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updating brignoni-ponce - New York University School of Law

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578 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 11:567<br />

A. Using Immigration <strong>Law</strong>s and Enforcement to<br />

Subordinate “Others”<br />

Congress’s broad authority in setting immigration policy allows<br />

nativism, the casting <strong>of</strong> noncitizens as unaccepted “others,” to pervade<br />

immigration laws. Similarly, the government’s choices in how and<br />

where to enforce immigration laws primarily targets immigrants from<br />

Latin and South America. The result is suspicion and mistrust on behalf<br />

<strong>of</strong> Latinos toward the government and the Border Patrol specifically,<br />

taking a toll on the Latino community and impeding law<br />

enforcement.<br />

1. Plenary Power over Immigration <strong>Law</strong><br />

U.S. immigration policies have long used the border to exclude<br />

certain groups <strong>of</strong> individuals considered “dangerous, unwanted, [and]<br />

undesirable.” 60 For example, the Alien and Sedition Acts <strong>of</strong> 1798<br />

targeted people <strong>of</strong> French ethnicity and ideology; fear <strong>of</strong> Japanese and<br />

Japanese Americans during World War II spurred the internment <strong>of</strong><br />

Japanese Americans; and, during the 1950s, fear <strong>of</strong> Communist enemies<br />

resulted in frequent interrogation <strong>of</strong> immigrants from Southeastern<br />

European countries. 61 Even though these policies have rested on<br />

questionable rationales at best, the Supreme Court has accepted that<br />

Congress has plenary power over immigration laws due to national<br />

security concerns, sovereignty, and the political branches’ control over<br />

foreign policy. 62 Accordingly, Congress has broad discretion to<br />

choose to exclude certain noncitizens. 63 Currently, the legislative and<br />

60. Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National<br />

Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1411 (1997).<br />

61. Juan F. Perea, Introduction to IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE<br />

ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 1–2 (Juan F. Perea ed., <strong>New</strong><br />

<strong>York</strong> <strong>University</strong> Press 1997).<br />

62. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,<br />

606 (1889) (establishing the plenary power doctrine). “To preserve its independence,<br />

and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty <strong>of</strong><br />

every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated.”<br />

Id.<br />

63. Id. The Court has gradually chipped away at the plenary power doctrine, recognizing<br />

that this power is “subject to important constitutional limitations.” Zadvydas v.<br />

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 (1983);<br />

The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604); see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,<br />

80–83 (1976) (reviewing Congress’s decision to limit Medicare to legal permanent<br />

residents who have been in the United States for at least five years and finding that it<br />

falls within Congress’s plenary power over immigration and was a reasonable policy);<br />

Hiroshima Motomura, Immigration <strong>Law</strong> After a Century <strong>of</strong> Plenary Power: Phantom<br />

Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 560 (1990)<br />

(describing the evolution <strong>of</strong> the plenary power doctrine). However, the Court does

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