REVIEW - Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies

104
Integrated air operations –
some ramifications for our
modus operandi
ByAir Cdre Julian Stinton
Some years ago I would have
accorded to the premise that jointness
on operations has developed from
deconfliction between components,
through cooperation to integration
– mostly as a result of technological
development, better understanding,
component evolution and operational
maturity. However, the joint approach,
though undoubtedly the holy grail for
joined-up military endeavour in the
contemporary operating environment,
is not proving as useful to commanders
as it might be, simply because fighting
jointly, particularly in a ‘PC’ sort of way
that embraces the diversity of approach
and attempts to harmonise, or at least
use equably, the different capabilities
that each component brings to the fight
is a difficult and sometimes sensitive
issue. This is because of the way
components are configured, armed
and commanded, but also because
we have not yet really worked out
quite how we want to fight jointly – or
even, dare I say, worked out precisely
what sort of war we are in and where
and how we must adjust our Modus
Operandi (MO).
So, let me give you a flavour of current
operations through commanders’
mission and intent and leave it to you
to deduce how we want to fight. Firstly
Commander International Security
Assistance Force (COMISAF)’s mission
for the ISAF:
‘To conduct military operations in the
assigned area of operations to assist the
Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GIRoA) in the establishment
and maintenance of a safe and secure
environment with full engagement of
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),
in order to extend GIRoA authority and
Viewpoint
influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan’s
reconstruction and contributing to regional
stability.’
And to give you more of an Air flavour,
the Coalition Force Air Component
Commander (CFACC)’s mission in Iraq:
‘To conduct air, space and information
operations integrated and synchronised with
Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) full
spectrum operations and Multi-National
Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) phased operations
throughout the Joint Operating Area (JOA)
in order to secure the population, defeat
extremists and insurgents and enable
Government of Iraq self-reliance until Iraq
is stable.’
Now these are missions – and I
appreciate that you might be able to
deduce more about how we planned
to fight from the supporting campaign
plans and concepts of operations. If the
campaign plan actually existed, in both
cases you would find that we would
be diving down into what air power
does, what capabilities it plans to apply
and how it is to be commanded and
controlled, with liberal applications
of the words ‘joint’ and ‘effect’ – but it
wouldn’t necessarily tell you how we
intend to integrate the effects of those air
operations.
This is not the first time we have
used high-end, heavy-metal forces
for missions for which they were not
designed. It is still – just – an article of
faith that the maintenance of a highend
technological warfare capability
enables the use of forces across the
conflict spectrum; and it is also true
that the contemporary operating
environment is a bit of a ‘come as you
are’ party and that we are fighting the
current wars as we must, rather than
as we should. Many a commander
– in all environments – is crying out
for better connectivity, more lift or
more Information, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) to give him
more flexibility, higher tempo, more