YSM Issue 95.1

Linguistics / Social Neuroscience
FOCUS
the participant cannot know whether the
word “small” is being used to contrast one
rectangle from a second, thus making it
harder to pinpoint the blindspot.
The third experiment replicated this
experimental paradigm with real world
objects rather than simple colored shapes.
Models of the Mind
To understand how participants used
language to identify the blindspot, the
experimenters created two probabilitybased
computer models that would go
through the same trials as the human
participants. They based these models on
two different theories of how a person
might try to approach the task.
The first model was based on a concept
in psychology known as the “Theory of
Mind”. Jara-Ettinger explained the model in
terms of our interview conversation. “You’re
representing what's happening in my mind,”
he said. “When you're talking with me, you
realize that I'm not just some regular object
like a glass of water on a table. You have a
very strong sense that there's a mental life
inside of me. It’s not just a curiosity; it's what
you use to make sense of my behavior.”
“Theory of Mind” is the process of
internally modeling the mental life of
another. “It's a huge space of possible
things that range from you knowing
nothing to you knowing everything to
you knowing some parts of things," Jara-
Ettinger said. "Then I can figure out, 'okay,
so under which states of knowledge would
your words make sense?’”
The first model, then, included three
parameters: the random chance that
the target object would be in the chosen
quadrant (a one in four probability), the
increased random chance that it would
be in one of the quadrants visible to the
director (a one in three probability), and
the probability that the director was using
as few adjectives as possible. The model
calculated the last parameter based on the
director’s word choice in each experiment.
This last probability factor allows it to
consider the likelihood that the director
is using adjectives unnecessarily, thus
presenting a model of the director’s mind.
The second model, or the “deductive”
model, is much simpler. It used only basic
logic like “the blindspot cannot be one
of the indicated squares” to identify the
blindspot. Because this model lacks the
final probability factor from the “Theory
of Mind” model, it can only reverse
engineer the director’s intent. It does not
imagine the set of possible beliefs that the
director could have. Rather, it identifies
which quadrants the director can see to
guess which quadrant is out of their sight.
Our Minds
Jara-Ettinger and Rubio-Fernandez
found that the “Theory of Mind” model
was a great fit for the data derived from
human trials across all three experiments,
while the “deductive” model was not. Both
the “Theory of Mind” model and human
participants were relatively successful at
locating the director’s blindspot. The high
correlation between “Theory of Mind” and
data from human trials suggests that it is
likely that people use “Theory of Mind” in
their everyday lives.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
IMAGE COURTESY OF JULIAN JARA-ETTINGER AND PAULA RUBIO-FERNANDEZ
Participants identified a single object indicated by the prompt (here: “The triangle”). On the third grid, (L)
represents where participants tapped for the first prompt, (R) represents where participants tapped for the
second prompt, and (B) represents where they believed the director’s blindspot was located.
ART BY NOORA SAID
Jara-Ettinger said the results give us
reason to marvel at the power of our
minds. “If we designed the model to
make the best possible inferences it can
and participants are giving you identical
answers, it seems that on average,
participants are also giving you the best
possible inferences,” he said.
But what does this mean for daily
communication? If people are, in
fact, relatively good at determining
another’s blindspots, why is it that we
miscommunicate so many times each day?
“It’s very surprising because it seems
that one of the most salient things for
us is that in conversation, we get each
other wrong,” Jara-Ettinger admitted.
But he then reoriented the question:
“Yes, we do get things wrong, but we also
just take for granted how often we get
things right. We’re just so used to getting
inferences very quickly that we just kind
of ignore those.” ■
KATRINA STARBIRD
KATRINA STARBIRD is a junior in Timothy Dwight College majoring in Earth and Planetary
Science. She studies natural resource science and policy, is a research assistant for Professor Justin
Farrell, and is a member of the Independent Party of the Yale Political Union.
THE AUTHOR WOULD LIKE TO THANK both Julian Jara-Ettinger and Paula Rubio-Fernandez for
their time in explaining their research and for their sparkling conversations.
FURTHER READING
Jara-Ettinger, J., & Rubio-Fernandez, P. (2021). Quantitative mental state attributions in language
understanding. Science Advances, 7(47). https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abj0970
Keysar, B., Lin, S., & Barr, D. J. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 89(1), 25-41.
www.yalescientific.org
March 2022 Yale Scientific Magazine 15