NOVEMBER- DECEMBER 2021

Jammeh factor looms large over Gambian polls

News. Analysis. Comment November-December 2021 Vol.4 No.17

Forced displacement is

a cause for concern

The making of

African dictatorships

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PUBLISHER’S NOTE

After COP26: why gas should

be part of the continent’s

clean energy future

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

FRICA is the continent likely to bear the

brunt of the effects of climate change even

Africa A bucks global

though studies show it has contributed least

to the crisis.

economic trend

The consensus at this year’s COP26 climate conference in Glasgow, Scotland was a blanket

ban on fossil fuels that would preclude any new projects involving natural gas. Burning

In natural 2018, gas emits six of carbon the 10 dioxide fastest-growing (CO2), a long-lived greenhouse gas. Facilities that produce,

transport economies and consume in the natural world were gas sometimes in leak methane, a short-lived but even more

potent Africa, greenhouse according gas. So to the blocking World money Bank, for new gas pipelines, gas-fired power plants, or

gas-consuming with Ghana industries leading the in Africa pack. might With seem like good environmental policy, especially as

GDP we seek growth to accelerate for the continent the global projected transition to a cleaner energy future in the wake of Covid-19.

accelerate But some experts to four disagree. per cent in 2019 and 4.1

per They cent maintain 2020, that Africa’s a prohibition economic funding growth for gas-fuelled power in Africa won’t work for

story climate continues mitigation apace. — and Meanwhile, it will hurt the World continent’s Bank’s development. 2019 Doing Worse, Business because Index gas has a

reveals pivotal that role to five play of in the Africa’s 10 most-improved transition to clean countries energy, are a in ban Africa, now could and one-third slow the adoption of

all of reforms renewables recorded and reinforce globally a global were energy in sub-Saharan double standard. Africa.

And there are many reasons why gas should have a bright future in Africa. The continent

What is starting makes from the such story a low more energy impressive use and and emissions heartening base that is that there the are growth few gains from

– squeezing projected out to gas. be broad-based Here’s how low: – is if being all of achieved Sub-Saharan in a Africa challenging tripled global its electricity

environment, consumption overnight bucking the using trend. only natural gas, the additional CO2 would be equivalent to just

1 percent of global emissions.

In the Cover Story of this edition, Dr. Hippolyte Fofack, Chief Economist at the

African Electricity Export-Import demand may Bank be plateauing (Afreximbank), in the US analyses and Western the Europe. factors But underpinning Africa, rising this

performance. incomes, growing Two populations factors, in and my rapid opinion, urbanisation stand out will in Dr. combine Hippolyte’s to push analysis: electricity demand

trade to at least between double Africa (or possibly and China triple and or the more) intra-African by 2040. Barring cross-border financing investment for all fossil and fuels

would have the very concrete effect of slowing poverty reduction, raising energy costs on the

infrastructure development.

most vulnerable people, and suppressing incomes and job creation.

Much Ruling has out been gas would said and hamstring written African about countries China’s ever-deepening as they try to adapt economic to the major foray impacts into

Africa, of climate especially change like by Western droughts, analysts floods and and soaring commentators temperatures. who Gas have is been particularly sounding wellsuited

bells to energy-intensive about re-colonisation adaptation of technologies, Africa, this time such by as steel the Chinese. and concrete But for empirical resilient

alarm

evidence infrastructure, paints desalination a different for picture. expanded freshwater supply, and cold storage and air

conditioning.

Despite the decelerating global growth environment, trade between Africa and

Coal, geothermal, nuclear and hydro power stations all incur huge upfront capital

China increased by 14.5 per cent in the first three quarters of 2018, surpassing

investments. By contrast, gas turbines are cheap and modular, which helps them sidestep the

the growth rate of world trade (11.6 per cent), reflecting the deepening economic

huge cost overruns that plague large coal-fired power projects. And they are less polluting

dependency than the default between modular the energy two major source trading in emerging partners. markets – the diesel generator.

Empirical Natural gas evidence is not just shows for electricity; that China’s it's also domestic a valuable investment feedstock has for become making highly fertilizer or

linked other petrochemicals with economic and expansion efficient in Africa. source of A process one percentage heat for high-energy point increase industries like

in cement China’s or steel domestic production. investment For African growth countries is associated with industrial with an average ambitions of (that 0.6 is, all of

percentage them), gas will point be increase an indispensable overall input. African exports. And, the expected economic

development Nigeria, Mozambique, and trade Ghana, impact Senegal of expanding many Chinese more countries investment have on their resource-rich own significant

African natural gas countries, resources especially that they oil-exporting are already developing, countries, often is even in partnership more important. with US and

European companies. Asking these countries to leave this resource in the ground and forego

The income, resilience or to export of African all their economies gas to richer can regions, also be seems attributed indefensible, to growing especially intra-African given that...

cross-border investment and infrastructure development. A combination of the

Gas accounted for nearly half of the global increase in energy demand in 2018. The United

two factors is accelerating the process of structural transformation in a continent

States, China, and large parts of Asia and Europe are all betting heavily on gas as a core

where component industrial of their output energy and futures, services with account important for volumes a growing sourced share from of GDP. Africa African as liquefied

corporations natural gas (LNG). and industrialists Indeed, French which energy are giant expanding Total has their inked industrial the financing footprint for a across $20

Africa billion and LNG globally project in are Mozambique. leading the Closing diversification off gas consumption from agriculture to African into higher countries just

value because goods they in are manufacturing late adopters with and more service limited sectors. financing These options industrial for building champions out domestic

are gas carrying infrastructure out transcontinental is a politically and operations, ethically fraught with investment stance. As a holdings senior African around policymaker

with once a said: strong “We presence will be aggressive in Europe in and promoting Pacific the Asia, energy together transition, account but for we more cannot

the

globe,

than accept 75 climate per cent colonialism.” of their combined activities outside Africa.

Innovation can position gas to support a future zero-carbon energy system. Methane leaks

A survey of 30 leading emerging African corporations with global footprints and

are starting to be monitored by satellite, potentially addressing a serious environmental

combined revenue of more than $118 billion shows that they are active in several

concern about gas. Over the longer term, pipelines and storage facilities needed for gas

industries, including manufacturing (e.g., Dangote Industries), basic materials,

utilisation today could allow future excess energy from off-peak wind and solar to be stored

telecommunications as “renewable gas” for (e.g., later use. Econet, Emerging Safaricom), technologies finance for (e.g., carbon Ecobank) capture and and storage oil (CCS)

and might gas. also In allow addition gas-fired to mitigating power plants risks to highly operate correlated with a low or with zero African carbon economies,

footprint.

these emerging African global corporations are accelerating the diversification of

The above is by no means exhaustive and given the seriousness of climate change, “Ban

sources of growth and reducing the exposure of countries to adverse commodity

all fossil fuels, everywhere” is an intuitively appealing position. When applied to energydeprived

of trade. regions like Africa, however, ruling out natural gas will do far more harm than good

terms

This on environmental, makes very health, bullish and about development Africa! fronts. In the process, it will convince policymakers

on the continent, perhaps not for the first time, that outside investors do not have their

best interests at heart.

Publisher

Jon Offei-Ansah

Editor

Publisher Desmond Davies

Jon Offei-Ansah

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Desmond Davies

Prof. Toyin Falola

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Contents Vol.4

No.17 November - December 2021

LEADER

6

Corruption and the violation

of human rights

COMMENT

07

Removing Hamdok from

power in Sudan is a serious

mistake

COVER STORY

10

Forced displacement: a

global cause for concern

10

Amid the challenges facing the world today, humanity has not

paid sufficient attention to the plight and suffering of millions

of people forcibly uprooted from their homes and countries, as

conflicts continue to be the main source of forced displacement

around the world, argues Adama Dieng

ANALYSIS

18

24

Coup in Guinea more than an act against

controversial change of Constitution

The making of African dictatorships

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

36

38

The cause-effect pattern that has been used to explain

the recent intervention of the country’s armed forces

is not simply linked to the trigger – an unpopular

constitutional amendment – but more to long-standing

political and socio-economic failings, writes

Albert Mbiatem

Whatever the speculations as to the consequence of Yahya

Jammeh’s return to The Gambia might be, it is, without

doubt, a reinforcement of the position of dictators in

Africa, argues Toyin Falola

Traditional banks can still gain an edge

in fintech transformation

The latest report in CR2’s Market Insight series discusses

how Africa represents a massive market that is providing

opportunity for investors to bring large segments of the

continent’s unbanked online, Jon Offei-Ansah reports

Ecowas begins reforms for improved

trade, regional levy mobilisation

The West African bloc has begun a process to

comprehensively overhaul sub-regional trade-related rules

and regulations to engender improved intra-community

trade and regional levy for the subregional body, Koku

Devitor reports from Accra

38

18

ENVIRONMENT

Africa’s Great Green Wall gives

41 viable return on investments,

FAO-led study finds

Cost-benefit analysis published in Nature

Sustainability shows average return of $1.2

for every $1.00 invested in the land restoration

project, despite harsh climatic conditions

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LEADER

Corruption and the violation of human rights

RECENTLY, when the

corruption scandal involving

Credit Suisse’s phantom loan to

Mozambique emerged, the UK’s Financial

Conduct Authority, in reaction to the

outrageous criminal act by Swiss bankers,

said in a statement that the action had

caused “a debt crisis and economic harm

for the people of Mozambique”. This is

what Africans have been saying for the last

30 years or more, long before the gravity

of corruption perpetuated by Western

bankers and their African collaborators

started being exposed recently by various

watchdog groups monitoring global

financial crime.

In October, the Pandora Papers

released 12 million documents exposing

corruption globally. The unethical

activities that fuelled the illicit movement

of money were on a monumental scale.

Granted that some people might have

felt that the huge sums of money that

they had somehow contrived to make

legitimately should not fall into the hands

of governments through high taxation.

That is their problem.

But when it comes to lumbering

African countries with loans that were

not used for the purpose that they were

disbursed, and instead lined the pockets of

European and African crooks, this is not

on at all. Put plainly, these actions are a

violation of the human rights of Africans

who will have to bear the brunt of paying

off phantom loans.

Article 3 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights says: “Everyone has

the right to life, liberty and security of

person.” But if phantom loans such as the

$2 billion arranged by Credit Suisse and

the attendant kickbacks that were dished

out are anything to go by, then the bankers

and their cronies in Mozambique have not

given Mozambicans a chance to benefit

from Article 3.

Article 22 goes even further:

“Everyone as a member of society has

the right to social security and entitled

to realisation, through national effort

and international cooperation and in

accordance with the organisation and

resources of each state, of the economic,

social and cultural rights indispensable for

his dignity and the free development of his

personality.”

With the unethical manner in which

the $2 billion phantom loan was organised,

Mozambicans, again, have been deprived

of their human rights, as enshrined in

Article 22. The bent bankers have not

only robbed the people of Mozambique of

these rights, but also other Africans whose

corrupt governments have entered into

such dubious loan agreements in the past.

These phantom loans have always

been around in Africa. Ngozi Okonjo-

Iweala, the current Director General of

the World Trade Organisation, in her

contribution to a 2003 book, The

Debt Trap in Nigeria, pointed out

that when Olusegun Obasanjo became

president of Nigeria in 1999, he ordered an

audit of external loans that were contracted

in the 1980s and 1990s, the height of illicit

capital flight from Africa.

She said the Ministry of Finance

discovered that 40 per cent of these

projects “were never started, even

though the loans were fully drawn, and

of the remaining hardly any of them was

economically viable to generate returns to

service the debts”.

So, the Nigerians who were supposed

to benefit from loans taken in their name

did not. It meant that, in the case of

such dodgy loan deals, African children

were dying before the age of five

because vaccines that were meant to stop

preventable diseases were not available.

African mothers were dying in childbirth

because medical facilities were not up

to scratch due to the suspicious loans.

The atrocities caused by these faulty

disbursements are continuing today.

It is all well and good for Swiss-based

Civitas Maxima to be chasing Liberians

on charges of international crimes during

the Liberian civil wars. On its website,

Civitas Maxima proclaims: “International

crimes not only violate individual victims’

rights but also touch the humanity in all

of us”. This is commendable. But the

human rights body should look closer to

home, where rogue bankers are regularly

violating the human rights of Africans by

encouraging bribery and corruption and

granting ghost loans.

The US and UK governments have

fined Credit Suisse a total of $475

million because of the bribery and fraud

by its bankers. Shamefacedly, the bank

said it would write off $200 million of

Mozambique’s debt. Mozambicans instead

want Credit Suisse to write off the suspect

$2 billion loan. Indeed, Credit Suisse

should.

‘

African governments should take

class action against Western

banks that have violated the

human rights of Africans through

bribery and corruption

’

In fact, just as Obasanjo ordered a

review of loans granted to Nigeria, every

African government should do the same

now and take class action against Western

banks that have violated the human

rights of Africans through bribery and

corruption.

Ann Pettifor, Coordinator of Jubilee

2000 Plus, noted in her contribution to

The Debt Trap in Nigeria: “Humanitarian

intervention to defend the human rights of

a billion people in indebted nations will

result in a transformation of the global

economy. Intervention will challenge

the dominance of finance capital. And

creditors will invariably be disciplined.”

Eighteen years after this was written

African countries are still fighting against

the violation of their human rights through

bribery, corruption, illicit financial flows

and phantom loans strategically organised

by Western bankers and their African coconspirators.

Enough is enough.

AB

6

AFRICA BRIEFING NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 2021

COMMENT

Removing Hamdok from power

in Sudan is a serious mistake

Desmond Davies

THE soldiers in Sudan are up

to their old tricks again. In

October, the army men who

were actually part of a power-sharing

civilian/military administration headed by

Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok decided

to grab power for themselves.

They did not even give Hamdok a

chance to show the Sudanese people what

he could do after 30 years of military

dictator Omar al Bashir who was ousted

in 2019. Hamdok was a Deputy Executive

Secretary and Chief Economist at the

Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)

in Addis Ababa when he was whisked

to Khartoum to head the post-al Bashir

administration.

This was a strategically sound move.

Having met him and interviewed him, I

know that he was a good choice as leader

of a rather jaded Sudan. A country that

had been battered from pillar to post by

the international community because of

human rights and war crimes issues.

Apart from that, after the independence

of South Sudan the country lost a huge

chunk of its territory and a massive

amount of oil reserves that went to the

South. But Hamdok was ready to take

up the challenge of reviving a moribund

country.

As I write this, the negotiations are

continuing to resolve this rather unseemly

behaviour by the Sudanese soldiers. An act

that is so odious, even by their own base

standards.

Hamdok was the best thing to

happen to Sudan when he was asked

to become Prime Minister two years

ago. In 2016, I attended a conference

in Addis Ababa organised by Wilton

Park, a UK government-funded strategic

forum focusing on international security,

prosperity and justice. The meeting was

the second organised by Wilton Park on

peacebuilding in Africa.

Hamdok was there. He grabbed my

attention whenever he intervened during

the discussions. While the academics

present were skirting around the issues,

Hamdok was straight to the point. He

didn’t mince his words as he presented his

vision for a conflict-free and prosperous

Africa.

I liked his ideas. So, when we had

a break, I asked him whether I could

interview him for my podcast, Talking

Africa, for the African Leadership Centre’s

Pan-African Radio, of which I am one of

the editors.

The 30-minute interview gave

Hamdok the chance to expand on the ideas

he had contributed during the conference.

It was a rich discussion.

‘

Today, election is the name

of the game, and no coup can

survive

’

Naturally, the issue of lifting Africans

out of poverty was my first question, given

his senior role at the ECA. I mentioned the

fact that at the turn of the century Africa

was recording five per cent economic

growth, which should at least help to lift

people out of poverty.

Hamdok agreed that it was a

“remarkable success”. But he was not sure

that this was making a difference to the

lives of ordinary Africans.

He told me that this growth “has

an extremely important challenge

to its quality. It has not addressed

issues of reducing poverty, addressing

unemployment. And in fact, in many

places it might have contributed to

inequality”.

Hamdok went on: “So what is

important for us moving forward is to

address the quality of this growth, in the

sense that we would like to see growth

that contributes jobs, particularly decent

jobs. And this can only happen if you

address this through industrialisation,

through value addition that would create

those decent jobs and embrace the broader

agenda of Africa’s transformation.”

On the issue of leadership in Africa,

Hamdok acknowledged it was “a key

factor in the development process…”,

adding: “We need, in Africa, leadership

that is committed, visionary; leadership

that has a project for society, where it takes

development as a key leading parameter,

and development becomes hegemonic in

the sense that society at large takes it and

runs with it.

“And in that sense, it transcends an

individual. So, once you lay the foundation

for this, and the nation takes off, then

it becomes a society project,” Hamdok

added.

Yes, indeed, Hamdok is not one of the

many individualistic leaders in Africa who

do not know whether they are coming or

going. He recognised that development

in Africa would only be achieved when

members of society as a whole – especially

young people – are fully involved.

Hamdok wants youngsters in Africa

to be given space to prosper. “This is the

future of the continent. If you look around.

the average age of the leadership on this

continent is over 65, probably 70.

“This cannot take us anywhere. The

future of this continent is going to be led

by these young people So we have to

nurture them. We have to give them the

opportunity to develop,” Hamdok said,

adding that the youth had “very bright

ideas”.

It’s not surprising that it’s young

Sudanese who are leading the protests

against the rebellious soldiers. They would

do well to reinstate the ousted Prime

Minister.

As Hamdok told me five years ago,

in the previous 30 years there was a

proliferation of military dictatorships in

Africa. This was no longer the case, he

added. “Today, election is the name of the

game, and no coup can survive.”

Let’s see what the soldiers do. AB

AFRICA BRIEFING NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 2021 7

COMMENT

Anambra State In

Nigerian politics

Chuks Iloegbunam

Anambra is one of Nigeria’s

36 states. In size, it is the

second smallest after Lagos,

measuring only 4,844 km2. Lagos State

is 3,577 km2. But Kaduna, Kano, Kogi

States are 46,053 km2 , 20,131 km2

and 29,833 km2 respectively. Despite

its tininess, however, Anambra’s motto

of Light Of The Nation is true in many

respects. Compared to all other states,

Anambra people have shone the brightest

in all positive forms of human endeavor

– academics, business, politics, sports

etc. Olaudah Equiano, the writer and

abolitionist came from Esseke, in Anambra

State. So did Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the

doyen of Nigerian journalism and the

first President of Nigeria who played a

pivotal role in the attainment of political

independence from Britain in 1960.

Chinua Achebe was from Anambra as were

countless other notable novelists, including

Chukwuemeka Ike, Nkem Nwankwo,

Onuorah Nzekwu. Chimamanda Ngozi

Adichie is from Anambra.

Nigeria’s first acclaimed millionaire,

Sir Louis-Phillip Odumegwu Ojukwu,

whose son led the war to attain a Biafran

Republic, was from Anambra. Anambra

boasts the Onitsha main market, the

largest in all of West Africa. Anambra

produced Godwin Achebe, the footballer

that captained the national soccer

side before the civil war and after it.

Emmanuel Ifeajuna, the first Nigeria to

win a Commonwealth gold medal was

from Anambra. Blessed Cyprian Michael

Iwene Tansi was from Anambra. Philip

Emeagwali, the computer wizard, is from

Anambra. Francis Cardinal Arinze is from

Anambra State. Stephen Osita Osadebe,

the extraordinary composer and exponent

of Highlife music and about the highest

selling Nigerian musician of all time, was

from Anambra State.

Year in, year out, Anambra students

come out in the top brackets in School

Certificate examinations. They make about

the greatest number of First Classes in the

nation’s degree examinations. Anambra’s

Godian Ezekwe led the Research and

Production Unit that sustained blockaded

Biafra during the civil war, of which

General Chukwuemeka Odumugwu-

Ojukwu sang this song of praise in a

speech titled Three Incredible Years Of

Biafra:

In the three years of the war necessity

gave birth to invention. During those

three years of heroic bound, we leapt

across the great chasm that separates

knowledge from know-how. We built

rocket, and we designed and built our own

delivery systems. We guided our rockets.

We guided them far; we guided them

accurately.

For three years, blockaded without

hope of import, we maintained all our

vehicles. The state extracted and refined

petrol, individuals refined petrol in their

back gardens. We built and maintained

our airports, maintained them under

heavy bombardment. Despite the heavy

bombardment, we recovered so quickly

after each raid that we were able to

maintain the record for the busiest airport

in the continent of Africa.

We spoke to the world through

telecommunication system engineered

by local ingenuity; the world heard us

‘ How could anyone

deploy the blind

to lead the fully

sighted?

’

and spoke back to us! We built armoured

cars and tanks. We modified aircraft

from trainer to fighters, from passenger

aircraft to bombers. In the three years of

freedom we had broken the technological

barrier. In the three years we became the

most civilised, the most technologically

advanced Black people on earth.

We spurn nylon yarn; we developed

new seeds for food and medicines...

The reader would expect that Anambra

people, a people of this distinction, a

nation set apart by God, would be left

severely alone to choose their own leaders

in what is supposedly a democratic

dispensation. You would expect them to

always submit the very best candidates

to contest their elections. Anambra’s

gubernatorial ballot was slated for

Saturday November 6, 2021. The All

Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) had

8


COMMENT

as its candidate, Professor Chukwuma

Charles Soludo, a first-class brain and

former Governor of the Central Bank of

Nigeria. The People’s Democratic Party

(PDP) presented Mr. Valentine Ozigbo,

the immediate past President and CEO

of Transnational Corporation of Nigeria

(Transcorp), who took a First Class

Accounting/Business Administration

degree from the University of Nigeria

in 2000, and an MSc in Finance with

distinction from the Lancaster University,

United Kingdom in 2004.

There were 16 other candidates, a

good number of whom had benefitted

from substantial education. Spectacularly,

President Muhammadu Buhari’s All

Progressive Congress (APC) presented Mr.

Emmanuel Nnamdi Uba (mostly known as

Andy Uba) to govern Anambra State!

Anambra people were scandalised.

How could anyone deploy the blind to

lead the fully sighted? Andy Uba had

lived in the United States for over two

decades before a chance meeting with

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo impelled him

to wing his way back to Nigeria. But he

hit town without as much as an Ordinary

National Diploma (OND) which is, in

a manner of speaking, only a halfway

house to a first degree. In Anambra and

the Igbo country in general, only those

not completely together upstairs would

abandon the panoply and sumptuous

dishes of an Ozo title-taking ceremony

for a ritual in propitiation of Agwu – the

god of recklessness – that is performed

with the sacrificial blind or lame chick.

People wondered whether Anambra’s

Federally imposed orphanage had hit such

a dismal nadir for alien interests to be

trumpeting from the rooftops that its next

Governor must be a bloke whose School

Certificate the West African Examinations

Council (WAEC) had pronounced forged,

a fella who in the not too distant past flew

into America to the charge of currency

offences, and a chap whose sole distinction

as an upstart federal lawmaker was recordshattering

victories in sleeping matches

inside the chambers?

Well, as they say, the taste of the

pudding is in the eating! President Buhari

had, weeks earlier, announced in the

presence of his party’s grinning candidate

that he couldn’t wait to see him elected

as Anambra’s Governor! Anambra people

knew differently. They remembered

that in 2004, a rogue band had abducted

Anambra’s Governor Chris Ngige, razed

Government House in Awka, the state

capital, to the ground and proceeded

to incinerate the offices of the electoral

commission, the Anambra Broadcasting

Service, the state-owned Ikenga Hotel and

many other key buildings. They recalled

that the perpetrators of those treasonous

acts went scandalously unpunished. It was

not lost on them that, on account of that

atrocious development, Chinua Achebe

had rejected the national honour offered

him by President Obasanjo, declaiming

thus in an October 15, 2004 letter:

I write this letter with a very heavy

heart. For some time now I have watched

events in Nigeria with alarm and dismay.

I have watched particularly the chaos in

my own state of Anambra where a small

clique of renegades, openly boasting

its connections in high places, seems

determined to turn my homeland into

a bankrupt and lawless fiefdom. I am

appalled by the brazenness of this clique

and the silence, if not connivance, of the

Presidency.

The people knew that the name of

the candidate Abuja was impatient to see

inside Government House, Awka, was

linked to those described by Achebe as

“a small clique of renegades.” Election

morning dawned. And polling station after

polling station the people resolutely stood

their ground. They refused to forfeit their

franchise for a mess of porridge. Each

‘

Anambra 2021 is a

rejected every entreaty to sell their vote for

filthy lucre worth no more than a carton of

noodles. They obstructed those minded to

“abduct” ballot boxes and falsify election

results. They said an overwhelming

NO Abuja’s candidate. They voted

overwhelmingly for Professor Soludo.

In retrospect, Anambra people could

not have acted otherwise. Days before

the ballot, there had been an election

debate by candidates of the APC, the

APGA and the PDP, the three leading

political parties. Through the hours of

that debate, the APC candidate played the

conspicuous spectator; he could barely

place what all the statistics being churned

out was about. The welter of allusions and

citations to international examples on good

governance, and the dire consequences

inherent on clueless political leadership

eluded him. He was a mere passenger,

riding wearily in a speeding vehicle

headed he knew not where.

The people were not impressed by

the man’s promise to connect them to

the politics of the Centre, as they found

repugnant any alignment to a Centre

quaking violently in the cesspit of the

corruption of nepotism, state application

of brute force and bankrupt and rudderless

leadership. They had for far too long been

subjected to the spite of the Centre, its

endless deceit, its treachery and double

standards, to now allow themselves to

be bamboozled by the voice of political

debauchery and its promises of the

meretricious. The so-called Centre

and its tentacles harboured the most

violent examples of terrorist activities,

kidnappings, decaying infrastructure,

unpaid salaries and pensions, festering

social dislocations and the interminable

shedding of innocent blood.

pointer to the presidential

ballot of 2023

’ Anambra 2021 is a pointer to the

presidential ballot of 2023. If this worthy

example of repudiating nonsense is

replicated, the much-vaunted Federal

Might will prove wholly incapable of

keeping in place a nightmare that, to begin

with, should have been obviated. AB


COVER STORY

Forced displacement: a global cause

for concern

Amid the challenges facing the world today, humanity has not paid sufficient attention

to the plight and suffering of millions of people forcibly uprooted from their homes

and countries, as conflicts continue to be the main source of forced displacement

around the world, argues Adama Dieng

THE UN Charter and a host of

other regional and international

instruments have unequivocally

reaffirmed the right of states to determine

their internal affairs without outside

interference. Indeed, this understanding

has been accepted as a settled principle in

customary international law.

Yet, the failure of countries to protect

both their people and their frontiers has

consistently challenged this doctrine. This

failure could be attributed to state collapse,

weak governance structures, protracted

conflicts and the inability of states to

exercise sovereignty over a section or

whole of their territories.

It is these challenges which provide

a compelling need to the international

community to extend protection to

those unable to avail themselves of

protection of their governments within

their countries. This argument is made

because international law recognises

the responsibility of the international

community to provide protection and

assistance to those who may not be able

to avail themselves of the same from their

governments.

While, in general, international

law recognises the sovereign right and

responsibility of states to protect citizens

within their own borders, political,

economic, and social realities have

inhibited this capability. In some cases,

while governments may be in power,

the ability to protect their citizens and

exercise sovereign authority across the

entire territory is constrained by political

instabilities and, especially, various rebel

movements that equally control some parts

of the territory. Many examples abound,

including Syria, Yemen and Mali.

Consequently, millions of citizens in

some countries have found themselves

trapped between rebels or militias

and government-controlled areas. A

development which ultimately deprives

civilians of necessary protection, safety,

and wellbeing.

Increasingly, forced displacement is

growing in complexity, affecting more

people and for protracted periods of

time. The immediate drivers of conflict

– competition for resources, political

Climate change induced displacement is a growing reality

unrest, social marginalisation, and poverty

– are compounded and accelerated by an

intersection of regional and global trends:

population growth, rapid urbanisation, food

and water scarcity, and above all climate

change, which is compelling millions to

abandon their homes because of extreme

weather making livelihood difficult.

Unfortunately, the resolve and

capability of the international community

10


COVER STORY

Internally displaced persons in South Sudan

to address most of these challenges has

drastically diminished, as evidenced

by limited engagement by international

actors to move beyond the provision

of humanitarian assistance; and lack

of dedicated financial resources aimed

at addressing protracted displacement

or preventing new displacement from

becoming protracted.

International law has reaffirmed

that states have certain obligations

towards their citizens, and they cannot

treat their population as they wish with

impunity in the name of sovereignty.

States are required to extend protection

to such vulnerable groups of people

displaced within their countries without

discrimination.

Indeed, it is based on this recognition

of state obligation that the doctrine

of responsibility to protect emerged.

The doctrine recognises the primary

responsibility of states and calls upon them

to take all measures to fulfil this duty by

protecting their own people against atrocity

crimes, including war crimes, crimes

against humanity or genocide. A right to

be protected from human rights violations

and atrocity crimes also extends to those

displaced.

There are a wide range of international

and regional legal instruments that govern

forced displacement. Most notably the

1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status

of Refugees, which defines a refugee as a

person who, owing to well-founded fear

of being persecuted for reasons of race,

religion, nationality, membership of a

particular social group or political opinion,

is outside the country of his nationality

and is unable or, owing to such fear, is

unwilling to avail himself of the protection

of that country.

This Convention has subsequently been

complemented by the 1967 Additional

Protocol and the 1969 Organisation of

African Unity Convention that expanded

the definition of a refugee to include not

only those fleeing persecution but also

those who flee their homelands “owing to

external aggression, occupation, foreign

domination or events seriously disturbing

public order.”

Drawing on international refugee,

human rights, and humanitarian law,

myriad legal and institutional framework

have evolved over time to cover a

‘

In Tigray, more than a

million people have been

displaced

’

widening array of persons in need of

assistance and protection. Humanitarian

and human rights laws, in conjunction with

the example set by the OAU Convention


COVER STORY

and Cartagena Declaration, have been

used to expand protection for displaced

persons who do not meet the 1951 Refugee

Convention definition but would be

harmed if returned to their areas of habitual

residences.

The argument regarding the lack of

international legal protection regime for

those internally displaced is premised on

the fact that despite being in their own

countries, internally displaced persons

(IDPs) hardly enjoy these rights as spelled

out in international human rights and

humanitarian law instruments precisely

because of their displacement and

inadequate state protection. In other words,

when people are on the move, whether

within or outside their own countries, it

is difficult to ensure that their rights are

protected, hence necessitating a different

legal framework to protect them.

In 1998, recognising the growing

challenge of IDPs worldwide and the

lack of comprehensive legal protection

mechanism, the Human Rights

Commission, a subsidiary organ of the

UN General Assembly, adopted Guiding

Principles for the protection of the IDPs.

These Principles identify and reinforce

the intersection of specific international

human rights law (IHRL) and international

humanitarian law (IHL) guarantees for

IDPs. They explicitly recognise the right

not to be arbitrarily displaced and spell

out in detail the rights of those who are

displaced. They further reaffirm that

governments cannot deny access to

international humanitarian organisations

helping IDPs if they are unable or unwilling

to provide the necessary assistance

themselves and underlines the right of IDPs

to either return voluntarily to their homes or

to resettle in another part of the country.

While these Guiding Principles have

gained wider international recognition

by different institutions involved in the

protection of IDPs, it is evident that they

do not constitute an internationally binding

legal instrument. This argument is made

because, unlike Declarations, Resolutions

or Recommendations by international

bodies such as the General Assembly, they

were not negotiated by states, rather they

were prepared by a team of experts who

were not representing sovereign states

that are normally the principal subject of

complying with and enforcing international

law. However, various scholars and

institutions have shown that the Principles,

Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict

as applied to situations of armed conflict,

restate in large measure customary

international law.

Following in the footsteps of the UN,

in 2009, the African Union adopted what is

known as the Kampala Convention. This is

the first legally binding regional instrument

offering protection of the internally

displaced persons.

The adoption of the instrument

recognised and reaffirmed the widely

held belief by the AU that universal

standards developed under the auspices

of the UN must be enriched by an African

understanding of basic rights and protection

of IDPs. This Convention is not only the

first legally binding instrument at the

continental level, but it is also the first one

that succinctly articulates the rights and

duties of IDPs and states.

It articulates general obligations

of states relating to the protection and

assistance of IDPs, obligations of the AU

itself, international organisations, armed

groups, non-state actors and state parties

during and after displacement.

The Convention further imposes

obligations on states to ensure sustainable

return, local integration or relocation,

compensation and above all registration

of all IDPs. The Convention construes

sovereignty as a positive obligation,

entailing responsibility for the protection

and general welfare of the citizens and of

those falling under the state jurisdiction.

The casting of sovereignty in a positive

12


COVER STORY

aspect is significant because it means

that states cannot abdicate their primary

responsibility towards their citizens while

hiding under the veil of sovereignty and

non-interference in internal matters.

The 1998 Guiding Principles reaffirm

that IDPs should be treated equally as

the rest of the citizens and it prohibits

discrimination based on their IDPs status.

The Kampala Convention, on its part,

restates the same ethos but differently.

It mandates states to refrain from,

prohibit and prevent arbitrary displacement

of population while at the same time

reaffirming the right of the IDPs not to

be arbitrarily displaced. In other words,

the primacy is put on the duty of states to

prevent displacement rather than the right

of population not be displaced.

In addition to the above instruments

which are widely regarded as a

foundational legal framework for the

protection of the displaced both at the

regional and international level, it is worth

noting that IHL plays an important role in

preventing displacement in the first place.

It prohibits the displacement of people

except if it is necessary for imperative

military reasons or the protection of the

civilians themselves.

A widespread or systematic policy of

displacement of civilians without such

justification may constitute a war crime or

a crime against humanity. There are many

other rules of IHL, notably those governing

the conduct of hostilities, that are crucial to

protect the civilian population and whose

violations often trigger displacement.

Under the Fourth Geneva Convention

and Additional Protocol I, it is a grave

breach of these instruments to deport

or transfer the civilian population of an

occupied territory, unless the security

of the civilians involved or imperative

military reasons so demand. Article 17 of

Additional Protocol II (dealing with noninternational

armed conflicts) notes: “The

displacement of the civilian population

shall not be ordered for reasons related

to the conflict unless the security of the

civilians involved or imperative military

reasons so demand… Civilians shall not be

compelled to leave their own territory for

reasons connected with the conflict.”

It has been argued that this provision

also covers “situations where the insurgent

party is in control of an extensive part of

the territory”. This means that insurgents as

well as states, are bound by the obligation

laid down therein.

This provision is now the basis for the

corresponding crime under the ICC Statute

applicable during an armed conflict not

of an international character, of ordering

displacement of a civilian population. The

expression “displacement of a civilian

population” appears to cover transfer both

within and beyond a border.

Despite clear prohibition of forced

displacement under all key branches of

international law including international

human rights law, international

humanitarian law, and international

refugee law, we continue to witness forced

displacement at a scale never seen before.

Most of the forced displacement we see

today emanates from ongoing conflicts

where belligerents continue to inflict

untold suffering on the population without

much accountability for such violations.

For example, in Syria, ongoing

conflict between government and its allied

forces and rebels has caused massive

displacement, condemning millions to

live as refugees in foreign countries while

others unable to escape the fighting have

been trapped in rebel-controlled areas,

which in effect makes them enemies of

the state because they are deemed willing

collaborators with rebels.

Effectively this unenvious status

deprives them of the essential basic

services and protection they might have

been entitled to from the state. Countless

reports by the UN-backed Syrian

Commission and others have demonstrated

the extent to which both the Syrian

government and rebels have been complicit

in causing forced displacement. Indeed,

these bodies have laid out incontrovertible

evidence indicating that such acts by the

government and rebels may amount to war

crimes and crimes against humanity.

In South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan,

Mali among others, ongoing conflicts

continue to be a major source of forced

displacement. Millions of men, women,

children continue to endure deplorable

living conditions with limited humanitarian

support. For example, the UN Group

of Eminent International and Regional

Experts on Yemen has noted how both

sides to the conflict continue to commit

massive violations with impunity, noting

that despite such violations by all sides to

the conflict “not one person from any of

the parties to the conflict has been held

responsible for any violations in Yemen”.

Millions have been internally

forcibly displaced while others have fled

the country. As noted by the Experts:

“Civilians in Yemen are not starving, they

are being starved by the parties to the

conflict.”

In South Sudan, multiple UN reports

have noted that indiscriminate attacks

against the civilian population and

lack of accountability for human rights

violations, political instability, the absence

of a transparent and inclusive process

towards national cohesion, as well as

South Sudan’s climatic vulnerabilities add

to an environment conducive to internal

displacement, and provide significant

obstacles to its resolution.

While a vast variety of causes of

displacement are prevalent in South

Sudan, armed conflict emanating from

inter-communal and political violence,


COVER STORY

human rights violations, and cross-border

incursions continue to be the main drivers

of internal displacement in the country. The

same situation can be said of Mali or the

Central African Republic where conflicts

continue to forcibly displace millions

without accountability for such violations.

In Tigray, Ethiopia, more than a million

people have been displaced because of

the conflict between the government and

the rebel groups. The Office of the High

Commissioner for Refugees has noted

that “mass detentions, killings, systematic

looting, and sexual violence continue to

create an atmosphere of fear and an erosion

of living conditions that have resulted in

the forced massive displacement of the

Tigrayan civilian population”.

It has been further confirmed that

civilian suffering is widespread, and

impunity is pervasive. Even with the

changing dynamics in the conflict, there

continues to be multiple and severe reports

of alleged gross violations of human rights,

humanitarian, and refugee law by all

parties.

Internal displacement due to natural

disasters induced by climate change is

increasingly becoming a norm in different

parts of the world. While such internal

displacement sometimes is short-term and

people return as soon as water recedes,

others are of a long-term nature especially

when it directly impacts livelihood

possibilities for a significant part of the

population.

For example, it is no longer an isolated

case to find pastoralists moving their

animals to other parts in search of pastures

or water for their livestock. Not only does

this movement impact arable land used by

farmers to grow food, it is also a source of

tension and more often conflict. In general,

climate change induced displacement

significantly impacts on the resilience of

the people living in disaster-prone areas,

including due to destruction of livelihoods

and destruction of homes and basic

infrastructure.

Humanitarian assistance in such

places is extremely necessary, yet more

challenging, than ever. Securing the space

for neutral, independent, and impartial

humanitarian action is an increasingly

complex endeavour in highly politicised

environments where humanitarian aid

becomes a substitute for effective political

engagement.

Today’s conflicts whether in Yemen,

Syria, Afghanistan, Mali, South Sudan or

the DRC, are fought by a multiplicity of

actors, with unclear lines of command and

control and a range of ideological, political,

economic, and criminal motivations. It

is also worth noting that, the language of

counterterrorism has been and continues

to be used by certain states to restrict

engagement of humanitarian actors with

non-state armed actors and even to justify

violations of international humanitarian

law. Ensuring access to protection and

humanitarian assistance for civilian

populations displaced by fighting or trapped

in conflict zones is an increasingly acute

and risky challenge.

The growing number of forced

displacements worldwide shows what

happens when multilateralism fails to

live up to its promise, leaving refugees,

internally displaced persons and host

countries as pawns in “chess games of

international politics”. Most worrying is

perhaps the situation in the Sahel, where

rising displacement numbers mirror the

impact of armed conflict, climate change,

‘

Civilians shall not be compelled

to leave their own territory for

reasons connected with conflict

’

food insecurity and, with COVID-19, the

closure of essential social services including

schools, vocational training centres among

others.

The ongoing conflict in the Sahel, has

meant that thousands have abandoned

their habitual homes of residence: they

cannot farm their land or undertake any

productive economic activities to support

their livelihood while thousands of children

have missed out on learning opportunities

creating a lost generation in the years to

come with its attendant consequences on

the country’s manpower and ability to grow

its economy.

Unfortunately, even the government

that is supposed to protect them is currently

unable to exercise its jurisdiction over its

territory. The implication is, most of these

people have been left at the mercy of the

The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 2009 Kampala Convention provide useful guidance on displacement-specific aspects

14


COVER STORY

Jihad groups with no hope for the future.

Increasingly, humanitarian aid workers

continue to bear the blunt of the violence.

For example, for the past two years, major

attacks affecting aid workers occurred

in many countries, but they were at the

highest levels in South Sudan, Syria, and

the DRC. In 2020 alone, more than 470 aid

workers were attacked including more than

100 who paid the ultimate price with their

lives, more than 200 who were seriously

injured and more than 100 who were

kidnapped.

These tragic numbers are a sober

reminder of the dangerous nature of

humanitarian work especially when all

the rules and laws governing the conduct

of hostilities are ignored and those

in positions of power don’t summon

the courage to hold to account those

responsible. Despite several resolutions

and statements by the UN General

Assembly and Security Council on the

need to protect humanitarian workers,

killings and violence continue with

impunity.

Amidst all these tragedies, what

should be done to address this unfortunate

situation? Truth is, we can’t address

these challenges without commitment to

dialogue and willingness to address our

differences without resorting to violence.

But most important, even when

dialogue fails – as it has done often – it is

critical that parties to the conflict respect

the law, and those who don’t, should be

held to account with the full force of the

law.

Respect for international human

rights and international humanitarian

law is first and foremost a requirement to

mitigate suffering continuously inflicted

on the population. Under IHL, people are

protected from and during displacement as

civilians, provided they do not take a direct

part in hostilities.

It has further been shown that

international humanitarian law provides

for limited circumstances under which

the displacement of civilians during

armed conflict is allowed, namely if

it is carried out for the security of the

individuals involved, or for imperative

military reasons. Nevertheless, in such

‘

Increasingly, forced

displacement is growing in

complexity

’

circumstances, displacement is temporary

and must be carried out in such a manner

as to ensure that displaced persons are

returned to their homes as soon as the

situation allows.

Unfortunately, parties to a conflict

continue to ignore or deny protection to

the displaced, including guarantees of

sustained and unhindered humanitarian

assistance to vulnerable civilians. The

immediate priority must be for all civilians

to have access to the food, water and

medical assistance they urgently require.

Facilitating access for monitors and

protection actors is also key to safeguard

the rights of civilians.

The UN Guiding Principles on Internal

Displacement and the 2009 Kampala

Convention provide useful guidance on

displacement-specific aspects. Many of

the rules contained in these instruments

are part and parcel of international human

rights law and international humanitarian

law.

For example, the principles make clear

that states have a duty to provide displaced

people with lasting return, resettlement and

reintegration solutions, and that displaced

people must be involved in planning and

managing measures that concern them.

But also, these instruments provide that

a state must take all necessary measures

to avoid displacement of its population

and when it does, must provide necessary

compensation to that effect.

The decision to end internal

displacement should be voluntary,

and depend on legislative, political,

economic, and social reforms and the

successful transition to peace or a return

to “normality”. The return process can be

difficult to monitor and assess, however, as

it is usually the responsibility of the host

country.

Displaced people should not feel

forced to return, but the issues that militate

against a return are often the same as those

against remaining. These include security,

infrastructure, employment, land, health

care and housing.

Perhaps the most important aspect

in addressing forced displacement is

the accountability question. As noted

above, most displacement emanates from

conflicts and violence often between

government allied forces and multiple

groups of rebels with multifaceted

demands and claims.

It has also been noted that one of the

single most important requirements for the

belligerents in the conduct of hostilities is

the respect for international humanitarian

law and international human rights law. Yet

often this obligation has been ignored or

disregarded without much accountability.

In situations like Syria and Yemen,

we have had multiple UN backed

reports which clearly indicate the

culpability of both parties to the conflict

in causing massive violations of human

rights including forced displacement.

Unfortunately, we have seen no appetite

at the international level or within the UN

Security Council to action these reports by

holding these parties to account rather.

Sadly, some of the worst violators

have found their protectors in the

Council and other related forums. While

the International Criminal Court was

established with the singular aim of ridding

humanity with atrocity crimes of the past,

the same humanity has demonstrated

monumental failure in using this institution

to address challenges it was precisely set

up to address.

Unless we gather political will and

summon courage to address violence

and conflicts by all necessary tools at

our disposal, including the UN Charter

and other Human Rights instruments and

institutions we have painstakingly adopted

and created over the years, it is unlikely

that we can tackle resultant effect of wars

especially conflict induced displacement.

The causes of displacement are

many and varied. And as such, solutions

should be innovative and multifaceted.

We have seen that while climate induced

displacement continues to emerge as a

threat to the wellbeing and livelihood

of millions around the world, conflict

constitutes, and is still, by far the primary

cause of forced displacement.

This type of displacement is most often


COVER STORY

caused by the failure of warring parties to

take all feasible precautions to spare the

civilian population, or by other unlawful

conduct by parties that carried out attacks

with little regard for civilian life. How we

prevent and resolve conflicts will largely

determine how we address the challenge of

conflict induced displacement now and in

the future.

Obligation of the parties to the conflict

to respect the laws governing the conduct

of war, political will, and the ability of the

international community to deploy all tools

at its disposal within the framework of the

UN charter to effectively hold accountable

those responsible for these violations, will

all determine our resolve in addressing

these challenges.

Climate change induced displacement

is a growing reality. How we use policy and

institutional tools to address its devastating

effects will define not only our commitment

to the vulnerable population but also our

ability to invest in the future of humanity.

Adama Dieng

An eminent jurist

ADAMA Dieng is a former UN Under

Secretary General and Special Adviser of

the Secretary General on the Prevention

of Genocide, a position he held from

July 2012 to July 2020. He also served

as Registrar of the UN International

Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda from 2001

to 2008.

Before joining the UN, Dieng was the

Secretary General of the Geneva-based

International Commission of Jurists from

1990 to 2000 and he served as the UN

Independent Expert for Haiti between

1995 and 2000.

In 1993, he was Envoy of the UN

Secretary General to Malawi to mediate

between the government and pressure

groups.

Dieng was the driving force behind

the establishment of the African Court

on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and he

also produced the draft of the African

Convention on Preventing and Combating

Corruption. In Senegal, Dieng was

Registrar at the Supreme Court.

He is a former founding member of

the Board of Directors of the International

Institute for Democracy and Electoral

Assistance as well as former President of

the Martin Ennals Foundation.

Dieng is an acclaimed human rights

expert and lecturer on issues relating to

international humanitarian law, human

rights law, and international criminal

justice.

He was recently appointed by the

Prosecutor of the International Criminal

Court, Karim Khan, to serve as one of his

17 Special Advisers.

This was a keynote address presented by Adama Dieng in September at the virtual Oxford and Volkswagen Foundation conference on:

“Governing Humanitarianism – Past, Present and Future”.

AB

16


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ANALYSIS

Coup in Guinea more than an act against

controversial change of Constitution

The cause-effect pattern that has been used to explain the recent intervention

of the country’s armed forces is not simply linked to the trigger – an unpopular

constitutional amendment – but more to long-standing political and socio-economic

failings, writes Albert Mbiatem

THE September military coup

in Guinea has largely been

regarded by many observers

and analysts as a response to the March

2020 constitutional amendment that

allowed President Alpha Condé to hold

on to power for a third consecutive

mandate. “A constitutional coup” was

how the Guinean opposition labelled

the controversial change. However, the

unpopular amendment only exacerbated

existing instability, which eventually

fuelled the massive anti-constitutional

protests that cost the lives of many

Guineans.

The possibility of a military coup could

not have been overlooked because the

situation in Guinea at the time perfectly

matched American political scientist Jay

Ulfelder’s benchmarks for predicting

political risk: “Countries which are poor

and have competitive authoritarian or

partially democratic political regimes are

likely to undergo military coup. The risk

of coup is higher in countries that have

experienced other coup attempts in the past

several years.”

The latest coup in Guinea, led by Lt.

Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, is the third

successful one after those led by Colonel

Lansana Conté and Captain Moussa Dadis

Camara.. It is obvious Condé’s decision to

amend the Constitution set the stage for the

latest putsch. Deep down, the coup gained

popularity because of frustrations linked

to numerous structural challenges that

include unequal distribution of resources,

underdevelopment, poverty, corruption and

unemployment.

The cause-effect pattern that has been

used to explain the coup is not simply

connected to the trigger – an unpopular

constitutional amendment – but more to

long-standing political and socio-economic

failings. Condé, hitherto considered

Lt. Colonel Mamady Doumbouya’s coup is the third successful one in Guinea

by many Guineans as an incorruptible

freedom fighter, failed to live up to popular

expectations during his presidential terms.

Reforms did not effectively take place

on the worrying issues of electricity, water,

roads and social services as promised

during his first term. His second and

short-lived third terms were more inclined

towards power concentration and regime

protection as reflected by the imprisonment

of a significant number of political

opponents and other forms of repression.

Many had predicted an unstable

Guinea following the March 2020

announcement by Condé of a referendum

to amend the Constitution that would

propel him to a third consecutive term at

the helm. The proposed amendment was

hugely controversial and it spurred mass

demonstrations during which at least 32

people were killed.

However, the referendum was

overwhelmingly in favour of a new

Constitution, with 91.59 per cent votes.

Strong reservations were raised by the

opposition and international community on

the credibility of the referendum with just a

61 per cent turnout. Strangely, 2.5 million

“unverifiable” names were deleted from

the electoral register.

The constitutional change was seen as

an affront to the public because, according

to Afrobarometer polling, more than eight

out of 10 Guineans favoured a two-term

limit on presidential mandates.

Regime protection emerged as a

priority during Condé’s last year of his

second term. Guineans were given very

limited space to express contrary opinions.

The regime cracked down on protesters

and political opponents, some of whom

died in prison.

The government used crippling

criminal laws to suppress dissent while

18


ANALYSIS

ethnic divisions and pervasive corruption

often intensified political disputes. Regular

abuse of civilians by the military and

police revealed a deep-seated culture of

impunity.

Freedom House in 2021 rated Guinea

as partly free with scores of 14/40 on

political rights and 24/60 on civil rights.

Although multiparty elections have

regularly taken place since Condé’s

accession to power, they have been

plagued by violence, delays and other

flaws.

Condé’s leadership was described

by many as authoritarian, with the main

outcome being the erosion of democratic

norms. His controversial methods to

remain in power earned him many

enemies.

The main opposition leader, Ibrahima

Diallo, expressed their determination

to prevent any form of constitutional

violation. “We will continue the fight

until the complete withdrawal of this new

Constitution. The fight continues until

Alpha Condé leaves power under the

current Constitution,” Diallo said.

It was obvious that at this time of his

political journey, Condé had lost popularity

among many civilians. But little at that

time was known about the real opinions of

members of the armed forces that initially

used hard power to enforce the new

Constitution in favour of the incumbent.

Created by Condé for regime protection,

the Special Forces, through the September

coup, demonstrated that the regime had in

reality lost legitimacy among the military.

The legality of Condé’s third

term following the amendment of

the Constitution has been seriously

undermined by many Guineans who

wanted him out. Therefore, the timing

of the putsch led by Doumbaya was

strategised amidst Condé’s fast-growing

unpopularity.

Doumbaya, in his first televised

address to Guineans following the

coup, emphasised the need to end the

personalisation and concentration of power.

This message was tactfully geared towards

nurturing popular hopes on effectively

liberalising civil and political rights. But

again, what competence does the military

have in rebuilding democracy when the

same military is known for operating

internally on a rigid top-bottom structure?

Alpha Condé’s decision to amend the Constitution

set the stage for the latest putsch

The significant level of corruption

in Guinea has over time sustained

unequal distribution of resources. In

essence, democracy and accountability

have largely been missing as corruption

continued to expand. A 2019/2020

Afrobarometer survey revealed that 63 per

cent of Guineans believed corruption had

increased in the country.

Transparency International’s 2020

Corruption Perception Index ranked

Guinea 137/180. The high level of

corruption under Condé naturally led to

the loss of popular trust in the government.

Thus, any change of regime, even through

a putsch, would be welcomed by many

Guineans. It is exactly the reason why

popular exuberance was witnessed on

many streets of Guinea following the

‘

’

September coup.

Poor governance in Guinea continued

to exacerbate unequal distribution of

resources and a very low ranking on global

human development. Although the GDP

of Guinea was growing at an average of

five per cent a year for the past five years,

70 per cent of the people were earning less

than $3.20 a day.

The uneven distribution of resources

during Condé’s brief third term was

equally felt within the circles of power.

In August 2021, in an attempt to balance

the budget, the government announced

tax hikes, slashed spending on the police

and the military and increased funding for

the Office of the President and National

Assembly.

This implied that the extreme difficulty

for many Guineans to make ends meet

under Condé’s rule created a smooth path

for a coup. This simply indicated how

frustrated and unsatisfied citizens would

embrace unorthodox methods to change

power when their needs and demands are

ignored by those in authority.

Despite possessing abundant natural

resources – the world’s largest reserves of

bauxite, significant gold, diamond and oil

deposits – Guinea, according to the UNDP

2020 Global Human Development Index

ranking, occupied the 178th position out of

189 countries.

The worsening state of roads,

hospitals, among other failing public utility

infrastructures, had made Condé’s regime

highly unpopular. Guinea’s infrastructure

ranked almost the lowest, 147th out of 148

countries. The quality of roads, the quality

of electricity supply and the ratio of fixed

telephone lines are the second lowest (also

147th out of 148), while the quality of

railroad and port infrastructure has some

potential, which rank 114th and 119th

respectively.

Corruption in Guinea

has over time sustained

unequal distribution of

resources

This extremely low infrastructural

ranking, which was largely captured during

Conde’s first term, did not fundamentally

alter during his second and truncated

third terms. Again, alike many other

structural challenges, such infrastructural

underdevelopment which has over the

years hindered human development in

Guinea, strongly contributed to easing

the way for September’s coup and its

subsequent popular support.

Albert Mbiatem, an alumnus of the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London and researcher at its Central African Hub,

is also a lecturer at the University of Buea in Cameroon.


AB

ANALYSIS

Jammeh factor looms large over

Gambian election

On December 4, The Gambia will hold its first presidential election since the dramatic

defeat five years ago of the authoritarian Yahya Jammeh after 22 years in office. Baba

Jallow looks at how the upcoming drama will play out

AFTER weeks of toing and

froing among politicians and

political parties in The Gambia,

the country’s Independent Electoral

Commission early in November finally

whittled down the number of presidential

candidates from 20 to just six. For a

country of 2.5 million people and less than

one million registered voters, 20 candidates

vying for the presidency in December were

seen as a bit on the high side.

The six candidates that the IEC

declared to have met all the requirements

according to the Elections Act are

President Adama Barrow, Ousainou

Darboe, Mamma Kandeh, Halifa Sallah,

Abdoulie Jammeh and independent

candidate Essa Fall. The reduction in the

number of presidential candidates changes

the dynamics of the election, whose run-up

had been fraught with political jockeying

Yahya Jammeh: muddying the waters even in exile

before the intervention of the IEC.

Indeed, the period since the December

2016 elections that saw President Yahya

Jammeh’s defeat and subsequent flight

into exile in Equatorial Guinea has

‘

been anything but dull. Nor has it been

encouraging, at least to those who hoped

for a proper transition from dictatorship to

some respectable level of democracy.

The human rights abuses that

galvanised a coalition of eight political

parties and independent candidates against

Jammeh in the 2016 election are a thing of

the past. Since then, the Gambian political

scene has been replete with acrimony,

intrigue and betrayal that saw a quick

A Machiavellian marriage of

convenience between Barrow’s

NPP and exiled Jammeh’s APRC

’

dissolution of the coalition that brought the

novice and accidental candidate, Barrow,

to the presidency.

On the eve of the December election,

Gambians have been witnessing some of

the most shocking political developments

in their country’s history. First, there was

an announcement of a Machiavellian

marriage of convenience between Barrow’s

newly formed National People’s Party

(NPP) and Jammeh’s Alliance for Patriotic

Reorientation and Construction (APRC).

Then on October 15, Jammeh bluntly

rejected the NPP-APRC alliance from his

place of exile in Equatorial Guinea. In a

WhatsApp audio message to some of his

supporters, he instructed his supporters to

throw their weight behind one of the new

parties, the Gambia Alliance for National

Unity (GANU). It is headed by Sheikh

Tijan Hydara, one of Jammeh’s many

former justice ministers, who was also

sacked, arrested and jailed on ostensibly

trumped-up charges, and has now been

dropped by the IEC.

But by the last week of October,

Jammeh had changed tack and endorsed

20


ANALYSIS

Adama Barrow: will he be smiling in December?

his former rival, Kandeh of the Gambia

Democratic Congress (GDC), for president

and instructed the breakaway faction of

his party, the No to Alliance movement, to

coalesce with Kandeh.

Barrow’s decision to sign an MOU in

the first place and enter into an alliance

with the APRC in August this year was not

simply a marriage of convenience between

two political parties seeking victory at

the polls. Rather, Barrow’s decision to

embrace the party of the former dictator is

indicative of his crippling fear of losing,

especially to the United Democratic Party’s

(UDP) Darboe, his former mentor who is

now his sworn enemy. On the other hand,

Barrow seems to have quickly developed

a liking for power and is desirous of being

re-elected and staying on as president for

as long as possible.

The common African sit-tight

syndrome seems to have affected him all

too early in his presidency, causing him

to first break his coalition promise to

serve only for three years. Then he pushed

The author is a journalist and communications consultant.

his former party, the UDP, out of his

government to form the NPP under whose

colours he is seeking re-election.

Barrow’s decision to embrace the

leader that Gambians voted out in

December 2016 is therefore driven by a

combination of fear on the one hand and

hunger for power on the other. It was, by

all accounts, an unpopular and unwise

decision that has already backfired and

might well cost him re-election.

When Barrow was elected, the

coalition that gave him victory agreed

that he would serve for three years after

which he would oversee an election

and hand over power to the winner. His

mandate also included putting in place a

transitional justice programme that saw the

establishment of three main commissions:

a commission of enquiry into the financial

dealings and assets of the former president

(the Janneh Commission); a Constitutional

Review Commission (CRC) to draft a new

Constitution with presidential term limits

and greater guarantee of rights for the

citizens, and a Truth, Reconciliation and

Reparations Commission (TRRC).

The TRRC looked into the human

rights violations of the ex-president

and, among other things, is to make

recommendations for the prosecution of

those most responsible for human rights

violations under Jammeh’s regime.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is

doubtful whether Barrow was ever serious

about his transitional justice programme.

His government deliberately refused to

implement the recommendations of the

Janneh Commission that unearthed massive

corruption by the former president, and

recommended the prosecution of several

Jammeh enablers. Ironically, some of them

already held, and still hold ministerial,

advisory and other senior positions in the

current government.

Barrow also made sure that the new

draft Constitution produced by the CRC

suffered a stillbirth because of a new twoterm

presidential limit. He was hoping that

his first five years would not be taken into


ANALYSIS

account, given that there would be a new

Constitution.

But the CRC insisted that Barrow’s first

five years in office should count as his first

term. It would mean that if Barrow wins the

December 2021 election, he could not seek

re-election in 2026 because it would count

as his second and final term.

This, apparently, was not good enough

for Barrow who now dreams of running for

president for as long as he could, and as

long as the current Constitution remains in

place. This 1997 Constitution has no term

limits, and winning is by simple majority.

The human rights abuses and violations

unearthed through the public hearings of the

TRRC shocked the conscience of the nation

by virtue of their scope, extent and brutality.

Even before the hearings ended, many who

followed the proceedings felt that Jammeh

would be recommended for prosecution.

But by forming an alliance with the

APRC, Barrow demonstrated that he was

willing to sacrifice the fate of the victims

and of the country’s transition to a better

and brighter future on the altar of his

political ambitions. The August MOU

signed with the APRC’s National Executive

showed that Barrow has no intention of

implementing any recommendations for

the prosecution of Jammeh should he be

re-elected.

In fact, spokesmen for the APRC

National Executive have repeatedly said

that some form of amnesty for Jammeh

was their top condition for entering into a

coalition with the NPP. Barrow, on the other

hand, insists that his primary objective for

entering into an alliance with the APRC is

to promote national reconciliation.

In reality, Barrow embraced the APRC

simply because he calculated that the

party could help him to hang on to the

presidency. He may have` miscalculated.

He certainly did not foresee a split within

the APRC as a result of the MOU it signed

with the NPP. And this is despite his highly

unpopular personal visit to Jammeh’s

family compound in Kanilai.

Jammeh would come out to flatly

reject any alliance between the APRC and

‘

The common African sit-tight

syndrome seems to have

affected Barrow all too early in

his presidency

’

NPP, even though the National Executive

claimed it acted with the former president’s

permission. True to form, Jammeh not

only rejected the alliance in his speech to

TRRC supporters: doubts whether Barrow was ever serious about transitional justice

22


ANALYSIS

supporters, he has also announced that he

was still the supreme leader of the APRC

and proceeded to promptly sack the old

National Executive and appoint a new one

from a dissenting faction of the party.

Barely a month after the signing of

the NPP-APRC alliance, it emerged that

not all supporters of the former president

were in agreement with the move. At least

a month before Jammeh publicly rejected

the alliance, a breakaway faction of the

APRC, calling itself the ‘No to APRC-NPP

Alliance’ movement, had been vocal in

condemning the party’s National Executive

for getting into bed with the NPP.

Faction members questioned why

Barrow would be warming up to a party

that he had so vehemently condemned just

months earlier. This breakaway faction

was the first to claim that Jammeh did not

sanction the alliance, contrary to what his

party’s National Executive was saying. The

breakaway faction, now legitimated and

backed by its supreme leader’s rejection of

the alliance will certainly cost the president

some votes, and by the look of things that

could be a significant number of votes. It

is clear that Barrow’s strategy of winning

‘

The election battleground

is full of many

imponderables

’

re-election by embracing the APRC has

backfired.

A divided APRC and Jammeh’s

rejection of an alliance with him are only

two of several challenges Barrow is facing

in the run-up to the December polls. There

is, first of all, his former party and now

arch rival, the UDP, which commands

significant support across the country and

is indisputably the largest opposition party

in the country.

A UDP victory in December would be

a nightmare for Barrow. It is a possibility

that the president cannot dismiss as remote.

There are also a few other contenders

that should be watched. There is the

veteran politician and sociologist Sallah,

who heads the People’s Democratic

Organisation for Independence and

Socialism (PDOIS). Though Sallah’s

chances of winning the presidency are

rather slim, his party has visibly expanded

its support base over the past year or two.

Then there is the independent

candidate, Essa Faal, former lead counsel

for the TRRC whose popularity during the

Commission’s public hearings convinced

him to run for president. Faal may not win

the election, but he certainly commands

significant support across the country

and is likely to win support from among

potential Barrow voters.

In effect, Barrow has good reason

to feel intimidated by the prospect of

defeat in December, especially now that

his plan to embrace the former dictator

and to jettison the work of the TRRC has

alienated a significant number of Gambian

voters in the Greater Banjul Area and West

Coast Region, the country’s most populous

urban areas.

In the final analysis, with the clock

fast approaching December 4, it is nearly

impossible to say who will be elected

the next president of The Gambia. Even

with the many advantages of incumbency,

Barrow is not guaranteed to win reelection.

Indeed, the battleground is full of many

imponderables. Thus, Gambians will have

to wait for the days after the election to

AB

know who their next president will be.

Ousainou Darboe: from Barrow’s mentor to sworn enemy


ANALYSIS

The making of African dictatorships

24

Whatever the speculations as to the consequence of Yahya Jammeh’s return to The

Gambia might be, it is, without doubt, a reinforcement of the position of dictators in

Africa, argues Toyin Falola

FOR a continent noted for its

immense natural wealth and

potentials – symbolised by

vast arable lands, precious minerals and

a young vibrant population – Africa has

failed to fully utilise these assets to achieve

progressive socio-economic transformation

after 60 years of self-rule. One central

reason identified for this misfortune is the

prevalent cases of bad leadership.

Except for a few occasions of

exemplary stewardship from the likes

of Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, and

John Kufuor, Africa’s post-independence

leadership history has comprised a litany

of sit-tight despotic and kleptocratic

regimes – both military and civilian. This

tragedy of Africa’s leadership situation is

even more apparent when one considers

that, about half-a-century or so ago, the

indigenous political forces of then nascent

African nation-states rallied around ideals

of freedom, equality and good governance

to protest against the injustice of colonial

rule and demand independence.

The unfortunate post-independence

tradition of tyrannical leadership in Africa

has followed a pattern. After independence,

a charismatic figure from a politically,

sometimes numerically, dominant ethnic

group of a typical multi-ethnic postcolonial

African state becomes president

and assumes complete control of economic

and political power through a network of

patrimonial/client-patron relationships

and the use of the state’s instruments of

coercion.

Firmly in place, such leaders then

initiate constitutional reforms which accord

them extensive powers and provide a cover

of legitimacy for undemocratic draconian

practices. Consequently, protests from

politically and, most times, numerically

less privileged ethnocultural groups, who

are alienated and subjected to deprivation

and abuse through the self-perpetuating

intrigues of the incumbent, provide the

basis for a military take-over, the only

other means, after death, of changing such

sit-tight leaders.

With military governments, the

experience is also mostly similar. Taking

Julius Nyerere: one of the few standout leaders in

Africa

a leaf from the ousted dictator’s book, the

“interim” military government promises to

hand over power after righting the political

mess of the overthrown government.

As such, it schedules transition/

handover dates that are repeatedly

postponed until such a time when its head

can, with some confidence, arrange for a

transition process. This comes complete

with a constitutional coup that guarantees

his emergence as president.

Such a government, with its military

background and extensive constitutional

powers, becomes nearly impossible to

replace through the ballot box. It deploys

every option available to remain in power

and even when, by some chance, it does

lose at the ballot, it voids the election.

However, from the 1990s, Africa has

recorded significant transformations in the

political systems of many of its countries.

These changes involved the collapse of

several military and civilian dictatorships,

as well as the emergence of rule-of-lawbased

governments, such as South Africa’s

non-racial democracy.

Notwithstanding these democratic

gains though, many countries in Africa

have continued to struggle with deepening

and institutionalising democracy. As such,

there is yet very little check on government

impunity, especially in the areas of the

abuse of executive power and human rights

violations.

There are countries like Togo, Uganda,

Equatorial Guinea, Chad and, until

recently, The Gambia, which are still under

the despotic regimes of sit-tight “leaders”.

These countries have remained notorious


for their hostile political environments,

economic hardship, poor records of human

rights and an ever-present threat of conflict.

They not only symbolise the threat to

Africa’s blossoming democratic culture,

but also stand as an inspiration for other

despotic ambitions yet laying fallow. As

constant reminders that Africa yet faces the

possibility of sliding back to the pre-1990s

levels of authoritarianism, the event of a

political transition in any of these countries

mentioned above represents hope; as

another vital step away from Africa’s

leadership albatross.

One country where recent political

developments best capture this patent

threat to Africa’s democratic gains is

The Gambia. A small, English-speaking,

West African country with at least 10

different ethnic groups, the country won

its independence from Britain in 1965.

And in the more than five decades of its

independent existence has had only three

presidents.

The Gambia’s venture into what

has become a long and perilous postindependence

leadership history began

with the tenure of Dawda Jawara, the

country’s first president who went on to

rule for almost four decades between 1965

and 1994. Under Jawara, the country was,

for all appearances, a liberal democracy.

The political atmosphere was, in

principle, one of competitive politicking,

complete with regular elections after fiveyear

tenures. However, it was a one-party

state where power was centred on the

dominant figure of Jawara and his People’s

Progressive Party (PPP).

With monopoly control over

government resources and a dictatorial

communications regulations policy, the

PPP maintained an undue advantage

over the opposition, which was left weak

and in constant danger of being declared

subversive. Jawara’s government also

imposed strict restrictions on civil society

and the activities of political organisations.

It was embroiled in numerous

allegations of misconduct, including

vote-buying, opposition intimidation and

election tampering. And with no limit set

ANALYSIS

for terms, Jawara was able to perpetuate

himself in office as president for 39 years

until the Yahya Jammeh-led military coup

of 1994.

Twenty-nine-year-old Jammeh, an

army Lieutenant, seized power through

a bloodless coup d’état in 1994 to lead

the Armed Forces Provisional Council

(AFPRC). Having assumed control,

Jammeh, as military dictator (1994-1996),

set out to consolidate his power.

Beginning with a suspension of the

Constitution, he went ahead to round up

and detain some of his superiors in the

military. He also placed Jawara’s ministers

under house arrest, banned political

activities and announced a four-year

transition period to democratic civilian

rule. The four-year transition period

was later reviewed and reduced to two

years in January 1995 by the National

Consultative Committee (NCC). In

April, three months later, a Constitutional

Review Commission was established. The

resultant Constitution, which was drawn

up to accentuate Jammeh’s economic and

political power, allowed for multi-party

elections, a limitless number of five-year

tenures and allowed the president to

appoint judges directly. Then, Jammeh

tactfully retired from the military at the

rank of Colonel, just a month before the

presidential elections of September 1996.

He contested and was declared the winner

by an electoral commission of his own

selection.

As civilian president, Jammeh ruled

The Gambia with an iron fist. His reign

of terror was enacted through a litany of

draconian laws and anti-people policies

that infringed on the people’s rights to

information, expression and interaction.

Typical of a brutal authoritarian

regime, Jammeh’s government sought to

control information coming in and going

out of The Gambia. It reduced state-owned

communication networks – both television

Dawda Jawara: for 40 years power centred on his

dominant figure and his party

and radio – to government (Jammeh’s)

propaganda outlets and moved to suppress

the “independent” press by enacting laws

that undermined their operations.

Some of these laws included the

1994 Newspaper Act (reviewed again

in 2004), which made it mandatory for

owners of media houses to pay expensive

registration fees yearly; the National

Media Communication Act, which

required journalists to divulge confidential

information to the police and judicial

authorities; and the 2004 Criminal Code

(Amendment) Bill, which stipulated prison

terms for defamation and sedition.

Following the enactment of these laws,

there were several attacks on the country’s

independent press and its personnel. As

the years passed, and Jammeh successfully

influenced the outcome of election after

election, his hold over The Gambia grew

even more resolute.

With the aid of armed groups like the

defunct “Green Boys,” some state security

agencies such as the Police Intervention

Unit, the Serious Crimes Unit, and the

National Intelligence Agency (NIA),

Jammeh enacted his diabolic reign of

terror. Individuals and journalists who

criticised his government were picked up

and taken to undisclosed locations, never

to be heard from again.

Before long, it became a practice for

Jammeh’s rivals at the polls to seek refuge

outside the country. He gradually reduced

The Gambia to his personal fiefdom and

started to equate any criticism on his

person as sedition, disturbing the nation’s

peace.

After a botched coup attempt in 2006,

Jammeh became even more resolute in his

oppressive strategies against the Gambian

populace. People were jailed without trial,

there were allegations of extrajudicial

killings and journalists disappeared without

trace.

Famous among his victims were

those of the April 2000 student massacre;

the over 50 West African migrants from

Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Cote d’Ivoire and

Senegal murdered by the NIA; the 1,000

Gambian citizens arrested and tortured

on allegations of witchcraft; journalists

Deyda Hydara and Ebrima Manneh; and

the victims of Jammeh’s fictitious HIV/

AIDS cure.

These do not include other allegations

of rape, embezzlement, and cases of

summary detentions for indefinite periods.

By and large, Jammeh became a symbol

of all that was wrong with democracy in

Africa.

Hence, when in 2017 members of the

Economic Community of West African

States decided to defend the outcome of

the Gambian elections, that action was

welcomed across Africa as a win for

democracy and a move towards the future

of respectable and responsible leadership

on the continent. To all supporters of

democracy, another ruthless dictator had

been removed, a cause to celebrate, and the

celebrations were heard even beyond the

shores of The Gambia and Africa.

Imagine, therefore, the shock and

disbelief that greeted the news that

Jammeh had formed a coalition with

incumbent President Adama Barrow with

the possibility of a return from exile in

Equatorial Guinea. Is there even a small

chance of this materialising barely four

years after his removal?

Where is the justice for Jammeh’s

victims? What is the message being

communicated to other dictatorial regimes

and ambitions? What does this portend for

the future of democracy in Africa? Should

donor agencies continue to support the

current government?

These and other issues haunt the minds

of serious Africans. One can just imagine

the feeling of horror for Gambians. With

the memories yet fresh and the inquisitions

having not yielded the whole truth,

whatever faith the people have in the

principles of democracy and government

stands a good chance of being lost forever,

which can also produce a multiplier effect

in other African countries.

Whatever the speculations as to the

consequence of Jammeh’s return to The

Gambia might be, it is, without doubt, a

reinforcement of the position of dictators in

Africa. Apart from the fact that a Jammeh

return would undermine all the democratic

efforts and gains already recorded in The

Gambia, there is a chance of a Jammeh

revenge campaign that can spark off deadly

conflicts between pro- and anti-Jammeh

factions. The fragility of ethnic divisions

will escalate into full-blown hostilities.

About this “second coming” of

Jammeh, Africa must have a rethink,

especially for the sake of the long-suffering

Gambian people and for the future of peace

and democracy in Africa. This unholy

alliance between Barrow, who publicly

stated that hypocrisy defines democracy,

and Jammeh, who demonstrated that the

purpose of power is to destroy institutions,

is the foundation of what may end up as

the greatest calamity to befall The Gambia

since 1965.

AB


ANALYSIS

West Africa’s security headaches continue

The dislocation and relocation of terrorist cells and training camps in the wake of the

global war on terror launched by the US 20 years ago have profoundly redefined the

security terrain in the Sahel, writes Mohammed Nurudeen Issahaq

APART from the fallout from the

global war on terror, the Arab

Spring also had a significant

influence on the emergence of violent

extremism, especially in West Africa. The

toppling of the Libyan leader, Muammar

Gaddafi, in particular, and the resultant

governance vacuum in that country

facilitated the proliferation of weapons on

a massive scale from Libya into other parts

of the region.

The Libyan situation also served as

a boost for North African-based terrorist

organisations such as Al-Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) whose activities

have witnessed a surge, spilling over into

Mali and other neighbouring states. The

culmination of these dynamics, coupled

with West Africa’s peculiar security

challenges, has given rise to the chilling

reality of terror and the growing number

of terrorist attacks in countries including

Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Burkina

Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali.

The latest major attack occurred at

Salhan village in northern Burkina Faso

along the border with Mali and Niger in

June this year, claiming the lives of 132

innocent civilians, including children.

Each successful terrorist attack, in spite of

existing local security safeguards hitherto

considered as adequate, goes to underscore

the vulnerabilities in the security

architecture of not only the countries under

attack, but the whole region.

The vulnerabilities alluded to here

include porous frontiers that make

illegal cross-border movements easy,

large expanse of ungoverned spaces

within the region that provide habitat for

fugitives, and even legitimate cross-border

movements such as those guaranteed

under the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) Protocol which,

to a large extent, render mobility and

infiltration easy for terrorist groups.

The existence of such safe havens

allows for easy recruitment, training and

indoctrination of radicals. When granted

a safe haven in which they are free to

operate, terrorist organisations become

as potent as guerrilla groups. The large

ungoverned spaces in Northern Mali

provided a sanctuary that enabled AQIM

to grow and become militarised to launch

assaults openly in that country.

Other enabling factors are the

proliferation of small arms and light

weapons, large numbers of unskilled/

unemployed youth, and the absence of

regional mechanisms and systems for

Nana Akufo-Addo: “No country is immune to terrorist attacks”

26


ANALYSIS

effective information sharing on the

activities of criminal gangs.

Security experts observe that the

terrorists’ mode of operation seems to

follow a similar pattern wherever they

strike. In most instances they target

Western establishments as well as

countries that are considered sympathetic

to, or supportive of the West, and places

frequented by Western nationals.

They go in for ‘soft targets’ including

hotels, restaurants, beach resorts and

shopping centres. Having chosen a target,

the terrorists would plant their men there

prior to the attack.

The bigger picture in the Sahel is a

multiplicity of terrorist groups and affiliates

across the region, from Algeria and Libya

in the north to Niger, Mauritania, Mali,

Chad and Nigeria further down. Mention

can be made of Al Mulathamum Battalion

(AMB), Movement for Unity and Jihad in

West Africa (MUJAO), Macina Liberation

Front (MLF), Boko Haram, Islamic State

of the Greater Sahara (ISGS), a regional

affiliate of the terror group Islamic State

(IS), and of course AQIM, among others.

These groups and their international

franchises support each other in the form

of funds, weapons and other essential

logistics. Therefore, rather than just one

simple situation, the jihadist threat in the

region is a hydra-headed problem shrouded

in complexity.

Having made that clarification,

however, it is also important to register that

the most active terrorist organisations that

have gained prominence in West Africa

currently are Boko Haram, AQIM and its

offshoot, MUJAO.

“Boko Haram” (translated simply as

“Western education is forbidden”) came

into existence in the northern Nigerian

city of Maiduguri in 2002, launching

attacks initially on Western interests in

neighbouring states around the Lake Chad

Basin. The death of its leader, Mohammed

Yusuf, in police custody in 2009 saw

the group becoming more radical and

extending its attacks to Islamic institutions

and moderate Muslims, including those in

the group’s home country of Nigeria.

The kidnap of 276 female students

from the Government Girls Secondary

School at Chibok in Borno State in

April 2014, was one of Boko Haram’s

high-profile exploits. In 2015, the group

formally pledged allegiance to the global

terrorist organisation, Islamic State in the

Levant (ISL) and assumed the title Islamic

State in West Africa Province (ISWAP).

For its part, AQIM, originally known

as the Salafist Group for Preaching and

Combat (GSPC), splintered in 1998 from

the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a key

architect in the Algerian Civil War. In

2006, GSPC formally merged with global

Al-Qaeda to become AQIM.

Following persistent counter-terrorism

crackdowns by the Algerian state, the

group scattered and established cells in

some locations abroad including West

Africa’s Sahel region. One of the group’s

initial exploits was an operation carried

out in Northern Mali in April 2003, during

which it abducted 32 Europeans. The

hostages were eventually released after a

ransom of $6 million was paid.

Although counter-insurgency

operations by French troops in the north

of Mali between 2013 and 2014 dealt a

significant blow to the activities of AQIM,

the inability to sustain the gains made by

the French allowed the group to bounce

back. In January 2017, AQIM claimed

responsibility for a suicide bomb at a joint

French-UN military base outside Gao in

Mali, killing 77 people and wounding 115

others. It was responsible for the bombings

of the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako,

Hotel Splendid and Cappuccino Café in

Burkina Faso, as well as the machine gun

attacks at Grand Bassam in neighbouring

Cote d’Ivoire.

So, in effect, these two groups (Boko

Haram and AQIM) are affiliates of the

two most deadly global terror franchises

– Al-Qaeda and ISL. As far as they are

concerned, every place is a legitimate

target – schools, hospitals, hotels, places

of worship, markets and pubs. In addition

to the loss of human lives, terrorist attacks

have also left in their trail destruction

of valuable property, displacement of

populations and humanitarian crises.

In May 2019, hundreds of victims

from neighbouring Burkina Faso crossed

the frontier to seek refuge in the Upper

West Region of Ghana, following terrorist

attacks in that country.

It is significant to note that the recent

attacks in Burkina Faso and the resultant

humanitarian challenges occurred at the

beginning of the rainy season, which was

also the onset of the major farming season.

Coupled with the Covid-19 pandemic and

‘

Each successful terrorist

attack goes to underscore the

vulnerabilities in the security

architecture of West Africa

’

its dire socio-economic ramifications, these

developments are bound to have a toll on

lives and livelihoods across the region.

At least 60 per cent of the population

depend on subsistence farming and other

agricultural activities for a living.

Another dimension of recent

developments in Burkina Faso is that they

brought home the chilling realisation of

how close terrorist activity has drawn

to Ghana. The news that came in the

aftermath of the event, particularly the

groups’ purported intention to extend their

action into Ghanaian territory, exacerbated

the perception of threat.

Also making the rounds at the time

and even to date, is the reported enlistment

of Ghanaian youth by terrorist groups

operating in the Mali-Burkina Faso

enclave. From the perspective of security

experts, all of these are possibilities and

none should be taken lightly.

Harsh economic circumstances

imposed by Covid-19 on countries in

West Africa have rendered the already

unemployed and idle youth more

vulnerable and easy targets for recruitment

by any terrorist organisation.

Widely hailed as a beacon of

democracy and stability in West Africa,

Ghana would definitely make a perfect

target for any terrorist group. It is therefore

imperative for all stakeholders in the

country to scale up preventive measures in

order to avert any such attacks.

Most importantly, such measures

should place emphasis on the indispensable

role of awareness and security

consciousness among the populace in

the fight against terrorism. Proprietors


ANALYSIS

and managers of establishments in the

category of soft targets should be duly

identified for sensitisation on fundamental

preservation techniques so that they can,

by their increased awareness, reduce the

vulnerabilities of their respective outfits.

These unsettling developments in

a region hitherto regarded as relatively

peaceful and safe, coupled with the capacity

demonstrated so far by the groups involved,

point to a new era whose reality dictates

a concerted revolutionary approach that

transcends conventional national security

narratives of any individual state.

“No country is immune to terrorist

attacks,” a truism aptly echoed by Nana

Akufo-Addo, Ghana’s President and current

Chairman of the ECOWAS Authority of

Heads of State and Government, when he

addressed the opening session of the 59th

Summit in Accra in June this year. Indeed,

the critical security challenges arising from

incessant terrorist attacks should reinforce

the collective commitment of member states

to pursue and implement the decisions

taken at the regional body’s extraordinary

summit on terrorism in September 2019.

“This concerted effort must be a major

issue and a priority objective for the

Community,” Akufo-Addo emphasised.

“A raging fire cannot be extinguished

with empty hands” is an old African

adage that holds true for all time. Most

significantly, therefore, it is imperative

that member countries demonstrate

the commitment to promptly pay their

contributions to the $1 billion ECOWAS

Regional Security Fund created in support

of the 2020-2024 Anti-Terrorism Action

Plan.

As would be expected, the increase

in terrorist activities in recent times has

created a heightened sense of insecurity,

resulting in the scaling up of security

The latest major attack occurred at Salhan village in northern Burkina Faso

alerts in countries across West Africa. To

the extent that almost all countries in the

region have currently closed their borders,

with joint military, police and immigration

operations round the clock.

In addition to the scaling up and strict

enforcement of security measures at all

international borders, there is also the need

for prompt action to guarantee the safety of

internal land transport.

To make these measures more effective,

it is crucial to provide a framework

for citizen engagement with the view

to sensitising and generating alertness

among the general population. It would

be particularly useful to make available

dedicated channels of communication to

enable citizens to pass on vital information

to the relevant agencies.

Modern day transnational terrorism

feeds on local and regional conflicts. This

assertion has been confirmed by situations

in Libya, Syria, Iraq, the Horn of Africa,

as well as in West Africa. For instance, the

marginalisation of local Tuaregs in Mali led

to a rebellion against the government by

militants in 2012.

AQIM joined forces with two other

militant organisations operating in the

Sahel region, Ansar Dine and MUJAO, to

hijack the Tuareg rebellion and establish

a foothold in northern Mali. Together, the

Mohammed Nurudeen Issahaq is a Ghanaian journalist and Communications Consultant.

groups established sharia law in the area

under their control and set up training

camps for new recruits.

With this realisation, it is important for

political actors in countries in the region

to reaffirm the necessity of respecting

the democratic process for ascending

to power, in conformity with the 2001

ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and

Good Governance. The expulsion of Mali

and Guinea by ECOWAS from the regional

body, following the recent overthrow of

‘

Developments in Burkina Faso

have brought home the chilling

realisation of how close terrorist

activity has drawn to Ghana

’

constitutional governments in these two

countries, is a step in the right direction and

must be sustained.

But beyond blacklisting military

adventurists, it has to be ensured also that

divisions such as those stemming from

the exclusion of a particular group from a

country’s political process, and any form

of discrimination in the distribution of

resources or life’s chances, ought to be

avoided as they are capable of plunging a

country into instability and armed violence.

A country that falls into a conflict trap

or long-term political unrest provides a

conducive environment and a perfect stage

for terrorist groups to cash in.

More significantly, observers in the

security arena have linked the recent

upsurge in terrorist attacks in the Sahel

region to the return of fighters who left

the area for action in Syria, Iraq and

Afghanistan. These, together with veterans

from the Libyan, Algerian and Tunisian

armed conflicts, have immensely expanded

the frontiers of extremism and terrorism in

the region.

The situation calls for an intensification

of international counter-terror efforts

across West Africa, with Western countries

working closely with regional governments

to increase their capacity and foster

regional co-operation to deal with violent

extremism. Otherwise, African governments

and their Western allies should get ready to

face the consequences of losing the battle

against jihadi extremists in the Sahel.

AB

28


ANALYSIS

Forging humane policies on narcotic drugs

Five years after the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS), a

virtual meeting was held in September that reviewed the progress of the programme.

Lansana Gberie, a co-sponsor of the gathering organised by the Global Commission

on Drug Policy, looks at how the initiative has evolved since 2016

THE UNGASS gave

unprecedented visibility to

the issue of access to essential

controlled medicines. In the Outcome

Document, an entire chapter was dedicated

to controlled medicines, with detailed

recommendations aimed at “addressing

existing barriers, including those related

to legislation and regulatory systems in

accessing controlled opioids for pain

management and palliative care”.

Internationally controlled medicines

such as morphine, diazepam and

midazolam, which are listed as World

Health Organisation (WHO) essential

medicines, are vital for the management

of pain, palliative care, surgical care and

anaesthesia, as well as the treatment of

drug-use disorders, mental health and

neurological conditions.

Yet, progress since has been very

modest, in particular for low- and middleincome

countries. According to the WHO,

each year over five million people suffer

moderate to severe pain because of the lack

of access to control management drugs.

Currently, Africa is experiencing a

shortage of adequate pain management

and palliative care medicine. According

to the 2021 World Drug Report, there

are just four standard doses of controlled

medicines to relieve pain available daily

per million people in Western and Central

Africa, compared to 31,826 doses in North

America.

Patients have been severely affected

in these regions in Africa with the onset of

the Covid-19 pandemic, according to the

Report.

In early September, a joint statement

on Access to Controlled Medicines

in Emergencies by the International

Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the UN

UNGASS 2016: getting it right on the use of

controlled medicines in humanitarian emergencies

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

and the WHO called on governments to

facilitate access to medicines containing

controlled substances in emergency

settings, including during pandemics and

the increasing number of climate-related

disasters.

Despite a strong commitment made

by member states to improve access to

controlled substances for medical and

scientific purposes by appropriately

addressing existing barriers in this regard

– including those related to legislation,

regulatory systems, health-care systems,

and affordability – progress remains

limited on the ground.

Improving equitable access to

controlled medicines in particular for the

management of pain and for palliative care

is in line with the objectives of the three

international drug control conventions.

Ensuring access to essential controlled

medicines must also be at the heart of

national drug control policies that play

a significant role in limiting access to

internationally controlled medicines.

Today, Sierra Leone only imports

500mg-1kg of cheap powdered morphine

for pain treatment, which is obviously

inadequate to meet the demand for

essential medicines needed for pain

management. Yet these medicines are

inexpensive and patent-free, but are still

routinely denied or severely limited in

many countries.

The explanations for the striking gap

in supply and demand are complex and

include misperceptions, fear of addiction

and deviation, drugs costs and inadequate

funding, complex drugs procurement

procedures, and, of course, drug control

policies.

Extraneous laws and excessive

regulation perpetuate this situation and

are among the main barriers in many

countries in Africa. And this comes at a

high cost: unnecessary suffering of the

most vulnerable, including children and the

poorest.

Therefore, African countries must

be prepared to adopt more efficient

and balanced drug policies in line with

the Sustainable Development Goals

and the African Common Position on

Controlled Substances and Access to Pain

Management Drugs.

It is crucial to work for the

achievement of an international drug

control system. Such a system should be

focused not only on the illicit use and

the prevention of abuse of controlled

medicines, but rather on a balanced

approach. Africa cannot afford repressive

drug control policies that have proven to be

ineffective and harmful to people.

It is time to rethink our policies and

work towards addressing the fundamental

challenges and not exacerbate them. The

choice of balanced national drug policies

that are respectful of human rights are key

to the future of Africa.

Let’s remember that access to palliative

care and pain relief is a health, equity, and

human rights imperative that can no longer

be ignored.

AB

Dr Lansana Gberie is Sierra Leone’s Ambassador to Switzerland and Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva. In 2014,

he was the lead author of a landmark report produced by the West Africa Commission on Drugs, launched by Kofi Annan, the late

Secretary General of the UN.


ANALYSIS

Troubled waters

The recent ruling in favour of Somalia in its maritime dispute with Kenya has exacerbated

an already strained relationship, writes Sylvanus Wekesa

ON October 12, the International

Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered

its much-anticipated ruling in

the Maritime Delimitation case between

Kenya and Somalia. From the outset of

the court hearing, the Kenyan government

refused to engage the ICJ, citing several

reasons. Among them were doubts about

procedural fairness on the court’s part due

to questions about the impartiality of Judge

Abdulqawi Yusuf because of his Somali

origins and previous dealings with the

Somali government.

Secondly, Kenya wrote to the ICJ

claiming that it lacked time to prepare for

the case because of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Thirdly, Kenya said the court lacked

jurisdiction to hear the case. Thus, with

Kenya having failed to participate in the

matter, everyone was expecting Somalia

to emerge victorious. This ruling comes

against the backdrop of the relationship

between Kenya and Somalia being at an

all-time low; a feud that has recently seen

both governments recalling their respective

ambassadors.

Despite the ICJ not going for a winnertakes-all

verdict, Kenya has made it clear

that it will not respect the ruling. In a

speech on October 20, during Mashujaa

Day celebrations, President Uhuru Kenyatta

reiterated that under his leadership “Kenya

will not cede an inch less or more” to

Somalia.

Efforts to have the case withdrawn and

solved within the framework of the African

Union mediation efforts did not bear any

fruit as Somalia insisted on the ICJ route.

Therefore, the court’s verdict is final.

According to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute,

the decision of the court is binding between

the parties in respect of that particular case

and also there is no option of appealing

against the verdict.

This does not mean that the two parties

cannot engage in some form of dialogue,

especially with the avenue for an appeal

Uhuru Kenyatta: “Kenya will not cede an inch less or more” to Somalia

closed. There is hope that both states will

not resort to violence in trying to hold

onto the disputed territory. The ruling has

provided a perfect a window of opportunity

for Kenya and Somalia to come up with

a mechanism on how to delimit their

maritime boundary and sign a treaty.

Kenya has done it before with Tanzania,

and this should not be a problem with

Somalia. Nevertheless, to stand a chance of

‘

leafy suburbs

’

succeeding, the treaty should go further in

making sure that the two countries mutually

benefit from the resources within the

disputed territory.

The role of the AU Border Programme,

established in 2007, has been brought into

question as the dispute rages on. It remains

a test for the AU to find a way of resolving

the issue under an African-designed

platform. With the Horn of Africa already

mired in multiple security challenges,

tensions between Kenya and Somalia have

the risk of plunging the region further into

political uncertainty.

The ICJ ruling exacerbates an already

dicey relationship between Kenya and

Somalia that has been tested frequently

due to several factors. Somalia has

The majority of the exiled

Somali elite live in Nairobi’s

repeatedly accused Kenya of supporting

Jubaland State, whose leader, Mohamed

Ahmed Madobe, is at loggerheads with the

government in Mogadishu over elections

that have been postponed multiple times.

Madobe has been blamed for going

against an electoral deal agreed in October

2020, which was to allow an indirect

30


ANALYSIS

election to happen within Jubaland.

Furthermore, Somalia accuses Kenya of

encouraging Madobe to reject any deal

‘

with President Mohamed Farmaajo’s

government, which has yearned to take

control over the state.

Kenya views Jubaland for economic

and security interests. With the threat of

the Al Shabab militant group still strong,

Kenya’s support for Jubaland is seen in

the light of creating a buffer zone that will

shield it from direct attacks.

Kenya argues that Mogadishu has

failed to gain control over the vast

majority of Somalia and this has given

Al Shabab free rein to cause havoc. Even

with the support of Kenyan troops and

the AU peacekeeping mission, the Somali

government remains weak and does not

assert its authority throughout the country.

It is against this backdrop that Kenya

allegedly decided to back the Madobe

regime in Jubaland with the hope that

his leadership can help stall Al Shabab’s

incursions into Kenyan territory.

What is behind the renewed tensions

between Mogadishu and Nairobi?

According to some analysts like Rashid

Abdi, the latest Mogadishu-Nairobi quarrel

is part of a broader political scheme by

Farmaajo to stir up nationalist sentiments

within Somalia to shore up his re-election

The AU Border Programme,

established in 2007, has

failed to deliver

’

bid.

According to Rashid, in one of his

recent tweets, the anti-Kenya sentiments

within Mogadishu are full of hypocrisy.

“The dishonesty of Somalia's political

elite is astonishing. They live in Nairobi

for years, buy property in Kenya, get cosy

with the corrupt elite here, send their kids

to Kenyan schools, buy property for wives

in the leafy suburbs. In Mogadishu, they

fuel anti-Kenyanism,” he writes.

Since the fall of the Siad Barre

regime in 1991, Kenya has played host to

thousands of refugees from Somalia. The

majority of the exiled Somali elite live in

Nairobi where Kenya has hosted countless

peace talks.

It continues to play a role in the

management of the security challenge in

Somalia through the deployment of Kenya

Defence Forces under the AU mandate.

Therefore, to wish Kenya away from the

Somalia conflict is an exercise in futility.

The souring of relations between

Mogadishu and Nairobi has also coincided

with the Gulf States and Turkey showing

The ICJ sitting on the Kenya-Somalia maritime dispute: Nairobi has rejected the outcome

strong interest in Somalia. Some

conspiracy theorists see their hand in the

continuing escalation of conflict between

the Kenya and Somalia.

Instead, the emerging powers from the

Gulf and Turkey should push for cordial

relationships between Kenya and Somalia.

This would benefit the Gulf States and

Turkey more in terms of a return on

investments.

Already the mediation led by Qatar

has seen a meeting between Kenyatta

and Somali Prime Minister Mohammed

Hussein Roble. This should be a signal that

indeed dialogue is not only possible but is

also the only way to reduce tensions.

Given that Kenya held the rotational

presidency of the UN Security Council

in October, it will be counter-productive

for Nairobi to continue to dispute the

ICJ’s decision. Furthermore, Kenya has

been an active participant in the global

Blue Economy initiatives that saw it host

a summit on the management of ocean

resources in 2018, making it a major

player in the sustainable use of the marine

ecosystem.

Therefore, it is in Kenya’s foreign

policy interests to find an amicable solution

to the dispute, which could allow it and

Somalia to benefit from the maritime

resources. In the long run this will promote

regional peace and stability.

The complex nature of security within

the Horn of African dictates that Kenya and

Somalia find a way to peacefully resolve

their differences without necessarily

raising the political tensions. Kenya needs

to reassure Farmaajo that removing him

from power is not one of its foreign policy

interests. This will require reassurances

from Kenyatta himself.

Subsequently, the AU Border

Programme, and the Intergovernmental

Authority on Development (IGAD) need

to move with speed to offer leadership by

calling for dialogue to address the tensions

between Kenya and Somalia that could

flare up in an already inflamed region. This

dispute should also serve as a wake-up

call to many African countries, which have

yet to delimit their maritime boundaries,

to find ways to avoid situations that can

destabilise the continent.

AB


BUSINESS & ECONOMY

The three-speed economic track heading out

of the pandemic

32

October’s IMF and World Bank annual meetings may have been overshadowed by

geopolitical rivalries, but the message for Africa is that the continent is now on a

three-speed economic track heading out of the pandemic and that debt sustainability

risks will rise from next year. Debt restructuring will again play into these same

geopolitical rivalries, while western support on climate change adaptation may further

increase debt burdens for African governments. PANGEA-RISK seeks to make

sense of the Bretton Woods institutions’ mixed messaging on Africa in this

special report, which also ties economic and sovereign debt projections to our

newly updated bespoke country risk ratings

ON 17 October, the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and

the World Bank finished

the annual meeting of the world’s two

foremost international financial institutions

with a strong warning on African debt

sustainability. According to a new World

Bank report released at the meeting, the

debt of low- and middle-income countries

in sub-Saharan Africa increased to a record

$702 billion in 2020, more than doubling

from $305 billion in 2010. Most of this

debt, i.e., $589 billion, consists of longterm

external debt, mostly denominated in

foreign currency.

The World Bank report specifically

issued warnings of debt distress for four

countries: Angola, Mozambique, Zambia,

and Cape Verde, based on a debt to Gross

National Income (GNI) ratio of above 100

percent. Both Zambia and Mozambique’s

sovereign debt have fallen into default,

while PANGEA-RISK has forecast debt

sustainability warnings on Angola and

Cape Verde in previous reports.

At the annual meeting, World Bank

Group president David Malpass said, “we

need a comprehensive approach to the debt

problem, including debt reduction, swifter

restructuring and improved transparency.”

He also warned that the debt situation for

poor countries could worsen due to volatile

commodity prices and higher interest

rates, urging countries to begin a gradual

scal consolidation to maintain investor

confidence.

However, the IMF and World Bank did

not agree to extend the pandemic-era Debt

Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). This


means that countries offered a suspension of

their bilateral and concessional debt interest

payments during 2020 and 2021 will have

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

to resume interest payments from 2022,

while also settling the arrears on two years

of suspended interest payments. Countries

that are unable to meet such terms will

have to apply to the Common Framework

for debt treatment beyond the DSSI to

manage a restructuring of their debt. So far,

three African countries have applied to the

Common Framework: Zambia, Chad, and

Ethiopia, with creditor committees already

formed for the latter two countries.

PANGEA-RISK delves deeper into

the main takeaway messages from

the annual meeting of the world’s

most prominent international financial

institutions and the impact on the country

risk outlook for Africa.

According to Africa’s Pulse, which is

the World Bank’s twice-yearly economic

update for the region, sub-Saharan Africa

is set to emerge from the 2020 recession

sparked by the Covid-19 pandemic with

growth expected to expand by 3.3 percent

in 2021. According to Africa’s Pulse, this

rebound is fuelled by elevated commodity

prices, a relaxation of stringent pandemic

measures, and recovery in global trade.

However, the Bank warned that the

region remains vulnerable given the

low rates of Covid-19 vaccination on

the continent, protracted economic

damage, and a slow pace of recovery.

Moreover, fiscal constraints that pre-dated

the pandemic have left African countries

unable to provide adequate stimulus

measures to engineer a sustained recovery.

Africa’s Pulse estimates the funding gap

at $290 billion in 2020. Sub-Saharan

Africa needs significant additional funding

to counter damage wrought by the

coronavirus pandemic, bolster its economic

recovery prospects, and mitigate threats

posed by climate change, according to the

World Bank.

Meanwhile, the IMF has revised its

2021 global economic growth forecast

down slightly, highlighting the uneven

pace of the vaccination roll-out between

advanced and low-income economies.

The Fund projects that sub-Saharan Africa

will achieve 3.7 percent GDP growth in

2021 and 3.8 percent growth next year, up

from a 1.7 percent economic contraction

in 2020. This projection for sub-Saharan

Africa is well below the Fund’s global

economic forecast of 5.9 percent growth,

and a reversal of the trend of the past few

years where African economies outpaced

the rest of the world.

The main driver of economic

recovery is the COVID-19 vaccination

rate, with the outlook for the lowincome

developing country group

darkening considerably due to worsening

pandemic dynamics, according to the IMF.

“While almost 60 percent of the population

in advanced economies are fully vaccinated

and some are now receiving booster shots,

about 96 percent of the population in lowincome

countries remain unvaccinated,”

the Fund has said.

The Africa Centres for Disease

Control and Prevention data show that

Africa is the world’s least-inoculated

region with only 4.3 percent of its 1.2

billion people fully immunised against the

disease. Meanwhile, commodity prices,

and the mismatch in supply and demand

stemming from global bottlenecks, have

in turn set off inflationary alarm bells. The

IMF therefore sees interest rates rising

faster than previously expected, which will

have important consequences for Africa’s

economies.

These factors have created a threespeed

economic trajectory for Africa,

categorised by economies boosted by

higher commodity prices, such as Burkina

Faso, South Sudan, and Guinea, whose

GDPs are all set to grow by 5 percent or

more. This category also includes countries

who led the pre-pandemic economic

growth rate charts thanks to relatively

superior fiscal and monetary governance,

such as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Benin,

Niger, and Rwanda.

Moreover, the fast-track also includes

countries whose economies dipped by

the most in 2020, notably Botswana,

Seychelles, and South Africa. The

region’s most industrialised economy,

South Africa, saw its growth forecast

by the IMF for this year lifted by a full

percentage point from 4 percent to 5

percent previously, indicating a recovery

from a deep contraction of 5.7 percent

last year. However, the South African

economy is the only one among the G20


BUSINESS & ECONOMY

34

group of countries that will not achieve prepandemic

levels of growth before 2022.

Meanwhile, the majority of African

countries will fail to match the global

economic recovery rate of above 5 percent

growth this year as they suffer from low

vaccination rates. This category includes

major regional economies such as Nigeria,

Ghana, Egypt, Algeria, and Sudan. In North

Africa, Morocco leads the pack with a

projected GDP growth rate of 5.7 percent,

but all other countries in the region lag

despite deep economic contractions in

2020. Most countries in Africa are on this

medium-speed laggard-track, indicating

that most of the continent will not reach

pre-pandemic economic output levels for

several more years. This trend is a major

setback for Africa’s growth narrative and

puts the continent behind other emerging

market regions.

The slowest-speed track includes

countries with structural economic

weaknesses such as Angola and Republic

of Congo, as well as war zones and failing

states such as Central African Republic,

whose economies will continue to shrink

this year. Matching PANGEA- RISK

forecasts at the start of 2021, Angola will

suffer from a sixth consecutive year of

economic contraction, while Congo marks

a seventh year of negative GDP growth.

Other African countries that will barely

register economic growth in 2021 include

Common Framework applicants Chad

and Zambia, debt distressed Namibia, and

states with deep inherent imbalances such

as Sudan and Eswatini (formerly known as

Swaziland).

Last year, the World Bank and the

IMF urged G20 countries to establish the

DSSI, which has delivered more than $5

billion in relief to more than 40 eligible

countries since May 2020. Beyond offering

temporary debt interest relief, the DSSI

commits participating countries to disclose

all public sector financial commitments

and to limit non-concessional borrowing.

The initiative has had a major impact in

some African countries, such as Angola

where total DSSI savings have accounted

for 4.7 percent of GDP, or 5 percent in

Mozambique and 5.7 percent in Djibouti.

Even initially reluctant markets such as

Kenya have eventually joined the initiative.

Although the G20 has also called on private

creditors to participate in the initiative

on comparable terms, there has been

little take-up by commercial lenders. The

initiative has also failed to achieve its goal

of reducing debt-service costs thus far,

with potential savings estimated at only 1

percent of GDP from January.

The DSSI will officially end at the end

of this year and from 2022 debt-service

payments owed to official bilateral creditors

will resume. For many African countries,

the end of the DSSI will renew debt

servicing risks, especially for countries

suffering from slow economic growth

and low revenues. In many instances,

external debt has outpaced gross national


income (GNI) and export growth. To offer

continued relief to such countries, the G20

and Paris Club of of official creditors late

last year launched a Common Framework

for Debt Treatments to restructure

unsustainable debt situations and protracted

financing gaps in DSSI-eligible countries.

Ethiopia, Chad, and Zambia have already

applied to the Common Framework, and the

World Bank has urged low- and middleincome

countries to consider restructuring

their debts when the DSSI expires. Other

African countries that are not DSSI-eligible,

such as Sudan, have also begun debt

restructuring talks with significant support

from international financial institutions and

partner countries like France.

According to the World Bank, the debt

of low- and middle-income countries in

sub-Saharan Africa increased to a record

$702 billion in 2020, more than double the

amount of ten years ago. The debt burden

in the region rose 5.5 percent from 2019-

2020 alone. In 2020, the debt to GNI ratio

was above 100 percent in four sub-Saharan

countries, including Mozambique, Zambia,

Cabo Verde, and Angola. Meanwhile, the

average debt-to-export ratio increased

three times over a decade to 205.1 percent

in 2020. Such data is hampered by a lack

of transparency of debt in some countries,

such as Zambia, Republic of Congo, and

Angola, particularly in relation to loans

issued by Chinese state banks and related

companies. World Bank president David

Malpass has often been critical of opaque

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Chinese lending terms in Africa and other

emerging markets.

In addition to funding to counter

damage wrought by the coronavirus

pandemic and to bolster its economic

recovery prospects, Africa will need

new funding to mitigate threats posed by

climate change. The sub-Saharan region

will also need as much as $50 billion

each year over the next decade to adapt

to climate change, according to the World

Bank. While the continent is a relatively

low producer of carbon emissions, it is

the most vulnerable to environmental

shifts due to its high reliance on rain-fed

agriculture. Rising temperatures, sea

levels and rainfall anomalies heighten the

frequency and intensity of natural disasters.

The World Bank says that financing

climate change adaptation is more costeffective

than frequent disaster relief

and the region should “seize the climate

opportunity to adapt and transform its

economy”, while adopting policies that

foster sustainable and inclusive growth.

Linking climate-related finance to

governance reforms could help mobilise

resources. The IMF has suggested that

redirecting special drawing rights (SDRs)

by wealthy countries to poorer ones should

boost climate change adaptation. Yet,

sub-Saharan Africa received only about

3.6 percent of the $650 billion in SDRs

distributed by the IMF in August this year.

Some countries like France have already

committed to reallocating part of its SDRs

to Africa, but few other wealthy nations

seem keen to reallocate their SDRs.

African countries are also pushing for

a fairer share of the $100 billion a year that

rich countries promised by 2020 to allocate

to developing economies for adjustment

to the effects of climate change. Until now

Africa has had just 3 percent of that fund,

with the bulk going to India and China.

Many wealthy countries are falling

behind on their payments to the fund

and the issue will be a key theme at

the upcoming COP26 summit. Climate

change financing is more likely to come

from further foreign direct investment,

as well as additional borrowing through

development finance. The European

Union has promised to make Africa part

of its ‘Global Gateway’, a new planned

initiative programme, which the European

Commission has heralded as its answer

to China’s ‘Belt and Road’ agenda. It is

hoped that the European Investment Bank

and other development finance institutions

will generate the bulk of the lending in

partnership with the private sector.

The world’s most polluting power

company, South Africa’s Eskom is at the

forefront of a new loan financed strategy to

boost climate change adaptation in Africa.

The World Bank, the African Development

Bank, and wealthy countries such as

France, Germany, the UK, and EU are

discussing a $5 billion financing package

to fund Eskom’s green power transition

from a dependence on coal.

Eskom relies on coal for around 90

percent of its electricity generation. The

company has said its green transition will

create 300,000 new jobs but cost $10

billion. Eskom already has debts of $24

billion, which are the greatest threat to

South Africa’s sovereign debt position.

The company’s investment status is also

tarnished by corruption allegations with

reports suggesting it awarded over $11.5

billion in corruption-tainted contracts over

the past decade. Discussions on financing

Eskom’s green transition may therefore be

hampered by a legacy of corruption and

debt vulnerabilities with contagion

risks to the sovereign.

AB


BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Traditional banks can still gain an edge in

fintech transformation

The latest report in CR2’s Market Insight series discusses how Africa represents a

massive market that is providing opportunity for investors to bring large segments of the

continent’s unbanked online, Jon Offei-Ansah reports

36

AFRICA is in the midst of a

fintech transformation. Millions

of Africans are now connected

to financial services as a result of hundreds

of start-ups. However, with the right mix

of innovation and partnerships, Africa’s

established commercial banks can gain

an edge in the continent’s digital finance

revolution.

This latest report in CR2’s Market

Insight series discusses how Africa

represents a massive market that is

providing opportunity for investors to bring

large segments of the continent’s unbanked

online. The surge of start-ups has been a

major factor throughout this transformation,

but they are not the only players on the

continent. Established banks are also

building on legacy infrastructure and client

networks to offer novel digital finance

services.

Funding that revolution is a mass

mobilisation of venture investment toward

Africa with the bulk of it—roughly 50

percent annually—going to fintech focused

companies. Venture capital (VC) spending

on the continent rose from $400 million in

2015, reached $1 billion in 2018 and is on

track to surpass $2 billion in 2021.

“While those figures represent a day

and a week in Silicon Valley, it makes

Africa one of the fastest growing tech

markets in the world by year-over-year VC

growth,” says the report. “The opportunity

investors and founders are chasing is

bringing large segments of the continent’s

unbanked online. By several estimates—

including The Global Findex Database—

Africa is home to the largest percentage of

the world’s unbanked population, with a

sizable number of underbanked SMEs and

consumers,” it adds.

In that respect, the continent represents

Africa’s traditional banks have not been rendered powerless in the face of disruption by start-ups

a reciprocal opportunity for savvy financial

actors. Those who find product market

fit can grow revenue streams from online

payment products while driving financial

inclusion for 1.2 billion people across 54

countries.

The rise of the M-Pesa mobile-money

service in Kenya provided a compelling

use case for start-ups on the viability

of phone-based apps to scale financial

services in Africa. Launched by Kenyan

telco Safaricom in 2007, the P2P payment

product went on to acquire over 20 million

users, process billions of transactions

annually and helped earn Kenya one of the

highest mobile-money penetration rates in

the world.

According to the report, while M-Pesa

wasn’t a VC backed endeavour, investors

and future founders took note. Over the

last decade, hundreds of fintech start-ups

have emerged in Africa’s key markets—

namely those with large economies and

populations—to launch app-based payments


platforms. A number of those companies

have built notable customer bases and

more recently, several African payments

companies have garnered global headlines.

Since going live in 2018, Pan-African

digital payments venture Chipper Cash has

scaled its business to three million users,

80,000 daily transactions and $100 million

in monthly payment value. In 2020, US

payment giant Stripe affirmed the potential

of Africa’s digital finance market—and

the value of start-ups to access it—when

it acquired Nigerian fintech Paystack for a

reported $200 million. Additional global

financial players, such as Visa and PayPal,

have also pursued partnerships with young

VC backed outfits to expand in Africa.

Start-ups are not the only players on

the continent, however, when it comes

to expanding online payments adoption.

Established banks in Africa are also

building on legacy infrastructure and client

networks to offer novel digital finance

services.

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Many longstanding financial

institutions in Africa are pursuing

innovation—such as online wallets and

digital payments services—to bank the

unbanked and meet the preferences of an

on-demand generation. It’s important that

the continent’s established banks be a part

of the innovation transformation occurring

in Africa, given their longstanding client

networks and more defined regulatory

environment. “Africa’s banks shouldn’t

make this journey alone, however.

partnering with fintech start-ups and

technology partners can accelerate their

route to success. We’re seeing a growing

tally of case studies that demonstrate this,”

the report says.

In 2018, Ethiopia’s Dashen Bank

and Addis Ababa based Fintech Moneta

Technologies launched the Amole digital

wallet, underpinned by CR2’s digital

banking platform. Since its launch, Amole

has opened up the ability for millions

of Ethiopians to conveniently transact a

diverse range of payments and services

entirely online.

Amole also expanded payment and

money transfer options to include Personto-Person

(P2P), QR codes and card

payments in Ethiopia—home to Africa’s

seventh largest economy and second

largest population. Today, with more than

3 million customers registered on the

platform, Amole is playing a significant

role in moving Ethiopia towards a cashless

society.

The Covid-19 crisis created an

additional push toward digital finance

in Africa, when governments in large

economies—such as Nigeria, Kenya and

South Africa—implemented measures

to shift a greater volume of payment

transactions away from cash toward

contactless mobile options.

The report believes that while

conditions across Africa are ripe for digital

finance adoption, there are signs some

traditional banks are missing the moment.

It cites a recent report by research group

Briter Bridges and the Catalyst Fund,

which illustrated that African payments

start-ups and neo-banks are leading on new

product launches and customer acquisition,

on the back of raising capital at rapid rates.

Additional reporting by TechCabal,

highlighted how product and service

glitches in digital banking apps rolled out

by two established Nigerian banks had led

to a customer exodus. This was juxtaposed

to VC backed fintech startup Kudabank,

which had grown its customer base from

300,000 to 1.4 million in Nigeria—home to

Africa’s largest economy and population of

200 million.

To meet the moment and hedge

disruption, traditional African banks need

to pursue just the right product innovation

to grow (and not lose) digital finance

market share to fintech ventures.

Traditional banks in Africa still hold

a significant asset they can leverage in the

continent’s fintech race: client trust. A case

study is Nigeria, which in addition to being

Africa’s largest economy, now receives the

greatest share of VC to start-ups.

A 2020 study and survey by McKinsey

Consulting on fintech in the West

African country found that 67 percent

of banked customers in Nigeria “still…

trust their bank more than fintech.” The

research indicated that despite missteps

by traditional banks in the country, there

was still some hesitation by consumers

to shift to fintech products. Some of this

likely stems from consumer knowledge of

longstanding Nigerian financial regulations

and deposit guarantees for traditional

banks, compared to relatively new

regulatory structures for mobile money.

The study concluded that customer

adoption of fintech products in Nigeria

is being driven primarily by access and

convenience, but trust is critical and this

gives the edge to trusted partners, i.e.

banks.

This all adds up to validate the role

Africa’s traditional banks can play in the

continent’s digital finance transformation.

It’s clear, a flurry of startup driven fintech

activity is occurring in Africa right

now across a continent ripe for digital

transformation. But this pivotal moment

also presents opportunities for Africa’s

banks. Longstanding financial institutions

must respond with innovation services built

through collaboration with enabling digital

banking platform partners. Those banks

that pair their customer trust advantage

to novel innovation on the product and

platform side stand to excel in Africa’s 21st

century fintech landscape.

AB

2 The rise of the M-Pesa mobile-money service in Kenya provided a compelling use case for start-ups


BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Ecowas begins reforms for improved

trade, regional levy mobilisation

The West African bloc has begun a process to comprehensively overhaul subregional

trade-related rules and regulations to engender improved intra-community

trade and regional levy for the subregional body, Koku Devitor reports from Accra

THE finance ministers from 13

of the 15 member states of the

Economic Community of West

African States (Ecowas) and Mauritania

gathered in the Ghanaian capital Accra

early November to review and validate

proposals from experts and the West

African Customs Union for onwards

submission to the Committee of (Foreign)

Ministers.

At the core of the reforms is the

use of Information and Communication

Technology (ICT) to reform the various

community instruments that impact the

cross-border movement of goods, and

also promote trade in made-in-West

Africa products for the benefit of all, said

Jean-Claude Kassi Brou, the Ecowas

Commission President.

Kassi Brou said the Council

of Ministers would finally make

recommendations to the Authority of Heads

of State and Government for approval of

the reforms at the next ordinary summit in

December.

He intimated that moving goods among

ECOWAS member countries, “from Lagos

to Abidjan, Dakar to Bamako or Lomé to

Niamey remains a nightmare despite the

protocol for the free movement of persons

and commodities in our region.”

“The need to reform the transit

procedure on our corridors has become

even more imperative, to ensure that it does

not become a source of revenue leakage or

risk to our collective security,” he stressed.

Kassi Brou said an efficient trade

facilitation measure leveraging on ICT must

support the efficient cross-border movement

of goods and improve the mobilisation

of levies collected by member states on

behalf of Ecowas to enhance the process of

integration.

“Over the period, the Ecowas

Community Levy has become the major

source of financing for our integration

efforts. The Levy is the lifeblood of our

community, and it has proved to be a much

more reliable mechanism than the payment

of contributions by member states,” added

the president.

For that reason, he said the draft

Community Levy Act was among the

documents presented to the ministers

for discussion and validation for an

improved financing mechanism with lucid

legal provisions to meet the resource

mobilization needs of Ecowas.

He added that the debilitating effects of

the Covid-19 pandemic on developing and

least developed countries also exposed the

structural weaknesses and fragility of the

economies of ECOWAS member states.

The economic recovery efforts of

member countries, he said, should,

Jean-Claude Kassi Brou: ‘Moving goods within the region remains a nightmare’

therefore, necessarily include the

strengthening of production capacities,

efficiency in revenue mobilisation, and the

stimulation of commercial activities in the

subregion.

In all, seven draft proposals were

presented to the ministers for their perusal

as the basis for the complete revision of the

legal framework for the transit procedure

in the subregion to ensure the fluidity in the

cross-border movement of goods.

These include the draft supplementary

Act laying down the conditions and

modalities of application, monitoring

and management of the community

levy; draft supplementary Act on

Ecowas Community transit, and the draft

regulation on additional modalities for the

implementation of community customs

regulations.

The finance ministers also reviewed

the draft regulation relating to the

determination of community regime for

38


BUSINESS & ECONOMY

At the heart of the community's economic integration efforts is the Ecowas Trade Liberalisation Scheme

customs duty reliefs in the Ecowas region

and the draft regulation defining the list

of categories of goods contained in the

Ecowas tariff and statistical nomenclature

and the adoption of the 2022 amendments

of the harmonised system nomenclature.

The other proposals include the draft

regulation on the procedures for the

recognition and certification of the origin of

products from Ecowas member states and

the draft regulation on the determination of

the components of ex-factory price and the

value of non-originating materials

At the heart of the community’s

economic integration efforts is the Ecowas

Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), an

instrument introduced in 1990 to facilitate

intra-community trade in “made-in-

Ecowas” goods, stimulate industrialisation

and investment, and enhance the economic

competitiveness of the Ecowas region.

The ETLS had the objectives to

progressively establish a Customs

Union among the Member States of the

Community over a period of fifteen years,

and to foster a smooth integration of

the region into the world economy with

due regard for the political choices and

development priorities of states in the desire

to engender sustainable development and

the reduction of poverty.

Under the Customs Union, Ecowas

introduced the Common External Tariff,

one of the principal instruments for

harmonizing trade among member states

and strengthening its Common Market as

a driver towards achieving an economic

union.

The ETLS also gave priority attention

and preferential treatment to three groups

of products, which are unprocessed

goods, traditional handicraft products, and

industrial products with a vision to boost

the region’s industrial development.

“Consequently, appropriate

implementing regulations, with clearer

and relatively simpler procedures, have

been developed to ensure that a lot

more enterprises can take advantage of

the ECOWAS preferential tariff regime

for unprocessed goods to enhance their

production base and provide employment

for our people,” the Ecowas Commission

President said.

This is also intended to break, or at least

minimise the cycle of exportation of its

abundant natural resources in their raw state

and incurring high expenditure in foreign

exchange on the importation of finished

products in an unfair global trade regime,

skewed to favour developed countries.

The subregional bloc also introduced

the Ecowas levy in 1996 to replace the

mechanism of annual financial contributions

from member states, which was the main

source of financing the institutions of the

Community.

After several years, the bloc

acknowledges many shortcomings in the

implementation of the levy mainly due

to the divergent interpretations of some

of its provisions, which has affected the

smooth and effective operation of this new

financing mechanism.

For this reason the bloc seeks to

redefine some of the tariff regimes

and create a better transit regulation to

accommodate the growing realities.

Meanwhile there have been new

developments in matters of trade on the

larger continent and also in the subregion,

including the interim Economic Partnership

Agreements (EPAs) signed by some

member states with the European Union

and the commencement of trading under

the African Continental Free Trade Area

(AfCFTA) since last January.

“Ecowas, therefore, recognises the

need for a constant review of the legal

framework of the ETLS to remain in

tune with the changing dynamics of trade

globally and locally, and update of the

entire trade mechanism to accommodate

changes in the institutional environment of

ECOWAS and in the international economic

environment,” Kassi Brou added.

At the end of the finance ministers

meeting, Abena Osei Asare, Ghana’s

Deputy Minister for Finance in charge of

revenue mobilisation, said Ecowas would

create a better environment for trade and

manufacturing to engender economic

development and job creation for the

populations.

AB


40

ENERGY

Productive use of energy is powering socio-economic

transformation while offering investment opportunities

New analysis reveals $1.2 trillion investment opportunity over the next 10 years can

be realised by building productive market demand for off-grid renewable energy in

sub-Saharan Africa

AFRICA needs energy for

development and the socioeconomic

transformation of

hundreds of millions of people. Increasing

the productive use of energy (PUE) is

an important way to unlock jobs, create

incomes and deliver social impacts in local

communities. Two reports released early

November by the Powering Renewable

Energy Opportunities (PREO) Programme

outline the business case for investment

into productive equipment and appliances

and the scale of the investment opportunity

that exists.

PREO is funded by the IKEA

Foundation and UK aid via the

Transforming Energy Access platform and

delivered by the Carbon Trust and Energy

4 Impact. The programme enables African

businesses to harness clean energy to

improve incomes, build climate resilience

and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. To

date it has funded 23 private sector and

non-profit enterprises that demonstrate

the business and impact case of PUE in

multiple sectors. PUE refers to the type

of energy demand that generates revenue,

increases productivity, enhances diversity,

and creates economic value.

The PUE market opportunity in sub-

Saharan Africa is significant. The Capital

Required to Maximise the Productive Use

of Energy in Sub-Saharan Africa report

details new analysis that estimates $1.2

trillion over the next 10 years (or $120

billion per year) is required to ensure the

necessary level of productive and revenue

generating demand is created to improve

the economics of off-grid renewable

energy. This is significantly larger than the

estimated $40 billion required annually to

achieve global universal energy access on

the same timeline, the report says.

The business case for investment is

backed by results as PREO releases the first

impacts from the projects being supported

via the programme. The Power of the

Productive Use of Energy – an Impact

Investment Frontier details outcomes

from six pilot projects (in e-mobility and

transport, cooling for food and healthcare).

PREO funding has enabled the

businesses it supports in sub-Saharan

Africa to demonstrate business model

viability while gathering critical business

information and securing commercial scaleup

capital. Each of the projects uses PUE

appliances or equipment to create business

opportunities and grow local economies,

while providing essential services in

agriculture, e-mobility transport, and

healthcare.

In e-mobility, PREO has demonstrated

viable payback for investment over a

little more than two years through a daily

leasing model of e-motorbikes. Moreover,

the projects have created jobs, created

opportunities for women, boosted local

production capacity, and created supply

chain opportunities. Emissions associated

with the use of fossil fuels in conventional

internal combustion engine motorbikes

have also been avoided while running

and service costs have come down by 68

percent and 33 percent respectively.

Cooling for food companies supported

through PREO have shown that off-grid

cold storage directly aggregates smallholder

farmers and achieves breakeven at a 72

percent utilisation rate. The cooling units

reduce agricultural waste by a third, and

client farmers typically pocket 20 percent

more for their produce when using the


service. Over six months, client farmers

sold 2,550kg more produce, resulting in

$11,460 additional income.

In primary healthcare, companies

supported by PREO show that by adopting

solar, facility downtime can be minimised

by as much as 40 percent, and revenues

improved by up to 20 percent through

serving more patients and introducing

electricity-powered medical devices and

other healthcare services. Investment

will attract capital for more off-grid

implementation and is a model that may be

applied elsewhere.

“Stimulating greater demand

for renewable energy and boosting

investment in productive use equipment

and applications is a critical way to

support business opportunities, grow local

economies and create jobs in sub-Saharan

Africa,” Jon Lane, Associate Director at the

Carbon Trust says. “However, traditional

forms of investment in energy access often

fall short of bridging the gap between the

high cost of supplying renewable energy

to off-grid communities and building

consistent and reliable demand from

businesses or households. We hope the

release of these reports not only highlights

the scale of the investment opportunity

available, but also confirms the economics

and social benefits that can be delivered.”

ENVIRONMENT

Africa’s Great Green Wall gives viable return

on investments, FAO-led study finds

Cost-benefit analysis published in Nature Sustainability shows average return of $1.2 for

every $1.00 invested in the land restoration project, despite harsh climatic conditions

AFRICA’S Great Green Wall

(GGW) programme to combat

desertification in the Sahel

region is not only crucial to the battle

against climate change but also makes

commercial sense for investors, a new

study led by the UN Food and Agriculture

Organisation (FAO) and published in

Nature Sustainability shows.

For every US dollar put into the

massive effort to halt land degradation

across the African continent from Senegal

in the west to Djibouti in the east, investors

can expect an average return of $1.2, with

outcomes ranging between $1.1 and $4.4,

the analysis finds.

“We need to change the rhetoric about

the Sahel region,” to reflect the fact that

despite its harsh and dry environment,

“investors can get a viable return on

their investment in efforts to restore the

land,”says Moctar Sacande, International

Projects Coordinator at FAO’s Forestry

Division and one of the study’s lead

authors.

The analysis uses field and satellite

data to track the land degradation over the

period 2001-2018 and then compares the

costs and benefits of restoring the land

based on different scenarios adapted to the

local contexts.

The results provide the final piece of

economic transparency in a jigsaw, with

the political will and technical know-how

already in place and should encourage the

private sector, which is showing increased

interest, Sacande says..

The greening and land restoration along

this belt stretching 8,000 km across the

continent is alrey underway. Communities

are planting resilient and hardy tree species

such as the Acacia senegal, providing gum

arabic, widely used as an emulsifier in food

and drinks and the Gao tree or Faidherbia

albida, which helps to fertilise soil for the

cultivation of such staples as millet, and for

animal fodder.

Africa's Great Green Wall gives viable return on investments, FAO-led study finds

With technical support from FAO, more

than 500 communities have seen improved

food security and income generation

opportunities. The total area the GGW

programme encompasses remains limited,

with only 4 million hectares out of a

targeted 100 million, according to the study.

A total of about £20 billion has

been pledged internationally to support

the scaling up of the Great Green Wall

programme, including $14.3 billion at a

One Planet summit for biodiversity held

in Paris in January this year and $1 billion

from Amazon founder Jeff Bezos at the

just-concluded COP26 climate conference.

Concrete details of how these funds can

be accessed are yet to be clearly mapped

out, says Sacande, adding that unless some

of the funding is delivered urgently, it could

be too late for planting to catch the limited

rainfall expected in June and July.

With its potential for carbon

sequestration and restoring biodiversity

and its emphasis on the socio-economic

benefits to the impoverished communities

inhabiting the region, the GGW straddles

the key areas of climate mitigation,

adaptation and resilience. It also addresses

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

1 (No poverty), 2 (No hunger), 13

(Climate action), 15 (Life on land) and 17

(Partnerships)) in the UN’s Agenda 2030.

The armed conflicts pervading the

region have long made some wary about

its potential. And the study finds that about

50 per cent of the land area involved is

currently inaccessible for security reasons.

But even taking this into account, land

restoration interventions still represent a

viable business proposition, the authors say.

Support for the implementation of

GGW forms a key part of FAO’s Action

Against Desertification work, which

is active in 10 GGW Sahel countries

and involves establishing baselines and

monitoring the GGW in North Africa, the

Sahel and Southern Africa. The programme

seeks to help restore degraded land at scale

and sustainably manage fragile ecosystems.

It puts rural communities at the heart

of restoration and upscaling to meet

the massive environmental and socioeconomic

needs. The use of the local

biodiversity in restoration generates

diverse non-timber forest products, vital

in supporting income generation, economic

growth and sustainable management of

natural resources. The programme works

to strengthen local capacities and put in

place monitoring and evaluation systems

tracking progress and impact, while sharing

information and promoting south-south

cooperation to leverage lessons

learned.

AB


REVIEW

A compelling read from a polymath

Value(s)

Building a Better World for All

By Mark Carney

£30 William Collins

ISBN: 978-0-00-842109-0

THIS is a surprising book, at least

to this reader. For not only does

it have a very wide remit, but

it is also evidence that this former central

bank governor is something of a polymath,

with interest in and thought-provoking

views on a multitude of disciplines from

ancient history to derivative markets.

When Carney’s tenure as governor

of the Bank of England ended in 2120 he

might have chosen to take on and be very

handsomely compensated with almost any

senior position in the world of finance.

But he chose instead a role as a UN

Special Envoy for Climate Action and

Finance, and becoming a finance advisor

for COP 26 to the British Prime Minister.

What emerged from the COP 26

Glasgow summit was a realisation that

mobilising finance is critical if the world

is to to deliver the urgent action needed to

limit global temperature rises to 1.5C.

Trillions of dollars of additional

investment a year are needed to secure a

low-carbon future and support countries

already living with the devastating impacts

of climate change.

After all, how can the world expect

those developing countries, in Africa

and elsewhere, to forego burning coal

(the dirtiest of fossil fuels) if they are not

compensated sufficiently to finance the

development of renewable energy systems?

While this book covers a number of

different themes, Carney devotes a chapter

to the climate crises. He writes: “Over

the next three decades, the total required

investments in the energy sector alone

will be $3.5 trillion per year. Another $50

to $135 billion per year will be needed

to develop and scale carbon capture and

biofuel technology.

“And more than six billion people

will live in urban areas. Some 400 million

VALUE(S) cover

homes are expected to be built in the next

decade alone, all of which will require

green technology and infrastructure to align

with a net-zero, resilient transition.”

This is a staggering summary of the

challenges ahead. But Carney believes

it possible to meet those challenges:

“Developing countries face twin challenges

of climate change and development. They

suffer some of the greatest harms from the

physical impacts of climate change and, as

we have seen, have enormous gaps in their

abilities to build resilience and to adapt

their economies to a more volatile climate.

“Moreover, green technologies are

capital intensive, and the cost of capital

in developing countries is higher due to

a combination of political and regulatory

uncertainties, less liquid and less developed

financial markets and the economic impacts

of climate risk itself.”

Despite Greta Thunberg, the feisty

Swedish climate activist, declaring that

COP 26 was nothing more than “a Global

North greenwash festival. A two week

celebration of business as usual and blah

blah blah”, Carney could claim that the

Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero

had brought together financial organisations

with assets worth more than $130 trillion

of capital to be deployed for the net zero

transition around the world.

That alone is a remarkable achievement

and it makes this book an even more

compelling read.

Stephen Williams

AB

42


African arts gifted to New York’s MoMA

REVIEW

IT is an indication of the increasing

value, both aesthetic and monetary,

that is being attached to the

contemporary art originating in Africa. It

is a value that has long been recognised by

the Italian-born collector Jean Pigozzi who

has built a collection of more than 10,000

paintings, photographs and sculptures from

sub-Saharan Africa over the past three

decades.

Pigozzi (“my friends call me Johnnie”)

describes his collecting as an obsession.

“Some people are obsessed with alcohol,

some with food, some with sex,” he

says. “I’m obsessed with contemporary

African art.” It is an obsession that began,

almost by chance, when he visited the

George Pompidou Centre and viewed the

Magiciens de la Terre exhibition in 1989

and was immediately struck by the African

works on display.

He tried to buy the entire exhibition

but was rebuffed. But he did meet the

exhibition’s curator, André Magnin with

whom he subsequently collaborated to

build his collection. While Magnin clocked

up the air miles in Africa to find new

works, Pigozzi took care of the business

side.

Pigozzi, who describes himself as a

businessman (although others attach the

Jean Depara (Congolese, born Angola 1928-1997). Les musiciens (The Musicians). 1975. Gelatin silver print,

printed later, 19 11/16 × 23 5/8″ (50 × 60 cm). The Museum of Modern Art, New York. CAAC-The Pigozzi

Collection. Gift of Jean Pigozzi, 2019. Photo courtesy The Museum of Modern Art.

moniker of a ‘High-Society Photographer’

– and an early pioneer of the ‘celebrity

selfie’) had the good fortune to inherit the

Simca automobile fortune, sold for many

millions to General Motors. Using that

fortune, and the money he has earned from

some astute investments in technology, he

has built the world’s greatest collection of

contemporary African art.

He has long had the ambition to build

a museum to hold this collection, but as

yet it’s an unrealised dream. Perhaps his

decision this summer to donate 45 works

to the gift of African art in the museum’s

history.

The stunning gift includes works by

Romuald Hazoumè (Republic of Bénin)

and Bodys Isek Kingelez (Democratic

Republic of Congo), painters Moké and

Cheri Samba (both from the DRC), and

photographers such Seydou Keïta (Mali)

and Jean Depara (DRC).

Given the size of New York’s African

diaspora and the number of visitors that

MoMA attracts from around the world,

this is a gift that is guaranteed to keep on

giving.

Stephen Williams

AB

Bodys Isek Kingelez (Congolese, 1948-2015). U.N.

1995. Paper, paperboard, and other various materials,

35 13/16 × 29 1/8 × 20 7/8″ (91 × 74 × 53 cm), irreg.

The Museum of Modern Art, New York. CAAC-The

Pigozzi Collection. Gift of Jean Pigozzi, 2019. ©

2019 Estate Bodys Isek Kingelez / Photo: Maurice

Aeschimann. Courtesy CAAC – The Pigozzi Collection

Chéri Samba (Congolese, born 1956). Water Problem. 2004. Acrylic on canvas,53 1/8 × 78 3/4″ (135 × 200 cm).

The Museum of Modern Art, New York. CAAC-The Pigozzi Collection. Promised gift of Jean Pigozzi, 2019.

Photo courtesy CAAC – The Pigozzi Collection


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