NOVEMBER- DECEMBER 2021

ANALYSIS
The making of African dictatorships
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Whatever the speculations as to the consequence of Yahya Jammeh’s return to The
Gambia might be, it is, without doubt, a reinforcement of the position of dictators in
Africa, argues Toyin Falola
FOR a continent noted for its
immense natural wealth and
potentials – symbolised by
vast arable lands, precious minerals and
a young vibrant population – Africa has
failed to fully utilise these assets to achieve
progressive socio-economic transformation
after 60 years of self-rule. One central
reason identified for this misfortune is the
prevalent cases of bad leadership.
Except for a few occasions of
exemplary stewardship from the likes
of Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, and
John Kufuor, Africa’s post-independence
leadership history has comprised a litany
of sit-tight despotic and kleptocratic
regimes – both military and civilian. This
tragedy of Africa’s leadership situation is
even more apparent when one considers
that, about half-a-century or so ago, the
indigenous political forces of then nascent
African nation-states rallied around ideals
of freedom, equality and good governance
to protest against the injustice of colonial
rule and demand independence.
The unfortunate post-independence
tradition of tyrannical leadership in Africa
has followed a pattern. After independence,
a charismatic figure from a politically,
sometimes numerically, dominant ethnic
group of a typical multi-ethnic postcolonial
African state becomes president
and assumes complete control of economic
and political power through a network of
patrimonial/client-patron relationships
and the use of the state’s instruments of
coercion.
Firmly in place, such leaders then
initiate constitutional reforms which accord
them extensive powers and provide a cover
of legitimacy for undemocratic draconian
practices. Consequently, protests from
politically and, most times, numerically
less privileged ethnocultural groups, who
are alienated and subjected to deprivation
and abuse through the self-perpetuating
intrigues of the incumbent, provide the
basis for a military take-over, the only
other means, after death, of changing such
sit-tight leaders.
With military governments, the
experience is also mostly similar. Taking
Julius Nyerere: one of the few standout leaders in
Africa
a leaf from the ousted dictator’s book, the
“interim” military government promises to
hand over power after righting the political
mess of the overthrown government.
As such, it schedules transition/
handover dates that are repeatedly
postponed until such a time when its head
can, with some confidence, arrange for a
transition process. This comes complete
with a constitutional coup that guarantees
his emergence as president.
Such a government, with its military
background and extensive constitutional
powers, becomes nearly impossible to
replace through the ballot box. It deploys
every option available to remain in power
and even when, by some chance, it does
lose at the ballot, it voids the election.
However, from the 1990s, Africa has
recorded significant transformations in the
political systems of many of its countries.
These changes involved the collapse of
several military and civilian dictatorships,
as well as the emergence of rule-of-lawbased
governments, such as South Africa’s
non-racial democracy.
Notwithstanding these democratic
gains though, many countries in Africa
have continued to struggle with deepening
and institutionalising democracy. As such,
there is yet very little check on government
impunity, especially in the areas of the
abuse of executive power and human rights
violations.
There are countries like Togo, Uganda,
Equatorial Guinea, Chad and, until
recently, The Gambia, which are still under
the despotic regimes of sit-tight “leaders”.
These countries have remained notorious
AFRICA BRIEFING NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 2021
for their hostile political environments,
economic hardship, poor records of human
rights and an ever-present threat of conflict.
They not only symbolise the threat to
Africa’s blossoming democratic culture,
but also stand as an inspiration for other
despotic ambitions yet laying fallow. As
constant reminders that Africa yet faces the
possibility of sliding back to the pre-1990s
levels of authoritarianism, the event of a
political transition in any of these countries
mentioned above represents hope; as
another vital step away from Africa’s
leadership albatross.
One country where recent political
developments best capture this patent
threat to Africa’s democratic gains is
The Gambia. A small, English-speaking,
West African country with at least 10
different ethnic groups, the country won
its independence from Britain in 1965.
And in the more than five decades of its
independent existence has had only three
presidents.
The Gambia’s venture into what
has become a long and perilous postindependence
leadership history began
with the tenure of Dawda Jawara, the
country’s first president who went on to
rule for almost four decades between 1965
and 1994. Under Jawara, the country was,
for all appearances, a liberal democracy.
The political atmosphere was, in
principle, one of competitive politicking,
complete with regular elections after fiveyear
tenures. However, it was a one-party
state where power was centred on the
dominant figure of Jawara and his People’s
Progressive Party (PPP).
With monopoly control over
government resources and a dictatorial
communications regulations policy, the
PPP maintained an undue advantage
over the opposition, which was left weak
and in constant danger of being declared
subversive. Jawara’s government also
imposed strict restrictions on civil society
and the activities of political organisations.
It was embroiled in numerous
allegations of misconduct, including
vote-buying, opposition intimidation and
election tampering. And with no limit set