Commando News issue 15 2019

freedom. Remarkably at the direction of Xanana
Gusmao and Taur Matan Ruak, this did not happen.
How did Fretilin and Falintil avoid succumbing to the
terrorism that has engulfed so many resistance
movements around the world? The character of the
resistance evolved and the ultimate decision to conduct
the guerrilla war in a principled way, without murdering
civilians or resorting to other atrocities, as so many such
movements have done, was by no means a foregone
conclusion. Indeed, in the early years there were distinct
failures of principle. Fretilin and Falintil did kill some
dissenting people and collaborators early on and there
was the internal failed coup in 1984.
Topography and Environment
The island of Timor is culturally quite diverse as there
are many language groupings. The further you go
eastward the more Melanesian are the people ethnically
and linguistically. While West Timor is comparatively
flatter, East Timor has a rugged mountain spine that
hampers conventional military operations and the
ground provides some assistance to guerilla warfare.
There are karst cave areas and interestingly Z Special
Unit had a discrete course on caving relative to Timor in
the Second World War.
Falintil also used the caves as an underground asset.
The topography afforded Falintil the ability to hide
noting that throughout the 1990s they were a very small
and reasonably inactive guerrilla force. Their aim was to
survive so that in the event of international support they
could rise to take control. The Resistance was always
stronger in the eastern half of the country because of
ethnic reasons and probably also due to the Indonesians
wiping out the resistance on the border early on. After
the encirclement disaster at Matabian, Falintil became
much more centred on the east.
Mobility
Throughout the struggle there were many forced and
self-initiated displacements of parts of, and even of the
total population thereby making the populous
inherently and strategically mobile. Fretilin and Falintil
suffered major divisions and schisms along political and
ethnic lines which impacted the characteristic of
mobility in this guerrilla war.
Their Mount Matebian redoubt, which was the fixed
defence strategy soon failed. Falintil dispersed and
much of the movement in the west of the country
disintegrated particularly from February 1979 with the
surrender of some key Falintil. 1979 was a year of
strategic defeat with 90 percent of the fighters and
weapons lost from the positional-based defence
disaster requiring a significant change in strategy.
With the transition to guerrilla warfare in 1988,
Falintil became more mobile, espousing the guerrilla
creed of ‘shots to the north, head south’ supported by
the clandestine organization inside population centres
and resettlement camps.
However, after the fall of Mount Matebian and
Natarbora in 1978, Fretilin and Falintil were then only
really operating in part of the centre and mainly in the
east. The March to August 1983 ceasefire also ended
badly for Fretilin and Falintil, which was then followed
by the putsch crisis of early 1984. By late 1980 Falintil
had less than 100 fighters. In 1996 there were about
1,888 men and by 1998 about 242 men. Their ranks
then swelled by August 1999 to about 1,500 fighters.
Surprise
The characteristic of surprise in guerrilla warfare
certainly applied in the tactical ambushing actions by
Falintil. It was less so strategically applied in the field,
however several startling actions kept the movement in
the international spotlight including the requests for
political asylum at various embassies in Jakarta from
1993 onwards and the demonstration at the US
Embassy in Jakarta in 1994, the protests at the Dutch
and Russian Embassies in Jakarta in 1995 and the
awarding of the Noble Peace prize to Belo and Ramos-
Horta in 1996.
The demonstrations during the Pope’s visit in 1988
embarrassed the Indonesian Government. They showed
the existence of an indigenous resistance movement to
the outside world and it galvanized the population.
The Political Situation
Who would have thought that the economic crisis in
Asia and the downfall of President Suharto would be the
trigger points for subsequent jubilation in East Timor
after twenty four years of oppressive occupation by the
Indonesian Army?
In hindsight the Asian financial crisis precipitated
independence. That crisis caused the downfall of
Suharto and when it brought Habibie to the presidency,
the rest was history. Without Habibie’s decision, there
would probably not have been any popular consultation
or any United Nations and INTERFET involvement in
East Timor.
In 1998-1999 Falintil were weak and their strongest
cards were the Timorese youth movements. Without the
political crisis it is probable that East Timor would still
be under Indonesian rule albeit with considerable Acehstyle
provincial autonomy
East Timor remained unstable throughout the
occupation and it belied constant Indonesian propa -
ganda to the contrary. It explains why East Timor
remained a political and psychological embarrassment
to Jakarta.
There is no systematic account of Indonesian
casualties but most probably occurred during skirmishes
and ambushes in rural areas. There are 3,804 names on
the Seroja monument in Jakarta consisting of 2,777
Indonesian soldiers and police and 1,527 East Timorese
irregulars who were killed in action. These names are
combat deaths from many units right across Indonesia
and they are higher than those acknowledged during
the occupation.
The number of Indonesian wounded can only be
guessed, but with the three to one, wounded to killed in
action ratio, there was likely about 10,800 casualties. By
40 COMMANDO NEWS ~ Edition 15 I 2019