NOVEMBER- DECEMBER 2021

ANALYSIS
effective information sharing on the
activities of criminal gangs.
Security experts observe that the
terrorists’ mode of operation seems to
follow a similar pattern wherever they
strike. In most instances they target
Western establishments as well as
countries that are considered sympathetic
to, or supportive of the West, and places
frequented by Western nationals.
They go in for ‘soft targets’ including
hotels, restaurants, beach resorts and
shopping centres. Having chosen a target,
the terrorists would plant their men there
prior to the attack.
The bigger picture in the Sahel is a
multiplicity of terrorist groups and affiliates
across the region, from Algeria and Libya
in the north to Niger, Mauritania, Mali,
Chad and Nigeria further down. Mention
can be made of Al Mulathamum Battalion
(AMB), Movement for Unity and Jihad in
West Africa (MUJAO), Macina Liberation
Front (MLF), Boko Haram, Islamic State
of the Greater Sahara (ISGS), a regional
affiliate of the terror group Islamic State
(IS), and of course AQIM, among others.
These groups and their international
franchises support each other in the form
of funds, weapons and other essential
logistics. Therefore, rather than just one
simple situation, the jihadist threat in the
region is a hydra-headed problem shrouded
in complexity.
Having made that clarification,
however, it is also important to register that
the most active terrorist organisations that
have gained prominence in West Africa
currently are Boko Haram, AQIM and its
offshoot, MUJAO.
“Boko Haram” (translated simply as
“Western education is forbidden”) came
into existence in the northern Nigerian
city of Maiduguri in 2002, launching
attacks initially on Western interests in
neighbouring states around the Lake Chad
Basin. The death of its leader, Mohammed
Yusuf, in police custody in 2009 saw
the group becoming more radical and
extending its attacks to Islamic institutions
and moderate Muslims, including those in
the group’s home country of Nigeria.
The kidnap of 276 female students
from the Government Girls Secondary
School at Chibok in Borno State in
April 2014, was one of Boko Haram’s
high-profile exploits. In 2015, the group
formally pledged allegiance to the global
terrorist organisation, Islamic State in the
Levant (ISL) and assumed the title Islamic
State in West Africa Province (ISWAP).
For its part, AQIM, originally known
as the Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC), splintered in 1998 from
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a key
architect in the Algerian Civil War. In
2006, GSPC formally merged with global
Al-Qaeda to become AQIM.
Following persistent counter-terrorism
crackdowns by the Algerian state, the
group scattered and established cells in
some locations abroad including West
Africa’s Sahel region. One of the group’s
initial exploits was an operation carried
out in Northern Mali in April 2003, during
which it abducted 32 Europeans. The
hostages were eventually released after a
ransom of $6 million was paid.
Although counter-insurgency
operations by French troops in the north
of Mali between 2013 and 2014 dealt a
significant blow to the activities of AQIM,
the inability to sustain the gains made by
the French allowed the group to bounce
back. In January 2017, AQIM claimed
responsibility for a suicide bomb at a joint
French-UN military base outside Gao in
Mali, killing 77 people and wounding 115
others. It was responsible for the bombings
of the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako,
Hotel Splendid and Cappuccino Café in
Burkina Faso, as well as the machine gun
attacks at Grand Bassam in neighbouring
Cote d’Ivoire.
So, in effect, these two groups (Boko
Haram and AQIM) are affiliates of the
two most deadly global terror franchises
– Al-Qaeda and ISL. As far as they are
concerned, every place is a legitimate
target – schools, hospitals, hotels, places
of worship, markets and pubs. In addition
to the loss of human lives, terrorist attacks
have also left in their trail destruction
of valuable property, displacement of
populations and humanitarian crises.
In May 2019, hundreds of victims
from neighbouring Burkina Faso crossed
the frontier to seek refuge in the Upper
West Region of Ghana, following terrorist
attacks in that country.
It is significant to note that the recent
attacks in Burkina Faso and the resultant
humanitarian challenges occurred at the
beginning of the rainy season, which was
also the onset of the major farming season.
Coupled with the Covid-19 pandemic and
‘
Each successful terrorist
attack goes to underscore the
vulnerabilities in the security
architecture of West Africa
’
its dire socio-economic ramifications, these
developments are bound to have a toll on
lives and livelihoods across the region.
At least 60 per cent of the population
depend on subsistence farming and other
agricultural activities for a living.
Another dimension of recent
developments in Burkina Faso is that they
brought home the chilling realisation of
how close terrorist activity has drawn
to Ghana. The news that came in the
aftermath of the event, particularly the
groups’ purported intention to extend their
action into Ghanaian territory, exacerbated
the perception of threat.
Also making the rounds at the time
and even to date, is the reported enlistment
of Ghanaian youth by terrorist groups
operating in the Mali-Burkina Faso
enclave. From the perspective of security
experts, all of these are possibilities and
none should be taken lightly.
Harsh economic circumstances
imposed by Covid-19 on countries in
West Africa have rendered the already
unemployed and idle youth more
vulnerable and easy targets for recruitment
by any terrorist organisation.
Widely hailed as a beacon of
democracy and stability in West Africa,
Ghana would definitely make a perfect
target for any terrorist group. It is therefore
imperative for all stakeholders in the
country to scale up preventive measures in
order to avert any such attacks.
Most importantly, such measures
should place emphasis on the indispensable
role of awareness and security
consciousness among the populace in
the fight against terrorism. Proprietors
AFRICA BRIEFING NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 2021 27