Other People's Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism in ... - Edocr

Other Peoples’ Wars – Chapter One
more bloody-minded, with mindsets that divide the world into the
enlightened/destined-for-salvation “us,” and the unenlightened/disposable “them”.
Aum Shinri Kyo, Timothy McVeigh, and al Qaeda respectively saw the general
population of the Western world as doomed, hopelessly compromised or as the
enemy itself.
9. Expanded target lists: The essence of terrorism includes its seeming randomness
and talent for searching out weakness. The Provisional Wing of the IRA
considered “legitimate military targets” to include soldiers on leave in Europe; the
wives and children of soldiers; ceremonial parades where tourists are present; a
Remembrance Day Ceremony; and recruiting booths at trade fairs. Latin
American death squads in countries that had been bedeviled by guerrillas have
seldom bothered to hunt armed insurgents in the jungle when there were – for
example – unarmed union organizers, schoolteachers, nuns, peasants, or irritating
journalists to murder. The Islamic Fundamentalists tend to be even less
discriminating.
10. Assured Indentity: Modern terrorist groups tend to establish a clear modus
operandi that precludes the need to send communiqués. Older groups used to
send letters to the media to describe why they had committed their actions,
placing their deeds in an ideological framework while usually blaming the
authorities or the target for the terrorists’ actions, and to seek publicity. Modern
groups often do not bother because the manner of their actions and selection of
targets speaks for itself. Moreover, many of them have no wish to communicate
with their target at all. However, in some cases, an insurgent group may be
competing for influence and prestige in another audience altogether. For
example, sundry Palestinian groups might not bother to send a communiqué to the
Israelis after committing an attack, except that status and influence inside much of
the Palestinian community depends on a demonstrated ability to harm the Israelis,
and it is vitally important to claim credit for an attack to this audience.
Except for a few highly specialized single interest groups (such as the Animal
Liberation Front and related “ecotage” groups) virtually all modern terrorists have
become international in scope and far more dangerous than the progenitor groups of the
late 1960s and ‘70s. They are tougher, more resilient, less likely to be easily confronted,
and far more likely to push roots deep into the broader community of their cultural
compatriots. There is no easy way to deal with them.
The Marxist and quasi-Marxist mindsets that dominated the terrorists of the 1960s and
‘70s involved a revolutionary endgame in which the terrorists could both provoke a civil
war, and then win it. They saw the authorities of their own nations as the government
they sought to supplant, and – wherever they grew large enough – sought to create
alternate institutions to rival those of the government – e.g. people’s courts and schools.
While most contemporary groups are usually (but not always) much less interested in
the annoyances of providing responsible government, they still must sometimes provide
institutions of their own within the community they wish to lead. Hizbollah and Hamas,
for example, provide schools, orphanages, and hospitals in Lebanon and the Palestinian
community. Other groups claim to provide such benefits – refugee relief and
16