Rambouillet Peace Conference - Hawaii Pacific University

Rambouillet Peace Conference; Road to the Conference and Results
Ivan Boshkovich
HIST 7602
Pierre Asselin, Ph.D.
Captain Carl O. Schuster
Fall 2009

Table of Content
Boshkovich 2
Part I
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….3
Chapter I
Section A; History of Violence……………………………………………………………...6
Section B; The End of the Cold War………………………………………………………13
Part II
Chapter II
Section A; About the KLA………………………………………………………………....27
Section B; Road to Rambouillet…………………………………………………………...36
Chapter III
Section A; Actors…………………………………………………………………………..43
Section B; Negotiations……………………………………………………………………56
Section C; Reactions to the Conference………………………………………………….70
Part III
Chapter IV
Section A; “Merciful Angel”……………………………………………………………...80
Section B; From UN Resolution 1244 to Declaration of Independence………………..90
Section C; Declaration of Independence………………………………………………...100
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….107
Historiography……………………………………………………………………………..115
Appendix
I Statement by the Contact Group……………………………………………………..120
II Fundamentals of the Agreement……………………………………………………..123
III Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo……………………125
IV Resolution 1244………………………………………………………………………..180
List of Acronyms……………………………………………………………………186
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………...187

Part I
Introduction
Map of Former Yugoslavia 1
Boshkovich 3
The main goal of this professional paper is to explain what happened during
Rambouillet‘s Peace Conference in 1999 which was in actuality ultimatum to Serbian and
Yugoslav authorities. At the same time, on the opposite side this conference, Albanians
from Kosovo, were in much better situation because, and it will be well supported
throughout this paper, they could sit peacefully and relax knowing that the Serbs would
have to choose between two evils; acceptance of independence of Kosovo, or NATO
1 Online, ―Kosovarian Independence: Viennese Celebration/Demonstration‖,
http://anaj.wordpress.com/category/politics/

Boshkovich 4
intervention. Maybe even more interestingly, this research will explain what the most
important points that led to this conference were. Also, the outcome of these talks will be
explained and how that affects the region and the rest of the world. To make sure that the
audience has a clear picture about the entire conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians
(for sake of simplicity, in continuation of this paper the author will use term ―Albanians‖
even if it will describe Albanians from Kosovo), the author will present historical events
that led to the conflict between these two groups. Contrary to what some experts claim,
the beginning of this problem was not in the 1980‘s and the rise of Serbian leader
Milosevic, but six centuries earlier when the Ottoman Empire spread on Balkan
Peninsula. However, this paper will be more concentrated on the recent history of this
conflict, which is period after WWII, especially from the late 1980‘s until 2008 (when
Albanians declared independence which is recognized so far by 63 countries; the most
recent was New Zealand-November 2009). When elaborating about this period on the
Balkan Peninsula, in addition to the peace conference, the author will offer valuable
information regarding the incident in Racak, which was a trigger for the NATO bombing;
bombing itself; Kumanovo agreement; UN Resolution 1244; and unilateral declaration of
independence of Kosovo in 2008.
In addition, the readers of this research will have an opportunity to find out more
about the role of the Serbian Armed Forces in this conflict (mainly in the late 1990‘s),
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). One will find this interesting because some of
the Serbian generals and politicians (based on command responsibilities), as well as the
KLA leaders were accused for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal of the

Boshkovich 5
former Yugoslavia or ICTY. Nevertheless, before they had to face this tribunal, some of
those individuals had a chance to participate in the 1999 Rambouillet peace talks.
Another aspect of this paper will be the involvement of the international
community. This is going to be discussed in chapters that are describing the conference,
also in these chapters the audience will discover more about media war and the influence
of some western politicians to the situation on Balkan.
At the end of this paper the audience will have a chance to read author‘s analysis
about the future of the Balkan Peninsula as well as the future of the world based on
events that took place in this region.
It is important to mention that the writer of this paper was born in Serbia (at that
time one of Yugoslav republics) and lived there until 2005, which gave him an
opportunity to see what happened in the war in Kosovo from a different perspective than
an average person in the rest of the world. However, thanks to his emigration to the USA
four years ago, the author completed his viewpoint of this conflict. Nevertheless, it is
possible that this paper will offer some views that differ from what people could hear on
CNN or BBC. The reason for this is that western media is very often willing to take sides
in wars, and in this case it was mostly Albanian side. Yet, if the author put some effort to
write something that is not favorable for Albanians in Kosovo, it would not be because of
some kind of bias, but rather due to facts that are supporting different viewpoints, which
will be documented adequately. Despite the fact that war in Kosovo happened just 10-11
years ago there is a huge number of sources that are helpful for anyone interested in this
topic. Some of those sources are bias, but some are quite objective and valuable.

Chapter I
Section A; History of Violence
Boshkovich 6
Serbs arrived on the Balkan Peninsula in the 7 th century C.E. as pagan‘s tribe
from central Asia. The reason for this long voyage was probably protection from
barbarian tribes in Asia and also the warmer Mediterranean climate. Serbs settled this
area from Dalmatia, in today‘s Croatia, to a region that is known today as Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In the middle of this area is today‘s Kosovo (full name
would be Kosovo and Metohija), also known as ‗Old Serbia‘. This entire territory was
under control of Byzantine Empire, and that is the reason why Serbs during the time
became Christians, and later, after the schism between Christians in 1054, Orthodox
Christians.
Albanians were the Serbs‘ southern neighbors, and until the Ottomans conquest
they were allies. Albanians were part of the Serbian army during the King Dushan‘s
leadership. In the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Albanians stood along with Serbs against
Turks. 2 Unfortunately, Serbian King Lazar lost this battle, and Turks occupied this part of
Europe for the next 500 years. 3 The majority of Albanians saw this as an opportunity to
become Turks‘ ally and finally grows to be stronger than the Serbs. Most of Albanians
accepted Islam 4 in an effort to be closer to their new rulers. This tactic began to have
results very fast and Turks started to settle Albanians in territories that were 100%
populated by Serbs. The excuse for this process Albanians, even today, tried to find in a
2 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje:Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 13.
3 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s bloody collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 18.
4 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 14.

Boshkovich 7
fact that Illyrians lived before Serbs on the entire Balkan Peninsula, and that they were
their ancestors. It is true that Illyrians lived on the Balkan, but there is no evidence that
Albanians are connected with them.
Since the Turks invasion of the Balkan in 14 th century, Albanians and Serbs
became more hostile to each other. However, Turks were the main reason for the Serbs
migrations to the north, such as that from second half of the 15 th century. But the largest
exodus of Serbs occurred during the World Wars, when Albanians started to realize their
nationalist ideas that were first introduced in 1878, when Albanians formed so-called
―League for protection of Albanian nation‖ or ―The First Prizren League‖. 5 The reason
for this meeting was Berlin Congress, in which great powers decided to return to Serbia
some counties that were taken by Ottomans, in which during the occupation Albanians
settled. The main goal of this league was creation of Albanians‘ nation state that would
consist of four regions (vilayets) inhabited by Albanians 6 : a) South Albania and Epir with
capitol in Janina (Greece-I.B.); b) North and Central Albania (Skadar, Tirana, and
Elbasan); c) Macedonia (Skopje, Debar, Gostivar, Prilep, Veles, Bitola, Ohrid); d)
Kosovo with parts of southern central Serbia (Pec, Djakovica, Prizren, Novi Pazar,
Mitrovica, Sjenica, Pristina, Gnjilane, Presevo, and Kumanovo). Between 1878 and the
first Balkan war (1912), 400,000 people escaped from Kosovo to central Serbia. 7
5 Jean-Arnault Dérens, ―Threat of Enduring Nationalism: Kosovo‘s Rival Histories‖, Le Monde
Diplomatique, July 12, 2005, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/446.html
6 Bernard J. Fisher, ―A Brief Historical Overview of the Development of Albanian Nationalism,‖ Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 23, 2005,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/MR313%20Fischer.doc
7 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 15-16.

Map of ―Great Albania‖ 8
Boshkovich 8
During WWI, the Serbian army along with thousands of civilians had to retreat
through Albania to Greece. That was the only way since Austrians attacked from the
north and west, while Bulgarians struck from the east in an effort to concur Macedonia
which was southern Serbia at that time. During that retreat through Albania, Albanians
were very aggressive toward Serbs. 9
Under the protection of the fascist Italian government in WWII, Albanian
collaborators killed thousands of Serbs and other non-Albanians. 10 Before WWII, Serbs
8 Zvonimir Trajkovic, ―Srbi Iznad Sarajeva Postavljaju Divovski Kriz,‖ Srpska Politika,
http://www.srpskapolitika.com/intervjui/2008/latinica/042.html
9 The New York Times, ―Serbian Retreat a Heroic Tragedy,‖ January 8, 1916, pg 2,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9404E7DD103FE233A2575BC0A9679C946796D6CF;
another good source for Serbian retreat through Albania is Olive M. Aldridge, Retreat from Serbia through
Montenegro and Albania (London: The Minerva Publishing Company, 1916)
http://www.archive.org/texts/flipbook/flippy.php?id=retreatfromserbi00aldriala
10 Carl Kosta Savich, ― Albanian Nazi Troops in WW2 Launched a Wide Spread Terror Against Kosovo
Serbs,‖ Vatopaidi Online, October 27, 2009, http://vatopaidi.wordpress.com/2009/10/27/albanian-nazitroops-in-ww2-launched-a-wide-spread-terror-against-kosovo-serbs/

Boshkovich 9
were the majority in Kosovo and Metohija, making up 61% of population. However, after
WWII on 1961 census, Albanians were majority with 67, 1%, this number rose in 1971 to
73, 7% of population in what was called after WWII ―Serbian Autonomous Province
Kosovo and Metohija‖. According to Mr. Simic, in 1981 ethnic Albanians made 77.4%
of population of Kosovo, while Serbs fell from 23.6% in 1961 to 7.3% in 1981. Other
than that, half of Albanian population is younger than 20 years, which means that their
population will most likely double in the next 20 years. Additional data is available in
Tim Judah‘s book, The Serbs, where one can see that 441,740 of Albanians lived in
Yugoslavia in 1918, while that number rises to 1,730,000 in 1981. 11
Besides Albanian ethnic cleansing of Serbs during WWII (in just one year of war,
until April 1942, 60,000 Serbs were forced to escape from Kosovo 12 ), there are other
reasons why the demographic structure changed so rapidly. The first reason is that
Communist‘s regime in Yugoslavia did not allow Serbs to return to Kosovo and Metohija
after the war (the decision maker of that time was Josip Broz Tito, and many Albanians
were known as ‗Titoists‘ because he gave them autonomy). ―The ‗Titoist‘ phenomenon
among Albanians was not simply, as it is often described, an expression of nostalgia for
Tito‘s ‗gift‘ to Kosova of its position as a Yugoslav autonomous province…‖ 13 At the
same time, Tito allowed Albanians from Albania to move to this part of Serbia with
excuse that they are trying to escape from dictatorship of Enver Hodza. ―…in the creation
of a Communist Yugoslavia under Tito, the Croat-Slovene. He concluded before World
11
Tim Judah, The Serbs: history, myth & the destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997), 311-13.
12
Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 19.
13
Stephen Schwartz, ―'Enverists' and 'Titoists' - Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941-99:
From the Partisan Movement of the Second World War to the Kosova Liberation War,‖ Journal of
Communist Studies and Politics 25, no. 1 (2009): 65.

Boshkovich 10
War II that Yugoslavia could only be re-created on the basis of a weakened and
constricted Serbia‖. 14
The second reason is the Albanians birth rate, which at the end of 20th century
was 6.8 children per family while Serbs had 1.5 per family. In addition to this, it is
interesting that even in a relatively peaceful period, from mid 1960‘s till mid 1980‘s,
approximately 200,000 people left Kosovo, creating 700 settlements ethnically
completely free of Serbs. 15
Albanian pronazi demonstration during WWII 16
Someone may ask why Serbs had tolerated this behavior of Yugoslav
communist‘s regime. The answer is that this regime was ruled by Dictator Josip Broz
14 David Binder, ―Thoughts about Serbs,‖ Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies 14,
no. 2 (2000): 167-71, http://www.serbianstudies.org/publications/pdf/Vol14_2_Binder.pdf
15 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 44.
16 Coordinamento Nazionale per la Yugoslavia, http://www.cnj.it/documentazione/KOSMET/foto.htm

Boshkovich 11
Tito who was Croat. 17 Though it is still unclear why, Croats and Serbs could never live in
a harmony. It is not easy to find evidences of Serbian hostility toward Croats, but the
newest example of animosity between these two ethnic groups was in civil war of 1990‘s,
which ended in 1995 when Croats launched ―Operation Storm‖ in which 200,000
refugees escaped to Serbia and Bosnia, while ―In the days that followed Operation Storm,
property was destroyed and atrocities committed against those Serbs who remained.‖ 18
But much worst example for this hatred occurred in 1940‘s. Only in WWII,
Croats, which were Nazi allies, killed 700,000 Serbs (most of them in extermination
camp Jasenovac were Croats killed about 600,000 people 19 ).
Tito‘s regime changed the constitution in 1974, giving to this province all
attributes of republic except the name. Albanians took advantage of this by creating
ethnically clear of Serbs police, making them less important citizens without any possible
protection from Federal or Republic government. On the other side, Albanians took all
important positions in the Province government and courts. They developed a parallel
education system based on the Albanian language which was against the law. All these
things were unthinkable for Serbs in Albania, where they were forced during the time to
change their names so that they won‘t sound as Slovenes in addition to being forbidden to
be educated in their language. 20 Besides that, Albanian government took all their houses
17 Rit Nosotro, ―Josip Broz Tito: 1892-1980, Yugoslavian Dictator Who Succeeded with Communism,‖
HyperHistory Online, 2003, http://www.hyperhistory.net/apwh/bios/b2tito-josip-marshall.htm
18 Matt Prodger, ―Evicted Serbs Remember Storm,‖ BBC News, August 5, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4747379.stm
19 Yad Vashem Museum Online, http://www1.yadvashem.org/education/entries/English/29.asp
20 David J. Kostelancik, ―Minorities and Minority Language Education in Inter-war…‖ East European
Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1996): 81.

Boshkovich 12
and other belongings. 21 However; discussion on this topic would require another research
paper.
Except for 1968, when Albanian separatists organized huge protests in all the
major cities in Kosovo, using an opportunity to cheer to ―Kosovo Republic‖, ―Long live
Albania‖ and Enver Hodza 22 (which was minimized very effectively by Tito‘s communist
propaganda, explaining that it was just a group of youths that broke in a couple of stores,
which is common even in the western countries 23 ) until 1980, when Tito died, Albanians
held their activities bellow the radar, knowing that time was working for them. After that
event everything changed. Albanian separatists begin massive demonstrations against
Serbian government with demands to be recognized as a Republic, which was
unacceptable for Serbian authorities because that would lead to separation from Serbia
and Yugoslavia. This period of violence in Kosovo lasts until 1989, when extremely
popular Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic changed the constitution, and brought
Serbian jurisdiction back to Kosovo, that would last until 1999.
21 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 10.
22 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: a short history (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 325.
23 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 24-25.

Section B; The End of the Cold War
Boshkovich 13
After Tito‘s death in 1980, Albanian separatists in Kosovo started massive
protests with parole ―Kosovo Republic‖. They believed that Tito‘s death meant death of
Yugoslavia. This was very dangerous for the security of the country, especially because
of the willingness of a huge number of Albanians in Macedonia (they already had
protests back in 1968 when they insisted on unification with Kosovo 24 ) and Montenegro
to join those demonstrations. The state government decided to send army and police to
suppress protestors. This situation ended with declaring martial law 25 and the
imprisonment of hundreds of Albanians. Unfortunately, these prisoners did not change in
the prison; oppositely, prison became an ideal place for recruiting new fighters for
Kosovo independence: ―Most [future] Albanian political prisoners were former students
arrested in the 1980s for their participation in the movement demanding a Republic of
Kosovo within Federal Yugoslavia‖. 26 It should be mentioned that arrests in communist
Yugoslavia were very common thing for more trivial things, such as a joke about the
president or a communist party. So these arrests would happen to any other group,
regardless of ethnicity.
Albanian separatists concluded that it was still too early for open confrontation
with the government, and they decided to continue with a less transparent war against
Serbs and other non-Albanians. There was a great number of Serbs killed during the
1980‘s, usurpation of their land and live stock, rapes, refusing to help Serbs in hospitals,
24 Ibid, 25.
25 Stephen Schwartz, ―'Enverists' and 'Titoists' - Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941-99:
from the Partisan Movement of the Second World War to the Kosova Liberation War,‖ Journal of
Communist Studies and Politics 25, no. 1 (2009): 67.
26 Zoran Kusovac, ―The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,‖ Jane’s Online
http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/jir990401_01_n.shtml

Boshkovich 14
or just to serve them in stores or restaurants. 27 ―Serbs have said the ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo have committed atrocities against them, including murder, rape, desecration of
graves and churches and blinding of cattle‖. 28 There was an increased number of Serbs
that were forced to leave Kosovo in the mid 1980‘s due to threats and hostility from
extreme Albanians who desired ―ethnically clean Kosovo‖. 29
Besides that, it was quite normal to kill a few soldiers or police officers in an
ambush. Police, which at that time consisted of Serbs and loyal Albanians, used every
opportunity to take revenge. There were a lot of examples of police brutality against
Albanians involved in activities against the government, but nothing that students in
Belgrade, for example, had not experienced during their fight against Milosevic‘s regime.
The reason was simple; police brutality was normal thing in Yugoslavia, like in any other
non-democracy.
27 Marvine Howe, ―Exodus of Serbians stirs province in Yugoslavia,‖ The New York Times, July 12, 1982,
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/12/world/exodus-of-serbians-stirs-province-in-yugoslavia.html
28 The New York Times, ―Belgrade Battles Kosovo Serbs,‖ June 28, 1987,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/28/world/belgrade-battles-kosovoserbs.html?scp=1&sq=Belgrade%20Battles%20Kosovo%20Serbs&st=cse
29 G. Richard Jansen, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo: an abbreviated history an opening for the The
Islamic Jihad in Europe (Fort Collins: Colorado State University, 1999),
http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html

Serbian police in action in Belgrade, Serbian capital 30 , 31
Boshkovich 15
The only institutions that gave some confidence to Serbs were the Church and the
Army. The largest number of Serbian churches and monasteries are on Kosovo. Some of
these sanctuaries are from the 12 th and 13 th centuries. 32 Albanian separatists did not have
to make special effort to suppress Church because the communist party was more than
sufficient at doing that job. After WWII communists usurped thousands of hectares of
churches land and gave it to Albanians. Different than in other post-communist regimes,
Church never received this land back. However, Serbs priests are still in Kosovo as the
last representatives of Serbian continuity in this province/independent country (depends
from which perspective).
30 B92 Online, http://vukajlija.com/attached_images/0003/6960/policija.jpg
31 Politika Online, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Hronika/Policija-na-nishanu-gnevnih.lt.html
32 UNESCO Online, ―Medieval Monuments in Kosovo,‖ http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/724/

Boshkovich 16
One of Serbian Monasteries (Saint Archangels) that was destroyed while under KFOR protection (March
2004) 33
When speaking of the Army, Albanian separatists used different approach to
diminish that organization. The JNA (Yugoslav National Army) consisted of youths from
all six republics and two autonomous provinces. These recruits were not professional
soldiers, and they had to serve in the Army for 18 months, and from the middle 1980‘s 12
months. This was a multiethnic institution and Albanian terrorists (a growing group of
people that started to use violence to gain independence, later organized in the Kosovo
Liberation Army) attacked soldiers less than the police because they were sure that if they
attacked police in Kosovo they could kill only Serbs or loyal Albanians, which are seen
as traitors and collaborators. Albanian terrorists decided to change the structure of the
Army. In 1987, Albanian recruit Kelmendi joined the Army, and when he finally got the
rifle he killed 4 soldiers, wounded 6, and simply escaped from the base. The terrorists
33 Info-sluzba Kosova I Metohije Online, http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2004/April_14/8.html

Boshkovich 17
accomplished their goal, and the JNA did not insist anymore on mandatory serving for
Albanians. The JNA soldiers also became legitimate targets for terrorists, while recruits
from all other republics tried everything to avoid serving in Kosovo. Even the writer of
this research remembers how the parents of Yugoslav teenagers were doing everything to
find someone who could help their kids to avoid serving in Kosovo.
The situation for Serbs in Kosovo from 1988 was desperate. Now Serbs started
demonstrations in effort to show how worried they were. This was the perfect opportunity
for a new energetic politician to make a career. His name was Slobodan Milosevic. He
put himself as a leader of all Serbs who would protect them from Albanian terrorists. The
most important moment in his political career happened on 28 th June 1989 (600th
anniversary of Kosovo Battle) when he gave the famous speech in Kosovo, telling the
one million Serbs present, all the things that they wanted to hear
Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing
battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet.
However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without
resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here
in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle now concerns
implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity,
finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people
will live in the 21st century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of course

Boshkovich 18
of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and
great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary. 34
Serbs from Kosovo felt saved, and they followed Milosevic everywhere. One
million people came to Belgrade‘s protest which was organized by Serbs from Kosovo.
The main speaker was Milosevic. He took the Communist Party of Serbia in his hands,
which was followed by the introduction of democracy, and his SPS (Socialistic Party of
Serbia) won first elections in Serbia. Milosevic changed the constitution, and Kosovo was
again under direct control of Serbia. Serbian refuges from Kosovo ceased to escape in to
the central Serbia, and citizens thought that problem of Albanian separatism and
terrorism in Kosovo is solved.
Milosevic with his supporters 35
Unfortunately, in the mid 1990‘s, after the civil war in former Yugoslavia (which
seemed to be expected due to the end of the Cold War), Albanian separatists decided to
try again, this time more violently. Separatists started attacks on Serbs, other non-
Albanians, Police, Army, and institutions, including Albanians that were loyal to Serbia.
34 Slobodan Milosevic Online, ―Political Speeches: Slobodan Milosevic‘s 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech,‖
June 28, 1989, http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm
35 Ibid, ―Bibliography,‖http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/biography.htm

Boshkovich 19
Interestingly, Pandora‘s Box in Kosovo was not open during civil war in other parts of
Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Mr. Simic said that reasons
for that, one can find in these three theories: 1) Separatists in Kosovo were not satisfied
with the balance of power in Kosovo, and they wanted to wait until Serbia became
exhausted from civil wars; 2) Neighboring Albania was going through post-communist
transition and turmoil; 3) Until the Dayton peace conference in 1995 regard ending of
civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albanians in Kosovo hoped that international
community would put Kosovo‘s question in Dayton‘s negotiations. Since this never
happened, separatists ceased to support peaceful Mr. Rugova, and started to support so-
called KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), which was established at the end of 1993. 36
The conflict culminated in 1998, when the USA threatened Serbia for the first
time with intervention due to ―ethnic cleansing of Albanians‖ and police brutality. To
make clear, Serbian security forces would overreact here and there. Those cases were
usually among police members, not in the army, because the police were local and
sometimes its members had relatives who were killed by KLA. 37 Besides that, bad people
exist everywhere. Even US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan had an incident in which
soldiers raped a 14-year-old girl and killed her family. Another example are pictures from
Abu Graib prison where US soldiers sexually assaulted Iraq prisoners, somehow they
even used dogs. Fortunately, no one bombed the USA because of these couple lunatics.
Different than what an international audience could read in newspaper, Serbian
36 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 23-25.
37 YouTube Online, Aidan Laverty and Tom Giles, ―Moral Combat - NATO at War - Part 3,‖ BBC
Production , 2000, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7J2Uqxh194&feature=related

Boshkovich 20
authorities punished individuals involved in criminal activities. 38 Many of them are still
in prison. The truth is that Serbs (civilians) suffered much more, and there was a new
wave of Serbian refuges, so the Albanian population on Kosovo rose to more than 95%.
However, the International Community led by Clinton‘s administration assumed that
Serbs are guilty for everything since they were already labeled as ‗bad boys‘ in wars in
former Yugoslavia.
Speaking of Serbian police, once again it should be mentioned that they could be
very violent toward any kind of protestors, regardless of their ethnicity or ideology. 39
There was not any difference in police approach to Albanian protestors from that to
supporters of opposition in central Serbia. In both cases protests would end with dozens
of injured protestors and police officers, which always had negative effect to Milosevic‘s
dictatorship. Brutality always led to increasing of number of Milosevic‘s opponents.
However, in the case of Kosovo, once the KLA started to kill police officers on a daily
basis 40 , Serbian police traded batons for rifles and the conflict escalated to a degree of
which no one could stop that spiral of violence.
Albanian terrorists were shocked, and they decided to become more radical. They
started to attack Police, Army, Serbs, and especially loyal Albanians anytime and
everywhere (more about this in the section about the KLA). This was followed by a large
number of performances for an international audience, from hunger strike of miners,
38 Four former police officers were convicted and sent to prison for total of 68 years for war crime against
50 Albanian civilians from Suva Reka. B92 Online, ―Presuda za Zlocin u Suvoj Reci,‖ April 23, 2009,
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=04&dd=23&nav_id=356909
39 Glas Javnosti Online, ―Ninth March Without Meeting,‖ March 8, 2000, http://arhiva.glasjavnosti.rs/arhiva/2000/03/09/srpski/p00030810.shtm;
On March 9 th , 1991 in Belgrade, 114 people were
hurt and 2 people died in the demonstrations against Slobodan Milosevic‘s regime.
40 Global Security Online, ―Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA].‖
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kla.htm

Boshkovich 21
through students declining to attend Serbian Universities, to food poisoning of school
children, but only Albanian children, even if the School was multiethnic. It should be
mentioned that during that time (September 1990) Albanians in Kosovo declared
independence by ―Kacanik Constitution‖; of course they did not have support from the
USA and other powers, so no one cared about it. 41 Nevertheless, during this turmoil
Albanians got a new leader, Ibrahim Rugova. On first elections for so-called ―Republic of
Kosovo‖ in 1992, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Mr. Rugova won by
far, and he became the first President of Albanian parallel state in Kosovo, while Bujar
Bukosi was elected as a first Prime Minister. 42
Rugova become very popular as a fighter for Albanian rights. The most important
thing that he has done for Albanians was abandoning of the blood feud. He gained
forgiveness among 150 families. 43 This custom, which divided Albanians for centuries,
was the main reason why they were not as dangerous. Rugova was for Albanians what
Arafat was for Palestinians. His objectives developed from real autonomy, through the
Republic of Kosovo, to full independence. 44 At the time Rugova and his followers
insisted that they should have the same rights as Serbs in Croatia, but they had to change
that once Croatian army conducted operation ―Oluja‖ (Storm) in August 1995 45 , in which
they completed ethnic cleansing of Serbs that started in WWII.
Milosevic, on the other side, tried to imitate Israelis, but he did not understand
that for that kind of approach he needed the support of the USA. On the contrary, Rugova
41 UNESCO Online, ―Parallel worlds rebuilding the education system in Kosovo,‖ 43,
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001361/136152e.pdf
42 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 30.
43 Milan Komnenic, Klopka u Rambujeu (Beograd: Prosveta, 2006), 124.
44 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 31.
45 Ibid, 36.

Boshkovich 22
had more support from the USA and other western countries, not to mention the support
from Muslim countries. It was quite normal when some politician visited Serbia, such as
Senator Bob Dole, to talk only with Albanians, avoiding even a courtesy talk with
government representatives. Encouraged by this amount of support, Albanian terrorists
decided to establish the KLA to intensify attacks on Serbs, especially after the collapse of
the Albanian government (in Albania) and stealing of countless number of weapons from
army bases around Albania (according to Mr. Simic it was more than 700,000 of
weapons). 46 Albanian separatists were very surprised when the State Department put the
KLA on the list of terrorist organizations, which lasted until 1998, when the KLA ceased
to be considered as a terrorist group 47 , and, as some politicians in Serbia claim, actually
become NATO infantry in 1999 bombing of Serbia.
Mr. Holbrook (high ranking diplomat of Department of State who even took off his shoes to show respect
to his host- I.B.) with KLA leadership 48
46
Ibid, 49.
47
Scott Park, ―State Department Once Called New Allies ‗Terrorists‘: Cohen: For KLA victory, but not for
KLA,‖ Human Events, April 30, 1999,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_199904/ai_n8836923/
48
Forumi Shqiptar Online, http://www.forumishqiptar.com/showthread.php?t=44488

Boshkovich 23
Left to Right: Hashim Thachi (KLA Leader), Bernard Kouchner (UNMIK Chief), Sir Michael Jackson
(NATO Command), Gen. Agim Ceku (Commanding KLA General), Gen. Wesley Clark (Commanding
NATO General) 49
According to Mr. Mitic, British journalist Tim Marshall in his book stated that
Americans did not came to Kosovo just to observe, but also to instruct the KLA and
provide them with equipment, satellite phones, etc. 50
By 1997, the KLA controlled significant parts of Kosovo‘s territory. This was
unacceptable for Serbian authorities, and Milosevic decided to send more troops to this
region. Quite easily the army and police defeated KLA, but international community did
not like this usage of armed forces so they insisted that Serbia accept UN mission which
would control movements of Serbian security forces. The head of this Mission was
William Walker. The problem with this mission was that they did not do what they were
49 Emperors Online, http://emperors-clothes.com/serbo-croatian/articles/s-sinko.htm
50 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 62.

supposed to; instead, according to some military commentators at that time in
Yugoslavia, they were marking targets for the NATO. 51
Boshkovich 24
This Mission was supposed to have 2,000 members, but at the end there were
1,600 people. They did not have any weapons, but a large number of them were military
intelligence personnel from western countries. British journalist Tim Marshall said that
British sent members of SAS as well as members of other elite units. In addition to that,
according to this journalist, the CIA was also present and very active in this mission. 52
Besides regular Serbian forces, there were some groups of so-called ―volunteers‖.
The most known leader of them was Arkan with his ―tigers‖. Some westerners said that
the number of these ―soldiers‖ was remarkable, but in actuality there were a couple of
dozens of them. While there were a remarkable percentage of volunteers that came to
Kosovo due to patriotic feelings and ideology (Arkan for example was very interested in
politics, he was once even a member of the Parliament), a significant number of them
came with the main goal to steal cars, TVs, money, jewelry, etc. General Lazarevic
mentioned some cases in which regular armed forces discovered misconduct of
volunteers: ―…25 volunteers were returned from the corps and seven were detained
because of renegade behavior, killings, robbery, rapes, et cetera‖. 53
Of course, these volunteers created an extremely negative picture of Serbia in the
world, creating more damage then favor for their country. Unfortunately, they liked to
pose for pictures in uniform and journalists from around the globe saw a great
51 Vlada Republike Srbije Online, ―General lazarevic: Neizostavno se vracamo na Kosmet,‖
http://www.arhiva.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/1999-12/26/17141.html
52 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 61.
53 UN ICTY Online, Transcripts from General Lazarevic Testimony, 17981,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071109IT.htm

Boshkovich 25
opportunity to make some story and earn their paycheck. On the other side the KLA
represented themselves as rebels fighting for freedom and democracy.
Arkan and his volunteers 54
Interestingly, some politicians in Serbia were ahead of time. Mr. Cosic for
example, who was the first president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (established
in 1992 after the collapse of Socialistic Yugoslavia), wanted to determine a new border in
Kosovo which would give one third of Kosovo to Serbia and the rest to Albanians. He
even discussed about this with an USA ambassador in Yugoslavia Mr. Zimmermann, but
Milosevic refused that idea. 55 The reason for that was Milosevic‘s stubbornness. He
insisted that Kosovo is part of Serbia and Yugoslavia and that no one could change that.
Legally he was right, but in reality he could not understand that almost two million of
Albanians in Kosovo do not want to live in Serbia, while Serbia is not as powerful as for
54 Zona Libre Online, http://www.zonalibre.org/blog/lobo/archives/077635.html
55 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 72.

Boshkovich 26
example Spain or China to suppress their separatisms in Basque, Catalonia and Tibet,
respectively. On the other side no one knows how Albanians led by Rugova would react
on this proposal, but most likely they would accept this idea because that would give
them independence without war (Mr. Cosic talked about this in 1992), which would be
recognized by Serbia.

Part II
Chapter II
Section A; About the KLA
Boshkovich 27
The KLA's guerrilla campaign was a deliberate attempt to provoke Belgrade into
reprisals that would attract the West's attention. Knowing it could not defeat Yugoslavia
without NATO's military support, the KLA waged a nasty insurgency that included
assassinations of Serbian political and military officials. 56
Answering the question ―What is actually the KLA?‖ back on 25 th February 1998,
the US special envoy for Kosovo, Ambassador Robert Gelbard said: ―I know how to
recognize terrorist when I see him. Trust me, these people are terrorists‖. 57 Even if it is not
easy to find these attributes about the KLA in western sources, a persistent researcher
will find one on BBC‘s website from June 28 th 1998 where Gelbard was quoted saying:
―I know a terrorist when I see one and these men are terrorists,". 58 However, according to
Mr. Simic a couple of months later the KLA was no longer considered a terrorist
organization, but fighters for freedom. Not just that, in the same year on April 21 st ,
Senators Mitch McConnell and Joseph Lieberman requested that the US administration
finance with 25 million dollars weapons for 10,000 members of the KLA. Journalist Tim
Judah noticed that comparing to organizations such as IRA, ETA, Hezbollah or Corsican
56 Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz, ―Was It a Mistake?; We Were Suckers for the KLA,‖ The
Washington Post, March 26, 2000,
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/51850611.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=
Mar+26%2C+2000&author=Christopher+Layne%3BBenjamin+Schwarz&pub=The+Washington+Post&ed
ition=&startpage=B.01&desc=WAS+IT+A+MISTAKE%3F%3B+We+Were+Suckers+For+the+KLA
57 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 53.
58 BBC Online, ―The KLA – Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?‖,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/121818.stm

Boshkovich 28
National Front, the KLA is most successful terrorist organization in modern history
because in just 18 months since they introduced themselves in public, they acquired main
political goals and succeed in gaining of support of the most powerful military
organization in the world to do for them majority of military goals. 59
One of the KLA leaders, Jakup Krasnici openly stated that the KLA objective is
unification of all Albanians on Balkan. 60 The other KLA leader, Bardil Mahmuti said that
they calculated that ethnic Albanians could lose approximately 300,000 people to gain
independence which is acceptable. 61
According to the DEA (Drugs Enforcement Administration) Albanian mafia is the
most important link in monthly shipments of 4-6 tons of Turkish heroin to Western
Europe. 62 The Times commented that the KLA "is a terrorist organization that has
financed much of its war effort with profits from the sale of heroin." Additional
documents from intelligence agencies of five different countries obtained by the news
agencies disclosed that "the KLA has aligned itself with an extensive organized crime
network centered in Albania that smuggles heroin and some cocaine tobuyers throughout
Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States." Members of the KLA are
among the individuals that are part of the Albanian drug cartel. Most of the profits from
this drug operation are then channeled into the KLA for arms purchases. 63
59 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 54.
60 ICG Europe, Report No 153, ―Pan Albanianism: how big a threat to Balkan stability?‖, February 25,
2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan014972.pdf
61 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 62-63.
62 Heather Cottin, ―The Balkan Route and the Contras of Kosovo,‖ CovertAction Online,
http://www.covertaction.org/content/view/77/75/
63 UN Wire, ―Newspaper Explores KLA Drug, Terrorism Ties,‖ May 6, 1999,
http://www.unwire.org/unwire/19990506/2453_story.asp

Boshkovich 29
Besides the KLA activities that are connected to distribution of illegal drugs, their
connection with Al-Qaeda was also topic of some investigations. ―…some members of
the KLA received training in terrorist camps run by international fugitive Osama bin
Laden… 64 And this is what Mr. Kirov, acting head of Bulgarian intelligence said about
Al-Qaeda aspirations on Balkan:‖ Ever since the Yugoslav wars began, Al-Qaeda and
other radical organizations have worked to gain and develop footholds in the Balkans and
among the expatriate populations. He warned that Kosovo would become a ‗direct source
of regional instability and a hub for international terrorism‘ if concerted action was not
taken to address the issue.‖ 65 According to data from the Yugoslav police, among
members of the KLA it was not unusual to find Mujahedins from Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Egypt, Sudan, and other Islamic countries. 66 According to the same sources, the KLA
was financed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Humanitarian Organization
―Third World Relief Agency (TWRA)‖ led by sheik Omar Rahman and Osama bin
Laden. 67 ―… the Bosnian pattern was replicated in Kosovo: Mujahadeen mercenaries
from various Islamic countries are reported to be fighting alongside the KLA in Kosovo.
German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were reported to be training the KLA in guerilla
and diversion tactics‖ 68 Even according to the London Times, American intelligence
agencies pointed out that there is a possible connection between the KLA and Osama bin
Laden, a Saudi emigrant accused for bombing of USA embassies in Nairobi and Kenya in
64
Ibid.
65
The New York Times, ―Carry on Blair,‖ May 10, 2007,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/carry-onblair/?scp=15&sq=Kosovo%20Liberation%20Army,%20Al-Qaeda&st=cse
66
Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 70.
67
Ibid, 70.
68
Michael Chossudovsky, ―Kosovo ‗Freedom Fighters‘ Financed by Organized Crime,‖
http://www.eroj.org/urbiorbi/Yugoslavia/kosovo.htm

Boshkovich 30
August 1998. 69 This statement was obviously released before 9/11. Some experts said
that they are concerned that Albanian organized crime groups from Kosovo, Albania and
Macedonia could make an alliance with other terrorist groups. However, according to US
officials, those links have not been detected. 70
Unfortunately, it seems that all these information are not enough for the US and
other western countries to see the KLA as just another terrorist organization, which might
become a threat to American soldiers as well. It will probably happen once NATO came
on the way to the KLA‘s ambitions in Kosovo.
Between January 1 st 1998, and June 10 th 1999, members of the KLA carried out
2,896 terrorist attacks, to include 1,071 attacks on citizens, 1,642 on members of police,
and 573 on members of Yugoslav Army. 71
69 The Times, ―U.S. Alarmed as Mujahidin Join Kosovo Rebels,‖ November 26, 1998.
70 US Embassy Online, ―Islamic Terrorism and the Balkan,‖ July 26, 2005,
www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL33012.pdf
71 Youtube Online, ―Kosovo War – Political Aspects (Part I)‖, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fv-
3z_cvJOk&feature=related

KLA terrorists with beheaded Serbian 72
Boshkovich 31
―Today these same men wear the uniforms of the [Kosovo] Protection Corps (approximately 5,000
members of the former KLA are in the Corps).‖ 73
Is it possible to reconstruct this crime?
The KLA terrorist in the middle is Sadik Cuflaj from the area of Decani. On his
left is Valon Cuflaj, his son who is currently employed by UNMIK in Kosovo Protection
Corps (rank of Lieutenant). He is taking the position in inspector‘s office in Pec, and in
the meantime UNMIK took disciplinary measures against him and his father. The
assumption is that these crimes are committed by units led by Ramush and Daut
Haradinaj (Ramush‘s case will be more elaborated in following part of this section). The
human head that is visible on the right most likely is the head of Bojan Cvetkovic from
72 Dejan Lucic Online, http://www.dejanlucic.net/
73 Vecernje Novosti, KLA Cut Off People’s Head http://www.ex-yupress.com/evnovosti/evnovosti13.html

Boshkovich 32
Nis (central Serbia), while it was not possible to find out whose head was the one on the
right side. 74
Even the ICTY‘s (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia)
main prosecutor Carla Del Ponte could not ignore war crimes committed by members of
the KLA. Simply, there were so many evidences of their brutality that some KLA leaders
had to be accused and sent to Hague. Many people have disappeared during the bombing
and after arrival of the KFOR troops. That number includes over 1,500 Albanians that
disappeared after being captured by the KLA during the bombing, while 300 Albanians
were missed in second half of 1999 and 2000. 75 Unfortunately, this number is growing
every day, especially in the Serbian community. Besides that, Del Ponte said that a
significant number of those that were captured (Serbian media covered that story before
Del Ponte) ended in Albania where Albanian doctors participated in surgeries in which
they were taking out internal organs of kidnapped people and smuggled them through an
airport in Rinas to wealthy patients in other countries. 76 Naturally, since these crimes
were committed by the KLA which should represent ‗good boys‘, Del Ponte always
highlighted that these stories are based on statements of witnesses. At the same time
Serbs that were accused for war crimes were usually pronounced guilty even before the
trial would begin. Nevertheless, Del Ponte said that Thaci did admit during one
conversation that the KLA committed crimes in Kosovo. She replied that she commenced
investigation in regard to that on which he reacted by huge surprise and fear. 77
Thaci did not have to defend himself in ICTY, but Ramush Haradinaj had to. This
74 Ibid
75 Carla del Ponte and Cak Sudetic, Gospodja Tuziteljka: Suocavanje s Najtezim Ratnim Zlocinima i
Kulturom Nekaznjivosti (Beograd: Profil Knjiga, 2008), 268.
76 Ibid, 268-69.
77 Ibid, 271.

Boshkovich 33
well known KLA leader was elected by the Kosovo Assembly as a Prime Minister of
Kosovo in 2004. Based on Del Ponte‘s investigation, Haradinaj was accused for crimes
against humanity and violations of laws of war. 78 Once again, Del Ponte made sure that
all accusations against Haradinaj were still to be proved (just on one page (281) of her
book she used word supposed 5 times before particular accusation made by witnesses).
Haradinaj found out about an indictment in March 2005, which was followed by his
patriotic speech. According to Del Ponte, it seemed that Søren Jessen-Petersen who was
chief of the UNMIK mission in Kosovo at that time was even sadder about this
accusation than Haradinaj himself. Jessen-Petersen said in his statement that it is very
painful that Mr. Haradinaj has to go to Hague, but he called all citizens of Kosovo to stay
calm and show same dignity that was showed by Haradinaj. 79
Fortunately for Haradinaj, the entire process against him in ICTY was poorly
prepared and followed by the disappearance of all crucial witnesses. Del Ponte tried to
find some excuse for that, such as the fact that those few Albanians from Kosovo who
wished to give testimony would have to be protected along with their families and moved
to third countries which were not ready to accept them. 80 Another explanation for a lack
of witnesses is evident in Nazim Bllaca‘s decision to talk. This man was member of
Kosovo‘s Intelligence Agency, for which he committed homicides, attempts of
homicides, and threats. Bllaca said that at that time he thought he was helping Kosovo,
but later on he found out that it was not the case. 81 His activities include the bribery
(150,000 Euros) of Riza Rehaj who was supposed to be a witness in Hague in trial
78 Ibid, 281.
79 Ibid, 283-84.
80 Ibid, 270.
81 Blic Online, ―Blaca: Tacijevi Saradnici su mi Naredjivali da Ubijam Ljude,‖ November 29, 2009,
http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123057

Boshkovich 34
against Fatmir Limaj, one of the KLA commanders. 82 Because of that, at the court Rehaj
changed his original testimony. Besides that, Bllaca admitted that he also killed one
witness in Limaj‘s case. 83 Anyway, Haradinaj was just another KLA leader that was
proclaimed innocent in front of ICTY because their prosecutors did not have enough
evidence to put him in jail. Also, this KLA leader had very expensive lawyers from the
law firm where one of employees is Cherie Blair (wife of British Prime Minister, at that
time, Tony Blair who was a strong advocate of bombing as well as independence of
Kosovo) for which he paid millions of Euros. 84 Once again, different than for many
Serbian generals, money was not the problem. However, at present signals from Hague
are giving some hope that Haradinaj might have a renewed trial, but it is yet to be
confirmed.
Serbian Intelligence Agency (BIA) in her ‗White Book‘ also presented some
valuable information regarding the KLA. According to BIA, between 1996 and 1999 the
KLA have received 900 million of German Marks, and half of that was made by drug
trafficking. Besides that, Albanians from Europe that were in charge of the financing of
the KLA where involved in trafficking persons, and the smuggling of weapons. A
sizeable amount of money was collected through imposed tax to Albanians that work
abroad (3% of their income) which they were forced to pay. The KLA had a special
department in charge of Serbians enclaves. Their task was to make the remaining Serbs to
leave Kosovo and at the same time make sure that Serbs that are IDPs (Internal
82 Limaj was accused along with three other KLA members of torturing and killing civilians, BBC Online,
―Prominent Kosovo Suspect Held,‖ February 19, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2778079.stm
83 Vuk Z. Cvijic and Nedjeljko Zeljak. ―Zastrasivali Svedoke da ne Optuze Tacija i Limaja,‖ Blic Online,
December 12, 2009, http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=123394
84 The Centre for Peace in the Balkans Online, ―U.S. Praises Incident Former Kosovo P.M,‖ May 1, 2007,
http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=14323

Boshkovich 35
Dislocated Persons) won‘t come back. 85 Even today the KLA is still active in Europe.
This time they are better known as ‗Albanian Mafia‘ which is growing stronger every
day. Just recently some of their members were caught in London in attempt to sell a girl
to another group of Albanians. Albanians already control most of the prostitution in
Greece, Germany, and Italy, where they are preparing to take the jobs of the Italian
mafia, especially in Milan. According to data from Belgian police department specialized
for Albanian organized crime, Albanian mafia is dominant in illegal activities. Experts
think that war in Kosovo played a crucial role in spreading of Albanian mafia in
Europe. 86 Even the famous Russian mafia is avoiding confrontations with Albanians due
to their brutality.
85 Vuk Z. Cvijic. ―Taci Bio Sef Obavestajne Sluzbe na Kosovu,‖ Blic Online, December 9, 2009,
http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=124554
86 Blic Online, ―Prodavali Devojku za Tri Hiljade Funti,‖ December 8, 2009,
http://www.blic.rs/svet.php?id=124352

Section B; Road to Rambouillet
Boshkovich 36
The beginning of the end started in the spring of 1998. That year separatists in
Kosovo initiated a real guerilla war. Almost every day the KLA would kill couple of
members of the Serbian armed forces from the ambush, in addition to attacks on
‖Albanian traitors‖ and non-Albanians. 87 On the other side, Milosevic organized
referendum regarding the involvement of the international community in this conflict in
Kosovo. As expected, a vast majority of the Serbian population voted against
internationalization of the internal issues of Serbia. Arrogant Milosevic was very satisfied
with the result of referendum, which he saw as approval to handle this conflict in the
same manner. He sent more troops to Kosovo to protect the borders and to deal with the
KLA.
Due to an enormous use of armed forces, Clinton‘s administration treated
Yugoslavia with bombing. Even Mr. Cosic found this ironic because USA bombed
countries that just might be connected to attacks on USA embassies in Africa while
Yugoslavia was not allowed to fight against terrorists on her own territory. However, to
make sure that any future intervention has some legitimacy, the UN Security Council
voted for resolution that will allowed NATO to intervene against ―country that
threatening international peace‖, regardless of the fact that NATO was established to
protect only those countries that are members of that organization. In the meantime,
Adem Demaci, ―political leader of the KLA‖ appealed to his ―army‖ to ―fight against
Serbian occupation until entire liberation of Kosovo‖. 88
87 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ―Indictment against Ramush
Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj Released to the Public,‖ March 10, 2005,
http://www.icty.org/sid/8631
88 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 89.

Boshkovich 37
The international community ordered Milosevic to sign the agreement with
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) regarding the engagement
of this organization‘s mission in Kosovo. This ―agreement‖ had 37 entries mainly made
to control Serbian armed forces without having to fight with them. This includes: turning
of all radars upon request of NATO headquarter in Vicenza, control of movements of all
Serbian border patrols (it was practically impossible to set an ambush for Albanian
terrorists that were smuggling weapons from Albania with all those OSCE employees
next to Serbian soldiers, especially because the OSCE had orange SUVs to make
themselves distinguishable), permission for NATO unmanned aircrafts to control the
entire region of Kosovo, etc. However, there was not any part of the agreement that
obligated Albanians to do anything. 89 Nevertheless, only ten days later, on 27 th October
1998, NATO commandant General Wesley Clark ordered Milosevic to pull his entire
army back to barracks, in addition to a request that Serbian police abandon her positions
on main roads in Kosovo (today‘s situation in Iraq proves how difficult is to pull troops
from the battlefield in short period of time). Once again, Milosevic accepted to do
everything under the threat of usage of NATO aviation. Serbs were shocked seeing all
those military convoys in retreat from Kosovo. Of course, this created vacuum on the
battlefield which made a great opportunity for the KLA to continue with their activities.
In the absence of enough support of the Serbian army, special police were forced
to fight with the KLA mainly on her own. The turning point was an incident in the village
of Racak, which happened on 17 th January 1999. The KLA killed a couple of members of
the Serbian armed forces in an ambush, which was followed by police intervention and
89 Ibid, 94.

Boshkovich 38
the killing of some KLA terrorists. 90 According to Serbian authorities, during the night
the KLA brought more bodies on this location, and also changed uniforms from fallen
terrorists so they would look like civilians, and according to a German documentary
movie this is something that also occurred in the village of Rugovo (Serbs were accused
for the massacres of civilians in Rugovo, but in reality there was a combat in which 24
KLA members and one police officer died, and according to OSCE there were not any
massacres but western media was never willing to say that). 91 Nevertheless, in the
morning Albanians called Mr. William Walker (head of OSCE mission in Kosovo who
was delegated to this position by Secretary Albright 92 which just proves how even this
European organization was just a toy of Clinton‘s administration) who came in company
with the KLA to see what happened in Racak (later on, during the trial against Milosevic,
Walker could not remember that he was there with the KLA, but, pictures from
newspapers reminded him). This was not the first time that Mr. Walker had a problem
with his memory. A great example is his testimony in BBC‘s documentary movie ―Moral
Combat-NATO at War‖, where he said that he did not call his superiors from Racak
while Mr. Holbrook and General Clark claim that he called them immediately from the
scene. 93 Nevertheless, Mr. Walker did obviously inform his mentors as soon as possible
about the killing of 46‘innocent civilians‘, even if some of them did not have holes from
bullets on their clothes due to a changing of uniforms. Finnish forensic experts in a final
90 Ibid, 101.
91 YouTube Online, Bettina Kapune, ―It started with a Lie - NATO Aggression against Serbia 1999 Part 3,‖
Westdeutschen Rundfunks (WDR), 2001, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kuhfyd6bJs&NR=1
92 YouTube Online, Aidan Laverty and Tom Giles, ―Moral Combat - NATO at War - Part 3,‖ BBC
Production , 2000, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7J2Uqxh194&feature=related
93 YouTube Online, Aidan Laverty and Tom Giles ―Moral Combat - NATO at War - Part 4,‖ BBC
Production , 2000, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2G-FHu4P_8&feature=related

Boshkovich 39
report on the circumstances of the deaths two years ago of some 40 people in the village
of Racak in Kosovo found no evidence of a massacre by Serb security forces. 94
Some experts in Serbia claim that this was well prepared performance with
purpose to invite NATO bombs, just like in case of Bosnia 1994, when, according to
some sources 95 , Muslims in Sarajevo conducted attack on ―Markale‖ market place in
downtown of Sarajevo just to blame the Serbs. That time dozens of people were killed
and injured which was a justification for NATO bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Even British General Michael Rose who was commander of UN troops
in Bosnia at that time argues about this tragedy in his book as something that happened
under suspicious circumstances. Because of that, his book was used by Milosevic in the
trial in ICTY, but also became an interesting topic for Rose‘s critics such as Noel
Malcolm. Malcolm did not like Rose‘s observation that "French military engineers"
suggested that, because the market was almost surrounded by high buildings, "the bomb
might not have been fired from a mortar at all, but detonated in situ". But the French
military engineers were not the only team that investigated this massacre. There were two
more teams, and in final statement it was said that ―The final verdict of this team was that
the mortar had been fired from the north-north-east, from a distance of between 300 and
5,551 metres. This meant that it could have come from either Bosnian Army or Serb
positions: the scientific evidence was simply inconclusive.‖ 96 Yet, regardless of the fact
that it was possible that Serbs were not responsible for this massacre, NATO commenced
94 Bassuener Kurt, ―Week in Review-January 20-26, 1999,‖ Balkans Watch 2, no. 4 (1999),
―http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/Balkan%20Action%20Council%20Archives/BW%202.4.do
c
95 Jim Fish, ―Sarajevo Massacre Remembered,‖ BBC Online,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3459965.stm
96 General Sir Michael Rose, ―Fighting for peace: Bosnia 1994,‖ Bosnian Institute Online,
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/about/bi_books/long_reviews.cfm?book=148

Boshkovich 40
bombing of Serbs in Bosnia. This is an excerpt from UN‘s report that supports the theory
that this event led to intervention: ―On 5 February 1994, a mortar round exploded in the
Markale marketplace in downtown Sarajevo killing 68 people, mostly Bosniac civilians,
and injuring over 200. Images of the carnage, which were captured by television crews,
were then transmitted around the world, provoking outrage‖. 97
Hopefully the history will show what really happened in Sarajevo, but for this
paper it is more important to find out if Racak was just a performance for the western
audience. According to Helena Ranta, forensic dentist from Finland, William Walker
threw the pencil at her in the winter of 1999 because she did not want to use stronger
language about the Serbs. She also said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to
manipulate the content of her reports while she was appointed by EU to investigate the
incident in Racak. She added that pressure regarding incident of Racak was very high,
including the one that came from media. ―In her investigations, Ranta focussed on
forensic medicine; she did not want to take a stand, at that stage, on politically and legally
loaded terminology‖. 98
Finish forensics were not the only one that were involved in the investigation of
Racak. Belarus and Serbian forensics revealed that on the hands of 37 killed Albanians
(from examined 40) they found tracks (using the method of paraffin glove) of
gunpowder, which is the evidence that they used weapons before they died, but no one
cared about that. 99
97 United Nations, ―Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: the
fall of Srebrenica,‖ November 15, 1999, http://www.un.org/news/ossg/srebrenica.pdf
98 Helsingin Sanomat. ―Helena Ranta: Foreign Ministry Tried to Influence Kosovo Reports.‖ Kosovo
Compromise. http://www.emperors-clothes.com/analysis/meetmr.htm
99 Vecernje Novosti Online, ―U Reziji Vokera,‖ January 15, 2010,
http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=4&status=jedna&vest=168147&title_add=U%20re%C5%BEi

Boshkovich 41
Some politicians were reserved from the very beginning in regard to Mr. Walker
due to rumors that he covered up the massacres of El Salvador‘s government back in
1989. In the investigation of this rumor, the author of this research found out that when
President Clinton wanted to make William Walker the Ambassador to Panama, back in
1993, the Church in Panama and local politicians reacted very fast accusing him for
involvement of the assassination of five priests in El Salvador in November 1989. "'The
Jesuit order at the time denounced the complicity of the U.S. Embassy (headed by
Walker) in the case, for concealing evidence, obstructing the investigation, pressuring
judges to impede the trial process, and terrorizing witnesses,' Valdes said." 100
On top of that, Fernando Garcia, Jesuit priest, said that ―Walker was 'a symbol of
the destruction of life' while he was ambassador in El Salvador." 101
Even Mr. Petritsch, one of the three co-presides of the Rambouillet Conference,
said that Mr. Walker was always taking terrorists under protection and that way proved
his anti-Serbian position. 102
Nevertheless, Racak incident was initial capsule for NATO intervention which
was actually already prepared. 103 However, as Serbian politicians claim, to gain
international support for this intervention, ―International Community‖, popularly called
―the Contact Group‖ (consisted of ministries of foreign affairs from USA, UK, France,
Germany, Italy, and Russia) organized peace conference in Rambouillet (just out of
ji%20Vokera&kword_add=bombardovanje%2C%20racak; This is a story from Serbian newspaper
Vecernje Novosti, which is a very credible agency.
100 Inter Press Service, ―Panama: Jesuits Oppose U.S. Ambassador Designate,‖ July 22, 1993,
http://www.mail-archive.com/forum.zagraniczne@3w3.net/msg00529.html
101 Ibid.
102 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 64.
103 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 383; Secretary
Albright talked about gaining support for bombing almost a year before the bombing. She said: ―To make
that [threat of force] credible, it was vital for NATO to begin laying plans for a bombing campaign‖.

Paris) as a last attempt to avoid war against Yugoslavia.
Boshkovich 42
The most important points from the statement of the Contact Group that was
issued on 29 th January are that regardless of efforts that were made by international
community violence was still part of daily life in Kosovo. At the same time ‗the massacre
of Kosovo Albanians in Racak‘ resulted in several thousands of people that had to escape
from their homes. Surprisingly, in second article of this statement one can found that the
Contact Group (CG) blamed both, Yugoslav armed forces and the KLA for escalation of
violence. Therefore, Ministers of the Contact Group urged both sides to accept
negotiations that would lead to political settlement. For that purpose the CG insisted that
all sides accept ‗the basis for a fair settlement must include the principles set out by the
Contact Group‘. Also, it was asked that negotiators include the elements of ‗substantial
autonomy for Kosovo‘ as a framework for the agreement. (Appendix, page 121)
The CG also demanded that both sides send their delegations to Rambouillet by
the sixth of February, where they would participate in the negotiation process led by co-
chairmen Hubert Vedrine and Robin Cook (French and British Ministers of Foreign
Affairs). This process was originally meant to last seven days, but as it will be explained
in the following chapters of this paper, it lasted longer. Additionally, the CG required that
both sides restrain from military actions, and said that ‗The Contact Group will hold both
sides accountable if they fail to take the opportunity now offered to them‘. 104
104 United Nations, Security Council, January 29, 1999, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s9996.pdf this
statement will be also available in the appendix I of this research.

Chapter III
Boshkovich 43
The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout
Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. 105 Rambouillet is not a
document that any Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that
should never have been presented in that form.
—Henry Kissinger, Daily Telegraph, June 28 1999 106
Section A; Actors
The brief version of the proposed document (available in appendix II) explains
that Rambouillet accords are agreement made for a period of three years. That agreement
would cover the most important aspects of life for citizens of Kosovo: self-government,
peace, and security. Regarding democratic self-government it was said that it was meant
to cover education, health care, and financial development. In addition to that, both sides
were to agree that Kosovo will have a President, an Assembly, independent courts, local
government, and ―national community institutions with the authority needed to protect
each community's identity‖. On the subject of security it was explained that international
troops will take care of that. At the same time local police would provide law
enforcement while Serbian and Yugoslav security forces were supposed to leave Kosovo
(the exception was small number of border patrols). In section that covers ‗mechanism
for final settlement‘ it was said that after three years the international community would
hold the meeting in which they would find the final solution for Kosovo. On that meeting
they would take very seriously in to consideration ‗the will of the people, opinions of
relevant authorities, each party's efforts regarding the implementation of the Accords, and
105 Ian Bancroft, ―Serbia‘s Anniversary Is a Timely Reminder,‖ Guardian Online, March 24, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/24/serbia-kosovo
106 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 189.

the Helsinki Final Act‘. 107
Boshkovich 44
The entire agreement (Appendix III) which was signed only by Albanians was
eighty two pages long (―…they [Albanians] officially signed the eighty-two-page
agreement in a five-minute ceremony boycotted both the Yugoslav delegation and the
Russian negotiator.‖) 108 , and the Serbs had a huge number of complaints which most of
the time were not accepted. However, the agreement discussion will follow after
description of the delegations, which had actually never met in Rambouillet, except when
they would see each other by accident in the hallways. The reason for this was host‘s
decision to implement shuttle diplomacy rather than direct negotiations which Yugoslav
delegation favored. 109
The negotiators
Serbian delegation
The Serbian delegation in Rambouillet was represented by five high-ranking allies
of Milosevic in addition to representatives of other ethnic groups from Kosovo. The
107 The State Department Online, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html
108 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 405.
109 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 203.

Boshkovich 45
reason for this is Serbia‘s desire to highlight that Albanians are not the only minority in
Serbian southern province. Therefore this is how the Yugoslav/Serbian delegation was
represented:
- Ratko Markovic; professor of law, constitutional expert, Serbian Deputy
Minister, and delegate of Socialist Party.
Ratko Markovic
- Nikola Sainovic; point of contact of Serbian Government on all matters regarding
Kosovo, in charge for negotiations including ceasefires and exchanges of
prisoners, former Minister of Economy, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister, and
also delegate of Socialist Party.
- Vladan Kutlesic; Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister.
- Vladimir Stambuk; Serbian Deputy Speaker.
- Vojislav Zivkovic; Chairman of the Socialist Party's branch in Kosovo.
- Guljbehar Sabovic; Member of the Kosmet (Kosovo and Metohija) Provisional
Executive Council.
- Refik Senadovic; Representative of the Muslim national Community.
- Zejnelabidin Kurejs; Representative of the Turkish Democratic Party and the Turk
national community.

- Ibro Vait; Representative of Goranies national Community.
Boshkovich 46
- Faik Jasari; President of the Kosovo Democratic Initiative (ethnic Albanian
political party).
- Sokolj Cuse; President of Democratic Reform Party of Albanians.
- Ljuan Koka; President of Co-ordinating Council of the Yugoslav Association of
Romanies and representative of the Romanian national community.
- Cerim Abazi; Representative of the Egyptian national community.
Of course, it is noticeable that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, as well as
Serbian President Milan Milutinovic were not members of the Yugoslav/Serbian
delegation (for simplicity it will be called the Serbian delegation).
Ethnic Albanian delegation
Albanian delegation had 16 delegates, and the most important of those were:
- Ibrahim Rugova; President of so-called Republic of Kosovo since 1992 and
leader of ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo.
Ibrahim Rugova
- Fehmi Agani; Rugova‘s ally, one of the leaders of Democratic League of Kosovo
(LDK), professor of philosophy.

- Veton Surroi; journalist with many important contacts in the West.
Boshkovich 47
- Rexhep Qosja; an academic that was advocate of a greater Albania that would
bring together in one country (Albania) Albanians from Kosovo and other
neighboring countries.
- Jakup Krasniqi; former teacher from Drenica (KLA stronghold), KLA‘s
spokesman.
- Ram Buja; former member of leadership of Rugova‘s Party (LDK), senior KLA
official ―for civilian affairs‖.
The only surprise regarding this delegation was that Adem Demaci was not part of it.
He was opponent of Serbian rule in Kosovo for almost 30 years. But in the late 90‘s he
became critic of Rugova because of his non-violent approach. Besides that, he was the
KLA‘s political representative, but the KLA did not take in account his advice to ignore
Rambouillet Peace Conference. 110
All these names of the members of the delegations are easy to find in numerous
sources that covered this conference. However, the most known media that covered the
Conference, such as BBC, did not know all names that will appear in Rambouillet,
including some KLA members.
Mr. Mitic (career diplomat of Yugoslavia) who was also one of the members of
delegations that was not mentioned offers more information regarding this matter.
According to Mr. Mitic, he and Professor Etinski were added to the Serbian delegation as
experts, beside two officials from SMIP (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and other
personnel from the same Ministry. Additionally, Mitic discussed what the role of
110 BBC Online, ―Europe Kosovo Talks: The Negotiators,‖ February 6, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/273830.stm

individuals in respective delegations was, particularly in Serbian delegation.
Boshkovich 48
Professor Markovic was just officially a head of the delegation. In reality, Mr.
Sainovic was the chief because Milosevic had full confidence in him. As Markovic said
to other members of Serbian delegation: ―In the way that this duck on the lake is the
owner of this castle, I am the head of the delegation! Besides, that is something that I do
not have to explain to you, you saw that yourself!‖ 111 (Mitic‘s book is in Serbian and this
is one of translations made by the author of this paper, just like in cases of Simic,
Komnenic, Cosic, and some texts from Serbian newspapers). Additionally, Serbian
President Milutinovic joined the Conference to prove that Yugoslavia did take the
Conference seriously. He ignored Markovic‘s suggestions even if he was usually right.
Occasionally, Milutinovic would use attributes such as a traitor to critique Markovic.
Other than Markovic and Sainovic, Kutlesic and Stambuk were also important
members of the delegation, while other members would be informed occasionally about
the talks. Those others were mainly representatives of minorities from Kosovo who were
seeing by westerners just as an ornament to Serbian delegation. 112 According to Austrian
Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch (one of three co-presides of the Conference), Kutlesic,
Markovic, and Sainovic were competent and willing to find the solution that was
acceptable for both sides, while other members of Serbian delegation did not have
anything to say. 113
111 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 81.
112 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 221.
113 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 83.

Boshkovich 49
Speaking of Albanian delegation, it is very important to mention that the head was
not Rugova but Hasim Thaci, the top leader of the KLA (present Prime Minister 114 ). Most
likely that Albanians would not accept Thaci as the chief of their delegation without an
influence from someone from the side, which was probably Madeleine Albright. Between
the other two KLA fighters, Thaci succeeded to come to Rambouillet with the help of
OSCE mission in Kosovo, regardless of the fact that he did not have a passport or other
legal documents. However, French issued them travel documents. 115 Besides Thaci, there
are other important members of the delegation that were not mentioned in media before
the conference. Those are experts in Albanian delegation that were mostly Americans
with their chief, Morton Abramowitz. 116
Secretary Albright and Hasim Thaci – nick
name ―Snake‖ (as stated in Latin say; nomen atque omen-name fits the object-I.B.) in Rambouillet 117
114
Central Intelligence Agency, ―Kosovo: Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments,‖
May 12, 2009, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/world-leaders-k/kosovo.html
115
Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 200.
116
Diana Johnstone, ―Nato‘s Mixed Motives,‖
http://www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/Johnstone69.pdf; Abramowitz may be considered the
éminence grise behind the US policy of support to the Albanian secessionists in Kosovo
117
Srpska Politika Online, http://www.srpskapolitika.com/Tekstovi/Komentari/2009/latinica/033.html.

Boshkovich 50
According to David Livingstone, Abramowitz was often associated to CIA‘s
activities abroad. 118 Other than that, Abramowitz was the leader of the group of 32
American intellectuals who wrote a letter to President Clinton titled ―Milosevic is the
Problem‖ (22 nd September 1998), in which they stated that the Balkan won‘t be peaceful
and stable until Milosevic is in power. And one of the crucial things in regard to
Abramowitz is that he is a close friend of Madeleine Albright, for which Tim Judah said
that is not insignificant. 119 Of course that this is very significant because Abramowitz
represented the Albanian delegation, while his close friend represented the international
community to include both, the stick and the carrot. What then Serbian delegation had to
expect? The only chance was to put someone more important in to Serbian delegation,
but Serbs never understood that part of the game. It is not important who is right, it is
about good advocates.
Since the Albanians acted like rich clients that could afford all the best lawyers,
they engaged many other western experts to fight for them: Paul Williams, an expert for
international law from Washington D.C.; Marc Weller, Professor of International Law
from Cambridge; Shinasi Rama from Columbia University who was in charge for the
KLA public affairs in New York. 120
When speaking of three co-presides of the Conference, except for the already
mentioned Petritsch, the other two were American Ambassador Christopher Hill, and
Russian Ambassador Boris Majorski. Officially these three individuals were supposed to
be equal, but it was obvious that Mr. Hill was ‗playing the first violin‘, while Petritsch
118 Word Press Online, ―Uighur Nationalism, Turkey and the CIA,‖
http://eldib.wordpress.com/2009/08/03/uighur-nationalism-turkey-and-the-cia/; Morton Abramowitz was
also deeply involved with Afghan Mujahedeen and Kosovo rebels.
119 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 205.
120 Ibid.

Boshkovich 51
and Majorski were just assistants. While Hill was most sympathetic to the KLA, Majorski
was making sure that he was not in opposition to Americans, but at the same time he was
doing his best not to confront with Yugoslav delegation, even if he (along with his
assistant Bazdnikin) acted sometimes as a ‘bigger Catholic than the Pope‘, criticizing
Serbs for refusing to accept the paper proposed by the Contact Group. 121 Regardless of
the fact that Mr. Hill was the most influential co-preside of the Conference, it is
noticeable that Europeans were trying to show that they also had an important role in
these talks. As published in The New York Times:‖…the French Government controlled
the ground rules. The Americans, for example, wanted NATO military officials in
uniform at the conference as a confidence-building measure for the Albanians. The
French Government blocked their presence.‖ 122
Among other individuals that are important to mention in regard to this
conference are official hosts (co-chairmen) Hubert Vedrine (French Foreign Minister),
and Robert Cook (British Foreign Minister). Of course it would be unacceptable not to
mention the most important figure of the entire conference, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright.
Despite being a very high ranking diplomat, who should refrain from announcing
publicly negative opinions about her counterparts, Albright never tried to hide her
extremely negative opinion about Milosevic. Regardless of the fact that Slovenia declared
independence, violating the constitution of the SFRY (Socialistic Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia), which was followed by an attempt of JNA to secure the borders, as well as
121 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 98.
122 Jane Perlez, ―Diplomat vs. Rebels,‖ New York Times, February 25, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/25/world/diplomat-vsrebels.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/C/Clinton,%20Bill&scp=9&sq=Rambouillet%20pe
ace%20conference%201999&st=cse

Boshkovich 52
Croatian ethnic cleansing of Serbs in 1995 123 , and civil war in Bosnia for which all three
sides were responsible (this time Serbs were military superior, but confrontation started
by killing of one Serbian in downtown of Sarajevo during his son‘s wedding), Albright
stated in her memoirs that ―Milosevic already started three wars in the Balkans (against
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia). He seemed ready to begin a fourth‖. 124 She insisted that
Milosevic has to be threatened by NATO if negotiations were meant to be possible.
Therefore, she started to gain support for NATO intervention almost a year before the
bombing. Albright was very satisfied when Robert Gelbard, Clinton‘s envoy for the
Balkan agreed that ―…it was vital for NATO to begin laying plans for a bombing
campaign‖ 125 back in April 1998.
On the other hand, Albright was very empathetic with the Albanians. During one
of her meetings with Rugova she said that ―[Rugova] said the goal of Albanians was
independence, but they might accept an interim status as an international protectorate or
even, he joked, as the fifty-first American state‖. 126 On the same page of her book in a
footnote Albright said something that is common knowledge on the Balkan, but not for
the rest of the world: ―Macedonia and Greece strongly opposed independence for Kosovo
because they feared it might inflame separatist ambitions within their own ethnic
Albanian populations….More generally, some Europeans feared that an independent
Kosovo would become a hotbed of Islamic extremism and organized crime‖. 127
123
Rebecca Sumner, ―A New World Order,‖ London Daily Online, http://www.london-daily.com/art/ldrebec.htm
124
Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 380.
125 Ibid, 383.
126 Ibid, 385.
127 Ibid, 385.

Boshkovich 53
Most of the thoughts that Albright put in her memoirs regarding the Balkan
described Albanians as innocent victims; while she forgot to talk about crimes committed
against Serbs. To make her stories more emotional and impressive she would talk about
Serbian crimes in detail, using an opportunity to blame Milosevic for everything, even if
he was not even close to the place where a particular incident had occurred. Here is one
of those examples; ―Three men, including a ninety-five-year-old paralytic, were burned
to death in their homes. Another sixteen civilians were found shot or hacked to death in
nearby villages. This was Milosevic‘s answer to the United Nations and NATO‖. 128 Not
to mention how all these reports were questionable, just like the one from the Racak.
Nevertheless, careful readers of Albright‘s memoirs will find from time to time
sentences that are not in favor of Albanians. Here is an example; ―Often indiscriminate in
their [KLA] attacks, they seemed intent on provoking a massive Serb response so that
international intervention would be unavoidable‖. 129 These kinds of tactics were
something that the writer of this paper would have used back in childhood to gain father‘s
support in fights with his older brother, but no one would imagine that the same
technique can be used on such a high level.
In her description of the Albanian delegation, one could see that Albright found
Rugova enigmatic, Surroi pragmatic, and Thaci problematic. Nevertheless, she found
Thaci very important and talked to him often trying to convince him to accept agreement
which he wanted to refuse because Albanians were supposed to wait three years before
the referendum in which they could vote for independence. Albright said: ―…we were
disappointed in him [Thaci], that if he thought we would bomb the Serbs even if the
128 Ibid, 388.
129 Ibid, 386.

Boshkovich 54
Albanians rejected the agreement, he was wrong. We could never get NATO support for
that. ‗On the other hand,‘ I said, ‗if you say yes and the Serbs say no, NATO will strike
and go on striking until the Serb forces are out and NATO can go in. You will have
security. And you will be able to govern yourselves‖. 130 Or as better explained in The
New York Times; ―…after intense arm-twisting by the U.S., the Albanian Kosovars said
yes. This was a dishonest yes -- it was a yes that was given not because the Kosovars
truly embraced Rambouillet, but because it was whispered in their ears that if they just
said yes and the Serbs said no, NATO would bomb the Serbs…‖ 131 Are these two
explanations strong enough pieces of evidences to see how the entire process in
Rambouillet was just a performance for the international community that was used to
make an excuse for bombing? Why? That is something that is not easy to find out. One
might assume that the USA wanted to show to the world that they are not always against
Muslims (both, in Bosnia and Kosovo Muslims were supported by the USA). Also, it is
possible that the West wanted to weaken Serbia because of its strong relationship with
Russia. In addition to that, it seemed that the USA was hardly waiting to bomb Serbia as
a punishment for the war in Bosnia. However, most likely the main reason was a strong
Albanian lobby in the USA which will be discussed later in this research.
Obviously Secretary Albright knew what she was talking about because she was
aware that Yugoslav delegation would never accept the agreement so she had to make
sure that Albanians would put their signature on the document. Unfortunately, Secretary
Albright missed an opportunity to explain why Yugoslav authorities could not accept
130 Ibid, 403.
131 Thomas L. Friedman , ―Foreign Affairs; Kosovo‘s Three Wars,‖ New York Times, August 6, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/06/opinion/foreign-affairs-kosovo-s-threewars.html?sec=&spon=&&scp=1&sq=Rambouillet%20peace%20conference%201999&st=cse

Boshkovich 55
proposed document. Luckily, Mitic, Judah, Weller and other scholars talked about those
reasons and the audience will have a chance to find out more about that in the following
section. 132
132 Stingray Online, http://www.mcculloughsite.net/stingray/2006/04/20/madeline-albright-can-legpress-
400-pounds.php.

Section B; Negotiations
Boshkovich 56
Enter into negotiations with the intention of creating an agreement that will allow
both parties to achieve their essential goals.
- Tom Hopkins 133
The Conference started on February 6 th 1999, and lasted until 23 rd of February
instead of the originally planned 13 th of February. ―Rambouillet, meanwhile, was under
siege from within. Thousands of security police were deployed, while road blocks were
operating throughout the town to prevent any mass demonstration of Albanians or
Serbs‖. 134
Talks in Rambouillet (30 miles south of Paris) started and finished without any
procedure that was planned in advance even if these talks were extremely important, as
Tim Judah said, ―…the alternatives were so awful that it just seemed inconceivable that
either side would scupper the talks‖. 135 The first draft of the agreement that was presented
to both sides by Contact Group had only three chapters; 1, 3, and 6. According to Mr.
Mitic this was not an accident. This is because chapters 2, 5, and 7 were so unacceptable
for the Yugoslav delegation that hosts did not want to present them until a couple of
hours before the end of the Conference. 136 Still, even chapters 1, 3, and 6 were extremely
difficult for the Serbs to accept them. The first chapter covered ―The Constitution of
Kosovo‖; the third was dedicated to elections; while the sixth chapter elaborated the
institution of the ombudsman.
133
Bob Phillips, Phillips’ Book of Great Thoughts and Funny Sayings (Carol Stream: Tyndale House
Publishers, Inc., 1993), 226.
134
Rupert Cornwell, ―The Peace Talks: Solution – or Simply a Sideshow?‖ The Independent, February 21,
1999, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/the-peace-talks-solution--or-simply-a-sideshow-1072343.html
135
Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 197.
136
Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 231.

Boshkovich 57
Serbs insisted that the agreement included principles of the statement of the
Contact Group from London (chapter II section B of this paper) because they thought that
it would be a good way to highlight Yugoslav integrity and sovereignty. 137 Unfortunately,
approximately 10 days of negotiations were lost because of this issue which was solved
against the will of Serbs and they were actually accused for the first time of obstruction.
Conversely, Albanians explained their three main goals at the beginning of the
Conference very clearly. These objectives included: the precise definition of the status of
Kosovo, organizing of referendum after three years of transitional period, and the
involvement of NATO in acceptance of the Agreement (as a one side that would sign the
Agreement). The Albanian side also had issues with acceptance of their request, but at the
end they even got something better; the NATO was not involved in signing of the
Agreement, but became warrantor of the Agreement with 10,000 troops in Kosovo.
The Serbian delegation had several complaints in regard to the Preamble of the
Agreement that were articulated in the form of the text that included all issues that the
Serbian delegation had found. Most of them the Contact Group did not accept, but at the
end of the Conference, on the paper that was signed by Albanians it became clear that
they did not change even those parts that were accepted. 138 The reason why these and
later Serbian complaints were not accepted in the final version of the Rambouillet
Accords one can find in Marc Weller‘s explanation. He said that the only way for the
paper to be modified was that both sides agreed upon that. If not, the draft would not be
137 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 110.
138 Ibid, 114.

Boshkovich 58
changed unless the negotiators thought that modification would be better for the
agreement. 139
A similar situation was with Article I in which the Serbian delegation had again
couple of objections. For example, in the sentence where it was stated that both sides
would implement all necessary measures to help refugees in their return to Kosovo, the
Serbs requested ―if they are citizens of Yugoslavia‖ to be added. Of course Serbs
requested this in an effort to prevent Albanians from Albania to settle in Kosovo, but
once again in final text Serbs saw that none of their requests was accepted. 140
On the other hand, the Albanians submitted comments on the draft on February
9 th in which they stated that each annex was acceptable. 141 That way it seemed that the
Albanians were more willing to cooperate while the Serbs had complaints regarding each
annex of the agreement (which will be presented in continuation of this chapter). Of
course, it is because of the fact that entire agreement was in favor of the Albanians.
In Annex I, named ―The Constitution of Kosovo‖, the title itself was irritating for
Serbs because the constitution is the highest law of independent countries, not of the
provinces. Instead, the Serbian side proposed the word ―Statute‖ so that the title of Annex
I would be ―The Statute of Kosovo‖. Nevertheless, the Contact Group did not accept this
request as well. Besides that, the Serbs had many other complaints such as in regard to
foreign missions in Kosovo, or Kosovo‘s offices in foreign countries, which Serbia was
not willing to accept except in cases of education, science, culture, or information. In
addition to this Serbs requested for some sentences to be completely deleted, such as:
Consent for state of emergency, or Consent of the President of Kosovo to Federal
139 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 228.
140 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 116.
141 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 228.

Boshkovich 59
decisions. Of course the reason for this is that the president of Kosovo (which would be
obviously always Albanian) would never support decisions of the Federal Government
that would blockade the implementation of Federal laws. Once again, the final paper
which was signed by Albanians was not different at all from the original. 142
Yet, the Serbian delegation was constructive as much as possible. For example,
the Serbs first said that they won‘t participate in the talks if the KLA members were part
of the Albanian delegation 143 , but later on they did not insist on that even if the Serbs
consider the KLA as a terrorist organization. After all, even the US never negotiates with
terrorists.
In Article I of The Constitution, which elaborated the characteristics of the
Kosovo Assembly, Serbs had a few ideas. For example they urged that the Assembly
should be bi-cameral with 120 members instead of uni-cameral with 100 members.
Besides that, the Serbs had some objections in regard to the jurisdictions of the Assembly
because it assumed canceling of jurisdictions of the Federal authorities. Nevertheless, the
final paper did not see any changes with exception to the number of delegates in the
Assembly which would be 120 (80 directly elected and 40 from national communities),
but still in uni-cameral assembly. 144
Another issue was ―The President of Kosovo‖. For the Serbs this meant that
Kosovo would have one more attribute of sovereign country, which was unacceptable.
Instead, Serbs suggested that the official title of that person should be ―President of the
Presides of Assembly‖. However, the Contact Group denied this suggestion as well. 145
142
Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 120.
143
Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 228-29.
144
Ibid, 240.
145
Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 128.

Boshkovich 60
A very similar problem was with the ―Government of Kosovo‖. According to the
Contact Group‘s draft, this body would implement laws made by the Kosovo‘s
Assembly. Serbs found this problematic because they thought that the Assembly of
Kosovo should not be authorized to make laws. In addition, the Serbs proposed that
instead of the Government, Kosovo should have an ―executive council‖, for which Weller
said that would be ―…a weakened Council of Ministers‖. 146 And again none of the Serbs
objections were accepted, 147 even if it was obvious that these proposals (The President,
The Government, and The Assembly) were something that represents a sovereign
country, not an autonomous province. These articles gave to Kosovo authorities to
conduct foreign relations, elect Prime Minister, implementing laws, etc. 148
The same situation was with the justice system in Kosovo. The Contact Group
had an idea that the justice system in Kosovo should be completely independent and
separated from that of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. Of course, the Serbian
delegation thought that this entire Article (V) was unacceptable. However, the Contact
Group did not change anything in their final version of the agreement 149 , just like in the
case of Article VI which covers human rights and rights of national groups (Serbs
requested adding of new statements such as ―the preventing of national groups to
jeopardize the rights of other citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia‖).
Article VII covered the role of the municipals in Kosovo. Serbian delegation did
not have any objections to the proposed paper, but had a couple of suggestions; they
thought that it should be added that municipals‘ assemblies would be constitute in the
146 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 235.
147 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 129.
148 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 242.
149 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 131.

Boshkovich 61
same manner as the Kosovo‘s Assembly, and that in the case of the reestablishment of
municipals‘ borders besides the consensus of the Assembly of Kosovo and authorities of
municipals involved in particular case add ―with acceptance of the people assembly of
Republic of Serbia‖. As usually, none of these suggestions were accepted. 150
Article IX, which discussed the representation of Kosovo in Federal and Republic
institutions was also problematic for the Serbian delegation. The reason for this was that
this article stated that this representation was the possibility but not the obligation. Serbs
pushed for changing of this to an obligation, but the Contact Group did not accept this
idea as well.
As mentioned, Chapter 2 (regarding security) was not presented until 18/19
February (even if the Conference commenced on February 6th), so actors moved to the
Chapter 3 titled ―The Conducting and Supervising of Elections‖. Serbs found most of the
decrees acceptable from the Paragraph I with the exception for the role of the OSCE. The
Serbian delegation thought that it was acceptable that the OSCE assists with conducting
of census of citizens of Kosovo (actually that would be the only way since Albanians
refused for many years to participate in census), as well as to assist in creation of a free
and fair atmosphere for carrying out of the elections, but they found the idea that OSCE
should carry out the elections itself unacceptable. Nevertheless, in the final text of the
Agreement Serbian objections were not implemented. That was probably not a wise
decision by the negotiators. Of course all the countries of the world would find it
inappropriate that someone else conduct elections for them. Negotiators could instead
insist on supervision of the elections by the OSCE just to make sure that there is not any
150 Ibid, 134.

Boshkovich 62
kind of abuses. After all, Serbia has a tradition of presence of international supervisors on
all modern elections and no one has a problem with that because everybody wants to
make sure that their votes won‘t be stolen.
As mentioned earlier in this section, the sixth Chapter was dedicated to the role of
the ombudsman. The ombudsman‘s responsibility would be to supervise the realization of
the practice of rights of members of national groups, as well as human rights and basic
freedoms in Kosovo. The Serbian delegation did not have any major objections regarding
this chapter. However, they suggested additional sentence which would clarify that
ombudsman should be parliamentary envoy who should be Yugoslav citizen, chosen
without intervention of international community. This suggestion was not accepted by the
Contact Group. 151
Chapter 4 and 4A were in connection to matters of economy, humanitarian relief,
reconstruction and economical development. The Albanian delegation ―commented upon
in writing very expeditiously‖. 152 The Serbs had serious objections regarding the idea that
all property of Federal and Republic Governments would be transferred to institutions of
Kosovo. However, the Contact Group did not accept these objections, and the final
document was same as the initial one. 153 Speaking of the international help, with
exception for humanitarian assistance, it should be mentioned that according to the
proposed agreement it would be dependable on full implementation of the Agreement, as
well as other conditions that would be established by potential donators. The Serbian
delegation found this Chapter offensive because it sounded like blackmail. They
suggested cancellation of the entire Chapter, but the Contact Group refused this proposal
151 Ibid, 140.
152 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 229.
153 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 142.

Boshkovich 63
and entire text ended as a part of the final document. 154 In an effort to get positive
response from the Serbian delegation, Ambassador Hill traveled to Serbia to talk to
Milosevic. The Albanian delegation protested because of that since they thought it was
the violation of isolation that was imposed upon the delegations. Therefore Hasim Tachi
was allowed to leave the conference and see his mentors at home. 155 However, the
Serbian delegation responded with the document that was ―incompatible with the non-
negotiable principles‖. 156 Weller missed an opportunity to explain the reason why the
Serbs refused this Chapter, but he rather said that the Serbs did not even accept the
Chapter that covers international assistance, and that way have foreclosed effective
negotiations. 157 By doing so he probably misled the part of the audience that did not have
a chance to see that Chapter which is available in the appendix of this research. After
reading that Chapter it becomes clear that Mitic did not lie when he said that it was a kind
of blackmail since it was said: ―International assistance, with the exception of
humanitarian aid, will be subject to full compliance with this Agreement as well as other
conditionalities defined in advance by the donors... ―(Appendix, page 155)
As explained, Chapter 2 (security) was finally presented on 18 th February along
with Chapters 5 (implementation) and 7 (military presence). When the Serbian delegation
found out what was proposed by these three chapters it became clear why they were not
presented earlier.
Chapter 2 was explained that verification mission of OSCE (later named
Implementation Mission) would assume all responsibilities regarding the supervision of
154 Ibid, 144.
155 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 229.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid, 235.

Boshkovich 64
implementation of the entire agreement. As part of that, this mission would be in charge
of the creation of ―community police‖ to include the decision on the number of police
officers. Other than that, it was requested that all federal and republic police institutions
for training in Kosovo ceased to exist. Serbian Police would retreat from Kosovo in few
phases, and while doing that it would be supervised by the Implementation Mission.
These and some other acts from this Chapter were of course unacceptable for the Serbs
because they meant almost total cancelation of sovereignty of Yugoslavia and Serbia on
the territory of Kosovo. The only representatives of the Serbian Government would be on
border crossings with Albania and Macedonia, but there would not be more than 50 of
them. It is important to mention that there is not such autonomy anywhere else, not even
close.
Another last minute surprise was Chapter 5 titled ―Implementation I‖. It was
nothing less unacceptable than Chapter 4. The purpose of this Chapter was to transform
the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) mission to the real
civilian authority in Kosovo, which would be led by the chief of the Implementation
Mission (officially he would be the chief of the mutual commission, but his decisions
would be final). Based on this Chapter, this chief (protected by Vienna Convection as any
other member of diplomatic missions) would be the supreme law in Kosovo. It is
probably unnecessary to mention that the Serbian delegation could not accept this
Chapter as well. If anything, negotiators should request that this mission works on those
parts of Kosovo where the Serbian Government did not have authority (areas where
ethnic Albanians are in majority), or something similar to that. It is impossible that the
world finest diplomats could not come to a better solution than that in several weeks, of

Boshkovich 65
course if they were honest about finding the political solution. As some people would
say: ‗If you want, you‘ll find the way; if you don‘t want, you‘ll find the excuse‘.
Last, but not least is Chapter 7 named ―Implementation II‖, but it was actually
written in regard to international military presence. This Chapter included some parts that
are so contradictory that they would be comical if they were not so tragic for the Serbs.
For example it is stated that ―Sides invite NATO to establish and command by military
forces in attempt to help securing and implementation of decrees from this Chapter. They
[NATO troops] also promote sovereignty and integrity of FR Yugoslavia‖ 158 (it was
unclear how would foreign troops promote sovereignty of an independent country, but it
became clear once they came to Kosovo after the bombing which will be discussed in the
part III of this paper). According to this Chapter the Yugoslav Army would have to
retreat from Kosovo in no more than 80 days, with the exception of border patrols which
could have up to 1,500 members. In addition to that, those soldiers would not be allowed
to have armored vehicles, while weapons on remaining vehicles could not be larger than
12, 7 mm caliber (it seems that they would be a perfect moving targets for the KLA
which by this Chapter was supposed to hand over weapons in the future). Marc Weller
also admits that Chapters 2 and 7 would ―…establish very strict limitations for the
operation of FRY/Serb law enforcement, border police, customs and military personnel,
both in terms of numbers and in terms of competence‖. 159 It seems that the international
community just wanted to make sure that Serbia wouldn‘t sign the agreement for sure
because they knew that no one could accept this part of the ultimatum as well. Which
leader of the country would agree to withdraw all troops (with exception of small number
158 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 155.
159 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 240.

Boshkovich 66
of border patrols) from the area in which terrorists/rebellions are targeting members of
other ethnic groups? Is it possible that negotiators did not want to offer to the Serbs some
kind of deal that would say for example that Serbian armed forces could stay in all those
areas where Serbs are the majority (northern Kosovo and few enclaves in the south,
including several monasteries)? Obviously there was no true desire to find a political
solution and avoid war.
Nevertheless, the most unacceptable parts of this Chapter and Agreement overall
was the section in which was stated that NATO troops would be allowed to use the entire
territory of FR (Federal Republic) Yugoslavia, to include air space and territorial waters,
without any restrictions. 160 Besides that, those NATO troops would be immune from any
laws of Yugoslavia, and they would be protected from any kind of investigations or
arrests. This meant that Yugoslavia would not loose sovereignty just in Kosovo but on
the entire territory. Why did not negotiators offer something more acceptable to the
Serbs? It is not a rocket science to understand that the Serbs would be more willing to
sign the treaty if it said that UN troops will be deployed instead of NATO, and not in the
entire territory of Yugoslavia, but just in the parts of Kosovo where the Albanians are
majority, to make sure that two sides are divided by a buffer zone, just like the case of
Cyprus where UN troops are doing a good job since 1974.
In addition to this, at the end of this Chapter was stated that three years after the
implementation of this agreement the people of Kosovo would have a chance to reach a
final solution for Kosovo based on their will. This was the first time that the Albanian
160 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 210.

Boshkovich 67
side had some major complaints. 161 They requested that ―will of people‖ was changed to
―referendum‖. That is the moment when Madeleine Albright jumped in to make sure that
the Albanians would accept the Agreement. She added her interpretation (on 22 nd
February) to this chapter summarizing that this meant that people of Kosovo would be
able to hold referendum regarding the future of Kosovo in three years. 162 Marc Weller
talked about this as well. He said that the Albanian delegation confirmed that after three
years of the interim period ―…the people of Kosovo will exercise their will through a
referendum, conducted freely and fairly‖. 163 How could anyone expect that the Serbs
would accept this document? That way Serbia would agree to the secession of Kosovo in
2002, which is still worse than a unilateral declaration of independence. Interestingly,
even if the US said that this proposal would be available only if the Albanians sign by the
deadline it did not happen. 164 However, this did not have any negative effects on the
Albanian position, and they did finally agree to sign this after Jim O‘Brien (the State
Department lawyer) told Jamie Rubin to distract Thaci (the strongest opponent of
acceptance of the proposal) while the Albanian delegation is accepting the proposal. 165
Of course, this was just another aspect of the Agreement that was obviously
unacceptable for Serbs (since everybody knows what would be the outcome of that
referendum). Ministries of the Contact Group added that the entire conference (which
was prolonged for a week) should be finished by 1500 on February 23 rd of 1999. The
Serbian delegation sent a couple of letters that day to all three co-presides of the
Conference where they urged for a continuation of negotiations, but it was ineffective and
161 Ibid, 211.
162 Ibid, 215.
163 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 235.
164 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 215.
165 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 404.

Boshkovich 68
the road to the bombing of Yugoslavia was open, with a small chance of a miracle in
additional talks scheduled for March 15 th in Paris, where nothing new happened except
that Albanians officially signed the Agreement (March 18 th ), while Serbs signed their
own paper regarding autonomy of Kosovo. 166 Most likely this meeting in March was
actually set only because the Albanians wanted an additional two weeks to make sure that
the KLA leaders would accept the agreement. Thaci had to travel through all areas that
were held by the KLA, while Albright sent Bob Dole to influence the Albanians toward
acceptance of the agreement. He said: ―We‘ll abandon you if you don‘t sign‖. 167 Of
course, in today‘s world it would be very rare that someone allows to be abandoned by
the strongest possible ally in the history. Naturally, it is easy to imagine how Serbs felt
seeing the US officials transparently take sides.
The document that was signed by the Serbs was mainly the text that the Serbian
delegation proposed to become a part of the political aspect of the agreement that was the
topic of the negotiation process.
Chomsky reminds us that, in terms of diplomatic options, "before the bombing
(Yugoslavia) on the table were two proposals: the so-called Rambouillet
Agreement, which was presented as an ultimatum to Serbia, and Serbia's
proposal" formulated in its draft political agreement on substantial autonomy ( for
Kosovo), which would guarantee the equality of all citizens and all ethnic
communities, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Republic
166 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 223.
167 Ibid, 220.

Boshkovich 69
of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ". And the other proposal is also
hidden from the public, notes Chomsky. 168
Additionally, the authors of this Serbian document added many ideas from the
Contact Group‘s proposal avoiding those elements that would lead to the cancelation of
Serbian sovereignty. 169 Of course, this was useless, and the sides could start to count
down the time to the NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia.
168 Vlada Republike Srbije Online, ―Čomski: Postojalo je Drugačije Rešenje za Kosmet,‖
http://www.arhiva.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/2000-03/06/18364.html
169 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 245.

Section C; Reactions to the Conference
Boshkovich 70
The Conference which lasted 17 days was unsuccessful (in a formal ceremony
only the Albanian delegation signed the agreement, witnessed by two negotiators since
Russian Ambassador Mayorski refused to participate) 170 and each side started to prepare
for the next steps. NATO started to warm up their aircrafts, the KLA continued guerrilla
warfare while the Serbs declared a state of emergency.
Many people in Yugoslavia at that time were convinced that NATO would not
bomb the Serbs because it would not make any sense considering that Serbia was a US
ally in both World Wars in addition to being one of the sides that signed the Dayton
agreement regarding the ending of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. Cosic (Serbian
writer previously mentioned in this paper) said: ―What a paradox of the history! NATO
was created to fight with the Soviet Union, Russia and communism, but they will fight
for Albanian separatism, terrorism and secession of Kosovo‖. 171 He also added that it was
the fourth time in the 20 th century that Serbia was threatened to accept an ultimatum by
great powers (Austro-Hungary in 1914, Hitler in 1941, and Stalin in 1948).
Unfortunately, once again Serbia got an ultimatum that was impossible to accept because
that would mean the independence of Kosovo, while NATO troops would be allowed to
use the entire territory of Yugoslavia. However, Serbs were hoping that NATO would
restrain from bombing due to a Russia‘s position which was at that time that bombing is
unacceptable. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said that ―Russia cannot sit around and
watch NATO destroy a sovereign nation‖. 172 Nevertheless, as Secretary Albright
explained ―Their [Russia‘s] military options were few, their dependence on the West was
170 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 235.
171 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 111.
172 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 413.

Boshkovich 71
growing, their domestic politics were toxic, and their putative client in Belgrade was a
ruthless dictator‖. 173 And she was right (mostly); all Russia could do was to complain, but
in reality NATO knew that this would not be a battle that Russia would fight, after all
NATO gave Russia the perfect excuse to intervene in Georgia in 2008. It was the same
scenario; great power came to help ―suppressed minority‖ that seeks independence
(Abkhazia and South Ossetia). This time NATO was the side that could just complain,
very well aware that it was not going to be their battle. One might assume that NATO and
Russia have made a deal regarding their interests in which small countries such as Serbia
and Georgia will pay the price, but of course, this theory would be impossible to prove.
Still, this topic is not unfamiliar to journalists such as Tim Marshall who compared
Kosovo and Georgia and said: ―This is not to defend Russia's actions in Georgia but it
does show how the Americans, British and others want things both ways - and it also
shows how the recognition of Kosovo has destroyed the hallowed concept that you don't
change borders through force‖. He also asked himself what would be the reason to have
different standards for Kosovo and South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The answer is usually,
'because of the behaviour of the Serb forces'. ―Put that forward in international law as a
justification for changing borders and you would be laughed out of court‖. 174
Another interesting story is the reactions of some politicians and scholars in the
world regarding the Rambouillet Conference. Some of those reactions could be found in
Mr. Komnenic‘s book. He traveled to Paris during the Conference to show to the West
that Serbian opposition, which was the strongest enemy of Milosevic, was also aware that
173 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 414.
174 Sky News Online, ―Russia Eats the Kosovo Cake,‖ http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-
News/Tim-Marshall-Russia-Eats-The-Kosovo-
Cake/Article/200808215076194?lpos=World_News_Article_Related_Content_Region_8&lid=ARTICLE_
15076194_Tim_Marshall%3A_Russia_Eats_The_Kosovo_Cake

Boshkovich 72
it was impossible to accept the proposed agreement. He stated that Mrs. Angelica Ber,
who was a member of the Bundestag from the Green Party of the FR Germany, said ―If
we read the agreement we would never allow NATO bombing‖. 175
Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) complained to the Senate (22 March 1999) that
President Clinton promised something (NATO intervention) without consulting
Congress. Therefore, the USA will declare a war to the country that can not be an enemy
of the USA, and is actually a partner from the Peace Conference in Dayton regarding the
peace in Bosnia. 176
Another member of the Congress that had a problem with this intervention was
Cunningham (R-CA). He said in the middle of the bombing (session of May 5, 1999)
Mr. Speaker, do you know the total number of people killed in Kosovo prior to
our bombing? It is amazing. People will say 10,000, 20,000. It is 2,012. Prior to
us bombing, this great massive killing, 2,012. Tudjman, the head of the Croatians,
slaughtered 10,000 Serbs in 1995 and ethnically cleansed out of Croatia 750,000
Yugoslavians. Where were we then? And on a scale 2,012, and one-third of those
were Serbs killed by the KLA. 177
He added that the USA was guilty for one million of refuges in neighboring countries.
This statement actually goes along with many similar statements that were made at that
time by politicians in Serbia who claimed that there was not a problem with refugees
before the bombing, and yet Serbia was bombed with the excuse (among other excuses)
that the international community has to help refugees.
175 Komnenic, Milan, Kloka u Rambujeu (Beograd: Prosveta, 2006), 134.
176 Congressional Record Online, Congressional Record, March 22, 1999 (Senate), S3039-3050,
DOCID:cr22mr99-39, wais.access.gpo.gov
177 Ibid, May 5, 1999 (House), H2785.

Boshkovich 73
Another Congressman that opposed this intervention is John Richard Kasich from
Ohio. He said that civil war in Kosovo started in 1389, and there is a small possibility
that stepping in that kind of conflict will be successful. 178
However, supporters of the intervention (and they might be led by desire to
punish the Serbs for civil war in Bosnia where the Serbs had an advantage in military
power 179 ) were doing what they were supposed to do to justify the bombing. Therefore
Mrs. Louise Arbour, which was at that time the main prosecutor for ICTY, had a meeting
with Secretary Albright (April 30 th ) after which (next month) Mrs. Arbour announced
that President Milosevic and his four most important assistants are accused of war crimes.
In reaction to this Albright said that this indictment is a proof that NATO intervention is
valid. 180 One journalist asked if that meant that there was not war crimes before the
bombing, but Albright responded that she thinks that many things happened before the
bombing. Same day, Russian Foreign Ministry critiqued Mrs. Arbour‘s decision,
claiming that it had political motivation. 181
Other reasons why the Serbs could not accept the Agreement one can find in the
fact that negotiators pressured Serbia to accept conditions regarding autonomy on part of
her territory that does not exist anywhere in the world. As Lord Gilbert, who was a
178 Congressional Record Online, Congressional Record, http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=933744387454+4+2+0&WAISaction=retrieve;
we found this out when we
intervened in Somalia. We furthermore found this out when we intervened in Lebanon, even under Ronald
Reagan. Being in the middle of civil wars that are not resolvable is a mistake for a major power. The
question is when, then, should we intervene militarily? Well, on three grounds. One, when it is in the direct
national interests of the United States. Number two, when there is an absolute achievable goal. And number
three, when there is a credible exit strategy. None of these criteria can be met in terms of Kosovo. There is
no direct national interest, there is not an achievable goal, and finally, there is no credible exit strategy.
179 President Clinton said: ―this is not the first time we‘ve faced this kind of choice [over whether to take
military action]. When President Milosevic started the war in Bosnia seven years ago, the world did not act
quickly enough to stop him….We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just few years ago.‖ Roland
Paris, ―Kosovo & the metaphor war,‖ Political Science Quarterly 117, no.3 (2002): 436.
180 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 225.
181 Ibid, 225.

Boshkovich 74
Minister of State in the MoD from 1997-1999 under George Robertson and spoke for the
Government in the House of Lords on defence said
I think the terms put to Milosevic at Rambouillet were absolutely
intolerable; how could he possibly accept them; it was quite deliberate…. It had
been decided in advance that Milosevic had to be taught a military lesson and the
only purpose of the Rambouillet process was to provide an excuse for doing so.
Milosevic was to be made an offer he couldn't accept…. it gave NATO
unrestricted access, not just to Kosovo, but to the whole of Yugoslavia (including
Montenegro). Unless defeated in a war no state with the pretence of independence
could accept those terms (and these terms were in fact omitted from the post-war
settlement in June 1999). 182
The Following paragraphs will offer a few examples on how real autonomy
should look like. In case of South Tyrol, Italy and Austria made bilateral international
agreement, and this region gained wide autonomy without any international presence. At
the same time, the Italian Government secured sovereignty and integrity from any kind of
abuses. 183 Why something similar to this was not possible in case of Kosovo? It would be
better if the international community encouraged two sides to make an agreement, which
will guarantee wide autonomy for Albanians, and at the same time sovereignty and
integrity of Serbia.
In Spain, the Article II of the Constitution says that ―The Constitution is based on
the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all
182 David Morrison, ―Rambouillet Terms ‗Absolutely Intolerable‘, Says ex-Minister,‖ Labour & Trade
Union Review (2001), http://web.ukonline.co.uk/pbrooke/p&t/Balkans/dmonkosovo/200102
183 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 179-80.

Boshkovich 75
Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and
regions which make it up and the solidarity among all of them.‖ 184 Obviously there is a
right to autonomy, but also an explanation that the country cannot be divisible.
Yugoslavia.
Ironically, both Italy and Spain were part of NATO forces that bombed FR
Finland is another case that is interesting to mention in regard to successful
autonomies. This country has a remarkable Swedish minority (approximately 300,000)
who live compactly on territory of Finland, especially on Oland islands where they are
the majority. Still, as a minority they don‘t have any special rights, and the Government
sees them as citizens of Finland which mother tongue is Swedish. 185 Nevertheless, Mr.
Marty Ahtisari (special envoy involved in ending of bombing and 2007 negotiations
process, which will be discussed later in this research) who comes from Finland never
thought that Albanians in Serbia should be treated in the same manner, as Serbs who
speak Albanian. Actually, he was one of the strongest allies of the Albanians in their
campaign for independence.
Another example of successful autonomy that is not comparable to that proposed
in Rambouillet is the case of Russian republic of Tatarstan. This region has autonomy
regarding culture, economy and technical cooperation with other countries, but Russia
kept positions in defense, security and international relations. 186
Obviously, these examples from other democracies are not even close to the paper
that was discussed in Rambouillet.
Even Henry Kissinger said in Newsweek International (New World Disorder,
184 Spain Constitution Online, August 27, 1992, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sp00000_.html
185 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 184-85.
186 Respublika Tatarstan Online, http://www.tatar.ru/?DNSID=830f4d0a9e1ddd7c1d6ac98b5eecc70b

Boshkovich 76
May 31 st , 1999), ‖The air war in Kosovo is justified as establishing the principle that the
international community--or at least NATO--will henceforth punish the transgressions of
governments against their own people. But we did not do so in Algeria, Sudan, Sierra
Leone, Croatia, Rwanda, the Caucasus, the Kurdish areas and many other regions‖. 187
Why is that so? What was the justification for bombing of Yugoslavia? The next
statement is one of the explanations how the international community justified the
bombing: George Kenny from Department of State said that they intentionally raised the
bar too high to make sure that Serbs would not be able to jump over. 188 Eric Suy, former
chief advisor for the law in UN and professor of international law at Catholic University
in Brussels went so far that he compared the Agreement from Rambouillet with Hitler‘s
ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. In both cases he said that excuse was found in protection
of national minority. 189
One more reaction came from British journalist Tim Marshall. He quoted Mr.
Robert Hayden from Pittsburgh University who claims that the only purpose of the
Agreement from Rambouillet was to justify military intervention against FR Yugoslavia.
He also said that members of western delegation had sketched the map of possible
division of Kosovo, but Albright prevented them to show that to the Serbian delegation, it
was feared that they might accept that. 190
Serbian President Mr. Milutinovic gave an official statement on 23 rd February, at
the end of negotiations. For this occasion it will be present most interesting parts from his
reaction.
187 Newsweek Online, ―New World Disorder,‖ May 31, 1999, http://www.newsweek.com/id/88424/page/5
188 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 189.
189 International Court of Justice, May 10, 1999, 38-39, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/114/4491.pdf
190 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 204.

Boshkovich 77
Participating in Rambouillet Peace Conference, Serbia and her citizens had
showed that they had sincere intention to negotiate on ten principles that was
made by the Contact Group. Unfortunately, today‘s decision to end ‗talks‘
without a positive result is a normal consequence of what we used to talk about on
previous press conferences (12 th , 15 th , and 20 th February). Serbia especially
insisted on 10 principles of the Contact Group, that there is not going to be
independence of Kosovo and Metohija, that there is not a third republic [besides
Serbia and Montenegro], neither the referendum, while sovereignty and integrity
of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia would not be challenged. However, those who
initiated this meeting did not accept same approach. They offered documents that
were in favor of the creation of a third republic and destroying Serbia. By doing
that, the international community worked absolutely in favor of the separatist
movement in Kosovo and Metohija. More than that, only 18 hours before the
projected end of the conference, delegation got a new document (56 pages long)
that was not discussed at all in first 18 days of the conference. Direct talks were
refused during the entire talks. It is a lie that negotiations could be successfully
conducted without negotiations. The conference was extended for three days
because there was a significant improvement, which was made by acceptance of
seven crucial questions in regard to real autonomy, which was proposed by the
Serbian delegation. Even the Contact Group admitted that. What then happened in
those three additional days of the conference?
This was fraud without precedent and open aggression. Serbian delegation was
very constructive in spite of the facts that: the entire conference was very poorly
organized; Albanian delegation was always negative toward the idea of face-toface
meetings, even on the level of experts; Albanian delegation refused to put
signature on 10 principles of the Contact Group; the Albanian delegation,
supported by sponsors and guardians, insisted on maximalist requests that
included international protectorate and referendum for independence.
At the end of his letter, Mr. Milutinovic added that FR Yugoslavia and Serbia are
willing to continue talks in Belgrade, Pristina or any other place regarding Kosovo‘s
autonomy, but never about the independence of Kosovo or third republic. He even said
that FR Yugoslavia is willing to consider the size and character of international presence
in Kosovo and Metohija in an effort to implement the agreement that would be accepted
in Rambouillet. 191 Even Albanian advisor Marc Weller talked about some of things that
were mentioned by President Milutinovic. He admits that the Serbian delegation in final
declaration emphasized the most important developments toward achieving a political
191 Ibid, 167-70.

Boshkovich 78
solution, as well as Serbian willingness to discuss about the character of international
presence in Kosovo. 192 But, it seems that the international community was not willing to
give peace a chance because they made deadline for acceptance of the agreement, even if
―…a significant number of substantive issues had not been negotiated‖. 193 Not to mention
that the most important annexes of the agreement were presented day before the deadline.
Yet there was some chance for avoidance of the war because both sides agreed to attend
new conference in Paris on 15 th March, but it ended just with Albanian acceptance to sign
the document and Serbian decision to present their version of the Agreement. 194 The
author of this paper thinks that there was a hidden agenda by the international community
not to achieve a peace solution because it does not make sense that negotiators did not
want to give more time to the time.
Besides Mr. Milutinovic, exactly one month later (23 rd March 1999) the President
of Yugoslavia Mr. Milosevic also made an official statement regarding the conference,
which was written just one day after Mr. Holbrooke‘s last trip to Belgrade where he said
that the bombing is imminent if Yugoslavia does not accept the Rambouillet accords. 195
Milosevic‘s statement was sent in form of the letter to Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Hubert Vedrine (France) and Robin Cook (UK), the official co-chairmen of the
conference. Unfortunately, this letter was not published, but is a part of the most knowing
collection of documents regarding Kosovo and Metohija published in Cambridge. These
are some of the most significant points of that letter.
192
Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 233.
193
Ibid, 231.
194
Ibid, 234.
195
Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 227.

Yugoslavia.
Boshkovich 79
…text that you named ―the Agreement from Rambouillet‖ was published in
Kosovo‘s newspapers even before the conference (Albanian newspaper Koha
Ditore). Belgrade is tolerant, but not stupid. Thanks to some one else‘s stupidity,
the document that was supposed to be a result of negotiations was published even
before those negotiations have begun. Therefore, my answer to your sentence ‗the
Agreement is on the table‘ is: just a proposal of the Agreement can be on the
table. But, an empty table can‘t lead to the agreement. Those that are interested in
to agreement have to seat around that table.
Considering your threat with NATO bombing, your nations will be ashamed
because of that, since you are preparing to use force against one small European
nation just because of her willingness to protect its territory from separatism. You
gentlemen, as Ministers of Foreign Affairs of two European countries have the
right to negotiate, mediate, etc, but you don‘t have the right to threaten other
countries and other citizens, nor you can arrange lives in other countries. 196
The next day, 24 th March 1999, NATO commenced the bombing of FR
196 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 154-76.

Part III
Chapter IV
Section A; “Merciful Angel”
Serbian capital Belgrade 197
Boshkovich 80
The Serbs would not accept a Nato force; Nato on its 50th anniversary wanted to
show it mattered - and only one outcome was possible 198
It was 24 th March 1999 when the first ―smart bombs‖, as some ―experts‖ like to
call them, were felt in the Federal Republic Yugoslavia. These bombs are considered
smart due to their precision, which is unquestionable, but nobody cared about the size of
the blasts that were produced from explosions. NATO would, for example, hit the Army
Headquarters in the Serbian capital Belgrade, which is in downtown, even if that building
was empty days before bombing. However, civilians on the streets were killed even if
197 Info-sluzba Kosova I Metohije Online, http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2007/March_25/2.html
198 BBC Online, ―Rambouillet Talks ‗Designed to Fail‘,‖ March 19, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/682877.stm

Boshkovich 81
they were mile away. Actually, more people died from the second ‗tomahawk‘, which
was launched a half hour later, because they came to help the injured. Civilians died also
in Radio Television of Serbia, in sanitarium in Surdulica 199 , on dozens of bridges 200
including the train bridge when the train passing through 201 , in factories (some of them
created small ecological catastrophes), in schools, etc. NATO bombers also attacked
refugees‘ convoy on Kosovo because they thought that it was a military convoy. 202
Unfortunately, so-called journalists from western countries did not have an interest in the
coverage of this side of the story. NATO officials, such as General Wesley Clark, also
did not show concerns for this issue, and they viewed civilian victims as ―collateral
damage‖. Actually, as Rebecca Sumner noticed: ―three to four times more civilians than
soldiers were killed‖. Besides that, based to international law and NATO's documents,
NATO must be subordinate to the UN and meet the terms of the international law. But in
the case of Kosovo, NATO waged war without declaration of war which is illegal, used
cluster bombs (forbidden for exceptional inhumanity), ―and repeatedly refused to
subordinate their actions to the UN‖. 203 One of the reasons for NATO’s arrogance can be
found in President Clinton‘s statement from 1993, where he said in regard to NATO
interventions: ―With the United Nations if possible, without it if necessary‖. He also
added: ―NATO is the decision-making criterion for the UN and not the other way
around‖. 204
199
General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York:
Public Affairs, 2001), 334.
200
Ibid, 334.
201
Ibid, 254.
202
Ibid, 254-55.
203
Rebecca Sumner, ―A New World Order,‖ London Daily Online, http://www.london-daily.com/art/ldrebec.htm
204
Youtube Online, Bettina Kapune, ―It started with a Lie - NATO Aggression against Serbia 1999 Part 3,‖
Westdeutschen Rundfunks (WDR), 2001, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kuhfyd6bJs&NR=1

Boshkovich 82
Nevertheless, the rest of the world did not show huge concern about life of
ordinary people in Yugoslavia until NATO bombed the Chinese embassy on the 45 th day
of bombing. On that day three Chinese journalists died which raised questions in the
world about the way that NATO chooses targets, especially when considering that it had
very negative effect on relationship with two important powers, Russia and China. 205
At the same time in Kosovo, Serbian Security forces saw an opportunity to
destroy the KLA, which was no longer on the State Department list of terrorist‘s
organization, regardless of their connections with Al-Qaeda. It should be mentioned that
some of the members of the KLA were involved in an unsuccessful attack on Fort Dix,
NJ in 2007. 206 As usual, the worst situation was for the civilians. Approximately 800,000
Albanians escaped from Kosovo. Some of them were victims of ―friendly fire‖, some
victims of Serbian ―volunteers‖, but some were killed by the KLA because they did not
want to fight against the Serbs. Of course people could read only about bad Serbs and
Albanian refuges. Very often politicians from ―civilized countries‖ would make numbers
bigger. The newest example is the interview in which Italian Foreign Minister Massimo
D‘Alema gave to Indian newspaper. He said, ―When NATO attacked, Kosovo was under
the Serb occupation and three million refugees crossed over to Albania‖. 207 What‘s
wrong with this statement? Well, first of all, Serbia could not occupy Kosovo because
that is/was (again depends from point of view) part of Serbia. Secondly, it is quite
205 Michael Mandelbaum, ―A Perfect Failure: NATO‘s War against Yugoslavia‖, Foreign Affairs (1999),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55396/michael-mandelbaum/a-perfect-failure-natos-war-againstyugoslavia
206 Chris Suellentrop, ―Carry on, Blair,‖ The New York Times Online, January 28, 2010,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/carry-onblair/?scp=15&sq=Kosovo%20Liberation%20Army,%20Al-Qaeda&st=cse;
four of the alleged plotters of a
terrorist attack on Fort Dix, N.J., were ―ethnic Albanians from the former Yugoslavia, three from a town on
the Macedonia-Kosovo border and one who had served as a sharpshooter in the Kosovo Liberation Army
(K.L.A.) in its clashes with Serbian security forces during the 1990s‖
207 B92 Online, archive October 17, 2007, http://www.b92.net/

Boshkovich 83
impossible to have three million refuges from province that has less than two million
people (it is impossible to know exact number because Albanians refused to participate
on official census since 1981). Unfortunately, nobody cares about these comments
because the Serbs are considered guilty for everything bad that happened in former
Yugoslavia including Kosovo.
Nevertheless, Serbia had to fight against the KLA and the NATO. This NATO
intervention was called ―Merciful Angel‖. During this intervention, the KLA was very
active. According to Serbian General Lazarevic‘s testimony in international court for war
crimes, the KLA had between 20,000 and 25,000 members. 208 The KLA had a tactic
called ―two villages‖. This meant that one village would be reserved only for the KLA,
while the next one was home of the civilians/refugee camp. After defeating of the KLA
positions, terrorists would escape to that second village and use civilians as shield. The
other tactic that was used by the KLA since 1998 was ―thousand fires‖. 209 In other words,
the KLA would have cells in every village, and their mission was to attack Serbian forces
so often that they would not be able to control the situation. Lazarevic said that by 1998
the KLA controlled between 400 and 600 villages on Kosovo. 210 At the same time, there
were more than 500 breakings of the Serbian border from Albania that were made by
Albanian groups seized from 10-800 members. Of course, Serbian forces could not stop
that because they were obligated by the UN to retreat from the border with Albania.
Speaking of battle with NATO aircrafts, Yugoslav army was in huge disadvantage
due to NATO‘s technical, quantitative, and logistical advantages. NATO used hundreds
208 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, p 17729,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071106IT.htm
209 Ibid, p 17754, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071106IT.htm
210 Ibid, p 18372-73, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071115IT.htm

Boshkovich 84
of all kinds of aircrafts and bases in many countries. Those countries were not just
members of NATO, but all other interested in military defeat of Yugoslavia. This is what
General Clark said regarding Albania:
In Albania, the reception was overwhelmingly positive. The young prime
minister, Pandeli Majko, fluent in English, approved every request. May we use
an additional airfield? Of course, use all airfields. May we repair the highway to
Kukes? Please do so. And the road to Skopje? You may have all roads and all
government facilities – take anything you need. 211
It was the same situation in FYRM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia),
and obviously in Croatia since General Clark said that NATO officials were in doubt if
they should launch a ground troop invasion (which actually never happened) from
Croatia and Hungary, or from Albania and FYRM.
Of course, NATO and the KLA coordinated their actions in Kosovo as real allies.
One of the KLA leaders, Agim Ceku, said more about that in Tim Judah‘s book, where
he explained how the KLA helped NATO to easier identify Yugoslav soldiers. He said:
One of the reasons Milosevic had to end the war was because we were attacking
from the border and he was obliged to bring in many units who made good
targets. Before, they had been dug in, but our attack made them come out. NATO
enjoyed that bombing! The Serbs were faced with low morale and no one wanted
to go to Pastrik or Kosare. Milosevic was in danger of losing his army. One B-52
killed 224 soldiers. 212
211
General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York:
Public Affairs, 2001), 257.
212
Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 284.

Boshkovich 85
Finally after 78 days of NATO bombing, in which the usage of ammunition
enriched with depleted uranium and cluster bombs (violation of a couple of UN
agreements regarding conducting the wars) was a common thing (even Gen. Clark
mentioned usage of cluster bombs in his book 213 ), Milosevic understood that a fight with
19 countries could not last forever, regardless of the fact that Yugoslav Anti Air Defense
was much more successful then one would expect, even Gen. Clark admitted a couple of
destroyed aircrafts including Stealth fighter bomber F-117. 214 Milosevic decided to sign
the Kumanovo (city in Macedonia) treaty, which was actually a capitulation (of course
Milosevic used his powerful propaganda to convince citizens that it was a victory).
Serbian forces had to retreat from Kosovo, while the KFOR came in to protect non-
Albanians. During this ―protection‖ more than 250,000 Serbs escaped to central Serbia,
while approximately 100,000 left in Kosovo, either on the north of the province or in
enclaves on the south. Unfortunately, the international community did not show an
interest to bring these refugees home. It is not very often that people are refugees in their
own country (precise name is actually Internal Dislocated Persons-IDP), but as head of
the European parliament for Southeast Europe Doris Pack said, Kosovo is the right
punishment for Serbian behavior. 215 Interestingly Doris Pack is German politician and it
is questionable if she has the moral right to talk about punishing an entire nation because
of one leader. If she is right, Germany should not exist today.
Noam Chomsky discussed about legitimacy of NATO bombing. He said:
213 Ibid, 296.
214 Ibid, 215.
215 Glas Javnosti Online, ―Nezavisnost Kosmeta, Zatim Potpis Srbiji,‖ December 14, 2007,
http://www.glas-javnosti.rs/clanak/glas-javnosti-14-12-2007/nezavisnost-kosmeta-zatim-potpis-srbiji

One of the most important is the study by the International Independent
Boshkovich 86
Commission of Inquiry on the Kosovo war, headed by the distinguished South
African jurist Richard Goldstone. The commission rendered the harshest criticism
anywhere near the mainstream of the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999,
concluding that the bombing was ―illegal but legitimate‖: ―It was illegal because
it did not receive approval from the UN Security Council, but it was legitimate
because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and there was no other way to
stop killings and atrocities in Kosovo‖. 216
However, Chomsky argued about the statement that all diplomatic options were
exhausted. The reason for this he found in the fact that after 78 days of bombing two
sides did actually reach compromise, ―…so it appears that diplomatic options were
available, after all‖. 217 Indeed, how was it possible to make some deal after the bombing
but not before? The international community led by NATO accepted to be present just in
Kosovo, Albanians did not insist anymore on referendum, while Serbs allowed the
foreign military presence. Is it possible that war was imminent just because some
influential people wanted that to happen, not to mention the real reasons for war because,
as Chomsky said: ―There is a vast documentary record available from impeccable
Western sources, including several compilations by the State Department released in
justification of war….They all reach the same conclusion: the killings and atrocities did
not precede but followed the bombing, as the indictment of Milosevic has also
revealed‖. 218 He added: ―It is perhaps worth mentioning an astonishing justification for
216 Noam Chomsky, Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy (New York: Holt
Paperbacks, 2006), 95.
217 Ibid, 96.
218 Ibid, 96.

Boshkovich 87
the bombing contrived by some of its supporters…that the NATO attack was justified by
the crimes at Srebrenica, or Bosnia generally‖. 219
A very important part of any war is a media war. This is the war that Serbia lost
even before the real war started. World media pictured Serbs as the worst enemies of
democracy in the world. It was a pretty common thing to see how President Milosevic
was compared with Hitler, Serbian Armed Forces with Nazi troops, while the KLA was
portrayed as freedom fighters. All this was the same scenario that was used in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even the writer of this paper experienced comic situation while
traveling to Athens in 1995 (Greece was one of rare countries that allowed Serbs to travel
regardless of UN sanctions). On that trip he met two girls from New York which were in
their mid twenties. Two of them showed interest to talk to the author of this paper and his
colleague from the band. However, once it was time for this author to say where he is
from, and he said Serbia, those two girls screamed ―Oh my God‖, and ran away. At that
time it seemed very funny, but from later perspective it became obvious that the situation
is very serious because people in the world thought that Serbs were monsters that are
killing babies and raping women (at that time media launched a story about collective
rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The same media did their job in preparing the world audience to new bombing of
Serbs. The Serbs were accused for millions of refuges from Kosovo and hundreds of
thousands of deaths. It was very common to hear comments such as: "we've now seen
about 100,000 military-aged [Albanian] men missing... they may have been murdered."-
US Defence Secretary William Cohen, or "225,000 ethnic Albanian men aged between
219 Ibid, 99.

Boshkovich 88
14 and 59 may have been killed‖- David Scheffer, the US ambassador at large for war
crimes. British PM Blair called upon the Holocaust and "the spirit of the Second World
War". 220
Nevertheless, ten years after the war relevant institution came with real numbers
of people killed in the conflict in Kosovo from 1998 until 2000. According to FHP
(Found for Humanitarian Right), 13,421 people were killed in Kosovo or had been
reported as a missing person. 10,533 of those are Albanians; 2,238 are Serbs; 126
Gypsies; 100 Bosniaks; 40 Montenegrins; 25 Ashkalis; 18 Egyptians; 13 Turks; 10
Hungarians; and over 300 of members of other ethnic groups 221 (unfortunately, number
of killed Serbs is not final because they are still targets of Albanian terrorists, including
the attack in March of 2004, the largest one since KFOR came to Kosovo). 222 Evidently,
Albanians had almost five times more victims than Serbs, but in percentages Serbs
suffered more since there were 6-7 times more Albanians than Serbs in Kosovo (now that
ratio is 1 to 10). It is interesting that among killed Serbs are 577 soldiers and 354 police
officers (13 of those police officers were actually Albanians that were loyal to Serbia).
Unfortunately, it is still unknown what happened to 1,886 people that are missing (over
500 of them are Serbs, Gypsies and other non-Albanians).
Since one picture is worth a 1,000 words here are a couple of pictures that were
used to blame the Serbs and portray the Albanians as innocent victims that seek
democracy and freedom.
220
John Pilger, ―How Silent Are the Humanitarian Invaders of Kosovo?‖ Global Policy Forum Online,
December 8, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/36491.html
221
Blic Online, ―FHP: 13,421 Zrtva Sukoba na Kosovu,‖ October 6, 2009,
http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=114227
222
Human Rights Watch, ―Kosovo: Failure of NATO, U.N. to Protect Minorities,‖ July 26, 2004,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/07/26/kosovo-failure-nato-un-protect-minorities

Boshkovich 89
223 224
225 It is always good to show innocent unprotected
babies at the cover page and ask tendentious
questions (I.B.) 226
223
Ovsiste Online, http://www.freewebs.com/ovsiste/#+
224
BBC Online, September 27, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/7016174.stm
225
Time Online, archive April 5, 1999,
http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://img.timeinc.net/time/magazine/archive/covers/1999/11019
90412_400.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19990412,00.html&usg=__kTkiJdH
BxskKu3OzUj4njz4Si2s=&h=527&w=400&sz=46&hl=en&start=3&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=qcjmC1IbvlOii
M:&tbnh=132&tbnw=100&prev=/images%3Fq%3DTime%2BCover,%2BKosovo%26hl%3Den%26rlz%3
D1T4GGIH_enUS310US310%26sa%3DN%26um%3D1
226
Time Online, archive April 12, 1999,
http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://img.timeinc.net/time/magazine/archive/covers/1999/11019
90412_400.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19990412,00.html&usg=__kTkiJdH
BxskKu3OzUj4njz4Si2s=&h=527&w=400&sz=46&hl=en&start=3&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=qcjmC1IbvlOii
M:&tbnh=132&tbnw=100&prev=/images%3Fq%3DTime%2BCover,%2BKosovo%26hl%3Den%26rlz%3
D1T4GGIH_enUS310US310%26sa%3DN%26um%3D1

Boshkovich 90
Section B; From UN Resolution 1244 to Declaration of Independence
In this section the most interesting points from UN‘s resolution 1244 (adopted
immediately after the bombing, on June 10 th 1999, available in Appendix (IV) of this
research) will be presented; it is also available on UN‘s website. 227 This is one of those
statements that clearly say that Yugoslav sovereignty should be secure;
―Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the
region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2.‖ 228
Obviously, member states did not protect sovereignty and integrity of the FR
Yugoslavia and Serbia since on their watch the Albanians declared independence.
Another interesting point is in regard to presence of Yugoslav‘s armed forces in
Kosovo. It is written:
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and
complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and
paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of
the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and
Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to
perform the functions in accordance with annex 2. 229
227 United Nations, Resolution 1244, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement
228 Ibid, 2.
229 Ibid, 2.

Boshkovich 91
Yugoslavia completed her part of this demand; all men under arms were pulled
back from Kosovo, but the other side that had particular obligations by this demand did
not fulfill her tasks. Their troops (KFOR) did not fill the vacuum made by withdrawal of
Yugoslav forces, which created perfect conditions for the KLA to continue with their
activities. More importantly, the UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo) never wanted to even discuss the fulfillment of the demand where it is stated
that the Yugoslav police and military should be permitted to return to Kosovo and
perform some functions in accordance to annex 2 where is stated:
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel
will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international
security presence;
- Marking/clearing minefields;
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 230
As already mentioned in this paper, the KLA was supposed to be demilitarized
(―Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo
Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below‖) 231 , but instead of that, a huge
number of KLA fighters just changed uniforms and became part of Kosovo Protection
Corpus (KPC).
230 Ibid, 6.
231 Ibid, 3.
―…Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced

Boshkovich 92
persons can return home in safety…‖ 232 is also something that was conduct only in the
manner to satisfy Albanian refugees. While they returned home immediately after the end
of the bombing, Serbs that were internally displaced persons (IDP) are still IDP and the
number of them is growing every day.
The following statement is one of those that are in favor of the Albanians because
it has ties with Rambouillet peace accords: ―Facilitating a political process designed to
determine Kosovo‘s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords
(S/1999/648)‖. 233 What is noticeable for anyone that knows something about the
negotiation process over Kosovo is that it is very strange that this sentence which
supports Rambouillet accords is written in the same document where member states are
called to protect Yugoslav‘s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Yugoslav
authorities led by President Milosevic had to accept this resolution to stop the bombing.
Another thing that was stated in resolution 1244 is ―Protecting and promoting
human rights”. Unfortunately, this was never implemented toward the Serbs who are
still targets of Albanian terrorists, especially in enclaves located in southern Kosovo. 234
The truth is that the Resolution 1244 ―created an international protectorate‖ 235 ,
regardless of Milosevic‘s attempt to fool his citizens that he made a fair agreement.
232
Ibid, 3.
233
Ibid, 4.
234
Zejak N, ―Mortar Attack on Gorazdevac,‖ Blic Online, March 11, 2000, http://www.exyupress.com/blic/blic17.html
235
Ray Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia, and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 157.

Boshkovich 93
Sectors in Kosovo 236
KFOR divided Kosovo into five zones of responsibilities. The French contingent
is in the northern part of Kosovo, in an area where the Serbs are the majority. The British
are in the central region, including the capital of Pristina, probably because the UK is one
of the strongest supporters of Kosovo independence. The US troops are on the border
with FYR Macedonia because they do not want to be involved too much in possible
conflicts. Germans are on the south where Albanians represent vast majority, which is
good because Serbs still have bad memories from WWII regarding German soldiers. In
the west zone are Italian soldiers. This is a very dangerous zone because of the great
number of locations that are contaminated by depleted uranium that was used by NATO
bombers. One study shows that several Italian soldiers died because of that, while dozens
of them suffer from different types of cancer. 237
How poorly KFOR protects citizens of Kosovo, especially the Serbs is noticeable
through the number of damaged and destroyed churches and other evidences that Serbs
236 Planken Online, http://planken.org/images/balkans/map_kfor_sect.gif
237 Blic Online, ―Uranijumski Danak na Jugu Srbije,‖ November 4, 2007,
http://www.blic.rs/drustvo.php?id=18489

Boshkovich 94
were in Kosovo for centuries. According to British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since
1999 in Kosovo was damaged or destroyed total of 155 Serbian churches and
monasteries, 250 cemeteries, and approximately 6,750 of graves. 238
There are soldiers from other countries inside these five zones, but their number is
not significant, and their purpose is to make picture of international presence in Kosovo,
not only NATO. KFOR came as a result of the UN resolution 1244. This resolution
should guarantee Serbia sovereignty and protection for all people, but the reality is
different. Peacekeepers are more concerned about their own safety, and there are not
enough of them. 239 That is the reason why they created the KPC (Kosovo Protection
Corpus), with a mission to protect people. As already mentioned, the problem is that the
majority of the KPC are former KLA members, just this time on the UNMIK paycheck.
So it is not very difficult to imagine how concerned they are about the rights of Serbs.
The other part of the Resolution 1244 that no one cares about is allowing the Serbian
Police and Army to return in areas with Serbs majority. On the contrary, the UNMIK said
that any attempt in this direction from the Serbian government would be considered as an
attack on Kosovo and the UN.
238 Tereza Bojkovic, ―Britanci Prebrojali Unisteno Srpsko Nasledje na Kosmetu,‖ Politika Online,
November 16, 2009, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Britanci-prebrojali-unishteno-srpsko-nasledjena-Kosmetu.sr.html
239 Melanie McDonagh, ―Now the Serbs Need Our Help,‖ New Statesman 128, no. 4442, 12,
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.hpu.edu:5000/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=104&sid=9dbdebf0-0704-4835-
9a72-
420fbf2333f2%40sessionmgr112&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=hlh&AN=2025037

Serbian population in Kosovo 1999 (since KFOR‘s watch) and 2005 240
In the meantime, Kosovo became a paradise for drug dealers and sex
Boshkovich 95
trafficking. 241, 242 The KLA is in charge of the majority of heroin supplies that comes
from Afghanistan through the Balkan to the EU. Even during the strongest presence of
Serbian Armed Forces in Kosovo it was impossible to stop these activities. Today the
situation is even worse, but the UNMIK did not show an interest to end these criminal
activities; probably even if they wanted it would not be doable. Prostitution is probably
the second biggest source of income for citizens of Kosovo. 243 Unfortunately, even some
KFOR soldiers, with their high incomes and huge distance from loved ones are
occasionally clients. Other than this, Kosovo‘s economy almost does not exist, and
besides illegal privatization of some Serbian companies, there is no other way for citizens
to make money. According to the UNDP, 14 % of Kosovo citizens live with less than 70
eurocents per day. 244
240 Novosti Online, February 21, 2008,
http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=4&status=jedna&vest=116577&datum=2008-02-22
241 Imer Mushkolaj, ―Drug Dealers Flourish in Post-War Kosovo,‖ New York University, June 22, 2000,
http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/Imer062200.html
242 BBC Online, ―Kosovo UN Troops ‗Fuel Sex Trade‘,‖ May 6, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3686173.stm
243 Ronald G McNeil Jr., ―U.N. and NATO Move to Curb Kosovo Crime,‖ The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/15/world/un-and-nato-move-to-curb-kosovo-crime.html?pagewanted=1
244 B92 Online, archive October 17, 2007, http://www.b92.net/

Boshkovich 96
The political situation in Kosovo is even worse than the economical. The first
Kosovo Prime Minister was Ramus Haradinaj, but, as explained in section about the
KLA, he had to go to Hague‘s war crimes court. He is now free in Kosovo due to the
disappearance of some crucial witnesses. 245, 246 The next Prime Minister was Agim
Ceku, another KLA suspect terrorist, but without enough evidences for Carla Del Ponte
(main prosecutor of ICTY in Hague) to press charges. The present Prime Minister is
Hasim Thaci, terrorist/rebellion earlier mentioned in this research. It is not difficult to
imagine how the Serbs feel with all these KLA leaders as Prime Ministers, but the writer
of this paper is very thankful to his grandparents because they decided a long time ago to
move from Kosovo. The only thing that the Serbs could do is avoiding participation in
this ―political life‖. Obeying official Belgrade, Serbs decide not to participate in elections
(except for a small number of those that are used by ethnic Albanians as an ornament).
The international community was ―very disappointed‖ with this decision. That is another
example of a double standard because Albanians from Kosovo have never (since 1990
first democratic elections) participated in elections, but that same international
community said that it was their democratic right not to vote, even if they could take
around 35 seats out of 250 in Serbian parliament, which would give them an opportunity
to, along with the Serbian opposition overthrow Milosevic‘s regime much earlier and
possibly avoid the war. More than that, when invited to participate in elections for
245 Simon Jennings, ―Hague Prosecutors Appeal Haradinaj Judgment,‖ Institute for War & Peace
Reporting, July 18, 2008, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=345814&apc_state=henptri
246 B92 Online, ―Hague Tribunal Sets Haradinaj, Balaj Free,‖ April 3, 2008,
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?mm=4&dd=3&yyyy=2008

Boshkovich 97
Serbian parliament, ethnic Albanians would cynically respond that they do not want to
interfere in domestic affairs of neighboring country. 247
248 Republican presidential candidate Sen. John
McCain, R-Ariz., speaks to a pro Kosovo, pro
McCain, rally across the street from his
New York City hotel Friday morning,
Feb. 11, 2000. McCain is in New York for the day
to attend fundraisers and to talk to the press
before returning to South Carolina Friday night.
(AP Photo/Stephan Savoia). 249
Money that the KLA made from dealing drugs, as well as from tax collection
abroad 250 , is no longer used for buying the weapons. Now that‘s the most important way
for buying the support for independence around the world. That is the reason why the
247
Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 35.
248
―John McCain aimed Kosovo Islamic terrorists.‖ Svet, February 13, 2008,
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_PsML9GxjaK0/R7dtJ7LSzJI/AAAAAAAAAXg/PChvWGtk-
2k/s320/McCainKLA.JPG
249
Justin Raimondo, ―McCain and the KLA connection,‖ Antiwar Online, February 25, 2000,
www.antiwar.com/justin/j022500.html
250
Zoran Kusovac, ―The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,‖ Jane’s Online
http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/jir990401_01_n.shtml; ―The self-proclaimed government of
the 'Republic of Kosovo' collected a 3 per cent income tax on all exiles working in Germany, Switzerland
and Austria, but much more important for the financing of the KLA were the funds sent by family members
who worked abroad‖.

Boshkovich 98
Albanians have such a strong caucus in the USA Senate and in EU parliament. One of the
main supporters of Albanian interests in USA is Congressman Joseph DioGuardi. He
founded the Albanian caucus (back in 1990‘s) in the Congress in which he brought
Senators Robert Dole, Alfonse D‘Amato, Dennis DeConcini, and Congressmen Tom
Lantos. 251, 252 Besides that, it is very important to have private journalists in influential
magazines and newspaper. Due to a huge pressure from these Albanian‘s allies, the UN
decided to end this status quo. The UN sent Marti Ahtisary to solve this problem. Very
soon he came to the conclusion that Kosovo should be independent. There were some
rumors in Serbia that he received 40 million euros for this decision and that this
information came from the BND (German Intelligence Service) 253 , but this story never
reached cover pages. Naturally Serbian government strongly opposed this idea and the
UN decided to send ―Troika‖ (from number three, representing negotiators from USA,
EU, and Russia) to start new negotiations. Albanians never took these negotiations
seriously because the international community said that if ‗Troika‘ does not manage a
better solution in 120 days than Ahtisary‘s proposal will be implemented 254 So Albanians
had a simple task, just to travel around the world with ‗Troika‘ and pretend that they care
about these talks.
Serbs, Albanians, and ‗Troika‖ had a due date of December 10 th 2007. Even
before this date their negotiations were finished because a compromise was impossible.
Albanians wanted only independence while the Serbs could offer anything but the
251 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 22.
252 Joseph J DioGuardi and Shirley Cloyes, ―The Albanian American Civic League: On a Collision Course
with Slobodan Milosevic,‖ http://blog.aacl.com/the-aacl-on-a-collision-course-with-slobodon-milsovic/
253 Axis Information and Analysis Online, ―Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review,‖ June 25, 2007,
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1334
254 Ahtisary received Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 for efforts to resolve international conflicts including that
one in Kosovo. Obviously it was less important how successful he was.

Boshkovich 99
independence. It is understandable that Serbia strongly disagreed with dismemberment of
15% of its territory. It would be interesting to see how people in UK for example would
feel if the international community insisted on the independence of Wales.
Potential Independent States in Europe 255
However, the reality is that 1.8 million Albanians in Kosovo do not want to live
under Serbian authority. For this reason Serbs suggested a couple of solutions during
talks with ‗Troika‘. The Serbs offered a system that exists in China regarding Hong
Kong, which is the part of China but still parallel system. Albanians rejected this because
―Hong Kong and Kosovo have completely different positions‖. 256 After this idea, Serbia
came up with another solution; Oland‘s islands in Finland with Swedish majority. 257
Again, the Albanians said no. All that the Albanians wanted to talk about was the future
relations between Serbia and Kosovo as two neighboring countries.
255
Caenada Blogspot Online, http://caenada.blogspot.com/2008/02/potential-independent-states-ineurope.html
256
B92 Online, ―Beograd: Kosovo kao Hong Kong,‖ November 5, 2007,
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=11&dd=05&nav_id=270794.
257
United Nations, ―Serbia‘s President Calls on Security Council to Prevent Encouragement, Adoption of
Any Unilateral Act on Independence of Kosovo,‖ January 16, 2008,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9227.doc.htm

Section C; Declaration of Independence
Boshkovich 100
Just a couple of months after the end of talks regarding the final solution for
Kosovo, on February 17 th 2008, the Albanians unilaterally declared independence.
Interestingly, to avoid Russian intervention in the UN, separatists have chosen Sunday to
declare independence. This declaration was immediately recognized by the USA,
Germany, UK, France, Italy, and other countries that bombed Serbia 9 years before.
Additionally, countries that are probably not sure where Kosovo is recognized this
independence most likely due to a foreign pressure; examples are Costa Rica,
Afghanistan, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Belize, Samoa,
Comoros, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, etc. Besides those countries, as expected, many
countries with Muslim majority have also recognized Kosovo as an independent country.
On the other side, Serbia decided to protect her territory and citizens not with the
weapons but by usage of diplomacy (for the first time since 1990‘s). The author of this
paper thinks that it was a very wise decision, regardless of the fact that some people in
Serbia thought that the invasion of Kosovo was a better alternative due to NATO‘s
commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The most important allies for the Serbs regarding
this matter are Russia and China. Besides them, there are some other countries that are
also in favor of Serbia mainly because of their own issues with separatism, or just
because of their strong belief that independence of Kosovo is violation of international
law. Examples are: Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus, Brazil, India, Argentina,
South Africa, Venezuela, Bosnia and Herzegovina (because of Serbs in that country who
have some kind of veto in federal institutions), etc.

Boshkovich 101
In reaction to declaration of independence many Serbs spontaneously started
demonstrations in major cities in Serbia and rest of the world. Unfortunately, some of
those protestors missed an opportunity to peacefully show their concern and
disagreement with this decision (there is an old saying in Serbia that Serbs never miss an
opportunity to miss the opportunity). Instead, they broke in to the US embassy and set
fire in which one protestor (internally displaced person from Kosovo) has died. Sadly,
because of a couple dozen of violent protestors that attacked the US and Croatian
embassy the rest of the world (thanks to the CNN and other news agencies) did not see
almost a million of worried protestors but footage from the US embassy in fire instead. 258
Even the writer of this paper had friends at work that asked him what‘s wrong with the
Serbs again.
Nevertheless, Serbian authorities commenced a huge diplomatic offensive to
make sure that number of countries that are recognizing Kosovo is not growing, lobbying
at the same time in the UN to open discussion in front of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in Hague which would have to hear pros and cons about declaration of
independence and announce the official opinion. 259
This trial started on December 1 st 2009, and the Serbs are hoping that this
decision will be in their favor, but some people are very concerned, especially after
Hisashi Owada‘s (Japanese Judge who is the President of ICJ) 260 announcement that most
258 CNN Online, ―U.S. Warns Serbia It‘s Responsible for Safety of Embassy,‖ February 22, 2008,
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/22/us.serbia/index.html?iref=storysearch; yet, some Western
sources were lees bias, such as Times, http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1715332,00.html
259 BBC Online, ―UN Seeks World Court Kosovo View,‖ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7658103.stm;
74 countries in the UN voted in favor of asking ICJ for advice, 6 were against, while 74 abstained from
voting.
260 Miroslav Lazanski, ―Od Japanca, Iskreno,‖ Politika Online, November 22, 2009,
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Od-Japanca-iskreno.sr.html

Boshkovich 102
likely the ICJ statement won‘t be right or wrong, but rather several pages of interpretation
which will make room for both sides to interpret it in the way they like.
So far several countries have had a chance to speak in front of the ICJ regarding
Kosovo independence. Approximately 15 countries will support the Serbs, while the
same number of countries will support the Albanians. Here are a couple of statements
from the ICJ sessions so far, starting with those that support Serbian positions:
The ambassador of Bolivia said that Serbia could not unilaterally forbid the
staying of international organization in Kosovo, and in the same manner authorities in
Pristina cannot unilaterally cancel the sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo. He said that the
right for independence is guaranteed to nations that are under colonial rule or occupation.
Since Kosovo have never been a colony nor under the occupation of foreign country it
can not have right for independence. 261
China said that there is not question that Kosovo was part of FR Yugoslavia and
Serbia after the collapse of SFRY. The integral parts of sovereign countries, based on
international law, do not have the right to unilaterally declare independence, while
protection of territorial integrity is a blueprint for international order of law. 262
Cyprus called the ICJ to implement international law, and stated that Kosovo‘s
declaration of independence is illegal. Cyprus‘ Ambassador denied accepting Kosovo as
a ‘unique case‘, warning that if the ICJ found Kosovo‘s independence legal it would be
very difficult to limit that statement just to Kosovo. 263
261 Blic Online, ―Brazil i Bolivija Protiv, Bugarska za Nezavisnost Kosova,‖ April 12, 2009,
http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905
262 B92 Online, ―Nastavak Rasprave o Kosovu u Hagu,‖ December 7, 2009,
http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905
263 Ibid

Russia said (Tuesday, December 8 th 2009) that unilateral declaration of
Boshkovich 103
independence is illegal, underlining that the Resolution 1244, which confirms the Serbian
territorial integrity is still active. The Russian delegation said that it is very often heard
that the international law is not the real law, but that the real law is that one of the
stronger. They added that this is time to show that international law is the real one. 264
Spain also said that Kosovo violated international law. Spain envoy stated that
unilateral declaration of independence can not be in line with international law because it
violates principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia, which are protected by
the Resolution 1244 of Security Council of UN. 265
views:
On the other side, countries that are traditionally opposed to Serbia gave their
The Bulgarian envoy said that Kosovo did not violate international law or the
Resolution 1244. He said that declaration of independence is not covered by international
law, but under domestic constitutional law. According to him, the Resolution 1244 did
not require agreement regarding the status of Kosovo. 266
Croatian envoy, Andreja Metelko Zgombic said that Kosovo was part of the
SFRY, and that because of that it had right to declare independence. She added that
Albanians in Kosovo were victims of repression of Serbian authorities, and that will of
the people of Kosovo should be the bottom line in making the final decision regarding
264 Novosti Online, ―Pravo je Iznad Moci,‖ December 8, 2009,
http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=1&status=jedna&vest=164837&title_add=Pravo%20je%20izn
ad%20mo%C4%87i&kword_add=nezavisnost%20kosova%2C%20medjunarodni%20sud%20pravde
265 Ibid
266 Blic Online, ―Brazil i Bolivija Protiv, Bugarska za Nezavisnost Kosova,‖ April 12, 2009,
http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905

Boshkovich 104
Kosovo. 267 Unfortunately, she missed an opportunity to explain why Serbs in Krajina
(part of Croatia where Serbs were in majority until ethnic cleansing of 1995) did not have
the same right as the one that she is giving to Albanians. However, this is something that
was expected from Croatia, especially when one knows that by giving right to southern
Serbian province to separate they are giving the same right to Serbian northern province
(Vojvodina), which was already occupied by Croatia (WWII when Vojvodina along with
Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of German made independent Croatia).
The USA asked ICJ to leave Kosovo‘s declaration of independence intact either
by refusal to make a statement about that, or by finding that the international law does not
forbid declaration of independence. The USA envoy also asked the ICJ not to look at
Kosovo‘s case as a part of bigger story, but rather as a unique case. He added that there is
not any kind of contradiction between peacefully declared independence and international
law, including the Resolution 1244. Envoy also explained that by doing this Kosovo did
not break principle of territorial integrity because that is obligatory only for states, but not
for inner entities. He also said that declaration of independence of Kosovo is final stage
of death of the SFRY, with note that initially Serbia did not recognize Slovenia and
Croatia, but later on that happened. 268 Again, it is not hard to find biases in the statement
of country that supports independence of Kosovo. First, who is going to explain to other
regions in the world that seeks independence why they can not be a ‗unique case‘ as
well? Also, the US envoy compared Slovenia and Croatia, which were republics that
267 B92 Online, ―Nastavak Rasprave o Kosovu u Hagu,‖ December 7, 2009,
http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905
268 Novosti Online, ―Pravo je Iznad Moci,‖ December 8, 2009,
http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=1&status=jedna&vest=164837&title_add=Pravo%20je%20izn
ad%20mo%C4%87i&kword_add=nezavisnost%20kosova%2C%20medjunarodni%20sud%20pravde

Boshkovich 105
were part of the SFRY with Kosovo which is/was a Province of Serbia (as people would
say apples and oranges). Lastly, is not this a great excuse for the Serbs in Bosnia
(Republic of Srpska covers 49% of Bosnia) to request independence as the last stage of
collapse of the SFRY?
Still, there are some important individuals in the US who also think that
independence of Kosovo is not good idea. One of them is James Lyons (U.S. Navy
retired Admiral) who use to serve as commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior
U.S. military representative to the United Nations, and deputy chief of naval operations,
where he was principal adviser on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters. He said that ―…more
than 300 mosques have been built in Kosovo, funded mainly by Saudi Arabia where the
radical teachings of the Wahhabi sect are promoted‖. Admiral Lyons also explained that
leaders of the KLA have connections with the global jihad movement, as well as with
organized crimes, and still they represent ―…the dominant element in the local Albanian
administration…”. More importantly he noticed that the US is endorsing formation of
‗Taliban-like‘ state in the heart of Europe. That is something that will be dangerous for
stability of the region. At the same time it will complicate US relations with Russia and
China which are already bad due to issues over Iran, Taiwan, North Korea and Middle
East. 269
If the writer of this paper could give some advice to the Serbian and Albanian
authorities it would be to come back to the table and find the solution that would satisfy
both sides. Of course, that would mean that neither side would get 100%, but more
importantly neither side would lose 100%, which is the case at this moment. Actually, the
269 The Washington Times, ―Kosovo Train Wreck-Warnings,‖ January 2, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jan/02/kosovo-32train-wreck-warnings/

Boshkovich 106
year 2010 might be a good year for negotiations since the ICJ should finish a process
regarding the legitimacy of declaration of independence.

Conclusion
Boshkovich 107
In conclusion, it is important to mention that the author of this paper wanted to
make sure that people who are not very familiar with the situation on Balkan Peninsula
had a chance to find out more about events that took place and are taking place in this
part of Europe. Hopefully, the audience saw that the Rambouillet Peace Conference was
actually an ultimatum which Serbs could never accept. At the same time, the readers of
this research had a chance to see that there is always the other side of the story. Nothing
is black and white, there is also a huge gray area. Just like in the case of Israelis and
Palestinians, or Kurds and Turks, Serbs and Albanians also have their sides of the same
story. Unfortunately, many major news agencies saw situation on the Balkan through
lenses of subjectivity, which is completely wrong and unacceptable. This is bad not just
because of generalization about the entire nation, but because of the credibility of news
provided by those stations. One of the lessons learned for the author of this project is to
always accept information heard from TV with lot of skepticisms. Of course, one would
not go so far to believe in all theories of conspiracy such as the one that 9/11 was an
‗inside job‘, but in cases such as the last year‘s victory of Sri Lanka‘s government against
Tamil Tigers in which Sri Lanka‘s government was supported by all means, one would
assume that the western audience did not hear the other side of the story.
Nevertheless, Serbs and Albanians should admit their mistakes and try to look
forward to future coexistence in the EU; after all state borders practically do not exist in
EU. Serbia should understand that even if Kosovo does not win full independence,
Albanians, due to a very high birth rate will be the majority in Serbia roughly 50 years
from now. Besides that, for future reference, Serbs needs to realize that it is impossible to

Boshkovich 108
suppress terrorists/rebellions without approval of the USA, EU, and NATO. The best
examples are Turkey 270 which has to fight against Kurds, and Israel fighting against
several terrorist‘s groups. Thanks to the support of the western world they can fight
against terrorists even in neighboring countries such as Iraq and Lebanon, respectively.
One can‘t imagine what would have happened if Serbia tried to fight against the KLA in
Albania.
In the future on the Balkan Peninsula, the world can expect more turmoil in FYR
Macedonia, the southern part of central Serbia, Montenegro, and perhaps Greece (some
of incidents in these areas were already mentioned in news and articles such as Pan-
Albanianism: How big a threat to Balkan stability?). 271
The reason for this is the Albanian aspiration to create ―Great Albania‖ as
mentioned earlier in this research. For this purpose terrorists established ANA (Albanian
National Army) which already had conflicts with security forces in FYR Macedonia and
central Serbia. Just a couple years ago Macedonian police conducted action on Sar
Mountain in which they killed several terrorists and recovered weapons for 650 men. 272
Many questions rose during this research; why does it seem that the international
community uses double standards in solving the problems around the world? Is it
possible that Croatia has right to separate from Yugoslavia while Serbs can not separate
from Croatia (or just stay in Yugoslavia)? Why was Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH)
270 Peter Brooke, ―Kosovo: What We Weren‘t Told,‖
http://web.ukonline.co.uk/pbrooke/p&t/Balkans/dmonkosovo/Kosovo; ―The Yugoslav response was not
gentle but it was certainly no more heavy-handed than Turkey's response to the Kurdish PKK guerrillas, in
a war which 30,000 lives were lost, 4,000 villages were razed to the ground and 3 million Kurds were
driven from their homes. And Turkey is a member of NATO, which participated enthusiastically in
NATO's "humanitarian war" on Yugoslavia.”
271 ICG Europe. Report No 153, ―Pan Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‖ February 25,
2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan014972.pdf.
272 B92 Online, archive November 9, 2007, http://www.b92.net/

Boshkovich 109
allowed to separate from Yugoslavia but Serbs were not allowed to separate from BH?
How are Albanians entitled to declare independence of Kosovo but Serbs from northern
Kosovo cannot stay in Serbia? Why did not the Albanians in Kosovo do almost anything
to encourage the Serbs to come back (According to the UNHCR, only just over 6,000
Serbs have returned home since the end of the war 273 ), which is sad when the world
knows that there is over 238,000 of IDP‘s. 274 Why is Serbia‘s future in the EU
conditioned with arrest of General Mladic (Serb from Bosnia accused for war crimes),
which Serbian authorities can not find (just like the US can not find Osama Bin Laden),
while at the same time no one blackmails Croatia due to a unsolved problem with the
refuges that never returned from Serbia (just like the case when no one pressured Austria
due to WWII Nazis that are still free citizens of this country). 275
The answer to all these questions might be that all this is a part of much bigger
picture. That is getting closer to Russia by destruction of their ally on Balkan. The
importance of this strategy was obvious immediately after NATO bombing when Russian
troops came first to Kosovo (contingent from Bosnia) and captured Pristina airport
Slatina. They did so to ensure that their reinforcement will have a place to land (Serbs
were amazed when they saw Russians in Kosovo before NATO). But, as the Secretary
Albright summarized; ―The Russian military had prepared six transport aircraft to ferry
273 ―Waiting Game,‖ Economist 376, no. 8434 (2005): 43,
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.hpu.edu:5000/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=104&sid=a4ecd0df-105c-4b4db4fb-
7239e7c36e7d%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=1758039
6
274 UNMIK Online, ―Division of Public Monitoring,‖ April 8, 2004, 2,
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2004/mon/apr/lmm080404.pdf
275 Efraim Zuroff the director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center office in Jerusalem talked about Austria as a
safe heaven for Nazis in his interview with Politika. Zorana Suvakovic, ―Nacisti jos Setaju Balkanom,‖
Politika Online, December 4, 2009, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Nacisti-josh-shetaju-
Balkanom.sr.html

Boshkovich 110
thousands of troops to reinforce the small contingent at the Pristina airport. The flights
never took off because the Russians were denied to cross the airspace of Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria….the NATO-led force deployed and ended up feeding the lightly
supplied Russians at the airport…‖. 276 Naturally, a couple of years later Romania and
Bulgaria were invited to become members of NATO (Hungary accede to NATO in April
1999, during the bombing). Nevertheless, it might be wise to determine where the limit of
NATO‘s increase is. Is it realistic to expect that France, for example, will fight with
Russians over Estonia? Besides that it seems better to build partnership with Russia than
to provoke them by putting under NATO‘s umbrella countries that are in their backyard.
After all, Russians proved in the 2008 war with Georgia that they still do not need
approval to invade another sovereign country.
Another explanation is that the west did not want a strong Yugoslavia but rather
several weak states under protectorate of EU, IMF, and NATO. "In post-cold war Europe
no place remained for a large, independent-minded socialist state that resisted
globalisation," said George Kenney, former Yugoslavia desk officer of the US state
department. ―The Serbs' great ‗crime‘ was not reading the script‖. 277
Additionally, it is just important to think far and wide because by allowing the
independence of Kosovo western world made a precedent that could be crucial in future
geopolitical games with some major powers. Examples are China with several regions
that seek independence or India which has many states that would like to be independent.
Even Russia showed that it is not immune to terrorism and separatism. Nevertheless,
western powers should be extremely careful when they make those moves because it
276 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 423-24.
277 Neil Clark, ―It‘s Time to End Serb-Bashing,‖ Guardian Online, January 14, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/14/itstimetoendserbbashing

Boshkovich 111
could make wrong effect such as in the case of Russia and Mr. Putin. One of the reasons
why this ex KGB officer got such a huge support from his people is the bombing of
Yugoslavia which he used to highlight the importance of powerful Russia. Maybe, if
NATO did not bomb Yugoslavia and teased this big country, Russia would be still in
political coma with some weak leader such as Mr. Yeltsin (well known for many scandals
connected to alcohol and violation of law 278 ) who would never seriously opposed
demands from the west.
Another significant issue is NATO credibility. This organization needs to be
extremely cautious when making important decisions. First NATO military actions were
in 1990‘s against Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia (Yugoslavia). Many countries saw that as a
violation of international laws which damaged NATO credibility. More importantly,
during the bombing of Serbia in 1999, NATO bombed China‘s embassy in Belgrade 279
which created a major diplomatic incident. Without mistakes such as that one or as
explained with Russia, NATO led by USA might be in better position today regarding
much more serious issues (Iran, Iraq, Al-Qaeda, North Korea, etc). All this issues would
be much easier to solve with the help of Russia and China. Unfortunately, these two
countries are not truly concerned about rogue regimes, but actually have pretty successful
cooperation in various fields (economy, weapons). However, President Obama
demonstrated, by abandoning the idea of the missile shield in Europe, that he is willing to
change western approach to other world powers which might be crucial for the future of
the world and avoidance of unnecessary wars (and interventions) such as that in
278 ―Swiss investigators say that up to $15m worth of bribes were made available to the Russian leader
[Yeltsin], his family and senior Kremlin officials by a construction company competing for Kremlin
contracts. ―, BBC Online, ―Business: The Economy Yeltsin Linked to Bribe Scandal,‖ September 8, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/441916.stm
279 Madeleine Albright. Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 417-18.

Yugoslavia.
Boshkovich 112
The UN is another organization that also lost credibility (which was always
questionable) over Yugoslavia and later on in Serbia because it did not do anything to
prevent Albanians from declaring their independence. Actually, many countries in this
organization were very supportive to independence of Kosovo, and the only reason that
Kosovo is not member of UN is Russia. Nevertheless, it would not be a surprise if some
future president of Russia allows membership of Kosovo in UN in return for some
benefits from the west. Especially when one has in mind that the only super-power is
pressuring countries around the world to recognize independence of Kosovo. The most
recent knowing case is Bangladesh. According to the RTS (Radio Television of Serbia),
the USA demanded for the fifth time this year (2009) from Bangladesh to recognize
independence of Kosovo. Even US Ambassador to Bangladesh, James Moriarty, admitted
that he talked about that with secretary and ministry of foreign affairs of Bangladesh. 280
However, this poor country still refuses to obey requests of the USA. A journalist of RTS
indicates that the main reason for this refusal is Bangladesh‘s close relations with Russia.
Besides that, it would not be surprise if the reason were fear from separatist movements
in Bangladesh who would see this as their chance to gain independence.
Another problem with the loss of credibility of UN and other international
organizations is the fact that worlds ‗rogue regimes‘ will also learn a lesson and become
more reluctant to peace talks and acceptance of UN resolutions, especially when they see
280 RTS Online, ―Pritisak na Banglades da Prizna Kosovo,‖ November 16, 2009,
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/1/%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0/30208
1/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BA+%D0%BD%D0%B0+%
D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%88+%D0%B4%D0
%B0+%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0+%D0%9A%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%
BE%D0%B2%D0%BE.html

Boshkovich 113
that main advocates of those resolutions from the west are not fulfilling their part of the
deal (in case of Resolution 1244 it was the protection of Serbian integrity). Maybe that is
the reason why Iran does not want to participate in talks regarding WMD (Weapons of
Mass Destruction). Besides that, how can western democracies can expect that double
magnet diplomacy (Secretary Albright talked about that in her book explaining how US
used Russia to influence Serbia) to work in the future if one country, in this case Russia,
was treated like a used diaper once they completed their task.
In the end, it is important to explain that the major powers in the world led by the
US should understand that it is a must to support the obedience of the international law.
There is no such a thing as a ―one time precedent‖ as President Obama explained
recognition of Kosovo (which was actually something that happened during Mr. Bush‘s
administration; someone could say just another mistake of Bush‘s administration). Once
established the precedent based on military power it is opening of Pandora‘s Box for
which no one knows how it will work in the future. What if USA goes through major
economic crises which will make China (for example) stronger power? And if, again just
a theoretical example, Mexicans from California decide to declare independence of
southern California. Who will protect the US sovereignty and integrity from separatists
backed by stronger military power? That is why the world needs laws that will be obeyed
always, not only when one side needs them. And that is the reason why no country in the
world should be faced with ultimatum such as that one from Rambouillet.
There cannot be good and bad terrorism. All terrorists are bad regardless of
possibility that their goals might at some point align with goals of some world power, not
to mention that some of those ‗freedom fighters‘ might become some they a threat to the

Boshkovich 114
country that was supplying them with weapons, just like in case of Iraq (while at war
with Iran) and Afghanistan (while at war with Soviets) which were supplied with
weapons by US, and today they use some of those weapons to attack US troops;
obviously someone did not think far and wide.
Clinton in Pristina (Kosovo capital) next to his 11 foot tall statue in 2009 for purpose of ceremony
made in his honor 281
281 Telegraph Online, ―Bill Clinton unveils statue of himself in Kosovo‖, November 1, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/kosovo/6481057/Bill-Clinton-unveils-statue-ofhimself-in-Kosovo.html

Historiography
Boshkovich 115
The first source that will be discussed in this part is BBC‘s documentary movie
Moral Combat; NATO at War (accessible at YouTube) . Producers of this movie were
favorable to Albanians (at the beginning of the movie they showed picture of Serbian
soldier with the mask who looked really scary, while the KLA fighters where showed as
they sang military cadences using the same melody as the US armed forces), but still they
provided a lot of useful information. Those information are mostly usable as primary
sources (testimonies of those that were involved in this story-Walker, Gen. Clark,
Albright, Serbian leaders, Holbrook, the KLA leaders, etc).
Another good source is Albright‘s book Madam Secretary: A Memoir, in which
she described many situations closely related to the topic of this paper. Even if she has a
very negative opinion about Serbs and their leadership it is possible to find some useful
information in her memoires.
Carla Del Ponte‘s book is another primary source that one will find interesting,
especially the part that covers KLA‘s crimes because it is not very often that someone
covers those war crimes, usually audience has much easier access to those crimes that
were committed by Serbs.
General Wesley K. Clark who was supreme allied commander in Europe offered a
significant number of information that were helpful in finding out more about NATO
bombing. Besides that, he went deeper and elaborated on some diplomatic issues in
which he was one of the main actors.
Journalist Tim Judah who wrote for the New York Review of Books, the London
Observer, the Sunday Telegraph, and the Guardian Weekend magazine wrote a book

Boshkovich 116
named Kosovo; War and Revenge. In this book readers can find many stories that explain
situation in Kosovo, but just like in case of Secretary Albright most of them are bias and
well chosen to support a stereotype abut Serbian guiltiness. Another book written by Tim
Judah is The Serbs; History, Myth & Destruction of Yugoslavia. This book offers very
detailed story of history of the Balkan with a vast amount of valuable information.
The Fall of Yugoslavia; the Third Balkan War by Misha Glenny is another book
that gives perspective in to western point of view. The writer of this book covers the
period from 1990 and situation in Croatia until 1996. This is interesting book about
situation on the Balkan, but the last edition is from 1996 and because of that it is not
essential for the research about the war in Kosovo. Yet it is valuable for any one
interested in other events that have occurred in the 1990‘s.
A very interesting book is Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse; Causes, Course and
Consequences by Christopher Bennet. This book just like many others talks about recent
wars, but more importantly it covers the early history of Balkan Peninsula, which is
important if one wants to understand the roots of the problem.
UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo; Operational and Legal
Issues in Practice by Ray Murphy provides valuable information about the UN‘s
peacekeeping mission around the world, including KFOR in Kosovo.
A several pages of Noam Chomsky‘s book Failed States; The Abuse of Power
and the Assault on Democracy are dedicated to case of Kosovo and Yugoslavia overall,
but mostly in the manner to support his accusations regarding US foreign policy.
Speaking of Serbian primary sources it is important to mention four books:

Boshkovich 117
1. Put u Rambuje (a trip to Rambouillet) by Predrag Simic which was very useful for this
research because he covered most of the stories regarding the Conference. At the same
time he did not allowed to himself to be bias just because he is Serbian, rather he
supported all statements with valid documentation.
2. Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (how Rambouillet happened to us) by Miodrag Mitic.
As already mentioned in this research , probably the most valuable book about this topic.
This is mainly because Mr. Mitic was a member of Yugoslav delegation in Rambouillet,
which gave him an opportunity to participate in all important occasions that occurred
during the Conference. He can not be blamed for being bias, but it is obvious that he had
a very hard time to digest all injustices that happened to Serbs.
3. Kosovo by Dobrica Cosic, which was prepared mainly by his daughter Ana Cosic-
Vukic. She actually made a selection of Mr. Cosic‘s entries from his diary, as well as
letters that he exchanged with relevant leaders in Yugoslavia and the rest of the world.
This is a very interesting book because Mr. Cosic was the president of FR Yugoslavia
and had a chance to participate in many important meetings, including those where was
discussed about solutions for Kosovo.
4. Klopka u Rambujeu (a trap in Rambouillet) by Milan Komnenic. Mr. Komnenic was
for many years one of those that fought against Milosevic in the Parliament and on the
streets of Belgrade. He was not included in Serbian delegation, but he traveled to Paris to
support Serbian cause. At that time he met with many influential politicians in Europe,
working on improvement of Serbian image abroad. However, his book did not offer
much data that could be used in this research. The main reason for that is the way that
Mr. Komnenic writes. It is too poetic for paper related to diplomacy and military studies.

Boshkovich 118
A huge number of newspapers, magazines, and other sources available online
were also used in this research. Some of them offered stories from primary sources, such
as interviews with main actors of the Conference and the bombing that followed, but
some were very well written secondary sources that covered many interesting statistics.
Most used news agency from Serbia is probably B92, which is traditionally opposed to
Milosevic and his followers. At the same time, this news agency was always close to
European values, and very supportive to democratization of Serbia. Speaking of foreign
news agencies, in this research most used was BBC, which covered many important
moments in recent history of Kosovo; from 1990‘s till today‘s process in Hague in front
of ICJ and ICTY.
Other books that are valuable for this topic are: Kosovo; a Short History, written
by Noel Malcolm, Making War, Thinking History; Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential
Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo by Jeffrey Record, Albania and Kosovo-Blue
Guide, The Road to Kosovo; a Balkan Diary written by Greg Campbell, Kosovo;
Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions, edited by William Joseph Buckley, and
Yugoslavia; a Country Study.
Additional sources used for this research include: The Rambouillet Conference on
Kosovo by Marc Weller, articles from journals such as the Foreign Policy as well as
commentaries from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Besides that, very
valuable information can be found in researches such as Depleted Uranium
Environmental and Medical Surveillance in the Balkans, which is actually written in a
form of the information paper (report). Also worth to mention is records from the US

Boshkovich 119
Congress, as well as transcripts from the ICTY. Unfortunately, the Serbian Parliament is
not so easy accessible records wise, at least on line.
At the end it is important to mention that the writer of this research is also a good
source regarding this topic. The reason for that is that he lived in Serbia until 2005, which
gave him an opportunity to see NATO bombing live (actually during one night at the
beginning of the bombing he got almost killed by one ‗Tomahawk‘, along with his future
wife and couple of friends), and talk to IDPs from Kosovo, as well as with refugees from
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (many of them are still in refugee‘s camps, even if
they were forced to leave their homes in 1995). Also, the writer of this research is very
well informed about the negotiation process about future of Kosovo because he followed
all of the news and press releases at that time since he was aware that all those events
were very important for the future of the country where he lived.
After all, people in Serbia did not have a choice but to follow politics at that time
because it was present everywhere. Either through the pressure from EU regarding
cooperation with ICTY, permanent threat of bombing, fears of terrorism, or simply desire
to know if Serbia will become member of EU which would close the curtain on bloody
period in Balkans. Unfortunately, that still did not happen, even though the last civil war
in that region ended in 1999.

I Statement by the Contact Group
Appendix
Boshkovich 120
UNITED NATIONS S
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/1999/96
29 January 1999
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 29 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL
I have the honour to enclose the statement of the Foreign Ministers of
France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of
Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (the
Contact
Group) following their meeting in London on 29 January 1999.
I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be
circulated as a document of the Security Council.
(Signed) Jeremy GREENSTOCK
99-02329 (E) 290199 /...
S/1999/96
English
Page 2
Annex
Statement by the Contact Group issued in London on
29 January 1999
1. Contact Group Ministers met in London on 29 January to consider the
critical situation in Kosovo, which remains a threat to peace and
security in the region, raising the prospect of a humanitarian
catastrophe.
2. Despite the intensive efforts of the international community,
violence remains a daily occurrence in Kosovo. Ministers unreservedly
condemned the massacre of Kosovo Albanians at Racak, which resulted in
several thousand people fleeing their homes. The escalation in violence
- for which both Belgrade’s security forces and the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) are responsible - must be stopped. Repression of civilians
by the security forces must end and those forces must be withdrawn.
Ministers of the Contact Group deplore the failure of the parties to
make progress towards a political settlement, and cannot accept that
this should permit the crisis to continue. Time is of the essence in
reaching a solution, and the Contact Group is therefore assuming its

esponsibility.
Boshkovich 121
3. Ministers called on both sides to end the cycle of violence and to
commit themselves to a process of negotiation leading to a political
settlement. To that end, the Contact Group:
(a) Insisted that the parties accept that the basis for a fair
settlement must include the principles set out by the Contact Group;
(b) Considered that the proposals drafted by the negotiators contained
the elements for substantial autonomy for Kosovo and asked the
negotiators to refine them further to serve as the framework for
agreement between the parties;
(c) Recognized that the work done by the negotiators had identified the
limited number of points that required final negotiation between the
parties;
(d) Agreed to summon representatives from the Federal Yugoslav and
Serbian Governments and representatives of the Kosovo Albanians to
Rambouillet by 6 February, under the co-chairmanship of Hubert Vedrine
and Robin Cook, to begin negotiations with the direct involvement of
the Contact Group. The Contact Group recognized the legitimate rights
of other communities within Kosovo. In the context of these
negotiations, it will work to ensure that their interests are fully
reflected in a settlement;
(e) Agreed that the participants should work to conclude negotiations
within seven days. The negotiators should then report to Contact Group
Ministers, who will assess whether the progress made justifies a
further period of less than one week to bring the negotiations to a
successful conclusion.
4. The Contact Group demanded that the parties seize this opportunity
to reach a settlement offering peace to the people of Kosovo. The
Contact Group praised the present role of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in
/...
S/1999/96
English
Page 3
Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission in working to reduce tensions
in Kosovo and create the conditions for political dialogue, and
recognized the continuing role of the Mission. The Contact Group
recognized that continuing international engagement would be necessary
to help the parties implement a settlement and rebuild the shattered
province. It required that the parties accept the level and nature of
international presence deemed appropriate by the international
community.
5. In the meantime, the Contact Group demands that the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia:
(a) Stop all offensive actions/repression in Kosovo;
(b) Comply fully with the OSCE/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia agreements and relevant Security Council resolutions;
(c) Promote the safe return of all those who have been forced to flee
their homes as a result of the conflict. This includes bringing muchneeded
relief to Kosovo;

Boshkovich 122
(d) Cooperate fully with OSCE and permit the Kosovo Verification
Mission and its Chief of Mission to continue to carry out their
responsibilities unhindered;
(e) Cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia as required by relevant Security Council resolutions;
(f) Conduct a full investigation of Racak with the participation of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, allowing the Chief
Prosecutor and Tribunal investigators to enter and work in Kosovo to
participate in the investigation of the massacre;
(g) Identify and suspend the Yugoslav Army/Serbian Special Police
officers operating in Racak at the time of the massacre until the
results of the investigation become available;
(h) Mitigate the sentences of those imprisoned in connection with the
conflict and provide due process to all detainees.
6. The Contact Group emphasized that compliance with Security Council
resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) applied equally to
the Kosovo Albanians. It condemned all provocations by the KLA, which
could only fuel the cycle of violence, and insisted that all hostages
should be released. The Contact Group believes that the framework it
has set out meets the legitimate aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians
and demands that their leaders rally behind negotiations to reach a
settlement and end provocative actions which would impede the political
process.
7. The Contact Group asked Robin Cook to travel to Belgrade and
Pristina to transmit these messages to the parties.
S/1999/96
English
Page 4
8. The future of the people of Kosovo is in the hands of leaders in
Belgrade and Kosovo. They must commit themselves now to complete the
negotiations on a political settlement within 21 days to bring peace to
Kosovo. The Contact Group will hold both sides accountable if they fail
to take the opportunity now offered to them, just as the Group stands
ready to work with both sides to realize the benefits for them of a
peaceful solution. 282
-----
282 United Nations, Security Council, January 29, 1999, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s9996.pdf this
statement will be also available in the appendix I of this research

II Fundamentals of the Agreement
Boshkovich 123
This is a document that could be found on the Department of State Website regarding an
agreement that was proposed to sides in Rambouillet;
The Rambouillet Accords are a 3-year interim agreement that will provide democratic
self-government, peace, and security for everyone living in Kosovo.
Democratic self-government will include all matters of daily importance to people in
Kosovo, including education, health care, and economic development. Kosovo will have
a President, an Assembly, its own courts, strong local government, and national
community institutions with the authority needed to protect each community's identity.
Security will be guaranteed by international troops deployed on the ground throughout
Kosovo. Local police, representative of all national communities in Kosovo, will provide
routine law enforcement. Federal and Republic security forces will leave Kosovo, except
for a limited border protection presence.
Mechanism for final settlement. An international meeting will be convened after 3
years to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo. The will of the people
will be an important factor at the international meeting.
DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNMENT
During the interim period, citizens in Kosovo will govern themselves democratically
through Kosovo institutions.
Kosovo will have a Constitution. The Constitution calls for the democratic
selection of a President, a Prime Minister and Government, an Assembly, and
strong communal authorities. Kosovo will have its own Supreme Court,
Constitutional Court, other courts, and prosecutors.
Free and fair elections will be held within 9 months of entry into force, under the
supervision of the OSCE.
Kosovo will have the authority to make laws not subject to revision by Serbia or
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including levying taxes, instituting programs
of economic, scientific, technological, regional, and social development,
conducting foreign relations within its areas of responsibility in the same manner
as a Republic, and all matters of local government.
Kosovo and its national communities will perform most functions presently
handled by the Republic of Serbia. However, citizens in Kosovo will be able to
call upon Republic institutions for assistance, if they wish. The Federal Republic
will not be permitted to act in ways injurious to Kosovo.
National communities in Kosovo will be able to control their own identities,
including preserving their languages and operating schools and hospitals. All
other authorities are forbidden from interfering.

SECURITY
Boshkovich 124
Human rights and the rights of the members of all national communities will be
guaranteed.
The international community will play a role in ensuring that these provisions are
carried out, through a civilian Implementation Mission, an ombudsman and
constitutional court judges selected under international auspices, OSCE
supervision of elections, and an international military presence.
The Parties invite NATO to deploy a military force (KFOR), which will be authorized to
use necessary force to ensure compliance with the Accords, protect international agencies
involved with implementation, and provide a secure environment for everyone in
Kosovo.
Security in Kosovo will be handled by KFOR. All other security forces will withdraw or
be phased out under the supervision of KFOR, according to a balanced schedule of
reciprocal steps by all sides specified in the Accords.
Yugoslav army forces will withdraw completely from Kosovo, except for a
limited border guard force (active only within 5 km. border zone) and associated
personnel.
Serb security forces will withdraw completely except for limited number of
border police and, for a transitional period, a limited number of civil police
officers who will serve at the direction of the international Implementation
Mission until local police are trained to replace them.
The Kosovo Liberation Army will hand over security in Kosovo to NATO troops
and will be demilitarized.
Local police will take over all policing duties in Kosovo within 1 year, extendable
for a limited period only by the Chief of the Implementation Mission.
A MECHANISM FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT
Three years after entry into force of the Accords, an international meeting will be
convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the
will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each party's efforts regarding the
implementation of the Accords, and the Helsinki Final Act. 283
283 The State Department Online, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html.

III Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo
The Parties to the present Agreement,
Boshkovich 125
Convinced of the need for a peaceful and political solution in Kosovo as a prerequisite
for stability and democracy,
Determined to establish a peaceful environment in Kosovo,
Reaffirming their commitment to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, as
well as to OSCE principles, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for
a new Europe,
Recalling the commitment of the international community to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Recalling the basic elements/principles adopted by the Contact Group at its ministerial
meeting in London on January 29, 1999,
Recognizing the need for democratic self-government in Kosovo, including full
participation of the members of all national communities in political decision-making,
Desiring to ensure the protection of the human rights of all persons in Kosovo, as well as
the rights of the members of all national communities, Recognizing the ongoing
contribution of the OSCE to peace and stability in Kosovo,
Noting that the present Agreement has been concluded under the auspices of the
members of the Contact Group and the European Union and undertaking with respect to
these members and the European Union to abide by this Agreement,
Aware that full respect for the present Agreement will be central for the development of
relations with European institutions,
Have agreed as follows:
Framework
Article I: Principles
1. All citizens in Kosovo shall enjoy, without discrimination, the equal rights and
freedoms set forth in this Agreement.
2. National communities and their members shall have additional rights specified in
Chapter 1. Kosovo, Federal, and Republic authorities shall not interfere with the exercise
of these additional rights. The national communities shall be legally equal as specified
herein, and shall not use their additional rights to endanger the rights of other national

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communities or the rights of citizens, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or the functioning of representative democratic
government in Kosovo.
3. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human rights, democracy, and the equality
of citizens and national communities.
4. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to democratic self-government through
legislative, executive, judicial, and other institutions established in accordance with this
Agreement. They shall have the opportunity to be represented in all institutions in
Kosovo. The right to democratic self-government shall include the right to participate in
free and fair elections.
5. Every person in Kosovo may have access to international institutions for the protection
of their rights in accordance with the procedures of such institutions.
6. The Parties accept that they will act only within their powers and responsibilities in
Kosovo as specified by this Agreement. Acts outside those powers and responsibilities
shall be null and void. Kosovo shall have all rights and powers set forth herein, including
in particular as specified in the Constitution at Chapter 1. This Agreement shall prevail
over any other legal provisions of the Parties and shall be directly applicable. The Parties
shall harmonize their governing practices and documents with this Agreement.
7. The Parties agree to cooperate fully with all international organizations working in
Kosovo on the implementation of this Agreement.
Article II: Confidence-Building Measures
End of Use of Force
1. Use of force in Kosovo shall cease immediately. In accordance with this Agreement,
alleged violations of the cease-fire shall be reported to international observers and shall
not be used to justify use of force in response.
2. The status of police and security forces in Kosovo, including withdrawal of forces,
shall be governed by the terms of this Agreement. Paramilitary and irregular forces in
Kosovo are incompatible with the terms of this Agreement.
Return
3. The Parties recognize that all persons have the right to return to their homes.
Appropriate authorities shall take all measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of
persons, including issuing necessary documents. All persons shall have the right to
reoccupy their real property, assert their occupancy rights in state-owned property, and
recover their other property and personal possessions. The Parties shall take all measures
necessary to readmit returning persons to Kosovo.

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4. The Parties shall cooperate fully with all efforts by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international and non-governmental
organizations concerning the repatriation and return of persons, including those
organizations monitoring of the treatment of persons following their return.
Access for International Assistance
5. There shall be no impediments to the normal flow of goods into Kosovo, including
materials for the reconstruction of homes and structures. The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia shall not require visas, customs, or licensing for persons or things for the
Implementation Mission (IM), the UNHCR, and other international organizations, as well
as for non- governmental organizations working in Kosovo as determined by the Chief of
the Implementation Mission (CIM).
6. All staff, whether national or international, working with international or nongovernmental
organizations including with the Yugoslav Red Cross, shall be allowed
unrestricted access to the Kosovo population for purposes of international assistance. All
persons in Kosovo shall similarly have safe, unhindered, and direct access to the staff of
such organizations.
Other Issues
7. Federal organs shall not take any decisions that have a differential, disproportionate,
injurious, or discriminatory effect on Kosovo. Such decisions, if any, shall be void with
regard to Kosovo.
8. Martial law shall not be declared in Kosovo.
9. The Parties shall immediately comply with all requests for support from the
Implementation Mission (IM). The IM shall have its own broadcast frequencies for radio
and television programming in Kosovo. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall
provide all necessary facilities, including frequencies for radio communications, to all
humanitarian organizations responsible for delivering aid in Kosovo.
Detention of Combatants and Justice Issues
10. All abducted persons or other persons held without charge shall be released. The
Parties shall also release and transfer in accordance with this Agreement all persons held
in connection with the conflict. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to facilitate its work in accordance with its mandate,
including ensuring full access to all such persons, irrespective of their status, wherever
they might be held, for visits in accordance with the ICRC's standard operating
procedures.
11. The Parties shall provide information, through tracing mechanisms of the ICRC, to
families of all persons who are unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the

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ICRC and the International Commission on Missing Persons in their efforts to determine
the identity, whereabouts, and fate of those unaccounted for.
12. Each Party:
(a) shall not prosecute anyone for crimes related to the conflict in Kosovo, except for
persons accused of having committed serious violations of international humanitarian
law. In order to facilitate transparency, the Parties shall grant access to foreign experts
(including forensics experts) along with state investigators;
(b) shall grant a general amnesty for all persons already convicted of committing
politically motivated crimes related to the conflict in Kosovo. This amnesty shall not
apply to those properly convicted of committing serious violations of international
humanitarian law at a fair and open trial conducted pursuant to international standards.
13. All Parties shall comply with their obligation to cooperate in the investigation and
prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
(a) As required by United Nations Security Council resolution 827 (1993) and subsequent
resolutions, the Parties shall fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia in its investigations and prosecutions, including complying with
its requests for assistance and its orders.
(b) The Parties shall also allow complete, unimpeded, and unfettered access to
international experts- including forensics experts and investigators to investigate
allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Independent Media
14. Recognizing the importance of free and independent media for the development of a
democratic political climate necessary for the reconstruction and development of Kosovo,
the Parties shall ensure the widest possible press freedoms in Kosovo in all media, public
and private, including print, television, radio, and Internet.
Chapter 1
Constitution
Affirming their belief in a peaceful society, justice, tolerance, and reconciliation,
Resolved to ensure respect for human rights and the equality of all citizens and national
communities,
Recognizing that the preservation and promotion of the national, cultural, and linguistic
identity of each national community in Kosovo are necessary for the harmonious
development of a peaceful society,

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Desiring through this interim Constitution to establish institutions of democratic selfgovernment
in Kosovo grounded in respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and from this Agreement, from which the authorities
of governance set forth herein originate,
Recognizing that the institutions of Kosovo should fairly represent the national
communities in Kosovo and foster the exercise of their rights and those of their members,
Recalling and endorsing the principles/basic elements adopted by the Contact Group at its
ministerial meeting in London on January 29, 1999,
Article I: Principles of Democratic Self-Government in Kosovo
1. Kosovo shall govern itself democratically through the legislative, executive, judicial,
and other organs and institutions specified herein. Organs and institutions of Kosovo
shall exercise their authorities consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
2. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human rights, democracy, and the equality
of citizens and national communities.
3. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has competence in Kosovo over the following
areas, except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement: (a) territorial integrity, (b)
maintaining a common market within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which power
shall be exercised in a manner that does not discriminate against Kosovo, (c) monetary
policy, (d) defense, (e) foreign policy, (f) customs services, (g) federal taxation, (h)
federal elections, and (i) other areas specified in this Agreement.
4. The Republic of Serbia shall have competence in Kosovo as specified in this
Agreement, including in relation to Republic elections.
5. Citizens in Kosovo may continue to participate in areas in which the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia have competence through their representation
in relevant institutions, without prejudice to the exercise of competence by Kosovo
authorities set forth in this Agreement.
6. With respect to Kosovo:
(a) There shall be no changes to the borders of Kosovo;
(b) Deployment and use of police and security forces shall be governed by Chapters 2
and 7 of this Agreement; and
(c) Kosovo shall have authority to conduct foreign relations within its areas of
responsibility equivalent to the power provided to Republics under Article 7 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

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7. There shall be no interference with the right of citizens and national communities in
Kosovo to call upon appropriate institutions of the Republic of Serbia for the following
purposes:
(a) assistance in designing school curricula and standards;
(b) participation in social benefits programs, such as care for war veterans, pensioners,
and disabled persons; and
(c) other voluntarily received services, provided that these services are not related to
police and security matters governed by Chapters 2 and 7 of this Agreement, and that any
Republic personnel serving in Kosovo pursuant to this paragraph shall be unarmed
service providers acting at the invitation of a national community in Kosovo.
The Republic shall have the authority to levy taxes or charges on those citizens
requesting services pursuant to this paragraph, as necessary to support the provision of
such services.
8. The basic territorial unit of local self-government in Kosovo shall be the commune. All
responsibilities in Kosovo not expressly assigned elsewhere shall be the responsibility of
the communes.
9. To preserve and promote democratic self-government in Kosovo, all candidates for
appointed, elective, or other public office, and all office holders, shall meet the following
criteria:
(a) No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and
who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a
candidate or hold any office; and
(b) All candidates and office holders shall renounce violence as a mechanism for
achieving political goals; past political or resistance activities shall not be a bar to holding
office in Kosovo.
General
Article II: The Assembly
1. Kosovo shall have an Assembly, which shall be comprised of 120 Members.
(a) Eighty Members shall be directly elected.
(b) A further 40 Members shall be elected by the members of qualifying national
communities.

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(i) Communities whose members constitute more than 0.5 per cent of the Kosovo
population but less than 5 per cent shall have ten of these seats, to be divided among them
in accordance with their proportion of the overall population.
(ii) Communities whose members constitute more than 5 per cent of the Kosovo
population shall divide the remaining thirty seats equally. The Serb and Albanian national
communities shall be presumed to meet the 5 per cent population threshold.
Other Provisions
2. Elections for all Members shall be conducted democratically, consistent with the
provisions of Chapter 3 of this Agreement. Members shall be elected for a term of three
years.
3. Allocation of seats in the Assembly shall be based on data gathered in the census
referred to in Chapter 5 of this Agreement. Prior to the completion of the census, for
purposes of this Article declarations of national community membership made during
voter registration shall be used to determine the percentage of the Kosovo population that
each national community represents.
4. Members of the Assembly shall be immune from all civil or criminal proceedings on
the basis of words expressed or other acts performed in their capacity as Members of the
Assembly.
Powers of the Assembly
5. The Assembly shall be responsible for enacting laws of Kosovo, including in political,
security, economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural areas as set out below and
elsewhere in this Agreement. This Constitution and the laws of the Kosovo Assembly
shall not be subject to change or modification by authorities of the Republics or the
Federation.
(a) The Assembly shall be responsible for:
(i) Financing activities of Kosovo institutions, including by levying taxes and duties on
sources within Kosovo;
(ii) Adopting budgets of the Administrative organs and other institutions of Kosovo, with
the exception of communal and national community institutions unless otherwise
specified herein;
(iii) Adopting regulations concerning the organization and procedures of the
Administrative Organs of Kosovo;
(iv) Approving the list of Ministers of the Government, including the Prime Minister;

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(v) Coordinating educational arrangements in Kosovo, with respect for the authorities of
national communities and Communes;
(vi) Electing candidates for judicial office put forward by the President of Kosovo;
(vii) Enacting laws ensuring free movement of goods, services, and persons in Kosovo
consistent with this Agreement;
(viii) Approving agreements concluded by the President within the areas of responsibility
of Kosovo;
(ix) Cooperating with the Federal Assembly, and with the Assemblies of the Republics,
and conducting relations with foreign legislative bodies;
(x) Establishing a framework for local self- government;
(xi) Enacting laws concerning inter-communal issues and relations between national
communities, when necessary;
(xii) Enacting laws regulating the work of medical institutions and hospitals;
(xiii) Protecting the environment, where inter- communal issues are involved;
(xiv) Adopting programs of economic, scientific, technological, demographic, regional,
and social development, as well as urban planning;
(xv) Adopting programs for the development of agriculture and of rural areas;
(xvi) Regulating elections consistent with Chapters 3 and 5;
(xvii) Regulating Kosovo-owned property; and
(xviii) Regulating land registries.
(b) The Assembly shall also have authority to enact laws in areas within the responsibility
of the Communes if the matter cannot be effectively regulated by the Communes or if
regulation by individual Communes might prejudice the rights of other Communes. In the
absence of a law enacted by the Assembly under this subparagraph that preempts
communal action, the Communes shall retain their authority.
Procedure
6. Laws and other decisions of the Assembly shall be adopted by majority of Members
present and voting.

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7. A majority of the Members of a single national community elected to the Assembly
pursuant to paragraph 1(b) may adopt a motion that a law or other decision adversely
affects the vital interests of their national community. The challenged law or decision
shall be suspended with regard to that national community until the dispute settlement
procedure in paragraph 8 is completed.
8. The following procedure shall be used in the event of a motion under paragraph 7:
(a) The Members making the vital interest motion shall give reasons for their motion. The
proposers of the legislation shall be given an opportunity to respond.
(b) The Members making the motion shall appoint within one day a mediator of their
choice to assist in reaching an agreement with those proposing the legislation.
(c) If mediation does not produce an agreement within seven days, the matter may be
submitted for a binding ruling. The decision shall be rendered by a panel comprising
three Members of the Assembly: one Albanian and one Serb, each appointed by his or her
national community delegation; and a third Member, who will be of a third nationality
and will be selected within two days by consensus of the Presidency of the Assembly.
(i) A vital interest motion shall be upheld if the legislation challenged adversely affects
the community's fundamental constitutional rights, additional rights as set forth in Article
VII, or the principle of fair treatment.
(ii) If the motion is not upheld, the challenged legislation shall enter into force for that
community.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply to the selection of Assembly officials.
(e) The Assembly may exclude other decisions from this procedure by means of a law
enacted by a majority that includes a majority of each national community elected
pursuant to paragraph 1(b).
9. A majority of the Members shall constitute a quorum. The Assembly shall otherwise
decide its own rules of procedure.
Leadership
10. The Assembly shall elect from among its Members a Presidency, which shall consist
of a President, two Vice-Presidents, and other leaders in accordance with the Assembly's
rules of procedure. Each national community meeting the threshold specified in
paragraph 1(b)(ii) shall be represented in the leadership. The President of the Assembly
shall not be from the same national community as the President of Kosovo.

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11. The President of the Assembly shall represent it, call its sessions to order, chair its
meetings, coordinate the work of any committees it may establish, and perform other
tasks prescribed by the rules of procedure of the Assembly.
Article III: President of Kosovo
1. There shall be a President of Kosovo, who shall be elected by the Assembly by vote of
a majority of its Members. The President of Kosovo shall serve for a three-year term. No
person may serve more than two terms as President of Kosovo.
2. The President of Kosovo shall be responsible for:
(i) Representing Kosovo, including before any international or Federal body or any body
of the Republics;
(ii) Proposing to the Assembly candidates for Prime Minister, the Constitutional Court,
the Supreme Court, and other Kosovo judicial offices;
(iii) Meeting regularly with the democratically elected representatives of the national
communities;
(iv) Conducting foreign relations and concluding agreements within this power consistent
with the authorities of Kosovo institutions under this Agreement. Such agreements shall
only enter into force upon approval by the Assembly;
(v) Designating a representative to serve on the Joint Commission established by Article
I.2 of Chapter 5 of this Agreement;
(vi) Meeting regularly with the Federal and Republic Presidents; and
(vii) Other functions specified herein or by law.
Article IV: Government and Administrative Organs
1. Executive power shall be exercised by the Government. The Government shall be
responsible for implementing the laws of Kosovo, and of other government authorities
when such responsibilities are devolved by those authorities. The Government shall also
have competence to propose laws to the Assembly.
(a) The Government shall consist of a Prime Minister and Ministers, including at least
one person from each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph
1(b)(ii) of Article II. Ministers shall head the Administrative Organs of Kosovo.
(b) The candidate for Prime Minister proposed by the President shall put forward a list of
Ministers to the Assembly. The Prime Minister, together with the list of Ministers, shall
be approved by a majority of those present and voting in the Assembly. In the event that

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the Prime Minister is not able to obtain a majority for the Government, the President shall
propose a new candidate for Prime Minister within ten days.
(c) The Government shall resign if a no confidence motion is adopted by a vote of a
majority of the members of the Assembly. If the Prime Minister or the Government
resigns, the President shall select a new candidate for Prime Minister who shall seek to
form a Government.
(d) The Prime Minister shall call meetings of the Government, represent it as appropriate,
and coordinate its work. Decisions of the Government shall require a majority of
Ministers present and voting. The Prime Minister shall cast the deciding vote in the event
Ministers are equally divided. The Government shall otherwise decide its own rules of
procedure.
2. Administrative Organs shall be responsible for assisting the Government in carrying
out its duties.
(a) National communities shall be fairly represented at all levels in the Administrative
Organs.
(b) Any citizen in Kosovo claiming to have been directly and adversely affected by the
decision of an executive or administrative body shall have the right to judicial review of
the legality of that decision after exhausting all avenues for administrative review. The
Assembly shall enact a law to regulate this review.
3. There shall be a Chief Prosecutor who shall be responsible for prosecuting individuals
who violate the criminal laws of Kosovo. He shall head an Office of the Prosecutor,
which shall at all levels have staff representative of the population of Kosovo.
General
Article V: Judiciary
1. Kosovo shall have a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, District Courts, and
Communal Courts.
2. The Kosovo courts shall have jurisdiction over all matters arising under this
Constitution or the laws of Kosovo except as specified in paragraph 3. The Kosovo courts
shall also have jurisdiction over questions of federal law, subject to appeal to the Federal
courts on these questions after all appeals available under the Kosovo system have been
exhausted.
3. Citizens in Kosovo may opt to have civil disputes to which they are party adjudicated
by other courts in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which shall apply the law
applicable in Kosovo.

4. The following rules will apply to criminal cases:
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(a) At the start of criminal proceedings, the defendant is entitled to have his or her trial
transferred to another Kosovo court that he or she designates.
(b) In criminal cases in which all defendants and victims are members of the same
national community, all members of the judicial council will be from a national
community of their choice if any party so requests.
(c) A defendant in a criminal case tried in Kosovo courts is entitled to have at least one
member of the judicial council hearing the case to be from his or her national community.
Kosovo authorities will consider and allow judges of other courts in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia to serve as Kosovo judges for these purposes.
Constitutional Court
5. The Constitutional Court shall consist of nine judges. There shall be at least one
Constitutional Court judge from each national community meeting the threshold specified
in paragraph 1(b)(ii) of Article II. Until such time as the Parties agree to discontinue this
arrangement, 5 judges of the Constitutional Court shall be selected from a list drawn up
by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.
6. The Constitutional Court shall have authority to resolve disputes relating to the
meaning of this Constitution. That authority shall include, but is not limited to,
determining whether laws applicable in Kosovo, decisions or acts of the President, the
Assembly, the Government, the Communes, and the national communities are compatible
with this Constitution.
(a) Matters may be referred to the Constitutional Court by the President of Kosovo, the
President or Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, the Ombudsman, the communal
assemblies and councils, and any national community acting according to its democratic
procedures.
(b) Any court which finds in the course of adjudicating a matter that the dispute depends
on the answer to a question within the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction shall refer the
issue to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary decision.
7. Following the exhaustion of other legal remedies, the Constitutional Court shall at the
request of any person claiming to be a victim have jurisdiction over complaints that
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rights of members of national
communities set forth in this Constitution have been violated by a public authority.
8. The Constitutional Court shall have such other jurisdiction as may be specified
elsewhere in this Agreement or by law.

Supreme Court
Boshkovich 137
9. The Supreme Court shall consist of nine judges. There shall be at least one Supreme
Court judge from each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph
1(b)(ii) of Article II.
10. The Supreme Court shall hear appeals from the District Courts and the Communal
Courts. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall be the
court of final appeal for all cases arising under law applicable in Kosovo. Its decisions
shall be recognized and executed by all authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Functioning of the Courts
11. The Assembly shall determine the number of District and Communal Court judges
necessary to meet current needs.
12. Judges of all courts in Kosovo shall be distinguished jurists of the highest moral
character. They shall be broadly representative of the national communities of Kosovo.
13. Removal of a Kosovo judge shall require the consensus of the judges of the
Constitutional Court. A Constitutional Court judge whose removal is in question shall not
participate in the decision on his case.
14. The Constitutional Court shall adopt rules for itself and for other courts in Kosovo.
The Constitutional and Supreme Courts shall each adopt decisions by majority vote of
their members.
15. Except as otherwise specified in their rules, all Kosovo courts shall hold public
proceedings. They shall issue published opinions setting forth the reasons for their
decisions.
Article VI: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1. All authorities in Kosovo shall ensure internationally recognized human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
2. The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in
Kosovo. Other internationally recognized human rights instruments enacted into law by
the Kosovo Assembly shall also apply. These rights and freedoms shall have priority over
all other law.
3. All courts, agencies, governmental institutions, and other public institutions of Kosovo
or operating in relation to Kosovo shall conform to these human rights and fundamental
freedoms.

Article VII: National Communities
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1. National communities and their members shall have additional rights as set forth below
in order to preserve and express their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities
in accordance with international standards and the Helsinki Final Act. Such rights shall
be exercised in conformity with human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. Each national community may elect, through democratic means and in a manner
consistent with the principles of Chapter 3 of this Agreement, institutions to administer
its affairs in Kosovo.
3. The national communities shall be subject to the laws applicable in Kosovo, provided
that any act or decision concerning national communities must be non- discriminatory.
The Assembly shall decide upon a procedure for resolving disputes between national
communities.
4. The additional rights of the national communities, acting through their democratically
elected institutions, are to:
(a) preserve and protect their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities,
including by:
(i) inscribing local names of towns and villages, of squares and streets, and of other
topographic names in the language and alphabet of the national community in addition to
signs in Albanian and Serbian, consistent with decisions about style made by the
communal institutions;
(ii) providing information in the language and alphabet of the national community;
(iii) providing for education and establishing educational institutions, in particular for
schooling in their own language and alphabet and in national culture and history, for
which relevant authorities will provide financial assistance; curricula shall reflect a spirit
of tolerance between national communities and respect for the rights of members of all
national communities in accordance with international standards;
(iv) enjoying unhindered contacts with representatives of their respective national
communities, within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;
(v) using and displaying national symbols, including symbols of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia;
(vi) protecting national traditions on family law by, if the community decides, arranging
rules in the field of inheritance; family and matrimonial relations; tutorship; and
adoption;

Boshkovich 139
(vii) the preservation of sites of religious, historical, or cultural importance to the national
community in cooperation with other authorities;
(viii) implementing public health and social services on a non-discriminatory basis as to
citizens and national communities;
(ix) operating religious institutions in cooperation with religious authorities; and
(x) participating in regional and international non-governmental organizations in
accordance with procedures of these organizations;
(b) be guaranteed access to, and representation in, public broadcast media, including
provisions for separate programming in relevant languages under the direction of those
nominated by the respective national community on a fair and equitable basis; and
(c) finance their activities by collecting contributions the national communities may
decide to levy on members of their own communities.
5. Members of national communities shall also be individually guaranteed:
(a) the right to enjoy unhindered contacts with members of their respective national
communities elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;
(b) equal access to employment in public services at all levels;
(c) the right to use their languages and alphabets;
(d) the right to use and display national community symbols;
(e) the right to participate in democratic institutions that will determine the national
community's exercise of the collective rights set forth in this Article; and
(f) the right to establish cultural and religious associations, for which relevant authorities
will provide financial assistance.
6. Each national community and, where appropriate, their members acting individually
may exercise these additional rights through Federal institutions and institutions of the
Republics, in accordance with the procedures of those institutions and without prejudice
to the ability of Kosovo institutions to carry out their responsibilities.
7. Every person shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as
belonging to a national community, and no disadvantage shall result from that choice or
from the exercise of the rights connected to that choice.

Article VIII: Communes
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1. Kosovo shall have the existing communes. Changes may be made to communal
boundaries by act of the Kosovo Assembly after consultation with the authorities of the
communes concerned.
2. Communes may develop relationships among themselves for their mutual benefit.
3. Each commune shall have an Assembly, an Executive Council, and such
administrative bodies as the commune may establish.
(a) Each national community whose membership constitutes at least three percent of the
population of the commune shall be represented on the Council in proportion to its share
of the communal population or by one member, whichever is greater.
(b) Prior to the completion of a census, disputes over communal population percentages
for purposes of this paragraph shall be resolved by reference to declarations of national
community membership in the voter registry.
4. The communes shall have responsibility for:
(a) law enforcement, as specified in Chapter 2 of this Agreement;
(b) regulating and, when appropriate, providing child care;
(c) providing education, consistent with the rights and duties of national communities,
and in a spirit of tolerance between national communities and respect for the rights of the
members of all national communities in accordance with international standards;
(d) protecting the communal environment;
(e) regulating commerce and privately-owned stores;
(f) regulating hunting and fishing;
(g) planning and carrying out public works of communal importance, including roads and
water supplies, and participating in the planning and carrying out of Kosovo-wide public
works projects in coordination with other communes and Kosovo authorities;
(h) regulating land use, town planning, building regulations, and housing construction;
(i) developing programs for tourism, the hotel industry, catering, and sport;
(j) organizing fairs and local markets;

Boshkovich 141
(k) organizing public services of communal importance, including fire, emergency
response, and police consistent with Chapter 2 of this Agreement; and
(l) financing the work of communal institutions, including raising revenues, taxes, and
preparing budgets.
5. The communes shall also have responsibility for all other areas within Kosovo's
authority not expressly assigned elsewhere herein, subject to the provisions of Article
II.5(b) of this Constitution.
6. Each commune shall conduct its business in public and shall maintain publicly
available records of its deliberations and decisions.
Article IX: Representation
1. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to participate in the election of:
(a) At least 10 deputies in the House of Citizens of the Federal Assembly; and
(b) At least 20 deputies in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.
2. The modalities of elections for the deputies specified in paragraph 1 shall be
determined by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia
respectively, under procedures to be agreed with the Chief of the Implementation
Mission.
3. The Assembly shall have the opportunity to present to the appropriate authorities a list
of candidates from which shall be drawn:
(a) At least one citizen in Kosovo to serve in the Federal Government, and at least one
citizen in Kosovo to serve in the Government of the Republic of Serbia; and
(b) At least one judge on the Federal Constitutional Court, one judge on the Federal
Court, and three judges on the Supreme Court of Serbia.
Article X: Amendment
1. The Assembly may by a majority of two-thirds of its Members, which majority must
include a majority of the Members elected from each national community pursuant to
Article II.1(b)(ii), adopt amendments to this Constitution.
2. There shall, however, be no amendments to Article I.3-8 or to this Article, nor shall
any amendment diminish the rights granted by Articles VI and VII.

Article XI: Entry into Force
This Constitution shall enter into force upon signature of this Agreement.
Chapter 2
Police and Civil Public Security
Article I: General Principles
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1. All law enforcement agencies, organizations and personnel of the Parties, which for
purposes of this Chapter will include customs and border police operating in Kosovo,
shall act in compliance with this Agreement and shall observe internationally recognized
standards of human rights and due process. In exercising their functions, law enforcement
personnel shall not discriminate on any ground, such as sex, race, color, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
community, property, birth or other status.
2. The Parties invite the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
through its Implementation Mission (IM) to monitor and supervise implementation of this
Chapter and related provisions of this Agreement. The Chief of the Implementation
Mission (CIM) or his designee shall have the authority to issue binding directives to the
Parties and subsidiary bodies on police and civil public security matters to obtain
compliance by the Parties with the terms of this Chapter. The Parties agree to cooperate
fully with the IM and to comply with its directives. Personnel assigned to police-related
duties within the IM shall be permitted to wear a uniform while serving in this part of the
mission.
3. In carrying out his responsibilities, the CIM will inform and consult KFOR as
appropriate.
4. The IM shall have the authority to:
(a) Monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement activities, personnel, and facilities,
including border police and customs units, as well as associated judicial organizations,
structures, and proceedings;
(b) Advise law enforcement personnel and forces, including border police and customs
units, and, when necessary to bring them into compliance with this Agreement, including
this Chapter, issue appropriate binding directions in coordination with KFOR;
(c) Participate in and guide the training of law enforcement personnel;
(d) In coordination with KFOR, assess threats to public order;
(e) Advise and provide guidance to governmental authorities on how to deal with threats
to public order and on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies;

(f) Accompany the Parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out their
responsibilities, as the IM deems appropriate;
(g) Dismiss or discipline public security personnel of the Parties for cause; and
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(h) Request appropriate law enforcement support from the international community to
enable IM to carry out the duties assigned in this Chapter.
5. All Kosovo, Republic and Federal law enforcement and Federal military authorities
shall be obligated, in their respective areas of authority, to ensure freedom of movement
and safe passage for all persons, vehicles and goods. This obligation includes a duty to
permit the unobstructed passage into Kosovo of police equipment which has been
approved by the CIM and COMKFOR for use by Kosovo police, and of any other
support provided under subparagraph 4(h) above.
6. The Parties undertake to provide one another mutual assistance, when requested, in the
surrender of those accused of committing criminal acts within a Party's jurisdiction, and
in the investigation and prosecution of offenses across the boundary of Kosovo with other
parts of the FRY. The Parties shall develop agreed procedures and mechanisms for
responding to these requests. The CIM or his designee shall resolve disputes on these
matters.
7. The IM shall aim to transfer law enforcement responsibilities described in Article II
below to the law enforcement officials and organizations described in Article II at the
earliest practical time consistent with civil public security.
Article II: Communal Police
1. As they build up, communal police units, organized and stationed at the communal and
municipal levels, shall assume primary responsibility for law enforcement in Kosovo.
The specific responsibilities of the communal police will include police patrols and crime
prevention, criminal investigations, arrest and detention of criminal suspects, crowd
control, and traffic control.
2. Number and Composition. The total number of communal police established by this
Agreement operating within Kosovo shall not exceed 3,000 active duty law enforcement
officers. However, the CIM shall have the authority to increase or decrease this personnel
ceiling if he determines such action is necessary to meet operational needs. Prior to
taking any such action, the CIM shall consult with the Criminal Justice Administration
and other officials as appropriate. The national communities in each commune shall be
fairly represented in the communal police unit.
3. Criminal Justice Administration.
a. A Criminal Justice Administration (CJA) shall be established. It shall be an
Administrative Organ of Kosovo, reporting to an appropriate member of the Government

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of Kosovo as determined by the Government. The CJA shall provide general
coordination of law enforcement operations in Kosovo. Specific functions of the CJA
shall include general supervision over, and providing guidance to, communal police
forces through their commanders, assisting in the coordination between separate
communal police forces, and oversight of the operations of the police academy. In
carrying out these responsibilities, the CJA may issue directives, which shall be binding
on communal police commanders and personnel. In the exercise of its functions, the CJA
shall be subject to any directions given by CIM.
b. Within twelve months of the establishment of the CJA, the CJA shall submit for
review by the CIM a plan for the coordination and development of law enforcement
bodies and personnel in Kosovo within its jurisdiction. This plan shall serve as the
framework for law enforcement coordination and development in Kosovo and be subject
to modification by the CIM.
c. The IM will endeavor to develop the capacities of the CJA as quickly as possible. Prior
to the point when the CJA is able to properly carry out the functions described in the
preceding paragraph, as determined by the CIM, the IM shall carry out these functions.
4. Communal Commanders. Subject to review by the CIM, each commune will appoint,
and may remove for cause, by majority vote of the communal council, a communal police
commander with responsibility for police operations within the commune.
5. Service in Police.
(a) Recruitment for public security personnel will be conducted primarily at the local
level. Local and communal governments, upon consultation with communal Criminal
Justice Commissions, will nominate officer candidates to attend the Kosovo Police
Academy. Offers of employment will be made by communal police commanders, with
the concurrence of the academy director, only after the candidate has successfully
completed the academy basic recruit course.
(b) Recruitment, selection and training of communal police officers shall be conducted
under the direction of the IM during the period of its operation.
(c) There shall be no bar to service in the communal police based on prior political
activities. Members of the police shall not, however, be permitted while they hold this
public office to participate in party political activities other than membership in such a
party.
(d) Continued service in the police is dependent upon behavior consistent with the terms
of this Agreement, including this Chapter. The IM shall supervise regular reviews of
officer performance, which shall be conducted in accordance with international due
process norms.

6. Uniforms and Equipment.
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(a) All communal police officers, with the exception of officers participating in crowd
control functions, shall wear a standard uniform. Uniforms shall include a badge, picture
identification, and name tag.
(b) Communal police officers may be equipped with a sidearm, handcuffs, a baton, and a
radio.
(c) Subject to authorization or modification by the CIM, each commune may maintain,
either at the communal headquarters or at municipal stations, no more than one longbarreled
weapon not to exceed 7.62 mm for every fifteen police officers assigned to the
commune. Each such weapon must be approved by and registered with the IM and KFOR
pursuant to procedures established by the CIM and COMKFOR. When not in use, all
such weapons will be securely stored and each commune will keep a registry of these
weapons.
(i) In the event of a serious law enforcement threat that would justify the use of these
weapons, the communal police commander shall obtain IM approval before employing
these weapons.
(ii) The communal police commander may authorize the use of these weapons without
prior approval of the IM for the sole purpose of self-defense. In such cases, he must
report the incident no later than one hour after it occurs to the IM and KFOR.
(iii) If the CIM determines that a weapon has been used by a member of a communal
police force in a manner contrary to this Chapter, he may take appropriate corrective
measures; such measures may include reducing the number of such weapons that the
communal police force is allowed to possess or dismissing or disciplining the law
enforcement personnel involved.
(d) Communal police officers engaged in crowd control functions will receive equipment
appropriate to their task, including batons, helmets and shields, subject to IM approval.
Article III: Interim Police Academy
1. Under the supervision of the IM, the CJA shall establish an interim Police Academy
that will offer mandatory and professional development training for all public security
personnel, including border police. Until the interim police academy is established, IM
will oversee a temporary training program for public security personnel including border
police.
2. All public security personnel shall be required to complete a course of police studies
successfully before serving as communal police officers.

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3. The Academy shall be headed by a Director appointed and removed by the CJA in
consultation with the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission and the IM. The Director
shall consult closely with the IM and comply fully with its recommendations and
guidance.
4. All Republic and Federal police training facilities in Kosovo, including the academy at
Vucitrn, will cease operations within 6 months of the entry into force of this Agreement.
Article IV: Criminal Justice Commissions
1. The parties shall establish a Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission and Communal
Criminal Justice Commissions. The CIM or his designee shall chair meetings of these
Commissions. They shall be forums for cooperation, coordination and the resolution of
disputes concerning law enforcement and civil public security in Kosovo.
2. The functions of the Commissions shall include the following:
(a) Monitor, review, and make recommendations regarding the operation of law
enforcement personnel and policies in Kosovo, including communal police units;
(b) Review, and make recommendations regarding the recruitment, selection and training
of communal police officers and commanders;
(c) Consider complaints regarding police practices filed by individuals or national
communities, and provide information and recommendations to communal police
commanders and the CIM for consideration in their reviews of officer performance; and
(d) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission only: In consultation with designated
local, Republic and Federal police liaisons, monitor jurisdiction sharing in cases of
overlapping criminal jurisdiction between Kosovo, Republic and Federal authorities.
3. The membership of the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission and each Communal
Criminal Justice Commission shall be representative of the population and shall include:
(a) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission:
(i) a representative of each commune;
(ii) the head of the Kosovo CJA;
(iii) a representative of each Republic and Federal law enforcement component operating
in Kosovo (for example, Customs police and Border police);
(iv) a representative of each national community;
(v) a representative of the IM, during its period of operation in Kosovo;

(vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, as appropriate;
(vii) a representative of the MUP, as appropriate, while present in Kosovo; and
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(viii) A representative of KFOR, as appropriate. (b) In the Communal Criminal Justice
Commissions:
(i) the communal police commander;
(ii) a representative of any Republic and Federal law enforcement component operating
in the commune;
(iii) a representative of each national community;
(iv) a civilian representative of the communal government;
(v) a representative of the IM, during its period of operation in Kosovo;
(vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, who shall have observer status, as
appropriate; and
(vii) A representative of KFOR, as appropriate.
4. Each Criminal Justice Commission shall meet at least monthly, or at the request of any
Commission member.
Article V: Police Operations in Kosovo
1. The communal police established by this Agreement shall have exclusive law
enforcement authority and jurisdiction and shall be the only police presence in Kosovo
following the reduction and eventual withdrawal from Kosovo by the MUP, with the
exception of border police as specified in Article VI and any support provided pursuant to
Article I(3)(h).
(a) During the transition to communal police, the remaining MUP shall carry out only
normal policing duties, and shall draw down, pursuant to the schedule described in
Chapter 7.
(b) During the period of the phased drawdown of the MUP, the MUP in Kosovo shall
have authority to conduct only civil police functions and shall be under the supervision
and control of the CIM. The IM may dismiss from service, or take other appropriate
disciplinary action against, MUP personnel who obstruct implementation of this
Agreement.

2. Concurrent Law Enforcement in Kosovo.
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(a) Except as provided in Article V.1 and Article VI, Federal and Republic law
enforcement officials may only act within Kosovo in cases of hot pursuit of a person
suspected of committing a serious criminal offense.
(i) Federal and Republic authorities shall as soon as practicable, but in no event later than
one hour after their entry into Kosovo while engaged in a hot pursuit, notify the nearest
Kosovo law enforcement officials that the pursuit has crossed into Kosovo. Once
notification has been made, further pursuit and apprehension shall be coordinated with
Kosovo law enforcement. Following apprehension, suspects shall be placed into the
custody of the authorities originating the pursuit. If the suspect has not been apprehended
within four hours, the original pursuing authorities shall cease their pursuit and
immediately depart Kosovo unless invited to continue their pursuit by the CJA or the
CIM.
(ii) In the event the pursuit is of such short duration as to preclude notification, Kosovo
law enforcement officials shall be notified that an apprehension has been made and shall
be given access to the detainee prior to his removal from Kosovo.
(iii) Personnel engaged in hot pursuit under the provisions of this Article may only be
civilian police, may only carry weapons appropriate for normal civilian police duties
(sidearms, and long-barreled weapons not to exceed 7.62mm), may only travel in
officially marked police vehicles, and may not exceed a total of eight personnel at any
one time. Travel in armored personnel carriers by police engaged in hot pursuit is strictly
prohibited.
(iv) The same rules shall apply to hot pursuit of suspects by Kosovo law enforcement
authorities to Federal territory outside of Kosovo.
(b) All Parties shall provide the highest degree of mutual assistance in law enforcement
matters in response to reasonable requests.
Article VI: Security on International Borders
1. The Government of the FRY will maintain official border crossings on its international
borders (Albania and FYROM).
2. Personnel from the organizations listed below may be present along Kosovo's
international borders and at international border crossings, and may not act outside the
scope of the authorities specified in this Chapter.
(a) Republic of Serbia Border Police
(i) The Border Police shall continue to exercise authority at Kosovo's international border
crossings and in connection with the enforcement of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

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immigration laws. The total number of border police shall be drawn down to 75 within 14
days of entry into force of this Agreement.
(ii) While maintaining the personnel threshold specified in subparagraph (i), the ranks of
the existing Border Police units operating in Kosovo shall be supplemented by new
recruits so that they are representative of the Kosovo population.
(iii) All Border Police stationed in Kosovo must attend police training at the Kosovo
police academy within 18 months of the entry into force of this Agreement.
(b) Customs Officers
(i) The FRY Customs Service will continue to exercise customs jurisdiction at Kosovo's
official international border crossings and in such customs warehouses as may be
necessary within Kosovo. The total number of customs personnel shall be drawn down to
50 within 14 days of the entry into force of this Agreement.
(ii) Kosovar Albanian officers of the Customs Service shall be trained and compensated
by the FRY.
(c) The CIM shall conduct a periodic review of customs and border police requirements
and shall have the authority to increase or decrease the personnel ceilings described in
paragraphs (a)(i) and (b)(i) above to reflect operational needs and to adjust the
composition of individual customs units.
Article VII: Arrest and Detention
1. Except pursuant to Article V, Article I(3)(h), and sections (a)-(b) of this paragraph,
only officers of the communal police shall have authority to arrest and detain individuals
in Kosovo. (a) Border Police officers shall have authority within Kosovo to arrest and
detain individuals who have violated criminal provisions of the immigration laws.
(b) Officers of the Customs Service shall have authority within Kosovo to arrest and
detain individuals for criminal violations of the customs laws.
2. Immediately upon making an arrest, the arresting officer shall notify the nearest
Communal Criminal Justice Commission of the detention and the location of the
detainee. He subsequently shall transfer the detainee to the nearest appropriate jail in
Kosovo at the earliest opportunity.
3. Officers may use reasonable and necessary force proportionate to the circumstances to
effect arrests and keep suspects in custody.
4. Kosovo and its constituent communes shall establish jails and prisons to accommodate
the detention of criminal suspects and the imprisonment of individuals convicted of
violating the laws applicable in Kosovo. Prisons shall be operated consistent with

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international standards. Access shall be provided to international personnel, including
representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Article VIII: Administration of Justice
1. Criminal Jurisdiction over Persons Arrested within Kosovo.
(a) Except in accordance with Article V and subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, any
person arrested within Kosovo shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts.
(b) Any person arrested within Kosovo, in accordance with the law and with this
Agreement, by the Border Police or Customs Police shall be subject to the jurisdiction of
the FRY courts. If there is no applicable court of the FRY to hear the case, the Kosovo
courts shall have jurisdiction.
2. Prosecution of Crimes.
(a) The CJA shall, in consultation with the CIM, appoint and have the authority to
remove the Chief Prosecutor.
(b) The IM shall have the authority to monitor, observe, inspect, and when necessary,
direct the operations of the Office of the Prosecutor and any and all related staff.
Article IX: Final Authority to Interpret
The CIM is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Chapter and his
determinations are binding on all Parties and persons.
Chapter 3
Conduct and Supervision of Elections
Article I: Conditions for Elections
1. The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and fair
elections, which include but are not limited to:
a) freedom of movement for all citizens;
b) an open and free political environment;
c) an environment conducive to the return of displaced persons;
d) a safe and secure environment that ensures freedom of assembly, association, and
expression;

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e) an electoral legal framework of rules and regulations complying with OSCE
commitments, which will be implemented by a Central Election Commission, as set forth
in Article III, which is representative of the population of Kosovo in terms of national
communities and political parties; and
f) free media, effectively accessible to registered political parties and candidates, and
available to voters throughout Kosovo.
2. The Parties request the OSCE to certify when elections will be effective under current
conditions in Kosovo, and to provide assistance to the Parties to create conditions for free
and fair elections.
3. The Parties shall comply fully with Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the OSCE Copenhagen
Document, which are attached to this Chapter.
Article II: Role of the OSCE
1. The Parties request the OSCE to adopt and put in place an elections program for
Kosovo and supervise elections as set forth in this Agreement.
2. The Parties request the OSCE to supervise, in a manner to be determined by the OSCE
and in cooperation with other international organizations the OSCE deems necessary, the
preparation and conduct of elections for:
a) Members of the Kosovo Assembly;
b) Members of Communal Assemblies;
c) other officials popularly elected in Kosovo under this Agreement and the laws and
Constitution of Kosovo at the discretion of the OSCE.
3. The Parties request the OSCE to establish a Central Election Commission in Kosovo
("the Commission").
4. Consistent with Article IV of Chapter 5, the first elections shall be held within nine
months of the entry into force of this Agreement. The President of the Commission shall
decide, in consultation with the Parties, the exact timing and order of elections for
Kosovo political offices.
Article III: Central Election Commission
1. The Commission shall adopt electoral Rules and Regulations on all matters necessary
for the conduct of free and fair elections in Kosovo, including rules relating to: the
eligibility and registration of candidates, parties, and voters, including displaced persons
and refugees; ensuring a free and fair elections campaign; administrative and technical

Boshkovich 152
preparation for elections including the establishment, publication, and certification of
election results; and the role of international and domestic election observers.
2. The responsibilities of the Commission, as provided in the electoral Rules and
Regulations, shall include:
a) the preparation, conduct, and supervision of all aspects of the electoral process,
including development and supervision of political party and voter registration, and
creation of secure and transparent procedures for production and dissemination of ballots
and sensitive election materials, vote counts, tabulations, and publication of elections
results;
b) ensuring compliance with the electoral Rules and Regulations established pursuant to
this Agreement, including establishing auxiliary bodies for this purpose as necessary;
c) ensuring that action is taken to remedy any violation of any provision of this
Agreement, including imposing penalties such as removal from candidate or party lists,
against any person, candidate, political party, or body that violates such provisions; and
d) accrediting observers, including personnel from international organizations and foreign
and domestic non-governmental organizations, and ensuring that the Parties grant the
accredited observers unimpeded access and movement.
3. The Commission shall consist of a person appointed by the Chairman-in-Office (CIO)
of the OSCE, representatives of all national communities, and representatives of political
parties in Kosovo selected by criteria to be determined by the Commission. The person
appointed by the CIO shall act as the President of the Commission. The rules of
procedure of the Commission shall provide that in the exceptional circumstance of an
unresolved dispute within the Commission, the decision of the President shall be final
and binding.
4. The Commission shall enjoy the right to establish communication facilities, and to
engage local and administrative staff.
Chapter 4
Economic Issues
Article I
1. The economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with free market principles.
2. The authorities established to levy and collect taxes and other charges are set forth in
this Agreement. Except as otherwise expressly provided, all authorities have the right to
keep all revenues from their own taxes or other charges consistent with this Agreement.

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3. Certain revenue from Kosovo taxes and duties shall accrue to the Communes, taking
into account the need for an equalization of revenues between the Communes based on
objective criteria. The Assembly of Kosovo shall enact appropriate non-discriminatory
legislation for this purpose. The Communes may also levy local taxes in accordance with
this Agreement.
4. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be responsible for the collection of all
customs duties at international borders in Kosovo. There shall be no impediments to the
free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to and from Kosovo.
5. Federal authorities shall ensure that Kosovo receives a proportionate and equitable
share of benefits that may be derived from international agreements concluded by the
Federal Republic and of Federal resources.
6. Federal and other authorities shall within their respective powers and responsibilities
ensure the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to Kosovo, including
from international sources. They shall in particular allow access to Kosovo without
discrimination for persons delivering such goods and services.
7. If expressly required by an international donor or lender, international contracts for
reconstruction projects shall be concluded by the authorities of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which shall establish appropriate mechanisms to make such funds available
to Kosovo authorities. Unless precluded by the terms of contracts, all reconstruction
projects that exclusively concern Kosovo shall be managed and implemented by the
appropriate Kosovo authority.
Article II
1. The Parties agree to reallocate ownership and resources in accordance insofar as
possible with the distribution of powers and responsibilities set forth in this Agreement,
in the following areas:
(a) government-owned assets (including educational institutions, hospitals, natural
resources, and production facilities);
(b) pension and social insurance contributions;
(c) revenues to be distributed under Article I.5; and
(d) any other matters relating to economic relations between the Parties not covered by
this Agreement.
2. The Parties agree to the creation of a Claim Settlement Commission (CSC) to resolve
all disputes between them on matters referred to in paragraph 1.

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(a) The CSC shall consist of three experts designated by Kosovo, three experts designated
jointly by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, and three
independent experts designated by the CIM.
(b) The decisions of the CSC, which shall be taken by majority vote, shall be final and
binding. The Parties shall implement them without delay.
3. Authorities receiving ownership of public facilities shall have the power to operate
such facilities.
Chapter 4 A
Humanitarian Assistance, Reconstruction and Economic Development
1. In parallel with the continuing full implementation of this Agreement, urgent attention
must be focused on meeting the real humanitarian and economic needs of Kosovo in
order to help create the conditions for reconstruction and lasting economic recovery.
International assistance will be provided without discrimination between national
communities.
2. The Parties welcome the willingness of the European Commission working with the
international community to co-ordinate international support for the parties' efforts.
Specifically, the European Commission will organize an international donors' conference
within one month of entry into force of this Agreement.
3. The international community will provide immediate and unconditional humanitarian
assistance, focusing primarily on refugees and internally displaced persons returning to
their former homes. The Parties welcome and endorse the UNHCR's lead role in coordination
of this effort, and endorse its intention, in close co-operation with the
Implementation Mission, to plan an early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugees
and displaced persons in conditions of safety and dignity.
4. The international community will provide the means for the rapid improvement of
living conditions for the population of Kosovo through the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of housing and local infrastructure (including water, energy, health and
local education infrastructure) based on damage assessment surveys.
5. Assistance will also be provided to support the establishment and development of the
institutional and legislative framework laid down in this Agreement, including local
governance and tax settlement, and to reinforce civil society, culture and education.
Social welfare will also be addressed, with priority given to the protection of vulnerable
social groups.
6. It will also be vital to lay the foundations for sustained development, based on a revival
of the local economy. This must take account of the need to address unemployment, and

Boshkovich 155
to stimulate the economy by a range of mechanisms. The European Commission will be
giving urgent attention to this.
7. International assistance, with the exception of humanitarian aid, will be subject to full
compliance with this Agreement as well as other conditionalities defined in advance by
the donors and the absorptive capacity of Kosovo.
Chapter 5
Implementation Mission
Implementation I
Article I: Institutions
1. The Parties invite the OSCE, in cooperation with the European Union, to constitute an
Implementation Mission in Kosovo. All responsibilities and powers previously vested in
the Kosovo Verification Mission and its Head by prior agreements shall be continued in
the Implementation Mission and its Chief.
Joint Commission
2. A Joint Commission shall serve as the central mechanism for monitoring and
coordinating the civilian implementation of this Agreement. It shall consist of the Chief
of the Implementation Mission (CIM), one Federal and one Republic representative, one
representative of each national community in Kosovo, the President of the Assembly, and
a representative of the President of Kosovo. Meetings of the Joint Commission may be
attended by other representatives of organizations specified in this Agreement or needed
for its implementation.
3. The CIM shall serve as the Chair of the Joint Commission. The Chair shall coordinate
and organize the work of the Joint Commission and decide the time and place of its
meetings. The Parties shall abide by and fully implement the decisions of the Joint
Commission. The Joint Commission shall operate on the basis of consensus, but in the
event consensus cannot be reached, the Chair's decision shall be final.
4. The Chair shall have full and unimpeded access to all places, persons, and information
(including documents and other records) within Kosovo that in his judgment are
necessary to his responsibilities with regard to the civilian aspects of this Agreement.
Joint Council and Local Councils
5. The CIM may, as necessary, establish a Kosovo Joint Council and Local Councils, for
informal dispute resolution and cooperation. The Kosovo Joint Council would consist of
one member from each of the national communities in Kosovo. Local Councils would
consist of representatives of each national community living in the locality where the
Local Council is established.

1. The CIM shall:
Article II: Responsibilities and Powers
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(a) supervise and direct the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement
pursuant to a schedule that he shall specify;
(b) maintain close contact with the Parties to promote full compliance with those aspects
of this Agreement;
(c) facilitate, as he deems necessary, the resolution of difficulties arising in connection
with such implementation;
(d) participate in meetings of donor organizations, including on issues of rehabilitation
and reconstruction, in particular by putting forward proposals and identifying priorities
for their consideration as appropriate;
(e) coordinate the activities of civilian organizations and agencies in Kosovo assisting in
the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, respecting fully their
specific organizational procedures;
(f) report periodically to the bodies responsible for constituting the Mission on progress
in the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement; and
(g) carry out the functions specified in this Agreement pertaining to police and security
forces.
2. The CIM shall also carry out other responsibilities set forth in this Agreement or as
may be later agreed.
Article III: Status of Implementation Mission
1. Implementation Mission personnel shall be allowed unrestricted movement and access
into and throughout Kosovo at any time.
2. The Parties shall facilitate the operations of the Implementation Mission, including by
the provision of assistance as requested with regard to transportation, subsistence,
accommodation, communication, and other facilities.
3. The Implementation Mission shall enjoy such legal capacity as may be necessary for
the exercise of its functions under the laws and regulations of Kosovo, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Serbia. Such legal capacity shall include the
capacity to contract, and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property.
4. Privileges and immunities are hereby accorded as follows to the Implementation
Mission and associated personnel:

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(a) the Implementation Mission and its premises, archives, and other property shall enjoy
the same privileges and immunities as a diplomatic mission under the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations;
(b) the CIM and professional members of his staff and their families shall enjoy the same
privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families under
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and
(c) other members of the Implementation Mission staff and their families shall enjoy the
same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by members of the administrative and
technical staff and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
General
Article IV: Process of Implementation
1. The Parties acknowledge that complete implementation will require political acts and
measures, and the election and establishment of institutions and bodies set forth in this
Agreement. The Parties agree to proceed expeditiously with these tasks on a schedule set
by the Joint Commission. The Parties shall provide active support, cooperation, and
participation for the successful implementation of this Agreement.
Elections and Census
2. Within nine months of the entry into force of this Agreement, there shall be elections
in accordance with and pursuant to procedures specified in Chapter 3 of this Agreement
for authorities established herein, according to a voter list prepared to international
standards by the Central Election Commission. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) shall supervise those elections to ensure that they are free
and fair.
3. Under the supervision of the OSCE and with the participation of Kosovo authorities
and experts nominated by and belonging to the national communities of Kosovo, Federal
authorities shall conduct an objective and free census of the population in Kosovo under
rules and regulations agreed with the OSCE in accordance with international standards.
The census shall be carried out when the OSCE determines that conditions allow an
objective and accurate enumeration.
(a) The first census shall be limited to name, place of birth, place of usual residence and
address, gender, age, citizenship, national community, and religion.
(b) The authorities of the Parties shall provide each other and the OSCE with all records
necessary to conduct the census, including data about places of residence, citizenship,
voters' lists, and other information.

Transitional Provisions
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4. All laws and regulations in effect in Kosovo when this Agreement enters into force
shall remain in effect unless and until replaced by laws or regulations adopted by a
competent body. All laws and regulations applicable in Kosovo that are incompatible
with this Agreement shall be presumed to have been harmonized with this Agreement. In
particular, martial law in Kosovo is hereby revoked.
5. Institutions currently in place in Kosovo shall remain until superseded by bodies
created by or in accordance with this Agreement. The CIM may recommend to the
appropriate authorities the removal and appointment of officials and the curtailment of
operations of existing institutions in Kosovo if he deems it necessary for the effective
implementation of this Agreement. If the action recommended is not taken in the time
requested, the Joint Commission may decide to take the recommended action.
6. Prior to the election of Kosovo officials pursuant to this Agreement, the CIM shall take
the measures necessary to ensure the development and functioning of independent media
in keeping with international standards, including allocation of radio and television
frequencies.
Article V: Authority to Interpret
The CIM shall be the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the civilian
aspects of this Agreement, and the Parties agree to abide by his determinations as binding
on all Parties and persons.
Chapter 6
The Ombudsman
Article I: General
1. There shall be an Ombudsman, who shall monitor the realization of the rights of
members of national communities and the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in Kosovo. The Ombudsman shall have unimpeded access to any person or
place and shall have the right to appear and intervene before any domestic, Federal, or
(consistent with the rules of such bodies) international authority upon his or her request.
No person, institution, or entity of the Parties may interfere with the functions of the
Ombudsman.
2. The Ombudsman shall be an eminent person of high moral standing who possesses a
demonstrated commitment to human rights and the rights of members of national
communities. He or she shall be nominated by the President of Kosovo and shall be
elected by the Assembly from a list of candidates prepared by the President of the
European Court of Human Rights for a non-renewable three-year term. The Ombudsman
shall not be a citizen of any State or entity that was a part of the former Yugoslavia, or of
any neighboring State. Pending the election of the President and the Assembly, the CIM

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shall designate a person to serve as Ombudsman on an interim basis who shall be
succeeded by a person selected pursuant to the procedure set forth in this paragraph.
3. The Ombudsman shall be independently responsible for choosing his or her own staff.
He or she shall have two Deputies. The Deputies shall each be drawn from different
national communities.
(a) The salaries and expenses of the Ombudsman and his or her staff shall be determined
and paid by the Kosovo Assembly. The salaries and expenses shall be fully adequate to
implement the Ombudsman's mandate.
(b) The Ombudsman and members of his or her staff shall not be held criminally or
civilly liable for any acts carried out within the scope of their duties.
1. The Ombudsman shall consider:
Article II: Jurisdiction
(a) alleged or apparent violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo,
as provided in the Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic
of Serbia, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and the Protocols thereto; and
(b) alleged or apparent violations of the rights of members of national communities
specified in this Agreement.
2. All persons in Kosovo shall have the right to submit complaints to the Ombudsman.
The Parties agree not to take any measures to punish persons who intend to submit or
who have submitted such allegations, or in any other way to deter the exercise of this
right.
Article III: Powers and Duties
1. The Ombudsman shall investigate alleged violations falling within the jurisdiction set
forth in Article II.1. He or she may act either on his or her own initiative or in response to
an allegation presented by any Party or person, non-governmental organization, or group
of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation or acting on behalf of alleged
victims who are deceased or missing. The work of the Ombudsman shall be free of
charge to the person concerned.
2. The Ombudsman shall have complete, unimpeded, and immediate access to any
person, place, or information upon his or her request.
(a) The Ombudsman shall have access to and may examine all official documents, and he
or she can require any person, including officials of Kosovo, to cooperate by providing
relevant information, documents, and files.

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(b) The Ombudsman may attend administrative hearings and meetings of other Kosovo
institutions in order to gather information.
(c) The Ombudsman may examine facilities and places where persons deprived of their
liberty are detained, work, or are otherwise located.
(d) The Ombudsman and staff shall maintain the confidentiality of all confidential
information obtained by them, unless the Ombudsman determines that such information
is evidence of a violation of rights falling within his or her jurisdiction, in which case that
information may be revealed in public reports or appropriate legal proceedings.
(e) The Parties undertake to ensure cooperation with the Ombudsman's investigations.
Willful and knowing failure to comply shall be a criminal offense prosecutable in any
jurisdiction of the Parties. Where an official impedes an investigation by refusing to
provide necessary information, the Ombudsman shall contact that official's superior or
the public prosecutor for appropriate penal action to be taken in accordance with the law.
3. The Ombudsman shall issue findings and conclusions in the form of a published report
promptly after concluding an investigation.
(a) A Party, institution, or official identified by the Ombudsman as a violator shall, within
a period specified by the Ombudsman, explain in writing how it will comply with any
prescriptions the Ombudsman may put forth for remedial measures.
(b) In the event that a person or entity does not comply with the conclusions and
recommendations of the Ombudsman, the report shall be forwarded for further action to
the Joint Commission established by Chapter 5 of this Agreement, to the President of the
appropriate Party, and to any other officials or institutions that the Ombudsman deems
proper.
Chapter 7
Implementation II
Article I: General Obligations
1. The Parties undertake to recreate, as quickly as possible, normal conditions of life in
Kosovo and to co- operate fully with each other and with all international organizations,
agencies, and non-governmental organizations involved in the implementation of this
Agreement. They welcome the willingness of the international community to send to the
region a force to assist in the implementation of this Agreement.
a. The United Nations Security Council is invited to pass a resolution under Chapter VII
of the Charter endorsing and adopting the arrangements set forth in this Chapter,
including the establishment of a multinational military implementation force in Kosovo.
The Parties invite NATO to constitute and lead a military force to help ensure compliance

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with the provisions of this Chapter. They also reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
b. The Parties agree that NATO will establish and deploy a force (hereinafter "KFOR")
which may be composed of ground, air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO
nations, operating under the authority and subject to the direction and the political control
of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command. The Parties
agree to facilitate the deployment and operations of this force and agree also to comply
fully with all the obligations of this Chapter.
c. It is agreed that other States may assist in implementing this Chapter. The Parties agree
that the modalities of those States' participation will be the subject of agreement between
such participating States and NATO.
2. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:
a. to establish a durable cessation of hostilities. Other than those Forces provided for in
this Chapter, under no circumstances shall any armed Forces enter, reenter, or remain
within Kosovo without the prior express consent of the KFOR Commander
(COMKFOR). For the purposes of this Chapter, the term "Forces" includes all personnel
and organizations with military capability, including regular army, armed civilian groups,
paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military
police, intelligence services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local, Special, Riot and Anti-
Terrorist Police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by COMKFOR. The
only exception to the provisions of this paragraph is for civilian police engaged in hot
pursuit of a person suspected of committing a serious criminal offense, as provided for in
Chapter 2;
b. to provide for the support and authorization of the KFOR and in particular to authorize
the KFOR to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, to
ensure compliance with this Chapter and the protection of the KFOR, Implementation
Mission (IM), and other international organizations, agencies, and non- governmental
organizations involved in the implementation of this Agreement, and to contribute to a
secure environment;
c. to provide, at no cost, the use of all facilities and services required for the deployment,
operations and support of the KFOR.
3. The Parties understand and agree that the obligations undertaken in this Chapter shall
apply equally to each Party. Each Party shall be held individually responsible for
compliance with its obligations, and each agrees that delay or failure to comply by one
Party shall not constitute cause for any other Party to fail to carry out its own obligations.
All Parties shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by the KFOR as may be
necessary to ensure implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo and the protection of the
KFOR, IM, and other international organizations, agencies, and non- governmental
organizations involved in the implementation of this Agreement.

Article II: Cessation of Hostilities
Boshkovich 162
1. The Parties shall, immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement (EIF), refrain
from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against each other or against
any person in Kosovo. They shall not encourage or organize hostile or provocative
demonstrations.
2. In carrying out the obligations set forth in paragraph 1, the Parties undertake in
particular to cease the firing of all weapons and explosive devices except as authorized by
COMKFOR. They shall not place any mines, barriers, unauthorized checkpoints,
observation posts (with the exception of COMKFOR-approved border observation posts
and crossing points), or protective obstacles. Except as provided in Chapter 2, the Parties
shall not engage in any military, security, or training-related activities, including ground,
air, or air defense operations, in or over Kosovo, without the prior express approval of
COMKFOR.
3. Except for Border Guard forces (as provided for in Article IV), no Party shall have
Forces present within a 5 kilometer zone inward from the international border of the FRY
that is also the border of Kosovo (hereinafter "the Border Zone"). The Border Zone will
be marked on the ground by EIF + 14 days by VJ Border Guard personnel in accordance
with direction from IM. COMKFOR may determine small scale reconfigurations for
operational reasons.
4. a. With the exception of civilian police performing normal police duties as determined
by the CIM, no Party shall have Forces present within 5 kilometers of the Kosovo side of
the boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY.
b. The presence of any Forces within 5 kilometers of the other side of that boundary shall
be notified to COMKFOR; if, in the judgment of COMKFOR, such presence threatens or
would threaten implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo, he shall contact the authorities
responsible for the Forces in question and may require those Forces to withdraw from or
remain outside that area.
5. No Party shall conduct any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions in
response to violations of this Chapter by another Party. The Parties shall respond to
alleged violations of this Chapter through the procedures provided in Article XI.
Article III: Redeployment, Withdrawal, and Demilitarization of Forces
In order to disengage their Forces and to avoid any further conflict, the Parties shall
immediately upon EIF begin to re-deploy, withdraw, or demilitarize their Forces in
accordance with Articles IV, V, and VI.

1. VJ Army Units
Article IV: VJ Forces
Boshkovich 163
a. By K-Day + 5 days, all VJ Army units in Kosovo (with the exception of those Forces
specified in paragraph 2 of this Article) shall have completed redeployment to the
approved cantonment sites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter. The senior VJ
commander in Kosovo shall confirm in writing to COMKFOR by K-Day + 5 days that
the VJ is in compliance and provide the information required in Article VII below to take
account of withdrawals or other changes made during the redeployment. This information
shall be updated weekly.
b. By K-Day + 30 days, the Chief of the VJ General Staff, through the senior VJ
commander in Kosovo, shall provide for approval by COMKFOR a detailed plan for the
phased withdrawal of VJ Forces from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia to ensure the
following timelines are met:
1) By K-Day + 90 days, VJ authorities must, to the satisfaction of COMKFOR, withdraw
from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia 50% of men and materiel and all designated
offensive assets. Such assets are taken to be: main battle tanks; all other armored vehicles
mounting weapons greater than 12.7mm; and, all heavy weapons (vehicle mounted or
not) of over 82mm.
2) By K-Day + 180 days, all VJ Army personnel and equipment (with the exception of
those Forces specified in paragraph 2 of this Article) shall be withdrawn from Kosovo to
other locations in Serbia.
2. VJ Border Guard Forces
a. VJ Border Guard forces shall be permitted but limited to a structure of 1500 members
at pre- February 1998 Border Guard Battalion facilities located in Djakovica, Prizren, and
Urosevac and subordinate facilities within the 5 kilometer Border Zone, or at a limited
number of existing facilities in the immediate proximity of the Border Zone subject to the
prior approval of COMKFOR, with that number to be reached by K-Day + 14 days. An
additional number of VJ personnel -- totaling no more than 1000 C2 and logistics forces -
- will be permitted to remain in the approved cantonment sites listed at Appendix A to
fulfill brigade-level functions related only to border security. After an initial 90 day
period from K- Day, COMKFOR may at any time review the deployments of VJ
personnel and may require further adjustments to force levels, with the objective of
reaching the minimum force structure required for legitimate border security, as the
security situation and the conduct of the Parties warrant.
b. VJ elements in Kosovo shall be limited to weapons of 82mm and below. They shall
possess neither armored vehicles (other than wheeled vehicles mounting weapons of
12.7mm or less) nor air defense weapons.

Boshkovich 164
c. VJ Border Guard units shall be permitted to patrol in Kosovo only within the Border
Zone and solely for the purpose of defending the border against external attack and
maintaining its integrity by preventing illicit border crossings. Geographic terrain
considerations may require Border Guard maneuver inward of the Border Zone; any such
maneuver shall be coordinated with and approved by COMKFOR.
d. With the exception of the Border Zone, VJ units may travel through Kosovo only to
reach duty stations and garrisons in the Border Zone or approved cantonment sites. Such
travel may only be along routes and in accordance with procedures that have been
determined by COMKFOR after consultation with the CIM, VJ unit commanders,
communal government authorities, and police commanders. These routes and procedures
will be determined by K-Day + 14 days, subject to re- determination by COMKFOR at
any time. VJ forces in Kosovo but outside the Border Zone shall be permitted to act only
in self-defense in response to a hostile act pursuant to Rules of Engagement (ROE) which
will be approved by COMKFOR in consultation with the CIM. When deployed in the
Border Zone, they will act in accordance with ROE established under control of
COMKFOR.
e. VJ Border Guard forces may conduct training activities only within the 5 kilometer
Border Zone, and only with the prior express approval of COMKFOR.
3. Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces (YAADF)
All aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including man-portable air defense systems
{MANPADS}) and anti-aircraft artillery in Kosovo shall immediately upon EIF begin
withdrawing from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia outside the 25 kilometer Mutual
Safety Zone as defined in Article X. This withdrawal shall be completed and reported by
the senior VJ commander in Kosovo to the appropriate NATO commander not more than
10 days after EIF. The appropriate NATO commander shall control and coordinate use of
airspace over Kosovo commencing at EIF as further specified in Article X. No air
defense systems, target tracking radars, or anti-aircraft artillery shall be positioned or
operated within Kosovo or the 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone without the prior express
approval of the appropriate NATO commander.
Article V: Other Forces
1. The actions of Forces in Kosovo other than KFOR, VJ, MUP, or local police forces
provided for in Chapter 2 (hereinafter referred to as "Other Forces") shall be in
accordance with this Article. Upon EIF, all Other Forces in Kosovo must immediately
observe the provisions of Article I, paragraph 2, Article II, paragraph 1, and Article III
and in addition refrain from all hostile intent, military training and formations,
organization of demonstrations, and any movement in either direction or smuggling
across international borders or the boundary between Kosovo and other parts of the FRY.
Furthermore, upon EIF, all Other Forces in Kosovo must publicly commit themselves to
demilitarize on terms to be determined by COMKFOR, renounce violence, guarantee

Boshkovich 165
security of international personnel, and respect the international borders of the FRY and
all terms of this Chapter.
2. Except as approved by COMKFOR, from K-Day, all Other Forces in Kosovo must not
carry weapons:
a. within 1 kilometer of VJ and MUP cantonments listed at Appendix A;
b. within 1 kilometer of the main roads as follows:
1) Pec - Lapusnik - Pristina
2) border - Djakovica - Klina
3) border - Prizren - Suva Rika - Pristina
4) Djakovica - Orahovac - Lapusnik - Pristina
5) Pec - Djakovica - Prizren - Urosevac - border
6) border - Urosevac - Pristina - Podujevo - border
7) Pristina - Kosovska Mitrovica - border
8) Kosovka Mitrovica - (Rakos) - Pec
9) Pec - Border with Montenegro (through Pozaj)
10) Pristina - Lisica - border with Serbia
11) Pristina - Gnjilane - Urosevac
12) Gnjilane - Veliki Trnovac - border with Serbia;
13) Prizren - Doganovic
c. within 1 kilometer of the Border Zone;
d. in any other areas designated by COMKFOR.
3. By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces must abandon and close all fighting positions,
entrenchments, and checkpoints.
4. By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces' commanders designated by COMKFOR shall
report completion of the above requirements in the format at Article VII to COMKFOR
and continue to provide weekly detailed status reports until demilitarization is complete.
5. COMKFOR will establish procedures for demilitarization and monitoring of Other
Forces in Kosovo and for the further regulation of their activities. These procedures will
be established to facilitate a phased demilitarization program as follows:
a. By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces shall establish secure weapons storage sites,
which shall be registered with and verified by the KFOR;
b. By K-Day + 30 days, all Other Forces shall store all prohibited weapons (any weapon
12.7mm or larger, any anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, mines or explosives)
and automatic weapons in the registered weapons storage sites. Other Forces
commanders shall confirm completion of weapons storage to COMKFOR no later than
K-Day + 30 days;

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c. By K-Day + 30 days, all Other Forces shall cease wearing military uniforms and
insignia, and cease carrying prohibited weapons and automatic weapons;
d. By K-Day + 90 days, authority for storage sites shall pass to the KFOR. After this date,
it shall be illegal for Other Forces to possess prohibited weapons and automatic weapons,
and such weapons shall be subject to confiscation by the KFOR;
e. By K-Day + 120 days, demilitarization of all Other Forces shall be completed.
6. By EIF + 30 days, subject to arrangements by COMKFOR if necessary, all Other
Forces personnel who are not of local origin, whether or not they are legally within
Kosovo, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and
personnel from neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from Kosovo.
ARTICLE VI: MUP
1. Ministry of Interior Police (MUP) is defined as all police and public security units and
personnel under the control of Federal or Republic authorities except for the border
police referred to in Chapter 2 and police academy students and personnel at the training
school in Vucitrn referred to in Chapter 2. The CIM, in consultation with COMKFOR,
shall have the discretion to exempt any public security units from this definition if he
determines that it is in the public interest (e.g. firefighters).
a. By K-Day + 5 days, all MUP units in Kosovo (with the exception of the border police
referred to in Chapter 2) shall have completed redeployment to the approved cantonment
sites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter or to garrisons outside Kosovo. The senior
MUP commander in Kosovo or his representative shall confirm in writing by K-Day + 5
days to COMKFOR and the CIM that the MUP is in compliance and update the
information required in Article VII to take account of withdrawals or other changes made
during the redeployment. This information shall be updated weekly. Resumption of
normal communal police patrolling will be permitted under the supervision and control of
the IM and as specifically approved by the CIM in consultation with COMKFOR, and
will be contingent on compliance with the terms of this Agreement.
b. Immediately upon EIF, the following withdrawals shall begin:
1) By K-Day + 5 days, those MUP units not assigned to Kosovo prior to 1 February 1998
shall withdraw all personnel and equipment from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia.
2) By K-Day + 20 days, all Special Police, including PJP, SAJ, and JSO forces, and their
equipment shall be withdrawn from their cantonment sites out of Kosovo to other
locations in Serbia. Additionally, all MUP offensive assets (designated as armored
vehicles mounting weapons 12.7mm or larger, and all heavy weapons {vehicle mounted
or not} of over 82mm) shall be withdrawn.

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c. By K-Day + 30 days, the senior MUP commander shall provide for approval by
COMKFOR, in consultation with the CIM, a detailed plan for the phased drawdown of
the remainder of MUP forces. In the event that COMKFOR, in consultation with the
CIM, does not approve the plan, he has the authority to issue his own binding plan for
further MUP drawdowns. The CIM will decide at the same time when the remaining
MUP units will wear new insignia. In any case, the following time-table must be met:
1) by K-Day + 60 days, 50% drawdown of the remaining MUP units including reservists.
The CIM after consultations with COMKFOR shall have the discretion to extend this
deadline for up to K-Day + 90 days if he judges there to be a risk of a law enforcement
vacuum;
2) by K-Day + 120 days, further drawdown to 2500 MUP. The CIM after consultations
with COMKFOR shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for up to K-Day + 180
days to meet operational needs;
3) transition to communal police force shall begin as Kosovar police are trained and able
to assume their duties. The CIM shall organize this transition between MUP and
communal police;
4) in any event, by EIF + one year, all Ministry of Interior Civil Police shall be drawn
down to zero. The CIM shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for up to an
additional 12 months to meet operational needs.
d. The 2500 MUP allowed by this Chapter and referred to in Article V.1(a) of Chapter 2
shall have authority only for civil police functions and be under the supervision and
control of the CIM.
Article VII: Notifications
1. By K-Day + 5 days, the Parties shall furnish the following specific information
regarding the status of all conventional military; all police, including military police,
Department of Public Security Police, special police; paramilitary; and all Other Forces
in Kosovo, and shall update the COMKFOR weekly on changes in this information:
a. location, disposition, and strengths of all military and special police units referred to
above;
b. quantity and type of weaponry of 12.7 mm and above, and ammunition for such
weaponry, including location of cantonments and supply depots and storage sites;
c. positions and descriptions of any surface-to-air missiles/launchers, including mobile
systems, anti-aircraft artillery, supporting radars, and associated command and control
systems;

Boshkovich 168
d. positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices,
demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire entanglements, physical or military hazards to
the safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo, weapons systems, vehicles, or any other
military equipment; and
e. any further information of a military or security nature requested by the COMKFOR.
Article VIII: Operations and Authority of the KFOR
1. Consistent with the general obligations of Article I, the Parties understand and agree
that the KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance and with the authority to take
all necessary action to help ensure compliance with this Chapter.
2. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall have the right:
a. to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties with this Chapter and to respond
promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if required. This
includes necessary action to:
1) enforce VJ and MUP reductions; 2) enforce demilitarization of Other Forces; 3)
enforce restrictions on all VJ, MUP and Other Forces' activities, movement and training
in Kosovo;
b. to establish liaison arrangements with IM, and support IM as appropriate;
c. to establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities, with Other Forces, and
with FRY and Serbian civil and military authorities;
d. to observe, monitor, and inspect any and all facilities or activities in Kosovo, including
within the Border Zone, that the COMKFOR believes has or may have military
capability, or are or may be associated with the employment of military or police
capabilities, or are otherwise relevant to compliance with this Chapter;
e. to require the Parties to mark and clear minefields and obstacles and to monitor their
performance;
f. to require the Parties to participate in the Joint Military Commission and its subordinate
military commissions as described in Article XI.
3. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall have the right to fulfill its
supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks, its capabilities, and
available resources, and as directed by the NAC, which include the following:
a. to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with
this Agreement, including free and fair elections;

Boshkovich 169
b. to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian
missions;
c. to assist international agencies in fulfilling their responsibilities in Kosovo;
d. to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations,
refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate threat to life
and person.
4. The Parties understand and agree that further directives from the NAC may establish
additional duties and responsibilities for the KFOR in implementing this Chapter.
5. KFOR operations shall be governed by the following provisions:
a. KFOR and its personnel shall have the legal status, rights, and obligations specified in
Appendix B to this Chapter;
b. The KFOR shall have the right to use all necessary means to ensure its full ability to
communicate and shall have the right to the unrestricted use of the entire electromagnetic
spectrum. In implementing this right, the KFOR shall make reasonable efforts to
coordinate with the appropriate authorities of the Parties;
c. The KFOR shall have the right to control and regulate surface traffic throughout
Kosovo including the movement of the Forces of the Parties. All military training
activities and movements in Kosovo must be authorized in advance by COMKFOR;
d. The KFOR shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement by ground, air,
and water into and throughout Kosovo. It shall in Kosovo have the right to bivouac,
maneuver, billet, and utilize any areas or facilities to carry out its responsibilities as
required for its support, training, and operations, with such advance notice as may be
practicable. Neither the KFOR nor any of its personnel shall be liable for any damages to
public or private property that they may cause in the course of duties related to the
implementation of this Chapter. Roadblocks, checkpoints, or other impediments to KFOR
freedom of movement shall constitute a breach of this Chapter and the violating Party
shall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force to
ensure compliance with this Chapter.
6. The Parties understand and agree that COMKFOR shall have the authority, without
interference or permission of any Party, to do all that he judges necessary and proper,
including the use of military force, to protect the KFOR and the IM, and to carry out the
responsibilities listed in this Chapter. The Parties shall comply in all respects with KFOR
instructions and requirements.
7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, the Parties understand and agree
that COMKFOR has the right and is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, or
relocation of specific Forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities

Boshkovich 170
whenever the COMKFOR determines such Forces, weapons, or activities to constitute a
threat or potential threat to either the KFOR or its mission, or to another Party. Forces
failing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threatening
activities following such a demand by the KFOR shall be subject to military action by the
KFOR, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance, consistent with the
terms set forth in Article I, paragraph 3.
Article IX: Border Control
The Parties understand and agree that, until other arrangements are established, and
subject to provisions of this Chapter and Chapter 2, controls along the international
border of the FRY that is also the border of Kosovo will be maintained by the existing
institutions normally assigned to such tasks, subject to supervision by the KFOR and the
IM, which shall have the right to review and approve all personnel and units, to monitor
their performance, and to remove and replace any personnel for behavior inconsistent
with this Chapter.
Article X: Control of Air Movements
The appropriate NATO commander shall have sole authority to establish rules and
procedures governing command and control of the airspace over Kosovo as well as
within a 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone (MSZ). This MSZ shall consist of FRY
airspace within 25 kilometers outward from the boundary of Kosovo with other parts of
the FRY. This Chapter supersedes the NATO Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement of
October 12, 1998 on any matter or area in which they may contradict each other. No
military air traffic, fixed or rotary wing, of any Party shall be permitted to fly over
Kosovo or in the MSZ without the prior express approval of the appropriate NATO
commander. Violations of any of the provisions above, including the appropriate NATO
commander's rules and procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well as
unauthorized flight or activation of FRY Integrated Air Defense (IADS) within the MSZ,
shall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force. The
KFOR shall have a liaison team at the FRY Air Force HQ and a YAADF liaison shall be
established with the KFOR. The Parties understand and agree that the appropriate NATO
commander may delegate control of normal civilian air activities to appropriate FRY
institutions to monitor operations, deconflict KFOR air traffic movements, and ensure
smooth and safe operation of the air traffic system.
Article XI: Establishment of a Joint Military Commission
1. A Joint Military Commission (JMC) shall be established with the deployment of the
KFOR to Kosovo.
2. The JMC shall be chaired by COMKFOR or his representative and consist of the
following members:

a. the senior Yugoslav military commander of the Forces of the FRY or his
representative;
Boshkovich 171
b. the Ministers of Interior of the FRY and Republic of Serbia or their representatives;
c. a senior military representative of all Other Forces;
d. a representative of the IM;
e. other persons as COMKFOR shall determine, including one or more representatives of
the Kosovo civilian leadership.
1. The JMC shall:
a. serve as the central body for all Parties to address any military complaints, questions,
or problems that require resolution by the COMKFOR, such as allegations of cease-fire
violations or other allegations of non-compliance with this Chapter;
b. receive reports and make recommendations for specific actions to COMKFOR to
ensure compliance by the Parties with the provisions of this Chapter;
c. assist COMKFOR in determining and implementing local transparency measures
between the Parties.
4. The JMC shall not include any persons publicly indicted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
5. The JMC shall function as a consultative body to advise COMKFOR. However, all
final decisions shall be made by COMKFOR and shall be binding on the Parties.
6. The JMC shall meet at the call of COMKFOR. Any Party may request COMKFOR to
convene a meeting.
7. The JMC shall establish subordinate military commissions for the purpose of providing
assistance in carrying out the functions described above. Such commissions shall be at an
appropriate level, as COMKFOR shall direct. Composition of such commissions shall be
determined by COMKFOR.
Article XII: Prisoner Release
1. By EIF + 21 days, the Parties shall release and transfer, in accordance with
international humanitarian standards, all persons held in connection with the conflict
(hereinafter "prisoners"). In addition, the Parties shall cooperate fully with the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to facilitate its work, in accordance
with its mandate, to implement and monitor a plan for the release and transfer of

Boshkovich 172
prisoners in accordance with the above deadline. In preparation for compliance with this
requirement, the Parties shall:
a. grant the ICRC full access to all persons, irrespective of their status, who are being
held by them in connection with the conflict, for visits in accordance with the ICRC's
standard operating procedures;
b. provide to the ICRC any and all information concerning prisoners, as requested by the
ICRC, by EIF + 14 days.
2. The Parties shall provide information, through the tracing mechanisms of the ICRC, to
the families of all persons who are unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate fully with
the ICRC in its efforts to determine the identity, whereabouts, and fate of those
unaccounted for.
Article XIII: Cooperation
The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this
settlement, as described in the Framework Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized
by the United Nations Security Council, including the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia.
Article XIV: Notification to Military Commands
Each Party shall ensure that the terms of this Chapter and written orders requiring
compliance are immediately communicated to all of its Forces.
Article XV: Final Authority to Interpret
1. Subject to paragraph 2, the KFOR Commander is the final authority in theater
regarding interpretation of this Chapter and his determinations are binding on all Parties
and persons.
2. The CIM is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the references in
this Chapter to his functions (directing the VJ Border Guards under Article II, paragraph
3; his functions concerning the MUP under Article VI) and his determinations are
binding on all Parties and persons.
Article XVI: K-Day
The date of activation of KFOR -- to be known as K-Day -- shall be determined by
NATO.
Appendices:
A. Approved VJ/MUP Cantonment Sites
B. Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force

Appendix A: Approved VJ/MUP Cantonment Sites
Boshkovich 173
1. There are 13 approved cantonment sites in Kosovo for all VJ units, weapons,
equipment, and ammunition. Movement to cantonment sites, and subsequent withdrawal
from Kosovo, will occur in accordance with this Chapter. As the phased withdrawal of
VJ units progresses along the timeline as specified in this Chapter, COMKFOR will close
selected cantonment sites.
2. Initial approved VJ cantonment sites:
a) Pristina SW 423913N0210819E
b) Pristina Airfield 423412N0210040E
c) Vuctrin North 424936N0205755E
d) Kosovska Mitrovica 425315N0205227E
e) Gnjilane NE 422807N0212845E
f) Urosevac 422233N0210753E
g) Prizren 421315N0204504E
h) Djakovica SW 422212N0202530E
i) Pec 423910N0201728E
j) Pristina Explosive Storage Fac 423636N0211225E
k) Pristina Ammo Depot SW 423518N0205923E
l) Pristina Ammo Depot 510 424211N0211056E
m) Pristina Headquarters facility 423938N0210934E
3. Within each cantonment site, VJ units are required to canton all heavy weapons and
vehicles outside of storage facilities.
4. After EIF + 180 days, the remaining 2500 VJ forces dedicated to border security
functions provided for in this Agreement will be garrisoned and cantoned at the following
locations: Djakovica, Prizren, and Ursoevac; subordinate border posts within the Border
Zone; a limited number of existing facilities in the immediate proximity of the Border
Zone subject to the prior approval of COMKFOR; and headquarters/C2 and logistic
support facilities in Pristina.
5. There are 37 approved cantonment sites for all MUP and Special Police force units in
Kosovo. There are seven (7) approved regional SUPs. Each of the 37 approved
cantonment sites will fall under the administrative control of one of the regional SUPs.
Movement to cantonment sites, and subsequent withdrawal of MUP from Kosovo, will
occur in accordance with this Chapter.
6. Approved MUP regional SUPs and cantonment sites:
a) Kosovska Mitrovica SUP 425300N0205200E
1) Kosovska Mitrovica (2 locations)
2) Leposavic
3) Srbica
4) Vucitrn
5) Zubin Potok

) Pristina SUP 424000N0211000E
1) Pristina (6 locations)
2) Glogovac
3) Kosovo Polje
4) Lipjan
5) Obilic
6) Podujevo
c) Pec SUP 423900N0201800E
1) Pec (2 locations)
2) Klina
3) Istok
4) Malisevo
d) Djakovica SUP 422300N0202600E
1) Djakovica (2 locations)
2) Decani
e) Urosevac SUP 422200N0211000E
1) Urosevac (2 locations)
2) Stimlje
3) Strpce
4) Kacanik
f) Gnjilane SUP 422800N0212900E
1) Gnjilane (2 locations)
2) Kamenica
3) Vitina
4) Kosovska
5) Novo Brdo
g) Prizren SUP 421300N0204500E
1) Prizren (2 locations)
2) Orahovac
3) Suva Reka
4) Gora
Boshkovich 174
7. Within each cantonment site, MUP units are required to canton all vehicles above 6
tons, including APCs and BOVs, and all heavy weapons outside of storage facilities.
8. KFOR will have the exclusive right to inspect any cantonment site or any other
location, at any time, without interference from any Party.
Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force
1. For the purposes of this Appendix, the following expressions shall have the meanings
hereunder assigned to them:
a. "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its subsidiary bodies,
its military Headquarters, the NATO-led KFOR, and any elements/units forming any part
of KFOR or supporting KFOR, whether or not they are from a NATO member country

Boshkovich 175
and whether or not they are under NATO or national command and control, when acting
in furtherance of this Agreement.
b. "Authorities in the FRY" means appropriate authorities, whether Federal, Republic,
Kosovo or other.
c. "NATO personnel" means the military, civilian, and contractor personnel assigned or
attached to or employed by NATO, including the military, civilian, and contractor
personnel from non-NATO states participating in the Operation, with the exception of
personnel locally hired.
d. "the Operation" means the support, implementation, preparation, and participation by
NATO and NATO personnel in furtherance of this Chapter.
e. "Military Headquarters" means any entity, whatever its denomination, consisting of or
constituted in part by NATO military personnel established in order to fulfill the
Operation.
f. "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or organization of
the Parties.
g. "Contractor personnel" means the technical experts or functional specialists whose
services are required by NATO and who are in the territory of the FRY exclusively to
serve NATO either in an advisory capacity in technical matters, or for the setting up,
operation, or maintenance of equipment, unless they are:
(1) nationals of the FRY; or
(2) persons ordinarily resident in the FRY.
h. "Official use" means any use of goods purchased, or of the services received and
intended for the performance of any function as required by the operation of the
Headquarters.
i. "Facilities" means all buildings, structures, premises, and land required for conducting
the operational, training, and administrative activities by NATO for the Operation as well
as for accommodation of NATO personnel.
2. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities under this Appendix, all NATO
personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the FRY, whether Federal, Republic,
Kosovo, or other, insofar as compliance with those laws is compatible with the entrusted
tasks/mandate and shall refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of the
Operation.
3. The Parties recognize the need for expeditious departure and entry procedures for
NATO personnel. Such personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and

Boshkovich 176
the registration requirements applicable to aliens. At all entry and exit points to/from the
FRY, NATO personnel shall be permitted to enter/exit the FRY on production of a
national identification (ID) card. NATO personnel shall carry identification which they
may be requested to produce for the authorities in the FRY, but operations, training, and
movement shall not be allowed to be impeded or delayed by such requests.
4. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms, and NATO personnel may
possess and carry arms if authorized to do so by their orders. The Parties shall accept as
valid, without tax or fee, drivers' licenses and permits issued to NATO personnel by their
respective national authorities.
5. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or national flags of its
constituent national elements/units on any NATO uniform, means of transport, or facility.
6. a. NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or
criminal.
b. NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the
Parties' jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or disciplinary
offenses which may be committed by them in the FRY. The Parties shall assist States
participating in the Operation in the exercise of their jurisdiction over their own nationals.
c. Notwithstanding the above, and with the NATO Commander's express agreement in
each case, the authorities in the FRY may exceptionally exercise jurisdiction in such
matters, but only in respect of Contractor personnel who are not subject to the jurisdiction
of their nation of citizenship.
7. NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention
by the authorities in the FRY. NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained shall
immediately be turned over to NATO authorities.
8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and
equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY
including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as
required for support, training, and operations.
9. NATO shall be exempt from duties, taxes, and other charges and inspections and
custom regulations including providing inventories or other routine customs
documentation, for personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and
provisions entering, exiting, or transiting the territory of the FRY in support of the
Operation.
10. The authorities in the FRY shall facilitate, on a priority basis and with all appropriate
means, all movement of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, or supplies,
through or in the airspace, ports, airports, or roads used. No charges may be assessed

Boshkovich 177
against NATO for air navigation, landing, or takeoff of aircraft, whether governmentowned
or chartered. Similarly, no duties, dues, tolls or charges may be assessed against
NATO ships, whether government-owned or chartered, for the mere entry and exit of
ports. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft used in support of the Operation shall not be subject
to licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial insurance.
11. NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees,
duties, dues, tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use. NATO shall not, however, claim
exemption from reasonable charges for specific services requested and received, but
operations/movement and access shall not be allowed to be impeded pending payment for
such services.
12. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the Parties on the salaries and
emoluments received from NATO and on any income received from outside the FRY.
13. NATO personnel and their tangible moveable property imported into, acquired in, or
exported from the FRY shall be exempt from all duties, taxes, and other charges and
inspections and custom regulations.
14. NATO shall be allowed to import and to export, free of duty, taxes and other charges,
such equipment, provisions, and supplies as NATO shall require for the Operation,
provided such goods are for the official use of NATO or for sale to NATO personnel.
Goods sold shall be solely for the use of NATO personnel and not transferable to
unauthorized persons.
15. The Parties recognize that the use of communications channels is necessary for the
Operation. NATO shall be allowed to operate its own internal mail services. The Parties
shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services, including broadcast
services, needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO. This shall include the right
to utilize such means and services as required to assure full ability to communicate, and
the right to use all of the electro-magnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost. In
implementing this right, NATO shall make every reasonable effort to coordinate with and
take into account the needs and requirements of appropriate authorities in the FRY.
16. The Parties shall provide, free of cost, such public facilities as NATO shall require to
prepare for and execute the Operation. The Parties shall assist NATO in obtaining, at the
lowest rate, the necessary utilities, such as electricity, water, gas and other resources, as
NATO shall require for the Operation.
17. NATO and NATO personnel shall be immune from claims of any sort which arise out
of activities in pursuance of the Operation; however, NATO will entertain claims on an
ex gratia basis.
18. NATO shall be allowed to contract directly for the acquisition of goods, services, and
construction from any source within and outside the FRY. Such contracts, goods,

Boshkovich 178
services, and construction shall not be subject to the payment of duties, taxes, or other
charges. NATO may also carry out construction works with their own personnel.
19. Commercial undertakings operating in the FRY only in the service of NATO shall be
exempt from local laws and regulations with respect to the terms and conditions of their
employment and licensing and registration of employees, businesses, and corporations.
20. NATO may hire local personnel who on an individual basis shall remain subject to
local laws and regulations with the exception of labor/employment laws. However, local
personnel hired by NATO shall:
a. be immune from legal process in respect of words
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in
their official capacity;
b. be immune from national services and/or national
military service obligations;
c. be subject only to employment terms and
conditions established by NATO; and
d. be exempt from taxation on the salaries and
emoluments paid to them by NATO.
21. In carrying out its authorities under this Chapter, NATO is authorized to detain
individuals and, as quickly as possible, turn them over to appropriate officials.
22. NATO may, in the conduct of the Operation, have need to make improvements or
modifications to certain infrastructure in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels,
buildings, and utility systems. Any such improvements or modifications of a nontemporary
nature shall become part of and in the same ownership as that infrastructure.
Temporary improvements or modifications may be removed at the discretion of the
NATO Commander, and the infrastructure returned to as near its original condition as
possible, fair wear and tear excepted.
23. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with the regard to the interpretation or
application of this Appendix shall be settled between NATO and the appropriate
authorities in the FRY.
24. Supplementary arrangements with any of the Parties may be concluded to facilitate
any details connected with the Operation.
25. The provisions of this Appendix shall remain in force until completion of the
Operation or as the Parties and NATO otherwise agree.

Chapter 8
Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and Final Clauses
Article I: Amendment and Comprehensive Assessment
Boshkovich 179
1. Amendments to this Agreement shall be adopted by agreement of all the Parties,
except as otherwise provided by Article X of Chapter 1.
2. Each Party may propose amendments at any time and will consider and consult with
the other Parties with regard to proposed amendments.
3. Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall
be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of
the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the
implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a
comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider
proposals by any Party for additional measures.
Article II: Final Clauses
1. This Agreement is signed in the English language. After signature of this Agreement,
translations will be made into Serbian, Albanian, and other languages of the national
communities of Kosovo, and attached to the English text.
2. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 284
284 http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html

IV Resolution 1244
UNITED NATIONS S
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/RES/1244 (1999)
10 June 1999
RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,
on 10 June 1999
Boshkovich 180
The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling its
resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September
1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the
requirements of these resolutions, Determined to resolve the grave
humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and
to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced
persons to their homes, Condemning all acts of violence against the
Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999,
expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return
to their homes in safety, Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Welcoming the
general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted
on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming
also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the
principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in
Belgrade on
99-17289 (E) /...
S/RES/1244 (1999)
Page 2
2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper, Reaffirming the
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States
of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo, Determining that the
situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security, Determined to ensure the safety and
security of international personnel and the implementation by all
concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and

Boshkovich 181
acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations,
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be
based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in
the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the
principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1
above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and
begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all
military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid
timetable, with which the deployment of
the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and
Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to
Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices,
of international civil and security presences, with appropriate
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the
implementation of the international civil presence, and further
requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative
to coordinate closely with the international security presence to
ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a
mutually supportive manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to
establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in
point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its
responsibilities under
paragraph 9 below;
/...
S/RES/1244 (1999)
Page 3
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective
international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that
the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security
presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the
return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and
paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced
persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can
operate,
a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid
can be delivered;
(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil

Boshkovich 182
presence can take responsibility for this task;
(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work
of the international civil presence;
(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organizations;
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations, to establish an international civil
presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic selfgoverning institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of
Kosovo;
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil
presence will include:
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account
of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as
long as required;
/...
S/RES/1244 (1999)
Page 4
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a
political settlement, including the holding of elections;
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its
administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the
consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other
peacebuilding activities;
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s
future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords
(S/1999/648);
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from
Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a
political settlement;
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other
economic reconstruction;
(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local
police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international
police personnel to serve in Kosovo;
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and
displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations,
and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such

Boshkovich 183
organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of
international aid;
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to
contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe
return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this
context the importance of convening an international donors’
conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g)
above, at the earliest possible date;
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the
international security presence, with the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia;
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end
immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for
demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security
presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General;
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution
1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of
the international civil and security presences;
/...
S/RES/1244 (1999)
Page 5
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other
international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the
economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the
Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to
further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and
regional cooperation;
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the
implementation of all aspects of this resolution;
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are
established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter
unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular
intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports
from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences,
the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of
this resolution;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex 1
Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting
of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre
on 6 May 1999
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on
the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:
- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided
by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for
a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;

Boshkovich 184
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the KLA;
/...
S/RES/1244 (1999)
Page 6
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization
of the crisis region.
Annex 2
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards
a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in
Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and
paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective
international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided
under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the
achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic
Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified
command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for
all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes
of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of
the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The
interim administration to provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel
will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international
security presence;
- Marking/clearing minefields;
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the
supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim
political
framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other

...
S/RES/1244 (1999)
Page 7
Boshkovich 185
countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations
between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the
establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and
stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the
implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy,
economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the
principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other,
previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the
footnote below.1 A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly
concluded that would, among other things, specify additional
modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb
personnel in Kosovo:
Withdrawal
- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule
and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be
withdrawn;
Returning personnel
- Equipment associated with returning personnel;
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
- Timetable for their return;
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security
presence and the international civil mission.
Notes
1 Other required elements:
- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning,
e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons
withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within
48 hours;
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will
be under the supervision of the international security presence
and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not
thousands);
/...
S/RES/1244 (1999)
Page 8
- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of
verifiable withdrawals;
- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement
shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of
withdrawals. 285
285 United Nations, Security Council, June 10, 1999, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12533/

List of Acronyms
Boshkovich 186
ANA – Albanian National Army
BH – Bosnia and Herzegovina
BIA – Security Information Agency (Bezbednosno Informativna Agencija)
BND – Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst)
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CG – Contact Group
DEA – Drugs Enforcement Administration
ETA – Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)
EU – European Union
FHP – Found for Humanitarian Right
FRY – Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
FYRM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ICJ – International Court of Justice
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IDP – Internal Dislocated Persons
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IRA – Irish Republican Army
JNA – Yugoslav National Army ( Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija)
KFOR – Kosovo Force
KGB – Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti)
KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army
Kosmet – Kosovo and Metohija
KPC – Kosovo Protection Corpus
LDK – Democratic League of Kosovo
MoD – Ministry of Defence
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RTS – Radio Television of Serbia
SAS – Special Air Service
SFRY – Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
SMIP – Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Savezno Ministarstvo Inostranih Poslova)
SPS – Socialistic Party of Serbia
TWRA – Third World Relief Agency
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration Mission
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

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