War in Ukraine Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted Report

Strategy & Corporate Finance Practice
War in Ukraine:
Lives and livelihoods,
lost and disrupted
As uncertainty weighs on decision making, scenarios can
provide guidance.
by Sven Smit, Martin Hirt, Kevin Buehler, Olivia White, Ezra Greenberg,
Mihir Mysore, Arvind Govindarajan, and Eric Chewning
© D1sk/Getty Images
March 2022

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused the
greatest humanitarian crisis in Europe since the
Second World War. Already, thousands of lives have
been lost, and millions of livelihoods have been
disrupted through displacement, lost homes, and
lost incomes (Exhibit 1). We, like so many others, are
shocked by the unfolding humanitarian tragedy and
the consequences of this brutal war.
As in any conflict, uncertainty is high. It is unclear
how the military situation, the political process, and
the countermeasures around the world will play
out—in either the shorter or longer term. However,
it is already certain that, as a consequence of the
economic impact of the crisis on energy and food
markets, disruptions will affect many in Europe
and beyond.
In this article, we offer an initial framing of the
challenges, with full recognition of the uncertainties.
We begin with a perspective on the short- and
midterm disruptions and then frame scenarios for
the potential impact on livelihoods in the eurozone,
in the belief that some guidelines to bound
uncertainty are better than none at all. As conditions
change, we will adjust. We conclude with some
reflections on implications for business leaders as
they navigate yet another crisis.
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Exhibit 1 of 4
Exhibit 1
The Russian invasion of of Ukraine has has caused the greatest humanitarian crisis
in in Europe since World War War II. II.
Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced people since start of conflict (as of March 23)
Internally displaced
Refugees
Belarus
4,938
Poland
2,144,244
Ukraine¹
6,295,051
Russia
271,254
Slovakia
256,838
Hungary
324,397
Romania
253,771
Moldova
371,104
¹Ukraine internally displaced data as of March 16.
Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR
2 War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted

Untangling short- and
midterm disruptions
As business leaders deal with the short-term
effects of the conflict, fundamental disruptions
are under way that will shape the future beyond
the immediate crisis. While we recognize that more
challenges may emerge over time, several areas are
already apparent:
— The invasion of Ukraine is causing a massive
humanitarian crisis. In addition to the pain and
suffering experienced by those inside Ukraine,
there are already more than three million people
seeking refuge in neighboring nations, with
similar numbers displaced within Ukraine. As
in other major conflicts and refugee crises—
including those in Syria and Yemen—it will be a
gargantuan task for the world community to aid,
shelter, and host these unfortunate people.
— Once again, the vulnerable will suffer the
most. Vulnerable populations are most likely to
become refugees and will find it hardest to bear
the rising costs of food and fuel. Aid efforts are
under way globally to ensure that people’s basic
needs for food, shelter, and psychological safety
are met, in and beyond the conflict zone. Initial
discussions on how to defray higher energy
costs for all are taking place in many countries,
and first funds have been made available.
— Energy policy is rotating toward secure access
and source diversification. The role of Russian
oil and natural gas globally brings into focus
the importance of access to energy. While
acceleration of renewable energy can solve
part of the puzzle, gas will remain an important
source, and nuclear and coal may become larger
components of the fuel mix to secure supply,
particularly to replace potential shortages of
gas. The implications for achieving publicly
committed net-zero emissions are not yet clear.
— Food security is on the agenda. The
concentration of wheat, fertilizer, and related
production in Russia and Ukraine will strain food
supplies globally. Securing the continual supply
of food to the countries most exposed to exports
from these regions is becoming a major nearterm
issue.
— The competition for critical materials,
equipment, and commodities intensifies.
The world’s real and perceived needs for secure
access to natural resources, materials, and
advanced equipment (for example, neon, nickel,
palladium, semiconductors) is likely to grow
and further intensify the race among nations
and companies.
— A new age of supply chain control efforts
and localization attempts has arrived.
The era of not looking too closely at supply
chains, trusting suppliers, and optimizing for
cost is probably over. Those behaviors, already
made suspect by new tariff regimes and
the COVID-19 pandemic, are now likely to
be consigned to history. Governments and
corporations are looking to increase supply
chain resiliency and are considering innovative
ways to fund these changes.
— Global technology standards are more likely
to separate. To promote security interests and
foreign-policy objectives, governments have
increased the use of geo-economic tools such
as sanctions, direct-state support to strategic
industries, and export controls over sensitive
equipment, software, and technology. The
coordinated use of these tools by like-minded
countries in response to Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine is likely to accelerate the trend toward
separation of standards and independent
technology development.
War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted
3

— Financial-system ripple effects will occur. The
disruption of sanctioned financial flows has
the potential to ripple through the banking
system and financial markets, with significant
repercussions for affected bondholders, lenders,
aircraft lessors, derivatives counterparties,
and investors. There remains a risk of contagion
with second- and third-order effects across
the globe.
— Defense investments are being stepped up. The
show of unity and economic sanctions by North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries,
the European Union, and other European
countries could drive a greater focus on defense
resilience. France and Germany have both
announced significant increases in defense
spending. In early March 2022, the US Congress
approved a $42 billion increase in America’s
defense budget.
— Cyber is a stage for conflict. Countries and
companies have for years been concerned about
the increasing frequency and sophistication of
state-supported cyberattacks. Most concerning
is the shift from ransomware and extortion to
direct destruction. It was a major topic at the
meeting between US president Joe Biden and
Russia president Vladimir Putin in Geneva in
June 2021. It is highly likely that these attacks
will further intensify, testing the resilience of
cybersecurity systems.
— Corporate actors are taking a stand. This war
has galvanized a strong global response against
the invasion. Many corporations and other
nonstate entities have restricted their activities
beyond the formal requirements of sanctions to
distance themselves from Russia and its actions.
— Volatility, volatility, volatility. The war in
Ukraine joins the already crowded timeline
of 21st-century disruptions, with disparate
origins and complex consequences. We see
many business leaders trying to move their
organizations from ad hoc reactions to each
disruption to a foundation of greater resilience,
staying alert to what is over the horizon
and building capabilities to continually
manage uncertainty.
This list covers only the most prominent vectors of
disruption at this early stage of the Ukraine crisis.
While there is a lot of uncertainty around how each
of these will play out, many of them will likely matter
a great deal to lives and livelihoods worldwide, albeit
to very different extents, depending on geography
and sector.
War’s impact on livelihoods: Framing
potential scenarios
We have learned from conflicts around the world
that livelihoods adjacent to and sometimes far from
the conflict zone can also be put at risk. In part, the
risk arises because of inadequate attention paid
to people whose economic well-being is already
precarious; in part because of the inevitable knockon
effects in a highly connected world.
In framing scenarios for how the war will potentially
affect livelihoods outside the conflict zone, we
draw upon a wide range of expertise. 1 We see two
critical dimensions.
1
This framework considers perspectives from the Atlantic Council, the Council on Foreign Relations, the German Marshall Fund of the United
States, Oxford Economics, and leading geopolitical experts.
4 War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted

First is the scale and duration of disruption. The
drivers of scale and duration of disruption are
complex and include both military and political
factors (such as sanctions). How high the prices
for natural gas, oil, agricultural commodities, and
minerals and metals go will in large part determine
the effects on most people’s livelihoods—price rises
have to be paid out of pocket. We currently illustrate
three potential levels of disruption:
— Contained disruption. The disruption is
significant but contained in duration and scale—
for example, through a quickly negotiated ceasefire.
Sanctions do not escalate further and may
even be scaled back. Some refugees can return
home. Energy and commodity markets stabilize,
and prices begin to normalize.
— Extended disruption. The disruption continues
and grows for some time—for example, through
hostilities that continue throughout 2022. The
refugee crisis worsens. Multilateral sanctions
escalate moderately. The global energy and
commodity markets adapt and stabilize, but
prices remain elevated for some time.
— Severe, escalating disruption. The disruption
becomes more pronounced in scale and
duration—for example, through protracted
hostilities. The refugee crisis grows more
desperate. Energy, food, and commodity
markets spiral higher over an extended period.
Supply chains are disrupted, particularly in the
Europe–Russia energy trade.
While military escalations beyond Ukraine are
conceivable, we currently do not include them in our
range of possibilities.
The second dimension is the impact of government
policy, consumer, and business responses.
Government actions will matter profoundly in
modulating the impact that this war has on
livelihoods. In our view, four elements are in play:
(1) the COVID-19 economic policies that are in
place as the world exits the Omicron wave; (2) new
policies that may be initiated to blunt the impact of
spiking energy prices; (3) policies and private-sector
actions toward achieving net-zero emissions and
sustainable growth; and (4) changes in consumer
behavior. As these elements will come together
unpredictably, we illustrate three potential
policy responses:
— Restrained response. Central banks accelerate
monetary tightening to limit inflation, hitting the
confidence of consumers who continue to save
instead of spend. Other headwinds persist and
limit growth, including labor market tensions (for
example, skill mismatches, rising unemployment,
stagnant wages) and the enduring challenges of
the COVID-19 shock, which hamper the ability of
the economy to produce.
— Moderate response. Current fiscal and
monetary stimulus programs continue to wind
down, with a focus on steadily reining in inflation.
Some new programs offer moderate, long-term
support that help mitigate higher energy and
food prices—for example, through fossil fuel
investments or slowing down decarbonization
plans. Consumers remain cautious but continue
to spend moderately.
— Robust response. Monetary stimulus continues
to wind down and successfully brings inflation
under control. Governments also launch fiscal
programs to blunt the impact of rising energy
and food prices. Lower inflation and additional
support are enough to buoy confidence and
cause consumers to spend some of their pentup
savings. Significant energy investments
increase resilience to energy shocks and hasten
the energy transition.
As illustrated in Exhibit 2, the intersection of
these two dimensions—the scale and duration of
disruption and the ensuing responses—produces a
range of potential scenarios, with differing effects
on global lives and livelihoods.
War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted
5

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Exhibit 1 of 23
In our initial framing, duration duration and and scale scale of of disruption and and policy policy response will will
shape the economic outcomes outcomes of of this this crisis. crisis.
Potential scenarios and response
Scenarios discussed in this document
Government policy, consumer
and business response
1 Contained
Disruption contained in duration
and scale, with no escalation in
sanctions; refugee situation and
energy, food, and commodity
markets stabilize
1C
1B
1A
2 Extended
Disruption grows; refugee situation
and sanctions escalate moderately;
energy, food, and commodity
markets adapt and then
stabilize
2C
2B
2A
Duration and
scale of
disruption
3 Severe and escalating
Pronounced disruption in scale
and duration; refugee situation
worsens; sanctions escalate;
energy and commodity markets
severely disrupted
3C
3B
3A
C Restrained
Accelerated pace
of monetary
measures to limit
inflation, lower
long-term global
growth prospects
B Moderate
Exit from current
stimulus policies
continue; decarbonization
goals
reduced; restart
of fossil fuel
investments
A Robust
Exit from current
stimulus policies
slowed; new fiscal
support for energy
and food costs and
for investments in
energy infrastructure
The current context
Across all scenarios, a few facts are immutable. The
harshest effects are being felt in Ukraine. This is
where lives have been lost and thrown into turmoil.
Destruction of property and infrastructure is already
extensive and worsening by the day. The impact of
sanctions on Russia is significant: the ruble has lost
about half of its value since the onset of hostilities,
consumer prices are increasing rapidly, the Russian
central bank has been forced to lift short-term
interest rates to 20 percent, and the Russian stock
market is closed.
Beyond the conflict zone, the invasion of Ukraine
takes place at a fraught moment for the global
economy and livelihoods, particularly the vulnerable.
COVID-19 is receding in many parts of the world
but is not yet gone, and it is still a crisis in many
countries, with some of them struggling with the exit
from public-health interventions. Furthermore, the
possibility of a new and severe virus variant cannot
be discounted. Also, inflation continues to gather
steam in most parts of the world. In some, it has
reached multidecade highs and is driving up the
costs of living for households.
6 War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted

Energy is a particular concern (and is a key
parameter across scenarios 2 ). European natural-gas
prices have jumped 60 percent since Russia started
massing troops. Brent crude oil is consistently
trading near $120 per barrel. Further, prices for key
agricultural, mineral, and metal commodities rose
10 to 15 percent in the first week of the conflict;
nickel prices doubled recently. Ukraine and Russia
together produce about 30 percent of global wheat;
spot market prices are up about 40 percent. They
are also the largest producers of class 1 nickel (used
in electric-vehicle batteries), with a 23 percent
global share, and the second-largest producers of
palladium (used in catalytic converters), holding a
38 percent global share.
The spike in commodity prices has shaken the
confidence of consumers and businesses globally.
Regardless of which scenario ultimately plays out,
households may remain cautious and will keep on
the sidelines the excess savings that they have
accumulated during the pandemic, at least in the near
term, even as the economy fully reopens. Businesses
may look to slow all but necessary expenditures
and hiring. And the US Federal Reserve and the
European Central Bank have, as of March 11, 2022,
stated that they see the risks of accelerating inflation
to be greater than those of potentially weak demand
and are moving to halt the inflation cycle by initiating
a steady pace of interest-rate increases.
Initial economic scenarios for
the eurozone
We have modeled three scenarios—1B, 2A, and
3B—which may help leaders and decision makers
bound uncertainty as it appears today. Scenario 1B
captures contained disruption with moderate policy
response. Scenario 2A looks at extended disruption
and robust policy response. Finally, scenario 3B
considers outcomes from a severe, escalating
disruption, but still with moderate policy response.
(Scenario 3C is also a distinct possibility, if central
banks act more aggressively to fight inflation and
the conflict endures for some time.)
In what follows, we focus on the eurozone, which
is the world’s largest macroeconomy and highly
exposed to the conflict. At the conclusion of this
section, we offer some considerations for other
geographies. Here, we do not analyze Eastern
Europe per se but are keenly aware that these
nations will see direct and significant impact from
the economic disruption, as well as the burgeoning
refugee crisis. We use GDP to measure impact
on livelihoods, as incomes are a substantial
component of GDP. As is standard in scenario
analyses, any point estimates in our calculations are
not forecasts but merely the center point of a range
of potential outcomes.
Scenario 1B: Contained disruption with moderate
policy response
In this scenario, the end of hostilities occurs within a
few more weeks. Sanctions do not escalate further
and may even be scaled back; energy exports from
Russia to Europe keep flowing. Before the end of
2022, natural-gas prices in Europe return to their
precrisis peak of about $30 per million British
thermal units (MMBtu); Brent crude returns to
$70 to $80 per barrel. GDP growth (and thus jobs
and incomes) across the eurozone reverts to its
precrisis trend, albeit with a first-quarter slowdown,
reflecting the shock of the invasion.
Inflation expectations remain elevated relative
to prepandemic norms but are stable, and the
European Central Bank continues to reduce
monetary stimulus. Consumer confidence reverts to
its prepandemic level, and businesses continue their
COVID-19-exit investment plans through most of the
eurozone by the second quarter of 2022.
Eurozone GDP growth in 2022 returns to a
preinvasion trajectory of 3.8 percent. Growth falls
to 2.7 percent in 2023 and 1.5 percent in 2024
as economies return to their long-term trends.
Germany, the largest economy in the eurozone,
follows a similar trajectory: growth of 3.5 percent in
2022, 3.0 percent in 2023, and 1.3 percent in 2024.
Exhibit 3 sets out estimated GDP growth for each of
the three scenarios.
2
Energy supply, demand, and price assumptions were developed in partnership with McKinsey Energy Insights.
War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted
7

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Exhibit 2 of 3
Exhibit 3
The eurozone economy is highly exposed to the conflict in Ukraine.
Eurozone real GDP growth scenarios as of March 12
1B
Contained disruption
with moderate policy
response
Hostilities end within
a few more weeks
Growth vs previous quarter, % Growth vs previous year, %
2
5
1
4
3
0
2
–1
1
0
–2
–1
Q1 2022 Q1 2023
2022 2023 2024
2A
Extended disruption
with robust policy
response
End of hostilities is
in sight in the second
half of 2022
Growth vs previous quarter, % Growth vs previous year, %
2
5
4
1
3
0
2
–1
1
0
–2
–1
Q1 2022 Q1 2023
2022 2023 2024
3B
Severe and escalating
disruption with
moderate policy
response
Protracted conflict
intensifies the refugee
crisis in Central Europe
Growth vs previous quarter, % Growth vs previous year, %
2
1
0
–1
–2
Q1 2022 Q1 2023
5
4
3
2
1
0
–1
2022 2023 2024
Source: National statistics agencies; McKinsey analysis, in partnership with Oxford Economics
The Russia/Ukraine discussions announced on
March 16, 2022, if agreed, would likely result in
this scenario.
Scenario 2A: Extended disruption with robust
policy response
In this scenario, the end of hostilities is in sight in
the second half of 2022. Sanctions do not extend
into the energy sector; energy exports from Russia
to Europe keep flowing. However, natural-gas
prices in Europe return only to their precrisis peak
of about $30 per MMBtu, and Brent crude trades
between $90 and $100 per barrel throughout 2022.
Consumer confidence bounces back by the end of
the year, and households use their pent-up savings
to drive a surge in demand, particularly for services,
and businesses respond with additional investments
and hiring. Further, sentiment on energy policy
shifts rapidly given new concerns about energy
insecurity. Businesses and governments make nearterm
investments in additional fossil fuel capacity to
ensure resilience—and also accelerate investment
in sustainable energy.
8 War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted

Shocks to energy, food, and other commodities
boost eurozone inflation to more than 4 percent in
2022, versus 2.5 to 3.0 percent in 2021. Exhibit 4
reviews energy prices and inflation in each of the
three scenarios. But prices fall back as a resolution
to the war comes into view. By early 2023, the
effects of energy shocks recede, and central-bank
actions successfully slow inflation, with consecutive
monthly increases in prices trending downward.
Inflation expectations remain elevated relative to
prepandemic norms but are stable, providing a
strong signal that inflation has been contained.
With elevated price levels in the near term, as well
as the shock from the invasion, GDP growth in the
eurozone and Germany is essentially flat in 2022.
Growth in the eurozone rises to 2.1 percent in 2023
and 4.8 percent in 2024. The German economy
grows slightly faster: 2.7 percent in 2023 and
5.5 percent in 2024, buoyed in part by increased
spending on defense.
Scenario 3B: Severe, escalating disruption with
moderate policy response
In this scenario, protracted conflict intensifies the
refugee crisis in Central Europe. Western countries
and Russia further extend sanctions, leading to
the shutdown of oil and gas exports from Russia to
Europe. European gas prices more than double to
$70 per MMBtu in early 2022, from their alreadyhigh
level of about $30, and Brent crude jumps to
$150 per barrel.
Eurozone headline inflation spikes to more than
7 percent on the year. The continent can replace
some of its natural-gas shortfall in part by buying on
the spot market and in part by slowing the shift away
from coal. Producing and consuming nations can
build new liquefied natural gas (LNG) export/import
infrastructure over time, but in the near term, higher
prices, lower real incomes, and reduced consumer
spending will result in some demand destruction.
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Exhibit Interactive 3 of 3
Exhibit 4
Energy prices and inflation are likely to vary across the scenarios.
Energy prices and inflation are likely to vary across the scenarios.
Energy prices and inflation scenarios as of March 9
1B 2A 3B
Crude oil, Brent, $ per barrel
160
Natural gas, Europe, $ per MMBtu¹
80
Inflation, 4-quarter % change 2
8
140
120
70
60
6
100
80
60
50
40
30
4
2
40
20
20
10
0
0
0
–2
2020 2022 2024 2020 2022 2024 2020 2022 2024
¹Million British thermal units.
²Eurozone headline consumer price index.
Source: National statistics agencies; McKinsey analysis, in partnership with Oxford Economics
War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted
9

Combined with the collapse in confidence we are
already seeing, the eurozone tips into recession
in 2022 and 2023. Growth slips to –0.5 percent in
both years; growth in Germany is weaker, at –1.4
percent, because of its greater reliance on natural
gas. By mid-2023, the weak economy suppresses
demand; energy prices fall from their peak, easing
inflation considerably. Entering 2024, GDP growth
resumes as consumer spending and business
investment start to rebound, even as a low-intensity
conflict in Ukraine continues. By the end of 2024,
employment finally regains the ground it has lost
since 2019, and growth moves back to prepandemic
long-term trends.
Effects on other large economies
Of course, the nature of disruption and the ability of
governments to respond will differ across countries,
and we can anticipate a wide range of scenarios.
In any scenario, growth in large economies such
as China and the United States will be less directly
affected than in the eurozone. Two questions
arise. Will the war in Ukraine disrupt consumer and
business confidence? What will be the impact of
higher commodity prices?
In the United States, the key issue will be how the
Federal Reserve Board reacts to the impact of the
spike in oil prices and to the jump in agricultural,
mining, and mineral commodity prices (US naturalgas
prices are largely independent of Europe).
Under more normal circumstances, the Fed
would likely not react to supply-driven spikes in
inflation, preferring to ensure that growth does not
falter. But inflation in the United States is already
uncomfortably high. On March 16, 2022, the Fed
raised its short-term rate by 25 basis points, the
first hike since December 2018. In its statement,
the Fed also said that it “anticipates that ongoing
increases in the target range will be appropriate.”
Market observers are in widespread agreement that
even larger 50-basis-point increases are likely. It
appears that the invasion of Ukraine will only slow
the pace of interest-rate hikes, not change the
course of policy in the United States. In scenario
2A, US growth would be flat. In scenario 3B, shaken
confidence and continued high prices for oil would
reduce spending by consumers and businesses, and
a recession would ensue.
The main impact in China will likely come from
price increases in globally traded commodities;
indirect effects such as reduced demand from trade
partners will also matter. Consumer sentiment in
China itself is less likely to be affected.
Implications for business leaders
The speed of this crisis has confounded many
corporate leaders. The fog of war makes it hard
to understand exactly what is happening in the
moment, let alone chart a path forward. However,
many companies need to decide how to act both
now and in anticipation of longer-term disruptions,
especially those we outlined at the outset.
Not every company is affected the same way.
Businesses that operate in Ukraine or Russia will be
most immediately affected. Right now, most of these
companies are deeply engaged in safeguarding the
lives of their employees.
For others, their geographic location, scope of
operations, and industry sector will determine to
what extent the war will affect their business. This
crisis is structurally different than the pandemic.
For companies outside the war zone, threats to
employees’ lives are less immediate. Instead, their
near-term challenges are more likely to concern
the effect of sanctions and challenges of
compliance, the stance toward Russia they
decide to take, and, especially for manufacturing
companies, inflationary effects on cost and issues
related to continuity of supply.
After several months of rising inflation in much of
the world, another rapid rise in commodity prices
is especially concerning. It will drive headline
inflation to even greater highs and lengthen the
period of elevated inflation. Our conversations with
10 War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted

executives worldwide suggest that a concerted,
enterprise-wide effort is the only appropriate
response. Leading companies are tackling inflation
simultaneously in procurement, pricing, supply
chains, the workforce, and the finance function.
Executives can be guided by the degree to which
their organizations are exposed to the forces
originating from this crisis. All leaders should
develop a view of the scenarios that matter to them,
designing models that reflect their industry and their
own circumstances. Leaders concerned about more
substantial impact can reactivate as appropriate
proven tools from the previous few major crises,
including nerve centers and plan-ahead teams.
One critical difference between this crisis and
COVID-19: today the world is suffering from supply
shocks (which might be followed by demand shocks),
while in March 2020 it was the other way around.
Plan-ahead teams should start by modeling today’s
supply shocks. These cross-functional teams can
also help to avoid decision-making biases and other
pitfalls of crisis management under high uncertainty,
while also supporting longer-term resilience.
The scenarios above suggest that only a contained
disruption can be absorbed by Europe and the
global economy—from a macroeconomic point
of view—but that window will not stay open for
long. We hope that the scenarios will help you
and your organization navigate a confusing and
challenging period. At the same time, we recognize
their shortcomings; they fail to account for the
extraordinarily long and fat tail of risks that most
wars implicitly carry.
This war has already caused devastation and
suffering. March 2022 is reminiscent of times in
Europe we all thought had long passed. In the
interests of people in Ukraine and everywhere,
we dearly hope that this conflict will end as soon
as possible.
Sven Smit is a senior partner in McKinsey’s Amsterdam office, Martin Hirt is a senior partner in our Greater China
office, Kevin Buehler is a senior partner in the New York office, Olivia White is a senior partner in the Bay Area office,
Ezra Greenberg is a partner in the Stamford office, Mihir Mysore is a partner in the Houston office, Arvind Govindarajan
is a partner in the Boston office, and Eric Chewning is a partner in the Washington, DC, office.
The authors wish to thank colleagues Gillian Boccara, Luciano Di Fiori, Tigmanshu Goyal, Berend Heringa, Krzysztof
Kwiatkowski, and Madhuri Maddipatla, and Neil Walker of Oxford Economics, for their contributions to this article.
Designed by McKinsey Global Publishing
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War in Ukraine: Lives and livelihoods, lost and disrupted
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