Turkey, Its Neighbors and the West - Robert Bosch Stiftung

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14 Consequently, Turkish-palestinian relations have also changed. Turkey has aided the palestinian and international legal struggle against Israeli house evictions and demolitions by opening ottoman archives regarding property certificates. It has supported the report of the un human rights Council headed by Justice richard Goldstone, which accused Israel (and hamas) of war crimes in Gaza (and southern Israel). Turkey has also maintained contact with hamas, recognizing the hamas government since 2006, after the latter won the elections; the aKp invited hamas’ Damascus-based leader Khaled Meshal to ankara in february 2006. While ankara has failed to trigger meaningful breakthroughs in view of its limited leverage, the transformation of Turkey’s role in the Middle east has positioned it to be a mediator in the region, and Turkey’s efforts at mediation have been persistent. Its mediation between Israel and syria dates back to January 2004, even though that process had been held back by the Western isolation of syria, the 2006 lebanon war, and the 2007 Israeli bombing of syria. between May and December 2008, four rounds of indirect talks took place via Turkish shuttle diplomacy, with both sides saying they achieved greater progress than expected. The crux of those talks came at a dinner between Turkish prime Minister erdo˘gan and his Israeli counterpart ehud olmert in December 2008, after which the launch of direct talks appeared imminent. five days later, however, Israel launched operation Cast lead into Gaza, and the process broke down. Turkey has also mediated between Israel and hamas on two occasions, albeit without meaningful results. Turkey’s first interjection came in the aftermath of hamas’ capture of Israeli soldier Gilad shalit in June 2006, when Davuto˘glu traveled to Damascus to try to broker a deal to release shalit and a disputed group of palestinian prisoners held by Israel. The second was during operation Cast lead in December 2008-January 2009, when Davuto˘glu shuttled between Damascus and Cairo to persuade hamas to agree to a ceasefire in return for Israel’s ceasefire and lifting the closure of Gaza. beyond the arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey has been drawn into mediation regarding the Iranian nuclear question. Turkey sought to facilitate p5+112 talks in 2006. since then, ankara has consistently relayed messages between Washington and Tehran. however, Turkey’s efforts have thus far yielded few results and have raised concerns about lack of solidarity with the West. There are examples of Turkey’s success in mediation, particularly within the arab world. In 2005, Turkey encouraged sunni leaders to participate in the national elections in Iraq. In 2009, ankara reconciled syrians and Iraqis after Iraq lodged initial accusations against syria for the august 2009 bombings in baghdad. While these cases are limited in scope, they are nonetheless emblematic of Turkey’s new, conciliatory role in the arab world, a position which would have been unthinkable in the past. Turkey, Russia, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus To the north and west, differing internal developments, Turkey’s changing fortunes with regard to the eu, and, most importantly, the rise of an assertive russia, have presented Turkey with both risks and opportunities. as in the Middle east, achieving the aim of “zero problems” in a conflict-prone neighborhood has not always been possible. In the 1990s, Turkey responded to instability in the balkans by participating in a variety of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions under both naTo and eu auspices. at the same time, the opening of the Turkish economy and the collapse of the soviet union allowed for the expansion of economic ties with russia, a country rich in natural resources, which had previously been cut off from Turkey. In the black sea region, Turkey took the opportunity to sponsor the creation of numerous black sea-only organizations, such as bseC and blaCKseafor, designed to improve economic and military cooperation and try to limit great power struggles in the region. 13 In the last several years, expanded economic ties with the balkan states have continued, while ties with russia have grown exponentially – at least until the economic downturn of 2009 hurt all Turkish trade (see figure 2 and Table 3). russia is also the source of roughly three million tourists a year to Turkey, and has received more than $17 billion in Turkish investment. In 2009 and 2010, reciprocal visits between prime Ministers led to even greater levels of planned cooperation between Turkey and russia, on energy, on arrangements for joint cabinet meetings, on agreeing on visa-free travel, and on building a russian nuclear power plant in Turkey. 14 While motivated by geostrategic and economic considerations and strongly supported domestically by Turkish businesses, this level of cooperation with russia has caused concern in the West and appears to limit Turkey’s foreign policy options.
Turkey’s Monthly Trade with Russia in Billion USD 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Export to Russia Import from Russia source: Turkstat. http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/cbt-uk.html after the 2008 russian invasion of Georgia, with which Turkey has strong historical and economic ties, ankara issued only cursory criticism of russia and confined itself to urging respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity. In Moscow soon after, Turkey offered a “Caucasus stability and Cooperation platform (CsCp),” which envisioned a multilateral framework among several foes in the region. not surprisingly, the initiative was stillborn. When the united states pressed Turkey to allow its naval forces to move through the Turkish straits to provide economic and humanitarian aid to Georgia, Turkey clung – as it has for decades – to the sanctity of the 1936 Montreux Convention governing the length of stay, size, and number of naval forces in the black sea. Defending Turkish foreign policy during this episode, foreign Minister ahmet Davuto˘glu was candid: “any other european country can follow a certain isolationist policy against russia. Can Turkey do this? I ask you to understand the geographical conditions of Turkey… unfortunately we have to admit this fact. Turkey is almost 75- 80 percent dependent on russia [for energy]. We don’t want to see a russian-american or russian-naTo confrontation… We don’t want to pay the bill of strategic mistakes by russia or by Georgia.” 15 0.7 3.5 0.6 3 0.5 2.5 0.4 2 0.3 1.5 0.2 1 0.1 0.5 0 Turkey rejects categorically the idea that its policies involve choosing the “east over the West.” 16 It sees its actions as serving Turkish interests in an attempt to create a peaceful and stable neighborhood by utilizing complementary, not competitive, policies. In the balkans, for example, Turkey quickly recognized the independence of Kosovo, something russia, in support of serbia, has not done. still, much of what Turkey has attempted to make its “zero problems” doctrine a reality has been blocked by forces beyond its control. This has been the case with its overture toward armenia. Turkey accepted an invitation for a presidential visit in 2008, then participated in negotiations to normalize relations between the two countries, signing protocols to that effect in october 2009. but Turkey may have underestimated the difficulties of achieving this goal, and has been forced to step back in the face of fierce criticism from azerbaijan, and a backlash domestically. In order to placate the azeris, the Turkish prime Minister linked Turkey’s ratification of the protocols with armenia to the progress on the nagorno-Karabakh peace process (see box 1). That linkage, in turn, has imperiled reconciliation with armenia, while greatly disappointing the united states and the eu, both of which stood to gain from C H A P T E R3 F i g u r e2 15
Page 1: Getting to ZER0 Turkey, Its Neighbo
Page 5 and 6: Preface Turkey is a key ally to bot
Page 7 and 8: What is at Stake? Key Questions and
Page 9 and 10: t a b l e1 GDP for Turkey and Its N
Page 11 and 12: as shown in Table 2, about 3.4 mill
Page 13: Caucasus, and Iranian accusations a
Page 17 and 18: for contributing to europe’s ener
Page 19 and 20: Driven by different priorities, Tur
Page 21 and 22: spain france algeria Germany l No V
Page 23 and 24: Degree of Openness of the Turkish E
Page 25 and 26: one group that has attracted contro
Page 27 and 28: affairs, was essential in improving
Page 29 and 30: Turkey from a Transatlantic Perspec
Page 31 and 32: Turkey’s current relations with t
Page 33 and 34: BOx 3 A Privileged Partnership Betw
Page 35 and 36: BOx 4 A Way Forward for NATO-EU Coo
Page 37 and 38: BOx 6 Hello? Am I Speaking to the E
Page 39 and 40: BOx 7 in february 1996. at a time w
Page 41 and 42: EU H Conduct relations with Turkey
Page 43 and 44: 35 soli ozel quoted in sabrian Tave
Page 45: helmut schmidt fellow Thomas Straub
Page 50: 50 W W W . T R A N S A T L A N T I

Turkey, Its Neighbors and the West - Robert Bosch Stiftung

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