of taxes (discussed below) tradable permits allow a<br />
market mechanism to be used without incurring a risk of excessive pollution<br />
through the setting of too low or too high a tax level. Permits can be set at a<br />
fraction of current pollution levels or current production levels: the latter <strong>for</strong>med<br />
the basis of the successful acid rain program in the US, as it avoided penalising<br />
those firms that had already invested more heavily in pollution reduction.<br />
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE<br />
The benefits of marketable permits in reducing pollution at the lowest cost have<br />
been largely confirmed by empirical research.<br />
Carlson, Burtraw, Cropper and Palmer (2000) assess the impact of the market <strong>for</strong><br />
transferable sulphur dioxide emission allowances among electric utilities<br />
introduced in the US by the 1990 Clean Air Amendments using econometric<br />
estimates of marginal abatement cost functions <strong>for</strong> affected power plants. 46 They<br />
find that technical changes and lower input prices were the main sources of cost<br />
reduction rather than trading per se, but that in the long run allowance trading<br />
may still result in annual cost savings of $700-800 million relative to a command<br />
and control alternative. They compare potential cost savings in 1995 and 1996<br />
with actual emissions costs, and find that most gains from trade were unrealised<br />
<strong>for</strong> the first two years of the program.<br />
Although potential savings were not realised in the early stages of this<br />
programme, research suggests that an efficient market <strong>for</strong> the trading of sulphur<br />
dioxide permits was nonetheless able to develop. Joskow et al (1998) find close<br />
alignment of permit prices and significant volumes of trade after 1994,<br />
suggesting the operation of a relatively efficient market. 47 They also note that the<br />
45 Stavins, R. (2001) ‘Lessons from the American Experiment with <strong>Market</strong>-based Environmental Policies’, RFF<br />
discussion paper 01-53.<br />
46 Carlson, Burtraw, Cropper and Palmer(2000) ‘Sulphur dioxide control by electric utilities: what are the gains from<br />
trade?’, RFF discussion paper 98-44-REV.<br />
47 Joskow, P, R. Schmalensee and E. Bailey (1998) ‘The <strong>Market</strong> <strong>for</strong> Sulphur Dioxide Emissions’, The American<br />
Economic Review 88(4).<br />
58
annual EPA auctions were successful in bringing parties to the market and<br />
helping to establish a range of market valuations, prerequisites <strong>for</strong> the<br />
development of private market trading activity.<br />
Newell and Rogers (2003) assess the US tradeable permit scheme <strong>for</strong> reducing<br />
lead in gasoline. In this scheme in the 1980s, permits <strong>for</strong> lead levels were<br />
assigned to refineries that could either trade these between themselves or ‘bank’<br />
them <strong>for</strong> later use. 48 They conclude that the program was effective in meeting<br />
environmental objectives, and that allowing permit banking contributed to the<br />
speed with which these objectives were obtained. The market-based program<br />
provided incentives <strong>for</strong> more efficient adoption of lead-removing technology<br />
relative to a uni<strong>for</strong>m standard, and thereby minimised the costs of the lead<br />
phase down.<br />
Although the potential <strong>for</strong> cost savings is substantial, the extent to which these<br />
have been realised varies widely across different schemes, suggesting that<br />
design is critical to success. Hahn (1989) assesses the evidence on experience<br />
with marketable permits in this light and finds that the capacity to monitor and<br />
en<strong>for</strong>ce a scheme can dramatically affect its per<strong>for</strong>mance. 49 Where monitoring is<br />
easy within the existing regulatory infrastructure and there is agreement from<br />
the outset about the allocation of property rights, realised cost savings will be<br />
closer to their theoretical potential. These features characterised the lead permit<br />
trading programme in the US, which enjoyed a high level of trading activity and<br />
savings in excess of $228 million from the permit banking rule alone. This<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance is in contrast to the Wisconsin Fox River water permits scheme,<br />
which saw only one trade during the first six years of operation and there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
minimal cost savings despite the potential <strong>for</strong> $7m per annum. Savings from the<br />
US emissions trading programme have amounted to billions of dollars, but they<br />
have arisen mainly from the internal trading of permits. Increased external<br />
trading would lead to greater savings still, but is discouraged by high<br />
transactions costs.<br />
APPLICATIONS<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
<strong>Market</strong>able permits have been used mainly in the field of pollution control. In<br />
this system, a limit is set on total emissions levels. This level can then be altered<br />
over time to meet the required emissions target. This system has been used in<br />
a number of different environmental control schemes since the 1970s.<br />
During the 1970’s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the US, in<br />
compliance with the Clean Air Act of 1970, set standards to protect public health<br />
<strong>for</strong> ozone, sulphur dioxide, lead, particulate matter, nitrogen dioxide and carbon<br />
monoxide. It designated metropolitan areas that did not comply with these<br />
48 Newell, R. and K. Rogers( 2003) ‘The market-based lead phasedown’, RFF discussion paper 03-37.<br />
49 Hahn, R. (1989) ‘Economic Prescriptions <strong>for</strong> Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s<br />
Orders’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(2).<br />
59
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
standards as ‘nonattainment areas’ and established the set of technology and<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance standards <strong>for</strong> a variety of emission sources. In the late 1970’s, in<br />
order to provide some flexibility in reducing emissions, the EPA introduced a<br />
trading policy. The scheme delivered some benefits but also demonstrated some<br />
design problems that limited the cost savings with little volume of external<br />
trading.<br />
In 1994, the Southern Cali<strong>for</strong>nia Air Quality Management District, in response to<br />
the increasing cost of air quality regulation, and the inefficiency of the thencurrent<br />
system of trading rules, began a tradable permit system known as<br />
Regional Clean Air Incentives <strong>Market</strong> (RECLAIM). RECLAIM was designed to<br />
reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides or sulphur oxides. The program has been<br />
successful in reducing emissions in a cost-effective manner and ozone standard<br />
violations in 1998 were roughly two thirds fewer than in 1980, and half the<br />
number in 1993.<br />
In 1990, the Clean Air Act Amendments directed the EPA to design a tradable<br />
system <strong>for</strong> Sulphur Dioxide (SO 2 ). The programme was designed to counteract<br />
acid deposition, also known as acid rain, which can acidify lakes, resulting in fish<br />
kills, reduce alkalinity of <strong>for</strong>est soils harming tree species and degrade various<br />
ecosystems functions. Additionally SO 2 is also associated with respiratory<br />
problems. The program allocated permits based on the product of a common<br />
emissions per<strong>for</strong>mance standard and historical utilisation, although a small<br />
percentage was auctioned in the Chicago Board of Trade. The SO 2 market has<br />
had very active participation and resulted in substantial cost savings. 50<br />
A recent example of the use of such market mechanisms is the UK Emissions<br />
Trading Scheme, which aims at reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases,<br />
which are believed to cause global warming. This program is examined in Part IV.<br />
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES<br />
Economic theory and studies of past experience suggest that the following<br />
implementation issues can affect the success of marketable-permit schemes:<br />
● the initial allocation of property rights;<br />
● location problems;<br />
● market liquidity; and<br />
● market power.<br />
The evidence on these issues which we have examined is set out in Part V. Below<br />
we summarise the main conclusions we have drawn from this evidence.<br />
50 Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (2000), Making <strong>Market</strong> Work <strong>for</strong> the Environment, Economic<br />
Report of the President, Chapter 7. USA 2000.<br />
60
Initial allocation of property rights<br />
Economic theory suggests that property rights should be allocated through an<br />
auction, rather than based on historic levels of pollution, although it appears that<br />
in practice rights have not been auctioned. An auction is likely to raise the cost<br />
of pollution, encouraging greater reductions in emissions from the outset. It also<br />
provides revenues that can be used to reduce other more distortionary taxes and<br />
so improve economic efficiency. However, over time an allocation based on<br />
historic emissions will provide firms with permits which have an opportunity<br />
cost (the value that can be earned by selling them in the market) and this will<br />
provide incentives to reduce emissions at the margin.<br />
Location problems<br />
For some types of pollution, emissions will have different impacts depending on<br />
their location. Emissions by firms in areas where there are few other polluters<br />
may have a lesser environmental impact than emissions by firms located in a<br />
region with many other polluters. Pollution targets <strong>for</strong> emissions trading are<br />
typically set by reference to the level of pollution that would be appropriate at an<br />
aggregate level. This approach can lead to localised pollution problems<br />
emerging even when national targets are met, if there are areas where polluters<br />
concentrate their activities or where pollution has a greater environmental<br />
impact. In these circumstances it may be desirable to introduce caps at a local or<br />
regional level rather than at a national or international level. However, this can<br />
affect the liquidity of the resulting market by limiting the number of participants.<br />
Liquidity<br />
A well-functioning, liquid market in permits is more likely to develop where there<br />
are a larger number of participants. Where possible, permits of different kinds<br />
should be exchangeable, so that they can be traded in the same market. This<br />
approach is possible where the relative impacts of different types of emissions<br />
can be easily compared (different types of greenhouse gases, <strong>for</strong> example) but<br />
is more difficult where their relative impacts are difficult to compare (emissions<br />
into individual rivers, <strong>for</strong> example). A well functioning market will also require a<br />
well developed infrastructure, including exchanges, brokers and available price<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation, <strong>for</strong> example.<br />
<strong>Market</strong> power<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
<strong>Market</strong> power problems can arise in two ways. First, firms may hoard permits in<br />
order to exclude potential entrants in the same industry. This problem is most<br />
likely to occur where permits are ‘grandfathered’: so that permits are allocated<br />
to existing producers in proportion to their existing production. This method of<br />
allocation favours existing producers over new entrants, since a new entrant has<br />
to purchase permits from market incumbents. In principle, an incumbent should<br />
be willing to sell its permits to any more-efficient new entrant. However, if the<br />
incumbent possesses market power that might be undermined by the new<br />
entrant, it may have an incentive to refuse to sell permits to this new entrant.<br />
61
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
<strong>Market</strong> power problems are less likely if permits are sold in an auction rather<br />
than grandfathered.<br />
Even if permits are allocated through an auction, however, market power<br />
problems can still arise. For example, one firm might outbid others in order to<br />
obtain enough permits to monopolise its product market. This outcome can be<br />
avoided if safeguards are included in the allocation process, which might involve<br />
limits on the proportion of permits that can be allocated to any individual firm.<br />
This problem is also less likely to occur where the scheme involves participants<br />
across several industries (and hence economic markets) so that new entrants to<br />
one market can purchase permits from firms operating in other markets.<br />
Second, firms may hoard permits in order to manipulate the market <strong>for</strong> the<br />
permits themselves. Economic theory suggests that it may be rational <strong>for</strong> firms<br />
to attempt to corner the market in this way. As with issues of liquidity, this risk<br />
can be reduced by maximising the size of scheme across emission types and<br />
geographic boundaries.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
<strong>Market</strong>able permits can allow government to limit the level of a negative<br />
externality to a socially desirable level with lower costs and greater incentives <strong>for</strong><br />
innovation than alternative methods of regulation. Our case study of the UK<br />
emissions trading scheme looks at how a system of marketable permits has been<br />
implemented in practice, the impact this has had on the cost efficiency with which<br />
emissions reductions have been achieved, and the extent to which the potential<br />
problems described above arose in practice and how they were dealt with.<br />
Taxes and subsidies<br />
<strong>Market</strong>able permits are one method by which externalities can be corrected <strong>for</strong>.<br />
In the case of marketable permits, the government sets the total quantity<br />
allowed of the negative externality and then lets the market determine the price.<br />
An alternative method is <strong>for</strong> the government to set the price, and allow the<br />
market to determine the quantity. The government can set a per-unit tax in the<br />
case of a negative externality, 51 or a subsidy in the case of a positive externality.<br />
The aim is to change the market price to reflect social costs and benefits and so<br />
to encourage an optimal level of production.<br />
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF THIS SYSTEM?<br />
The benefit of per-unit taxes and subsidies are that they may align private and<br />
social interests more closely so that users pay close to the ‘true’ cost. However,<br />
as we noted earlier, considerable in<strong>for</strong>mation with regard to the right level of the<br />
tax is required.<br />
51 Or a subsidy <strong>for</strong> reducing the externality.<br />
62
Due to the negative externality, these taxes can provide a source of public<br />
revenue that is likely to be less distortionary than existing taxes. 52 In fact, Terkla<br />
estimates that revenues from an effluent fee charged on particulates and sulphur<br />
oxide emissions would provide substantial efficiency gains of up to $3.05 billion<br />
(in 1982 US dollars) if substituted <strong>for</strong> either federal individual income tax or<br />
corporation income tax. 53<br />
APPLICATIONS<br />
Unit taxes in the <strong>for</strong>m of effluent fees have been employed to regulate water quality<br />
and noise pollution in Europe. However, their goal has largely been to raise money<br />
to finance projects <strong>for</strong> water quality management rather than to regulate optimal<br />
effluent discharge. Evidence from the Netherlands, however, suggests that fees<br />
have had a measurable effect on reducing emissions. For example, Bressers (1983)<br />
and Brown and Bressers (1986) use econometric techniques to find that firms have<br />
responded to fees by cutting back significantly on discharges of water borne<br />
pollutants. 54 Although a command and control situation would also have reduced<br />
pollution, the benefit of the taxes and subsidy system is that the cost of the<br />
pollution is internalised and the market adjusts to find the optimum level of output.<br />
WHEN ARE TAXES PREFERABLE TO MARKETABLE PERMITS?<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
In a world of perfect in<strong>for</strong>mation and certainty, tradable permits and taxes would<br />
have identical effects on emissions abatement and costs. 55 In the real world,<br />
however, uncertainties about costs and benefits can influence which approach is<br />
preferred. For instance, in cases where a small increase in the level of emissions<br />
could result in a large decrease in benefit a tradable permit approach may be<br />
preferred. In cases where the cost of achieving a given emissions level is<br />
uncertain the charge approach may be preferred. 56<br />
52 Lee, D. and Misiolek, W. (1986) ‘Substituting Pollution Taxation <strong>for</strong> General Taxation: Some Implications <strong>for</strong><br />
Efficiency in Pollution Taxation’, Journal of Environmental Economic Management 13(4).<br />
53 Terkla, D. (1984) ‘The Efficiency Value of Effluent Tax Revenues’, Journal of Environmental Economic<br />
Management 11(2).<br />
54 Bressers, H. (1983) ‘The Effectiveness of Dutch Water Quality <strong>Policy</strong>,’ Mimeo, The Netherlands: Twente University<br />
of Technology.<br />
Brown, G. and H. Bressers (1986) ‘Evidence Supporting Effluent Charges’, Mimeo. The Netherlands: Twente<br />
University of Technology.<br />
55 <strong>Using</strong> taxes to address environmental externalities leads to an efficient level of pollution abatement, which can<br />
occurred at the lowest marginal cost. Baumol,W.J.(1972) ‘On taxation and the Control of Externalities’, American<br />
Economic Review 62 (3).<br />
56 See <strong>for</strong> instance Stavins, R. (2001) ‘Lessons from the American Experiment with <strong>Market</strong>-based Environmental<br />
Policies’ RFF discussion paper 01-53: and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (2000), Making <strong>Market</strong><br />
Work <strong>for</strong> the Environment, Economic Report of the President, Chapter 7. USA 2000<br />
63
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
<strong>Market</strong>able permit schemes share many features with environmental taxes.<br />
However, there are two main differences: 57<br />
a. taxes fix the value assigned to pollution but leave the quantity undetermined,<br />
while trading schemes fix the quantity and leave the value to be determined<br />
by the market; and<br />
b. the distributional consequences can vary depending how permits <strong>for</strong> trading<br />
schemes are allocated.<br />
In cases where there is a choice between using a tax or tradable permit scheme,<br />
the choice between the two options will depend on the goal of the policy to be<br />
implemented and a cost-benefit analysis of each option. In other words and as<br />
stated by HM Treasury: 58<br />
a. Is it essential to bring pollution down to a set quantity or is it the aim to<br />
internalise the known externality?<br />
In the <strong>for</strong>mer case a tradable permit scheme may be preferred, in the latter a<br />
per unit tax.<br />
b. What is the relationship between the marginal benefits of reducing emissions<br />
and the marginal cost of abatement?<br />
If this relationship is very uncertain, a tradable permit scheme may be<br />
preferred, as it allows the price to be determined by the market. A per unit tax<br />
could result in too great or too low a level of pollution abatement.<br />
c. Can a trading scheme be implemented at a reasonable cost and is there likely<br />
to be a well-functioning market in permits?<br />
If the answer is no, a marketable permits scheme is unlikely to given an<br />
optimal result.<br />
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES<br />
Economic theory and studies of past experience suggest that the following<br />
implementation issues can affect the success of taxes and subsidies:<br />
● existing market failures;<br />
● measurement of emissions;<br />
● determining the appropriate tax rate; and<br />
● problems specific to subsidies<br />
The evidence on these issues which we have examined is set out in Part V. Below<br />
we summarise the main conclusions we have drawn from this evidence.<br />
57 Cabinet Office (2002), The Energy Review, available at<br />
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/su/energy/TheEnergyReview.PDF.<br />
58 HM Treasury (November 2002) Tax and the environment: using economic instruments, available at:<br />
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/D54/07/adtaxenviron02-332kb.pdf.<br />
64
Existing market failures<br />
If an existing market failure, in addition to the externality, exists, the use of a tax<br />
may fail to maximise social welfare. For example, in an industry with a<br />
monopoly supplier we would expect (everything else being equal) output to<br />
already be lower than the socially optimal level. Where we have both a pollution<br />
externality and monopoly power it will not be clear whether existing output is<br />
above or below the socially optimal level. In the latter case a pollution tax would<br />
reduce output further below the socially optimal level. In the presence of market<br />
power it may there<strong>for</strong>e be appropriate to have a lower tax, or no tax at all.<br />
Measuring emissions<br />
Where a tax is used to control pollution it will be necessary to accurately<br />
measure emissions. Where measurement is not feasible it may be possible to<br />
use a proxy measure, such as an input associated with the relevant pollutant –<br />
coal could be used as a proxy <strong>for</strong> SO 2 emissions, <strong>for</strong> example. The use of such<br />
proxies can reduce measurement and en<strong>for</strong>cement costs, but can also reduce<br />
the efficiency of the tax. The tax might fail to provide incentives to use<br />
technologies which reduces the level of emissions per unit of input, <strong>for</strong> example.<br />
The appropriate tax rate<br />
Calculating an appropriate tax rate would in theory require accurate in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
on the marginal cost to society of the externality that is taxed. In practice this<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation is unlikely to be known, which may suggest that a marketablepermit<br />
system might be more appropriate. Where a tax is used it will be<br />
necessary to adjust its level <strong>for</strong>m time to time to reflect the effects of inflation<br />
and economic growth – a process which occurs automatically through changes<br />
in market prices under a marketable-permit scheme.<br />
Subsidies<br />
Subsidies raise many of the same issues as taxes. In addition, where a subsidy<br />
is used to reward reductions in a negative externality by increasing the quantity<br />
consumed of a substitute good (reductions in pollution, <strong>for</strong> example) there is a<br />
risk that the subsidy will encourage new entry into the industry, thereby<br />
increasing the overall level of the externality. For this reason, a tax is likely to be<br />
more effective at reducing a negative externality.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
Taxes and subsidies can be a more efficient means of achieving a desired level<br />
of externality than direct regulation. They may be preferable to a marketable<br />
permit scheme where uncertainty surrounding the cost of externality reduction<br />
means that setting the wrong quantity of permits could have significant and<br />
undesirable economic impacts. However, they can also drive the economy<br />
further from the socially optimal outcome when other market failures are<br />
65
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
present, and may be difficult to implement if there are problems measuring the<br />
externality or in determining the appropriate tax rate. No case study was<br />
conducted <strong>for</strong> this particular market mechanism. However, available<br />
international evidence on the above issues is set out in Part V.<br />
Opening-up access to natural monopolies<br />
Natural monopolies occur when it is cheaper <strong>for</strong> a single firm to produce <strong>for</strong> the<br />
entire market than to have several competing firms. A natural monopoly exists<br />
when there is great scope <strong>for</strong> economies of scale to be exploited over a very<br />
large range of output. Indeed the scale of production that achieves productive<br />
efficiency may require that a single firm services a high percentage of the total<br />
market demand <strong>for</strong> the product.<br />
Natural monopolies tend to be associated with industries where there is a high<br />
ratio of fixed to variable costs. For example, the fixed costs of establishing a<br />
national distribution network <strong>for</strong> a product might be enormous, but the cost of<br />
supplying extra units of output may be very small. In this case, the average total<br />
cost will continue to decline as the scale of production increases, because fixed<br />
(or overhead) costs are being spread over higher and higher levels of output.<br />
In the recent past, telecommunications, electricity, railways and water provision<br />
have all been considered as natural monopolies. In each of these sectors there<br />
is an element of the industry that is inefficient to duplicate. For example, the<br />
existence of several companies supplying the same area would result in an<br />
inefficient multiplication of cables, trans<strong>for</strong>mers, pipelines, transmission<br />
systems etc. However, in each case there are other elements of the industry<br />
where competition is possible. Although it may be inefficient to have more than<br />
one national grid, it is efficient to have several different generation firms.<br />
Similarly, although economies of scale make it implausible to have competing<br />
telecoms companies physically connected to each individual house, competition<br />
is possible in calls, or in the core backbone. By allowing access to the natural<br />
monopoly element at regulated terms, it is possible to have competition in the<br />
other areas. For example, if all generators can obtain access to the national grid<br />
at an appropriate price, then competition is made possible in generation.<br />
BENEFITS<br />
The benefits of regulating access is that if the natural monopoly element can be<br />
isolated from other elements, then competition can work in the other areas. This<br />
means that these other areas can benefit from the discipline of market <strong>for</strong>ces,<br />
including incentives <strong>for</strong> efficiency, reducing the total cost of provision and a<br />
greater responsiveness to customer needs. This system has been used in<br />
telecoms (local loop unbundling allows rival operators access to the ‘last mile’<br />
connecting customers to their local exchange), electricity (where access to the<br />
national grid has to be provided on regulated terms), railways (where ownership<br />
66
of the track is separated from operating the trains), and gas (where the gas<br />
network is separated from retail supply).<br />
Studies of these industries have founded that this isolation of the natural<br />
monopoly from other elements has resulted in significant improvements in<br />
efficiency compared with government ownership. Littlechild (2003) found that,<br />
taken together, restructuring, competition and private ownership enabled a<br />
nearly 50 per cent increase in output of the UK nuclear programme. 59<br />
A social cost-benefit analysis of the restructured and privatised England and<br />
Wales electricity industry by Newbery and Pollitt (1997) reveals that social<br />
benefits amounted to a permanent reduction in costs of six per cent compared<br />
to the counterfactual. 60,61 The tangible benefits of restructuring in England and<br />
Wales provide a stark contrast to the per<strong>for</strong>mance of the Scottish privatisation<br />
program. Pollitt (1999) per<strong>for</strong>med a social cost-benefit analysis of the Scottish<br />
electricity generating companies and finds negligible benefits. 62 He suggests that<br />
this is due to the lack of restructuring. This finding highlights the fact that the<br />
change of ownership of assets is not by itself a guarantee that efficiency will<br />
improve: competition is also required.<br />
APPLICATIONS<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
Regulating access is only an appropriate solution in a limited number of cases<br />
where, without such access, competition is unlikely to be possible. In practice,<br />
these cases have also tended to be where the natural monopoly was not<br />
developed through competition or investment but through the privatisation of a<br />
<strong>for</strong>mer state monopoly. This has been the case in each of the examples listed<br />
above (gas, telecoms, electricity, railways etc).<br />
As we noted earlier, it is important that the use of regulated access is severely<br />
restricted as otherwise there is a risk that firms who have legitimately invested<br />
in an industry see the benefits of their innovation shared with competitors. If<br />
access to infrastructure is granted too easily, then there is no incentive <strong>for</strong> rival<br />
producers to develop their own infrastructure, so competition and innovation<br />
may diminish.<br />
59 Littlechild, S. 2003. ‘Reflections on incentive regulation’ Review of network economics 2 ( 4).<br />
60 Newbery, D. and Pollitt, M. (1997) ‘The restructuring and privatisation of the CEGB- was it worth it?‘, Journal of<br />
industrial economics XLV(3).<br />
61 Newbery(2001). It should be noted that one difficulty in such studies is identifying what the effect would have<br />
been in the absence of deregulation, in other words defining the correct counterfactual.<br />
62 Pollitt, M. (1999) ‘The restructuring and privatisation of the electricity supply industry in Scotland’, Mimeo.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES<br />
The main implementation issues in providing access to natural monopolies are:<br />
● excessive intervention;<br />
● asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation between the regulator and monopolist; and<br />
● the costs of regulation.<br />
The first issue arises because requiring access can reduce incentives <strong>for</strong> firms to<br />
invest in new assets. For this reason intervention has generally been limited to<br />
a small number of sectors, which in the UK are almost exclusively <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
nationalised industries.<br />
The second issue arises because the regulator will know less about the firm than<br />
its own managers. This issue can be particularly important in setting access<br />
charges and other terms and conditions, where asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation can<br />
lead to the setting of sub-optimal access fees. It can also lead to the firm inflating<br />
its costs, particularly in the period immediately be<strong>for</strong>e any review of its access<br />
charges.<br />
The third issue is in part a consequence of the asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation issue.<br />
That problem leads to the need <strong>for</strong> a well-resourced regulator and significant<br />
burdens on regulated firms in terms of the monitoring and reporting of<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation on costs and quality of services. This burden can create significant<br />
costs of regulation. The process of opening up access, which may involve the<br />
restructuring of businesses to separate monopoly from competitive functions<br />
and the introduction of new systems to facilitate open access, can also lead to<br />
one-off and ongoing costs.<br />
All these factors need to be balanced against the benefits of opening up markets<br />
to greater competition.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
Opening up access can bring the benefits of competition in terms of incentives<br />
<strong>for</strong> efficiency and innovation to the non-natural monopoly elements of an<br />
industry. However, it can also reduce the incentives <strong>for</strong> the monopoly element to<br />
undertake investment, and asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation may expose regulators to<br />
the potential <strong>for</strong> capture. The evidence outlined above suggests that in some<br />
industries, the resulting efficiency savings dominate the costs of regulation.<br />
However, ensuring the emergence of genuine competition in the contestable<br />
elements of the unbundled monopoly is crucial to realising the potential<br />
benefits, highlighting the importance of competition. This market mechanism is<br />
not considered in our case studies since there is already an extensive literature<br />
documenting the success of the mechanism, <strong>for</strong> example in the regulation of<br />
privatised network industries in the UK.<br />
68
Limitations on the use of market mechanisms<br />
Section 7 – <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Mechanisms<br />
When successfully implemented in an appropriate area, all of the market<br />
mechanisms outlined above can have beneficial effects <strong>for</strong> public policy.<br />
However, each of the mechanisms are also associated with potential pitfalls that<br />
must be addressed in the policy design. A failure to do so properly could result<br />
in the desired goal not being achieved, or being achieved to the detriment of<br />
another public policy objective. With this in mind, the case studies in Part IV<br />
provide illustrations of how the identified potential problems with each market<br />
mechanism have been addressed in practice.<br />
A particular market mechanism may be well suited to one area of public policy<br />
but completely inappropriate <strong>for</strong> another. For example, competitive tendering<br />
<strong>for</strong> core aspects of national defence would be impossible because of political<br />
and security considerations. Similarly, user choice could not be introduced to the<br />
provision of hospital accident and emergency services <strong>for</strong> obvious practical<br />
reasons. The case studies highlight these potential limitations <strong>for</strong> each market<br />
mechanism, and help to provide practical guidance regarding the areas of policy<br />
each mechanism is most likely to suit.<br />
Competition can yield substantial benefits <strong>for</strong> public policy but there are also<br />
significant financial and opportunity costs associated with the introduction of<br />
any market mechanism. For example, as we illustrate in our case study, each<br />
tendering process <strong>for</strong> a new private prison can cost around £1m in government<br />
resources. In the case of prisons, independent studies have suggested that these<br />
costs have been easily recouped through reductions in costs to the prison<br />
service. However, in other cases, the benefits may not outweigh the cost, or it<br />
may be difficult to find funding to meet the initial start-up costs. This issue is<br />
explored further in each of the case studies.<br />
69
SECTION 8<br />
Framework <strong>for</strong> assessing<br />
market mechanisms<br />
In Part IV of this report we examine a number of case studies in order to draw<br />
lessons on best-practice in the use of these mechanisms. In this section we set<br />
out a framework <strong>for</strong> analysing the per<strong>for</strong>mance of different market-based<br />
mechanisms. We focus on two issues: the choice of market-based mechanism<br />
and the implementation of that mechanism.<br />
The choice of market-based mechanism<br />
As explained in sections 5 and 6, policy makers designing public-policy<br />
interventions have to balance two factors. <strong>Market</strong> failure (or issues of equality)<br />
may provide a rationale <strong>for</strong> some <strong>for</strong>m of intervention, but intervention may<br />
itself give rise to government failures that may outweigh the problem that<br />
intervention was designed to correct. This balance suggests two options:<br />
intervening in the expectation that government failure will not undermine the<br />
achievement of the policy objective, or not intervening on the basis that it is<br />
better to live with some degree of market failure rather than create even greater<br />
problems through public-sector intervention. As explained in Section 7, a third<br />
option is to use a market-based mechanism in order to minimise the<br />
government failure that might arise from intervention.<br />
It follows that, in assessing the per<strong>for</strong>mance of a market-based mechanism,<br />
there are two principal situations to use as a comparison: no intervention or<br />
intervention using some other mechanism. In practice, we assume that in the<br />
absence of a market-based mechanism the government would still have wished<br />
to intervene in the areas we are studying (<strong>for</strong> example, because intervention had<br />
already been taking place be<strong>for</strong>e the market-based mechanism was adopted) so<br />
the appropriate counterfactual is one where the government intervenes using a<br />
more traditional command-and-control mechanism. In the case studies below, it<br />
is possible to identify an alternative method of intervention that has been used<br />
in the past to achieve the same or a similar policy objective, and we use that as<br />
the basis of our comparison.<br />
In the case studies we there<strong>for</strong>e compare the market-based mechanism with the<br />
mechanism that had previously been used in the same or a similar area.<br />
70
Implementation issues<br />
A further comparison that can be made is between the scheme as it was<br />
implemented and what might be termed an ‘optimal’ public-policy intervention.<br />
In section 7 we identified a number of issues that arise in the implementation of<br />
specific market-based mechanisms. These issues have been suggested by the<br />
academic literature on the use of market-based mechanisms and previous<br />
experience of their use. In the case studies we consider the implementation<br />
issues associated with specific market-based mechanisms. These issues are<br />
specific to the mechanism under consideration (although there may be some<br />
overlap between different mechanisms). In Part II we made general<br />
recommendations on how policy makers might best deal with these issues and<br />
implement the chosen market mechanism in practice.<br />
Summary<br />
Section 8 – Framework <strong>for</strong> assessing market mechanisms<br />
The case studies in Part IV are designed to provide practical illustrations of the<br />
theory developed in this literature review. They have been selected to cover a<br />
range of different mechanisms used in different economic and policy contexts.<br />
Each study looks at the policy goal the market mechanism was designed to<br />
deliver and the problems with previous methods of intervention that motivated<br />
the introduction of market <strong>for</strong>ces. We describe the way in which each<br />
mechanism was introduced and, with reference to theoretical predictions, we<br />
look at the extent to which scheme design has been successful in capturing<br />
potential benefits and avoiding potential problems. We also consider<br />
implementation issues and conclude in each case by drawing lessons that could<br />
be helpful <strong>for</strong> policy makers considering the use of this particular mechanism.<br />
71
Part IV<br />
Case Studies<br />
73
SECTION 9<br />
Competitive Tendering<br />
of Prisons<br />
Introduction<br />
Competitive tendering refers to the process of inviting a number of organisations to<br />
prepare proposals to deliver a particular good or service, and subsequently<br />
evaluating these proposals against criteria such as price and quality. This case study<br />
examines the introduction of competition to prison services in the UK through<br />
contracting out and market testing, two different types of competitive tendering.<br />
Competition was first introduced to prison services in 1991 by contracting out the<br />
management of a new prison centre to a private sector provider through competitive<br />
tender. Since 1994, the scope <strong>for</strong> private sector involvement has been extended to<br />
include the design, construction and finance of new prisons. In 2001, market testing<br />
was introduced <strong>for</strong> underper<strong>for</strong>ming publicly managed prisons. 63<br />
The competitive tendering of prison services provides an example of how to<br />
manage outsourcing in situations where the quality of the service, as opposed<br />
to price alone, is also important and not readily observed. In this case study, we<br />
first provide a background description of the market, including supply and<br />
demand conditions. We then discuss the perceived failings that led to the<br />
introduction of a market-based mechanism, and why the particular marketbased<br />
mechanism was chosen. The next section examines the potential<br />
problems with this market mechanism and how these problems were<br />
addressed. In the final section we provide an overall assessment of the policy.<br />
This case study draws on the following sources:<br />
● an interview with David Kent, Head of the Office of Contracts and<br />
Competitions at the National Offender Management Service (NOMS);<br />
● the CBI report on the effects of competition in the prison service; 64<br />
● the National Audit Office (NAO) report on the operational per<strong>for</strong>mance of<br />
private prisons; 65<br />
● a case study by •econ assessing the impact of prison service procurement on<br />
competition; 66<br />
63 Under ‘market testing’ the management of existing prisons is placed out to competitive tender and bids are<br />
invited from the current team and from outside suppliers. This differs from the initial contracts which were <strong>for</strong><br />
new rather than existing prisons.<br />
64 CBI (2003), Competition: a catalyst <strong>for</strong> change in the prison service. A decade of improvement, available at<br />
http://www.gslglobal.com/downloads/CBI_report.pdf.<br />
65 National Audit Office (2003) The Operational Per<strong>for</strong>mance of PFI Prisons, London: The Stationery Office, available<br />
at http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/02-03/0203700.pdf.<br />
66 Econ (2004), Assessing the impact of public sector procurement on competition, Volume 2: case studies, Prepared<br />
<strong>for</strong> the Office of Fair Trading.<br />
74
● the Green and White papers behind the introduction of the policy; 67<br />
● the Competition Commission report on the acquisition by Group 4 Falck<br />
(Group 4) of The Wackenhut Corporation (TWC) in 2002; 68 and<br />
● an interview with a Director of Business Development at an operator of<br />
several private prisons.<br />
<strong>Market</strong> Background<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
The market in this case study is the building and management of prisons<br />
designed <strong>for</strong> the custody and rehabilitation of adults convicted of criminal<br />
offences, which we call ‘prison services’.<br />
The public sector is the only buyer of prison services in the UK, and purchases<br />
these through Her Majesty’s Prison Service (HMPS) in England and Wales, the<br />
Scottish Prison Service (SPS) in Scotland and the Northern Ireland Prison<br />
Service (NIPS). Because there is only one privately run prison currently<br />
operating in Scotland, 69 and no prison centres in Northern Ireland have been<br />
contracted out to date, this study focuses on HMPS and the market <strong>for</strong> prison<br />
services in England and Wales.<br />
Procurement of prison services in England and Wales can be <strong>for</strong>:<br />
● Management-Only (MO) contracts. These are contracts <strong>for</strong> the management<br />
of newly-built, re-built or existing prisons; or<br />
● Design, Construction, Management and Finance (DCMF) contracts. These are<br />
integrated contracts <strong>for</strong> the provision and management of new prisons,<br />
including their design, construction, management and finance.<br />
There have been no contracts to date in which the design, construction and<br />
finance elements were tendered separately from the management component.<br />
The Prison Service considers such contracts unlikely as the design of a prison<br />
can make it much easier to run. In particular, modern prisons are designed to<br />
accommodate more recreational and educational facilities than are available in<br />
Victorian prisons. This approach leads to synergies in design and management.<br />
Each prison under private management is appointed its own controller, who<br />
confirms the number of prisoner places available and monitors the operation of<br />
the centre. The Chief Executive of the National Offender Management Service<br />
67 Green Paper (1988) Private Sector Involvement in the Remand System, Cm 434, London: The Stationery Office;<br />
and White Paper (1990) Crime, Justice and Protecting the <strong>Public</strong>, Cm 965, London: The Stationery Office.<br />
68 Competition Commission (2002) Group 4 Falck A/S and The Wackenhut Corporation: A report on the merger<br />
situation, available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2002/471group4.htm.<br />
69 The reconstruction of a public sector prison, Low Moss, is also underway in Scotland.<br />
75
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
(NOMS) also has direct responsibility <strong>for</strong> private prisons, including the<br />
assessment of their per<strong>for</strong>mance and the review of contracts. 70<br />
<strong>Policy</strong> history and timetable<br />
The introduction of private provision of prison services has been achieved<br />
through two Acts of Parliament governing private sector prisons in England and<br />
Wales: the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and the Criminal Justice and <strong>Public</strong> Order<br />
Act 1994. The 1991 Criminal Justice Act allows <strong>for</strong> private firms to be involved in<br />
the provision of prison services, and led to the contracting-out of the<br />
management of newly constructed prisons. In the same year invitations to<br />
tender were issued to potential contractors <strong>for</strong> the new Wolds prison. The fiveyear<br />
MO contract was won by Group 4, and the prison opened in 1992.<br />
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was proposed in 1993 as an alternative means<br />
of raising capital to invest in the provision of public services. In 1994 the Criminal<br />
Justice and <strong>Public</strong> Order Act enabled prisons to be provided under the PFI,<br />
extending the role of the private sector to include the design, construction and<br />
financing of new prisons. The PFI coincided with a need <strong>for</strong> a programme of<br />
prison building due to increasing conviction rates and changing sentencing<br />
practices, <strong>for</strong> which no government capital was available. As a result, the first<br />
DCMF contract was offered <strong>for</strong> tender by the Prison Service in 1995.<br />
The first three MO contracts were <strong>for</strong> the management of new-build prisons only.<br />
Early plans to market test prisons led to a tender <strong>for</strong> the management of the<br />
newly rebuilt HMP Manchester, won by the in-house bid in 1994. The in-house<br />
team was awarded the first example of a Service Level Agreement (SLA), which<br />
is an agreement between what was <strong>for</strong>merly the Prison Service (now the Office<br />
of Contracted Prisons. or OCP) and an individual public sector prison stating the<br />
number of prisoners the prison will hold and specifying the standard of<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance expected in return <strong>for</strong> a fixed budget. The Manchester SLA was<br />
designed to operate in a similar manner to a private sector contract.<br />
<strong>Market</strong> testing plans were suspended following a challenge by the Prison<br />
Officers’ Association, and legal concerns regarding underlying lease<br />
arrangements, but reintroduced in 1998 at the expiry of four MO contracts. Of<br />
the contracts subject to market testing, two were won by the in-house team<br />
leading to allegations of discrimination in favour of the public sector. These<br />
claims were investigated by the NAO but not upheld. However, as a result of the<br />
aborted Brixton prison market test (described below) the Prison Service<br />
introduced per<strong>for</strong>mance testing of publicly-run prisons. Per<strong>for</strong>mance testing<br />
gives underper<strong>for</strong>ming prisons six months to produce an improvement plan<br />
without the involvement of external bidders. If the plan is accepted, the prison is<br />
awarded an SLA and if not, the prison is contracted out without an in-house bid.<br />
70 The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) oversees the management of offenders and is responsible<br />
<strong>for</strong> market testing and competitive tendering in prisons.<br />
76
A prison failing to deliver on its SLA will also be opened up to competition<br />
without an in-house bid.<br />
In 2003 a benchmarking programme was introduced <strong>for</strong> all prisons. Under this<br />
scheme, poorly per<strong>for</strong>ming prisons are subject to per<strong>for</strong>mance testing, and<br />
high-per<strong>for</strong>ming prisons may attract bonus payments and be awarded an SLA<br />
with operational and financial flexibility. Prisons falling in the middle range will<br />
be required to develop and implement improvement plans, which, if<br />
implemented successfully, will result in an SLA. Failure to improve will result in<br />
the prison being nominated as a candidate <strong>for</strong> per<strong>for</strong>mance testing.<br />
DEMAND<br />
The UK was one of the first countries, following the USA and Australia, to create<br />
a market <strong>for</strong> prison services by contracting out the management of certain<br />
prisons to the private sector. Since 1991, twenty-one contracts have been<br />
awarded in total, of which four were MO contracts and one an SLA re-tendered<br />
upon expiry. Competition <strong>for</strong> the management of Brixton prison, considered to<br />
be failing, was opened up in 2001 but no private contractor submitted a bid.<br />
There are currently eleven private sector prisons, and three market-tested SLAs.<br />
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 list tender dates <strong>for</strong> all MO and DCMF contracts.<br />
Table 9.1<br />
MO Contracts<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
Tender Winning<br />
Prison(s) date Competitors bidder<br />
Wolds 1991 GSL, Securicor, UKDS, Mancare, Pricor, Burns, Serco, Securiguard, WCC. GSL<br />
Wolds 2001 GSL, Premier, HMPS, Burns. GSL<br />
Blakenhurst 1992 GSL, Premier, Securicor, Reliance, UKDS, Burns, Securiguard. UKDS<br />
Blakenhurst 2000 Premier, Securicor, UKDS, HMPS. HMPS<br />
Doncaster 1993 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, HMPS, Mancare. Premier<br />
Doncaster 1999 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, HMPS, Mancare. Premier<br />
Buckley Hall 1994 GSL, Premier, Securicor, HMPS, Mancare. GSL<br />
Buckley Hall 1999 GSL, Premier, HMPS. HMPS<br />
Manchester 1992/93 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, HMPS, Mancare, Securiguard. HMPS<br />
Manchester 2000 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, HMPS. HMPS<br />
Notes: All firms that submitted bids and not just short-listed bidders are included as competitors.<br />
Source: •econ report, Competition Commission (2002), HM Prison Service website (www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk).<br />
77
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Table 9.2<br />
DCMF contracts<br />
Tender Winning<br />
Prison(s) date Competitors bidder<br />
Altcourse 1994/95 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, SCS. GSL<br />
Parc 1994/95 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, SCS. Securicor<br />
Lowdham Grange 1996 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, CSC, SCS, Cornell, Bobby Rose. Premier<br />
Bronzefield 1997 Premier, Securicor, UKDS. Premier<br />
Forest Bank 1997 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, CSC. UKDS<br />
Rye Hill 1998 GSL, Premier, Securicor, CSC. GSL<br />
Dovegate 1998 GSL, Premier, Securicor, CSC. Premier<br />
Ash<strong>for</strong>d 2001 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, CSC. UKDS<br />
Peterborough 2001 GSL, Premier, Securicor, UKDS, CSC. UKDS<br />
Notes: ‘Competitor’ is defined as a firm that pre-qualified and submitted a bid. Not all competitors were short-listed.<br />
Source: •econ report, Competition Commission (2002), NOMS.<br />
SUPPLY<br />
The majority of UK prison services are self-supplied by HMPS. There are<br />
currently four private firms supplying prison services in the UK:<br />
● Group 4 Securicor, an international security services company <strong>for</strong>med from<br />
the merger between Securicor Plc and Group 4 Falck A/S’s security business,<br />
completed in July 2004. Group 4 Securicor is listed on the London Stock<br />
Exchange, with a secondary listing in Copenhagen.<br />
● GSL, a UK-based firm providing security and other support services in the<br />
UK, South Africa and Australia. Following the de-merger and divestment of<br />
Group 4 Falck A/S in May 2004, GSL is now owned by private equity investors<br />
Englefield Capital and Electra Partners Europe.<br />
● Premier, owned by Serco, a UK company listed on the London Stock<br />
Exchange. Previously a 50:50 joint venture between Wackenhut Correctional<br />
Corporation (WCC) and Serco, it has been owned and managed solely by<br />
Serco since Group 4 sold its shares in WCC in 2003.<br />
● UKDS, a subsidiary of Sodhexo Alliances SA, a French company listed in<br />
Paris.<br />
All have an international presence and supply services to governments in other<br />
countries. Between them, these four companies currently manage eleven<br />
different contracts listed in Table 9.3.<br />
78
Table 9.3<br />
Companies providing prison management services in the UK<br />
Source: •econ report, Group 4 Securicor website<br />
There are 17 firms providing prison-management services globally, of which<br />
only six currently operate outside of the US. 71<br />
Introduction of a market mechanism<br />
PERCEIVED FAILING<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
Firm MO contract DCMF contract<br />
Group 4 Securicor Parc<br />
GSL Wolds Altcourse<br />
Buckley Hall (until 1999) Rye Hill<br />
Premier Doncaster Lowdham Grange<br />
Ashfield<br />
Dovegate<br />
UKDS Blakenhurst (until 1999) Forest Bank<br />
Ash<strong>for</strong>d<br />
Peterborough<br />
Outsourcing was introduced into prison services in the 1980s. Changes in<br />
sentencing practice in the 1980s led to a growth in the prison population that<br />
public-sector capacity at the time was unable to meet. There was also a belief<br />
that the public sector was inefficient and that private-sector provision would<br />
allow <strong>for</strong> the cost-efficient expansion of capacity. A feasibility study into privatesector<br />
involvement in prison services was carried out by the House of Commons<br />
Home Affairs Committee (the ‘Committee’). The Committee identified problems<br />
in the prison service including the age of prisons, the state of over-crowding,<br />
sanitary conditions and the slow pace of modernisation. 72<br />
In 1987 the Committee visited the US to report on the effects of private-sector<br />
involvement in prison management there. The Committee recommended that<br />
the Home Office experiment with contracting out management of new prisons in<br />
order to meet the demands of a growing prison population. A study was then<br />
carried out assessing the feasibility of introducing private-sector provision in<br />
prison management. This study concluded that the private sector could be used<br />
to increase the number of available prison places whilst delivering cost<br />
efficiency and spurring innovation.<br />
As noted in Part III, private sector providers are motivated by profits and so have<br />
a stronger incentive to reduce costs than their public sector counterparts. Private<br />
sector providers also face sharper incentives to innovate because they are able<br />
71 Data from http://web.crim.uft.edu/pcp/census/2001/<strong>Market</strong>.html<br />
72 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (1987) Contract Provision of Prisons, London: The Stationery Office.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
to capture the returns to a successful innovation in the <strong>for</strong>m of greater profit.<br />
<strong>Public</strong> sector providers on the other hand often face a reduced budget if they<br />
reduce costs or innovate successfully, and are there<strong>for</strong>e less likely to do so. They<br />
may also be more constrained in their ability to innovate, <strong>for</strong> example because<br />
of restrictions on firing or rewarding employees.<br />
Acting on the Committee’s recommendations, the Government published a<br />
Green Paper in 1988 entitled ‘Private Sector Involvement in the Remand<br />
System’. The Green Paper concluded that it would be:<br />
wrong to ignore the possibility that ... private sector involvement could make<br />
a speedier and more cost-effective contribution [to the improvement of<br />
prison services] 73<br />
The Green Paper also identified the objective of private-sector involvement as<br />
being:<br />
to improve the cost-effectiveness of the remand system by ... making<br />
additional remand accommodation available more quickly and flexibly than<br />
would otherwise be possible... thus accelerating the ... elimination of overcrowding<br />
and improving conditions <strong>for</strong> remand prisoners. 74<br />
DIFFERENT MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS CONSIDERED<br />
The involvement of the private sector could have been achieved through one of<br />
two main methods: contracting out or market testing. The difference between<br />
these procedures is that market testing involves the private sector submitting<br />
bids in competition with an in-house team, whereas in contracting out only the<br />
private sector is allowed to bid. However, the distinction between the two is not<br />
substantial, and both can be expected to have similar results in terms of<br />
incentives <strong>for</strong> efficiency. Arguably, these are greater under market testing as a<br />
wider range of bidders (both public and private sector) is involved. Although<br />
market testing was considered, the initial contracts were open to private bidders<br />
only. <strong>Market</strong> testing has been used <strong>for</strong> all MO contracts except Wolds in 1991<br />
and Blakenhurst in 1992. The in-house bid has won four of the eight contracts<br />
tendered since then.<br />
US EXPERIENCE WITH PRIVATE PRISONS<br />
Private sector involvement in US prisons can be traced back to 1607 (Feeler,<br />
1991). 75 However, pursuit of profit maximisation and lack of contract supervision<br />
led to such poor conditions and exploitation of inmates that public agencies<br />
were <strong>for</strong>ced to assume responsibility <strong>for</strong> all US correctional facilities by the<br />
73 Green Paper (1988) Private Sector Involvement in the Remand System, Cm 434, London: The Stationery Office, p.3.<br />
74 Green Paper (1988), Op.Cit, p.9.<br />
75 Feeler, M. (1991) ‘The privatisation of prisons in historical perspective’, Criminal Justice Research Bulletin 6 (2).<br />
80
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
1920s (Austin and Coventry, 2001). 76 Private sector management of prisons was<br />
re-introduced to the US in the 1980s in response to problems of overcrowding.<br />
Privatisation of existing prisons was achieved by contracting out management<br />
and, more radically, transferring ownership of the prison and its management<br />
responsibilities to a private operator. Some private prisons have been built<br />
speculatively, in that the contractor constructs the prison without having a<br />
contract from the prison service. The operator then seeks to obtain a contract<br />
once the prison is already constructed. There are 158 private correctional<br />
facilities in the States, making up less than 5 per cent of the current market<br />
(Austin and Coventry, 2001). 77<br />
A nationwide survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Assistance in 2001 found<br />
that, rather than the projected 20 per cent savings, the average saving from<br />
privatisation was only about 1 per cent, and most of this was achieved through<br />
lower labour costs. The study concluded that in general privately operated<br />
prisons function as well as publicly managed prisons, with the exception of the<br />
rate of inmate-on-inmate assaults, which was 35.1 per cent in private prisons<br />
compared to 25.4 per cent in public prisons. This was attributed to a number of<br />
factors, including the 15 per cent fewer staff employed by private prisons.<br />
These labour cost savings, achieved through reductions in number of staff,<br />
fringe benefits and working patterns, have been the source of great controversy<br />
because they have been linked with some highly publicised management<br />
failures. These failures are often cited as examples of why the private sector<br />
should not be involved in prisons. One such example is the Northeast Ohio<br />
Correctional Center, constructed by CCA in 1996 as a speculative build prison.<br />
Within the first 15 months of operation, 17 inmates had been stabbed, 6 had<br />
escaped and 2 had been murdered. Furthermore, in 1999 the US District Court<br />
granted preliminary approval of a $1.6m settlement on behalf of inmates who<br />
claimed they were abused, denied adequate medical care and not properly<br />
separated from other inmates (Clarke, 1998). 78 Northeast’s problems were found<br />
to result from a lack of basic security practices, inexperienced staff, inadequate<br />
training and a willingness to accept inmates who should not have been<br />
transferred to the facility.<br />
Another example of private prison failure is that of the Elizabeth detention centre<br />
in New Jersey, operated by Esmore Correctional Services Corporation, where<br />
attempts to cut costs led to the hiring of inadequately qualified prison guards.<br />
This was in breach of its contract, but inadequate monitoring resources meant<br />
the breach went undetected until a riot broke out in 1995. Following an<br />
investigation that found under-qualified staff to be a contributing factor to the<br />
76 Austin, J. and G. Coventry (2001) Emerging issues on privatised prisons, Bureau of Justice Assistance, National<br />
Council on Crime and Delinquency.<br />
77 Op.Cit.<br />
78 Clarke, J.L. (1998) Report to the Attorney General: Inspection and Review of Northeast Ohio Correctional Center,<br />
Washington, DC: Office of the Corrections Trustee <strong>for</strong> the District of Columbia.<br />
81
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
riot, the contract was terminated (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). 79 Other wellpublicised<br />
incidents of poor per<strong>for</strong>mance have occurred at private prisons in<br />
Colorado, Louisiana, Oregon, South Carolina and Texas. 80<br />
The UK experience has differed to date <strong>for</strong> two main reasons. Firstly there have<br />
been no instances of speculative build prisons. Private firms can enter the<br />
market <strong>for</strong> prison services only by winning a tender <strong>for</strong> a specific contract.<br />
Speculative build prisons in the US have been the most difficult to monitor and<br />
regulate. 81 Secondly, the UK has devoted a significant amount of resources to<br />
contract specification, monitoring and en<strong>for</strong>cement. Where management<br />
failures have occurred in the US, they have typically been the result of problems<br />
in the contractual framework.<br />
DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET MECHANISM<br />
The process <strong>for</strong> procurement is identical <strong>for</strong> both MO and DMCF contracts, and<br />
between contracting out and market testing. The main dimension in which<br />
contracts differ is that of contract duration. DCMF contracts are typically<br />
awarded <strong>for</strong> 25 years and MO contracts and SLAs <strong>for</strong> 10 years.<br />
There are some technical differences in the way a DCMF contract is drawn up,<br />
reflecting the complexity of the contract, which must cover the construction of<br />
the prison. DCMF contracts are made between NOMS and a Special Purpose<br />
Vehicle, a type of holding company in which the construction company,<br />
architect, operating company and finance provider all have a stake. All operating<br />
risk is passed to the operating company through a sub-contract between the SPV<br />
and the operating company, so that, in practice, all negotiations pertaining to<br />
contract en<strong>for</strong>cement occur between the operating company and NOMS.<br />
Tendering out operations<br />
Procurement is centralised and conducted by the NOMS Commercial and<br />
Competitions Unit, working closely with the Office of Government Commerce.<br />
HMPS publishes an announcement inviting private companies to express an<br />
interest. To qualify <strong>for</strong> bidding, bidders must demonstrate the capability to<br />
operate a prison safely, either through a proven track record or related<br />
experience, and the capacity to meet necessary financial obligations arising<br />
during the contract life. Only bidders who meet these criteria are invited to<br />
submit sealed bids. As noted in Part III, the use of sealed bids helps to limit the<br />
scope <strong>for</strong> collusive behaviour amongst potential bidders because this implies<br />
that bids are private rather than public in<strong>for</strong>mation. This means that rival bidders<br />
lack in<strong>for</strong>mation about each other’s bids, and that it is there<strong>for</strong>e more difficult to<br />
79 Domberger, S. and Jensen, PH (1997) ‘Competitive tendering and contracting out: theory, evidence, prospects’,<br />
Ox<strong>for</strong>d Review of Economic <strong>Policy</strong> 13(4).<br />
80 Austin, J. and Coventry, G, ‘Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons’, p.59, Bureau of Justice Assistance.<br />
81 Austin, J. and Coventry, G, ‘Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons’, P.xi, Bureau of Justice Assistance.<br />
82
detect any deviation from a collusive agreement. This reduces the probability<br />
that a cheating bidder will be punished, and so makes any agreement more<br />
difficult to sustain.<br />
Pre-selected bidders are required to specify:<br />
● the plans <strong>for</strong> the design and construction of the centre (if a PFI contract);<br />
● any plans <strong>for</strong> renovation/maintenance/repair;<br />
● plans <strong>for</strong> operating the prison (including staff involved, how the centre will be<br />
organised and how prisoners will be managed); and<br />
● the cost of providing the service. 82<br />
Bids are then evaluated qualitatively and by means of a score based on an<br />
assessment of individual criteria. The bid evaluation process assesses<br />
deliverability, price and quality. Innovation has recently been added to these<br />
criteria. Subject to considering that the bidder is able to deliver the service, the<br />
quality and innovativeness of bids is assessed using a complex matrix marking.<br />
This score is used to adjust the price of the bid to reflect the quality of service<br />
being proposed, and the contract is then offered to the bid with the lowest<br />
quality-adjusted price. Details of the weighting and criteria are made available to<br />
bidders in the invitation to tender. This kind of allocation mechanism is known<br />
as a weighted beauty contest. 83<br />
For design plans, bid criteria include:<br />
● how many prisoners the centre could support,<br />
● the operational advantages/disadvantages of the design,<br />
● the flexibility of purpose of the centre,<br />
● the likely longevity of the building; and<br />
● the aesthetics of the building.<br />
For operational plans, the criteria include:<br />
● security,<br />
● ease of moving prisoners,<br />
● time out of cell <strong>for</strong> prisoners,<br />
● recreational services,<br />
● educational services,<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
82 Specified as the cost per prisoner-place per day<br />
83 A beauty contest is a means of allocating an asset (such as the contract to provide prison services) that involves<br />
firms submitting proposals regarding their plans <strong>for</strong> managing the asset that are then evaluated, typically by a<br />
committee, in terms of criteria such as price and quality. A weighted beauty contest is one in which bidders know<br />
in advance the criteria against which they will be assessed, and the relative weighting attached to each.<br />
83
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
● fair treatment of prisoners; and<br />
● efficient management of resources.<br />
The weighting assigned to these criteria will differ according to the purpose of<br />
the particular prison: <strong>for</strong> example, safety will be of more concern in a highsecurity<br />
prison.<br />
Once a contract has been awarded, each centre is assigned its own Controller to<br />
monitor the operations of the prison and ensure contract terms are being met.<br />
Each controller is answerable to NOMS headquarters. Prisons are then<br />
monitored against per<strong>for</strong>mance measures stipulated in individual contracts 84 as<br />
outlined in further detail below.<br />
The degree of risk borne by the private contractor depends on which party is<br />
best able to bear it. Risk is transferred to the private sector through a<br />
combination of payment mechanisms and specific contract provisions. For<br />
example, the risk of the required number of prisoner places being available by<br />
the scheduled date is transferred from HMPS to the contractor through the<br />
payment stream of a DCMF contract: contractors are paid a daily rate <strong>for</strong> prison<br />
places made available, so no payment is made until the prison is up and<br />
running. The private contractor is also responsible <strong>for</strong> the risks of obtaining<br />
detailed planning permission, construction-cost and time over-runs, changes in<br />
general legislation and maintenance. Prices are reviewed every five years to<br />
cover external factors that have significantly affected prison operators’ costs,<br />
reducing the risk of the contract <strong>for</strong> both parties. 85<br />
Multi-sourcing involves sourcing the same good or service from multiple<br />
suppliers, rather than relying on one supplier to meet all requirements. Despite<br />
a high level of aggregation within individual contracts, HMPS has been able to<br />
engage in multi-sourcing by placing the management of a number of different<br />
prisons out to tender over time as discussed above. Multi-sourcing not only<br />
ensures competition <strong>for</strong> the market in the future, by allowing more than one firm<br />
to develop any incumbency advantages, but also allows <strong>for</strong> the analysis of<br />
relative per<strong>for</strong>mance, encouraging competition within contracts. This latter<br />
feature is one HMPS hopes to make increasing use of with the development of<br />
its benchmarking programme.<br />
The procurement process adopted by HMPS has worked moderately well in<br />
practice, although some private contractors feel there is scope <strong>for</strong> improvement.<br />
In particular, one operator expressed concerns that whilst the procurement team<br />
84 This is in contrast to public prisons, which are monitored according to per<strong>for</strong>mance relative to a set of Key<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance Targets. Private contracts have recently been adapted to incorporate the same KPTs that apply to<br />
public prisons, with annual per<strong>for</strong>mance measures now defined in relation to the appropriate KPTs. This is<br />
discussed in more detail later.<br />
85 For example, HMPS faces the risk that costs in the prison service industry may fall during the life of the contract,<br />
and that it would not then be delivering the most cost-efficient service possible. The contractor faces the risk that<br />
industry costs change, <strong>for</strong> example staff costs increase, and this may threaten both its ability to deliver its<br />
contractual obligations and its commercial viability.<br />
84
at HMPS began as an equal mix of those specialised in operating prisons and<br />
those with professional procurement skills, operational staff have had less input<br />
in recent contracts. This operator feels that this has led to problems of<br />
professional procurers not understanding the service requirements and focusing<br />
on less important issues whilst not always recognising more important<br />
operational issues. They would also welcome greater transparency around<br />
evaluation, <strong>for</strong> example regarding who makes the decisions and the relative<br />
importance attached to different elements of a bid. Furthermore, bids are<br />
currently very expensive to produce because of the level of detail required<br />
regarding operational plans.<br />
Although no economists were involved in the design of the policy, economic<br />
rationales can be seen behind many of the design features outlined above, <strong>for</strong><br />
example, in using a sealed bid auction design to limit the scope <strong>for</strong> collusion and<br />
engaging in multi-sourcing to ensure the development of a competitive market<br />
<strong>for</strong> prison services.<br />
Private-sector involvement is currently limited to 11 prisons and this is unlikely<br />
to increase dramatically in the near future. Contracting out a greater proportion<br />
of prisons would be likely to encounter political resistance and private-sector<br />
capacity is presently limited. Greater use of market testing is anticipated in the<br />
future however.<br />
DEVELOPMENTS OVER TIME<br />
As HMPS has developed more experience in procuring services, the process has<br />
been modified over time.<br />
Contract length<br />
The first MO contracts were offered <strong>for</strong> five years, with three options <strong>for</strong><br />
extension by another three years upon contract expiration. This length was<br />
found to be too short <strong>for</strong> a project with a long lead-in time with the result that<br />
the contract length was extended to ten years. PFI prison contracts were given a<br />
25-year duration in order to allow sufficient returns to be realised on the<br />
construction of the prison.<br />
Benchmarking<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance measures contained in contracts are defined in absolute terms<br />
based on stipulated targets. These targets are set at the beginning of a contract,<br />
and would normally last <strong>for</strong> the entire contract duration. However, as contracts<br />
can be as long as 25 years, some per<strong>for</strong>mance targets are less appropriate at<br />
later points in the contract. Benchmarking, on the other hand, involves the<br />
comparison of relative per<strong>for</strong>mance between prisons at specified points in time.<br />
It allows revision of the per<strong>for</strong>mance targets based on how the prison has<br />
per<strong>for</strong>med relative to other prisons. This approach means that a prison could be<br />
considered to be underper<strong>for</strong>ming even if it has met its stipulated targets, if it is<br />
85
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
felt to be lagging behind similar prisons. It ensures the competitive stimulus is<br />
present throughout the contract duration and provides flexibility to renegotiate<br />
contracts to reflect significant changes in industry conditions.<br />
The first prison management contracts contained no provision <strong>for</strong> per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
measures to be revised during the contract duration. Later contracts addressed<br />
the potential need <strong>for</strong> renegotiation of a DCMF contract, if industry costs were to<br />
fall during the contract life, <strong>for</strong> example, by allowing <strong>for</strong> benchmarking of the<br />
operational subcontract at 15 years. The most recent contracts have introduced<br />
benchmarking to the entire contract at 10 and 20 years. Benchmarking will be<br />
undertaken if NOMS believes it could obtain the same service more cheaply from<br />
another supplier. In this case, the incumbent is invited to re-tender at a lower<br />
price. If the incumbent does not re-tender, or HMPS is not satisfied with the offer,<br />
the contract may be opened <strong>for</strong> bids from other private firms. This leads to<br />
greater risk <strong>for</strong> the contractor, which is reflected in a higher contract price, but<br />
reduces the risk of tendering long-term contracts <strong>for</strong> HMPS.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance measure rationalisation<br />
Early contracts were designed with a greater number of per<strong>for</strong>mance measures<br />
than were required to achieve the desired outcome, implying excessive contract<br />
specification and monitoring costs as well as unnecessary restrictions on<br />
innovation. Recently tendered contracts have taken this into account, and have<br />
not only rationalised the number of per<strong>for</strong>mance measures but have also<br />
introduced a system of bonuses as well as penalties.<br />
One criticism of the per<strong>for</strong>mance measure system is that it focuses on specifying<br />
inputs (e.g. hours of education per prisoner per week) to achieve desired outputs<br />
rather than outlining desired outputs (e.g. 50 per cent of prisoners to pass a level<br />
1 literacy certificate) and giving the contractor freedom over how best to deliver<br />
these. One operator of private prisons felt that this restricted its scope <strong>for</strong><br />
innovation as HMPS began specifying operational requirements in increasing<br />
detail. This operator hopes this problem will be addressed in the near future as<br />
contracts are refreshed and per<strong>for</strong>mance measures revised. They note that a<br />
number of input-related measures contained in existing contracts have recently<br />
been changed to focus more on outputs. For example, a measure stipulating the<br />
number of hours that each prisoner must spend learning in a classroom has<br />
been replaced by a target number of level 1 literacy certificates to be obtained.<br />
Another side-effect of using per<strong>for</strong>mance measures is that it encourages<br />
operators to concentrate their resources on the measurable aspects of service<br />
quality to the detriment of others. One such example is the requirement to repair<br />
or replace all broken items in the building within 24 hours. This requirement<br />
caused problems when one prison introduced a new initiative to provide<br />
inmates with toasters in their cells: when toasters broke they were not replaced<br />
within the required timeframe and so the operator began to accumulate penalty<br />
points. Even though it was not a contractual requirement to provide toasters,<br />
the penalty points were the same as those <strong>for</strong> more important breakages<br />
86
(e.g. lighting). This impact could have caused the operator to withdraw its<br />
toaster scheme altogether, although its eventual solution was to buy a large<br />
stock of toasters to allow <strong>for</strong> speedy replacement in the event of a fault.<br />
Conversely, other important areas of per<strong>for</strong>mance, such as staff attitude towards<br />
prisoners, which may be equally important <strong>for</strong> a harmonious regime, are not<br />
directly measurable, although anecdotal evidence suggests that prisoner-staff<br />
relations are better in private-sector than public-sector prisons.<br />
Risk-sharing<br />
As the private sector now has experience in the management of prisons, it is more<br />
com<strong>for</strong>table taking on risks at a lower premium than be<strong>for</strong>e, making it efficient <strong>for</strong><br />
the Government to shift more risk to the private sector. Initially, the main risks<br />
borne by the private contractor were the design, construction, management and<br />
financing of the prison. Whilst the public sector continues to retain responsibility<br />
<strong>for</strong> the risks of adequate demand and the residual value of the property, it has been<br />
able to transfer risks such as insurance to the private sector.<br />
Dovegate Therapeutic Centre (TC) is the only centre in which the private sector<br />
is able to influence the number of places as courses provided by the centre are<br />
voluntary and can be advertised to other prisons to attract applicants.<br />
Accordingly, the public sector has shifted some volume risk to Dovegate TC in<br />
the design of its contract.<br />
The contracts <strong>for</strong> Ash<strong>for</strong>d and Peterborough saw the contractor taking on the<br />
risk of filling the top 5 per cent of places, despite being unable to influence<br />
demand. This approach was largely as a result of new accounting treatment<br />
standards, and has been found an inefficient means of allocating risk because<br />
both contractors simply charged a higher premium to reflect the increased risk.<br />
It will there<strong>for</strong>e not be pursued in future competitions.<br />
Potential problems<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
In Part III, we noted that although economic theory says that introducing<br />
contestability can lead to greater efficiency and can provide incentives <strong>for</strong><br />
innovation, these benefits can only be achieved if there is adequate competition.<br />
Moreover, although the incentives <strong>for</strong> cost reduction can be stronger in the private<br />
sector, if not properly controlled through well-specified and effectively monitored<br />
contracts, these costs reductions can come at the expense of the quality of the<br />
service. This problem is a particular concern in an area such as prisons, where a<br />
poor quality service can have outcomes such as riots or increased prison suicides.<br />
Competitive tendering may also lead to problems of market power and<br />
asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation.<br />
In this section we first summarise these potential problems, focusing on those<br />
that theory suggests are most likely to impact the procurement of prison<br />
87
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
services. We then discuss how these problems were dealt with and the success<br />
of this process.<br />
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN PRISON PROCUREMENT<br />
Political Constraints<br />
Sometimes the implementation of a market mechanism may be affected by<br />
political constraints that prevent the full potential benefits of the policy being<br />
realised. One such constraint in prison procurement was the limit placed on the<br />
size of the private sector market that could develop by the Government’s<br />
commitment to retain most of the prison estate under public sector management.<br />
In 1993 the then Home Secretary announced a target <strong>for</strong> 10 per cent of prisons to<br />
be privately managed. This target reflected a balance between concerns about<br />
private sector involvement in the delivery of a politically sensitive service and the<br />
need to offer a sufficient number of contracts <strong>for</strong> a private market to develop.<br />
However, the fact that there are only four private sector suppliers of prison<br />
services today in the UK suggests that current procurement levels might not<br />
guarantee a sufficiently high level of demand to encourage new entry. Today<br />
there are 11 prisons under private sector management out of more than 139.<br />
There is no explicit target under the current administration <strong>for</strong> the level of private<br />
sector involvement but rather a desire to maintain healthy competition between<br />
public and private sector providers. 86 Plans to extend market testing could result<br />
in an increase in the level of private sector involvement.<br />
Another constraint acting on prison procurement policy-makers was the internal<br />
resistance felt at the time competition was first introduced. This continues today<br />
and is particularly strong in the Prison Governors’ Association and Prison<br />
Officers’ Association (POA), trades unions representing public sector prison<br />
workers. A recent example of this opposition is the POA’s vote against plans to<br />
market test clusters of prisons from 2005. With a 70 per cent turnout, union<br />
members voted by 87 to 13 per cent not to take part in the market testing on the<br />
grounds that it is likely to lead to increased privatisation of prisons. The POA’s<br />
general secretary, Brian Caton, has warned that industrial action is likely if the<br />
Government continues with its plans. 87 The proposed market testing of Emley,<br />
Stand<strong>for</strong>d Hill and Swaleside has since been suspended and there is no certainty<br />
about whether it will be resumed.<br />
Economic Constraints<br />
In the main report, we identified a number of problems with outsourcing<br />
suggested by economic theory. These problems arose from issues of market<br />
power, the hold-up problem, asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation and incomplete contracts.<br />
We now consider each of these potential problems in turn, looking at why they<br />
may arise in the context of prison service procurement and how the<br />
procurement process was designed to mitigate their effect.<br />
86 White Paper (2002) Justice <strong>for</strong> All, London: The Stationery Office.<br />
87 Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust (2005) Private Punishment: Who Profits?, Briefing Paper, p.11.<br />
88
MARKET POWER<br />
The full benefits of competition can be realised only if there is sufficient<br />
competition between firms. However, this can be undermined if there are a small<br />
number of bidders, <strong>for</strong> example, because of incumbency advantages and other<br />
barriers to entry, or if bidders engage in collusive behaviour. These sources of<br />
market power are addressed in turn below.<br />
INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGES AND OTHER BARRIERS TO ENTRY<br />
Incumbency advantages can arise from a variety of sources, including preselection<br />
criteria, switching costs and asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation. Each of these has<br />
the potential to arise in the prison service.<br />
Given the concerns over quality in the prison service, the potential barriers to entry<br />
created by pre-selection criteria can be a major concern. For example, one method<br />
that is sometimes used to try to avoid poor-quality service delivery is to require<br />
that the bidders have a proven track record in the area. This obviously gives<br />
incumbents an advantage over new entrants. Furthermore, because winning firms<br />
are required to take on existing staff, considerable switching costs exist when<br />
transferring staff to a new contractor. Incumbents are also likely to enjoy superior<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation regarding costs and the prison building concerned. They will be better<br />
acquainted with tender requirements, and as such will not only incur lower<br />
tendering costs but will also enjoy a higher probability of success.<br />
Incumbency advantages combined with high bidding costs could be expected to<br />
impose substantial barriers to entry. Both incumbency advantages and barriers<br />
to entry reduce competition <strong>for</strong> the market in the future, leading to higher<br />
procurement costs in the longer run.<br />
Controlling <strong>for</strong> incumbency advantages<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
Although only a few prison contracts have yet come up <strong>for</strong> renewal, HMPS has<br />
taken several steps to try to reduce incumbency advantages.<br />
When a contract comes up <strong>for</strong> renewal, the incumbent supplier has an<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mational advantage over rival bidders in relation to costs. The incumbent<br />
supplier has gained years of experience in how the prison operates and how<br />
much it costs to run. In order to try to reduce this advantage, the incumbent is<br />
required to disclose cost in<strong>for</strong>mation to potential bidders and to allow access to<br />
the prison being offered <strong>for</strong> re-tender. Although increasing cost transparency is<br />
beneficial in limiting incumbency advantages, there is a trade-off to be made<br />
against the increased scope <strong>for</strong> collusion.<br />
As described in Section 7, one of the factors that makes a collusive agreement<br />
easier to sustain is readily available in<strong>for</strong>mation on rivals’ costs and prices. The<br />
sharing of in<strong>for</strong>mation on costs would tend to increase the likelihood of<br />
collusion between suppliers. However, since it is difficult <strong>for</strong> other bidders to<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
verify that cost data represent the true running costs of the prison, this effect is<br />
unlikely to be very strong. One prison operator observed that requiring cost<br />
disclosure has little effect on incumbency advantages in practice because there<br />
are means of presenting cost in<strong>for</strong>mation in a way that is not helpful to potential<br />
bidders.<br />
HMPS also tries to limit incumbency advantages through multi-sourcing, so that<br />
there are more companies with experience in operating prisons. For example, in<br />
1995 and 1996 a PFI contract was awarded to each of Securicor and GSL, despite<br />
the fact that one bidder had offered a lower price <strong>for</strong> both contracts. This<br />
attracted criticism from the NAO 88 but HMPS defended its decision with<br />
reference to the need to ensure competition <strong>for</strong> future contracts.<br />
An additional way in which competition is encouraged is through a proactive<br />
approach to encouraging firms to bid. There are no examples of potential<br />
suppliers being pre-qualified without previous relevant experience, largely as a<br />
result of strict pre-qualification criteria. However, these criteria do not require<br />
previous experience in running prisons, but only experience in security issues.<br />
For example, Securicor and GSL had no prior prison experience but satisfied<br />
tender requirements by proposing to recruit experienced prison staff from the<br />
UK public sector. Whilst the HMPS procurement group is unable to relax its preselection<br />
requirements, it has nonetheless tried to encourage entry by actively<br />
inviting bidders with experience in custodial services both in the UK and abroad<br />
to submit tenders. The Prison Service is aware of other potential providers who<br />
could be encouraged to submit tenders in the future, and has taken an active<br />
approach to increasing the size of the market by speaking to these firms directly.<br />
As a consequence, two new entrants have submitted bids <strong>for</strong> the management<br />
of a Scottish prison and competition <strong>for</strong> the prison management market in future<br />
tenders is hoped to increase.<br />
The considerable expense involved in the bidding process represents a barrier<br />
to entry, particularly in the case of PFI contracts. 89 One way to encourage bidding<br />
in spite of high costs is to increase the reward <strong>for</strong> winning a tender by offering<br />
more valuable contracts. It can be achieved by aggregating contracts<br />
horizontally, vertically or over time. Contract aggregation refers to the bundling<br />
of service requirements into fewer, larger contracts that are tendered less<br />
frequently. Contracts are aggregated horizontally when identical requirements<br />
are pooled and put out to tender, <strong>for</strong> example, if one contract were offered <strong>for</strong><br />
the management of multiple prison centres. Vertical aggregation refers to the<br />
bundling together of different stages of the value chain, <strong>for</strong> example, sourcing<br />
one supplier to design, construct, manage and finance a new prison under a<br />
DCMF contract.<br />
88 See National Audit Office (1997) The PFI Contracts <strong>for</strong> Bridgend and Fazakerley Prisons, London: The Stationery<br />
Office.<br />
89 See Competition Commission (2002) Group 4 Falck A/S and The Wackenhut Corporation: A report on the merger<br />
situation, available at: http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2002/471group4.htm, p.21.<br />
90
However, it should be noted that tendering larger contracts may also impede<br />
entry, both directly by excluding smaller firms who are unable to provide the<br />
complete bundle of requirements and indirectly by reducing the chances of<br />
winning a contract. Furthermore aggregating contracts not only influences the<br />
entry decision but also has wider implications <strong>for</strong> market per<strong>for</strong>mance, some<br />
positive and some negative. For example, contract aggregation helps provide<br />
incentives <strong>for</strong> long-term investment and limits the scope <strong>for</strong> collusion, but may<br />
exacerbate incumbency advantages. It may also reduce procurement costs by<br />
reducing the number of tenders conducted and the number of ongoing contracts<br />
that must be monitored, as well as allowing <strong>for</strong> the exploitation of economies of<br />
scale and scope. Economic theory provides no clear answer regarding the<br />
appropriate degree of contract aggregation because this will vary with individual<br />
industry characteristics. In the case of prison management, there are efficiencies<br />
from aggregating together the provision of all services provided at one location<br />
(see below). Dividing the requirement up into smaller contracts, or allowing<br />
contractors to bid <strong>for</strong> part of the contract, could prevent these efficiencies from<br />
being realised and lead to higher procurement costs.<br />
Prison management contracts are aggregated both across time and horizontally.<br />
MO contracts are <strong>for</strong> all aspects of prison management and no DCMF contract<br />
tenders have yet separated design, construction and finance from management.<br />
There are efficiencies from aggregating contracts in this way arising from<br />
natural synergies between the designer and the operator. The poor per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
of early PFI schools gives an example of problems that can arise when the<br />
interests of designer and operator are allowed to diverge. 90<br />
Theory suggests that a high level of contract aggregation could lead to problems<br />
of incumbency advantages lessening competition <strong>for</strong> future tenders. The issue<br />
of advantaged incumbents is discussed above, but it is worth noting that HMPS<br />
has retained many of the benefits of multi-sourcing despite high levels of<br />
individual contract aggregation. These benefits include competition within the<br />
market as well as <strong>for</strong> future tenders. Ensuring the continued existence of<br />
multiple private-sector suppliers and encouraging new entry to the market have<br />
helped secure these benefits.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance in practice<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
The fact that few tenders have come up <strong>for</strong> renewal makes the assessment of<br />
incumbency advantages difficult. However, there is some evidence to suggest<br />
that incumbents have an advantage in bidding. Incumbent providers have won<br />
four out of the six contracts put to re-procurement, with the other two being won<br />
by the public sector rather than another private sector firm. Although this<br />
suggests that incumbents have an advantage in the re-tender process, the fact<br />
that the price of bids in tenders has tended to fall over time suggests that the<br />
process is competitive.<br />
90 For example, a report by the Audit Commission found that early PFI schools per<strong>for</strong>med significantly worse than<br />
those that were traditionally funded. See The Audit Commission (2003) PFI in schools: the quality and cost of<br />
buildings and services provided by early Private Finance Initiative schemes.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Moreover, the fact that two prisons previously under private-sector management<br />
were lost to an in-house bid, indicates that the incumbency advantage is not<br />
absolute. An evaluation report by HMPS and the NAO report both concluded that<br />
these bids were won by the public sector on the basis of cost and quality, rather<br />
than as a result of discrimination. 91 Indeed, to the extent that the procurement<br />
process has encouraged the public sector to become more competitive,<br />
competition may even have been increasing over time.<br />
COLLUSION<br />
The nature of public procurement means it can be susceptible to collusion<br />
amongst bidders. Collusion is most likely to arise when many similar contracts are<br />
tendered at frequent intervals because this can allow bidders to allocate contracts<br />
between themselves. Requiring bidders to meet certain pre-selection criteria helps<br />
HMPS guarantee the quality of its suppliers but restricts the number of potential<br />
bidders and creates barriers to entry. These latter effects may increase the scope<br />
<strong>for</strong> collusion, as might the practice of publishing tender in<strong>for</strong>mation. As noted<br />
above, when in<strong>for</strong>mation regarding rivals’ bids is in the public domain it is much<br />
easier <strong>for</strong> colluding bidders to detect any deviation from their agreement. This<br />
increases the likelihood that defectors will be caught and subsequently punished,<br />
and so lowers the returns to cheating. Reducing the temptation to renege on an<br />
agreement in this way makes collusion easier to sustain.<br />
Controlling <strong>for</strong> collusion<br />
Although HMPS has not made any conscious ef<strong>for</strong>ts to try to prevent collusion<br />
in tenders <strong>for</strong> prison contracts, the way the process is run means that such<br />
collusion is unlikely. First, the use of a sealed bid auction design reduces price<br />
transparency, making it more difficult to detect and punish any member cheating<br />
on the agreement. As collusive agreements require an effective punishment<br />
mechanism to be sustainable, this has the effect of making coordination more<br />
difficult. Second, the number of contracts is few – just 21 in total since 1991. This<br />
has reduced the potential <strong>for</strong> collusion in two ways. First, as each contract is very<br />
valuable, it is always tempting <strong>for</strong> firms to cheat on any collusive agreement to<br />
secure the contract. Second, as there have been few of these contracts put to<br />
tender there have been limited opportunities <strong>for</strong> interaction amongst the<br />
competing firms. Because collusion is easier to sustain where rivals interact<br />
frequently, this naturally limits the scope <strong>for</strong> collusion. 92<br />
The allocation of public sector funding in the UK is such that plans can only ever<br />
be made three years in advance at most. This limits the extent to which collusion<br />
can be sustained by introducing a large amount of uncertainty into the future<br />
demand <strong>for</strong> private prison services. However, the overall effect of this practice<br />
91 A level playing field is ensured whenever an in-house team puts <strong>for</strong>ward a bid by adding the costs of their bid to<br />
the proposed contract, as well as an allowance <strong>for</strong> public sector overheads and differences in pension service<br />
provision.<br />
92 For example, two firms competing <strong>for</strong> twenty-one contracts may allow <strong>for</strong> collusion whereas twenty firms<br />
competing <strong>for</strong> the same number of contracts is unlikely to do so.<br />
92
on competition is uncertain. The ability to commit to a longer-term programme<br />
of contract competitions would provide a greater degree of certainty to the<br />
private sector that may encourage new entrants to undertake the costs<br />
associated with joining the market. Increasing the number of market players<br />
could then also be expected to reduce the scope <strong>for</strong> collusion.<br />
The threat of self-supply reduces the potential <strong>for</strong> collusion by providing what is<br />
effectively a reservation price. The Prison Service can tender in-house bids <strong>for</strong><br />
MO contracts, but is obviously unable to do so <strong>for</strong> DCMF contracts. It can and<br />
does, however, compute the likely cost of self-provision <strong>for</strong> such tenders. This<br />
measure is known as the public sector comparator. A collusive agreement is<br />
more sustainable when its participants value the future benefits of colluding<br />
more than the immediate benefits of cheating, which will occur when they attach<br />
a relatively high importance to future rewards. As noted by Thomas (2001), the<br />
appropriate use of a reservation price can substantially increase the weight that<br />
must be attached to the future to make a given agreement sustainable. Doing so,<br />
effectively limits the range of situations in which collusion could occur.<br />
Although certain characteristics of the prison-management market may appear to<br />
make collusion likely, a closer inspection reveals this is unlikely to be the case in<br />
practice. Because services procured vary greatly from contract to contract, the<br />
public availability of prices <strong>for</strong> previous tenders is unlikely to support a collusive<br />
outcome. Prices could be lower because a firm is cheating on a collusive<br />
agreement or because the standards required <strong>for</strong> a particular prison could be met<br />
at a lower price than others. Firms in an agreement would find it difficult to<br />
distinguish between the two scenarios, limiting the effectiveness of a punishment<br />
mechanism. Furthermore, tenders are relatively infrequent and the value of<br />
contracts is large, two features that further lessen the scope <strong>for</strong> collusion.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance in practice<br />
There is no evidence to suggest that there has been collusion in prison tenders.<br />
The cost per place <strong>for</strong> a male prisoner at a local prison has fallen over time,<br />
which does not appear to be consistent with collusion. Costs may have fallen<br />
because the perceived success of the design, construction and management of<br />
prisons by the private sector has led to contractors being prepared to take on<br />
more risk <strong>for</strong> a lower price premium. It could also reflect contractors becoming<br />
more efficient as they learn more about the prison management market, or the<br />
adoption of new technologies associated with lower running costs.<br />
HOLD-UP PROBLEM<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
The hold-up problem occurs in contracts when an initial commitment by one party<br />
exposes that party to ex post opportunism by the other. As noted in Part III, the<br />
Government’s inability to commit to not behaving opportunistically after<br />
investment is undertaken may lead to sub-optimal levels of investment, particularly<br />
in the case of long-lived specific assets. Laffont and Tirole (1993) consider the case<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
of such assets and conclude that investment may not be undertaken at all if there<br />
is a high probability of the incumbent being replaced at the next re-tendering of the<br />
contract. This occurs because the service provider will be aware that the remaining<br />
returns to an asset will be appropriated by the new service provider unless precommitment<br />
to an appropriate transfer price is possible.<br />
Prison centres constructed under DCMF contracts are an example of long-lived,<br />
specific assets.<br />
Controlling <strong>for</strong> the hold-up problem<br />
Since buildings constructed under PFI contracts become the property of HMPS<br />
upon expiry of the contract, the Government can there<strong>for</strong>e overcome the holdup<br />
problem and encourage appropriate levels of investment. As the longevity of<br />
the building is taken into account during the contract negotiation period, the<br />
Government is essentially able to pre-commit to a transfer rate that is implicit in<br />
the contract price. The decision to award DCMF contracts of 25-year duration<br />
reflected this need to ensure suppliers received an appropriate return on their<br />
investment.<br />
Aggregating contracts over time into 25-year bundles is one means of<br />
encouraging suppliers to undertake investment in specific assets. Indeed, the<br />
tendering of fewer and larger, contracts creates something more akin to a<br />
bilateral hostage situation: the procuring body is as dependent on the private<br />
supplier as the supplier is on the procurer when it has few alternative suppliers<br />
from which to source the service. This situation limits the risk of ex-post<br />
opportunism by the procuring body relative to a situation in which there are a<br />
greater number of alternative sources of supply.<br />
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION<br />
Asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation problems arise when either the public sector has less<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation than potential service providers, or when some service providers<br />
possess less in<strong>for</strong>mation than others. The <strong>for</strong>mer situation can lead to private<br />
providers exploiting their in<strong>for</strong>mational advantage, <strong>for</strong> example, by claiming an<br />
increase in costs is due to external factors rather than their own inefficiency.<br />
Asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation amongst bidders can lead to the winner’s curse, a<br />
situation which arises when bidders do not know the true costs of providing the<br />
service and base their bids on different estimates of these costs. The winning<br />
bidder is the one with the lowest <strong>for</strong>ecast, and there<strong>for</strong>e the one most likely to<br />
have bid below true cost. Although this outcome is mostly a problem <strong>for</strong> the<br />
winning supplier, rather than the Government, it can have implications if the<br />
supplier is then unable to fulfil all their duties or seeks to cut quality in order to<br />
save costs. An extreme winner’s curse outcome could even jeopardise service<br />
delivery altogether. A winner’s curse outcome is most likely when there are a<br />
large number of bidders and uncertainty surrounding costs.<br />
94
Controlling <strong>for</strong> problems of asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
Although there is no explicit provision to deal with the winner’s curse in the<br />
procurement of prison services, there are two aspects of the tender process that<br />
reduce this risk.<br />
First, there is no obligation on HMPS to purchase from the lowest bidder. The<br />
tender evaluation process begins with a deliverability test that does not consider<br />
costs at all but focuses on whether the proposed operational plans are feasible.<br />
Bids are often eliminated at this stage. Even though, in theory, all remaining bids<br />
are deliverable, the evaluation team will still not necessarily accept the lowestpriced<br />
bid, but instead will apply a complex matrix marking <strong>for</strong> quality. They<br />
then attempt to price quality, and select the contract with the lowest qualityadjusted<br />
price. Of the nine DCMF contracts in existence, four were not won by<br />
the lowest-priced bidder.<br />
Second, rival bidders are provided with detailed in<strong>for</strong>mation on costs. The<br />
publication of contract competition, and the requirement that incumbent providers<br />
make cost in<strong>for</strong>mation available to interested bidders, should both reduce the risks<br />
in bidding. However, there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that the latter<br />
measure is less effective in practice because it is possible <strong>for</strong> incumbents to<br />
present cost in<strong>for</strong>mation in a way that is unhelpful to other bidders.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance in practice<br />
There are some concerns that competition between providers has led to contract<br />
prices that will not cover costs adequately. Parc prison saw very poor<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance as a result of failing to provide sufficient staff with the appropriate<br />
level of experience. The same was true of Ashfield, whose assessment of the<br />
costs involved in recruitment and retention of the required staff fell short of the<br />
actual costs, with the result that staffing levels fell significantly below<br />
requirements. After several months of warnings, HMPS relocated half of the<br />
Ashfield inmates and installed its own Governor in place of the private<br />
management team. As a consequence, the operating service provider, Premier,<br />
improved the terms and conditions it offered staff, was thus better able to recruit<br />
and retain staff and has since per<strong>for</strong>med well against contractual criteria.<br />
Problems at Ashfield may have arisen partly because the role of the prison was<br />
changed after the contract was signed from a centre <strong>for</strong> three-hundred juveniles<br />
and one-hundred young offenders to a centre <strong>for</strong> four-hundred juveniles.<br />
Although the contract was revisited accordingly, it is possible that the failure<br />
occurred at the renegotiation stage.<br />
Controlling Service Quality<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
For the market to deliver an efficient outcome, contracts must be complete.<br />
However, in reality contracts are almost always likely to be incomplete. For<br />
example, there may be some aspects of service quality that are too difficult to<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
measure or it may be prohibitively costly to include a provision <strong>for</strong> every<br />
possible contingency. Incomplete contracts 93 in competitive tendering can lead<br />
to two main problems, cost reductions being achieved at the expense of quality<br />
(‘quality shading’) and fears of the ‘hold-up’ problem previously discussed. In<br />
the case of prison procurement, quality shading is of particular interest because<br />
the economics literature has cited this as the main reason that private sector<br />
involvement in prison services is inadvisable.<br />
QUALITY-SHADING<br />
Quality shading means that the private sector firm running the prison service<br />
reduces costs partly or mainly by reducing the quality of the service provided.<br />
Quality shading has been found in privately provided prisons in the US, which<br />
have been subject to a great deal of criticism. 94 It arises where there are multiple<br />
objectives to be pursued, some of which are more readily observable than<br />
others. Agents will tend to focus ef<strong>for</strong>ts on improving the per<strong>for</strong>mance of the<br />
measurable output to the detriment of the others. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny<br />
(1997) developed this idea in relation to public-sector procurement, and<br />
concluded that, where non-contractible quality is important, the public-sector<br />
should retain both ownership and management of the service. One of the public<br />
services they concluded was there<strong>for</strong>e unsuited to private sector management<br />
was prison management.<br />
Because issues of incomplete contracts have been central to the introduction of<br />
competition to prison services, features of the procurement process designed to<br />
control <strong>for</strong> quality are considered in detail in the following section, along with an<br />
evaluation of the quality of private prison services in practice.<br />
Hart et al. (1997) concluded that prison management was unsuited to private<br />
sector involvement on the grounds that the quality of prison services is very<br />
important, but costly <strong>for</strong> a private sector provider to deliver and difficult to specify<br />
in a contract. Whilst the first two points are without dispute, HMPS has shown<br />
that it is possible to contract <strong>for</strong> quality: this has been an important part of<br />
contract design and monitoring, as discussed in detail below. Whilst the quality<br />
shading problems associated with incomplete contracts have been limited largely<br />
through designing contracts that are as complete as possible, HMPS has also<br />
tried to address this potential problem through the bid evaluation procedure and<br />
more recently through incentives <strong>for</strong> enhanced per<strong>for</strong>mance. It is worth noting<br />
that firms face additional incentives to deliver a high-quality service arising from<br />
the fact that they care about their reputation. This is particularly important given<br />
the need <strong>for</strong> bidders to demonstrate a proven track record in security services to<br />
be considered <strong>for</strong> the contract.<br />
93 Because virtually all contracts are incomplete, this potential issue is one of degree rather than existence. However<br />
<strong>for</strong> simplicity here we use the term ‘incomplete contracts’ to refer to contracts that are sufficiently incomplete to<br />
cause the problems discussed.<br />
94 See <strong>for</strong> example Logan (1990) and Shichor (1995) <strong>for</strong> a summary of evidence <strong>for</strong> and against private prisons in<br />
the US.<br />
96
Procurement process design<br />
One way in which quality can be controlled <strong>for</strong>, even if contracts are incomplete,<br />
is by making it an explicit part of the process <strong>for</strong> evaluating bids. Tendering <strong>for</strong><br />
a prison management contract takes the <strong>for</strong>m of a beauty contest, with price just<br />
one criterion on which bidders compete. Other criteria related to quality of<br />
service may be assigned equal or greater weight in the decision process and in<br />
many cases the bid accepted is not the lowest price bid.<br />
Contract design and contract monitoring<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
Critics of prison privatisation in the US have pointed to evidence of quality<br />
shading, lending support to the Hart et al. (1997) conclusion that prison service<br />
quality is non-contractible and is there<strong>for</strong>e likely to suffer from the involvement<br />
of the private sector. Quality shading in the US has been observed particularly in<br />
relation to staffing levels and qualifications. However, the UK experience so far<br />
demonstrates that it is possible to contract <strong>for</strong> quality if sufficient resources are<br />
devoted to contract design and monitoring. The UK system is now described in<br />
detail below.<br />
The winning bidder taking on management of a prison signed a contract with the<br />
Commissioner <strong>for</strong> Correctional Services, whose post was replaced by the Chief<br />
Executive of NOMS on 1 June 2004. Each contract sets out the level of service<br />
that contractors are expected to provide, the payment system and the<br />
mechanisms by which the Commissioner/Chief Executive can make financial<br />
deductions <strong>for</strong> poor per<strong>for</strong>mance. Individually negotiated contracts are linked to<br />
a national monitoring system that applies to all prisons, whether privately or<br />
publicly managed. Fifteen Key Per<strong>for</strong>mance Indicators (KPIs) measure whether<br />
the Prison Service as a whole is meeting its objectives of protecting the public<br />
and reducing crime. For example, one KPI <strong>for</strong> 2005/6 is to ensure that the rate of<br />
escapes is less than 0.05 per cent of the average prison population. National KPIs<br />
are supported by 48 Key Per<strong>for</strong>mance Targets (KPTs) that measure the<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance of individual prisons against planned activities. Target figures are<br />
agreed on an individual prison basis, and vary according to the nature of the<br />
centre concerned. For example, each prison will agree to keep escapes below an<br />
appropriate level, in order to ensure that the national KPI is achieved. Contracts<br />
have recently been adapted to incorporate the same KPTs that apply to public<br />
prisons, with annual per<strong>for</strong>mance measures defined in relation to the<br />
appropriate KPTs. Per<strong>for</strong>mance measurement in relation to individual contracts<br />
is addressed in further detail below.<br />
In addition, contractors are obliged to comply with national operational<br />
requirements laid out in primary and secondary legislation, Prison Service<br />
Standards, Prison Service Orders and Prison Service Instructions. Compliance<br />
with these requirements is measured by the Prison Service Standards Audit unit,<br />
which allocates each prison an overall rating of superior, good, acceptable,<br />
deficient or unacceptable on the basis of its visits.<br />
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The procurement department at HMPS has invested considerable resources in<br />
trying to measure the different elements of quality provision within prison<br />
management. The result is that the tenders <strong>for</strong> individual management contracts<br />
outline 30 to 40 per<strong>for</strong>mance measures covering different aspects of prison<br />
management quality which bidders have to commit to meet. These per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
measures typically fall into seven broad categories:<br />
● keeping prisoners in custody;<br />
● maintaining order, control, discipline and a safe environment;<br />
● providing decent conditions and meeting prisoners’ needs;<br />
● providing positive regimes;<br />
● preparing prisoners <strong>for</strong> their return to the community;<br />
● delivering prison services; and<br />
● community relations.<br />
For example security is a key aspect of keeping prisoners in custody and is<br />
monitored according to both a quarterly and an annual per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
measurement system. Penalty points are accrued on a quarterly basis <strong>for</strong>:<br />
● failure to achieve an agreed percentage of planned searches;<br />
● discovery of serious items smuggled in;<br />
● failure of security procedures laid down in the Prison Service Security<br />
Manual; and/or<br />
● failure to observe key/lock procedures laid down in the Prison Service<br />
Security Manual.<br />
Annual penalty points are incurred <strong>for</strong>:<br />
● failure to achieve an ‘acceptable’ or higher rating in the Security Audit during<br />
the relevant per<strong>for</strong>mance year; and/or<br />
● failure to achieve the agreed Key Per<strong>for</strong>mance Target percentage compliance<br />
with local planned preventative maintenance with respect to all equipment.<br />
Credit points can be awarded <strong>for</strong> a rating above ‘acceptable’ in the Security<br />
Audit. These can be offset against penalty points incurred against certain annual<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance measures, specified in the contract.<br />
The per<strong>for</strong>mance-management system is based on points <strong>for</strong> failing various<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance metrics, such as the occurrence of an assault. As no prison will ever<br />
be without failure, contract negotiations include a threshold number of points<br />
below which no financial penalty is incurred based on the particular<br />
characteristics of the prison. These thresholds apply quarterly. At the end of each<br />
quarter, per<strong>for</strong>mance points are summed together and if they lie below the<br />
contractual threshold, no further action is taken. If they exceed this level,<br />
98
however, financial deductions are made at a rate reflecting the number of points.<br />
Although this could potentially lead to problems of moral hazard in reporting<br />
poor per<strong>for</strong>mance, the penalties <strong>for</strong> failure to report are far stronger than any<br />
other penalty. Furthermore, the HMPS Controller and the Independent<br />
Monitoring Board (previously the Board of Visitors) provide on-site independent<br />
monitoring services so that the probability of poor per<strong>for</strong>mance being detected<br />
even if it is unreported is very high.<br />
The quality and number of employees hired by a private contractor is crucial to<br />
ensuring the quality of service provision. The quality is partly ensured through a<br />
legal requirement under the 1991 Criminal Justice Act that staff recruited by<br />
private contractors are required to be certified by the Prison Service as Prisoner<br />
Custody Officers. Certification involves a training course of approximately ten<br />
weeks’ duration. This certification means that no unqualified staff are allowed to<br />
work in private prisons.<br />
The number of staff that the contractor will use is not part of the initial tender<br />
documents, but does <strong>for</strong>m part of the contract signed with the winning bidder. It<br />
was decided not to include detailed requirements <strong>for</strong> staff numbers in the tender<br />
documents because this might restrict innovation. Instead staffing levels<br />
proposed in bids are scrutinised closely during the bid evaluation stage and then<br />
<strong>for</strong>m part of the final contract. This attempts to balance the need to ensure<br />
quality is maintained with providing sufficient contractual flexibility to<br />
encourage innovation. Because quality of prison service provision is crucial,<br />
where trade-offs between price and quality have been made they have been in<br />
favour of service quality.<br />
One aspect of service quality that cannot normally be measured is the ability of<br />
a centre to reduce the re-offending rate. Measurement is impossible because<br />
prisoners rarely serve an entire sentence within the same prison, so the effects<br />
of different centres on behaviour following release cannot be distinguished. The<br />
one exception to this is that of Dovegate Therapeutic Centre. This centre<br />
specialises in running courses <strong>for</strong> the rehabilitation of offenders. An unusual<br />
aspect of this centre is that participation is voluntary and prisoners have to apply<br />
to be sent there. Once there, the volunteers spend the entire duration of an 18month<br />
programme within the centre. As the aim of the program is to reduce reoffending,<br />
this is then an explicit part of the system <strong>for</strong> assessing per<strong>for</strong>mance.<br />
Contract monitoring<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
A rigorous monitoring process supports the per<strong>for</strong>mance measures set out in<br />
the contract. Each prison is allocated an on-site controller, a deputy controller<br />
and support staff whose job is to monitor the per<strong>for</strong>mance of each prison. In a<br />
recent drive to standardise controllers’ approach to contract management, and<br />
minimise the risk of regulatory capture, an Assistant Director of Contracted<br />
Prisons was appointed to oversee all monitoring.<br />
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Private and public sector prisons:<br />
● are also subject to inspections by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons and<br />
Probation;<br />
● have all Independent Monitoring Board as an independent watchdog<br />
composed of representatives from the local community monitoring the<br />
physical state of the prison, its administration and prisoner concerns; and<br />
● are subject to prisoner complaints procedures administered by the Prison and<br />
Probation Ombudsmen.<br />
Incentives to provide a high quality service<br />
The initial contracts contained only penalties <strong>for</strong> failure to meet the per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
targets, they did not include rewards <strong>for</strong> exceeding targets. More recently,<br />
attempts have been made to include incentives <strong>for</strong> high-quality service, as well<br />
as the penalties <strong>for</strong> poor per<strong>for</strong>mance. These incentives take two main <strong>for</strong>ms. In<br />
the special case of Dovegate Therapeutic Centre, the centre can earn financial<br />
bonuses <strong>for</strong> per<strong>for</strong>mance above the expected standard.<br />
However, in all other contracts bonuses take the <strong>for</strong>m of credits that can be offset<br />
against poor per<strong>for</strong>mance points. Such bonuses were introduced in the two most<br />
recent contracts, Bronzefield and Peterborough, and have since been negotiated<br />
and applied retroactively to all existing contracts. Moreover, all private contractors<br />
have the incentive to per<strong>for</strong>m well in order to be considered <strong>for</strong> re-tender.<br />
The final aspect of the quality assurance regime is the ultimate sanction of<br />
terminating the contract early. The Prison Service is empowered to take over the<br />
prison if it appears that the director has lost, or is likely to lose, effective control<br />
of the prison or any part of it. This power has been exercised in the case of<br />
Ashfield, where HMPS assumed control <strong>for</strong> five months in 2002 following<br />
concerns <strong>for</strong> inmate safety.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance in practice<br />
The available evidence suggests that the system of per<strong>for</strong>mance measures and<br />
contract monitoring used by HMPS has largely been successful in ensuring service<br />
quality, although there are exceptions. Two independent studies have both found<br />
that the best private prisons are among the best prisons in the country.<br />
The NAO evaluated a sample of 21 prisons 95 and found the best PFI prisons are<br />
outper<strong>for</strong>ming most public prisons but that the lowest-per<strong>for</strong>ming PFI prison is<br />
among the worst overall. The Coopers and Lybrand (1996) study arrives at a<br />
similar conclusion. It finds that contractually-managed prisons per<strong>for</strong>m well or<br />
better on escapes and visiting entitlement, and better in terms of the number of<br />
95 The NAO’s methodology consisted of collating all available in<strong>for</strong>mation into a traffic light structure assessing the<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance of individual prisons against a range of indicators and then ranking them according to the number<br />
of red indicators.<br />
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Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
hours during which prisoners are unlocked and average weekly hours of<br />
purposeful activity. However, the study also observes that assault rates are<br />
higher at privately managed prisons than at comparable public prisons.<br />
This evidence suggests there may be tension between different objectives. In<br />
general, PFI prisons outper<strong>for</strong>m publicly managed prisons on decency criteria<br />
but the reverse is true <strong>for</strong> safety/security criteria. 96 The NAO report observes that<br />
it appears difficult <strong>for</strong> any prison, whether public or private, to per<strong>for</strong>m well in<br />
both of these areas, suggesting that there may be some degree of trade-off<br />
between the two. The observed differences in per<strong>for</strong>mance may arise from the<br />
fact that public prison decency targets are often set at lower levels than <strong>for</strong><br />
private prisons, 97 perhaps enabling public prisons to make this trade-off where<br />
private prisons could not without breaching their contract. They may also reflect<br />
differences in staff culture across the types of provider. Private prisons often hire<br />
workers with no previous experience in prison management, and there<strong>for</strong>e have<br />
staff who are more likely to accept changing attitudes towards prisoners than<br />
their more experienced public sector counterparts.<br />
Not all evaluations of private prisons have been so positive. For example, the<br />
Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust has criticised private prisons <strong>for</strong> cutting labour costs to the<br />
detriment of service quality. It finds that these labour cost savings have been<br />
achieved in two main ways. First by reducing the number of employees: the<br />
private sector hires on average 17 per cent fewer staff per prisoner. 98 Second, by<br />
offering worse terms and conditions to prison officers than those enjoyed by<br />
public sector employees. The average basic salary <strong>for</strong> prison officers in state run<br />
prisons in England and Wales in April 2003 was £23,071, compared to £16,077 in<br />
privately managed prisons. 99 The average contracted working week is two hours<br />
longer and annual leave two to ten days less per annum. By including<br />
differentials in overtime pay and pension entitlements, some estimates have<br />
arrived at the conclusion that staff in private prisons may be up to 70 per cent<br />
worse off than public sector prison officers. 100<br />
The Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust has suggested that inferior terms and conditions have<br />
led to the hiring of young and inexperienced staff with little prior knowledge of<br />
the prison system, as well as observed higher turnover rates (25 per cent as<br />
opposed to 2.5 per cent). 101 It attributes problems maintaining required staff<br />
levels to these higher turnover rates, and suggests that the use of inexperienced<br />
96 Decency criteria relate to the quality of life in prison, and include measures such as hours of purposeful activity<br />
and respect shown to prisoners. Safety/security criteria on the other hand include measures to limit the number<br />
of escapes and assaults.<br />
97 For example, the NAO observes that the average purposeful activity target <strong>for</strong> local prisons operating in the<br />
public sector is 20.6 hours per prisoner per week, where the equivalent figure <strong>for</strong> PFI and privately-managed local<br />
prisons is 29.5 hours.<br />
98 Sachdev(2003).<br />
99 Hansard(23 March 2004).<br />
100 Sachdev (2003).<br />
101 DLA MCG Consulting (2003).<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
staff may have compromised prisoner’s safety and quality of life. To support this,<br />
the Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust cites the fact that six out of ten private prisons in 2003-<br />
2004 failed to meet their targets <strong>for</strong> serious assaults, and that only one private<br />
prison met its target <strong>for</strong> purposeful activity <strong>for</strong> inmates. Per<strong>for</strong>mance relative to<br />
targets is given in Table 9.4. No such measures are available <strong>for</strong> public prisons<br />
against which to compare this per<strong>for</strong>mance. However the Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust<br />
does note that the average amount of time prisoners spend in purposeful activity<br />
is higher in private prisons than in public prisons. In 2003-2004, the Prison<br />
Service failed to meet its target of 24 hours per week, whereas the private sector<br />
prisons averaged 26.7 hours per week. 102<br />
Table 9.4<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance of private prisons against targets<br />
Prison Actual Per<strong>for</strong>mance Target Actual Target on<br />
on serious assaults on serious per<strong>for</strong>mance purposeful<br />
(rate on prisoners assaults on purposeful activity<br />
and staff) activity (average<br />
hours per prisoner<br />
per week)<br />
Altcourse 2.41% 1.50% 34.4 32<br />
Ashfield 2.52% 2.60% 29.3 30<br />
Dovegate 2.36% 1.30% 25.5 35<br />
Doncaster 0.09% 0.40% 19.6 20<br />
Forest Bank 0.80% 1.40% 20.9 24<br />
Lowdham Grange 1.15% 0.90% 26.8 28<br />
Parc 3.98% 1.00% 26.3 32<br />
Rye Hill 1.07% 0.00% 28.5 30<br />
Wolds 2.32% 1.50% 29.2 30<br />
Notes: Data relate to per<strong>for</strong>mance year 2003-2004.<br />
Source: Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust (2005).<br />
The Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust is not the only body to have expressed concerns over<br />
the experience of staff. As the Chief Inspector of Prisons observed in her report<br />
on HMP Dovegate:<br />
102<br />
‘There was some welcome innovation, and good staff-prisoner relationships.<br />
But there was also a worrying lack of experience and confidence amongst a<br />
young, locally recruited staff, few of whom had any previous prison<br />
experience, and who were operating with low staffing levels and high staff<br />
turnover. By contrast Dovegate’s prisoners were not inexperienced.’ 103<br />
102 See Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust (2005) Private Punishment: Who Profits?, Briefing Paper, HM Prison Service (2004),<br />
cited on p.10.<br />
103 See Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust (2005) Op.Cit, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2003), as quoted on p.8.
The Independent Monitoring Board at Rye Hill also noted in its annual report<br />
that:<br />
‘...lack of experience has led to instances of different staff giving conflicting<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation to prisoners. The Board has received a number of applications<br />
from prisoners who do not feel their concerns are taken seriously enough’. 104<br />
However, private contractors argue that their recruitment policies have been one<br />
factor contributing to their success. For example, some operators actively<br />
operate a policy of not employing public sector prison officers because they<br />
consider previous experience to be disadvantageous to a culture of change and<br />
innovation, and prefer to train staff themselves. They attribute the observed<br />
wage differentials to a number of factors, including differences in average years<br />
of experience and also in training, support and available opportunities.<br />
Furthermore, private contractors tend to pay at a rate reflecting local labour market<br />
conditions in contrast to the public sector, which conducts wage bargaining on a<br />
national basis. This has the effect that public sector prison officers are relatively<br />
less well paid in London, but receive a higher wage than they would otherwise<br />
hope to command elsewhere in the country, leading to a very low turnover rate.<br />
Some critics consider that this low turnover, combined with strong unionisation,<br />
can make change more difficult <strong>for</strong> the public sector to introduce than its private<br />
counterparts: workers who have been per<strong>for</strong>ming the same job <strong>for</strong> a long time are<br />
less likely to think of or welcome innovations than workers entering the sector with<br />
no pre-conceptions regarding prison management.<br />
If it were impossible to specify a sufficiently complete contract <strong>for</strong> prison<br />
services, widespread termination of contracts would be likely. The fact that no<br />
contracts have failed to this extent there<strong>for</strong>e suggests that contracting <strong>for</strong> quality<br />
has been largely successful in prison service procurement. Where problems<br />
have arisen with private providers they have constituted a breach of contract and<br />
attracted appropriate financial penalties. This outcome suggests that the range<br />
of per<strong>for</strong>mance measures included in prison contracts adequately covers most<br />
aspects of service quality. Most notably, most private prisons outper<strong>for</strong>m their<br />
public sector counterparts on many measures of service quality. Even though<br />
this per<strong>for</strong>mance may be helped by having more modern facilities, it suggests<br />
that overall service quality in private prisons is satisfactorily maintained.<br />
Outcome of market mechanism<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
The two expected benefits of the introduction of the private sector were that it<br />
would reduce costs and improve innovation. Although no specific targets were<br />
set, there is evidence that the process was successful in both of these objectives.<br />
104 See Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust (2005) Op.Cit, Rye Hill IMB (2004), as quoted on p.9.<br />
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COST EFFICIENCY<br />
Two independent reports have suggested that there have been significant cost<br />
savings from procurement. The CBI report estimates cost savings of between<br />
£40m and £60m per annum from prison-service procurement, amounting to a<br />
total of between £200m and £260m between 1991 and 2002. This estimate is<br />
based on the most recent available data <strong>for</strong> cost per prisoner place, which state<br />
that the operating costs of privately-managed prisons are 10-15 per cent lower<br />
than comparable publicly managed prisons. The CBI measure also includes<br />
construction cost savings of 20 per cent achieved by designing and building<br />
prisons under PFI contracts rather than traditional procurement means. These<br />
savings are mainly attributable to the fact that new prisons have been completed<br />
on time 105 and on budget, with construction times falling by more than 40 per<br />
cent and the risk of cost over-runs transferred to the private contractor. The<br />
measure also includes operating cost reductions in the three market-tested<br />
prisons won by the in-house bid.<br />
There is some question over whether cost per prisoner place is the appropriate<br />
measure to use. A study by the Home Office found that whilst this measure<br />
reports cost savings of the order assumed by the CBI, two alternative measures<br />
based on the cost of available places give a different picture. These measures,<br />
based on cost per place, show the gap between public and private management<br />
costs narrowing over time to the extent that there are no longer any savings to<br />
be made from private sector involvement. 106 The study suggests that the<br />
marginal cost of accommodating an additional prisoner is small, and there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
that over-crowded prisons will appear more cost efficient than prisons operating<br />
at or under capacity when measured in terms of cost per prisoner. The number<br />
of prisoner places on the other hand is more stable and so reporting cost in<br />
terms of prisoner places provides a more reliable indicator of relative efficiency.<br />
Figure 9.1 opposite shows trends in these different measures over time.<br />
105 In contrast to prisons constructed under traditional procurement, which averaged 13% construction overruns. See<br />
Competition: a catalyst <strong>for</strong> change in the prison service, CBI, p.18.<br />
106 Park, I.(2000) ‘Review of Comparative Costs and Per<strong>for</strong>mance of Privately and <strong>Public</strong>ly Operated Prisons 1998-99’<br />
Home Office Statistical Bulletin 6/00, RDS Directorate .<br />
104
Figure 9.1: Difference between the average operating costs of private prisons<br />
and public sector comparators<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0%<br />
-5%<br />
Cost per in-use CNA<br />
Cost per baseline CNA<br />
Cost per prisoner<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99<br />
Notes: Cost per baseline Certified Normal Accommodation (CNA) place refers to the total number of places the prison is<br />
certified to offer. Cost per in-use CNA place measures the total number of places excluding those temporarily out of use.<br />
<strong>Public</strong> sector comparators are computed by taking the average operating costs of two or three prisons similar to the<br />
private prison concerned. The above figure represents the average differences in the operating costs of four private prisons<br />
(Blakenhurst, Buckley Hall, Doncaster and Wolds) and their public sector comparator. Data is not available after 1999.<br />
Source: Reviews of comparative costs and per<strong>for</strong>mance of privately and publicly operated prisons 1998-99, Home Office.<br />
The CBI has questioned the Home Office methodology on the grounds that large<br />
increases in over-crowding require additional staff resources and that the<br />
marginal cost of prisoners is there<strong>for</strong>e significant. The report also cites the fact<br />
that staffing costs per prisoner in 1997-98 were 33 per cent lower in contract<br />
prisons than in public prisons, and staffing costs per place 24 per cent lower. 107<br />
Because staffing costs account <strong>for</strong> a large proportion of a prison’s running costs,<br />
it seems likely that savings that are still being realised from private sector<br />
involvement. The CBI methodology states that it adjusts its total annual cost<br />
saving estimate <strong>for</strong> over-crowding during contract life, but does not explain how<br />
this is done.<br />
Although there is some debate over the relative improvements in efficiency of<br />
private prisons, there is a consensus that competitive tendering led to<br />
operational cost savings at least in the short run. Coopers and Lybrand (1996)<br />
per<strong>for</strong>med a cost analysis <strong>for</strong> 1994-95 and found operational cost savings of<br />
between 13 and 22 per cent relative to a group of comparable publicly-managed<br />
prisons. It should also be noted that any improvements in the relative efficiency<br />
of public prisons are a likely result, at least in part, from competitive pressure<br />
and diffusion of best practice from privately managed prisons. This implies that<br />
107 CBI (2003), Competition: a catalyst <strong>for</strong> change in the prison service, p.17.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
private sector involvement continues to deliver significant operating cost<br />
efficiency benefits but that the public sector comparator is no longer the most<br />
appropriate means of measuring these. Operating cost savings under this<br />
scenario also include the lower running costs of public prisons attributable to the<br />
development of a private sector market in prison services.<br />
SHARPER INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION<br />
There are three main reasons <strong>for</strong> innovation being more likely in the private<br />
sector.<br />
● First, private sector contractors capture the entire rents from cost reducing<br />
innovation <strong>for</strong> the duration of the contract life since prices are agreed when a<br />
contract is signed. In contrast, public sector managers would be likely to see<br />
their budget cut the following year in response to a cost reducing innovation.<br />
● Second, innovative working practices may also be easier to introduce in the<br />
private sector where working practices are less firmly established.<br />
● Third, the process of competition may encourage both public and private<br />
sector bidders to be more responsive to customer needs.<br />
There is indeed evidence that competition, and, more broadly, the threat of<br />
competition, has delivered greater innovation in the following areas.<br />
Staff recruitment and deployment<br />
The largest opportunity <strong>for</strong> innovation in a prison-management contract is in<br />
staff deployment, as staff represent around 80 per cent of running costs.<br />
Innovation in staff deployment and recruitment has included a flatter<br />
management structure and the recruitment of a younger, more flexible<br />
work<strong>for</strong>ce, many of whom have had little or no prior experience in prisons.<br />
These features, combined with a higher average staff turnover, have facilitated<br />
the introduction of more flexible working practices such as shift work. As noted<br />
previously, low staff turnover rates in public prisons may make it more difficult<br />
to change established methods of operation. Shift patterns have enabled<br />
receptions to remain open longer, visiting times to be more flexible and<br />
prisoners on enhanced regimes to eat with their families.<br />
Although these recruitment practices may have increased flexibility, they have<br />
raised some concerns about security.<br />
Staff/Prisoner relationship<br />
One of the most significant innovations to occur has involved a focus on<br />
encouraging a more positive relationship between staff and prisoners. The CBI<br />
report notes that:<br />
106
‘While there were staff in the publicly managed prisons who wanted to break<br />
from the confrontational culture of the past, it required the creation of a new<br />
class of prison with a profoundly different management regime to bring<br />
about a new and more constructive culture.’ 108<br />
The NAO-commissioned study by MORI found that prisoners in privately<br />
managed prisons feel better treated than those in publicly managed prisons.<br />
These conclusions find support in independent work by the Institute of<br />
Criminology at Cambridge University 109 and even amongst some critics of<br />
private sector involvement. For example, the Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust comments:<br />
‘A noticeable private sector innovation has been in the attitude of staff<br />
towards prisoners....It is the norm in private jails <strong>for</strong> staff to address prisoners<br />
by their title and to develop a different style of staff-prisoner relations.’ 110<br />
Technological innovation<br />
Technological innovations have generally been introduced to reduce staffing<br />
requirements, and include the increased use of CCTV and the introduction of<br />
magnetic keys.<br />
Prison Design<br />
Under the DCMF contracts, the design of prisons has been left to the private<br />
sector. This has led to innovations in prison design. New prisons designed under<br />
PFI contracts have been built to incorporate clear lines of sight <strong>for</strong> ease of<br />
monitoring, <strong>for</strong> example situating control rooms at the centre of a spine system<br />
of wings.<br />
Some of these private sector innovations have helped the Prison Service<br />
become more competitive. For example, when building new house blocks within<br />
existing prisons, HMPS has drawn on private sector best practice of using prefabricated<br />
buildings that can be assembled on site. The private sector has also<br />
made use of innovative shift patterns and staff arrangements to improve<br />
efficiency, although the extent to which the public sector has been able to adopt<br />
these has been limited.<br />
UNANTICIPATED BENEFITS<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
There have been unanticipated benefits from the introduction of competition.<br />
The main unanticipated benefit has been the competitive pressure that private<br />
sector involvement has exerted on the public sector. Competitive tendering has<br />
allowed <strong>for</strong> the development of an alternative market of rival suppliers, against<br />
108 CBI (2003) Competition: a catalyst <strong>for</strong> change in the prison service, p.25.<br />
109 See <strong>for</strong> example, Liebling, A. and Arnold, H. (2002) ‘Measuring the quality of prison life’, Findings no.174, Home<br />
Office, RDS Directorate.<br />
110 Prison Re<strong>for</strong>m Trust (2005) Private Punishment: Who Profits?, Briefing Paper, p.10.<br />
107
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
whom the public sector has had to compete <strong>for</strong> the management of markettested<br />
prisons. To date, there have been eight contracts <strong>for</strong> which the public and<br />
private sector have competed directly. The introduction of per<strong>for</strong>mance testing<br />
<strong>for</strong> failing prisons has also provided an indirect competitive stimulus <strong>for</strong> good<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance in the public sector, and is only possible because an alternative<br />
market of private sector suppliers now exists.<br />
That the public sector has become more efficient as a result is evidenced by:<br />
● its ability to win back two management contracts, Buckley Hall and<br />
Blakenhurst, from incumbent private sector contractors. That this is<br />
attributable to the improved efficiency of the public sector rather than the<br />
poor per<strong>for</strong>mance of private suppliers is demonstrated by the fact that both<br />
prisons received good reports from the Prison Inspectorate shortly be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
contracts were re-tendered and lost. In the case of Buckley Hall, the report<br />
went as far as concluding that it was ‘... a thoroughly good prison: in terms of<br />
outcomes <strong>for</strong> prisoners, Buckley Hall was outper<strong>for</strong>ming the majority of<br />
Prison Service establishments fulfilling similar roles’; 111 and<br />
● the fact that the prison population has increased more than proportionately<br />
with the Prison Service budget. In the 1980s, it was the increase in prisoner<br />
population that gave rise to the very concerns about over-crowding and poor<br />
conditions that led to the involvement of the private sector in the first place.<br />
Recent increases in prison population, however, appear to have been<br />
absorbed without any significant adverse impact on per<strong>for</strong>mance. This<br />
outcome is unlikely to reflect economies of scale, as the CBI report observes:<br />
‘One would expect there would have been some scale economies<br />
associated with overcrowding and yet the two contract prisons with the<br />
biggest increases in overcrowding, HMP Blakenhurst and HMP Doncaster,<br />
had larger increases in cost per place and smaller falls in cost per prisoner<br />
than the other two contract prisons. If there were scale economies<br />
associated with overcrowding, they cannot have been significant.’ 112<br />
Overall Assessment<br />
The overall evidence suggests that the procurement of prison services has been<br />
successful. The anticipated benefits of competition appear to have been realised,<br />
without suffering from any major potential detriments. In particular, the<br />
supporting per<strong>for</strong>mance-measurement process, combined with an extensive<br />
monitoring process, appears to have been sufficient to maintain quality in the<br />
majority of private prisons, although there have been exceptions.<br />
This success has not come without significant investment of time and resources.<br />
Each competition requires four or five internal staff at a cost of around £250k to<br />
111 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons <strong>for</strong> England and Wales, ‘Annual Report 1999-2000’, p.25.<br />
112 CBI (2003) Op.Cit. p.17.<br />
108
design the invitation to tender and negotiate bids. Further costs of £500-600k are<br />
incurred in the <strong>for</strong>m of legal advice and financial insurance. In addition, each<br />
prison has its own on-site controller to monitor the quality of service.<br />
Table 9.5<br />
Average total costs per competition<br />
Source: Interview with David Kent, HMPS; interview with private prisons operator.<br />
However, the evidence suggests that these costs have been far outweighed by<br />
the benefits. The CBI reports that the prison service has saved £40-60m per year<br />
as a result of the introduction of competition. 113 Moreover, this measures only the<br />
direct benefits of having more efficient private prisons. Other benefits exist, such<br />
as encouraging greater efficiency and innovation in the public sector. <strong>Public</strong><br />
sector comparator estimates computed by HMPS show there are now fewer<br />
savings from using the private sector <strong>for</strong> the operation of a prison as the public<br />
sector has become more efficient. This finding shows that even opening a<br />
limited portion of a service to competition can have significant benefits <strong>for</strong> the<br />
parts not directly exposed to competition.<br />
LESSONS FOR OTHER AREAS<br />
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
Source of cost Amount<br />
Design of invitation to tender and negotiation around bids £250k<br />
Legal advice and financial insurance £500k-600k<br />
TOTAL COSTS FOR HMPS PER COMPETITION £750-850k<br />
Legal advice £100k<br />
Financial costs £100k<br />
Building design costs £100k<br />
Asset management costs £70k<br />
Internal costs (including opportunity cost of staff resources) £200k<br />
TOTAL COSTS FOR A BIDDING FIRM PER COMPETITION £570k<br />
We have identified the following lessons that could be relevant to the use of<br />
competitive tendering in other areas.<br />
● Involving the private sector in the provision of public services can lead to<br />
lower service delivery costs and greater innovation. It may also increase<br />
public sector provider efficiency by introducing competition and allowing the<br />
diffusion of innovations. Even when only introduced to a small proportion of<br />
the sector, competition can still help to increase the sector’s overall efficiency.<br />
The per<strong>for</strong>mance of public sector prisons has improved since the introduction<br />
of competitive tendering and this improvement is believed to be partly<br />
attributable to the threat of replacement by private prisons.<br />
113 The CBI measure includes operating cost savings in privately-managed prisons and an estimate of savings from<br />
contestability in terms of lower prices <strong>for</strong> successful in-house bids. It does not include any cost efficiencies in<br />
non-market tested public sector prisons that may have resulted from the diffusion of best practice from the<br />
private sector<br />
109
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
● It may be possible to specify aspects of service quality in a contract using<br />
measurable and en<strong>for</strong>ceable per<strong>for</strong>mance criteria. Combined with an<br />
adequate monitoring system, contract design may there<strong>for</strong>e be used to limit<br />
quality shading in competitively tendered services. This runs counter to the<br />
predictions of economic theory, which assumes that quality is difficult to<br />
measure and there<strong>for</strong>e concludes that private sector involvement in public<br />
services may lead to cost cutting at the expense of quality. Conducting the<br />
competitive tender process through a beauty contest mechanism may also be<br />
useful where quality is an important aspect of the service because this<br />
prevents an excessive focus on cost.<br />
● Targets and per<strong>for</strong>mance measures should be well defined and based on<br />
clear objectives. Most aspects of service quality involve trade-offs.<br />
Contractors are there<strong>for</strong>e likely to focus on delivering the outcomes that are<br />
most easily measurable. When designing targets it is important to bear in<br />
mind that measurable per<strong>for</strong>mance indicators will be preferred over those<br />
that are less easy to measure. The potential <strong>for</strong> a target to have an unintended<br />
consequence should be taken into account when setting the target. As no<br />
system is perfect, targets should also be regularly reviewed over time to take<br />
their actual per<strong>for</strong>mance into account.<br />
● The benefits of contract aggregation can be realised without creating<br />
problems <strong>for</strong> long-term competition from incumbency advantages. Requiring<br />
disclosure of in<strong>for</strong>mation by incumbents to bidders and encouraging entry by<br />
suitable firms operating in relevant fields can help to maintain a competitive<br />
market.<br />
● When a market is relatively new, it may be necessary to select bidders not<br />
offering the lowest price <strong>for</strong> a contract to ensure competition <strong>for</strong> future<br />
contracts. Awarding early contracts to one provider only may realise shortterm<br />
cost savings, but it can prevent the entry of competitors who can help<br />
to keep costs down in the future.<br />
● The appropriate use of self-supply can be an effective constraint against<br />
collusion, but must be managed carefully to avoid creating an impression of<br />
discrimination in favour of in-house bids. Excessive self-supply may also limit<br />
the number of private sector firms the market can support, preventing the<br />
development of competition.<br />
● The risk of a winner’s curse can be reduced by increasing the in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
available to bidders, restricting the number of bidders through pre-selection<br />
criteria and allocating tenders through a beauty-contest mechanism.<br />
● Pre-committing to an appropriate transfer rate <strong>for</strong> specific assets at the end<br />
of the contract life can help to ensure an efficient amount of investment is<br />
undertaken. One means of pre-committing to this transfer payment is<br />
through the contract price.<br />
110
Section 9 – Competitive Tendering of Prisons<br />
● There are likely to be important trade-offs in contract design when there are<br />
multiple objectives <strong>for</strong> quality; as, <strong>for</strong> example, in the observed trade-off<br />
between meeting safety/security criteria and meeting decency criteria<br />
contained in contracts <strong>for</strong> privately-managed prisons.<br />
● Learning and adapting the process as both the procuring body and the<br />
contractors gain in experience can improve the benefits to be gained from<br />
competitive tendering. In the case of prison services, HMPS has modified<br />
the type and length of contract it offers, introduced bonus points <strong>for</strong><br />
good per<strong>for</strong>mance and allowed <strong>for</strong> benchmarking against other suppliers<br />
mid-contract.<br />
● Introducing competitive tendering <strong>for</strong> the provision of a service requires a<br />
heavy resource commitment, in both up-front and ongoing costs. Any public<br />
sector body seeking to introduce competition in this way must be able to<br />
guarantee the availability of these resources <strong>for</strong> the policy to be implemented<br />
effectively. However, competitive tendering has the capacity to deliver<br />
substantial net cost savings.<br />
111
SECTION 10<br />
Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting<br />
in Social Housing<br />
Introduction<br />
This case study looks at the introduction of choice in the allocation of social<br />
rented housing. Social housing is af<strong>for</strong>dable housing provided by local<br />
authorities and Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) <strong>for</strong> people who cannot af<strong>for</strong>d<br />
to, or do not aspire to, own or rent a home in the private sector. Social rented<br />
housing offers rents at sub-market levels 114 and is one of a number of af<strong>for</strong>dable<br />
housing policies designed to offer everyone in the UK the opportunity of a decent<br />
home. The development of housing <strong>for</strong> letting at sub-market rents is supported<br />
by public subsidy (the Social Housing Grant) but maintenance costs and other<br />
financial commitments of RSLs are met out of rental income. As the number of<br />
social rented properties on offer is fixed and often outstripped by demand, an<br />
allocation mechanism is necessary to determine who gets which property.<br />
The allocation method we examine here was first introduced in England in 2000<br />
by Harborough and Mansfield local authorities. These districts experimented<br />
with housing allocation models based on successful schemes developed in the<br />
Netherlands in the 1990s. The resulting models became known as Choice-<strong>Based</strong><br />
Letting (CBL) schemes.<br />
CBL schemes received increasing attention from local authorities following the<br />
publication of the Housing Green Paper in 2000, which encouraged greater<br />
emphasis on user choice in social housing. Various local authorities ran pilot<br />
CBL schemes partially funded by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM)<br />
between 2001-2003. Most schemes have continued operating beyond the pilot<br />
stage, and other areas have introduced CBL since.<br />
CBL differs from traditional methods <strong>for</strong> allocating social rented housing as<br />
follows. The traditional model involves local authority housing officers deciding<br />
which properties should be offered to which social housing applicants.<br />
Individual properties are then offered to individual applicants, one-at-a-time.<br />
Under CBL, all or most applicants are in<strong>for</strong>med of all the properties available at<br />
a given point in time and have an opportunity to express an interest in any of<br />
these properties (subject, perhaps, to some suitability criteria).<br />
CBL schemes provide an example of how choice can be introduced to a public<br />
service previously rationed through central, administrative allocation. In this case<br />
study, we first provide a background description of the market, including supply<br />
114 Currently 30-40 per cent below market rates. See Housing Green Paper (2000) Quality and Choice: a Decent Home<br />
<strong>for</strong> All, London: The Stationery Office, Chapter 10.<br />
112
and demand conditions. Second, we discuss the perceived failings that led to the<br />
introduction of a market-based mechanism, and why the particular mechanism<br />
was chosen. Third, we examine potential problems with this market mechanism,<br />
how these problems were addressed in scheme design and the success in doing<br />
so. In the final section we provide an overall assessment of the policy.<br />
This case study draws on the following sources:<br />
● an interview with Frances Walker, a policy official at ODPM and Kathleen<br />
Kelly, then a senior research officer at ODPM;<br />
● the housing green paper behind the introduction of the policy 115 ;<br />
● two external studies of CBL pilots commissioned by the ODPM: an evaluation<br />
of the 27 schemes conducted by Bristol and Cambridge Universities 116 ; and a<br />
qualitative study of applicants’ views carried out by BMRB 117 in six of the<br />
pilots;<br />
● ODPM bidding guidance <strong>for</strong> local authorities;<br />
● an LGA study on introducing choice to government services 118 ;<br />
● a report published by <strong>Market</strong> Harborough officials and an academic from De<br />
Mont<strong>for</strong>t University based on Harborough’s experience with choice based<br />
lettings 119 ; and<br />
● interviews with officials involved in the implementation of CBL pilots in three<br />
different areas, Blackburn, Camden and <strong>Market</strong> Harborough. These areas<br />
were selected <strong>for</strong> more detailed study as they encompass a broad range of<br />
local housing market conditions and so illustrate how user choice can be<br />
introduced in very different contexts.<br />
<strong>Market</strong> Background<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
The market considered in this case study is the allocation of low-cost, rented<br />
accommodation provided by local authorities and Registered Social Landlords<br />
<strong>for</strong> those considered to be in housing need in Britain, which we call the social<br />
rented housing market. Although this report focuses primarily on the market <strong>for</strong><br />
social rented housing in England, the National Assembly <strong>for</strong> Wales has also<br />
supported pilot CBL schemes in Caerphilly, Swansea and Torfaen. Similarly, the<br />
Scottish Executive has promoted choice-based pilots in Edinburgh and<br />
Berwickshire.<br />
115 Housing Green Paper (2000) Quality and Choice: a Decent Home <strong>for</strong> All, London: The Stationery Office.<br />
116 A. Marsh, D. Cowan, A. Cameron, M. Jones, C. Kiddle and C. Whitehead <strong>for</strong> ODPM (2004) Piloting choice based<br />
lettings: An evaluation, London: The Stationery Office.<br />
117 BMRB <strong>for</strong> ODPM (2004) Applicants’ Perspectives on Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Lettings, London: The Stationery Office.<br />
118 LGA (2004) Enabling choice: research on choice in public services.<br />
119 Brown, T., A. Dearling, R. Hunt, J. Richardson and N. Yates (2002) ‘Allocate or Let? Your Choice: Lessons from<br />
Harborough Home Search’, Chartered Institute of Housing/ The Joseph Rowntree Foundation.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
POLICY HISTORY AND TIMETABLE<br />
In 1990, an alternative approach to letting social housing involving a greater<br />
degree of choice on the part of the applicant was developed in the Delft region<br />
of the Netherlands. This approach (known as the advertising model) was based<br />
around advertising vacant properties, with applicants then actively bidding <strong>for</strong><br />
properties using a ‘currency’ allocated to them by the relevant authority, rather<br />
than waiting to be allocated a property by a housing official.<br />
The success of this model became known to some English local authorities. They<br />
began investigating alternative allocation mechanisms in response to mounting<br />
dissatisfaction with their existing systems. One such council was Harborough<br />
District Council, which introduced the first district-wide scheme of this kind in<br />
the UK in April 2000 encompassing all of its properties. Mansfield District<br />
Council also introduced a choice experiment at this time <strong>for</strong> its difficult-to-let<br />
properties only.<br />
A Housing Green Paper entitled ‘Quality and choice: a decent home <strong>for</strong> all’ was<br />
published in 2000 proposing best-practice principles <strong>for</strong> lettings schemes, and<br />
encouraging the introduction of choice to social housing allocation as part of the<br />
Government’s wider choice agenda. The Housing Green Paper aimed to test<br />
alternative allocation approaches that would facilitate choice and encourage a<br />
more pro-active role <strong>for</strong> households whilst ensuring that local authorities<br />
continued to meet their statutory responsibilities under the Housing Act 1996.<br />
Following the publication of the Green Paper, the ODPM made £13m available to<br />
support and evaluate pilot CBL schemes. The pilots were intended to test<br />
approaches that offered more consumer choice in different housing markets and<br />
across a variety of authority types. Local authorities were invited to bid <strong>for</strong> this<br />
funding in 2000. Ninety-one bids were received, of which twenty-seven were<br />
successful. Other local authorities subsequently introduced choice schemes<br />
using their own resources.<br />
The pilot schemes ran from 1 April 2001 to 31 March 2003 and their initial<br />
outcomes have since been evaluated in two research studies conducted <strong>for</strong> the<br />
ODPM. 120<br />
In April 2004, more than 20 per cent of local authorities were running CBL<br />
schemes. 121 The Government has announced a target <strong>for</strong> 100 per cent of local<br />
authorities to introduce CBL by 2010.<br />
120 A. Marsh, D. Cowan, A. Cameron, M. Jones, C. Kiddle and C. Whitehead <strong>for</strong> ODPM (2004) Piloting choice based<br />
lettings: An evaluation, London: The Stationery Office and BMRB <strong>for</strong> ODPM (2004) Applicants’ Perspectives on<br />
Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Lettings, London: The Stationery Office.<br />
121 Source: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.<br />
114
DEMAND<br />
Anyone can apply to a local authority <strong>for</strong> social housing. Typically applications<br />
are directed towards the borough in which the applicant resides, but this is not<br />
essential. As local authorities are unable to offer homes to everyone, they design<br />
an allocation mechanism to ensure households with the greatest housing need<br />
are accommodated first.<br />
Allocation schemes must comply with a local authority’s statutory<br />
responsibilities under section 6 of the Housing Act 1996, which requires that<br />
local authorities have and publish a scheme that determines priorities and the<br />
procedure <strong>for</strong> allocating social housing. Certain people must be given<br />
‘reasonable preference’ under an allocation scheme in order to ensure that<br />
priority <strong>for</strong> social housing goes to those in the greatest housing need. These<br />
categories are defined in the Housing Act 1996, were modified by the<br />
Homelessness Act 2002, and are:<br />
● people occupying unsanitary or overcrowded housing, or otherwise living in<br />
unsatisfactory housing conditions;<br />
● people who are homeless;<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
● people who need to move <strong>for</strong> medical or welfare reasons; and<br />
● people who need to move to a particular location and who would suffer<br />
hardship if they were unable to do so (<strong>for</strong> example to be near a special<br />
medical facility).<br />
The assessment of housing need varies from council to council, but is typically<br />
calculated with reference to current housing conditions and health problems.<br />
Applicants are allocated a ‘currency’, often in terms of points or bands, assessed<br />
according to the mechanism used by their local council.<br />
Housing market conditions can vary dramatically between local authorities.<br />
Some face a high level of demand relative to the supply of available properties,<br />
resulting in long waiting lists and many households being placed in temporary<br />
accommodation. Others face insufficient demand <strong>for</strong> some or most types of<br />
social rented property available in their area. Table 10.1 compares the market<br />
characteristics in the three areas where we interviewed officials involved in<br />
administering local schemes.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Table 10.1<br />
Comparison of markets in different localities<br />
Source: Interviews with officials from Blackburn, Camden and Harborough CBL schemes.<br />
SUPPLY<br />
Blackburn Camden Harborough<br />
Nature of market Low demand High demand, urban area. High demand, rural area<br />
covering 92 different<br />
villages<br />
Number on register 6500 15,000 1600<br />
Number of properties/ 10,800, all owned by 30,000 3100<br />
ownership of properties Registered Social (22,000 owned by council) (2000 owned by council)<br />
Landlords<br />
Average waiting time 1 year Unknown 2-2.5 years<br />
Social rented housing is supplied by local councils and Registered Social<br />
Landlords.<br />
Local authorities traditionally owned all social rented housing. Whilst they still<br />
hold waiting lists <strong>for</strong> all social housing in their area, there are many that no<br />
longer own or manage any permanent housing. Two national programmes have<br />
been responsible <strong>for</strong> the transfer of social housing in England from local<br />
authorities to RSLs, namely the Large Scale Voluntary Transfer and Estates<br />
Renewal Challenge Fund programmes. An RSL is an independent housing<br />
organisation registered with the Housing Corporation under the Housing<br />
Act 1996. Most RSLs are housing associations, but they also include trusts,<br />
co-operatives and companies.<br />
Housing associations are the main providers of new social housing. There are<br />
currently over two thousand privately run housing associations in England<br />
managing over 1.45 million properties and providing accommodation <strong>for</strong> over 3<br />
million people. Most associations are small and own fewer than two hundred<br />
and fifty homes, but the largest 7 per cent of associations own 78 per cent of the<br />
sector’s total housing stock. 122<br />
There may be other housing options that solve a household’s housing needs.<br />
These can be considered substitutes <strong>for</strong> social rented housing and include:<br />
● The Homebuy scheme. This involves paying 75 per cent of the value of the<br />
property and receiving an equity loan <strong>for</strong> the remainder, payable upon sale of<br />
the property. A further 25 per cent must also be repaid upon property re-sale.<br />
A mortgage is paid only on 75 per cent of the property value and no rent is<br />
paid (unlike shared ownership).<br />
● Shared ownership. This involves buying a share of a property from a housing<br />
association and paying rent <strong>for</strong> the remainder.<br />
122 Statistics from the Housing Corporation website: http://www.housingcorp.gov.uk/.<br />
116
● Rent deposit guarantee by the local authority <strong>for</strong> private sector rental.<br />
● Mutual exchange with another local authority or housing association tenant<br />
wishing to be re-housed.<br />
The operation of the social housing market is subject to various laws.<br />
The Housing Act 1996<br />
This confers on local authorities a statutory responsibility <strong>for</strong> developing,<br />
maintaining and operating an allocation scheme showing reasonable preference<br />
to those in housing need.<br />
The Homelessness Act 2002<br />
The Homelessness Act 2002 amended the Housing Act 1996 in the following<br />
way:<br />
● the number of reasonable preference categories was reduced, and the<br />
categories themselves were changed, <strong>for</strong> example, to include the<br />
intentionally homeless;<br />
● local authorities were required to issue a statement and provide in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
on their policy in relation to offering choice or giving preferences to<br />
applicants;<br />
● advertising schemes were conferred legislative authority;<br />
● the requirement to keep a housing register was removed;<br />
● applicants can now be excluded from applying to a local authority only <strong>for</strong><br />
reasons of prior unacceptable behaviour;<br />
● local authorities were given the power to determine priorities between<br />
reasonable and additional preference categories; and<br />
● local authorities were given the power to determine whether certain<br />
categories of applicants should be entitled to additional preference.<br />
Introduction of market mechanism<br />
PERCEIVED FAILING<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Social rented housing in the UK was traditionally allocated by the relevant<br />
landlord to households who had applied <strong>for</strong> housing, typically through the use<br />
of a waiting list. Vacant properties were offered to the applicant considered in<br />
greatest need, where need was expressed in points reflecting the unsuitability of<br />
current housing circumstances and waiting time on the housing register.<br />
The weighting assigned to different components of a household’s points score<br />
was left to the discretion of landlords, subject to the requirement that they give<br />
117
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
‘reasonable preference’ to certain groups as defined in The Housing Act 1996,<br />
and amended by The Homelessness Act 2002. When the household came to the<br />
top of the waiting list, it was offered a property deemed suitable by the local<br />
authority. Although households were able to specify to a certain extent the area<br />
and type of property, refusing an offer frequently resulted in penalties such as<br />
suspension from the waiting list. In spite of this penalty practice, some areas<br />
also reported high refusal rates. 123<br />
There were growing concerns about the traditional allocation system in terms of<br />
the way in which it assessed needs and priorities, as well as the extent to which<br />
housing officials determined the outcome of choices regarding location and type<br />
of property. The following key drawbacks were identified.<br />
● The complexity of the system was making it difficult <strong>for</strong> users to understand<br />
and there<strong>for</strong>e participate effectively in the process. Under the traditional<br />
allocation mechanism, customers had no understanding of the number of<br />
points required to obtain a given type of property, and did not know how their<br />
points assessment related to others in their area. Furthermore, housing<br />
associations and local authorities would often use different points schemes.<br />
This created confusion over how need was assessed and was also thought to<br />
impede mobility between neighbouring authorities.<br />
● A lack of transparency was leading to customer concerns about the fairness<br />
of the process. Users were often unaware not just of the mechanisms behind<br />
the allocation process, but also of the availability of social housing in their<br />
area.<br />
● The unfairness and undesirability of processes relying heavily on housing<br />
officers’ discretion was becoming increasingly apparent and at odds with the<br />
modernising government agenda. The Government was concerned that the<br />
dependency of applicants on social housing officials encouraged by an<br />
administrative allocation mechanism had adverse implications <strong>for</strong><br />
individuals’ sense of empowerment and community stability.<br />
● The system created undesirable incentives. Points-based allocation systems<br />
suffered the drawback that they generated ‘points-chasing’ behaviour in<br />
some users, who lobbied housing officials in an attempt to increase the<br />
assessment of their housing need because this was the only means available<br />
to increase their chances of being re-housed. This potential <strong>for</strong> capture is<br />
common to many public-sector regulators and often a major source of publicsector<br />
inefficiency. It was hoped that introducing a greater element of the<br />
market into the allocation mechanism would increase transparency and<br />
thereby limit this practice by providing incentives instead <strong>for</strong> customers to<br />
make themselves better in<strong>for</strong>med about CBL and alternative housing options.<br />
123 For example, Dover reported a 70% refusal rate prior to its implementation of a CBL scheme. (From interview<br />
with officials at ODPM).<br />
118
The Green Paper stated the Government’s objective <strong>for</strong> social rented housing<br />
policy was to:<br />
...promote lettings policies that offer choice, tackle social exclusion, help<br />
create sustainable communities and encourage the effective use and<br />
management of social housing.<br />
One means proposed to achieve this goal was the funding of pilot consumer<br />
choice-based lettings schemes in different areas of the country. The Green Paper<br />
noted that the more opportunity people have to decide trade-offs (e.g. over<br />
property location and size) themselves, the more likely they are to feel<br />
ownership of the decision and there<strong>for</strong>e to be happy with the outcome. Offering<br />
choice was also seen as a means of empowering people who may have been<br />
dependent on social housing officials in the past.<br />
The fundamental objective of user choice in social rented housing allocation was<br />
to create sustainable communities. In Part III above, we noted that empowering<br />
users by enabling them to exercise choice could create incentives <strong>for</strong> individuals<br />
to take responsibility <strong>for</strong> their own outcomes. In the context of CBL, it was hoped<br />
that households would be more likely to stay longer in a property, maintain<br />
the property and participate actively within the community. This outcome was<br />
hoped in turn to lead to the creation of more sustainable communities.<br />
Other objectives were outlined in the bidding document provided to all local<br />
authorities. They were:<br />
● to increase transparency;<br />
● to increase choice;<br />
● to give priority to those in greatest housing need;<br />
● to protect the interests of the vulnerable and the excluded;<br />
● to address particular black and ethnic minority issues;<br />
● to encourage mobility between areas of high and low demand;<br />
● to increase labour mobility;<br />
● to educate applicants about availability in the social rented sector,<br />
heightening awareness of the genuine capacity constraints;<br />
● to make better use of national housing stock by:<br />
● addressing problems of empty and unpopular stock as well as underoccupation;<br />
● encouraging partnerships between local authorities and housing<br />
associations;<br />
● developing lettings schemes involving private landlords; and<br />
● bridging boundaries between local authorities;<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
119
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
● to use different and innovative methods of marketing and advertising<br />
property; and<br />
● to use IT innovatively, <strong>for</strong> example using new technologies to promote choice.<br />
Individual pilot-scheme objectives varied across different localities reflecting<br />
differing local housing-market characteristics. For example, low-demand areas<br />
wished to use CBL to stimulate demand <strong>for</strong> social rented housing whereas highdemand<br />
areas hoped CBL would raise awareness of capacity constraints and<br />
thus encourage migration into other housing options. Three examples are given<br />
in table 10.2 below.<br />
Table 10.2<br />
Pilot scheme objectives in different localities<br />
Blackburn Camden <strong>Market</strong> Harborough<br />
Form an effective partnership Empower applicants; Improve customer satisfaction<br />
between RSLs and the council; and sense of fairness by<br />
Increase transparency to improve increasing transparency;<br />
Simplify access <strong>for</strong> users; consumer understanding of their<br />
relative position on the register; Ensure all applicants given the<br />
Boost local demand <strong>for</strong> same opportunities and choices;<br />
social rented property; Increase awareness of capacity<br />
constraints; Ensure every property is advertised;<br />
Offer users a degree of control<br />
and choice; Ensure vulnerable groups and BME Provide feedback on bidding<br />
households are not disadvantaged; rankings; and<br />
Make the most efficient use and<br />
of IT; and Encourage movement to lower<br />
Use in<strong>for</strong>mation from bidding to demand areas.<br />
Ensure needs of vulnerable guide strategic plans.<br />
groups are met.<br />
Source: Interviews as be<strong>for</strong>e.<br />
It is worth briefly comparing the national and local objectives <strong>for</strong> CBL schemes<br />
with the potential benefits of user choice identified by economic theory and<br />
summarised in Part III above. These economic benefits were divided into supplyside<br />
and demand-side benefits. Supply-side benefits are realised only if<br />
introducing choice leads to competition amongst different providers, and<br />
include sharper incentives <strong>for</strong> efficiency, quality and innovation. Demand-side<br />
benefits do not require service providers to be in competition with one another,<br />
and include improved allocative efficiency as a result of better in<strong>for</strong>mation and<br />
benefits associated with empowering users.<br />
120
It was not an objective of ODPM or CBL schemes to encourage competition<br />
between social landlords, suggesting in the first instance that potential benefits<br />
of user choice achieved through the supply side of the market are unlikely to<br />
apply to CBL. However, it was an objective of CBL to raise the profile of and<br />
increase the demand <strong>for</strong> social housing in low demand areas, particularly local<br />
authority housing. This may affect demand <strong>for</strong> private landlords operating<br />
outside of the scheme, as some applicants who would have rented privately<br />
instead rent from social landlords. Similarly the objective to encourage mobility<br />
between high and low demand areas may have led to lower demand areas<br />
competing with higher demand areas <strong>for</strong> applicants, although this would also<br />
have occurred under the previous administrative system.<br />
User choice schemes can also increase efficiency through the demand side of the<br />
market, primarily by improving the quality of in<strong>for</strong>mation used as the basis <strong>for</strong><br />
housing allocation decisions. Allowing applicants to express an interest in the<br />
properties they would like to be considered <strong>for</strong> increases in<strong>for</strong>mation relative to<br />
a situation in which housing officials alone decide who gets which property. Part<br />
III of this report highlights lack of in<strong>for</strong>mation as one cause of both market and<br />
government failure, and consequently identifies improving in<strong>for</strong>mation as one<br />
means of increasing efficiency. Many of the stated objectives of CBL were also<br />
linked with improving the quality of in<strong>for</strong>mation, including the objectives of<br />
increasing transparency and educating applicants about availability. For example<br />
by heightening awareness of capacity constraints, applicants can make the<br />
decision about whether to continue waiting or to investigate alternative housing<br />
options on the basis of superior in<strong>for</strong>mation. The objective to make better use of<br />
the nation’s housing stock by reducing the number of vacant properties is one<br />
means in which any increase in efficiency might be observed and measured.<br />
The ODPM’s main objective of building sustainable communities is an example<br />
of an outcome that may be improved as a result of empowering users.<br />
Empowering users was often an objective in its own right <strong>for</strong> local schemes, and<br />
is also linked to the objective of improving customer satisfaction.<br />
The remaining objectives relate more to the design of CBL schemes than<br />
measurable outcomes. These include the objective of giving priority to those in<br />
greatest housing need, which is achieved by giving higher priority to vulnerable<br />
groups.<br />
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY CBL<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Only one market mechanism, user choice, was considered in this context.<br />
However, the means in which it was introduced varied across local authorities to<br />
reflect the different needs of different areas.<br />
121
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
It was hoped by the ODPM and local authorities involved in the pilots that CBL<br />
schemes would address the problems of the traditional allocation mechanism in<br />
the following ways:<br />
● Complexity. Many CBL schemes involved the simplification of prioritisation<br />
of housing need from a points-based to, <strong>for</strong> example, a band-based system.<br />
It was hoped this would improve users’ understanding of the process and<br />
enable applicants to participate more effectively. Although this could have<br />
been implemented as a standalone policy, facilitating user understanding in<br />
this way was important in reducing the burden placed on customers by<br />
introducing user choice and increasing the probability that customers would<br />
make rational choices. Those CBL pilots that retained points-based systems<br />
sought alternative means of improving user understanding of the process, <strong>for</strong><br />
example increasing the amount of in<strong>for</strong>mation available to potential users.<br />
● Lack of transparency. CBL schemes involve advertising vacant properties and<br />
also providing feedback to unsuccessful bidders regarding the characteristics<br />
of the successful applicant. These features obviously serve to improve the<br />
transparency of the allocation process. It was hoped this would make the<br />
process more equitable and enhance users’ ability to make rational choices<br />
based on availability.<br />
● Unfairness. Moving away from a situation in which the local authority<br />
determined the allocation of property to one in which applicants are able to<br />
select the properties <strong>for</strong> which they wish to express an interest was intended<br />
to make the process fairer.<br />
● Undesirable incentives. Because CBL schemes intended to offer a simpler<br />
currency than be<strong>for</strong>e, it was hoped there would be less scope <strong>for</strong> applicants to<br />
waste officers’ time in ‘points chasing’ to improve their chances of re-housing.<br />
By increasing transparency, it was hoped customers would become more<br />
aware of their relative position on the housing register, the capacity constraints<br />
in their area and there<strong>for</strong>e their probability of being re-housed. Once they<br />
realised that exaggerating their housing need could do little to improve this<br />
probability, it was hoped that the incentives to chase additional points would<br />
be far lower. Instead, customers would have an incentive to find out more<br />
about the trade-offs they could make or other housing options they could<br />
consider that would genuinely increase their chances of being re-housed.<br />
It was hoped that cross-boundary CBL schemes would increase consumer<br />
choice further by breaking down barriers between local authorities and<br />
encouraging mobility where possible and desirable. There are currently four<br />
cross-boundary CBL schemes.<br />
Whilst most pilot schemes introduced choice to the allocation mechanism itself,<br />
some explored the alternative route of increasing household awareness of<br />
potential solutions to their housing problems outside local social housing. These<br />
options included various private sector possibilities or longer-distance mobility<br />
schemes.<br />
122
DESCRIPTION OF MARKET MECHANISM<br />
The market mechanism generally introduced was based on the advertising<br />
approach to lettings. This approach is based on the Delft model developed in the<br />
Netherlands. The Delft model follows a number of steps, although the process<br />
actually used may differ between local authorities:<br />
● Vacant properties are advertised, typically in a weekly newspaper although<br />
other media are also used. Advertisements usually include a property<br />
description and any qualifying conditions <strong>for</strong> potential tenants, such as<br />
household size or age.<br />
● Rules <strong>for</strong> applying are included with the advertisement. Households express<br />
an interest in a property by sending the reply coupon to the housing<br />
association.<br />
● Households are ranked according to transparent and objective criteria such as<br />
age, length of residence and waiting time. The property is offered to the<br />
household with the highest ranking.<br />
● Feedback is provided in the newspaper on the number of applicants <strong>for</strong> each<br />
advertised property and the qualifying conditions of the successful<br />
applicants.<br />
● Unsuccessful applicants are able to check the qualifying conditions of the<br />
successful applicants and can use this in<strong>for</strong>mation to focus their future<br />
applications <strong>for</strong> properties where they would have a realistic chance of being<br />
ranked more highly.<br />
Because pilot scheme design and details were left to local authorities to<br />
determine, different variants of this model were implemented. Many common<br />
features emerged however and these are outlined below.<br />
Advertising is typically per<strong>for</strong>med in a weekly or <strong>for</strong>tnightly cycle, with<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation being delivered through a variety of channels including:<br />
● a list of vacancies mailed to applicants each week;<br />
● a brochure placed at specified collection points;<br />
● a designated-purpose property shop; and<br />
● internet advertising.<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Once the advertising cycle has begun, households may bid <strong>for</strong> the property<br />
using the ‘currency’ they have been awarded.<br />
The principal currency can be housing need points or bands, or waiting time.<br />
The most common <strong>for</strong>m of currency is housing need bands. Systems based on<br />
waiting time tend to be associated with lower demand areas and are used in<br />
conjunction with a time-limited priority card system <strong>for</strong> applicants in urgent<br />
need in order to comply with legislation.<br />
123
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Camden is an example of a high demand area that chose to retain its pointsbased<br />
system largely because it felt that an effective currency expressed in<br />
points mimicked the operation of prices in a real market more closely than<br />
bands. By giving an indicative price <strong>for</strong> each property, Camden hopes<br />
households will look at this price relative to their currency and work out if they<br />
have a realistic chance of accessing a similar property or whether they should<br />
adjust their search strategy accordingly.<br />
In total, five broad approaches have been used to assess housing need <strong>for</strong> CBL<br />
schemes. These have allocated to households either:<br />
● a number of points with which to bid. These points are related to housing<br />
circumstances, as under a traditional points system;<br />
● a housing-need band with which to bid. Within bands, households can be<br />
ranked by date order;<br />
● an amount of waiting time with which to bid, typically taken from registration<br />
date. These systems often include a time-limited priority card <strong>for</strong> urgent<br />
re-housing cases;<br />
● differential status on the basis of tenancy history. For example, an excellent<br />
tenant (based on criteria including tenancy standards, such as keeping rent<br />
payments up to date) could be offered a property in preference to an<br />
otherwise identical non-excellent tenant; or<br />
● a property on a first-come-first-served basis. This approach typically<br />
complements the main CBL approach based on housing need or waiting time,<br />
<strong>for</strong> example, <strong>for</strong> properties receiving no expression of interest following<br />
advertisement.<br />
The means used to assess housing need strongly influences the type of<br />
applicant who can access which property. If no other constraints are placed on<br />
bidding, households awarded the highest amount of currency under the chosen<br />
assessment mechanism will be the successful bidders. One constraint that can<br />
be placed on bidding is property labelling, which can be used to restrict the type<br />
of applicants entitled to bid <strong>for</strong> a particular property. Labelling criteria may take<br />
the <strong>for</strong>m of a minimum age requirement or number of children in the household,<br />
<strong>for</strong> example, and often appear alongside the advert <strong>for</strong> the vacant property. They<br />
may also be incorporated into the rules of the scheme so that applicants are told<br />
the type of property <strong>for</strong> which they will be eligible to bid when they register.<br />
Labelling is often the vehicle through which other policy priorities are achieved,<br />
such as policies designed to create more sustainable communities.<br />
Once bidding closes, a shortlist <strong>for</strong> each property is drawn up ranking bidders by<br />
eligibility, currency level and any other relevant criteria. The eligible bidder with<br />
the highest amount of currency is then offered the property, subject to<br />
verification of their details.<br />
124
Once the outcome is determined, feedback in<strong>for</strong>mation is published. Providing<br />
feedback to other applicants on the housing needs band or points of the winning<br />
bidder helps the unsuccessful to determine whether they are likely to win a<br />
similar property in the future or whether they should alter their bidding<br />
preferences. Feedback can be provided through all or some of the channels in<br />
which properties are advertised. Typical feedback in relation to a property might<br />
include:<br />
● the property address;<br />
● the type of property;<br />
● the number of bids;<br />
● the banding, points and/or waiting time of the successful bidder;<br />
● whether a priority card was used; and<br />
● the winning bidder’s match against any labelling criteria.<br />
Some schemes also provide summary in<strong>for</strong>mation over a longer time period to<br />
improve the quality of in<strong>for</strong>mation available <strong>for</strong> bidders. Table 10.3 below is one<br />
example of this, taken from the Camden CBL website.<br />
Table 10.3<br />
Example of Feedback In<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Property Number Average Average Highest Lowest<br />
Type of Bidders Number of Points Points Points<br />
Housed Bids Per Let For Let For Let For<br />
Property<br />
Studio 59 25 171 413 105<br />
1 Bed 170 92 237 439 140<br />
2 Bed 127 66 241 445 162<br />
3 Bed 47 74 367 596 170<br />
4 Bed 9 57 355 575 195<br />
5 Bed 2 41 546 672 420<br />
6 Bed 1 36 656 656 656<br />
Notes: <strong>Based</strong> on results <strong>for</strong> 415 properties advertised through Home Connections in the second half of 2003 and the<br />
first quarter of 2004.<br />
Source: Camden Council, Home Connections. 124<br />
Under CBL, applicants can access services through a single gateway rather than<br />
applying separately to local authorities and other social landlords. This makes<br />
the process easier to understand <strong>for</strong> the user, and also encourages partnerships<br />
between landlords, local authorities and housing associations.<br />
124 Data available at:<br />
http://www.homeconnections.org.uk/public/xml/advert.asp?name=camdenlets1.pdf&GUID=929C0FFDB0BD45F495<br />
797BD2C4397EF6&PPAGE=10214737.<br />
125
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Local innovation was ensured by setting out national objectives in bidding<br />
documents and then allowing each local authority to propose the details of a<br />
choice-based scheme that would achieve these objectives in their locality. An<br />
example of different approaches taken by three local authorities is given in Table<br />
10.4 below. One of them, Harborough, is an area comprising 92 villages whose<br />
residents rarely move further than 2 miles from their existing location. Housing<br />
officials in Harborough have found it unnecessary to spend resources on photos<br />
of properties in adverts, as applicants are generally aware of the properties in<br />
the area in which they would consider moving. The main vulnerable group in<br />
Harborough has been those with literacy or health problems. This is in contrast<br />
to Camden, where the ethnic minority population is significant and potentially<br />
very vulnerable. Whereas Harborough provides in<strong>for</strong>mation in English and<br />
Braille only, Camden translates its in<strong>for</strong>mation into five different languages.<br />
Scheme design was there<strong>for</strong>e the product of ODPM’s bidding criteria and local<br />
authorities’ views on how best to implement an allocation system using choice<br />
<strong>for</strong> their area. Economists were not involved in either the development of<br />
bidding criteria or the bids. However, economists are involved in the ODPM’s<br />
ongoing longer-term evaluation of pilot schemes.<br />
Table 10.4<br />
Sample of scheme designs by locality<br />
Source: Interviews as be<strong>for</strong>e.<br />
Blackburn Camden Harborough<br />
Assessment mechanism Two bands: general and Effective currency is Three bands: priority,<br />
priority. Within bands, points awarded <strong>for</strong> a preference and potential.<br />
currency is waiting time. weighted combination Within bands, currency<br />
of housing need and is waiting time.<br />
waiting time.<br />
Channels used to Local press; website; Weekly local press; website; Adverts mailed to priority<br />
advertise properties touch-screen kiosks in brochures; email lists; and preference members;<br />
local offices. SMS text messages <strong>for</strong> all properties advertised<br />
registered applicants. on website and in property<br />
shop<br />
In<strong>for</strong>mation provided Size and type of property; Photo, description, Location, size and type<br />
in advert facilities; characteristics indicative ‘price’ in of property; facilities;<br />
of preferred applicant terms of points. applicant requirements<br />
e.g. number of children;<br />
rent and council tax band.<br />
Mechanisms to Educated organisations Bidding in<strong>for</strong>mation Adverts on community<br />
support the vulnerable working with vulnerable monitored and non-bidders buses and parking tickets<br />
groups about CBL and contacted; housing officials to ensure in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
enabled them to act as can act as advocates available to all; involved<br />
advocates on their where needed; in<strong>for</strong>mation health and social workers,<br />
customers’ behalf and support available in who can act as advocates<br />
5 different languages.<br />
126
DEVELOPMENTS OVER TIME<br />
The major modification at a national level has been to extend user-choice targets<br />
further. The current ODPM target is <strong>for</strong> 100 per cent of local authorities to adopt<br />
CBL by 2010. The Government is keen to extend CBL to cover low cost home<br />
ownership options and properties to rent from private landlords, as well as social<br />
housing. The ODPM’s five year housing plan (Homes For All) contains a new<br />
commitment to work towards a nationwide system of CBL by 2010. The<br />
Government is also keen that CBL schemes should operate on a regional or subregional<br />
basis. It is hoped that regional schemes will break down artificial<br />
boundaries and recognise existing housing and labour markets; improve regional<br />
mobility and help ease localised problems of high demand; give tenants more<br />
choice; and also help larger housing associations develop more productive<br />
relationships with local authorities.<br />
Some pilots in high-demand areas modified their allocation mechanism in order<br />
to ensure that non-priority households could access property. This was often<br />
achieved through a quota system. For example, Blackburn Council introduced a<br />
system that allocated vacant properties arising in high demand areas half under<br />
the CBL scheme and half according to a pure waiting time system. Whilst the<br />
CBL scheme gives priority to those in reasonable preference categories, the<br />
waiting time system allows some non-priority households a chance to access<br />
properties in highly sought-after locations.<br />
The major cause of modifications to pilots was the Homelessness Act 2002, in<br />
response to which some pilot schemes:<br />
● added further bands to their banding system to recognise cumulative need<br />
more fully;<br />
● changed the way households are classified into bands to differentiate more<br />
clearly between different levels of need; and<br />
● placed a limit on the amount of currency an applicant could accumulate<br />
through waiting time.<br />
Potential problems<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
In section 8 of Part III, we noted that although economic theory tells us that<br />
introducing user choice can improve efficiency and provide incentives <strong>for</strong> a<br />
more consumer-responsive service, this is only possible if genuine choice is<br />
offered. Furthermore, choice could have adverse consequences if some<br />
participants are unable to exercise this right to choice effectively or other<br />
restrictions on effective choice exist.<br />
In this section, we first summarise the potential problems with choice be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
discussing how they were addressed in CBL schemes and the success or<br />
otherwise of doing so.<br />
127
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS<br />
Political constraints<br />
Sometimes the implementation of a market mechanism may be affected by<br />
political constraints that prevent the full potential benefits of the policy being<br />
realised. In the case of CBL, this was encountered in the <strong>for</strong>m of internal<br />
resistance on the part of some housing officials. These officials feared that a loss<br />
of personal influence would adversely affect housing management per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
measures, such as void turnaround times. Their concerns were generally related<br />
to the fact that advertising could potentially increase the time taken <strong>for</strong> the<br />
letting process.<br />
Economic constraints<br />
In Part III above, we identified the following potential problems with introducing<br />
user choice suggested by economic theory.<br />
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS<br />
The introduction of consumer choice may lead to capacity constraints <strong>for</strong> the<br />
most desirable properties, or even a worsening of existing constraints. This<br />
requires landlords to exercise a <strong>for</strong>m of rationing, reducing the effective choice<br />
offered to users. Where these capacity constraints are binding, it may be<br />
tempting <strong>for</strong> landlords to use any discretionary powers they have to ‘cream<br />
skim’ the housing register <strong>for</strong> the most desirable tenants. Cream skimming could<br />
arise in a CBL scheme if landlords were able to reject tenants until the desired<br />
tenant is offered the property. It is prevented in practice by specifying strict<br />
criteria as the only grounds <strong>for</strong> rejections.<br />
Capacity constraints can also affect outcomes through the demand-side of the<br />
market. In areas with a relatively small flow of vacancies, the proportion of<br />
applicants ever accessing a property is low and choice within the social housing<br />
sector is correspondingly low. Users who are repeatedly unsuccessful in their<br />
bidding because of capacity constraints may become despondent and consider<br />
the CBL allocation process to be less fair than an administrative system. This<br />
outcome could lead to reductions in customer satisfaction and even limit the<br />
efficiency of the allocation process if users cease to participate effectively as a<br />
result of their disappointment.<br />
It should also be noted that the opposite can occur through CBL: by increasing<br />
transparency, existing capacity constraints become visible and households may<br />
be better placed to exercise choice in a way that redistributes interest between<br />
high and low demand properties and areas. Furthermore, CBL provides<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation about household preferences as revealed by bidding choices. This<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation can be used to guide strategic plans and so address capacity<br />
constraints in the longer run by ensuring more of the most popular types of<br />
property are provided.<br />
128
Concerns about capacity constraints were particularly strong in high demand areas.<br />
Controlling <strong>for</strong> capacity constraints<br />
The rationing mechanism was left to the discretion of local authorities, although<br />
this was subject to national legislation protecting those with greatest housing<br />
need. These statutory requirements combined with strict and specific criteria <strong>for</strong><br />
rejecting applicants have made cream skimming by local authorities and<br />
landlords difficult.<br />
Problems of consumer despondency and feelings of unfairness as a result of<br />
limited effective choice have been addressed through extensive consumer<br />
consultation and the publication of in<strong>for</strong>mation. It was hoped that making<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation on capacity constraints more visible would help unsuccessful<br />
bidders realise that the problem lay in limited availability of social rented<br />
housing relative to demand, rather than any unfairness in the allocation process.<br />
IT databases were designed to provide management in<strong>for</strong>mation regarding<br />
revealed bidder preferences in order to guide strategic plans that would address<br />
these capacity constraints in the longer run.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance in practice<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Research carried out by BMRB <strong>for</strong> the ODPM revealed that some users found the<br />
experience of repeated bidding disheartening and frustrating, particularly if they<br />
were in desperate housing need and had few other housing options. While many<br />
applicants recognised this was a problem of insufficient supply, some blamed<br />
the CBL allocation mechanism <strong>for</strong> their lack of success. Harborough District<br />
Council noted that users who had been on the housing register <strong>for</strong> more than<br />
four years returned considerably fewer survey <strong>for</strong>ms, and attributed this to<br />
apathy stemming from lack of success. 125 The same survey revealed that 12 per<br />
cent of non-bidders cited ‘Did not think I would be successful’ as their main<br />
reason <strong>for</strong> not responding to any properties advertised during the period,<br />
suggesting possible feelings of despondency.<br />
Despite this, customer satisfaction on the whole appears to have improved even<br />
in high-demand areas where effective choice was limited. Applicants reported<br />
greater choice in terms of the ability to reject properties, the range of languages<br />
in which in<strong>for</strong>mation was available, the choice of media through which<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation could be submitted and received, and the availability of non-social<br />
housing solutions to applicants’ needs. Those with high levels of currency also<br />
found CBL offered genuine choice, even in high demand areas.<br />
For example, 80 per cent of applicants who responded to a postal questionnaire<br />
conducted by Harborough district council and who could compare a points-<br />
125 Harborough District Council, Harborough Home Search April 2004 Survey: Results.<br />
129
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
based system with CBL preferred the latter. 126 Similarly, a survey conducted by<br />
Blackburn Council found 82 per cent of respondents considered their overall<br />
experience of the new scheme as being very good or good and only 2 per cent<br />
as very bad. 127<br />
INEQUALITY<br />
The introduction of consumer choice can lead to increases in outcome inequality<br />
if some members of society are better able to exercise their right to choose. If<br />
the more advantaged, <strong>for</strong> example, in terms of education or income, are better<br />
placed to bear the costs of collecting and analysing in<strong>for</strong>mation necessary <strong>for</strong><br />
rational decision-making, they are more likely to achieve favourable outcomes<br />
from CBL than less advantaged participants. In some cases, increases in<br />
outcome inequality may be driven by inequalities of opportunity. For example,<br />
vulnerable users may be unable to participate at all if in<strong>for</strong>mation is only<br />
available in languages or <strong>for</strong>mats they cannot understand. Unless these<br />
vulnerable consumers receive appropriate support, their housing outcome is<br />
likely to suffer.<br />
Those who could be disadvantaged in the context of a CBL scheme include:<br />
● households lacking access to in<strong>for</strong>mation on vacancies, <strong>for</strong> example, due to<br />
language barriers, learning difficulties or physical disabilities;<br />
● households lacking access to bidding mechanisms, <strong>for</strong> example, due to lack<br />
of access to appropriate IT; and<br />
● households unable to make or articulate choices and adopt an appropriate<br />
bidding strategy.<br />
The sources of inequality outlined above apply to inequalities arising between<br />
users of the same scheme. Part III above identifies another dimension in which<br />
increased inequality may manifest itself, namely between geographical regions<br />
operating different schemes. This type of geographical inequality is more likely<br />
to arise when users are locked into their local suppliers, as this allows the market<br />
to develop into sub-sectors of under-per<strong>for</strong>ming suppliers located in<br />
disadvantaged areas and excellent suppliers in advantaged areas. As<br />
geographical mobility of applicants is generally low, this was a potential concern<br />
<strong>for</strong> the national CBL agenda.<br />
Controlling <strong>for</strong> inequality<br />
Geographical inequality was limited to some extent by the Homelessness Act<br />
2002. This requires local authorities to allow anyone in the UK to join their<br />
register where previously many authorities would only consider applications<br />
126 Brown et al (2002), ‘Allocate or Let? Your Choice’, p.4, Respondents included unsuccessful bidders still on the<br />
housing register, although those who had been on the housing register <strong>for</strong> over four years showed a far lower<br />
response rate.<br />
127 Source; Twin Valley Homes<br />
130
from those already located within their district. Because this increases the scope<br />
<strong>for</strong> geographical mobility, it reduces the probability that applicants could be<br />
locked into under-per<strong>for</strong>ming schemes because of their location.<br />
Inequality between individuals using the same scheme can be limited by<br />
enabling the less advantaged to exercise their choice as effectively as more<br />
advantaged users. To this end, proposals regarding support <strong>for</strong> vulnerable users<br />
were one of the criteria against which bids <strong>for</strong> ODPM funding were evaluated. In<br />
addition, legislation contained in the Homelessness Act 2002 means local<br />
authorities are required to provide assistance to those users who would be<br />
unable to participate effectively without external support.<br />
Because vulnerabilities in accessing CBL schemes can arise from a variety of<br />
different sources, enabling the vulnerable to operate effectively within CBL has<br />
required a multiplicity of approaches. These have included ensuring:<br />
● in<strong>for</strong>mation on vacancies and processes is available in appropriate <strong>for</strong>mats,<br />
including minority languages;<br />
● that bidding mechanisms are accessible to all; and<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
● that systems are set up to provide assistance to those who would struggle to<br />
participate in the CBL process on their own, <strong>for</strong> example, by enabling carers<br />
or housing officials to act as advocates on behalf of these participants.<br />
Where possible, non-bidders are identified by local authorities and follow-up<br />
work is carried out to ensure applicants understand what is required of them and<br />
receive any necessary support. The dominant approach to supporting vulnerable<br />
and excluded groups is to seek the cooperation of a network of statutory and<br />
voluntary organisations such as Citizens’ Advice Bureaux and train them to<br />
assist their clients to participate in CBL.<br />
A number of pilots produced fully-translated leaflets explaining their schemes or<br />
offered translations of the English summary. As producing translations is a<br />
costly activity, many offered the option of requesting a translation from the local<br />
housing department or requesting alternative <strong>for</strong>mats such as large print, audio<br />
tape, and Braille. Some pilots produced non-English versions of part or all of<br />
their websites or telephone scripts.<br />
For those with limited literacy in any language, pilots experimented with a<br />
variety of approaches to communication. Screening materials <strong>for</strong> plain English<br />
was a widespread practice, and some schemes replaced words with symbols<br />
and introduced colour-coded maps to assist applicants in identifying where<br />
properties were located.<br />
In some pilots, a multi-lingual member of staff would visit local minority<br />
community groups and older people’s organisations on a regular basis to explain<br />
the system, answer queries and, where necessary, assist with completing <strong>for</strong>ms.<br />
131
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Support to the disadvantaged also included:<br />
● home visits to explain the system and determine the amount of support<br />
required;<br />
● the mailing of advertising materials and bidding coupons to those unable to<br />
access materials through other channels;<br />
● telephoning applicants to alert them of relevant vacancies about to be<br />
advertised;<br />
● talking through advertised properties with applicants to determine whether<br />
they wished to bid and if bidding would be advisable;<br />
● allowing proxy bidders to be nominated; and<br />
● arranging <strong>for</strong> applicants to be accompanied by an advocate or social worker<br />
when visiting a property.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance in practice<br />
Greater inequality between individuals as a result of introducing user choice<br />
would be apparent if vulnerable users participated less in the bidding process<br />
and as a result secured less than their share of advertised vacancies. There is<br />
some evidence that the more vulnerable submitted fewer bids but in general<br />
housing outcome inequality does not appear to have increased.<br />
One pilot recorded the percentages of different ethnic groups applying, bidding<br />
and securing lettings over the course of 506 lettings. These results are given in<br />
the table below. The table suggests the small proportion of Caribbean<br />
households are rather more active in bidding and successful in securing a<br />
property than others. In contrast Asian communities are active but relatively less<br />
successful in securing properties. These figures however, need to be interpreted<br />
in the light of the significant proportion of activity associated with households<br />
where ethnic origins are not known.<br />
Table 10.5<br />
Participation in one pilot scheme by ethnic group<br />
Notes: <strong>Based</strong> on 506 lettings.<br />
Source: p.147, Marsh et al (2004).<br />
Applicants Bidding Lettings<br />
African 20% 23% 22%<br />
Asian 22% 25% 21%<br />
Caribbean 6% 9% 10.5%<br />
Irish 1% 1% 1%<br />
Other European 3% 3% 2.5%<br />
British 20% 19% 23%<br />
Other 4% 4% 4%<br />
Not Known 24% 16% 16%<br />
132
In several areas, registrations by members of ethnic minority communities<br />
actually increased following the launch of CBL. Any increase was typically<br />
modest, with one pilot reporting an increase in applicants from minority ethnic<br />
groups from 35 to 38 per cent. 128 Ethnic minority households were often less<br />
successful in securing their share of vacancies in the area, but this is attributed<br />
to their bidding <strong>for</strong> larger, more scarce properties. 129<br />
The table demonstrates both the potential <strong>for</strong> CBL to provide useful and timely<br />
data on the operation of a lettings system and the difficulties in making<br />
inferences on the basis of incomplete data.<br />
Homeless households generally bid less frequently than other households.<br />
Research by local councils revealed that this arose from in<strong>for</strong>mation failing to<br />
reach them regularly, a lack of understanding of the CBL process or a lack of<br />
appropriate ongoing support. The lower participation of homeless households<br />
was more frequent in areas of high demand. In spite of this, homeless<br />
households were reported to be securing a similar proportion of lettings as<br />
under the previous allocation system. 130 Even though homeless households<br />
often record a relatively low level of bidding the head start they receive through<br />
the award of a high banding or priority card means their probability of success<br />
when bidding is high.<br />
There have been some reports from pilots of older people bidding less<br />
frequently, largely in IT-based schemes where IT access and skills may be the<br />
root of the problem. 131 However, Table 10.6 below showing available data<br />
suggests that rather than being adversely affected, pensioners have secured at<br />
least, if not more than, their proportionate share of lettings.<br />
Table 10.6<br />
Bidding activity of older applicants<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Pilot R Pilot T<br />
Household Type Applicants Bidders Lettings Applicants Bidders Lettings<br />
Pensioner Couple 5% 5% 5% 1% 2% 2%<br />
Pensioner Single 5% 5% 5% 10% 12% 12%<br />
Source: Marsh et al (2004), Piloting Choice <strong>Based</strong> Lettings: An Evaluation, London: The Stationery Office, p.113.<br />
There has been no research into the impact of CBL on geographical housing<br />
inequality, although average waiting times and reported customer satisfaction<br />
varied greatly across the pilot schemes.<br />
128 See Marsh et al (2004), p147.<br />
129 See Marsh et al (2004), pg 15 and 147.<br />
130 See p.130, Marsh et al (2004) Piloting Choice <strong>Based</strong> Lettings: An Evaluation London: The Stationery Office.<br />
Pg 159-160.<br />
131 See Marsh et al (2004), p.100.<br />
133
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
SEGREGATION<br />
Segregation may increase either as a direct result of the exercise of choice by<br />
individuals of the same ethnic/working/educational background or as an indirect<br />
result of any increase in inequality. This problem is of particular concern to the<br />
fostering stable communities agenda, as housing segregation by ethnic group is<br />
thought to have been a contributing factor to the 2001 Northern town riots. 132<br />
Controlling <strong>for</strong> segregation<br />
The House of Commons ODPM Select Committee report on Social Cohesion<br />
(2004) recommended that CBL policy include the encouragement of greater<br />
integration of communities by offering support to tenants moving into areas<br />
where they might be in a minority. ODPM has also set up a Black and Minority<br />
Ethnic Housing Group to assist with a race impact assessment of CBL policy.<br />
In addition, addressing potential inequality problems through methods outlined<br />
previously is likely to have the indirect effect of limiting increases in segregation.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance in practice<br />
There is no evidence of increased segregation to date from either local<br />
evaluations or ODPM-commissioned national evaluations. The issue of<br />
segregation and community cohesion will continue to be monitored through the<br />
current ODPM research, which is looking into the longer-term effects of CBL.<br />
Applicants’ views are also currently being sought on issues including whether<br />
CBL would lead them to consider moving to areas with a different ethnic profile<br />
to their own and will be published as part of the longer-term evaluation report.<br />
Results will be available in 2006. 133<br />
INFORMATION<br />
Participants in a user choice scheme must be able to make rational decisions in<br />
order <strong>for</strong> the scheme to generate positive outcomes. Rational decision making<br />
requires that the supply-side of the market provide sufficient relevant<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation in a language and <strong>for</strong>mat all users can understand. It also requires<br />
that users are willing and able to bear the costs of collecting this in<strong>for</strong>mation and<br />
assessing alternatives to arrive at their decision. In<strong>for</strong>mational failures arising on<br />
either side of the market could have significant consequences in a CBL context<br />
as they may prevent local authorities from housing those in the greatest housing<br />
need. Such failures could arise if registered households bid <strong>for</strong> inappropriate<br />
properties or do not bid at all, or if households in housing need do not even<br />
register in the first place.<br />
132 See Perri (2003) ‘Giving users of British public services more choice: what can be learned from recent history?’ ,<br />
Journal of Social <strong>Policy</strong> 32(2), pp.239-270.<br />
133 From the ODPM research specification ‘Applicants’ longer term perspectives on choice based lettings’.<br />
134
Controlling <strong>for</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation problems<br />
The provision of sufficient in<strong>for</strong>mation was ensured through the measures<br />
outlined above to limit inequality. In addition, local authorities made in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
as easy to access as possible and offered support in analysing in<strong>for</strong>mation if<br />
requested to reduce the burden of choice on the user.<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance in practice 134<br />
If insufficient in<strong>for</strong>mation was available or the burden of choice too great <strong>for</strong><br />
rational choices to be made, we would expect to see this reflected in a lack of<br />
searching and bidding behaviour. Available evidence on consumers’ willingness<br />
to bear search costs is positive, with one pilot surveying applicants and finding<br />
that 85 per cent of respondents were looking in the paper every week <strong>for</strong> adverts.<br />
However, most pilots that examined the issue suggest that whilst many<br />
participants were actively searching <strong>for</strong> properties, bidding was relatively<br />
infrequent. For example, one pilot analysed bidding behaviour over 15 cycles<br />
and determined that the majority of people bid infrequently. Out of a maximum<br />
of 30 possible bids, it found that only 7 per cent bid more than 20 times and more<br />
than 25 per cent bid only once or twice. Most pilots reported that between 25 and<br />
50 per cent of applicants were bidding at any one time. However, this could have<br />
been a result of lack of suitable properties rather than an unwillingness to bear<br />
the costs of bidding per se.<br />
Outcome of market mechanism<br />
BENEFITS<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Theory suggests that introducing choice could have the effect of increasing<br />
efficiency through both the demand and supply sides of the market. As noted in<br />
Part III, there are three main types of efficiency relevant to our analysis of user<br />
choice, namely allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. The first of these,<br />
allocative efficiency, refers to a situation in which scarce resources are allocated<br />
to the use that society values higher than all other alternative uses. In other<br />
words, resources are allocated in a way that maximises social welfare. In this<br />
situation, no one member of society can be made better off by re-allocating<br />
resources without making another worse off. Productive efficiency is a precondition<br />
<strong>for</strong> allocative efficiency, and is achieved when a specific outcome or<br />
level of output is obtained using the most cost-effective method. Dynamic<br />
efficiency refers to the efficient allocation of resources over time.<br />
Introducing user choice can also lead to increases in social welfare, both by<br />
improving efficiency and by empowering users. Reducing the dependency of<br />
users on housing officials can be beneficial in its own rights, and can improve<br />
customer satisfaction by conferring on users a sense of ownership of the<br />
134 All data in this paragraph taken from Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.136.<br />
135
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
decision. This sense of ownership can also encourage households to take more<br />
responsibility <strong>for</strong> outcomes, by actively participating in the bidding process and<br />
contributing positively to community life once they have secured a property.<br />
CBL pilots appear to have realised all of these potential benefits, although<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance has varied between localities. An example of outcomes from<br />
different schemes is provided in Table 10.9 at the end of this section.<br />
As discussed above, many of the departmental objectives <strong>for</strong> CBL can be viewed<br />
as specific examples of the more general benefits predicted by theory. The<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance of the pilot schemes against these objectives is included in the<br />
following discussion. The objectives identified as being in addition to the<br />
theoretical benefits of choice, however, are not discussed in detail here. They are<br />
not the outcome of a market mechanism per se and, being specific to the<br />
implementation of CBL, do not provide guidance <strong>for</strong> other policy areas wishing<br />
to introduce user choice.<br />
Supply-side benefits<br />
Allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency benefits may be realised through<br />
the supply side if introducing choice fosters per<strong>for</strong>mance-enhancing<br />
competition between social landlords and provides incentives <strong>for</strong> authorities to<br />
run a more consumer-responsive service. As noted previously, it was not an<br />
objective of ODPM or of CBL schemes to encourage competition between social<br />
landlords. However, one objective of CBL was to raise the profile of social<br />
housing in low demand areas, particularly of local authority housing. Raising the<br />
profile of social housing may have stimulated competition between social<br />
landlords involved in CBL and private landlords operating outside the scheme,<br />
leading to sharper incentives <strong>for</strong> quality, efficiency and innovation, although this<br />
was not a direct intention of the scheme. The objective of encouraging<br />
geographical mobility could also theoretically lead to competition <strong>for</strong> applicants<br />
between different local authorities, with similar effects on incentives.<br />
No studies have been conducted to see whether user choice has stimulated<br />
competition between social and private landlords. There is some indirect<br />
evidence of this though: lower demand areas have seen an increased interest in<br />
social housing and higher demand areas have seen a greater willingness of<br />
customers to consider other housing options, including the private sector. 135 It is<br />
unlikely that this competition was sufficient to deliver any of the observed<br />
improvements in productive efficiency, however. The sources of these efficiency<br />
improvements are discussed under administration costs.<br />
Because joint working was an objective of CBL, competition within individual<br />
schemes was minimal. In fact, one officer is reported as commenting that one<br />
benefit of CBL was that it had ‘taken the competition out of lettings’. 136 To some<br />
135 Frances Walker, ODPM.<br />
136 See, Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.132.<br />
136
extent though, it was competition between local authorities that lay behind<br />
increased innovation. Local authorities competed against one another to receive<br />
funding from the ODPM, and one of the criteria used to assess bids were the<br />
national objectives to use IT and advertising media innovatively. By proposing a<br />
more innovative CBL scheme, there<strong>for</strong>e, local authorities could increase their<br />
chance of receiving funding.<br />
Whilst competition may have been limited to date, suppliers of social rented<br />
housing may still face different incentives as a result of introducing choice that<br />
lead to a more customer-responsive service. One of the potential problems with<br />
public-sector provision of a service is that the absence of the profit motive<br />
means incentives to tailor services to meet customer needs can be weak.<br />
Introducing choice is a means of addressing this problem.<br />
CBL was typically followed by a significant increase in the demand <strong>for</strong> social<br />
housing, with a proportion of this interest coming from working households,<br />
and in some instances, households from minority communities. The extent to<br />
which this impact was felt varied greatly across pilots: <strong>for</strong> example, one pilot felt<br />
the flow of registrations was similar to pre-CBL rates where others reported<br />
increases of up to 50 per cent per quarter. 137 One low demand pilot area,<br />
Blackburn, saw the numbers on its register increase from 2,000 to 6,500 as a<br />
result of CBL. 138 Although rising house prices and other external factors are likely<br />
to have influenced this trend, at least part can be ascribed to the success of CBL<br />
in providing a more consumer-focused service.<br />
Demand-side benefits<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Allocative efficiency improvements can be achieved through the demand side of<br />
the market if introducing user choice means that decisions regarding the<br />
allocation of social rented housing are made on the basis of superior<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation. In<strong>for</strong>mation could be enhanced because CBL provides incentives<br />
<strong>for</strong> users to reveal preferences that would not be immediately obvious under an<br />
administrative system. This increases the likelihood of a good match between<br />
the properties and households. It also provides incentives <strong>for</strong> users to find out<br />
the kinds of properties that are actually available in their chosen area, and<br />
encourages them to act on this in<strong>for</strong>mation by being more flexible over location<br />
and property features. Be<strong>for</strong>e, households simply waited to be allocated a<br />
property without necessarily knowing anything about availability. Under CBL,<br />
applicants can improve their chances of being re-housed if they make<br />
themselves better in<strong>for</strong>med, and so face stronger incentives to do so. This<br />
potential benefit ties in with ODPM’s objectives to increase transparency and<br />
educate applicants about the availability of social housing. CBL also reveals<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation that may be used to improve dynamic efficiency, <strong>for</strong> example, by<br />
directing investment towards the types of property and locations <strong>for</strong> which the<br />
greatest number of bids were received.<br />
137 See, Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.132.<br />
138 Interview with Twin Valley Homes.<br />
137
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
One means of measuring any efficiency benefits resulting from the introduction<br />
of CBL is to assess the impact of CBL on housing management per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
measures, such as void times, re-let times and refusal rates. 139 Evidence on these<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance measures varied across pilot scheme areas but in general appears<br />
to be positive.<br />
Void turnaround times. Void turnaround time measures the length of time a<br />
property remains empty and is typically captured by a measure known as the relet<br />
time. Some housing associations reported deterioration in re-let times that<br />
they ascribed to the introduction of CBL. This deterioration occurred because the<br />
strict timing of the advertising and bidding cycles introduced a minimum period<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e a vacant property could be let under CBL that did not exist under the<br />
traditional allocation mechanism. These housing associations either planned to<br />
discontinue their involvement or at least were considering doing so as a result.<br />
However, very few landlords monitor and report per<strong>for</strong>mance indicators and so<br />
observations can only be made using local authority data. Drawing on this data,<br />
the ODPM evaluation report finds the impact of CBL on re-let times to have been<br />
broadly positive, although notes that it is difficult to distinguish between that<br />
success which is due to CBL and that which is due to improvements in other<br />
housing management functions introduced at the same time. Some pilots ran<br />
the scheme <strong>for</strong> only part of the borough, allowing a comparison of re-let times<br />
in the CBL area with the rest of the borough. This was generally favourable, with<br />
one area citing an average re-let time of 2.3 weeks <strong>for</strong> the borough as a whole<br />
and 1.8 weeks <strong>for</strong> the pilot area alone. 140<br />
Table 10.7 below shows void turnaround data <strong>for</strong> different boroughs in the Home<br />
Connections scheme.<br />
Table 10.7<br />
Home Connections void turnaround per<strong>for</strong>mance by borough<br />
Landlord CBL void days Pre-CBL void days Improvement (days)<br />
Barnet 21 32 11<br />
Camden 21 27 6<br />
Enfield 34 34 -<br />
Islington 19 28 9<br />
SPH Housing 35 50 15<br />
Westminster General Needs 22 22 -<br />
Westminster sheltered 21 80 59<br />
Source: Home Connections, Camden.<br />
139 Void turnaround time measures the length of time a property remains empty. Re-let times are one means of<br />
measuring void turnaround and are defined as the time from the date of termination of one tenancy up to and<br />
including the date a new tenancy agreement begins. Refusal rates are the percentage of offers made that are<br />
rejected by the household.<br />
140 Ibid, p152.<br />
138
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Reductions in re-let times, along with greater interest in social rented housing,<br />
has contributed towards the ODPM objective to make better use of housing stock<br />
by reducing the number of vacant properties.<br />
Refusal rates. The refusal rate is the frequency with which applicants reject a<br />
property that they have been allocated. This increases administration costs <strong>for</strong><br />
local authorities. The precise impact of CBL on refusal rates is uncertain and<br />
contingent on local factors. For example, some areas introduced a more<br />
comprehensive system of measuring refusals at the same time as CBL. These<br />
areas cannot measure the full extent of reductions in refusal rates because they<br />
are comparing results against a different baseline that reported a lower<br />
percentage of total refusals. In most pilot areas CBL does seem to have reduced<br />
refusals. In some cases this reduction has been dramatic: <strong>for</strong> example,<br />
Berwickshire has reported a 66 per cent reduction in refusal rates as a result of<br />
CBL. Another pilot estimated that the refusal rate had fallen from 20 per cent to<br />
5 per cent under CBL. 141 Some pilots reported higher than anticipated refusal<br />
rates, and others an increase following a sharp initial decline. Managers in these<br />
pilot areas saw this as reflecting increasing user buy-in to the idea of choice<br />
rather than any failure of the scheme, especially as analysis of the reasons <strong>for</strong><br />
refusal found that the majority related to the condition of the property.<br />
The observed differences in measured outcomes across pilots at least partially<br />
reflects the dependence of per<strong>for</strong>mance measures on many factors external to<br />
the CBL scheme. These external factors include staff availability, the method used<br />
to calculate the reported statistic and the per<strong>for</strong>mance of contractors supplying<br />
maintenance work. As a result, per<strong>for</strong>mance measures alone cannot be used to<br />
determine the relative success of different scheme designs. However a comment<br />
from one CBL project manager suggests that some of the divergence in outcomes<br />
can be explained by the differing levels of commitment from local authorities:<br />
We have seen major differences in people we have talked to about CBL. Some<br />
are committed, understand what they are trying to achieve and plan carefully.<br />
Others are doing it because their director has told them to. There is a need<br />
<strong>for</strong> a committed change agent, leadership, planning and commitment to<br />
improving customer service. 142<br />
Another way in which improvements in efficiency could be observed is through<br />
greater flexibility on the part of users. As outlined above, increased transparency<br />
provides households with better in<strong>for</strong>mation to make appropriate trade-offs<br />
between type of property/location and length of waiting time. As a result, one<br />
possible outcome of CBL is that applicants may become more willing to consider<br />
less-popular areas in order to access properties more quickly. Evidence from the<br />
Delft programme showed that in the longer term applicants altered their<br />
preferences in response to feedback after unsuccessful bids.<br />
141 See Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit, p.86.<br />
142 See Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.178.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Flexibility could take the <strong>for</strong>m of applicants no longer bidding <strong>for</strong> properties<br />
where they did not meet key criteria, widening the area they would consider,<br />
bidding <strong>for</strong> different property types, dropping requirements, looking <strong>for</strong> less<br />
popular properties and looking outside of the social rented sector. There is some<br />
evidence of applicants using feedback in<strong>for</strong>mation to alter their initial<br />
preferences and bid <strong>for</strong> different areas or property types to increase their chance<br />
of success. For example, some pilots reported an increase in the number of bids<br />
<strong>for</strong> previously unpopular property types, such as maisonettes, and a<br />
corresponding reduction in bids <strong>for</strong> more popular property types, such as<br />
houses. Similarly, one pilot observed that of the 94 properties let in one quarter,<br />
29 were awarded to applicants bidding <strong>for</strong> a property one or more bedrooms<br />
smaller than their assessed need. 143<br />
Consumer flexibility has been relatively limited so far, particularly in<br />
geographical scope. The BMRB research found that some applicants were<br />
willing to remain in inadequate and unpleasant circumstances rather than move<br />
to an area they felt to be undesirable. 144 Furthermore, evidence on transfer<br />
activity in one pilot area found that 22 per cent of moves were to an area of<br />
higher demand and only 15 per cent to areas of lower demand. 145 However, these<br />
data are not necessarily representative of all choices because households<br />
entering the social rented sector rather than transferring within it may base their<br />
decisions on different criteria. Greater flexibility is expected to emerge in the<br />
longer run.<br />
The main driver behind CBL was not to improve efficiency, but to create<br />
sustainable communities. It was hoped that empowering users by offering them<br />
greater choice and encouraging them to take greater responsibility <strong>for</strong> their<br />
outcomes would help achieve this. Most pilots believed it to be too early to<br />
comment on the impact of CBL in this area, although there has been some<br />
positive evidence to date. One pilot cited a sharp reduction in transfer requests<br />
among those who had been re-housed through CBL. Another pilot reported that<br />
its turnover rate <strong>for</strong> the stock of its lead landlord fell from 6.34 to 5.77 per cent<br />
in the first quarter of operation, and then to 4.4 and 3.23 per cent in subsequent<br />
quarters. A pilot operating a partial-borough programme observed that<br />
abandonment rates dropped more sharply in CBL areas than non-CBL, falling<br />
from 11.86 and 9.66 per cent in the CBL and non-CBL areas respectively to 4.25<br />
and 4.75 per cent between September 2001 and September 2002. 146<br />
However, as one pilot project manager observed:<br />
140<br />
It is difficult to say at this stage whether or not [CBL] has helped contribute<br />
towards sustainable communities. Recent evaluation reports have looked at<br />
this issue and have given positive feedback. Certainly the void turnaround<br />
143 See Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.71.<br />
144 BMRB <strong>for</strong> ODPM (2004) Applicants’ Perspectives on Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Lettings, London: The Stationery Office.<br />
145 See Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.121.<br />
146 See Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.161-62.
levels are reducing and new tenants are staying in their properties <strong>for</strong> a<br />
longer period. How this contributes towards sustainable communities and<br />
how much of it can be attributed to [CBL], it is difficult to say. 147<br />
ADMINISTRATION COSTS<br />
ODPM funding was provided <strong>for</strong> the pilot phase of CBL only. For subsequent<br />
schemes the local authority has to pay all set-up costs out of its existing budget.<br />
The most significant set-up costs are IT and organisational change costs.<br />
Organisational change costs include equipping housing officials with new skills,<br />
such as marketing, and helping them adapt from their previous administrative<br />
function to their new roles as facilitators of choice. IT set-up costs vary greatly<br />
depending on the approach taken to procurement. Pilots adapting existing<br />
systems or purchasing off-the-shelf solutions typically spent around £20,000 on<br />
IT whereas pilots choosing to develop a bespoke system spent closer to<br />
£100,000. 148 IT costs could also include the provision of computers <strong>for</strong> use by<br />
applicants, the purchase of camera equipment, the setting up of property<br />
websites and training staff. Some pilots managed to set-up on the basis of very<br />
limited funds, <strong>for</strong> example <strong>Market</strong> Harborough’s only development costs were<br />
employing a project manager <strong>for</strong> 3 months (£4,500) and establishing a new IT<br />
database (£2,000).<br />
Table 10.8 shows estimated set-up costs used by one local authority as the basis<br />
of its bid.<br />
Table 10.8<br />
Example of pilot set-up costs<br />
Category Cost<br />
<strong>Market</strong>ing (campaigns to increase awareness) £150,000<br />
PR (private sector agency to develop and oversee media strategy) £50,000<br />
IT costs (including 2 years’ maintenance costs, valued at £3000) £123,000<br />
Training <strong>for</strong> 150 staff £68,000<br />
Private sector monitoring £30,000<br />
Project co-ordinator £30,000<br />
Resources used in establishing the network system £25,000<br />
Developing links with other agencies £10,000<br />
Exploring and describing local area <strong>for</strong> inclusion in property details £32,000<br />
Cost of staff time spent in training £42,000<br />
TOTAL £560,000<br />
Notes: These costs are estimates only.<br />
Source: Twin Valley Homes.<br />
147 See Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit.,p.162.<br />
148 LGA (2004) Enabling choice: research on choice in public services,p.34.<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Schemes were established on the understanding that local authorities would<br />
meet ongoing running costs out of their own budgets. A minority of pilots<br />
designed schemes to operate within their previous budget and used ODPM<br />
funding <strong>for</strong> capital investment only. To some extent there was a trade-off<br />
between up-front and ongoing costs, with the set-up costs of an automated<br />
approach being higher than those of a paper-based approach but its running<br />
costs lower. Schemes using a property shop, <strong>for</strong> example, faced considerably<br />
higher ongoing costs than those that did not.<br />
The main cost of running CBL relative to the traditional allocation mechanism is<br />
advertising. Advertising costs have varied greatly as a result of:<br />
● different abilities of local authorities to negotiate terms;<br />
● geography. Pilots located in urban and southern areas generally faced higher<br />
costs because there was more demand <strong>for</strong> advertising space;<br />
● frequency of advertising. Pilots operating weekly cycles incurred higher costs<br />
than those running <strong>for</strong>tnightly cycles;<br />
● level of detail provided in advert; and<br />
● size of borough. Smaller authorities could find £15,000 per annum to be a<br />
burden whilst larger authorities may face bills of £60,000 per annum. 149 For<br />
example, Camden had a budget of £30,000 <strong>for</strong> advertising in 2004/05. 150<br />
Where CBL resulted in an increased number of applications, there were also<br />
additional staff costs to be met.<br />
The savings associated with CBL are currently being investigated by the ODPM<br />
in their longer-term evaluation projects, but are likely to stem from:<br />
● households staying in properties longer, giving rise to taxpayer benefits and<br />
consumer satisfaction;<br />
● reductions in refusal rates; and<br />
● improvements in turnaround time.<br />
Improving the match of households and properties could be expected to lead to<br />
better housing per<strong>for</strong>mance measures. Reducing refusals rates, in particular, is<br />
then likely to increase the efficiency and speed of the allocation process because<br />
it implies less time spent finding a household who will accept the property being<br />
offered. Reduced void rates may also offset some costs in the short run by<br />
reducing rent loss.<br />
CBL may free up resources that could be re-deployed elsewhere, keeping<br />
additional staff costs to a minimum. For example, if CBL schemes have the<br />
149 Marsh et al (2004), Op.Cit., p.46.<br />
150 Home Connections, Camden Council.<br />
142
desired effect of limiting points-chasing behaviour, this would increase the<br />
amount of housing officials’ time available <strong>for</strong> productive activity. Shifting the<br />
costs of the matching process from officials to the customers also releases local<br />
authority resources <strong>for</strong> other uses.<br />
There is no evidence on the magnitude of any cost savings as yet.<br />
UNANTICIPATED EFFECTS<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
There were three main unanticipated benefits arising from pilot CBL schemes,<br />
outlined below.<br />
● Areas of low demand saw an immediate and substantial increase in the<br />
number of applicants beyond that which had been anticipated. In some areas,<br />
new applicants included groups who had not previously participated in social<br />
housing schemes. The statutory obligation on local authorities to continue to<br />
give priority to households in the ‘reasonable preference’ categories has<br />
ensured that this increased demand has not adversely affected those in<br />
greatest need.<br />
● CBL has demonstrated to applicants and politicians alike how little social<br />
housing is available in high demand areas by increasing transparency. This<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation has led to the need <strong>for</strong> greater supply of social housing moving<br />
up local policy agendas in some areas.<br />
● Many CBL schemes led to the creation of inter-organisational and joint<br />
working structures that have improved relationships between local<br />
authorities and RSLs, voluntary sector agencies and local authorities in other<br />
regions.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Table 10.9<br />
Comparison of CBL outcomes in different localities<br />
Source: Interviews as be<strong>for</strong>e.<br />
Overall Assessment<br />
Blackburn Camden Harborough<br />
Per<strong>for</strong>mance measures Void turnaround increased Re-let times have fallen Void turnaround<br />
initially due to advertising by 22% initially deteriorated as<br />
cycle; actual void rates properties that had been<br />
have fallen from 12% to vacant a long time were<br />
less than 2% let under CBL; refusal<br />
rates have fallen.<br />
Consumer satisfaction Numbers on housing Transfer rates have fallen 6 months after scheme<br />
register increased from and participation in tenants’ introduced, 83% of<br />
2000 to 6500; positive associations increased. customers surveyed<br />
consumer survey results preferred the new<br />
scheme to the old.<br />
Consumer flexibility No evidence Approximately 20% of Some flexibility<br />
properties are allocated to regarding facilities<br />
households voluntarily and features; none<br />
bidding below assessed regarding location.<br />
needs in terms of number of<br />
bedrooms; some showing<br />
willingness to consider other<br />
housing options as capacity<br />
constraints have become<br />
more transparent<br />
Costs Project manager, IT set-up Significant advertising and IT Initial set-up costs<br />
and marketing costs were set-up costs were incurred covered by £80k grant<br />
met by £450k ODPM funding but efficiency savings from from Joseph Rowntree<br />
and an additional £116k of shifting matching costs from foundation. Later<br />
council resources. officials to users have also received £0.5m ODPM<br />
been realised. funding.<br />
Inequality Homeless identified as No apparent problems. No apparent problems.<br />
main vulnerable group:<br />
despite comprising 3% of<br />
register, they secured 26%<br />
of all lettings during<br />
scheme<br />
Segregation No official studies conducted. No evidence yet. Only 1% of population<br />
Anecdotal evidence suggests non-white British:<br />
decline in ethnic segregation. segregation by ethnic<br />
No evidence of non-ethnic group not even potential<br />
segregation. problem. No evidence of<br />
non-ethnic segregation.<br />
Overall, the per<strong>for</strong>mance of choice based lettings has been positive with little<br />
evidence so far of increased inequality or housing segregation, two undesirable<br />
outcomes which had been suggested as associated with the introduction of<br />
choice. Although significant set-up costs were incurred and the on-going<br />
running costs associated with advertising are substantial, there are likely to be<br />
144
efficiency savings in some areas. The magnitude of these potential savings is<br />
currently unknown. The reduced refusal rate is likely to have led to some cost<br />
savings, but the magnitude is not known.<br />
Housing management per<strong>for</strong>mance has generally improved, customer feedback<br />
has been largely positive, and users are beginning to demonstrate a greater<br />
awareness of the functioning of the market by becoming more flexible in their<br />
search strategies. Although it is too early to judge whether the longer-term<br />
expected benefits fostering more stable communities have yet emerged, the<br />
obvious and immediate benefits of empowering individuals to make their own<br />
decisions through CBL provides an example of a market mechanism that has<br />
achieved a public policy aim.<br />
LESSONS FOR OTHER AREAS<br />
Section 10 – Choice-<strong>Based</strong> Letting in Social Housing<br />
Social rented property is a relatively liquid market with a large number of<br />
different properties and users and offers users a basic choice from the outset of<br />
opting in or out of the scheme. Not all public services share these features.<br />
Lessons emerging from the CBL experience that are applicable to other areas are<br />
outlined below.<br />
● Introducing choice can increase in<strong>for</strong>mation about consumer preferences<br />
relative to a pure command-and-control allocation mechanism and, by so<br />
doing, allow more efficient matching of users to available resources.<br />
● Offering users the ability to exercise choice can make public service<br />
providers, such as social landlords, more consumer-focused where they have<br />
lacked incentives to act in this way in the past. User choice increases the<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation about customer preferences available to the service provider,<br />
and staff are encouraged to act as facilitators of choice rather than<br />
administrators.<br />
● User choice can there<strong>for</strong>e lead to outcomes similar to some of those<br />
generated by private sector incentives whilst still allowing the public sector to<br />
remain the sole provider. This makes choice an attractive option <strong>for</strong> services<br />
where involvement of the private sector is not possible or desirable but the<br />
Government would still like to introduce a market mechanism to improve<br />
outcomes. Indeed, it has always been ODPM’s aspiration to include the private<br />
rented sector in CBL schemes and this has now become official policy. 151<br />
151 ODPM (2005), Homes <strong>for</strong> All, para 5.21. ‘To increase choice and opportunity further we want to make it as easy as<br />
possible <strong>for</strong> tenants to move between local authority, housing association and privately owned accommodation.<br />
We are there<strong>for</strong>e keen to encourage the extension of choice-based lettings to cover low cost home ownership<br />
options and properties <strong>for</strong> rent from private landlords, as well as social housing.’<br />
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● Consumer choice can in theory have adverse effects <strong>for</strong> equality because<br />
there are likely to be vulnerable users who are unable to exercise their right<br />
to choose as effectively as others. Although all systems are likely to have<br />
winners and losers, ensuring that the introduction of choice does not lead to<br />
a less equitable outcome overall requires that these vulnerable users are<br />
identified and offered targeted support services. Such services are often most<br />
effective when offered in collaboration with voluntary sector organisations<br />
such as Citizens’ Advice Bureaux. Where possible, a system to identify nonparticipants<br />
rapidly should be put into place.<br />
● Scheme design and implementation is important to achieve benefits and to<br />
avoid risks. Benefits will only be realised if the provider introducing choice is<br />
committed to doing so.<br />
● The social rented property market has arguably adapted well to the<br />
introduction of choice because it has been able to increase the choice<br />
available to participants compared to the previous system, despite clear<br />
capacity constraints in high-demand areas. Where it is not possible to provide<br />
this increase in choice, <strong>for</strong> example, because users face prohibitively high<br />
costs in gathering and processing the necessary in<strong>for</strong>mation, the dimension<br />
over which choice is being offered should be re-considered and/or an<br />
alternative market mechanism explored.<br />
● There is some evidence that users can perceive a well-designed market<br />
process to be fairer than an administrative one, as long as it is sufficiently<br />
transparent and adequately addresses equity issues.<br />
To conclude, user choice is there<strong>for</strong>e most suited to government services where<br />
effective choice is a genuine possibility, vulnerable consumer groups can be<br />
easily identified and their needs met satisfactorily, and private provision is<br />
neither a desirable nor feasible option.<br />
146
SECTION 11<br />
Emissions Trading<br />
Introduction<br />
This case study looks at the introduction of a market <strong>for</strong> the trading of<br />
allowances 152 <strong>for</strong> greenhouse gas emissions in the UK, known as the UK<br />
Emissions Trading Scheme (UK-ETS), which was launched by the <strong>Department</strong><br />
<strong>for</strong> Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) in April 2002. The scheme is part<br />
of a set of policy measures that comprise the UK Climate Change Programme<br />
(CCP). This is a program of policy measures which are designed to help the UK<br />
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. 153<br />
This case study draws on the following sources of in<strong>for</strong>mation:<br />
● interviews with Chris Leigh and Jill Duggan from Defra’s National Climate<br />
Change <strong>Policy</strong> Division, with Christopher Moir from DTI, with Gareth Phillips,<br />
from SGS, one of the verifiers of the program and with Bill Edrich and Kay<br />
Beagley from Kirklees Council, one of the direct participants of the UK-ETS;<br />
● a report by a task <strong>for</strong>ce led by Lord Marshall on Economic Instruments and<br />
the Business Use of Energy;<br />
● an NAO study of the UK-ETS;<br />
● NERA’s review of the first and second years of the UK Emissions trading<br />
scheme; and<br />
● several documents provided by Defra.<br />
Background<br />
The UK Government, along with governments in many other countries, is<br />
concerned that emissions of certain pollutants, known as greenhouse gases, are<br />
causing changes to the world’s climate, and that this climate change represents<br />
a threat to human health and sustainable development. For this reason, many<br />
governments, through international treaties, have decided to act together to<br />
gradually reduce their emissions of these greenhouse-gas pollutants.<br />
In 1992, a framework was established under which the international community<br />
could take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: the United Nations<br />
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 154 The Kyoto Protocol (the<br />
152 In the economics literature these ‘allowances’ are often referred to as ‘permits’. These two terms are used<br />
interchangeably in this report.<br />
153 Greenhouse gases are: Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, hydrocarbons and<br />
perfluorocarbons.<br />
154 Further in<strong>for</strong>mation on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) can be found on<br />
the following website: http://unfccc.int/2860.php.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Protocol) is an international agreement signed in 1997 under this framework.<br />
The signatories to the Protocol committed themselves to reduce emissions of<br />
greenhouse gasses. Under the Protocol, developed countries agreed to reduce<br />
their total emissions of greenhouse gases to 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels over<br />
the period 2008 to 2012 (different countries have different individual<br />
obligations).<br />
The Protocol also encouraged its signatory members to implement policies and<br />
measures in accordance with their national circumstances, that promote the:<br />
[p]rogressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal<br />
incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas<br />
emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the Convention (UNFCCC)<br />
and application of market instruments. 155<br />
The Protocol envisages that that there should in future be international trading<br />
in greenhouse gas emission allowances, so that emissions reductions are<br />
achieved in a cost-effective way.<br />
The UK’s obligation under the Protocol is to reduce its greenhouse gas<br />
emissions to 12.5 per cent below 1990 levels over the period 2008 to 2012.<br />
However, the UK has committed itself to go beyond its obligations under the<br />
Protocol, and reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 20 per cent below 1990<br />
levels by 2010.<br />
Introduction of a market mechanism<br />
Emissions of greenhouse gases are an example of a negative externality. When<br />
one person engages in an activity which leads to the emission of pollutants into<br />
the atmosphere, the cost of that pollution is borne largely by others, rather than<br />
by the person who created the pollution. Because individual people or firms do<br />
not personally bear the full cost of the pollution they generate, they tend to<br />
produce more pollution than society as a whole would consider desirable.<br />
This market failure creates a role <strong>for</strong> governments to intervene in order to reduce<br />
levels of pollution to a socially desirable level. Traditionally, this intervention has<br />
involved the government setting individual limits on the level of pollution which<br />
each economic agent can produce. For example, various Clean Air Acts<br />
introduced in the UK in the 20th Century restricted the burning of coal in urban<br />
areas. However, alternative, market-based approaches, can also be used to limit<br />
pollution. There are two main alternative market-based approaches. The first is<br />
to impose a tax on pollution emissions and the second is to set a cap on the level<br />
of emissions, allocating rights to produce this set level of emissions and then<br />
allowing individuals to trade those rights. In the UK, both of these mechanisms<br />
155 Kyoto Protocol (1997) Article 2, Paragraph 1, part a.<br />
148
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
coexist under a set of integrated policies 156 aimed at meeting climate change<br />
targets, set out in the CCP, published in November 2000.<br />
Under the CCP there is a tax called the climate change levy, which was<br />
introduced on 1 April 2001. The levy is a tax on the use of energy in industry,<br />
commerce and the public sector. 157 Revenues raised through this tax were used<br />
to reduce employers’ National Insurance Contributions and provide additional<br />
support <strong>for</strong> energy efficiency schemes and renewable sources of energy. The<br />
levy is complemented by the UK-ETS, which was launched in April 2002. In this<br />
case study we consider the UK-ETS but not the climate change levy.<br />
A further emissions trading scheme is now being introduced at the European<br />
level, which is also beyond the scope of this case study.<br />
DIFFERENT MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS THAT WERE CONSIDERED<br />
The decision to implement the UK-ETS and climate change levy result from the<br />
recommendations of a task <strong>for</strong>ce led by Lord Marshall. 158<br />
In 1998 the Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned this task <strong>for</strong>ce to explore<br />
how best to use economic instruments to improve the industrial and commercial<br />
use of energy and help reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. The task <strong>for</strong>ce<br />
examined two potential economic instruments: (i) a system of tradable<br />
emissions permits and (ii) a tax on emissions.<br />
The report recommended the use of a tradable-permits scheme as a way to<br />
encourage emissions reductions in a cost-effective way. The report,<br />
nevertheless, considered that it would not have been sensible at that stage to<br />
introduce a fully-fledged statutory scheme and there<strong>for</strong>e recommended that a<br />
pilot scheme should be introduced first.<br />
The report also considered that it might be impractical <strong>for</strong> small- and mediumsized<br />
enterprises (SMEs) to participate in an international trading scheme. Thus,<br />
the task <strong>for</strong>ce concluded that there could be a role <strong>for</strong> a tax if businesses in all<br />
sectors and of all sizes were to contribute to improving energy efficiency and<br />
reducing greenhouse gas emissions – especially given that SMEs account <strong>for</strong><br />
around 60 percent of total carbon dioxide emissions. This recommendation<br />
became the basis <strong>for</strong> the Climate Change Levy.<br />
In summary, the two instruments considered and recommended in the task<br />
<strong>for</strong>ce’s report were implemented in the CCP in the <strong>for</strong>m of the UK-ETS and the<br />
Climate Change Levy.<br />
156 For instance, the Renewables Obligation, which is also a part of the CCP.<br />
157 Emissions of carbon dioxide, which is produced when fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) are burnt to release<br />
energy, is an important contributor to climate change. Improving energy efficiency, so that less fossil fuel is burnt<br />
to provide the same level of output, is there<strong>for</strong>e one way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.<br />
158 Lord Marshall (November 1998), Economic Instruments and the business use of energy, a study <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Government Task<strong>for</strong>ce on the Industrial Use of Energy.<br />
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OBJECTIVES OF THE UK-ETS<br />
The rationale <strong>for</strong> using a market-based mechanism as part of the CCP was that<br />
this would allow a given reduction in emissions to be achieved at minimum cost.<br />
Under a market-based mechanism (either a tax or a tradable permits scheme)<br />
reductions will be made by firms who can reduce emissions at lowest cost. Firms<br />
that face a high cost of reducing emissions will chose not to reduce emissions<br />
and instead pay the tax or (in the case of the UK-ETS) purchase permits from<br />
firms who have exceeded their targets <strong>for</strong> reducing emissions.<br />
A further rationale <strong>for</strong> the launch of the UK-ETS was that the UK Government<br />
expected it to create opportunities <strong>for</strong> UK firms to gain experience of an<br />
emissions trading scheme and develop knowledge and expertise that would<br />
provide the UK with a competitive advantage in future European and<br />
international trading schemes. This objective included allowing participants in<br />
the scheme (UK firms and public-sector organisations that produce greenhouse<br />
emissions) to gain experience of participating in a tradable permits scheme. It<br />
also included allowing firms who would provide services to the participants<br />
(such as verifiers and traders) to develop expertise that could be used to provide<br />
services to participants in European and international schemes in the future.<br />
In summary, there<strong>for</strong>e, the UK-ETS had three main objectives:<br />
● to secure a significant amount of cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas<br />
emissions;<br />
● to give organisations in the UK early practical experience of emissions<br />
trading, ahead of the launch of European and international trading systems;<br />
and<br />
● to establish the City of London as a centre <strong>for</strong> emissions trading.<br />
DESCRIPTION OF THE SCHEME<br />
The UK-ETS has four main phases:<br />
● entry into the scheme;<br />
● the allocation of allowances;<br />
● the trading of allowances; and<br />
● reporting compliance.<br />
Entry into the Scheme<br />
In order to widen the scope of participation in the UK-ETS, four ways <strong>for</strong><br />
participants to join the scheme were created. These four options were intended<br />
to provide a wide range of participants with opportunities to participate. This<br />
wider participation was expected to increase the likelihood of delivering larger<br />
150
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
emissions reductions. The four different ways of entering the programme are<br />
described below.<br />
● The first option was participation in an incentive auction where participants<br />
bid voluntary emissions reductions in exchange <strong>for</strong> incentive payments from<br />
the Government. In effect the Government bought a volume of emissions<br />
reductions from these participants in return <strong>for</strong> financial payments. 159 The<br />
participants could then trade within the scheme any excess or shortfall<br />
relative to these reductions. Participants who joined the scheme in this way<br />
are called ‘direct participants’.<br />
● The second option was to enter the scheme through a Climate Change<br />
Agreement. Only organisations from certain energy-intensive sectors that<br />
were liable to pay the climate change levy could enter into these<br />
agreements. 160 These organisations have two-year milestones and if they met<br />
the milestone they would receive an 80 percent climate change levy discount.<br />
These companies could meet their targets either by reducing their emissions<br />
to meet the target or by purchasing emissions permits to cover any gap<br />
between their actual emissions and their target. Organisations are also able<br />
to sell any reductions in excess of this target into the scheme subject to such<br />
‘overachievement’ being verified. Organisations joining the UK-ETS via this<br />
option are called ‘agreement participants’.<br />
● The third option applies to non-target holders. Emitters of greenhouse gases<br />
that did not want to take on a target could participate via an approved<br />
emissions reduction project. Non-target holders would undertake an activity<br />
that led to quantified reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and such a<br />
reduction would earn credits that could then be traded in the UK-ETS. The<br />
aim of this alternative was to stimulate emissions reductions in areas that<br />
would not otherwise be covered by the UK-ETS. However, this option was not<br />
developed due to the expected introduction of the EU-ETS, so no projects<br />
were able to participate using this option.<br />
● Lastly, any other organisation not participating through the previous three<br />
options could register with the Emissions Trading Authority and trade<br />
allowances/credits in the UK-ETS, regardless of whether or not they are an<br />
emitter of greenhouse gases.<br />
The table below summarises the four initial possible ways to enter the UK-ETS.<br />
159 A total of 31 participants entered the scheme through this option thus covering a wide range of sizes and sectors,<br />
from global companies such as BP and Shell to banks and supermarkets, through to smaller organisations such<br />
as London’s Natural History Museum.<br />
160 For more in<strong>for</strong>mation about the type of energy-intensive organisations eligible to join the scheme through this<br />
option see www.Defra.gov.uk/environment/ccl/index.htm<br />
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Table 11.1<br />
The different entry methods considered in the UK-ETS<br />
Entry Option <strong>for</strong> Method of Entry Eligibility<br />
Target Holders With a voluntary emissions target taken Any firm willing to offer voluntary<br />
(‘Direct Participants’) on through the financial incentive emissions reductions in exchange<br />
<strong>for</strong> incentive payments from the<br />
Government<br />
Target Holders Through an existing target set through Any organization liable to pay the<br />
(‘Agreement Participants’) a CCA Climate Change Levy<br />
Non-Target Holders (1) Via an approved emissions reduction Emitters of greenhouse gasses<br />
project that did not want to take on a<br />
target<br />
Non-Target Holders (2) By simply opening a trading account Any firm wanting to trade<br />
allowances/credits in the UK<br />
scheme, irrespective of whether<br />
they are an emitter of<br />
greenhouse gasses<br />
Note: The entry option Non-target holders (1) via an approved emissions reduction project did not develop and no<br />
projects participated in the UK-ETS. However, this option was considered at the beginning of the scheme.<br />
Source: LECG, based on Framework <strong>for</strong> the UK Emissions Trading Scheme, Defra. 161<br />
Allocation of allowances in the initial auction<br />
Allowances were allocated to direct participants in the initial auction through a<br />
‘descending-clock’ auction, where participants could bid emissions reductions<br />
over the five-year period (2002-2006) in return <strong>for</strong> a share of £215 million of<br />
incentive funding from Defra.<br />
The auction <strong>for</strong> the allocation of these allowances had the following process.<br />
● First, Defra published the scheme rules and announced the maximum<br />
amount available <strong>for</strong> emissions reductions (£215 million). Companies then<br />
applied to participate and once the number of participants was sufficient to<br />
create a competitive auction, the auction took place. This was in March 2002.<br />
● Second, at the beginning of the auction, Defra, announced an initial price <strong>for</strong><br />
emissions reductions, which was set at £100 per tonne. 162 Participants then<br />
bid the quantities of emissions reductions they were willing to make at the<br />
announced price.<br />
● Third, Defra determined the final amount of the incentive fund <strong>for</strong> the auction<br />
at £215 million, the maximum previously indicated.<br />
● Lastly, if the amounts bid multiplied by the offered price exceeded the £215<br />
million fund then the process was repeated at successively lower prices until<br />
the total quantity of emissions bid multiplied by the current price was just<br />
within the budget of £215 million. This process was repeated nine times,<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e the auction reached a clearing price.<br />
161 Available at http://www.Defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/uk/pdf/trading-full.pdf<br />
162 The term tonne refers to emissions reductions or allowances measured in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent<br />
(tCO2e).<br />
152
A more detailed and diagrammatic description of the auction process is depicted<br />
in Figure 11.1.<br />
Figure 11.1<br />
Allocation of allowances – the auction process<br />
Start<br />
The <strong>Department</strong> publishes<br />
scheme rules, announces up<br />
to £215 million available <strong>for</strong><br />
emissions reductions and<br />
invites participants<br />
Companies apply to participate<br />
via 3-stage process<br />
The <strong>Department</strong> has discretion<br />
to abandon the auction<br />
NO<br />
Auction begins<br />
The <strong>Department</strong> announces<br />
starting price per tonne of<br />
reduction in 2006, £100<br />
Participants bid quantities<br />
of reductions they will<br />
make at that price<br />
The <strong>Department</strong> determines<br />
budget <strong>for</strong> the auction<br />
(in practice £215 million,<br />
but could have been less)<br />
Is <strong>Department</strong><br />
satisfied with bids<br />
received?<br />
9 auction rounds<br />
took place<br />
Participants bid<br />
quantities of<br />
reductions they will<br />
make at new price<br />
The <strong>Department</strong> announces<br />
new, reduced price<br />
Source: Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, The UK Emissions Trading Scheme: A new way to combat<br />
climate change. National Audit Office, April 2004.<br />
The outcome of the auction was that participants bid to reduce emissions by a<br />
total of 4.03 million tonnes in 2006 at a price of £53.37 per tonne in 2006, or<br />
equivalently £17.79 per tonne over the lifetime of the UK-ETS. 163 However, three<br />
direct participants subsequently dropped out so the final amount of reduction<br />
purchased was 3.96 million tonnes.<br />
The 3.96 million tonnes are to be achieved in a period of five years, thus each<br />
year direct participants must achieve 20 per cent of their promised reductions.<br />
At the beginning of the scheme, participants submitted bids <strong>for</strong> the total<br />
emissions reductions they would achieve in 2006, relative to a predetermined<br />
YES<br />
Is (price x quantity)<br />
more than the<br />
incentive budget?<br />
NO<br />
Auction clears – participants<br />
are committed to deliver<br />
reductions they bid in final<br />
round, at clearing price<br />
(£53.37 in practice)<br />
End<br />
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
163 Participants must deliver annual reductions increasing by 20 per cent per year starting in 2002 and ending in<br />
2006. Thus the reductions in 2006, relative to the baseline, represents one-third of the cumulative total reductions<br />
from 2002-06. There<strong>for</strong>e the price of £53.37 per tCO2e in 2006 corresponds to £17.79 per tCO2e over the lifetime<br />
of the Scheme.<br />
YES<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
base-line level of emissions. Participants were then allocated allowances<br />
equivalent to this base-line minus the reductions they committed to achieve <strong>for</strong><br />
that year.<br />
To summarise, once emissions targets are set, participants are issued with<br />
allowances equal to their target emissions <strong>for</strong> that year. At the end of the year,<br />
each participant must hold enough allowances to cover its actual emissions <strong>for</strong><br />
the corresponding year. A participant can decide to reduce its actual emissions<br />
below its target (and sell or ‘bank’ the difference), or meet its target, or buy<br />
allowances to cover its emissions above the target.<br />
Trading<br />
All participants in the scheme are able to trade allowances at any time, the only<br />
requirement is that they hold an account in the registry.<br />
Reporting Compliance<br />
An important aspect of an emissions trading scheme is the monitoring and<br />
reporting of compliance at the end of each year. The Government needs to know<br />
that direct participants’ emissions do not exceed the number of allowances that<br />
they hold.<br />
The UK-ETS requires that all direct participants report their level of emissions at<br />
the end of each compliance period. An independent and accredited verifier must<br />
certify that this in<strong>for</strong>mation is accurate. The credibility of any emissions trading<br />
scheme relies heavily on accurate third-party verification of emissions data,<br />
which confers an important role on verifying companies.<br />
For direct participants, who had committed to reduce their level of emissions, it<br />
was necessary to establish a baseline – the level of emissions that the participant<br />
would otherwise have been expected to make. The purpose of setting baselines<br />
was to establish a participant’s expected emissions in the absence of the scheme<br />
so that reductions relative to this counterfactual could be measured. The<br />
baselines were originally calculated as an average of the participant’s emissions<br />
between 1998 and 2000. However, some participants had already reduced<br />
emissions relative to this base line in response to existing governmental<br />
regulations. In some cases their targets were already met be<strong>for</strong>e the scheme<br />
started in 2002.<br />
Defra took the view that direct participants should not benefit financially from<br />
achieving reductions that they were already legally obliged to make. Thus, in<br />
some cases, baselines were set by reference to both historic emissions levels<br />
and existing legal requirements. If a participant’s historic level of emissions was<br />
above the regulatory limit then the baseline was the regulatory limit; if historic<br />
emissions were under the limit then the baseline was the participant’s average<br />
emissions between 1998 and 2000.<br />
154
The costs of monitoring and reporting vary depending on the size of the scheme<br />
participant, as the number of staff needed to per<strong>for</strong>m the task depends on firm<br />
size. The cost of verification depends on the number of days verifiers have to<br />
spend on the site. The estimated cost per day of verification is around £1,350 per<br />
day <strong>for</strong> large scheme participants, and around £800-£1,000 per day <strong>for</strong> smaller<br />
target holders. These rates reflect the high degree of specialisation, accreditation<br />
and liability involved.<br />
CONSTRAINTS THE PUBLIC SECTOR FACED IN INTRODUCING THIS<br />
MECHANISM<br />
Emissions allowances can be seen as permits to pollute, which can create<br />
hostility in some quarters to the idea of an emissions trading scheme. In<br />
practice, both direct and agreement participants were required to make<br />
commitments to reduce emissions in order to participate in the scheme and<br />
receive an initial allocation of allowances.<br />
On the other hand, firms that have not previously faced any costs from emitting<br />
greenhouse gases could have faced new costs as a result of the scheme (the<br />
costs of purchasing allowances), which could also have generated hostility to<br />
the scheme. In order to overcome such hostility the UK-ETS was launched as a<br />
voluntary scheme, with financial incentives <strong>for</strong> direct participants joining the<br />
scheme. It was hoped that by providing participants with this experience they<br />
would be become better placed to face the costs arising from future compulsory<br />
schemes.<br />
Potential problems<br />
In Part III of the report, we noted that although economic theory says that<br />
marketable permits can allow governments to control the level of a negative<br />
externality with lower costs and greater incentives <strong>for</strong> innovation than alternative<br />
methods of regulation, their efficacy can be affected by various factors.<br />
Below we first summarise again the potential problems in marketable permit<br />
schemes be<strong>for</strong>e discussing how they were dealt with in the implementation of<br />
the UK-ETS and the outcomes of the scheme.<br />
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH MARKETABLE PERMITS<br />
In Part III, we identified the following potential problems with marketable<br />
permits.<br />
Initial allocation of property rights<br />
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
Economic theory suggests that property rights should be allocated through an<br />
auction, rather than based on historic levels of pollution. An auction ensures<br />
that, from the beginning, the right to pollute is given to those firms that can<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
extract the most value from it. An auction also provides revenues that can be<br />
used to reduce other more distortionary taxes and so improve economic<br />
efficiency. However, such an allocation method is likely to face more opposition<br />
from firms than the ‘grandfathering’ of rights, where firms are given rights free<br />
of charge depending on current pollution levels.<br />
Location problems<br />
For some types of pollution, emissions will have different impacts depending on<br />
their location. Emissions by firms in areas where there are few other polluters<br />
may have a lesser environmental impact than emissions by firms located in a<br />
region with many other polluters. Pollution targets <strong>for</strong> emissions trading are<br />
typically set by reference to what would be appropriate at an aggregate level.<br />
This approach can lead to localised pollution problems emerging even where<br />
national targets are met, if there are areas where polluters concentrate their<br />
activities or where pollution has a greater impact on the environment. In these<br />
circumstances it may be desirable to introduce caps at a local or regional level<br />
rather than at a national or international level. However, this can affect the<br />
liquidity of the resulting market by limiting the number of participants and<br />
volumes traded.<br />
Liquidity<br />
A well-functioning, liquid market in permits is more likely to develop where there<br />
are a larger number of participants. Where possible, permits of different kinds<br />
should be exchangeable, so that they can be traded in the same market. This<br />
approach is possible where the relative impacts of different types of emissions<br />
can be easily compared but is more difficult where their relative impacts are<br />
difficult to compare. A well functioning market will also require a well-developed<br />
infrastructure, including exchanges, brokers and available price in<strong>for</strong>mation,<br />
<strong>for</strong> example.<br />
<strong>Market</strong> power<br />
<strong>Market</strong> power problems can arise in two ways. First, firms may hoard permits in<br />
order to exclude potential entrants in the same industry. This problem can be<br />
avoided by including within the same scheme participants across several<br />
industries, from whom new entrants can purchase permits.<br />
Second, firms may hoard permits in order to manipulate the market <strong>for</strong> the<br />
permits themselves. Economic theory suggests that it may be rational <strong>for</strong> firms<br />
to attempt to corner the market in this way. As with issues of liquidity, this risk<br />
can be reduced by maximising the size of the scheme across emission types and<br />
geographic boundaries.<br />
156
INITIAL ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS<br />
The initial allocation of property rights matters. Economic theory suggests that<br />
property rights should be allocated through an auction, which is likely to<br />
increase the cost of pollution, encouraging the reduction of pollution from the<br />
outset.<br />
The auction<br />
In the UK-ETS, participants received permits based on their historic emissions<br />
levels. In order to encourage voluntary participation, the Government held an<br />
auction where participants could bid emissions reductions over the period 2002-<br />
2006 relative to historic emissions in return <strong>for</strong> a share of £215 million of<br />
incentive funding from Defra. (Participants in this auction were the direct<br />
participants under the first option described above.)<br />
The auction flowed from the recommendations of Lord Marshall’s task <strong>for</strong>ce. The<br />
task <strong>for</strong>ce envisaged a voluntary pilot scheme that would be a precursor to more<br />
wide-ranging compulsory schemes in the future. Defra chose to use incentive<br />
funding in order to encourage voluntary participation in this ‘pilot’ scheme.<br />
The outcome of the auction<br />
This aspect of the UK-ETS seems to have delivered results in line with the UK-<br />
ETS’s objectives: attracting participation by UK firms in an emissions trading<br />
scheme, while ensuring significant levels of emissions reductions. The auction<br />
attracted 34 direct participants covering a wide range of sizes and sectors, from<br />
global companies such as BP and Shell to banks, metropolitan councils and<br />
supermarkets, through to smaller organisations such as London’s Natural<br />
History Museum.<br />
The outcome of the auction was that 4.03 million tonnes in 2006 were sold at a<br />
price of £53.37 per tonne, which is equivalent to £17.79 per tonne per year over<br />
the life of the scheme. When three direct participants subsequently dropped out,<br />
the reduction in emissions was reduced slightly to 3.96 million tonnes. This<br />
reduction represents about 6 per cent of the 65.8 million tonnes reduction<br />
expected to be delivered by the policies and measures contemplated in the CCP.<br />
An alternative way of auctioning property rights<br />
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
An assessment of the auction carried out <strong>for</strong> the NAO by Frontier Economics<br />
suggested that an alternative, and perhaps better, way to have set and allocated<br />
the incentive fund would have been through a ‘sealed-bid’ auction process<br />
where participants submit details of how many reductions they would bid at a<br />
range of prices. 164 According to Frontier Economics, this auction design would<br />
have allowed Defra to procure emissions reductions at a lower unit cost. The<br />
164 For more details on the alternative auction see Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (April 2004)<br />
The UK Emissions Trading Scheme: A new way to combat climate change, National Audit Office.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
submission of each participant’s supply curve would have allowed Defra to<br />
construct an aggregate supply curve and hence find the quantity of reductions it<br />
could buy by spending all its budget (£215 million), as well as the quantity of<br />
reductions it could buy <strong>for</strong> a variety of lower budgets. With an aggregate supply<br />
curve it would have been possible to estimate the amount of emissions<br />
reductions that would have been lost by setting a lower budget, which would<br />
have allowed Defra to set a budget <strong>for</strong> the scheme that would result in a lower<br />
unit cost per tonne of emissions reductions.<br />
It is worth noting that a ‘sealed-bid auction’ was one of the options considered<br />
by Defra’s consultant in the auction design. However, they felt that an auction<br />
based on sealed bids might have appeared complex and would thus have<br />
deterred potential small participants. In additional, Defra believed that greater<br />
flexibility over the budget might have discouraged participation and it was<br />
important to attract enough participants in order to create an active market. 165<br />
LOCATION PROBLEMS<br />
This issue does not appear to be relevant to the UK-ETS or the CCP in general.<br />
The UK-ETS and CCP are designed to address the problem of climate change<br />
caused by emissions of greenhouse gases. The extent of climate change caused<br />
by emissions of greenhouse gases depends on the concentration of these gases<br />
in the atmosphere across the globe. Emissions in Europe have the same impact<br />
as emissions in Australia, <strong>for</strong> example.<br />
For this reason, the UK-ETS makes no distinction between emissions arising in<br />
different locations within the UK.<br />
LIQUIDITY<br />
Participation in the emissions market is open to direct participants, agreement<br />
participants and others such as traders who do not have any need to use<br />
greenhouse-gas emission allowances themselves. This wide range of<br />
participants increases the number of potential buyers and sellers in the<br />
emissions market, which in turn increases the probability of a liquid market.<br />
However, a review by NERA on the per<strong>for</strong>mance of the first two years of the UK-<br />
ETS 166 found some evidence of liquidity problems during the initial years of the<br />
scheme. According to NERA, during the first two years of the UK-ETS, 946<br />
participants engaged in at least one trade in the market at volumes ranging from<br />
a singe allowance to 220,000 allowances. According to the criteria used by the<br />
study, there were a total of 1,331 trades during the first year of the scheme and<br />
165 See NAO report (April 2004), Ibid.<br />
166 NERA Economic Consulting (August 2004) Review of the First and Second Years of the UK Emissions Trading<br />
Scheme, a report prepared <strong>for</strong> the UK <strong>Department</strong> <strong>for</strong> Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, <strong>Department</strong> <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: London.<br />
158
only 242 in the second year. The difference in volumes of trades appears to have<br />
occurred because Agreement Participants had to report on their emissions every<br />
two years, and hence were less active in the market in the intervening period.<br />
During these two years direct participants were much more consistent and<br />
active than agreement participants, with the latter acting more as buyers than<br />
sellers. Overall, direct participants were the source of most of the allowances<br />
supplied, but because of their large numbers, agreement participants were able<br />
to provide additional liquidity to the market by engaging in smaller trades.<br />
Price developments, especially at the beginning of the scheme, suggest the<br />
presence of low liquidity. Between August and September 2002, the price of<br />
allowances increased from under £8 per tonne to more than £12 per tonne,<br />
which represents a price increase of over 50 per cent. Such a price increase is<br />
likely to be due to the relatively short supply of allowances available in the<br />
market, as a consequence of difficulties with the verification process, which in<br />
turn delayed the availability of allowances.<br />
By the end of 2002, the price of allowances had dropped to around £3 per tonne,<br />
and settled at around £2 per tonne during the following months. Although the<br />
reasons behind this price development are less clear, NERA suggests that ‘the<br />
price movements in the early days of the Scheme may have been affected more<br />
by low liquidity and inexperience than by underlying demand’. 167<br />
The operational infrastructure of the UK-ETS<br />
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
Anyone wanting to hold, buy or sell allowances or credits needs to have an<br />
account in the registry. The registry is an electronic, web-based system tracking<br />
emissions allowance holdings and transfers by all participants, from their initial<br />
allocation through all transfers of ownership until their final cancellation or<br />
retirement. The UK emissions trading registry is run by Defra and is designed to<br />
support the UK-ETS.<br />
There is no firm evidence to suggest that the operational infrastructure of the<br />
scheme has adversely affected market liquidity. However, some brokers suggest<br />
that the UK-ETS should operate via a system providing a ‘screen’ showing the<br />
prices offered and taken <strong>for</strong> allowances, as in any other financial market. The<br />
absence of such a system, the brokers argue, affects market transparency as<br />
small companies in the market would often contact only a single broker and<br />
would pay the first price they are offered. However, the NAO report points out<br />
that in other markets the responsibility <strong>for</strong> establishing such systems generally<br />
rests with brokers and their trade associations and Defra has not inhibited such<br />
developments. 168<br />
167 See NERA Economic Consulting report (August 2004), Ibid.<br />
168 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (April 2004) The UK Emissions Trading Scheme: A new way to<br />
combat climate change. National Audit Office.<br />
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<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
MARKET POWER<br />
As previously mentioned, direct participants, agreement participants and other<br />
traders are all allowed to trade in the emissions market. This range of potential<br />
participants increases both the number of participants and the number of<br />
sectors or industries participating in the market, which helps to improve market<br />
liquidity and reduce the likelihood of market power problems.<br />
The UK-ETS covers emissions of all six greenhouse gases. The same allowance<br />
can be used to meet a target <strong>for</strong> emissions of any greenhouse gas (with set<br />
‘exchange rates’ between different greenhouse gases to reflect their differing<br />
impacts on climate change). A firm that emits methane can trade with firms that<br />
emit carbon dioxide or nitrous oxide, <strong>for</strong> example. This market widening can also<br />
limit the extent to which firms can exercise market power within the scheme.<br />
Additionally, under the scheme rules, participants were prevented from gaining<br />
more than 20 per cent of the incentive fund in the initial auction, which reduced<br />
the amount of allowances they were able to hold and thus their ability to<br />
manipulate the price of allowances.<br />
The overachievement by the biggest participants (see below) has led to some of<br />
these direct participants holding a very large number of allowances. However,<br />
the observed movements in prices suggest that the presence of market power is<br />
unlikely. Prices have, on average, fallen since the launch of the program in 2002,<br />
and the price increases in the beginning of the UK-ETS can be explained by a<br />
lack of market liquidity due to delays in the verification process rather than the<br />
existence of market power.<br />
Outcome of market mechanism<br />
The UK-ETS has three main objectives, which were presented as being of equal<br />
importance:<br />
● to secure significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the UK in a<br />
cost-effective manner, i.e. minimising the costs of emissions reductions <strong>for</strong><br />
the UK economy as a whole;<br />
● to provide UK companies with early experience of emissions trading, in<br />
preparation <strong>for</strong> European and international emissions trading schemes; and<br />
● to promote the establishment of the City of London as a centre <strong>for</strong> emissions<br />
trading.<br />
160
COST-EFFICIENT EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS<br />
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
According to Defra, emissions reductions within the scheme have exceeded<br />
expectations with both direct participants and climate change agreement<br />
holders going well beyond their targets <strong>for</strong> future years of the scheme. 169 During<br />
the first year of the UK-ETS, direct participants, in aggregate, surpassed their<br />
targets <strong>for</strong> that year by 487 per cent and reported reductions of 4.64 million<br />
tonnes. 170 In other words, the reductions in emissions in the first year alone<br />
exceeded the target <strong>for</strong> reductions over the whole five-year life of the scheme by<br />
17 per cent.<br />
Since participants have the option of selling the allowances or ‘banking’ them <strong>for</strong><br />
later use, the final impact of the reductions in the initial year are uncertain at<br />
present. Economic theory would suggest that the total volume of allowances<br />
available in the market will determine the total level of emissions produced over<br />
the life of the scheme. Given that participants can bank allowances and use them<br />
in later years, it may be that participants use the allowances they have banked<br />
to increase emissions in the later years of the scheme. This outcome might be<br />
the case if direct participants reacted to the price achieved in the initial auction<br />
(£18 per tonne per year) and calculated that at this price it would be profitable<br />
<strong>for</strong> them to reduce emissions by more than their target and sell the excess<br />
allowances generated at this market price. Since the market price is now much<br />
lower than this level, direct participants may in future years find it less profitable<br />
to reduce emissions and their emissions might there<strong>for</strong>e be expected to rise.<br />
A more likely outcome perhaps, is that direct participants will use some of their<br />
banked allowances to cover their own emissions in future years and sell the<br />
others to agreement participants who will then be able to exceed their targets.<br />
This outcome would counteract the overachievement of direct participants in the<br />
first year of the scheme so that the total level of emission reductions achieved<br />
through the initial auction might not exceed 3.96 million tonnes over the life of<br />
the scheme.<br />
However, such an outcome might suggest that the scheme has succeeded in<br />
achieving emission reductions in a cost effective manner, since it would suggest<br />
that direct participants are able to reduce emissions at a lower cost, on average,<br />
than agreement participants. (It would seem reasonable to expect that direct<br />
participants in the UK-ETS will have relatively lower emissions reduction costs<br />
than other firms in the UK economy, otherwise it would not have been rational<br />
<strong>for</strong> them to have entered ‘winning bids’ in the initial auction.)<br />
It has been suggested in some press reports that the goals set <strong>for</strong> some of the<br />
direct participants were undemanding and that some of the companies’ targeted<br />
levels of emissions were below their actual baselines. 171 On the other hand, Defra<br />
169 Third Annual Workshop on Greenhouse Gas Emission, 23-24 September 2003, ‘Country Summary: U.K Emissions<br />
Trading Scheme’, available at: http://www.iea.org/textbase/work/2003/ghgem/uk.pdf.<br />
170 Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (April 2004) The UK Emissions Trading Scheme: A new way to<br />
combat climate change. National Audit Office.<br />
171 See NAO report, Ibid.<br />
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had little in<strong>for</strong>mation on the recent emissions of direct participants and attempts<br />
to go further in this respect could have resulted in unequal treatment <strong>for</strong> some<br />
direct participants – if, instead of using an average, the baseline <strong>for</strong> some<br />
participants was set only using the lowest level of emissions reported during the<br />
previous three years, <strong>for</strong> example. Tightening the targets could also have<br />
increased the risk that some of the participants might drop out of the scheme.<br />
The NAO’s research into four of these companies shows that, in practice,<br />
companies have made significant additional ef<strong>for</strong>ts to cut emissions and that<br />
incentive payments are helping to pay <strong>for</strong> emissions reductions. In addition,<br />
Defra believes that some of the direct participants are going beyond the goals<br />
set at the beginning of the UK-ETS and these firms are attempting to deliver<br />
further reductions, as they have discovered that further reductions lead to<br />
improvements in energy efficiency which are cost effective <strong>for</strong> the firm. 172<br />
During 2004, following the second year reconciliation 173 and the publication of<br />
the NAO report, Defra negotiated with direct participants, who had significantly<br />
exceeded their target reduction, to gain additional voluntary emissions<br />
reductions. As a result, the total guaranteed emissions reductions over the life of<br />
the scheme increased to around 20 million tonnes of CO 2 equivalent, from the<br />
original 11.88 million tonnes of CO 2 equivalent. 174<br />
It can be difficult to isolate the effect of the UK-ETS on the emissions reductions<br />
undertaken by firms. However, according to the NAO report, approximately 66<br />
per cent of the reductions reported by four of the main overachiever firms are<br />
attributable to the scheme.<br />
The market price of allowances in the UK is within the range of comparable<br />
markets. According to the NERA report, prices in the Chicago Climate Exchange,<br />
which is also a voluntary scheme, have been rarely above £0.6 per tonne since<br />
the exchange’s launch in 2003. In Europe, the <strong>for</strong>ward price <strong>for</strong> carbon dioxide<br />
allowances under the EU-ETS had fluctuated between £4-£9 over the first six<br />
months of 2004. 175 Under the UK-ETS the allowance prices has fluctuated<br />
between £2 and £4 during 2003-2004. 176<br />
However, the price obtained in the initial auction, £18 per tonne over the life of<br />
the scheme, is significantly above the price estimated previous to the auction by<br />
172 Interview with Defra.<br />
173 The reconciliation process implies the verification that claimed emissions reductions correspond with actual ones.<br />
174 In<strong>for</strong>mation provided by Defra.<br />
175 The price of a metric tonne of CO has plunged since the UK ETS began officially on January 1, 2005, to less than<br />
2<br />
€7 (£4.7) from the in<strong>for</strong>mal ‘grey -market’ figure of €13 (£8.87) at the start of 2004. According to Time Magazine,<br />
February 21, 2005, page 49.<br />
176 According to DEFRA the price of allowances rose to around £4 in the beginning of 2004 when DEFRA made<br />
known its intention to review the scheme to deal with overachievements from direct participants. See also Report<br />
by the Comptroller and Auditor General(April 2004) The UK Emissions Trading Scheme: A new way to combat<br />
climate change. National Audit Office.;and NERA Economic Consulting (August 2004) Review of the First and<br />
Second Years of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme, a report prepared <strong>for</strong> the UK <strong>Department</strong> <strong>for</strong> Environment,<br />
Food and Rural Affairs, <strong>Department</strong> <strong>for</strong> the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: London.<br />
162
consultants to Defra of £11 per tonne, although this estimation was ‘subject to<br />
major uncertainties’.<br />
In summary, experience suggests that the price paid by Defra in the initial<br />
auction to obtain commitments to reduce emissions was significantly higher<br />
than the underlying price of the allowances. A different auction design (such as<br />
perhaps a closed-bid auction) might have allowed Defra to obtain a higher level<br />
of reductions <strong>for</strong> the same cost or the same level of reductions at a lower cost.<br />
However, when measured against the stated objective of achieving emissions<br />
reductions in a cost-effective manner (in terms of costs incurred by the<br />
participating organisations) the scheme appears, on the basis of the evidence of<br />
its first few years, to have been highly successful. It has delivered emissions<br />
reductions in a cost effective way, by providing incentives <strong>for</strong> emissions<br />
reductions to take place in the industries and organisations with the lowest<br />
abatement costs.<br />
EXPERIENCE IN EMISSIONS TRADING<br />
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
The second objective of the UK-ETS was to provide early experience in<br />
emissions trading <strong>for</strong> UK organisations and in so doing to provide firms with an<br />
advantage over their international competitors in future international trading<br />
schemes.<br />
Interviews with direct participants per<strong>for</strong>med by NERA, NAO and LECG suggest<br />
that this objective has been achieved. According to the NAO, all respondents in<br />
their study agreed that the scheme had improved their understanding of the<br />
benefits emissions trading could bring to them and, although some direct<br />
participants did not use the market because they had achieved their emissions<br />
target <strong>for</strong> that year, most of the participants said that their confidence in the use<br />
of the market <strong>for</strong> emissions had improved.<br />
In addition, of eleven participants that have sites that will fall within the scope of<br />
the EU-ETS, most felt that they are better prepared to take part in this international<br />
scheme than they would have been in the absence of the UK scheme.<br />
The majority of brokers and verifiers interviewed by NERA considered that their<br />
experience in the UK-ETS had left them well placed to provide services to<br />
companies participating in the EU-ETS. However, the verifiers also noted that the<br />
full benefits of the UK experience would only be realised if the EU-ETS integrity<br />
standards are similar to those used in the UK-ETS. Some verifiers expressed<br />
concerns that the lack of guidance on verification standards or requirements <strong>for</strong><br />
accreditation under the EU-ETS would lead to different standards of verification<br />
across EU members, which can threaten the integrity of the programme, as well<br />
as presenting obstacles to the trade of verification services. 177<br />
177 NERA Economic Consulting (August 2004) Review of the First and Second Years of the UK Emissions Trading<br />
Scheme, a report prepared <strong>for</strong> the UK <strong>Department</strong> <strong>for</strong> Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, <strong>Department</strong> <strong>for</strong> the<br />
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: London.<br />
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Overall, the UK-ETS seems to have provided firms and participants in the UK-<br />
ETS with early experience of emissions trading. Most of the direct participants<br />
interviewed said that their understanding of emissions trading and the<br />
relationships between energy savings, emissions and cost has also deepened.<br />
Brokers and verifiers consider that their participation in the scheme has left them<br />
well placed to participate in the EU scheme.<br />
THE CITY OF LONDON AS A CENTRE FOR EMISSIONS TRADING<br />
The third objective of the scheme was to promote the establishment of the City<br />
of London as a centre <strong>for</strong> emissions trading.<br />
It is perhaps difficult to assess at the moment whether or not this objective will<br />
be achieved. Defra considers that the early experience in emissions trading has<br />
given the City of London a first-mover advantage that has prepared lawyers,<br />
brokers, bankers, traders, consultants and verifiers <strong>for</strong> the new international<br />
emissions trading schemes. A number of firms interviewed by NERA consider<br />
that the majority of greenhouse gas brokers and traders are currently located in<br />
London and that significant expertise in legal, financial and data requirements<br />
have been gained as a result of the UK-ETS. It appears that the UK-ETS has led<br />
to the establishment of a centre of emissions trading expertise in London. 178 It is,<br />
however, perhaps too early to say whether London will become the centre <strong>for</strong><br />
emissions trading globally or in Europe.<br />
UNANTICIPATED BENEFITS/DRAWBACKS<br />
Defra suggested to us that the introduction of the monitoring process in itself<br />
provided incentives to reduce emissions, since be<strong>for</strong>e the scheme existed some<br />
participants lacked in<strong>for</strong>mation on their total energy use. The in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
produced as part of the monitoring process has allowed participants to assess<br />
their total energy use and take measures to improve their energy efficiency in<br />
ways that would be privately profitable even in the absence of the CCP. It is not<br />
clear why firms had not already exploited these profitable opportunities, but it<br />
appears that the scheme may have revealed in<strong>for</strong>mation to firms on their energy<br />
efficiency that they were not previously aware of.<br />
These benefits appear to be supported by evidence gathered by the NAO and<br />
our interviews with direct participants. According to some of the direct<br />
participants interviewed, participation in the UK-ETS has been an effective way<br />
to secure corporate commitment to projects aimed at reducing greenhouse gas<br />
emissions. Shell UK limited, one of the major participants in the Scheme said<br />
that:<br />
178 An example of this is the existence of London Climate Change Service (LCCS), an association of service providers<br />
who aim to assist international firms adjust to the European and Kyoto Regulations by providing expertise across<br />
a wide range of services. LCCS is also a <strong>for</strong>um to promote the shared interests of the member service providers<br />
in the climate change and emissions trading sectors.<br />
164
Participation has helped us to raise the profile of emissions management at<br />
all levels in our company. This has enabled us to accelerate our energy<br />
management programme and to progress more opportunities through<br />
implementation. 179<br />
However, the scheme seems also to contribute to improvements in energy<br />
management and thus energy and cost savings <strong>for</strong> smaller participants, as<br />
acknowledged by Kirklees Metropolitan Council:<br />
[T]he UK ETS is an excellent driver and tool to implement many energy<br />
saving schemes and initiatives towards GHG reduction, including ensuring<br />
that we have a process to obtain more accurate and timely meter readings<br />
from the utilities. 180<br />
Similarly, in the study per<strong>for</strong>med by NERA, almost all participants reported<br />
improvements to internal environmental and energy management procedures<br />
as a result of scheme participation.<br />
It appears that this process has produced benefits in terms of greenhouse gas<br />
emissions reductions and reductions in other pollutants arising from the burning<br />
of fossil fuels, as well as benefits to the profitability of these firms as a result of<br />
the reduction in their total energy costs. 181 However, it could be argued that these<br />
benefits would have arisen from any scheme that <strong>for</strong>ced firms to monitor their<br />
energy use and greenhouse gas emissions in order to meet specific targets,<br />
whether or not this involved the use of a market mechanism.<br />
Overall Assessment<br />
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
The evidence available to date suggests that the UK-ETS has been successful at<br />
reducing levels of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective manner.<br />
The idea of assigning property rights to a negative externality and then allowing<br />
market participants to work out the appropriate price, as suggested by economic<br />
theory, has produced positive results in other areas of environmental control, <strong>for</strong><br />
instance the SO 2 allowance trading <strong>for</strong> acid rain control and the lead trading<br />
program in the US. 182 The evidence suggests that the UK-ETS has been no<br />
exception.<br />
179 DEFRA, UK emissions Trading Scheme: Reports, Third Year (2004) results, Views from two Direct Participants on<br />
what they have learnt from participating in the UK Emissions Trading Scheme, prepared <strong>for</strong> the Secretary of State<br />
in advance of the Conference of Parties 10 in Buenos Aires, available at<br />
http://www.Defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/uk/pdf/dpviews.pdf.<br />
180 Interview with Bill Edrich and Kay Beagley from the Kirklees Metropolitan Council, June, 2005.<br />
181 For instance the Kirklees Metropolitan Council estimates that their participation in the UK-ETS will improve the<br />
corporate management of energy resulting in an estimated saving of up to 5 per cent of consumption over the<br />
five years of the scheme.<br />
182 Stavins, Robert (2001) ‘Lessons from the American Experiment with <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> Environmental Policies, KGS<br />
Working Paper No. RWP01-032.<br />
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The UK-ETS has also provided valuable experience to the organisations involved<br />
in it. The process of setting baselines, monitoring and verification has provided<br />
UK firms with experience in an essential process of any trading scheme. Such<br />
experience is likely to provide them with an advantage over <strong>for</strong>eign competitors<br />
in international trading schemes.<br />
The early experience in emissions trading has given the City of London a<br />
potential first-mover advantage that has prepared lawyers, brokers, bankers,<br />
traders, consultants and verifiers with skills that can be exploited in new<br />
international schemes. This may, in the future, allow the City of London to<br />
become an important centre <strong>for</strong> emissions trading.<br />
LESSONS FOR OTHER AREAS<br />
A number of factors have contributed to the apparent success of the UK-ETS.<br />
First, the nature of greenhouse gas emissions allowed the creation of a single<br />
market in which allowances <strong>for</strong> all types of greenhouse gas emissions in all<br />
locations could be traded. This feature has promoted the liquidity of the market.<br />
While not all pollutants lend themselves to this degree of interchangeability<br />
between allowances, it would seem desirable, wherever possible, to seek the<br />
creation of a single wide market in convertible allowances. This approach<br />
promotes the liquidity of the market and allows participants collectively to make<br />
efficient trade-offs and achieve emission reductions at minimum cost.<br />
Second, the use of an initial auction, where public funds were used to purchase<br />
emissions reductions from direct participants, using historical emissions as a<br />
baseline, appears to have been successful at enticing firms to participate in the<br />
scheme and promoted the liquidity of a market in which other participants have<br />
been able to trade.<br />
Third, specific measures were taken to avoid allowing one participant to ‘corner<br />
the market’ in allowances (no participant was able to obtain more than 20 per<br />
cent of the allowances allocated in the initial auction). While it is not clear that<br />
any market power or liquidity problems would have arisen in the UK-ETS in the<br />
absence of this intervention, it may be an important safeguard in other schemes<br />
which are not able to achieve the same level of liquidity as the UK-ETS.<br />
Within this context of the overall success of the scheme, three issues arise that<br />
would require careful consideration in future tradable emissions permits<br />
schemes.<br />
The first is that the initial auction resulted in DEFRA purchasing emissions<br />
reductions at a price (£18 per tonne per year) that subsequent experience has<br />
shown is significantly above the market price <strong>for</strong> allowances (which were later<br />
trading in the range £2-£4 per tonne since February 2003). This suggests that the<br />
<strong>for</strong>m of auction used failed to reveal the underlying cost of reducing carbon<br />
166
Section 11 – Emissions Trading<br />
emissions <strong>for</strong> scheme participants and other auction designs may have<br />
been more appropriate. However, it is important to note that there are significant<br />
fixed costs of participation in the UK-ETS and thus, Defra did not expect the cost<br />
of reducing emissions to the Government to be the same as the secondary<br />
market price.<br />
The second is that implementation raised complex issues regarding both (i) the<br />
setting of baselines and (ii) the verification process. To some extent these issues<br />
led to delays in the allocation of allowances which caused a temporary shortage<br />
of allowances and affected the liquidity of the market and efficient price<br />
<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>for</strong> a period of time. Both of these issues appear to require<br />
considerable resources to resolve. However, the first (setting baselines) can be<br />
avoided in a scheme where allowances are allocated through an initial auction<br />
rather than allocated on the basis of historic emission levels or reductions<br />
against historic emission levels. Such an approach may be difficult where it<br />
leads to significant cost increases <strong>for</strong> some industries that may have to reduce<br />
output as a result. However, such changes in industrial output are the natural<br />
consequence of adjusting prices to reflect externality costs. The resulting<br />
adjustment costs <strong>for</strong> industry should be addressed directly (through support <strong>for</strong><br />
retraining of employees, <strong>for</strong> example) rather than by adjustments to the market<br />
mechanism.<br />
Lastly, the lack of a full international consensus on tackling climate change<br />
(e.g. the US and China have not signed the Protocol) may make it difficult <strong>for</strong><br />
governments to use a market-based instrument to internalise the cost of<br />
greenhouse gas emissions. Without international agreement, the use of such<br />
mechanisms by one country may simply shift polluting industries to other<br />
countries without such controls, with no resulting benefit to the environment.<br />
167
Part V<br />
Annex<br />
169
SECTION 12<br />
Issues in the<br />
implementation of<br />
market mechanisms<br />
This section provides additional details from the economic literature reviewed in<br />
Part III on the main issues involved in the implementation of market<br />
mechanisms. Properly applied, market mechanisms can lead to a more efficient<br />
and often more user-friendly system than under a traditional public policy<br />
system. However, implementing these mechanisms is rarely straight<strong>for</strong>ward and<br />
runs the risk of introducing market failures as well as market benefits into the<br />
public sector. In this section we discuss issues that can arise in implementing<br />
each of the market mechanisms, focusing on the potential problems highlighted<br />
by theory. We also suggest ways in which these issues can be addressed and<br />
review the available evidence on the overall per<strong>for</strong>mance of each mechanism.<br />
Competitive tendering of service provision<br />
MARKET POWER<br />
The benefits from a competitive tendering process can only be realised if there<br />
is genuine competition <strong>for</strong> the contract. However, if the process does not elicit<br />
genuine competition, either due to market power by a single firm, or due to<br />
collusion amongst potential bidders, then an optimal result is unlikely to be<br />
obtained. As a result, prices may be higher and quality may be lower than under<br />
government provision. Unless there are other benefits such as improvements in<br />
consumer choice, it is possible that consumer welfare may be reduced under the<br />
market mechanism compared with government provision.<br />
Single firm market power<br />
When conducting a competitive tendering process it is important to ensure that<br />
there will be competing bidders. This outcome is highly unlikely where only one<br />
firm is in a strong position to win the contract. This situation can arise <strong>for</strong> a<br />
number of reasons – there may be only one firm which is genuinely able to fulfil<br />
the requirements, the contract may be structured in such a way that only one<br />
firm is in a credible position to bid, or there may be strong incumbency<br />
advantages.<br />
If there is only one firm that is able to provide the required service, then it is<br />
debatable whether a competitive tendering process is appropriate. However, in<br />
some cases, this problem may be solved through appropriate structuring of the<br />
170
contract. In particular, dividing the contract into a number of distinct separate<br />
contracts may elicit greater competition. Although there may be only a limited<br />
number of bidders able to compete <strong>for</strong> a national contract, many more firms able<br />
to offer a service on a local or regional basis.<br />
In other cases, although there may be adequate competition when the contract<br />
is first awarded, in subsequent tenders the incumbent may have secured an<br />
advantage that prevents a competitive outcome. These incumbency advantages<br />
can arise if there is learning-by-doing or if the winning bidder undertakes<br />
specific investments. An incumbent could also earn a good reputation or<br />
develop a good understanding of the public sector and its requirements, which<br />
could create a strong advantage if the government agency is risk-averse.<br />
The reduced competitive discipline resulting from incumbency advantage will<br />
undermine the efficiency incentives that competitive tendering aims to<br />
encourage and could result in the government paying too high a price <strong>for</strong> the<br />
outsourced services. Moreover, these problems may be further compounded if<br />
the incumbency advantage is perceived by rival bidders. Weaker firms may not<br />
be willing to undertake the costs associated with compiling a tender if the<br />
incumbent is sufficiently well positioned to win the contract. This incumbency<br />
advantage discourages new entrants from participating in future tenders,<br />
restricting competition in the long run.<br />
Solutions to incumbency advantages<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
A number of different methods have been suggested to reduce the potential <strong>for</strong><br />
incumbency advantages.<br />
One approach is to offer multiple contracts and award them to different bidders,<br />
setting limits on how many contracts any one firm is allowed to hold. Although<br />
this may mean the lowest-cost bidder is not always selected, cost savings are<br />
likely to be realised in the long run by ensuring future competition <strong>for</strong> the<br />
market. Awarding multiple contracts facilitates competition in subsequent<br />
stages because it allows <strong>for</strong> more than one firm to develop relevant expertise<br />
that can be drawn upon when the contract is re-tendered. Aggregating<br />
requirements into a single tender, on the other hand, allows only one firm to<br />
gain the incumbency advantage, reducing the ability of other firms to compete<br />
effectively in the future. Multiple contracts also help mitigate cases where one<br />
firm has gained market power through another means. Offering a number of<br />
contracts and stipulating how many each firm may hold increases the<br />
probabilities of success <strong>for</strong> other firms and potential entrants. This approach<br />
makes them more likely to incur the costs of bidding, increasing competition <strong>for</strong><br />
the market and reducing rents to the advantaged incumbent.<br />
Seshandri et al (1991) 183 develop a model in which the level of aggregation of the<br />
contract determines the number of participating bidders, and find that multi-<br />
183 Seshandri, S., K. Chatterjee and G. Lilien (1991), ‘Multiple Source Procurement Competitions’, <strong>Market</strong>ing Science 10.<br />
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sourcing will increase participation at the cost of higher prices. However, Perry<br />
and Sakovics (2003) show that this is true when the number of bidders is fixed,<br />
but not when letting multiple contracts can attract entry. In this situation,<br />
multiple contracts can lead to lower costs, particularly if the number of initial<br />
bidders is small. 184 They also show that it will never be optimal to split<br />
requirements equally as this would allocate the largest possible demand to the<br />
most inefficient supplier, maximising productive inefficiency. It would also<br />
create the weakest incentives <strong>for</strong> competition <strong>for</strong> the primary contract. They<br />
advocate a split that involves the minimum size of secondary contract required<br />
to attract an additional bidder to the market.<br />
Maintaining bidding parity may be difficult even when the buyer sources from<br />
multiple suppliers. Sheang (2000) notes that multi-sourcing is sustainable in the<br />
long run only if the learning-by-doing advantage is equal across suppliers. 185 If<br />
this is not the case then the cost of multi-sourcing increases as cost differences<br />
between suppliers increase. Sheang recommends learning-by-doing advantages<br />
be equalised by splitting contracts equally amongst suppliers, even though this<br />
means productive inefficiency <strong>for</strong> the first tender is maximised and competition<br />
is weakened. Together this literature suggests that when incumbency<br />
advantages are a real concern, it can be better to award contracts to multiple<br />
bidders to minimise incumbency advantages. Contract length can also be<br />
helpful in reducing incumbency advantages. Although a long contract length<br />
means that an incumbent may have significantly more experience than a new<br />
entrant, a long contract also increases the incentives <strong>for</strong> new entrants to invest<br />
in bidding and to develop the skills. Newbery (2004) looks at the interaction<br />
between contract design and market structure in the context of the restructured<br />
and privatised electricity industry in England and Wales. He notes that the use of<br />
long-term contracts encouraged entry of new merchant Independent Power<br />
Producers by reducing uncertainty.<br />
The terms under which the contract is offered can also affect the level of<br />
incumbency advantages. A fixed-price contract exposes the bidder to the fact<br />
that costs may be uncertain ex ante, giving incumbents an in<strong>for</strong>mational<br />
advantage regarding costs. A cost-plus contract removes this advantage, but<br />
introduces problems of its own, as firms have no incentive to control their costs<br />
and so may engage in excess investment and gold-plating of services.<br />
In other cases, where incumbency advantages are recognised, it may be<br />
worthwhile <strong>for</strong> the government to take special steps to ignore the incumbency<br />
advantage when re-contracting. Cabral and Greenstein (1990) cite an example of<br />
the purchasing of computer equipment by the US government. 186 In the 1970s<br />
184 Perry, M. and J. Sakovics (2003), ‘Auctions <strong>for</strong> Split-Award Contracts,’ The Journal of Industrial Economics 2.<br />
185 Sheang, K. (2000), ‘Production Cost, Transaction Cost, and Outsourcing Strategy: A Game Theoretical Analysis’,<br />
mimeo, National University<br />
186 Cabral, L. and Greenstein, S. 1990. Switching costs and bidding parity in government procurement of computer<br />
systems. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 6<br />
172
the US Government procurement procedure <strong>for</strong> mainframe computers ignored<br />
the often substantial conversion costs involved in changing from one system to<br />
another and instead opted <strong>for</strong> the system that bid the lowest. Following much<br />
criticism from the individual Government agencies that had to bear the<br />
conversion costs, this system was changed in 1980 to one where estimated<br />
switching costs were added to incompatible vendors’ bids.<br />
Cabral and Greenstein find that centralised procurement, where conversion<br />
costs are ignored, elicits more competitive behaviour from the bidder who has a<br />
competitive advantage. Although on a local level the decision to ignore<br />
switching costs may appear suboptimal, at a global level this policy can be<br />
optimal as it induces lower prices as a result of more competitive bidding.<br />
Consequently, it is not clear that taking switching costs into account is always an<br />
optimal policy <strong>for</strong> customers.<br />
Collusion<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
Collusion arises when the firms in a market realise that they are collectively<br />
better off by ceasing to compete aggressively, and instead co-ordinate their<br />
behaviour to raise prices and maximise the profits of all. Collusion has been a<br />
cause <strong>for</strong> concern in many procurement processes. 187<br />
In order <strong>for</strong> collusion to occur, the firms in an industry must be able to explicitly<br />
or tacitly reach an agreement on how to share the market. Such an<br />
understanding can be reached in a number of different ways, such as agreeing<br />
to keep to a particular geographic area (geographic market sharing), or reaching<br />
an understanding on the price to be charged.<br />
Moreover, <strong>for</strong> collusion to be successful it has to be sustained over time. Within<br />
collusion there is always an inherent tension between individual and collective<br />
interests. Whilst collusion may be in firms’ collective interests, at any point in<br />
time, firms have an individual incentive to ‘cheat’ on the collective agreement to<br />
increase their sales. For example, consider the situation where firms have<br />
colluded to raise prices significantly above the competitive level. If any one firm<br />
cheats by offering a price just below the cartel price, then it can steal significant<br />
sales from its rivals. As a consequence, economists have found that collusion<br />
can only be sustained if firms that deviate from the collusive agreement can be<br />
detected and punished by other cartel members. 188<br />
187 McMillan, p. 1991. Dango: Japan’s price fixing conspiracies. Economics and Politics 3.<br />
Porter and Zona. 1993. Detection of bid rigging in procurement auctions. Journal of Political Economy 101.<br />
Pesendorfer, M. 2000. A study of collusion in first price auctions. Review of Economic Studies 67.<br />
188 Motta (2004), Competition <strong>Policy</strong>: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press.<br />
173
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Factors that facilitate collusion<br />
Economists have found that the following market features help firms to reach<br />
and sustain a collusive agreement. 189 These are:<br />
● High concentration: the lower the number of potential firms in a market, the<br />
easier it is to reach an agreement between them;<br />
● Symmetry of firms: it is easier <strong>for</strong> firms to reach an agreement when they are<br />
similar as their interests are more likely to be aligned;<br />
● Transparency: a transparent market makes it easier <strong>for</strong> firms to reach an<br />
agreement and to monitor that the agreement is being maintained;<br />
● Homogenous contracts: if contracts are similar, it is easier <strong>for</strong> firms to share<br />
them amongst themselves;<br />
● Regularity and frequency of orders: if there are frequent, regular orders it is<br />
easier <strong>for</strong> firms to sustain a collusive agreement. It may not be worth<br />
deviating and undermining the agreement <strong>for</strong> a small contract. Moreover,<br />
punishing cheating firms is easier when the next contract comes soon;<br />
● Multi-market contacts: these can help collusion by increasing the symmetry<br />
of firms (as one may be strong in one market, and one strong in another) and<br />
by increasing the regularity of orders. Where firms have a ‘natural territory’<br />
this can also make it easier to agree on an initial allocation of contracts;<br />
● Stable demand: stable demand makes it easier <strong>for</strong> firms to determine<br />
whether prices have fallen due to a firm cheating on an agreement or a<br />
genuine fall in demand;<br />
● High barriers to entry: this makes it less likely that collusion will be<br />
undermined by new entrants; and<br />
● Absence of buyer power: a strong buyer can make collusion more difficult<br />
through the design of the sales process.<br />
Factors that make public procurement vulnerable to collusion<br />
A number of the factors listed above are often found in public procurement<br />
processes, increasing the potential <strong>for</strong> collusion. Although governments should<br />
often be in a position to exercise buyer power, the design of some procurement<br />
processes has on occasions created conditions ideal <strong>for</strong> fostering collusion<br />
among bidders. For example, standard contracts are often awarded by many<br />
local authorities on a local basis, resulting in a high degree of regular, standard<br />
contracts and repeated interaction among firms. In addition, many public tender<br />
processes can require a past track record by a firm, creating barriers to entry and<br />
reducing the pool of potential firms. Risk-averse government agencies, such as<br />
those involved in the provision of frontline services, are likely to favour<br />
procurement through a steady and predictable flow of demand. Stable demand<br />
189 Motta (2004), Competition <strong>Policy</strong>: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press.<br />
174
allows suppliers to plan more effectively to meet demand and thus ensures<br />
sufficient capacity is available to deliver these services, but also makes collusion<br />
easier to sustain.<br />
An illustration of how a badly designed public procurement process can create<br />
conditions ideal <strong>for</strong> collusion is provided by Pesendorfer (2000) who examined<br />
a cartel <strong>for</strong> school milk contracts in Florida and Texas. 190 The market was<br />
characterised by many small contracts (in total several hundred a year between<br />
the two states). In each school district contracts were awarded independently of<br />
one another and at different dates. Each school district also published details of<br />
all bidders <strong>for</strong> the contract and the price bid by each. The transparency created<br />
by this system made it easy <strong>for</strong> bidders to collude on a market outcome (either<br />
in terms of price or by sharing contracts) and to detect when any firm had<br />
cheated on a contract. The frequency of contracts deterred firms from cheating,<br />
both as the gains from cheating on any individual contract were likely to be low<br />
and as any deviation could quickly be punished on the next contract.<br />
Ways to reduce the risk of collusion<br />
The potential <strong>for</strong> collusion can be restricted through appropriate auction design,<br />
bearing in mind the features that are likely to support a coordinated outcome in<br />
the first place. Making the process less transparent, reducing the frequency and<br />
similarity of contracts and reducing barriers to entry can all help in undermining<br />
collusion. For example, in the school milk example cited above, collusion would<br />
have been less likely if in<strong>for</strong>mation on bids and bidders were not published and<br />
if the authority had aggregated together groups of contracts into large contracts.<br />
Fewer and larger contracts reduce the frequency of interaction, introduce an<br />
element of volatility to demand and increase the cost of losing. However, this<br />
must be balanced against incumbency advantages and the resulting impact on<br />
long-term market structure. Similarly, making bidding processes less<br />
transparent may limit the potential <strong>for</strong> collusion, but implies a trade-off in terms<br />
of the increased risk of regulatory capture that will also result.<br />
Auction design<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
As many competitive tenders are allocated through an auction process, care<br />
needs to be taken to ensure that the auction design does not create conditions<br />
<strong>for</strong> collusion.<br />
Auctions can be either open or sealed bid. In open auctions, bidding proceeds in<br />
stages, with bidders acting simultaneously and independently in each round. At<br />
the end of the round, bidders observe the outcome and adjust bids accordingly.<br />
Under a sealed-bid auction, bidders submit bids simultaneously and<br />
independently. Bids are then opened and the auction outcome decided<br />
190 Pesendorfer (2000) as quoted in Motta (2004), Competition <strong>Policy</strong>: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University<br />
Press.<br />
175
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
according to pre-determined rules. Open auctions can be either ascending or<br />
descending, <strong>for</strong> example, and sealed-bid auctions can specify that the winner<br />
pays his own bid (‘a first-price auction’) or the bid of his strongest competitor,<br />
<strong>for</strong> example (‘a second-price auction’). Simultaneous multi-round auctions<br />
(SMRAs) have been used in the allocation of radio spectrum and the divestment<br />
of electricity generating capacity. In an SMRA, a number of items are sold<br />
simultaneously over multiple rounds. The auction closes when no new bids are<br />
<strong>for</strong>thcoming and each item is sold to the highest bidder. Over the course of the<br />
auction, the prices of different items vary and bidders can switch between them<br />
on the basis of their relative price. 191<br />
Klemperer points to the divergent outcomes of the European spectrum auctions<br />
<strong>for</strong> 3G mobile licences as evidence of the impact of auction design. 192 In Germany<br />
and the UK, spectrum sold <strong>for</strong> more than 600 euros per person, whereas in<br />
Austria, Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland the sums raised were 100, 700, 240<br />
and 20 euros per person respectively. Klemperer identifies the main potential<br />
pitfalls as permitting collusion or entry-deterring and predatory behaviour and<br />
outlines the means through which these traps could be avoided.<br />
Auction design is particularly important where the number of competitors is not<br />
large in relation to the number of items being sold. Brusco and Lopsmo (1999)<br />
prove that the possibility <strong>for</strong> collusive outcomes declines as the number of<br />
bidders rises relative to the number of items being auctioned, as the possibility<br />
of bidders agreeing on how to split the bids falls. 193 However, where the expected<br />
number of competitors is few, collusion can be a real concern. Klemperer notes<br />
that open ascending auctions can be particularly prone to collusion because:<br />
a. bidders can use the early stages of low prices to signal who should win which<br />
object and then tacitly agree to stop pushing up prices; and<br />
b. they offer a punishment mechanism as members can bid more aggressively<br />
<strong>for</strong> lots they do not want. The firm that wants that particular licence will then<br />
bid higher so the punishment mechanism is costless. Furthermore, by<br />
blocking entry, ascending auctions encourage remaining strong bidders to<br />
collude.<br />
Bidders may also be able to exploit an auction set-up to engage in entrydeterring<br />
or predatory behaviour. If asymmetries between bidders are too great,<br />
there is little incentive <strong>for</strong> others to enter given the costs associated with<br />
bidding. Weaker bidders are likely to perceive the outcome as a <strong>for</strong>egone<br />
conclusion, and so not participate. This perception creates an incentive <strong>for</strong><br />
bidders to develop an advantage as an effective predatory strategy, and create a<br />
reputation <strong>for</strong> aggressiveness to rein<strong>for</strong>ce this advantage. Predation is<br />
particularly easy in repeated ascending auctions as it is easier to develop a<br />
stronger reputation.<br />
191 •econ report <strong>for</strong> the OFT<br />
192 Klemperer, P, 2002, What really matters in auction design, Journal of economic perspectives, 16(1).<br />
193 Brusco, S. and Lopsmo, G. 1999. Collusion via signalling in open ascending auctions with multiple objects and<br />
complementarities. Working paper, Stern School of Business, New York University<br />
176
In a sealed-bid auction, bidders cannot use their bid to signal who should win a<br />
contract, making collusion more difficult. Weaker bidders have some chance of<br />
victory and are correspondingly more likely to enter. Winner’s curse is also less<br />
severe. The strongest player may well have been willing to pay the winning bid,<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e the winner has not necessarily over-estimated the lot’s value.<br />
Ways to reduce the potential <strong>for</strong> collusion in auctions<br />
In auctions where it is identified that collusion among bidders may be a potential<br />
concern, there are a number of steps that can be taken in the auction design to<br />
reduce this risk.<br />
The use of a sealed bid auction, rather than an ascending auction should be<br />
considered as the lack of transparency in a sealed bid auction makes collusion<br />
more difficult. Cramton and Schwartz (2000) and Klemperer (2002) have<br />
suggested this as a means of reducing the likelihood of collusion in auctions. 194<br />
However, it should be noted that where collusion is not a major concern, this<br />
may give a less efficient outcome, as firms cannot use good in<strong>for</strong>mation about<br />
rivals in order to bid intelligently.<br />
If an ascending auction is to be used, then Klemperer suggests that the<br />
ascending auction can be made more robust by <strong>for</strong>cing bidders to bid in round<br />
numbers or aggregating lots into larger bundles. The number of bidders left in<br />
the auction can be kept secret and bidders can even be paid to enter the auction<br />
to address problems of collusion and insufficient entry.<br />
The use of a reserve price can also affect the risk of collusion. Thomas (2001)<br />
shows the strategic choice of a reserve price can dramatically reduce the range<br />
of discount factors over which collusion is sustainable. 195 The option to selfsupply<br />
is an alternative to setting a reserve price, suggesting that a valuable tool<br />
<strong>for</strong> reducing the scope <strong>for</strong> collusion in procurement is the threat of self-supply.<br />
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
When drawing up a contract <strong>for</strong> supply, it can be difficult to have a contract that<br />
specifies what will happen in every possible contingency, either because not all<br />
contingencies can be <strong>for</strong>eseen, or because the costs of doing so are too high. In<br />
economics terms, this means that the contract is ‘incomplete’.<br />
In the context of public procurement, there are two areas in particular where<br />
incomplete contracts can lead to problems – these are in ensuring quality and<br />
problems caused by incumbency advantages. The latter issue has been<br />
194 Cramton, P. and Schwartz, J. 2000. Collusive bidding: lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions. Journal of<br />
regulatory economics 17.<br />
Klemperer, P. 2002. What really matters in auction design. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(1)<br />
195 Thomas, C. 2001. Collusion and optimal reserve prices in repeated procurement auctions. Working paper no.242,<br />
Federal Trade Commission<br />
177
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
considered in the section on market power above. In this section we consider the<br />
issues that arise from the inability to adequately specify quality.<br />
Quality is a frequent problem in incomplete contracts as it can be difficult to<br />
measure and monitor quality in all its dimensions. For example, although some<br />
aspects of quality may be specified, such as the minimum number of customers<br />
to be treated, other aspects, such as how much attention is spent on each<br />
customer, may be more difficult to codify. Some goods, known as credence<br />
goods, have the characteristic that customers are unable to assess the level of<br />
quality they received, even after they have consumed the good. This is a<br />
problem arising from asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation and further complicates the<br />
monitoring of quality. An inability to contract <strong>for</strong> and monitor quality can raise<br />
potential problems in situations where there is a trade-off between improving or<br />
maintaining quality and reducing cost.<br />
If contracts could be completely specified, motivating private contractors and<br />
public employees would amount to the same principal-agent problem and there<br />
would be nothing to distinguish private from public sector provision. All relevant<br />
measures of per<strong>for</strong>mance could be specified under the contracts. Under<br />
incomplete contracts, however, the incentives of public and private sector<br />
providers may differ. Where some elements of quality are specified in a contract,<br />
but others are not, then this can lead to an over-concentration on those that are<br />
specified. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) argue that when an agent is required<br />
to per<strong>for</strong>m a variety of tasks, he will allocate ef<strong>for</strong>t to the most easily measurable<br />
task, often leading to an increase in productivity at the expense of quality. 196<br />
Grossman and Hart (1994) show that, in a world of incomplete contracts, a<br />
private provider has stronger incentives to engage in cost reduction than a<br />
government employee. 197 The private provider has stronger incentives because<br />
it obtains the surplus profits under the contract. However, the incentive to reduce<br />
costs will typically be too strong as it will ignore the adverse effect on noncontractible<br />
quality, with the result that costs are always lower under private<br />
ownership but quality may be either higher or lower. Quality tends to improve if<br />
there is strong competition <strong>for</strong> contract renewal, at which point, noncontractable<br />
quality may also be observed, or if higher quality can lead to a<br />
higher price <strong>for</strong> work.<br />
Grossman and Hart note that the public manager may have lower incentives to<br />
innovate due to his inability to appropriate full gains from innovations. The<br />
public sector employee can command the same share of rents as a private<br />
manager only if he is totally irreplaceable. Assuming he is not, he will have<br />
correspondingly lower incentives to invest in either quality-enhancing or costreducing<br />
technologies.<br />
196 Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1991) ‘Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership<br />
and Job Design.’ Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 7.<br />
197 Grossman, S. and Hart, O..(1986) ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral<br />
Integration,’ Journal of Political Economy 94<br />
178
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
Both outcomes are obviously inefficient. Which arrangement is superior<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e depends on which distortion is less damaging: too much cost<br />
reduction and too little quality improvement, or too little cost reduction and<br />
quality innovation. Private ownership will be superior when:<br />
a. the deterioration in quality resulting from cost reductions is small; and/or<br />
b. the opportunity <strong>for</strong> cost reductions is large and government employees have<br />
weak incentives.<br />
<strong>Public</strong>-sector provision will be superior when the adverse effect of cost reduction<br />
on quality is large and either quality enhancements are unimportant or<br />
government employees have strong incentives.<br />
Hart et al (1997) apply these findings to a study of private prisons in the United<br />
States. 198 They note concerns that have been raised regarding inmate quality of<br />
life and incidence of prison violence in private prisons. Donahue (1988) found<br />
that private prisons were 10 per cent cheaper per prisoner because public sector<br />
guards were paid a 15 per cent premium. This could have been due to public<br />
sector union activity or because private prisons hired lower quality staff. Hart et<br />
al conclude that incompleteness in prison contracts has led to quality<br />
shortcomings, and cite the example of Esmore in New Jersey where attempts by<br />
the private contractor to cut costs by employing inadequately qualified prison<br />
guards led to a riot in 1995 at the Elizabeth detention centre and the subsequent<br />
termination of the contract. Because the welfare consequences of quality<br />
deterioration are similar to the cost difference, and opportunities <strong>for</strong> quality<br />
innovation limited, Hart et al conclude that prison services should be retained<br />
under public ownership. They do qualify this conclusion however: if there were<br />
a means of introducing competition between providers, then contracting out<br />
may become more attractive. For example, competition between schools is<br />
associated with a higher quality of education (Hoxby, 1994). 199 They note that<br />
some markets are more naturally suited to competition than others. Where there<br />
is limited ability to assess quality, <strong>for</strong> example, in health care, competition is<br />
likely to be restricted even with a large number of suppliers and contracting-out<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e less attractive.<br />
Moreover, other studies have found that competitive tendering tends to maintain<br />
or even improve quality of service. Domberger et al. (1995) examine whether<br />
price reductions observed from outsourcing cleaning contracts resulted from<br />
reductions in quality. 200 They examine data on 61 cleaning services contracts.<br />
They look at contracts awarded through competitively tendered processes and<br />
those not put out to tender, and also distinguish between tenders that are<br />
contracted out and those that are awarded to the in-house team. The authors<br />
198 Hart, Shleifer and Vishny. 1997. The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons.<br />
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112.<br />
199 Hoxby. 1994. Does competition among public schools benefit students and taxpayers? NBER working paper<br />
number 4979.<br />
200 Domberger, S., C. Hall and E. Ah Lik Li. 1995. Price and quality in competitively tendered contracts. Economic<br />
Journal 105.<br />
179
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
observe that whilst competition does reduce the price of these contracts, quality<br />
is maintained or even enhanced. They there<strong>for</strong>e conclude that the effect of<br />
competition is greater on price than quality and the influence of ownership<br />
negligible on both.<br />
Ways to reduce the quality incomplete contracts problem<br />
The single best way to minimise the problems posed by incomplete contracts is<br />
to ensure that the initial contract is as ‘complete’ as possible, and to ensure that<br />
the resulting contract can be effectively monitored and en<strong>for</strong>ced. In some of the<br />
cases reviewed in the literature, where private firms have reduced quality, the<br />
problem has been one of lack of monitoring and en<strong>for</strong>cement of contract<br />
provisions rather than incompleteness per se. Domberger and Jensen (1997)<br />
note that one example of quality reduction, at the Esmore Correctional Services<br />
Corporation at Elizabeth detention centre in New Jersey, USA, which resulted in<br />
a riot in 1995, was actually a problem of contract en<strong>for</strong>cement. In that case the<br />
terms of the contract were broken as the prison guards lacked the necessary<br />
qualifications to per<strong>for</strong>m their role.<br />
Moreover, evidence suggests that monitoring is not particularly costly. The UK<br />
Audit Commission (1995) finds that contract monitoring costs amount to no<br />
more than a few percent of the contract price. 201 Although a number of studies<br />
have found evidence of such quality shading (reduced quality that meets<br />
contract requirements) (e.g. Cope, (1995) and Evatt Research Centre (1990)), 202<br />
this is generally considered preventable through the use of proper contract<br />
design (Domberger and Jensen, 1997) as long as appropriate monitoring and<br />
en<strong>for</strong>cement mechanisms are in place.<br />
However, even if all per<strong>for</strong>mance measures cannot be adequately specified, it<br />
may be possible to assess the overall quality of the service received when the<br />
contract comes up <strong>for</strong> renewal. If reducing quality adversely affects the possibility<br />
of a provider having the contract renewed, then this can provide a strong<br />
incentive to maintain quality, even when quality cannot be completely specified.<br />
Another means to prevent quality shading is by multi-sourcing, as this allows <strong>for</strong><br />
‘yardstick competition’ through the benchmarking of suppliers against one<br />
another. The threat of moving demand from poor to high per<strong>for</strong>ming suppliers<br />
deters suppliers from cutting quality during the life of the contract, and provides<br />
incentives to exceed contractual requirements. This effect <strong>for</strong>med the rationale<br />
behind the multi-sourcing approach adopted by the NHS <strong>for</strong> its National<br />
Programme <strong>for</strong> IT, which committed to selecting at least three different suppliers<br />
<strong>for</strong> its regional contracts and actually chose four.<br />
201 See Audit Commission (1995) Making markets: a review of the audits of the chief role <strong>for</strong> contracted services.<br />
March 1995, London, HMSO.<br />
202 Cope, S. 1995. Contracting-out in local government: cutting by privatising. <strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong> and Administration 10(3).<br />
Evatt Research Centre. 1990. Breach of Contract: Privatisation and the Management of the Australian Local<br />
Government. Pluto Press: Sydney.<br />
180
Incomplete contracts and optimal contract duration<br />
If a contract is incomplete, there is a greater chance renegotiation of terms will<br />
be necessary once certain contingencies have been realised. Posner (1972)<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e suggests that franchise contracts should be short so as to avoid<br />
problems arising from incomplete long-term contracts. Short-term contracts<br />
may reduce the risk of a contract failing by allowing <strong>for</strong> more frequent<br />
renegotiation, but may lead to problems of bidder parity when the contract is<br />
re-tendered. Ensuring bidder parity reduces incentives to invest (see Laffont and<br />
Tirole 1993, described earlier) but encouraging investment by biasing the tender<br />
towards the incumbent lessens competition.<br />
Short-term contracts are most likely to discourage investment where investment<br />
is specific and non-contractable, and the asset is long-lived. This is the classic<br />
‘hold-up’ problem. In the procurement context, the incumbent supplier may be<br />
concerned about exposure to opportunistic behaviour by the government if it<br />
undertakes an investment specific to that contract. The incumbent runs the risk<br />
of being replaced at the next re-procurement and then being unable to<br />
command an appropriate return on its investment from the new entrant. Without<br />
a commitment by the public sector to transfer assets at an appropriate rate, such<br />
investments may not be made.<br />
Williamson (1976), Schmalensee (1979) and Krugman (2002) argue that the gains<br />
from outsourcing may be reduced by another case of the ‘hold up’ problem, in<br />
which the advantaged incumbent exploits his power opportunistically to extract<br />
rent from the government.<br />
Affuso and Newbery (2002) look at the problem of contract length and specific<br />
investments in relation to the rolling stock operators of the privatised British<br />
railway. Here the choice of franchise length reflected the trade-off between<br />
periodic contestability <strong>for</strong> the market and the need to provide sufficient<br />
investment incentives. Although short-term demand and long-lived assets could<br />
have been expected to impact investment adversely, they do not find a simple<br />
relationship between contract length and investment. They find that<br />
discretionary investment is higher where contracts are shorter. An explanation<br />
<strong>for</strong> this finding could be that train operators facing sooner re-procurement<br />
respond with increased investment to signal their commitment to the regulator<br />
and thereby increase the probability of being re-awarded the franchise.<br />
Investment towards the end of a franchise also signals aggressive behaviour to<br />
potential entrants and increases their costs of entry.<br />
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
Problems of asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation arise when the in<strong>for</strong>mation available to the<br />
government issuing the tender differs from that of the provider of the service. Two<br />
examples of problems caused by asymmetric in<strong>for</strong>mation in the use of marketbased<br />
mechanisms are the ability to share risk optimally between parties and the<br />
winner’s curse effect in public procurement. These are addressed in turn below.<br />
181
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Risk-sharing<br />
When the government has less in<strong>for</strong>mation than the supplier, it may be <strong>for</strong>ced<br />
to trade-off risk allocation and per<strong>for</strong>mance incentives. Principal-agent theory<br />
tells us that the principal (the government) is often unable to distinguish<br />
between the effects of an agent’s (the service provider’s) ef<strong>for</strong>t and random<br />
events on output. Transferring the risk of an unfavourable outcome to the private<br />
sector requires that the private-sector firm be compensated <strong>for</strong> this burden,<br />
leading to higher procurement costs. However, if the government accepts the full<br />
burden of risk, the private sector provider may be faced with inappropriate<br />
incentives.<br />
Different <strong>for</strong>ms of contract strike a different balance in this trade-off. Fixed-price<br />
contracts provide strong incentives <strong>for</strong> productive efficiency, as an agent is<br />
rewarded <strong>for</strong> any cost-reducing ef<strong>for</strong>t he makes (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).<br />
However, they suffer from weak quality incentives as the agent can increase<br />
profit by reducing quality, particularly where quality is difficult to measure or<br />
observe (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991); Hart, Shleifer and Vishney (1997)). 203<br />
Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts offer weak incentives <strong>for</strong> productive efficiency, and<br />
may encourage ‘gold plating’ in which the supplier produces the highest<br />
possible quality as it is compensated <strong>for</strong> any ef<strong>for</strong>t it makes. Incentive contracts<br />
involve a fixed-fee component as well as a pre-determined fraction of costs<br />
incurred. For incentive contracts to achieve their desired outcomes, there must<br />
be both accountability and en<strong>for</strong>ceability (see Stiglitz, 2000).<br />
Winner’s curse<br />
Winner’s curse arises in common-value auctions, in which competing bidders<br />
have different in<strong>for</strong>mation about the value of the tender. The winner’s curse<br />
effect refers to the adverse selection problem that arises because the winner<br />
tends to be the bidder with the most optimistic valuation of the tender. As the<br />
probability of over-estimating the tender value increases with the number of<br />
competitors, bidders are aware of this and internalise the winner’s curse<br />
problem by bidding more cautiously. This leads to the perverse result that<br />
increasing the number of competitors can actually increase procurement costs.<br />
The more in<strong>for</strong>mation a bidder has, the smaller the chance of falling prey to<br />
winner’s curse and the more aggressively bidders will there<strong>for</strong>e bid. Choosing<br />
an auction design to maximise in<strong>for</strong>mation, such as the open auction, helps<br />
mitigate this problem as it reduces the probability that a bidder will have overestimated<br />
the value of the good. 204 However, it should be noted that increasing<br />
the availability of in<strong>for</strong>mation may substantially increase the costs of the<br />
tendering process.<br />
203 Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1991) ‘Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership<br />
and Job Design.’ Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 7.<br />
204 Salmon, T. 2004’Preventing Collusion’ Chapter 3 in Auctioning <strong>Public</strong> Assets: Analysis and Alternatives. Ed. M.<br />
Janssen. Cambridge University Press..<br />
182
Empirical evidence on winner’s curse<br />
Flambard et al (2004) analyse snow removal contracts tendered by the City of<br />
Montreal under an independent, private-value procurement auction model. 205<br />
They find a positive correlation between costs and bids, that rents increase with<br />
the variance of costs and that rents decrease with the number of bidders. Their<br />
findings suggest that rationalising tender requirements may permit economies<br />
of scale to be reaped and technological progress to be induced without too great<br />
a cost in terms of impact on competition.<br />
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that the winner’s curse exists,<br />
although the risk is mainly <strong>for</strong> the firms bidding, rather than <strong>for</strong> the government<br />
agency. However, where the winner’s curse effect is particularly strong, this can<br />
deter bidders and so can raise the total cost of procurement. Hong and Shum<br />
(2001) evaluate the effect of increased competition on equilibrium bidding in<br />
procurement auctions using data from the New Jersey transport department. 206<br />
They demonstrate that the response of procurement costs to increased<br />
competition depends on the relative magnitude of the competitive and winner’s<br />
curse effect, which in turn depend upon the relative importance of the private<br />
and common value elements of the bid. They observe that when the asymmetric<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation, and thus winner’s curse effect, is particularly severe, authorities<br />
may gain from allowing collusion amongst bidders. Discussions between<br />
competitors may give rise to in<strong>for</strong>mation pooling that prevents the winner’s<br />
curse from arising and thus leads to lower procurement costs.<br />
TRANSACTIONS COSTS<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
Theory and empirical evidence shows us that sometimes market-based<br />
mechanisms may be more costly to implement than the benefits they yield. The<br />
procurement process itself is often very costly, and design features to limit the<br />
extent of its potential pitfalls may increase these costs still further. For example,<br />
tendering contracts more frequently and splitting up requirements over multiple<br />
suppliers reduces incumbency advantages, but also implies greater tender costs.<br />
Specifying all aspects of service quality and monitoring and en<strong>for</strong>cing the<br />
resulting contract is similarly costly, as is increasing the availability of<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation to reduce the likelihood of a winner’s curse outcome. However,<br />
theory also provides some guidance about (a) how to minimise these costs and<br />
(b) when a market-based mechanism is likely to be most appropriate given the<br />
identified costs and benefits.<br />
As Domberger and Jensen (1997) note, the costs of contracting can limit the<br />
practical application of procurement. Williamson (1979) shows that the cost of<br />
transacting in the marketplace can be large enough to offset the benefits, in<br />
which case in-house production would be optimal. Whilst this theory was<br />
205 Flambard, V., Lasserre, P., Mohnen, P. 2004. Snow removal auctions in Montreal: costs, in<strong>for</strong>mational rents, and<br />
procurement management.<br />
206 Hong, H. and M. Shum. Increasing competition and the winner’s curse: evidence from procurement. 2001.<br />
183
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
developed in the context of the boundaries of the firm, it is clearly relevant to the<br />
contracting out of public services. The existence of transaction costs in<br />
specifying contracts puts a natural limit on the size of the firm: surely they must<br />
also limit the extent to which government can optimally organise activities in the<br />
market? In the context of public sector procurement, these costs could include<br />
the writing of specifications and contracts, the evaluation of tenders and the<br />
negotiation of the final contract with the winning bidder.<br />
It is not necessarily easier to design incentive schemes in the private sector than<br />
it is in the public sector. In Laffont and Tirole (1993), problems of incentive<br />
scheme design in the public sector arise from the different objectives associated<br />
with social welfare maximisation, many of which are unmeasurable. This<br />
problem can lead to lower than optimal levels of investment in their model.<br />
Privatisation, however, brings incentive contract problems of its own arising<br />
from the fact that the regulator and the shareholders have different interests<br />
they wish to motivate the manager to achieve. Managers of privatised firms<br />
must balance the interests of these two principals, which may be conflicting and<br />
thus lead to a less efficient outcome than if a single objective had been pursued.<br />
User choice<br />
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS<br />
The number of places that can be offered restricts user choice in public services.<br />
For example, not all children can go to the same school, or not all patients can<br />
be treated in the same hospital. If choice leads to an excess of demand over<br />
supply at a given establishment, some kind of rationing mechanism will be<br />
required. This rationing may be at the discretion of the service provider or<br />
regulated by the state and could take a variety of <strong>for</strong>ms. 207<br />
Organisation of rationing by the service provider can result in some negative<br />
consequences. For example, the service provider may use the rationing system<br />
as a selection system to improve their per<strong>for</strong>mance in comparison tables. For<br />
example, schools allowed to design their own rationing mechanism may<br />
practice cream-skimming or other <strong>for</strong>ms of discrimination. Cream skimming<br />
involves selecting the most able students to improve measured outcomes rather<br />
than focusing on improving actual service quality.<br />
However, it is not clear how strong the impact of this problem is in practice. In the<br />
UK, some choice in schools was introduced in 1988. Bradley and Taylor (2002)<br />
find that since 1992 schools with better exam results have seen a reduction in the<br />
proportion of low-income students enrolling, whereas schools with poor exam<br />
per<strong>for</strong>mance have seen an increase. 208 However, they note that the estimated<br />
impact is very small, suggesting little segregation has actually occurred.<br />
207 For example the school could run a lottery <strong>for</strong> places, operate a ‘first-come-first-served’ policy, or allocate places<br />
according to specified student characteristics.<br />
208 Bradley, S. and Taylor, J. (2002) ‘The Report Card on Competition in Schools’ Adam Smith Institute.<br />
184
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
In New Zealand, 1991 re<strong>for</strong>ms allowed schools to exercise their own oversubscription<br />
schemes and thus choose their own students. Research suggests<br />
that schools did use this discretion to improve measured outcomes by cream<br />
skimming. Fiske and Ladd (2000) find that segregation between schools<br />
increased as a result at a faster rate than segregation between the pre-1991<br />
catchments areas. 209 They also find higher levels of segregation by occupational<br />
status and unemployment in the post-re<strong>for</strong>m period, and an increase in the<br />
proportion of minority groups in the most deprived schools.<br />
However, in the US, the evidence in fact suggests the opposite. The balance of<br />
evidence suggests it is the underper<strong>for</strong>mers and the minorities who are most<br />
likely to exercise their choice, and so if anything that reverse cream skimming<br />
occurs. Hoxby (2003) looks at all US charter schools in 2000-2001 and finds that<br />
they attracted disproportionate numbers of black, Hispanic and poor students<br />
away from state schools under a voucher scheme which allows greater school<br />
choice. Similarly, Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain (2002) look at the per<strong>for</strong>mance of<br />
future charter school students whilst still in regular state schools in Texas, and<br />
find that they per<strong>for</strong>m worse than those who continue their education at the<br />
state schools.<br />
Cream skimming and discrimination can be limited through appropriate scheme<br />
design. As incentives to cream skim will be strongest if suppliers are rewarded<br />
<strong>for</strong> good outcomes alone, good design implies rewarding suppliers on a valueadded<br />
basis, or at least limiting the rewards to good outcomes alone. In<br />
healthcare services in the UK cream skimming was avoided through the<br />
introduction of the stop-loss insurance scheme, which provided that health<br />
authorities would reimburse fund-holding GPs <strong>for</strong> patients with higher than<br />
threshold costs and also limited the personal financial exposure of GPs. In<br />
education in the UK avoiding cream skimming has been more difficult to<br />
achieve, particularly because the main per<strong>for</strong>mance indicator used by parents<br />
choosing between schools is per<strong>for</strong>mance in exam league tables. 210 An LGA<br />
study on choice notes that there is only a limited range of actions that can be<br />
taken to reverse the polarising effects of cream skimming, and all of these rely<br />
on the local education authority enlisting the voluntary participation of schools.<br />
In other countries, voucher differentials have been used to increase the financial<br />
attractiveness of admitting pupils from more disadvantaged areas. As<br />
documented above, this has sometimes been sufficient to encourage reverse<br />
cream skimming – it is difficult to set the differential at a level which avoids<br />
problems in either direction.<br />
Even if appropriate design prevents cream-skimming and other <strong>for</strong>ms of<br />
discrimination, capacity constraints may still have adverse consequences. In the<br />
short term at least, capacity is constrained by the size of the school or other<br />
service provider. If successful schools are unable to expand capacity in the long<br />
run, this will have two effects. First, parents will face constrained choice if they<br />
209 Fiske and Ladd (2000) When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale.<br />
210 See Bradley, S. and J. Taylor (2002) ‘The Report Card on Competition in Schools’ Adam Smith Institute.<br />
185
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
are unable to send their children to their most-preferred schools. Second,<br />
competition will be limited between schools because the most successful will<br />
cease to be a competitive threat to others once they reach capacity. However,<br />
this effect is mitigated as over time the most popular service providers seek to<br />
expand capacity. Bradley and Taylor (2002) look at data on all secondary schools<br />
in England during 1992-2000 and estimate that excess demand <strong>for</strong> places of 10<br />
per cent is associated with a subsequent increase in physical capacity of 3 per<br />
cent, suggesting capacity constraints are not binding in the longer run. 211<br />
INEQUALITY<br />
Inequalities could widen if the more advantaged in society are better able to<br />
access the required in<strong>for</strong>mation and thus better equipped to exercise their right<br />
to choose. In the case of education, students from more advantaged<br />
backgrounds are also more likely to be able to meet the increased transport<br />
costs that may be associated with choice. Segregation between groups could<br />
also increase both indirectly through the widening of inequality or as a direct<br />
result of the exercise of choice. For example, parents from similar backgrounds<br />
may choose to send their children to the same school.<br />
There is some evidence in the educational choice literature to suggest that the<br />
better off are better at exercising choice and also that choice has led to more<br />
segregation. In Sweden, Bjorklund et al (2004) find that parents who attended<br />
university are 4.5 per cent more likely to send their children to an independent<br />
school, implying increased segregation by parental education level. 212 In their<br />
study of the New Zealand school re<strong>for</strong>ms, Lauder et al (1999) found that parents<br />
choosing non-local schools tended to be more affluent than those who did not<br />
and were more likely to be from the white majority. 213<br />
However, these problems are often worse without choice. In the context of<br />
school choice, Osborne and Gaebler note that not permitting choice amongst<br />
state school providers restricts the exercise of choice to those able to af<strong>for</strong>d<br />
private schools: introducing choice <strong>for</strong> all parents necessarily increases equality<br />
of opportunity in this sense. 214<br />
The potential <strong>for</strong> problems of inequality means that limits are normally placed<br />
on the criteria that service providers can use. For example, if an increase in<br />
inequality following school choice is a concern, limits can be placed on schools<br />
use of certain critreria when rationing places. Places could be allocated on a firstcome-first-served<br />
basis or on the basis of distance <strong>for</strong> instance.<br />
211 Bradley and Taylor. (2002) ‘The Report Card on Competition in Schools’ Adam Smith Institute.<br />
212 Bjorklund, Edin, Frederiksson and Kreuger (2004) ‘The <strong>Market</strong> Comes to Education in Sweden: An Evaluation of<br />
Sweden’s Surprising School Re<strong>for</strong>ms’ SNS Welfare <strong>Policy</strong> Group.<br />
213 Lauder, Hughes, Watson, Waslander, Thrupp, Strathdee, Simiyu, Dupis, McGlinn and Hamlin (1999). Trading in<br />
Futures: Why <strong>Market</strong>s In Education Don’t Work. Open University Press.<br />
214 Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992) Reinventing Government Addison-Wesley.<br />
186
INCENTIVES<br />
Where citizens can exercise choice regarding how much of a publicly-provided<br />
good or service they consume, care must be taken to ensure that this does not<br />
create an incentive to over-consume. For example, choice between providers in<br />
the French health care system may be associated with its ranking as number one<br />
in the World Health Organisation’s assessment of world health care systems, but<br />
also with its high expenditure per capita on health. The fact that the French<br />
consume three times as many antibiotics as the Germans and twice as many<br />
anti-cholesterol drugs as the British, <strong>for</strong> example, suggest that the French<br />
system may encourage over-consumption of health services. 215<br />
INFORMATION ISSUES<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
As noted previously, consumers must be able and willing to gather and process<br />
sufficient in<strong>for</strong>mation if they are to make rational choices. In<strong>for</strong>mation issues can<br />
lead to high costs of providing enough in<strong>for</strong>mation and support, and greater<br />
inequality if in<strong>for</strong>mation is more readily accessible to some groups of society<br />
than others.<br />
In<strong>for</strong>mation issues are of particular significance <strong>for</strong> experience and credence<br />
goods, which both require decisions be made with no ex ante knowledge of<br />
quality. In credence goods, the consumer cannot even learn from previous<br />
experience because he does not know whether he received an appropriate<br />
quality of service, even after consumption has taken place. In other words, he<br />
must trust the in<strong>for</strong>mation he is given to make his decision.<br />
The costs of providing in<strong>for</strong>mation and support in choice-based lettings have<br />
been significant, with pilots reporting advertising costs as the main component<br />
of scheme operating costs. However, this approach seems to have been effective<br />
in encouraging participation and limiting inequality. In education, consumer<br />
feedback suggests the majority of participants feel they are provided with the<br />
right in<strong>for</strong>mation to make their decisions. For example, a study conducted <strong>for</strong><br />
the DfEE found that 87 per cent of parents interviewed were satisfied they had<br />
the in<strong>for</strong>mation they needed to help them choose a school. 216<br />
The impact of in<strong>for</strong>mation issues when introducing user choice to credence<br />
goods are most clearly seen in the case of healthcare services. For example,<br />
patients may exercise choice in the NHS by selecting their GP and the hospital<br />
they attend in some cases. 217 Research shows patients are unlikely to switch GPs<br />
or travel beyond their local hospital, even if they are dissatisfied with the<br />
service. 218 Although this will at least partially reflect travel costs, it also points to<br />
215 Aldridge, S. (2004). Presentation at the Social <strong>Market</strong> Foundation Seminar on Choice.<br />
216 Quoted on p.15 of LGA (2004) Enabling Choice: Research on Choice in <strong>Public</strong> Services.<br />
217 These include choice of GP and choice of hospital consultant <strong>for</strong> all patients, and choice of hospital only <strong>for</strong><br />
patients who have been kept waiting <strong>for</strong> longer than the target <strong>for</strong> elective surgery.<br />
218 See p.23 andp.27, LGA (2004) Enabling Choice: Research on Choice in <strong>Public</strong> Services.<br />
187
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
potential in<strong>for</strong>mation issues. Research finds that patients are unsure of the value<br />
of per<strong>for</strong>mance measures and hospital rankings, leading researchers to<br />
conclude that patients need educating in order to interpret per<strong>for</strong>mance data<br />
properly. 219 The LGA study also notes that some data crucial to consumer choice,<br />
such as the atmosphere and cleanliness of the hospital or GP surgery, is unlikely<br />
to be collected in a way that allows <strong>for</strong> comparison.<br />
<strong>Market</strong>able permits (‘Cap and Trade’)<br />
THE INITIAL ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS<br />
One of the main issues in a marketable-permits scheme is to determine the initial<br />
allocation of permits. A trading scheme can have important distributional<br />
consequences depending on how permits <strong>for</strong> a trading scheme are allocated.<br />
There are two main approaches to the distribution of emission allowances.<br />
These are:<br />
● the auctioning of permits; and<br />
● the allocation of permits to existing polluters, based on their historic levels of<br />
pollution.<br />
Auctions are likely to be superior to the allocation of permits without charge, in<br />
terms of economic efficiency. 220 However, we find that in most schemes permits<br />
are allocated based on historic data or targeted emissions. 221<br />
Auctioned permits mean that polluters have to pay <strong>for</strong> the initial right to pollute.<br />
This approach is likely to result in higher costs <strong>for</strong> firms than under a scheme<br />
where they are given an initial allocation that they can then trade amongst<br />
themselves. The higher cost of this approach means that the initial effect on<br />
reducing pollution is likely to be higher. The resulting additional costs <strong>for</strong><br />
participants can in principle be ameliorated by using the resulting revenues to<br />
reduce taxes, which can have the added benefit of reducing more distortionary<br />
taxes, such as taxes on incomes.<br />
If permits are allocated based on existing, or targeted, levels of emissions then,<br />
because firms do not pay <strong>for</strong> their initial permits, the initial cost to firms is likely<br />
to be lower. The initial reduction of pollution may be less than under a system<br />
of auctioning. However, at the margin, the incentives to reduce pollution should<br />
still be strong, since firms still face an opportunity cost from pollution: the value<br />
that could be realised by selling their permits. 222<br />
219 See, <strong>for</strong> example, Magee, H., Davis, L-J and Coulter, A. (2003) ‘<strong>Public</strong> views on healthcare per<strong>for</strong>mance indicators<br />
and patient choice’, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 96, 7, pp.338-342.<br />
220 See Fullerton, D. and G. Metcalf (1997) ‘Environmental controls, Scarcity rents, and Pre-existing distortions’,<br />
NBER Working paper 6091. Goulder, L., I. Parry and D. Burtraw (1997), ‘ Revenue raising vs. Other <strong>Approaches</strong> to<br />
Environmental Protection: The Critical significance of Pre-existing price distortions’ Rand Journal of Economics,<br />
221 See Stavins (2001) and UK ETS at http://www.Defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/uk/<br />
222 See HM Treasury (2002)<br />
188
LOCATION PROBLEMS<br />
Emissions trading typically takes place on a national or multinational basis. Each<br />
country or block is assigned a cap on how much pollution they can emit. This<br />
pollution target is based on an appropriate aggregate level. However, there may<br />
be localised problems of pollution if, even though the overall cap is met, all<br />
polluters locate in a particular geographic area. This may be a problem with<br />
some pollutants, such as emissions into rivers, which can cause local problems.<br />
This can be resolved, using regional caps.<br />
WILL A WELL-FUNCTIONING MARKET DEVELOP?<br />
Another consideration is whether the existence of a well-functioning market is<br />
likely to emerge, since in its absence very low trading would occur and thus the<br />
economic efficiencies associated with such a scheme are unlikely to be<br />
delivered. A well functioning market may require that various associated<br />
services are in place. These might include some <strong>for</strong>m of organised exchange<br />
where permits can be traded. An organised exchange would normally involve<br />
brokers acting as agents <strong>for</strong> participants, providing them with access to the<br />
exchange, and the dissemination of in<strong>for</strong>mation on prices so that participants<br />
can take in<strong>for</strong>med decisions on whether to hold or sell their permits. Price<br />
transparency is important in signalling the cost of pollution to participants who<br />
can then use this in<strong>for</strong>mation to take decisions on whether to reduce emissions<br />
or buy permits.<br />
To function well, the market in permits needs to be liquid, which means that it<br />
must be possible <strong>for</strong> participants to buy and sell permits relatively quickly<br />
without creating a significant impact on the market price. The market is likely to<br />
be more liquid the larger the number of potential participants trading permits.<br />
This can be achieved by allowing permits in different pollutants to be converted<br />
into the same ‘currency’ and traded on the same market. For example, the UK<br />
emissions trading scheme allows participants to convert permits between<br />
different types of greenhouse gas emissions at pre-specified values that<br />
represent their relative impact on climate change.<br />
MARKET POWER IN EMISSIONS TRADING<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
There are two types of market power that are usually identified in relation to<br />
emissions trading: 223<br />
● ‘exclusionary manipulation’, in which a firm holding a significant share of<br />
total tradable permits decides to hoard them in order to exclude other firms<br />
from its product market, which results in a distortion in competition <strong>for</strong> that<br />
product market; 224 or<br />
223 See Burniaux, J.-M(1999) ‘How important is market power in achieving Kyoto? An assessment based on the<br />
GREEN model’ OECD paper. Economics Directorate, OECD, Paris.<br />
224 See also Baron R (2000) ‘<strong>Market</strong> Power and <strong>Market</strong> Access in International GHG Emissions Trading’ Environment<br />
Directorate and International Energy Agency, OECD, Paris.<br />
189
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
● ‘cost-minimising’ (profit maximising) manipulations, which implies the ability<br />
to influence the transaction price of traded permits. A monopolistic seller sets<br />
the price at the level which maximises the difference between revenues from<br />
permits sales and its abatement costs. Similarly a monopolistic buyer<br />
manipulates the price in order to minimise the sum of expenditures from<br />
permits purchases and its abatement costs.<br />
In most cases, exclusionary manipulation is not a feasible strategy. In most<br />
markets <strong>for</strong> emissions trading, participants come from a very wide range of<br />
economic activities. This means that a new entrant into a given sector can obtain<br />
tradable permits from firms outside its own sector, which have no incentives to<br />
withhold the permits from the new entrant. 225 In practice there<strong>for</strong>e, an<br />
exclusionary manipulation strategy will be difficult to pursue. 226<br />
However, the cost-minimising manipulation strategy could arise if either<br />
dominant buyers or dominant sellers could exercise their market power and thus<br />
alter prices. For instance, a dominant seller may set a high price and sell fewer<br />
permits than under competitive conditions. 227 In such a case emissions trading<br />
will not deliver the economic efficiencies expected, since the permit price would<br />
reflect market power and not the cost of pollution abatement. Firms would<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e be induced to undertake emission reduction strategies that are not cost<br />
effective. Hahn (1984) and Weskog (1996) predict that a dominant seller, or a<br />
coalition of them, would withhold supply from the market, resulting in smaller<br />
aggregate cost savings than if the market had been competitive. 228<br />
However, Carlén (2003) in an experimental analysis focusing on the end of the<br />
emissions trading period, shows that in a dual auction market, where a<br />
dominant trader faces an opposite side of the market that is fairly competitive,<br />
the presence of a dominant trader does not affect market efficiency. 229<br />
A possible way to prevent the exercise of market power is to extend the size of<br />
the trading market. The greater the trading market, the lower the problems of<br />
concentration. This can be achieved by extending trading on an international<br />
basis, perhaps with aggregate caps at an industry level. 230 Burniaux (1999) and<br />
Bader (1996), following Hahn (1984), find that international-level trading would<br />
greatly minimise the risk of market power. 231<br />
225 See Baron (2000)<br />
226 Westkog (1996) shows that an exclusionary manipulation may be unlikely even in the case that governments and<br />
not firms where the main traders, since conflicting interests by different firms within a country would make<br />
difficult <strong>for</strong> countries to arrive to an effective exclusionary manipulation. Westkog H. (1996) ‘ <strong>Market</strong> Power in a<br />
System of Tradable CO Quotas’. The Energy Journal, Vol. 17, No 3.<br />
2<br />
227 In the same way a monopsonistic firm may set the permit price lower compared with the competitive scenario<br />
and abate too much (buy too few permits) relative to the competitive case.<br />
228 Hahn R.W.(1984), ‘ <strong>Market</strong> Power and Transferable Property Rights’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 99, pp 753-65.<br />
229 Carlén B, ‘ <strong>Market</strong> Power in International Carbon Emissions Trading: A Laboratory Test. Global Change, MIT<br />
Report No. 96, January 2003.<br />
230 ABARE (1995) Global Climate Change: Economic Dimension of a Cooperative International <strong>Policy</strong> Response<br />
beyond 2000, ABARE, Canberra.<br />
231 Bader P. (1996): Emissions trading; country-model vs. industry-model’. Chair of Economics, University of<br />
Augsburg, Germany.<br />
190
Taxes and subsidies<br />
MARKET FAILURES<br />
Buchanan (1969) shows that introducing a Pigouvian tax on a monopolist could<br />
reduce social welfare rather than improve it, even if it led to a reduction in<br />
pollution. 232 In the absence of an externality, monopolists restrict output to below<br />
socially optimal levels already. Taxing emissions would lead to further<br />
restrictions in output, and so could lead to welfare losses. However, this problem<br />
may be overstated as others have found that the welfare effects of output<br />
restrictions are likely to be less than the gains from reducing emissions even in<br />
the absence of perfect competition. 233<br />
Lee (1975) and Barnett (1980) suggest a unit tax on emissions at a lower level<br />
than the unit tax <strong>for</strong> a perfectly competitive polluter to account <strong>for</strong> the output<br />
effect of the tax. The more price elastic the demand, the closer this second best<br />
tax will be to the perfectly competitive tax. This results occurs because, where<br />
demand is more elastic, distortions are reduced and the resulting output loss will<br />
be lower.<br />
MEASURING EMISSIONS<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
If emissions cannot be measured directly, the alternative may involve taxing an<br />
input or output closely related to pollutant emissions. 234 As a second best<br />
solution, this approach suffers a number of drawbacks. Because input taxes do<br />
not target emissions directly they may not provide the right incentives to reduce<br />
pollution using the most cost-effective method. For example, if firms do not have<br />
access to suitable less-polluting substitute inputs, the tax will only lead to higher<br />
producer costs with no discernible environmental impact. Even if a suitable<br />
input is available, an input tax suffers the drawback that it does not encourage<br />
investment in pollution abatement technology and so will not act as a stimulus<br />
to pollution-reducing innovation. 235 Furthermore, it may be difficult to distinguish<br />
between those usages of an input that contribute to pollution and those that do<br />
not. As an input tax would apply equally to all uses, this would result in suboptimal<br />
production of the non-polluting good. Input and output taxes may also<br />
lead to the standard problems of second-best taxation policy, in which an<br />
attempt to use a tax to correct an externality pushes the market even further<br />
away from its optimum because of additional distortions in the market being<br />
232 Buchanan, J. (1969). ‘External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and <strong>Market</strong> Structure,’ American Economic<br />
Review 59(1).<br />
233 Oates, W. and N. Strassman, (1984), ‘Effluent Fees and <strong>Market</strong> Structure’, Journal of <strong>Public</strong> Economics 24(1).<br />
Asch, P. J. Seneca, (1976), Monopoly and External Cost: An Application of Second Best Theory to the Automobile<br />
Industry,’ Journal of Environmental Economic Management 3(2).<br />
234 For papers on the use of input taxes <strong>for</strong> non-point pollution control see Griffin, R and D. Bromley (1982)<br />
‘Agricultural Runoff as a Non-point Externality: A Theoretical Development’, American Journal of Agricultural<br />
Economics and Shortle,J. and J. Dunn (1986) ‘The Relative Efficiency of Agricultural Source Water Pollution<br />
Control Policies’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68.<br />
235 See Blackman, A. 1999. ‘In<strong>for</strong>mal Sector Pollution Control: What <strong>Policy</strong> Options Do We Have?’ Discussion Paper<br />
00-02-REV, Resources <strong>for</strong> the Future<br />
191
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
taxed. <strong>Market</strong> failures could arise in these markets if the input were already<br />
subject to some <strong>for</strong>m of price distortion or if the output market were supplied by<br />
a monopolist, <strong>for</strong> example. These problems can be minimised through<br />
appropriate tax design, in particular, by taxing the input or output most strongly<br />
correlated with pollutant levels and by taking account of other market<br />
imperfections when setting the tax rate.<br />
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF TAX<br />
The appropriate level of unit tax is the level which will lead to the optimal level<br />
of pollution. This requires knowledge of incremental costs and benefits of<br />
pollution damages over a substantial range, a feat that is likely to be difficult to<br />
achieve in practice. Estimating benefits of pollution reduction is particularly<br />
problematic. As Baumol and Brad<strong>for</strong>d (1972) demonstrate, the nature of<br />
negative externalities mean that there is unlikely to be a single appropriate level<br />
of tax that would result in an equilibrium output level. In that case, it may be<br />
better to control the quantity of the negative externality, through permits, and<br />
letting the market determine the appropriate level of the tax.<br />
Political interference/inappropriate use of tax<br />
Although the purpose of the tax may be to control pollution, governments may<br />
be tempted to use the tax as a revenue-raising device. This may lead to the tax<br />
being set at a higher level than is optimal. Such inappropriate use could also<br />
undermine support <strong>for</strong> the real objective of correcting <strong>for</strong> the negative<br />
externality.<br />
Growth and inflation<br />
A nominal tax designed to induce optimal emissions at one point in time will fail<br />
to do so in the future in the presence of growth and rising prices. This requires<br />
continual upward revision of the tax by the government, which is likely to be<br />
both costly and politically unpopular. Tradable permits on the other hand<br />
automatically accommodate these features of a dynamic economy. 236<br />
Location<br />
The effect of emissions on the environment and thus the optimal level of<br />
emissions is likely to vary across different locations, suggesting a differential<br />
unit tax that is unlikely to receive political support. However, imposing a uni<strong>for</strong>m<br />
tax may lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 237<br />
236 Cropper, M. and W. Oates. (1992) ‘Environmental Economics: A Survey’, Journal of Economic Literature 30(2).<br />
237 Cropper, M. and W. Oates. (1992) ‘Environmental Economics: A Survey’, Journal of Economic Literature 30(2)..<br />
192
SUBSIDIES<br />
In some cases, instead of taxing pollution, governments have introduced<br />
subsidies <strong>for</strong> pollution abatement. This can include subsidies <strong>for</strong> using lowemissions<br />
technology. However, the long-term effects of such subsidies have<br />
been poor. In some cases, the subsidy may induce so much entry that in the long<br />
run there is an increase the total amount of pollutant emitted. 238 For this reason,<br />
taxes on the emission of pollution are often preferable to subsidies <strong>for</strong> lowpollution<br />
technology.<br />
Opening access to natural monopolies<br />
UNDUE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION<br />
As we noted in Part III, regulated access is only likely to be appropriate in a very<br />
limited number of cases. In practice, the majority of cases of regulated access<br />
have been in previously nationalised monopolies. There are good reasons <strong>for</strong><br />
this. The provision of access at a regulated price necessarily involves an<br />
appropriation by government of some of the assets of a private firm. If the firm<br />
has acquired these assets through legitimate investment in the market, then the<br />
use of regulated access can deter investment. Any short-term benefit in terms of<br />
price, will likely be more than out-weighed by the long-term effects on firms’<br />
incentives <strong>for</strong> investment.<br />
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION<br />
If regulated access is, however, deemed appropriate, then it should be granted<br />
at an appropriate level. This will normally be at a level that bears some relation<br />
to cost. In setting this level, the regulator is at a disadvantage compared with the<br />
regulated firm. The regulated firm will have more in<strong>for</strong>mation about its own<br />
costs than an external regulator possess. Moreover, it faces an obvious incentive<br />
to have the access charge as high as possible. The result can be an incentive <strong>for</strong><br />
the regulated firm to inflate its costs, with the consequence of an inefficiently<br />
high access charge. Moreover, even if a correct access charge were set, the<br />
process <strong>for</strong> acquiring and analysing the necessary in<strong>for</strong>mation can be costly.<br />
COST OF REGULATION<br />
Section 12 – Issues in the implementation of market mechanisms<br />
In the case of natural monopoly, the efficiency losses from allowing one private<br />
firm to supply the market and extract monopoly rent may be less than the cost<br />
of regulation. This is suggested by Harberger’s empirical estimates of the cost of<br />
monopoly in the US, which suggests the deadweight loss from monopoly is of<br />
a relatively small magnitude.<br />
238 Baumol, W. and W. Oates, (1988), The Theory of Environmental <strong>Policy</strong>, Second Edition, Cambridge, England:<br />
Cambridge University Press.<br />
Kohn, R. (1985) ‘A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Optimal Number of Firms in a Polluting Industry,’<br />
Canadian Journal of Economics 18(2).<br />
193
<strong>Public</strong> <strong>Policy</strong>: <strong>Using</strong> <strong>Market</strong>-<strong>Based</strong> <strong>Approaches</strong><br />
Littlechild (2003) notes that there are costs and benefits to both regulation and<br />
competition in network industries. For example, Littlechild makes reference to<br />
the transactions costs of competition, including the costs to customers of<br />
understanding the differing and more rapidly changing prices and of choosing<br />
between the ever-changing options available, and the difficulties and time taken<br />
to contact the relevant companies and deal with problems when they arise. This<br />
must be balanced against the benefits that deregulation and restructuring can<br />
bring in terms of increasing cost transparency, i.e. improving in<strong>for</strong>mation in the<br />
industry.<br />
Newbery (2001) queries whether the costs of competition in the case of<br />
electricity generation were worthwhile. Whilst the benefits are real, so too are<br />
the costs of spare capacity, of the creation of new market trading arrangements<br />
and the risks to service quality posed by unbundling.<br />
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