TA4862-VIE Ho Chi Minh City Metro Rail System - ppiaf

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Risk Payments to/from the concessionaire • Incentives to encourage concessionaire to provide good services • Improper recordkeeping of services provided Concession Option (1) Public Public Train Supply and Build, Operate & Enterprise Implementation with Operating Concession (PIOC) Limited capacity to transfer risk because government operator cannot be held to same contractual standard as a private company. The risk remains with the government because the concessionaire is publicly owned. Transfer of risk is limited because operators can blame poor performance on M&E assets and trains that are provided by the government. Operating Transfer Concession (BOT) (TSOC) Substantial transfer can occur with concessionaire control over operating assets and patronage incentive payment. Government needs independent means for confirming services provided to provide the basis for contract payments. • Cost inflation Risk can be transferred to the concessionaire to the optimal extent by using appropriate price indices to adjust concession payments over time. • Potential for windfall gains to the concessionaire Procurement model • Model is unattractive to potential tenderers • Model results in productive tension between concession partners Government will capture any gains. Not relevant because operator is publicly owned. Greatest level of transfer. Government has a limited need because payments to the concessionaire are not linked to specific service provision. Risk is transferred to the concessionaire by using an average price index. Concessionaire may not be able to manage all of the risk, e.g. changes in energy prices. Potential for windfall gains from operations is very limited. Risk of windfall gains is limited by sharing profits from specific financing and development activities. May be attractive because tenderers do not need to arrange finance and they will seek to assign asset risk to the government. Not relevant because concessionaire involves an operator only. 30 May be less attractive to tenderers because they need to arrange finance. May be less attractive to tenderers because they need to arrange finance and bear considerable risk. Deliberate tension introduced by involvement of financier partner who will monitor operator performance.
Risk • Inadequate performance by concessionaire • Termination of concessionaire Other financial matters • Exchange rate movements • Interest rate changes • Changes to tax legislation affecting E&M and train assets • Changes to tax legislation affecting operations Concession Option (1) Public Public Train Supply and Build, Operate & Enterprise Implementation with Operating Concession (PIOC) Risk remains with the government because the concessionaire is publicly owned. Government can terminate the concession, though political lobbying may make this difficult to achieve. Risk remains with the government. Some risk transfer through a patronage-related payment, but the concessionaire can blame poor assets provided by the government for inadequate performance. Operating Transfer Concession (BOT) (TSOC) More risk transfer because of the patronage-related payment and concessionaire selection of E&M assets and trains. Greatest transfer of risk, though there is the potential for the transfer of risk that the concessionaire cannot manage – this would result in the added costs through risk premiums and risk averse behavior by the concessionaire. Government can establish conditions to terminate the concession in the case of persistent sub-standard performance by the concessionaire. Primary risk should be transferred to the concessionaire, which can use various instruments to mitigate the risk. Government bears some indirect risk through indexation of future payments to concessionaires. While the concessionaire has no influence over these risks, simplicity of management indicates that the risk for nondiscriminatory changes to tax should be transferred to the concessionaire, noting also that indexation will include some effect of tax changes. Government should bear the risk of tax changes that primarily affect only concessionaires because the consequences of the changes can be more easily identified. 31
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Asian Development Bank Public Priva
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Abbreviations Preparing the HCMC Me
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1. Introduction 1.1 Background Prep
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Preparing the HCMC Metro Rail Syste
Page 10 and 11: Preparing the HCMC Metro Rail Syste
Page 18 and 19: 4.3 Transport Agencies and Function
Page 28 and 29: Asian Development Bank Public Priva
Page 30 and 31: 6. Implementing Competitive Tenderi
Page 32 and 33: Four possible implementation option
Page 34 and 35: 1.2 Role of the current report The
Page 36 and 37: ‒ the PPP involves the transfer o
Page 38 and 39: These categories of activity serve
Page 40 and 41: change in the course of ongoing wor
Page 42 and 43: MRT systems, and few in the world.
Page 44 and 45: private sector incur. The logic for
Page 46 and 47: 2.10 Using the private sector to mi
Page 48 and 49: e better to use government capital
Page 50 and 51: 3.2 Recent examples in other cities
Page 52 and 53: Delivery of: Civil Infrastructure a
Page 54 and 55: concessionaire 6 . The transfer of
Page 56 and 57: ecause it places less pressure on c
Page 58 and 59: Risk Maintenance of assets • Chan
Page 62 and 63: 5. Concession Template The provisio
Page 64 and 65: setting a central payment level to
Page 66 and 67: • Changes in the MRT System • C
Page 68 and 69: agreement be drafted prior to comme
Page 70 and 71: is well prepared to follow through.
Page 72 and 73: only with respect to their area of
Page 74 and 75: Appendix A: Bibliography Asian Deve
Page 76 and 77: Table B.2: Comparison of Melbourne
Page 78 and 79: Concession management TSOC approach
Page 80 and 81: TSOC approach with a TSOC approach
Page 82 and 83: Financial amounts specified by the
Page 84 and 85: This form of concession can be usef
Page 86 and 87: Appendix D: Concession Template Thi
Page 88 and 89: 6. CONCESSION Key features of the c
Page 90 and 91: An example of a circumstance where
Page 92 and 93: the Company. However where the cons
Page 94 and 95: against late service commencement t
Page 96 and 97: However, as the provision of additi
Page 98 and 99: 3. Gross Cost concession with some
Page 100 and 101: eing granted in respect of cash flo
Page 102 and 103: substantial obligations. Accordingl
Page 104 and 105: c) On Termination for Force Majeure
Page 106 and 107: of reasonable endeavors to rectify
Page 108 and 109: • A balance must be stuck between
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obtain financial specialist and als
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� Focus HCMC Metro Rail System 1
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Four objectives for PPIAF Technical
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4. Stakeholder Feedback & Implement
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Examples of MRT experience in other
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� Integration Lessons from Bangko
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Ideal structure for management in t
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General arrangement for implementin
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2. Should a single agency develop a
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6. Should the concessionaire be sel
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10. Should the concessionaire finan
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14. Should ticketing be implemented
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Part E 45 MORE DETAILED FEATURES OF
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Indicative assessment of concession
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Summary of recommended approach wit
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� Part VII: Assets Contents of a
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ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND PUBLIC P
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in the PPTA feasibility study final
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2.3 Model logical structure Figure
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page also contains input data for l
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additional rolling stock investment
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Table 2.7 (Cont’d) HCMC MRT Proje
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Table 2.8 Private sector project en
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Table 2.8 (Cont’d) HCMC MRT Proje
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PPTA 7 , this is an MRT service wit
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from a state-owned enterprise (SOE)
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Figure 3.1 Private sector concessio
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34. With service operation, sound e
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depending on each option. The net b
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order of preference based on VfM, t
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APPENDIX 1. MODEL OPERATION AND MAN
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trains going in one direction (“h
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Public sector financial statements
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Table of Contents Summary .........
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Summary Si
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Problems if MRT is not treated as a
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Provision and Management of Public
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Diagnosis � Policy and strategy c
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4 Institutional Strengthening Optio
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Option 4: Integrated Transport Auth
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While the MRT system will be develo
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around the central area along key c
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of financing. These plans are submi
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Sector Ministry/Administration Resp
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2.3 Key Policies and Regulatory Pro
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Article 83 defines “railway busin
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Source: MAUR Figure 2.1: Current St
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2.3.4. Other Relevant Laws and Decr
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Floor Area (GFA) they can build or
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Table 2.3: Current Main Transport A
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Policy & strategy • Policy framew
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excessively focused on technical ma
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locations to which feeder bus servi
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� Metro rail ie MRT expertise. Sp
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Thailand, through the standing Comm
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Feature Option 1: Strengthen MAUR O
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Figure 4.3: Key lines of responsibi
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Clarity of strategic direction� E
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5. Some Lessons on Organizational S
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� Thailand’s Mass Rapid Transit
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Figure 5.2: Integrated Transport Ar
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Appendix A: Trends in the Managemen
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Appendix B: Review of Other Arrange
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Feature Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Roll
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Feature Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Inst
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Feature Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Fina
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Feature London, UK Stockholm, Swede
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Feature London, UK Stockholm, Swede
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Appendix C: Scoping of the Possible
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one MRT line to another will not ha
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References and Bibliography Asian D
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Table of Contents Summary & Recomme
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Summary & Recommendations An object
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1. Background and Purpose The Peopl
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2. Fares Policy Issues & Implicatio
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Distance based fare systems are typ
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3. Patronage and Revenue Impacts of
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There is more extensive information
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3.2.1. 2007/ 2008 Study Non Integra
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4. Achieving Uniform Fares and Inte
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4.3 Addressing the Challenges of Im
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Table 4.3: Steps to Implement Integ
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Box 4.1: Fare restructuring study -
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Transit Railway (MTR) and five othe
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Under the second approach described
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In terms of transit purposes, as di
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Appendix A: Affordability Analysis
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Based on Table A.4, the potential h
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Appendix B: Most Likely Technical O
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References and Bibliography Asian D
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References and Bibliography Prepari
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