Opportunity Issue 88 - Sept-Oct 2018

CHINA-AFRICA
next level, or it can simply rip off
your arms.
The fundamental economic and power
imbalance between China and African
countries has led to the relationship
being criticised as neocolonial. The
truth, however, is that African governments
exercise more agency than they
are given credit for. This includes frequently
playing China and traditional
Western development partners off
against one another.
The word “agency” is key here: to
what extent is Africa able to freely make
its own decisions and drive the best
deals with China?
Our new research focused on this
issue. We looked at two emerging areas
shaping African agency in relation to
China. These are reforms to the African
Union (AU) and the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). The initiative involves
a massive infrastructure rollout aimed
at linking China to Europe and beyond.
The aim is to set up a zone of shared
development that encompasses Central
and Western Asia and Africa.
The AU and the Belt and Road
initiative
The AU has proposed a set of reforms
to streamline African negotiations at
events like the FOCAC under the auspices
of the continental body. This could
be seen as a step towards the frequently
repeated goal of Africa negotiating collectively
with China. But, in fact, we
show that it faces significant resistance
from within the continent. This comes
both from powerful states worried about
losing control of their bilateral relationships
with China, and from smaller
states worried about being excluded.
China’s BRI reveals other aspects
of African agency. It’s structured by
numerous bilateral agreements, but
is also subject to regional as well as
local pressures. The way the initiative’s
projects have been pulled into national
debates involving opposition politics
shows that the range of actors constituting
African agency is potentially
much wider than national governments.
We argue that before African agency
can be maximised, this aspect of
relations between China and particular
African governments needs to be taken
into account. Thinking about the issue
has so far fixated on the role of national
governments, to the exclusion of other
actors. The biggest include regional
economic communities such as Nepad
and the AU. The smaller ones comprise
opposition parties, civil society, local
businesses and communities. All contribute
to and constitute African agency.
What is this agency, how does it work
and how can it be strengthened?
Understanding African agency
We identified three key areas where
African agency can be located.
Firstly, African agency is expressed
in the frameworks and documents
that govern bodies like the forum. For
example, in the early days arrangements
paid relatively little attention
to the issue of industrialisation. That
changed after the formal adoption in
2015 of the AU’s Agenda 2063—its
blueprint for Africa’s sustainable development.
The forum held that yearsaw
an uptick in how many times the issue
was mentioned.
By 2016, African industrialisation
had become a key initiative of China’s
presidency of the G20. Beijing directed
an unprecedented level of G20 attention
to the continent.
By 2018, the Beijing summit ended
with fewer declarations of intent
relating to industrialisation. Instead, it
had become integrated into the continental
and bilateral planning processes.
In particular, it features regularly in
discussions on development financing.
Likewise the word “training” was mentioned
over 40 times and in virtually
every section of the Beijing Action Plan.
This suggests there is a shift from
declarations of intent to more specific
engagement towards industrialisation.
This doesn’t necessarily guarantee the
success of Africa’s industrialisation. But
it shows that China responds to African
agenda-setting.
Secondly, African agency is diffused
across various levels and among various
actors. Any analysis of African agency
has to consider the complex interactions
between continental bodies like the AU,
regional economic blocs, national governments,
civil society, business, and
local communities. Each plays a role
in shaping African decision making in
relation to China. Partnerships that cut
across the state-business-civil society
divide are as important as state led initiatives
in articulating policy initiatives
in relation to China.
Thirdly, it’s important to think of the
changing terms of agency as African governments
face growing debt burdens via
such initiatives as the BRI. For instance,
rumours that the Zambian government
offered its national electricity supplier as
collateral in exchange for a new tranche
of Chinese loans have reportedly caused
political division at home.
Critics have focused on debt as diminishing
African agency. What they’ve
ignored are the significant financial and
reputational risks to China.
Maximising African agency
As Africa becomes more involved in
global initiatives, and as it moves
towards greater continental integration
via AU reforms and the Continental Free
Trade Agreement, the need increases
to think harder and more creatively
about what African agency means. It
isn’t enough to simply reiterate the call
for Africa to negotiate collectively with
China—not least because this disregards
the complex interactions between
African governments.
Rather, it’s time for more comprehensive
thinking about how African agency
manifests across actors and geographic
scales. Only once we have a firmer
handle on this can we move towards
maximising it.
Yu-Shan Wu, Foreign policy researcher
and doctoral candidate, University of the
Witwatersrand
Chris Alden, Professor of International
Relations, London School of Economics
and Political Science
Cobus van Staden, Senior Researcher:
China Africa, South African Institute of
International Affairs
theconversation.com
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