The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses

The Construction of National Identity and its
Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses ∗
Florian Bieber, University of Graz
Objectives. To understand the politics of population census in postconflict countries and salience
of the categories imposed through census. By doing so, it seeks to shed light on the mechanisms
of identity construction in the post-Yugoslav context. Methods. The article analyzes the categories
and the responses to post-Yugoslav censuses, focusing on national, religious, and linguistic identity
markers. Results. The analysis shows that a varying, yet significant, share of the population refuses
to identify according to the identity markers proposed by the state and promoted by key political
actors. Conclusion. The article proposes a novel way of studying censuses and argues that even in
a postconflict context national identities are less fixed than often supposed and highlights the need
to focus more on nonconformist identities in postconflict settings.
In the run up to the 2011 Croatian census, the Serb national council, which represents the
Serb minority, released a video spot to convince fellow Serbs to declare themselves as such.
In a tense moment, the enumerator asks a citizen during the census: “[Are you] Some other
nationality . . . or do you not want to declare yourself?” The man, visibly uncomfortable
with the question, answers “Marsijanac [Martian],” only to be corrected by the enumerator,
“in Croatian we say Marsovac [Martian],” revealing that the man was a “Serbian” Martian.
He then immediately responds, “No, Serbian.” The enumerator responds, with a smile,
“Why didn’t you say so right away?” (YouTube, 2011b). In reality, only 24 citizens in
Croatia identified as Martians, and 186,633 (4.36 percent) identified as Serbs. The Serb
National Council’s video reveals a widespread concern among minority organizations—be
they churches, NGOs, or parties in post-Yugoslav states—that citizens might opt out of
national categories, and thus dilute or diminish the size of the minority population. Here,
the Serb in the census appears to opt for Martian because he feels pressured, and the
enumerator does not readily offer the category of Serb. Consequently, the sketch hints at
the tense relations between minority and majority, including the enumerator’s correction
when told “Martian” in the distinctive Serb variant.
This article will explore how the census constitutes a site where the state, citizens, and
groups representing majorities and minorities negotiate national identities. It argues that
this process is not only about state imposition of certain identities, but also about how they
are accepted or rejected by citizens, and how different actors seek to shape them, like the
Serb National Council does in the example above.
∗ Direct correspondence to Florian Bieber, University of Graz, Schubertstrasse 21, 8010 Graz, Austria
〈florian.bieber@uni-graz.at〉. A draft version of this article was presented at the ASN Convention, New York,
April 2014 and at the workshop Migration and Ethnicity at the Beginning of the 21st Century, in Zagreb,
Croatia, February 2015. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and Paul Goode for their
helpful suggestions.
SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Volume 96, Number 3, September 2015
C○ 2015 by the Southwestern Social Science Association
DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12195

874 Social Science Quarterly
Censuses are tools to make, reaffirm, and also reject identities. They provide crucial data,
and allow for states to categorize their citizens. Their importance has increased with the
rise of the modern state and its needs, which range from economics to taxation. It is also a
major logistical enterprise that reaffirms the state in its capacity. A U.N. study notes: “The
traditional census is among the most complex and massive peacetime exercises a nation
undertakes” (U.N., 2008:23).
Census takers in modern and colonial states sought to recreate a complete and comprehensive
picture not only to govern better, but also to impose and normalize certain
categories of identity. As Benedict Anderson notes, colonial censuses introduced racial, or
ethnic, categories that were not just part of “divide-and-rule” strategies, but also were born
out of a genuine, if misguided, desire to understand and to categorize (2008:164–66).
In some cases, population counts in Balkan nation states served to legitimize competing
territorial claims, as can be seen in the censuses conducted in the Ottoman-ruled Macedonia
in the early 20th century (Yosmaoğlu, 2014:129–68). Whether their purpose is benign or
manipulative, censuses require clear, measurable categories that allow for the aggregation
of a large number of citizens. Most of the questions censuses ask, from a respondent’s
household size, to a respondent’s level of education, or profession, might be intrusive for
an individual, but not necessarily controversial. When it comes to identity categories,
however, markers such as religion, language, and ethnicity introduce a significant element
of subjective choice. It is at this juncture of a seemingly objective exercise and the subjective
nature of identity that the controversies of census taking are most pronounced. As Simon
and Piché have noted, “[t]he statistical representation of diversity is a complex process
which reveals the foundations of societies and their political choices. Thus there is a gap
between the apparent ethnic and racial diversity in most countries in the world and the
way these societies perceive themselves and are portrayed in official and social statistics”
(2012:357). Considering the ambiguity of identity we know to be case in all societies, an
inevitable tension arises between the fiction of steady, objective categories, and the reality
where belonging varies and does not necessarily fit into easily identified boxes.
We need to be careful neither to fall into the trap of uncritically accepting the logic of
ethnic numbers, nor to simply dismiss them, or those who “roll out census results and
maps” as primitive and primordial (Jansen, 2005:51). A two-fold strategy allows us to
take censuses into account without falling into the trap of inadvertently attributing a fixed
quality to them. First, we need to accept the political use (and abuse) of numbers. As
such, they are used for bargaining over competing claims, just like history (and its myths),
international support, and victims on one’s side. Second, even if census results are snapshots
that grant us an admittedly reductionist view of a more complex reality, they can serve as a
useful tool to determine both the categories of the state and the response of its citizens.
The Argument
This article argues that censuses are an important site of contestation that establish,
enforce, and negotiate national identities, which are in turn either accepted or rejected. By
examining both the process of category making, and the response of citizens, the article
seeks to highlight not only the production of identity boundaries, but also the response
of citizens. In doing so, it seeks to explore the following hypotheses. First, censuses are
politicized and the categorization of, and responses to, choices available to respondents
are significant for the state and the organizations (such as parties) that represent ethnonational
groups. Second, individuals have a choice to confirm or reject proposed identity
categories. The scale of rejection is expected to result from two factors: (a) the availability of

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 875
choice (i.e., whether more than one identity category with which individuals can identify
is available), and (b) the social and political polarization resulting from recent conflict.
The main hypothesis of this article is that top-down nation-building processes, epitomized
by census policies, require considerable efforts by ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize
citizens to choose particular national identities, and that they encounter considerable contestation
among citizens, especially in deeply divided postconflict societies such as the states
of former Yugoslavia. The efforts by ethnic entrepreneurs to impose groupness are greater
in cases of ambiguous identities. Similarly, this article argues that the number of citizens
that will opt out of prevailing identity categories depends on (a) the degree of interethnic
polarization and (b) the availability of alternative identities that constitute possible choice.
Ethnic entrepreneurs seek to block defection from the nation by extensive campaigning,
and, depending on the options available to them, to mobilize (presumed) members of the
constituency or to seek support from groups at the margins of group identity. By taking
this approach, the article follows Rogers Brubaker’s call to focus less on groups themselves,
and instead focus on the processes through which groupness is established and categories
of identity imposed (2006:27).
Understanding these processes highlights the mechanisms of group making and the
discrepancies between top-down identity imposition and bottom-up responses. The article
argues that national identity is more ambiguous, and boundary lines are more blurred,
than the creation of the nation-state and the ensuing violence during the 1990s would
suggest. Competing ethno-nationalist claims may shape contestation in the public arena,
yet private choices made during censuses often refute these categories.
As we shall see in the next section, the literature on censuses outside the United States,
and other immigrant societies, has played scant attention to hybrid and complex identities.
Furthermore, the literature gives little attention to the role of ethnic entrepreneurs rather
than just the state in mobilizing individuals to opt for particular groups.
As this article will show, the process of identity building through censuses is complex,
contingent, and contested. It thus supports and contributes to the study of ethnic boundary
making that Andreas Wimmer (2013) recently emphasized as a productive way to study
ethno-nationalism.
Literature Review
Since Benedict Anderson (2008) singled out censuses as one of the tools of nationbuilding,
a wealth of literature has appeared on the interrelationship between race, nation,
and census politics. The claim by Peterson (1995) that there is no systemic discussion of
censuses could hardly be made today. This interest in censuses in the United States and
elsewhere challenges a positivist reading of censuses as an objective indicator of identity.
This is part of the larger constructivist turn in the literature on race, nationalism, and
ethnic identity, which views these categories as socially constructed, and changeable (Leets,
Clement, and Giles, 1996). However, census results are still routinely used in quantitative
studies of ethnicity. The reliance on ethnic, racial, and national categories in census results
is useful and helps to identify diversity, yet bears the risk of “methodological nationalism,”
of naturalizing the nation (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002). Thus, scholars of race and nationalism
have to reflect on how to “document and analyze racial identity without reifying race
as a social construct” (Rockquemore, Brunsma, and Delgado, 2009:14). Studying censuses
as a site of identity contestation by critically observing the mechanisms through which
states and ethnic entrepreneurs construct these identities and the responses of citizens can
be an effective approach in addressing this challenge.

876 Social Science Quarterly
There is a consensus among constructivist approaches that censuses are not mere statistical
exercises, but are rather inherently political. Nobles argues that “census bureaus are political
actors that help to make race a political reality and do not simply count by it” (2000:22).
The significance of the counting is derived from the social reality a census produces (Kertzer
and Arel, 2002:5; Goldscheider, 2002:72; Hirschman, 1987:557).
The census first shapes identity politics by “normalizing” race, ethnicity, or religion
and asking citizens to self-identify when they otherwise might not do so. Here, Pierre
Bourdieu’s assertion, made in the context of public opinion, equally applies to censuses:
“[O]ne of the most pernicious effects of the opinion surveys is to put people in a position
where they must answer a question they have never thought about, or mistakenly answer a
different question from that which was asked, the interpretation only being a record of the
misunderstand” (1979:125). Hence, we need to reflect on the categories, as well as their
assumptions, rather than just their specific content.
Second, censuses set the boundaries by determining which categories are legitimate and
implicitly exist. Nobles remarks: “Census-taking is one of the institutional mechanisms
by which racial boundaries are set” (2000:xi). Thus, if censuses ask about nation, race,
religion, or language they engage in boundary making. Boundary making also presupposes
a certain degree of homogenization of the groups circumscribed by these boundaries
(Appadurai, 1996:133). Particular policies can be directed at the group, suggesting that
its members have a certain degree of homogeneity. This assumption has been repeatedly
challenged, particularly when it comes to Roma communities in Central and Eastern Europe
(Vermeersch, 2003:897–98). Of course, this process is not completed with the questions
citizens are asked, but also occurs in their subsequent interpretation and categorization
(Cohen, 1987:243, 248). Scholars have also noted the importance of the census procedure
itself, which includes factors such as the background of the enumerators (Rallu, Piché, and
Simon, 2004:502, Rodríguez, 2000:135.)
Third, censuses rank identities. This might occur, as Hirschman (1987:563) notes in
his discussion of Malaysian census categories, by changing position of particular identities
in the ordering of the census categories, or their eventual inclusion in a residual category
of “Others.” Especially if censuses enumerate a limited number of categories, inclusion or
exclusion bestows a distinct value on an identity.
Fourth, census results can be linked to entitlements and group rights. From the policies of
affirmative action in the United States, to minority language thresholds based on the size of
a minority population, the size of a community matters (Kertzer and Arel, 2002:25). This
observation links the larger argument that institutional frameworks for groups empower
ethnic entrepreneurs in the process of mobilizing and reinforcing groups (Hale, 2000;
Roeder, 2007).
Uses of Racial Category
In addition to the functions of categorization, their purpose also is crucial. In the U.S.
census, there has been a shift from being a tool to uphold racial segregation toward enabling
affirmative action policies. In a comparative perspective, Rallu, Piché, and Simon (2004)
have argued that the choice to ask or not to ask citizens about ethnic, racial, or national
identity is based on four different approaches.
1. Counting to dominate.
2. Not counting for the goal of national integration.
3. Counting or not counting to acknowledge the diverse nature of the population.
4. Counting to justify policies to support minorities.

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 877
These policies closely correlate to the types of states, from colonial or ethnocracies (1),
and republican systems, to multicultural or consociational systems (Smooha, 2002:426).
This categorization leaves out most of the post-Communists countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. As noted above, most countries distinguish their citizens along national
or ethnic lines. However, this approach is curious mixture of 1 and 4. On one hand, the
counting asserts the nation-state and the dominant nation, yet, on the other hand, counting
also gives minority rights to ethnic or national minorities. This apparent tension is partly a
result of external demands that have modified nation-building projects, in particular E.U.
membership (or desire to join), and a dense network of international legal obligations in the
field of human and minority rights (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Furthermore,
minority rights do not inherently challenge the nation-state, as they affirm a hierarchy of
nations (majority and minorities), and the concept of an ethnically defined nation (i.e.,
nations based on the presumption of common ancestry).
Identity Packages
Most censuses often ask several questions about an individual’s identity, such as race, national,
ethnic identity, ancestry, country of origin, religion, or language (U.N., 2014). Some
of them can be determined objectively, such as country of origin, citizenship, or mother
tongue, while others are profoundly subjective, such as race or ethnicity. Importantly, these
categories interact with one another, and are productively examined together.
The identity categories can be centrifugal or centripetal. In centrifugal identity combinations
identification with one identity reduces the relevance of another category. For
example, in the 2000 U.S. census, 40 percent of Hispanic respondents identified themselves
as belonging to the racial category of “others.” In total, 97.5 percent of the “other” racial
category were Hispanic respondents (Rodríguez, 2000:7–12). As Rodríguez argues, many
Hispanics have a different understanding of race than is commonly used in the United
States, and many find the rigid dominant race categories inappropriate for themselves.
On the other hand, in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe we can observe
centripetal identity dynamics, which I describe as identity packages. Here, language and/or
religion are closely linked to a particular nation. In fact, they are often used as proxies for
national identity. Thus, Filatov and Lunkin note for Russia that what “produces the highest
figures for religious adherence is the widely applied ‘ethnic’ principle” (2006:33). Religion
is not a marker of individual identity, but is, instead, closely linked to national or ethnic
identity. Like religion, language is often treated as a proxy for nationality, and is defined in
rigid categories not allowing for ambiguity (Arel, 2002:95).
Consequently, some scholars have observed that ethnic entrepreneurs do not only seek to
advance a particular national or ethnic identity, but also a particular religion and language.
Bernard S. Cohn (1987:250) notes in his study of the Indian census how a leaflet of
the Hindu reform movement Arya Samaj in Lahore in 1931 called on people to make a
particular choice in terms of religion, sect, language, caste, and race. As we shall see, similar
dynamics can be observed in post-Yugoslav censuses.
Mixing and Multiple Identities
In debates about race, until the 1970s, mixing and multiple identities were often viewed
as negative (Nobles, 2000:56–70). Since then, this conceptualization has changed. Now,
multiple identities are not only perceived less negatively, but those who have a mixed

878 Social Science Quarterly
heritage have also achieved a greater sense of agency (Rodríguez, 2000:40). Thus, following
extensive consultations during the 1990s, the concept of mixed racial origin returned to
the U.S. census in 2000. The census bureau did not introduce a single multiracial category,
but rather allowed individuals to choose several racial identities (Nobles, 2000:82). Since
then, the group of citizens with a multiracial background became the largest growing group
(Shih and Sanchez, 2009:40).
This follows a broader trend that allows for the identification with multiple racial
identities. Similar trends began in Canada in 1996, and most Latin American countries
have taken a more fluid understanding of ethnicity or race that is based less on absolute
categories, and instead on degrees (Nobles, 2000:86–87).
Rather than forming a new, distinct identity, multiracial identities are a highlighted
variable. They are contingent on social, spatial, and cultural experiences, and subject to
switching and individual changes (Rockquemore, Brunsma, and Delgado, 2009:20–22).
These insights gained from multiracial identities in the United States have not been transferred
into other multiethnic contexts that are often presumed to be more static. However,
studies of Yugoslav identity identify similar features (Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson, 1994;
Isailović, 2011)
The debates over multiracial identity also have elicited distinction between racial identities
(i.e., self-identification, racial identification by others) and racial categorization, the
chosen identity based on a particular context, including census (Rockquemore, 2009:27–
28). This triad of identities applies also to national identities and can easily be understood
outside the context of multiracial identity. Applying it to the post-Yugoslav context, an
individual with a Serb father and a Croat mother (the two nations that are most represented
in mixed marriages) living in Belgrade would most likely be identified by fellow
citizens as a Serb, considering the small numbers of Croats in Belgrade. However, she might
self-identify as having no distinct national identity, and, instead, identify as European. In
terms of the census, she might opt for the category of Serb, but when going to the Croatian
embassy to apply for a Croatian passport to facilitate traveling, she would present herself as
a Croat. Such multiple and contextual identifications, identities, and categories are in fact
commonplace in the post-Yugoslav context.
Contestation
Beyond the changing categories and underlying conceptions, recent scholarship has
also increasingly acknowledged and studied the process of categorization as a debate and
contest between state bureaucracies and social actors, like minority groups, parties, NGOs,
or ethnic entrepreneurs. As Melissa Nobles notes, “the [census] bureau is a gatekeeper to
particular groups and can be used, but also be the result of pressure from social movements”
(2000:20).
Rather than just the expression of state power or imposition, the categories are a reflection
of the understanding of identity categories by policymakers, and, often, society at large.
In particular, in democratic pluralist societies, this process matters. This has been well
illustrated by the debates occurring prior to the 2000 U.S. census, including the rejection
of multiracial categories by civil rights organizations such as the NACCP (Anderson
and Fienberg, 1999:173). As Nobles notes, “movement leaders use the census to create
identities as much as to energize preexisting identities, yet securing a new census category
and galvanizing self-conscious group of people . . . ” (2000:130).
The focus of research on censuses in recent decades has been the United States, the post-
Soviet states, and the postcolonial states. The emphasis placed on the United States is partly

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 879
the result of the long and uninterrupted conduct of censuses since its establishment, as well
as the accessibility of data to researchers. However, the United States is, in many aspects,
an outlier, as race is only used in 15 percent of countries, whereas ethnicity and nationality
are used by 56 percent and 23 percent, respectively (Morning, 2008:247). The post-Soviet
context, including Russia, is characterized by highly complex and numerous categories
that are a consequence of the strong emphasis on ethno-national identity in the Soviet
Union (Stepanov, 2005). The last Soviet Census of 1989 had 823 ethnonyms, which were
reduced to 128 official nationalities (Uvin, 2002:185). Even the Yugoslav system, which
gave great emphasis to ethnic markers, and was conducted in a complex environment, was
far removed from such numbers. In 1981, the Yugoslav-wide census results listed “just” 10
nations at the state level. Furthermore, much attention has been paid to cases with very
rigid categories that extend beyond censuses. In Rwanda, for example, the census was just
one tool among many used to shape rigid boundaries between Tutsis and Hutus, including
indicating ethnicity on ID cards, which proved fatal for many during the 1994 genocide
(Abramson, 2002). Europe has received comparatively little attention in scholarship on
censuses. This is, of course, partly because large parts of Europe have been considerably
more homogenous, at least until the onset of mass immigration, than most countries in
Africa or Asia. Although there is a clear West-East gap with ethnicity or nationality widely
asked in Central and Eastern Europe and only occasionally in Western Europe, many
European countries do not ask about race, nationality, or ethnic belonging (UNECE,
2014, Morning, 2008:246, 263).
Beyond the fact that there has been relatively little research on censuses and their results
in post-Yugoslav cases, 1 or post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe, the identity
contestation and debates have been largely confined to the United States, and a few
comparative cases.
The Cases
The article will seek to answer the above-mentioned hypothesis by analyzing the censuses
in the post-Yugoslav countries. 2 By 2013, all post-Yugoslav countries had held at least one
census. Most held their first census in 2001–2002, and once more a decade later, in line
with the general timing of censes. Only Macedonia held an earlier census in 1994, but
abandoned the one that was to take place in 2011 (Daskalovski, 2013). Bosnia and Kosovo
held their first census since the end of Yugoslavia in 2013 and 2011, respectively, as earlier
censuses had been impossible due to the postconflict context.
The analysis of the post-Yugoslav censuses is relevant for several reasons. First, they largely
reflect the wider identity patterns in Central and Eastern Europe, with national identity
being defined along ethnic origins, mostly as dominant majorities with several recognized
minorities. In this context, the censuses reflect the larger regional patterns of asking about
1 Exceptions include Daskalovski (2013), Jović (2011), Visoka and Gjevori (2013) and, for the Yugoslav
period, Burg and Berbaum (1989) and Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson (1994).
2 The 2011 Slovenian census was register based and contains no information about national or
religious identity and is thus excluded from consideration (Jović, 2011:40). The results from the
Bosnian census have also not been realized at the point of completion of this article (March 2015).
All census data in the article are taken from the countries’ statistical offices. For Montenegro:
http://www.monstat.org/cg/page.php?id=322&pageid=322; for Serbia: http://popis2011.stat.rs/?lang=cir;
for Croatia: http://www.dzs.hr/; for Kosovo: http://ask.rks-gov.net/rekos2011/?cid=1,1. All data from the
1991 census and earlier Yugoslav censuses are taken from the Yugoslav Statistical Office (Savezni Zavod,
1998).

880 Social Science Quarterly
national, religious, and linguistic identities. In addition, the post-Yugoslav censuses also
shed light on identities in flux, particularly the response of citizens to four challenges.
1. State dissolution: With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, one source of identity disappeared
and forced people to reconsider their identity.
2. New nation-states: All states that have emerged from Yugoslavia define themselves,
either implicitly or explicitly as nation-states containing one or several nations. Thus,
individuals must relate their identity to the larger dominant categories.
3. Reifying national identities: The conflicts in former Yugoslavia reified ethnic identities
through violence and political arrangements that emphasize ethnicity in institutions.
Thus, belonging to a nation matters, both symbolically and in terms of specific
political entitlements.
4. Emergence of new categories: With the dissolution of the Yugoslavian state and emergence
of new states, old categories have been largely abandoned (e.g., Yugoslavs,
Muslims), or had their meanings changed, while new categories have been adopted
(e.g., Bosniaks). A key question is the degree to which these changes, the result of
top-down processes, have been accepted.
Census results and national identity have been politicized in the context of the dissolution
of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars. Census results have justified territorial claims,
ethnic exclusion, and worse. Thus, we are able to explore peacetime censuses taken in
a highly politicized context. All countries explored here have a similar historical legacy
of census taking and the categorization of identities during Yugoslav times, allowing for
cross-country comparisons.
Rather than just mapping out the controversies over the census, this article maps out
different ways in which citizens chose not to adhere to the predominant or desired identity
categories, and argues that while those “not fitting in” varies greatly across the region,
overall they constitute a significant and neglected community that does not fit into the
easy ethno-nationalist matrix. Thus, rather than just understanding the census as a site of
contestation between the state and minority groups or kin states, this article brings in the
citizen, who might or might not follow the arguments of either the state or respective ethnonational
community leaders. Here, we argue that the creation of categories and linking
particular forms of identity is not just a feature of state policy, but is also the product
of ethnic entrepreneurs who seek to impose varying levels of control on their respective
communities. Although results vary across the region, it emerges that, often, citizens follow
neither the state categories, nor those given by their supposed ethno-national leaders.
Historical Background
Until the end of the 19th century, the two dominant empires in Southeastern Europe,
the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, viewed their subjects not through the
lens of nationhood, but religion. The first Ottoman census was taken in 1830–1831, and
as a result of the difficulty in modernizing the census, the Ottoman Empire was unable to
conduct its second complete census until 1905–1906. The empire categorized its citizens
according to the recognized religious communities, while ethnicity or nationality remained
unknown (Shaw, 1978). The first census in the Habsburg Monarchy dates to the mid-
18th century and, by 1880, censuses were held regularly every 10 years. The Habsburg
Monarchy, while challenged by competing nationalisms, only asked about religion and the
language used by the citizens, and not their mother tongue (Van der Plank, 2012).

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 881
The new nation-states conducted censuses more regularly, and also endorsed the concept
of nationality. Thus, Serbia, even prior to full independence in 1878, conducted regular
censuses starting in 1834, and began asking about national identity, as well as religion and
mother tongue, in 1866. At the time, Serbia was a largely homogenous nation-state, with
the largest minorities being the Vlach and Roma (Vuletić, 2012).
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes introduced national categories in the first
census held in the interwar period in 1921. The categories according to which citizens
could identify were limited to the recognized majorities (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) and
minorities. In 1931, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in an effort to establish a unified Yugoslav
national identity, did not provide for national categories, but reverted to only linguistic or
religious identification of earlier censuses.
Nationality, as a constant and regular category, entered the censuses in socialist Yugoslavia
only after World War II. As socialist Yugoslavia was founded on the recognition of different
nations and republics, a large number of new identity categories became available. The
core nations of the new country were Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Serbs, and
Macedonians. Previously, Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats had been well-accepted national
identities, while Macedonians had not been recognized as a distinct nation. The recognition
in the censuses after 1945 reflected the state policy of recognizing Macedonians as a
constitutive nation of Yugoslavia with its own language, and later, its own Orthodox
Church. While censuses previously considered Montenegrins as a distinct part of the Serb
nation, socialist Yugoslavia recognized a separate nation of Montenegrins. Even so, this
nation was understood in the early socialist period to be closely linked to Serb identity.
Socialist Yugoslavia also recognized ethnic groups that were not the core nations of the new
state, including Hungarians and Albanians, as categories of official nationalities equivalent
to minorities.
Categories of citizens that were offered were subject to change based on the countries’
policies toward the “national question.” The two groups that experienced the most frequent
redefinitions in socialist censuses were Muslims and Yugoslavs. By the early 1970s, Muslims
would be understood as a distinct nation composed of Muslim Slavs who spoke Serbo-
Croatian. This group, mostly living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the adjacent Sandžak
region straddling Montenegro and Serbia, was first considered “undecided” (1948), followed
by “undecided Yugoslavs—Muslims” (1953), “Muslims in the ethnic sense,” and
finally, from 1971 onward, as a nation equal to other core Yugoslav nations as “Muslims.”
Yugoslavs were another category of changing meanings. Until 1961, the category of “Yugoslavs”
was treated as a residual category of individuals who did not identify with the
nations of Yugoslavs (Isailović, 2011).
Until 1971, the category of Yugoslavs was mostly the choice of preference among
Muslims, who did not have a distinct national category of their own. In fact, the state
policy was to promote the distinctiveness of Muslims from Serb and Croat national identity.
(Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson, 1994). With the recognition of a distinct Muslim nation,
the meaning of the Yugoslav category shifted. It was still not promoted by the state, but an
increasing number of citizens identified as Yugoslavs. The instructions for the 1981 census
reveal this reluctance in acknowledging Yugoslavs: “if a citizen wishes to record Yugoslav as
an answer to this question, the census taker is obliged to record even that answer, although
by this the citizen does not declare membership in a nation or nationality” (cited from Burg
and Berbaum, 1989:538). The peak was reached in 1981, when 5.8 percent of citizens
self-identified as Yugoslavs. These Yugoslavs were particularly prevalent in urban centers
and in Bosnia (8.4 percent), Croatia (8.8 percent), and Vojvodina, the northern province
of Serbia (8.5 percent). As Sekulić Massey and Hodson noted (1994:94–95), the three

882 Social Science Quarterly
dominant factors explaining Yugoslav self-identification during this period were residence
in urban centers, membership in the Communist Party, and parents of mixed background.
Throughout the socialist period, censuses were based on self-identification. Thus, for
example, in the last Yugoslav census of 1991, the questions about national identity, religion,
and mother tongue were left open.
Besides Yugoslavs and Muslims, smaller minorities experienced considerable numerical
shifts during the socialist periods. These changes were not the result of demographic
changes, but rather of ethnic mimicry (i.e., the self-identification with categories other
than one’s own background due to external factors). This remains particularly noticeable
among Roma, whose numbers in censuses consistently lay well below those estimated by
the state and experts (Guijzings, 2000:147–50).
The last Yugoslav census was held in March 1991, few months prior to Slovenia’s and
Croatia’s declaration of independence in June, amidst growing tensions in the country.
These tensions were also reflected in the census. The number of Yugoslavs declined by
nearly half to 3.01 percent of the population, still larger in number than Montenegrins
or Hungarians. However, the collapse of the League of Communists, and the capture of
the Yugoslav project by Slobodan Milošević, contributed to the decline of its popularity.
Furthermore, the Albanian population of Kosovo boycotted the census in 1991, in protest
against Serb dominance, and the abolition of the province’s autonomy two years earlier.
State Categories
As argued above, censuses constitute a site in which the ethnic entrepreneurs negotiate
identity categories and their salience. The state, as in the case of the post-Yugoslav censuses,
as well as elsewhere, is hardly a neutral arbiter of identities. Prior to the 1990s, different
states offered varying categories depending on their self-conception as a multinational,
multireligious, or nation-state.
By offering particular choices, states co-determine the outcome and shape the discourse
over identity. The formulation of questions asked in census forms, and the categories
offered, do not take place in a vacuum, and the ability of the state to arbitrarily determine
categories is constrained.
In addition to the categories created in the census, the role of the state (i.e., the timing
and enumerators) is also crucial in the process of census. This is particularly true in the case
of substantial minorities, who often speak a different language than the majority and have
a legacy of conflict. The recruitment of minority enumerators is thus important, yet this
does not address potential intragroup pressures or tensions among different minorities.
Finally, in addition to the categories at the point of census taking, the categorizations
employed in the census results matter. Here, the state has to decide which categories to
aggregate, and which to ignore or subsume into larger categories. Thus, the identity-shaping
role of the state extends well beyond the census categories, which we will focus on here.
There are three sources that constrain the choices of states: (1) established patterns (i.e.,
the way in which these categories existed in the past, as reflected through past censuses
and the legal framework); (2) social expectations and debate, informed not only by the
dominant community, but also by minorities, in as much as they are able to articulate
themselves; and (3) E.U. and international standards that are aspired to by the states, and
that dictate certain procedures and categories.
The current categories provided in all post-Yugoslav censuses have evolved continuously
since the first postwar census held in Socialist Yugoslavia in 1948.

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 883
Although most post-Yugoslav states often sought to break with the Yugoslavia legacy,
census categories remained largely unchanged. Unlike earlier critical junctures—the establishment
of nation-states and the two world wars—that brought ruptures in the census
categories, the dissolution of Yugoslavia occurred along existing internal borders and even
the new states inherited the institutions and the international patterns of the republics.
While the states reconfigured the hierarchy of nations, granting greater power to the dominant
nation in new constitutions (especially in Croatia and Macedonia), no successor state
denied recognition to minorities (Jović, 2011). In the first postindependence census held
in the early 2000s, the old categories largely remained, with minor shifts. Thus, following
a decision of Muslim intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, the name of the
Muslims changed to Bosniaks to create a greater distinction for religious identity and also
assert greater ownership over the Bosnian state (Dimitrovova, 2001). All post-Yugoslav
states followed this shift by allowing their citizens to identify as Bosniaks, even if not all
Muslims followed suit.
The new nation-states that replaced Yugoslavia often introduced new identity categories,
resulting in the often-deliberate fragmentation of minorities. In the 1990s, highlighting
smaller minorities also served to downplay larger communities. Serbia, under Milošević,
recognized the Egyptian and Ashkali minorities distinct from Roma, as well as the Slav
Muslim Gorani in Kosovo and Bunjevci, and the Catholic South Slavs like the Croats in
the northern province of Vojvodina.
Subsequently, as we shall see in more detail in the next sections, census categories
are shaped by public debate, in addition to historical patterns. Political parties, religious
leaders, and NGOs have taken an active part in both seeking to determine the categories,
and subsequently in mobilizing citizens to make particular identity choices.
Finally, international standards and the monitoring of the European Union have also
shaped the conduct of the census, including the construction of categories. In part, this can
be attributed to the European Union’s professional standards and networks of statistical
offices, and to the external assistance and financial support provided to the census in
the region by the European Union. E.U. engagement has been particularly significant, as
the European Union has a particular interest in supporting the development of reliable
statistics in potential member states. As a result, it has provided expertise and established
the Technical Coordination Group (TGC) ahead of the censuses in 2009, with census
offices in all countries of the Western Balkans. The European Union and United Nations
not only provided advice on the censuses, but also established monitoring missions at the
request of the governments in Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia. In Kosovo,
with a strong international presence and a controversial census due to the contested nature
of Kosovo’s statehood, the E.U. official in charge of the census met with the prime minister
Hashim Thaçi and the International Monitoring Mission (composed of E.U. and U.N.
officials) to publicly declare the questions posed on national identity and religion to be in
line with international standards (Collaku, 2011). The approach taken by the European
Union, which had funded and observed the first post-Yugoslav census in Macedonia in
1994, focused on the census as a neutral statistical exercise. Viktor Friedman noted the gap
between the international observers’ technical understanding of the census and the deeply
political and contested significance it held domestically (1994:84).
Macedonia and Kosovo’s constitutions both contain provisions linking political representation
to population share and group rights, and, as a result, there is clearly an internationally
sanctioned constitutional logic to determining the citizens’ national identity. Generally
speaking, considering the international mediation of the constitutional arrangements in
Bosnia, international and E.U. standards on census neither require questions asking about

884 Social Science Quarterly
national or religious identity, nor particularly discourage them. E.U. and U.N. guidelines
on census note that the questions regarding national and religious identity should be open
and voluntary. The practice in Europe is broad, and state policies vary greatly, ranging
from not asking about national identity, to voluntary questions, to closed questions (Perry,
2013:8–10).
Significantly, the U.N. census recommendations note that the category of ethnicity
should allow for multiple identities. This recommendation is followed by only a few
countries, including those in our case studies. It also notes that “no internationally relevant
criteria or classification can be recommended” (U.N., 2008:140; UNECE, 2006:96) due
to the diversity of groups and the difficulties of establishing universal categories; such
categories have to be context specific.
The state-led census process reflected these three, sometimes conflicting, features. All
countries under consideration here asked about the respondent’s ethnicity or nationality,
as well as religion and mother tongue.
In analyzing the questionnaires, we need to consider the following questions
1. To what degree are the different identity questions linked?
2. Were there specific choices of questions offered, and what opportunities for opting
out existed?
3. To what degree was the indication of identity voluntary?
While the Yugoslav census had offered an open, write-in question for national identity,
mother tongue, and religion, and did not require citizens to answer the national identity
question, the post-Yugoslav censuses vary in some aspects.
They all list the three questions on national identity, mother tongue, and religion
together—usually following the question on citizenship. This suggests a nexus between the
questions. 3
This link is most explicit in Serbia and Macedonia. This link is apparent in the Macedonian
law on the abandoned 2011 census, which determines that the census will identify
“ethnic characteristics, including ‘national identity, mother tongue, and religion’” (Zakon
za popis, 2010:Art. 9). Similarly, in Serbia, questions about national belonging, language,
and religion are grouped together under the heading “ethnic markers.”
Even where such an explicit link does not exist, the connection is clear. The order on
all forms was first national or ethnic identity, followed by either language or religion,
creating a logical flow from national identity to other identity markers. Thus, religion and
language are suggested to be a function of national/ethnic identity, 4 rather than distinctive
and discreet individual markers of identity. This linkage was also criticized by NGOs
advocating secularization in Serbia (Krstić, 2013) (Table 1).
Greater variation existed in the degree to which the categories are predetermined. Croatia
used the most narrowly predetermined form, with the only identity category explicitly offered
being the dominant majority (Croat, Catholic, Croatian language) and other options
having to be stated by the citizen enumerated. Serbia, on the other hand, predetermines no
categories on the form, and all three responses are to be written in, which closest resembles
the Yugoslav census practice. Bosnia and Kosovo follow the Croatian approach by offering
3 For the census forms from Montenegro, see http://www.monstat.org/userfiles/file/popis2011/POPISNICA
%202011.pdf. For Bosnia, see http://www2.rzs.rs.ba/static/uploads/popis/obrasci/Obrazac_P1.pdf. For Serbia,
see http://media.popis2011.stat.rs/2011/obrasci/Popisnica-latinica.pdf. For Croatia, see http://www.dzs.
hr/Hrv/censuses/census2011/forms/P1-WEB.PDF. For Kosovo, see http://ask.rks-gov.net/rekos2011/
repository/docs/R3ENG.pdf (in English).
4 The terminology varies between national identity and ethnic belonging. Such variation does not arise when
asking for mother tongue or religion.

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 885
TABLE 1
Categories and Main Identity Groups in Post-Yugoslav Censuses in 2011/2013 a
Combined/ Largest Largest Largest
Categorization and Closed Ethno-National Groups Religious Communities Mother Tongue
Options Offered Categories (Above 1 Percent) (Above 1 Percent) (Above 1 Percent)
Croatia Nationality: Croat/Other
Mother tongue: Croatian/Other
Religion: Catholic/Other/Not
believer/Undeclared
Combined Croats: 90.42 percent
Serbs: 4.36 percent
Catholics: 86.28 percent
Orthodox: 4.44 percent
Not religious or atheists:
3.81 percent
Not declared: 2.17 percent
Croatian: 95.60 percent
Serbian: 1.23 percent
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Ethnic/national declaration:
Bosniak, Croat, Serb, Undeclared,
Other write in, not
mandatory
Religion: Islam, Catholicism, Orthodoxy,
Agnostic, Atheist,
Undeclared, Other (write in),
not mandatory
Mother tongue: Bosnian, Croatian,
Serbian, write in
Combined n/a n/a n/a
Serbia National affiliation, open, not
mandatory
Mother tongue, open
Religion, open, not mandatory
Open Serbs: 83.32 percent
Hungarian: 3.53 percent
Roma: 2.05 percent
Bosniaks: 2.02 percent
Orthodox: 84.59 percent
Catholic: 4.97 percent
Muslim: 3.10 percent
Not religious or atheist:
1.11 percent
Serbian: 88.09 percent
Hungarian: 3.34
Bosnian: 1.93 percent
Roma: 1.40 percent
Continued

886 Social Science Quarterly
TABLE 1
Continued
Combined/ Largest Largest Largest
Categorization and Closed Ethno-National Groups Religious Communities Mother Tongue
Options Offered Categories (Above 1 Percent) (Above 1 Percent) (Above 1 Percent)
Kosovo Cultural background: Albanian,
Serb, Turkish, Bosniak,
Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian,
Goran (Other and prefer not
to answer)
Religion: Islamic, Orthodox,
Catholic (Other, no religion,
prefer not to answer)
Mother tongue: Albanian, Serb,
Turkish, Bosnian, Romani,
Other specify
Combined Albanians: 92.9 percent
Bosniaks: 1.6 percent
Serbs: 1.5 percent b
Turkish: 1.1 percent
Islam: 95.6 percent
Catholic: 2.2 percent
Orthodox: 1.48 percent
Albanian: 94.5 percent
Bosnian: 1.7 percent
Serbian: 1.6 percent
Turkish: 1.1 percent
Montenegro Nation or ethnic belonging,
open list
Religion, open list
Mother tongue, open list
(suggestion Montenegrin,
Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian,
Croatia, or other)
Open Montenegrins: 44.98 percent
Serbs: 28.73 percent
Bosniaks: 8.65 percent
Albanians: 4.91 percent
Muslims: 3.31 percent
Orthodox: 72.07 percent
Muslim: 19.11 percent
Catholic: 3.44 percent
Atheist: 1.24 percent
Serbian: 42.88 percent
Montenegrin: 36.97 percent
Bosnian: 5.33 percent
Albanian: 5.27 percent
a Macedonia is not included as the census was not completed and the census form is not available.
b Serbs in the north of Kosovo boycotted the census; thus the result is unreliable for ethnicity, religion, and language in regard to Serb, Orthodox, and Serbian
self-identification.

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 887
categories. Bosnia follows the logic of the trinational state (Bosniak, Serb, Croat; Islam,
Orthodox, Catholic; and Bosnian, Serbian, and Croat, respectively), while in Kosovo all
of the recognized identity groups are listed. Lastly, the census of Montenegro only offers
options for languages (Montenegrin, Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian, Croatian, or any other
language), but not for national identity or religion.
All census forms have an additional write-in category for other identities in the categories
of religion, language, and national identity, and the possibility to remain undeclared in
answering the question on national identity and religion.
While Croatia did not allow for multiple identities (Jović, 2011:41), Montenegro and
Serbia did allow for such self-identification, although this is not noted explicitly on the
form. While all permit write-in categories, and citizens are not precluded from identifying
themselves with several groups, such categories are neither offered, nor do the forms
explicitly offer such a choice.
Finally, the level to which citizens can opt out varies among censuses. In all countries,
national identity was a voluntary category (although it was not explicitly marked as such
in Croatia), and religion was a voluntary category in all cases except Montenegro.
The forms and the categories they establish also offer an insight into the state selfconception,
and how the state negotiates the three constraints on the categorization noted
above. It is no surprise to scholars of Southeastern Europe that national identity is determined
by not just self-identification with a nation, but also through religion and language.
This may be done explicitly, as in Macedonia and Serbia, or implicitly, as done elsewhere.
Thus, the census forms not only reflect these common understandings of identity, but also
reaffirm them through posing leading questions to respondents. The questionnaires also
reveal the degree to which a state defines itself as a nation-state or otherwise. While Croatia
offers only the options of Croat–Croatian–Catholic as predetermined identity categories,
others leave more space. When the state gives great constitutional weight to identity, the
legally relevant categories are listed, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo. Thus, Croatia emerges
as a nation-state, whereas Kosovo and Bosnia are clearly multinational states with group
rights, and Montenegro and Serbia leave some space for a more or less rigid understanding
of identity. The largely voluntary nature of these identity markers is both a legacy of the
socialist Yugoslav censuses and the international standards.
Census Election Campaigns
Continuing our inquiry into the census as a site of contestation, we now turn to social
actors who seek to shape the outcome of the census. These are primarily ethnic entrepreneurs
who are invested in the identity-specific outcome of the census. These include NGOs,
political parties, and religious and cultural institutions, such as the Serb National Council
in Croatia, mentioned at the beginning of the article.
It is a common adage that in divided societies, such as Bosnia, elections resemble censuses,
with voting patterns following ethnic lines. While this is often true, censuses, in turn, also
resemble elections. Campaigns are held, politicians and public figures call for citizens to
make particular choices, and the results have political consequences (Jović, 2011).
There are three key reasons why political actors care about censuses. First, census results
serve as a basis for concrete legal entitlements. In most post-Yugoslav countries, the local
share of minority populations translates into specific linguistic or educational minority
rights, and possible access to political representation. Thus, minority representatives have a
vested interest in securing a high number of minorities in particular regions. In the Croatian

888 Social Science Quarterly
city of Vukovar, for example, the number of Serbs determined the use of Cyrillic for local
use (Vesti, 2012). In Macedonia, at the state and the municipal level, the threshold of 20
percent guarantees far-reaching rights, including official use of the minority language and
special veto rights among others.
In other cases, the entitlements might not be legally binding, but numerical strength is
crucial for making claims and symbolic entitlement. The main distinction that numbers
provide is between being a minority and holding a claim to co-ownership of the state.
For example, the demands of Serb political parties in Montenegro to have Serb identity
recognized as constituent people equal to Montenegrins, or the fear of Croat parties and
groups in Bosnia that the status of Croats as constituent people might be endangered by
low numbers.
Finally, the group size provides for political capital and legitimacy to parties and organizations
claiming to represent these groups. For example, in Bosnia a large number
Bosnians would undermine the claims of ethno-nationalist parties to be the only legitimate
representatives of the different communities.
With the significance of census results established, we can turn to the strategies of ethnic
entrepreneurs at censuses. In addition to shaping the categories, as noted above, the main
activity of these ethnic entrepreneurs has been threefold: challenging censuses, mobilizing
their constituencies, and seeking to broaden their base.
Contestation
The threat of boycott and challenging the census process has been a frequent strategy
employed by ethnic entrepreneurs. As noted earlier, Albanians in Kosovo boycotted the
1991 Yugoslav census. Serbs, in turn, largely boycotted the Kosovo census in 2011. As a
result, the last reliable census for Kosovo dates back to 1981. In their recent article, Visoka
and Gjevori (2013) have argued that censuses in Southeastern Europe experience four
levels of contestation: marginal, partial, extensive, and full. Marginal contestation implies
few challenges by organized groups. A partially contested census is challenged by at least
one minority group. A significant boycott of the census by an important minority could
be considered an extensive contestation. A fully contested census means that the census is
abandoned due to strong resistance. The four-pronged categorization allows the authors
to characterize the 2011 censuses in Serbia and Montenegro as marginally contested, the
census in Albania as partially contested, the census in Kosovo as extensively contested, and
the Macedonian census fully contested.
However, contestation itself can be controversial and contested. Minorities are rarely
monolithic actors, and outside the context of authoritarian repression (as during the 1990s
in Serbia), the motives for boycotts are not always accepted. For example, in Sandžak,
Muamer Zukorlić, an influential leader of the Islamic community, called on Bosniaks to
boycott the census. Two key parties of Bosniaks, both in the Serbian government at the
time, supported the census (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2011). Similarly in Kosovo, Serbs
in the north followed the call of the Serbian government to boycot the count, whereas
some Serbs in central Kosovo followed the advice of the Serb Independent Liberal Party,
which was represented in the Kosovo government, to participate (Barlovac, 2011). The
contestation within minority communities sheds light on the fact that censuses are not
just controversial between minorities and the state, but especially today, as minority parties
regularly participate in government in Southeastern Europe, differences also emerge within
minority groups.

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 889
Mobilizing the Group
The particularity of the census election campaigns is similar to the broader dynamics
Donald Horowitz outlined regarding political campaigning in divided societies (Horowitz,
2000:333–64). If group boundaries are well defined, and fairly stable, the census campaign
will seek less to convince others to join the group, but rather to mobilize the predefined
community. Ethnic entrepreneurs are not natural proselytizers. Even though censuses are
a mandatory exercise, ethnic entrepreneurs can only increase group size by either lobbying
with the state for particular categories, or by supporting voting for ethnic kin who are
temporarily (or permanently) abroad. Most importantly, ethnic entrepreneurs will seek to
maximize the count by ensuring group coherence, and preventing individuals from “opting
out” like the self-declared Martian in the beginning of the article. Though the goal of the
census might be positioning groups toward others and reinforcing the boundary between
them, the main target of campaigning is within the group itself, and the biggest challenge
arises not from others, but rather from “within.”
Essentially, when group boundaries are relatively firm, the main challenge to group
coherence arises from those opting out of the group entirely, or at least rejecting or choosing
not to identify with a particular identity package, such as the linkage between national or
ethnic identity, religion, and language. In such instances, there is always the option to join
another group, or altogether reject the existing categories and choose a fictional group or
none at all.
Competition Among Groups
If group boundaries are less firm, election campaigning is focused on the “undecided.”
There are numerous examples of fluid identity boundaries in Southeastern Europe, falling
into three categories: (1) fluid identities between different national identities due to either
shifts in their self-perception or high levels of congruence (i.e., in terms of language,
religion, and so forth) with other ethnonational groups; (2) fluid boundaries between
minorities and local majorities, based on assimilation or mimicry by minorities; or (3) fluid
identities between state and national identity. Examples of fluid group identities are Serb
and Montenegrin identity, between Bosniak and Muslim identities in Sandzak and Croatia,
between Bunjevci and Croats in Vojvodina, and Vlachs and Romanians in Eastern Serbia.
Campaigning was particularly pronounced in Montenegro, as supporters of Montenegrin
identity sought to reaffirm the identity that had experienced a sharp decline since the early
1990s, but also managed to establish an independent state in 2006. Likewise, Serb ethnic
entrepreneurs (like parties whose legitimacy rests on claiming to represent Serbs, or the
Serbian Orthodox Church, which is locked in a conflict with the Montenegrin Orthodox
Church) also engaged in campaigning.
Roma are a pertinent example of the blurry boundary between minorities and majorities,
where the flexibility does not extend both ways, as it only extends to Roma opting for
a majority identity. Ethnic mimicry also occurs in regard to other smaller minorities
where parts of the community are largely assimilated to the (local) majorities. Here, the
contestation occurred between groups, often about which categories (and by extension
groups) are legitimate, and then over its members.
Bosniak identity construction in Bosnia and Sandžak (in Serbia and Montenegro) was
characterized by several challenges. “Muslim” was used as an identity category until 1991
in Bosnia, and the term “Bosnian” was not been “tested” in a census until 2013. In

890 Social Science Quarterly
addition, the Bosniak “identity package” is more challenging, as the language associated
with community, “Bosnian,” is contested and also a product of the dissolution of Serbo-
Croatian. Bosnian speakers, therefore, may opt for three alternatives: Serbian, Croatian, or
Montenegrin.
Finally, the boundary between Bosnian and Bosniak identity remains fluid and untested.
The identification with the state (Bosnian) rather than an ethnic group was not option in
the 2013 census, but could be chosen as a “write-in” option. This option was the success
of a coalition of NGOs called “Be a citizen” (Budi građanin/ka) that campaigned, for this
(Perry, 2013:12–14). They also encouraged citizens to identify as Bosnian to challenge the
prevailing ethno-nationalist stratification of society. In this sense, Bosnia is an exception,
as identification with the state does not imply a particular ethno-national identity. Selfidentification
as Croat, Serb, Macedonian, or Montenegrin cannot be a marker of national
identity linked solely to the state and devoid of ethno-national connotations. Only Kosovo
and Bosnia theoretically provide the possibility to separate identification with the state and
the ethno-national community. However, the reality of this is quite different. In both cases,
the state is identified more strongly with a particular community, Albanians for Kosovo
and Bosniaks for Bosnia. 5
Ethnic entrepreneurs promoting Bosniak identity, led by the Islamic Community, the
Party of Democratic Action (the main Bosniak ethnonational party), and a coalition called
“It is important to be Bosniak” (Bitno je biti Bošnjak), sought to discredit both Muslim and
Bosnian identity categories. The Muslim option was dismissed as unnatural (i.e., confusing
religion and national identity), and the Bosnian identity was attacked by these groups for
being “fake,” and the groups accused intellectuals and NGOs lobbying for Bosnian identity
of continuing the wartime violence against Bosniaks (Armakolas and Maksimovic, 2014).
Next to discrediting alternative identity categories, census campaigns have been marked
by an effort of ethnic entrepreneurs to reinforce the “identity package” that is construed
in the census forms, explicitly or implicitly, to jointly form national identity. This was
particularly pronounced in cases where citizens had alternatives easily available. This includes
particularly speakers of Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin who are able
to switch among the four languages, amidst the fluid national identity markers, as noted
above and between religious and nonreligious categories. For example, in a one-page advertisement
in the Bosnian daily, Dnevni Avaz, the well-known intellectual, Muhamed
Filipović, implored Bosniaks “that we have to be consistent and declare according to the
historical truth and rights of our people and that in regard to our ethnic and national
belonging as Bosniaks; in regard to our religion as members of the Islamic faith; in regard
to our mother tongue which we all share as speakers of Bosnian” (Dnevni Avaz, 2013).
Similar calls were made by Croat minority organizations (YouTube, 2011a), and Islamic
religious leaders in Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro (Imamović, 2012; YouTube, 2011c),
leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Vesti, 2011), and religious institutions, NGOs,
political parties, and minority organizations.
In conclusion, campaigning and mobilization during the census was more extensive in
countries with more fluid identities, where advertisements, billboards, and videos sought
to encourage identification with one particular ethno-national group or another, and
stressed adherence to coherent identity packages. Countries with rigid lines of division,
such as Kosovo, witnessed considerably less competition and campaigning, as there is less
possibility to blur identity lines and the identity packages are more clearly defined.
5 A total of 2,352 citizens of Kosovo opted for “Other” in the ethnic/cultural background category that also
includes Kosovars. Results on ethnic self-identification of the Bosnian census have not been released by the
completion of this article.

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 891
As such, censuses are elementary moments of group making, and an opportunity for
ethnic entrepreneurs to assert and define groupness (Brubaker, 2004:7–20). Thus, in addition
to the arena of contention between state and minorities, censuses are fundamentally
about citizens and how they respond to the different demands, categories, and pressures.
Individual Challenges to Ethno-National Identity
The final aspect of the census as a site where identities are negotiated is the response of
citizens. Here, we are interested in citizens who fail to identify themselves along the lines
prescribed by the states and ethnic entrepreneurs. While categories, as noted above, are
suggestive and citizens had been subject to strong pressure and campaigning, the ultimate
census choices rested with them. The contestations between minority organizations and
the state represent the conflict of two (or more) concepts of collectivities (i.e., how does the
state vs. how do the representatives of a minority define the collectivity or does the state
discourage the self-identification as a minority).
However, an important subject neglected in the literature to date that has broader repercussions
for the study of nationalism is the study of respondents. Do respondents accept
the identity categories offered by the state or the categories suggested by their presumed
political representatives? The responses allow us not only to ascertain the acceptance of
these categories, but also to assess the success of ethnic boundary making. If citizens refuse
to follow ethno-nationalist logic, they can undermine groupness and challenge its legitimacy.
An ethnic group without members does not exist, and if a nation is the result of a
“daily plebiscite” (Renan, [1882] 1996), then the census is the most visible plebiscite for
(or against) a nation. Here, we are less interested in motives for rejecting these categories,
which can range from social or political protest, to the perceived inappropriateness of the
categories for one’s own identity.
Individuals have a range of options to respond to censuses. The most visible level of
rejection might be a boycott of the census. For example, the German census of 1987 was
controversial due to concerns about data protection, and because a number of civil society
groups led a campaign to boycott the census. For the post-Yugoslav censuses, boycotts
were not widely promoted outside of “ethno-national boycotts” led by minority parties
or organizations mentioned above. In Bosnia, in addition to some ethno-national groups,
civil groups also threatened a boycott if the forms would not comply with their preference.
However, boycotting a census, especially for individuals without organized support, is
difficult, as participation in censuses is mandatory and boycotts usually carry fines (even if
not always enforced in practice).
Another tool for individual contestation is to opt for identity categories that mock
the established groups, often through drawing on imagined groups. From Martians to
Earthlings, the name of the favorite soccer club, to Jedi and Sith, a wide range of groups
were used. The Jedi/Sith category has been widely used in other censuses, including Australia
and the United Kingdom and had its echoes in the post-Yugoslav censuses. These categories
are not officially listed in the census results and are subsumed either in the residual category
of “Others” (Montenegro), “Unknown” (Serbia), or “Unallocated” (Croatia). 6
While invisible in the official statistics (but available on request), these movements
achieved considerable media attention. The media response generally dismissed them as a
6 E-mail communication with Statistical Offices of Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia, 2014 and 2015, on
file with the author.

892 Social Science Quarterly
curiosity, or just as a joke. Altogether these choices had limited resonance, with 40 Jedi 7
in Montenegro (B92, 2011), 303 in Croatia (Slobodna Dalmacija, 2012), some 640 Jedi
in Serbia (Na Dlanu, 2012). Other common ironic categories include “aliens,” “smurfs,”
or “Martians,” which some 268 choose in Serbia (Kurir, 2012). Croatian media similarly
reported of 154 “Cosmopolitans,” some calling themselves just “humans,” “Klingons,”
“internationals,” or “in love” (Slobodna Dalmacija, 2012). Altogether, individuals choosing
these categories do not amount to more than a few hundred in each of the post-Yugoslav
countries. This type of response has some tradition in Yugoslavia. In the last Yugoslav
census in 1991, some citizens in Bosnia identified as “Eskimos” to reject the dominant
ethno-national discourse (Touquet and Vermeersch, 2008:280). As the video spot described
at the beginning of this article highlights, these choices should not be seen merely as a
prank, but also as a form of protest and resistance (Cusack, 2010:3–4).
However, other choices are more significant in terms of numbers in the post-Yugoslav
censuses. Namely, individuals can choose identity constellations that do not mock the
official classifications, but that run counter the “desired” categories of either the state or
dominant identity groups and their political representatives. Such a choice might be the
consequence of a person’s biography that does not fit into the dominant ethno-national
matrix (i.e., parentage from different national background), or based on a personal identity
choice. This self-definition can reflect itself by opting out of the dominant categories (i.e.,
by identifying as “Bosnian” rather than “Bosniak,” “Serb,” or “Croat” in the Bosnian
census) (Markowitz, 2007).
Another possibility is to not follow the aforementioned logic of congruence between
national, linguistic, and religious identity. For example, a self-identified Montenegrin
might indicate Serbian as mother tongue, and atheism as religion, instead of Montenegrin
language and Orthodoxy. Due to the linkage between national identity, religion, and
language, both suggested by the census forms and the campaigns, such a choice clearly
subverts the dominant ethno-national discourse. It is important to note that such choices
do not just oppose state categories and the suggested linkages between nation, language,
and religion, but also the census campaigns led by different ethno-nationalist and religious
communities that seek to establish the hegemony of a particular interpretation of identity.
Our analysis of the available census results thus focuses on the citizens who in one of
the manners above sought to opt out of the “suggested” identity categories and choose
alternative identities or identity combinations.
Regional Identities
Regional identities generally act as a supplement to, rather than a replacement for,
national identities. In the post-Yugoslav space, only two regional identities have been able
to articulate a political and transnational dimension, namely, in Istria and Vojvodina. The
number of citizens opting for regional identities as national identity is, generally speaking,
low. In Croatia, 0.64 percent of the population identified with a region as national identity.
The overwhelming majority of these 27,225 citizens chose Istrian identity (92.6 percent).
The share of citizens with a regional identity in Serbia is somewhat lower (0.43 percent)
and, again, 92.8 percent of them hail from Vojvodina (see Table 2). Considering the low
levels of regional identity in Montenegro and Kosovo, we can note that regional identity is
overwhelmingly linked to two regions that have been able to constitute a relevant category in
7 Data from the Statistic Office of Montenegro.

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 893
TABLE 2
Rejecting Ethno-National Identities in Select Post-Yugoslav Censuses
(Percentage in Parentheses)
Croatia Serbia Montenegro Kosovo
2001 2011 2002 2011 2002 2011 2011
Regional identity 9,302 27,225 11,485 30,771 1,258 1,202 n/a
(0.21) (0.64) (0.15) (0.43) (0.20) (0.19)
Undeclared 79,828 26,763 107,732 160,346 26,906 30,170 912
(1.80) (0.62) (1.44) (2.46) (4.34) (4.87) (0.05)
Unknown 17,975 8,877 75,483 81,740 6,168 1,840
(0.41) (0.21) (1.01) (1.25) (0.99) (0.11)
Yugoslavs a n/a 331 80,721 23,303 1,860 1,154 n/a
(1.08) (0.32) 0.3 (0.19)
Hyphenated
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4,732 n/a
identities b (0.76)
Total 107,105 63,196 275,421 296,160 36,192 37,258 2,752
(2.41) (1.47) (3.95) (4.12) (5.83) (6) (0.16)
a Number of Yugoslavs according to the 2001 Croatian census not made available.
b This possibility was also introduced in Serbia in the 2011, but no extensive use has been made and the
results are thus subsumed under “other.”
both cases, as citizens with regional identity makes up around 1.5 percent of the population
of Vojvodina and in much smaller Istria 12.11 percent. In Istria, the dominant regionalist
party, the Istrian Democratic Assembly, had explicitly called on its supporters to identify as
Istrians (Jović, 2011:40). Thus overall, regional identity is not a significant marker in lieu
of ethno-national identity, but in two regions, it has been able to achieve some salience.
Yugoslavs and Undeclared
Unlike regional identity, Yugoslav identity used to offer a catch-all identity marker
available to citizens who did not want to identify with a particular nation. While this
identity category continues to exist, the number of citizens self-identifying as Yugoslavs in
censuses drastically declined since the dissolution of the country. 8 Taking a longitudinal
view at the micro level helps to explain what happened to Yugoslavs since the demise of the
country, and offers some insights into citizens refusing to identify according to national
categories today. Of course, the identity category is inherently flexible, as all self-identified
Yugoslavs have at least one presumed “reserve” ethno-national identity to revert to. Thus,
the decline in self-identified Yugoslavs between 1981 and 1991 did not result in the rise of
any new identities. Here, we look at three regions with a disproportionally large share of
Yugoslavs in 1991 and the shifts in censuses after the state dissolution.
The Autonomous Province of Vojvodina as a whole had a disproportionally large share
of Yugoslavs, and within it most Yugoslavs lived in multinational urban centers. One
instructive example is Subotica, a city on the Hungarian border with a Hungarian majority,
a Croat minority, and a Bunjevac population (a national minority closely linked to the
Croat community in faith and tradition, only recognized in the 1990s). In 1991, nearly 15
8 While this is expected, it is important to note that the Yugoslav idea and identity predates Yugoslavia by
nearly a century and is thus not intrinsically linked to the existance of a state (Rusinow, 2003).

894 Social Science Quarterly
TABLE 3
Census Results from Subotica (Vojvodina, Serbia), 1991–2011
1991 2002 2011
Serbs 22,463 14.94 35,826 24.14 38,254 27.02
Croats 16,282 10.83 16,688 11.25 14,151 10.00
Hungarians 64,274 42.77 57,092 38.47 50,469 35.65
Bunjevci 17,527 11.66 16,254 10.95 13,553 9.57
Yugoslavs 22,486 14.96 8,562 5.77 3,202 2.26
Unknown 419 0.30 168 0.10 563 0.40
Undeclared 1,747 1.16 6,470 4.36 11,815 8.35
Regional 126 0.08 706 0.48 2,067 1.46
Total 150,266 148,401 141,554
percent of the population was Yugoslav, nearly twice the number in Vojvodina as a whole
(8.39 percent) and nearly five times the number for all of Serbia (3.24 percent). Unlike
elsewhere, the number of Yugoslavs did not collapse in the first census after 1991, as still
5.77 percent identified as Yugoslavs in 2002. At the time of this census, more than 10
percent of all Yugoslavs in Serbia lived in Subotica, which had a population of less than 2
percent of Serbia. At the same time, inhabitants not identifying with a national identity,
or choosing a regional identity, rose, amounting to nearly 10 percent of all respondents
by 2011 (see Table 3). Although Subotica experienced significant population shifts after
1991—including the emigration of Hungarians and Croats due to nationalist pressures and
the immigration of Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia—the rise of the “undeclared” is
clearly tied to the strong presence of Yugoslav identity. The rise of undeclared citizens in
2011, and the decline of Yugoslavs, suggests that many former Yugoslavs have chosen not
to identify with the dominant national categories, a pattern repeated in Montenegro, as we
shall see next.
The Bay of Kotor includes three municipalities of Montenegro bordering the Adriatic
Sea, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. A region with a large Croat and Serb community,
it also has a strong seafaring tradition, and had a large naval base in Yugoslav times. Nearly
50 percent of all Montenegrin Yugoslavs lived in these three municipalities. As research on
Yugoslav identity has noted, individuals were prone to identify as Yugoslavs if they lived
in a mixed Serb-Croat region (Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson, 1994; Isailović, 2011). After
1991, the number of self-identified Yugoslavs declined, shrinking to less than 1 percent. At
the same time, we note a marked rise of those citizens who refused to declare their national
identity. These citizens account for around 9 percent in both the 2003 and 2011 censuses
(see Table 4). Though not all Yugoslavs rejected the national categories after 1991, we
can see a clear pattern, as the share of those refusing to declare is nearly twice the level as
elsewhere in the country.
As a result, we can link the relatively large share of undeclared citizens (see Table 2) to the
pre-1991 category of Yugoslavs. This is not to argue that citizens switched automatically
from one to the other but, rather, that with the disappearance of Yugoslavia, individuals
were deprived of a ready, non-ethno-national, identity category to choose from, increasing
the attractiveness of the undeclared category. The third case highlights that this identity
shift is, however, not universal in the post-Yugoslav context.
A third region with a large number of Yugoslavs in 1991 was Slavonia, the Croatian plain
that stretches from the outskirts of Zagreb to the Serbian border. Here, because Serbs and
Croats lived in mixed villages and towns, there was much intermarriage and a large number

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 895
TABLE 4
Census Results from the Bay of Kotor (Montenegro), 1991–2011
1991 2003 2011
Montenegrins 27,396 44.60 24,270 34.87 26,108 38.68
Serbs 13,418 21.84 29,360 42.17 26,435 39.17
Croats 4,910 7.99 5,223 7.50 4,519 6.70
Yugoslavs 11,703 19.05 509 0.73 311 0.46
Undeclared n/a 6,028 8.66 6,129 9.08
Total 61,430 69,611 67,496
of Yugoslavs (Isailović, 2011). Vukovar, on the Danube, was the town with the highest
number of Yugoslavs in 1991, with 29.17 percent of the population. However, in Vukovar,
violence and group polarization not only eroded the category of Yugoslavs, but also reduced
the space for ambiguity. In 2011, less than 2 percent of the town’s inhabitants selected any
ambiguous identity category, such as regional identity, unknown, or unidentified identity.
Due to significant population shifts during the war, a large number of Yugoslavs have
left the town, often emigrating, thus the decline of the Yugoslavs is not only attributable
to shifts in self-identification. Elsewhere, in Croatian municipalities with a high level of
prewar Yugoslavs, identity choices are considerably less ambiguous than in the other two
cases. This would suggest that polarization of similar identities, even if the main period
of ethno-national mobilization was in the 1990s, reduced the space of contesting the
dominant identity categories subsequently.
Muslims
Like Yugoslav identity, the national identity of Muslims has been closely associated with
socialist Yugoslavia. The majority of intellectuals and ethnic entrepreneurs in post-Yugoslav
states adopted the category of Bosniaks over Muslims, as noted earlier. However, this shift
has not been universally accepted. In Montenegro, Muslims account for a share of 38.31
percent of Bosniaks (20,537 vs. 53,605). A similarly high number can be identified in
Croatia with a share of 24.01 percent (7,558 Muslims vs. 31,479 Bosniaks). However, in
Serbia, Muslims account for only 15.35 percent of Bosniaks (23,303 vs. 145,278). Muslim
identity has been well established and has a clearly ethno-national signifier, encompassing
the Islamic Slavic population that spoke Serbo-Croatian in Yugoslav times. Thus, Muslim
identity is an example of an identity category that has lost its main proponents, but not
its support among some citizens. As a result, it has few prominent ethnic entrepreneurs
promoting the category. The most active organizations promoting Muslim identity are in
Montenegro, where the term “Bosniak” has met most resistance in census results (Tomović,
2011), mostly as the the term Bosniak implied Bosnia as a kin state.
Complex Identity Combinations
National identities, as noted above, are not solely defined through the self-identification
with a nation, but also through religious and linguistic identity. Thus, the identity packages
and their acceptance by citizens constitute a crucial test of the success of ethnic entrepreneurs

896 Social Science Quarterly
TABLE 5
Opting Out of Dominant Language Categories in Select Post-Yugoslav Censuses
Croatia Serbia Montenegro Kosovo
Serbo-Croatian or 10,881 0.25 13,770 2.22
other hyphenated
variant
Unknown 9,329 0.22 81,692 1.13 2,252 0.13
Undeclared 46,499 0.65 24,748 3.99
Mother tongue 3,318 0.53
Total 20,210 0.47 148,401 1.78 41,836 6.74 2,252 0.13
in consolidating their ethno-national identities. On the other hand, they are, as we shall
see, the most common way in which individuals opt out of the dominant identity patterns,
by choosing an individual identity “package” that does not follow either the census forms
or the choices promoted in public debates.
Unlike in the U.S. census, citizens were not able to explicitly indicate multiple identities in
any the post-Yugoslav census. There were also no explicit “hyphenated” identity categories
available. The only option available was for citizens to indicate multiple identities as
“other” identity. As a consequence, respondents are not counted with either of the groups,
but rather constitute part of the census category of “others.” Only Montenegro and Serbia
released the results of citizens making such a choice, but the number of citizens choosing
this option over other identity combinations has been relatively minor, with 0.76 percent of
Montenegrins (see Table 2) and only 0.27 percent of Serbs (Večernje novosti, 2012). These
low numbers stand in stark contrast to the number of citizens in all countries born out of
so-called mixed marriages (i.e., between individuals with different national backgrounds).
In the absence of a large number of hyphenated identity choices, the main hybrid identities
are based on challenges to the identity packages. Here, we can distinguish between
moderate and strong hybrid identities. Moderate hybrid identities are those where individuals
opt out of one identity category, but without choosing a feature from different
national packages; for example, a citizen choosing Croat national identity, Croatian language
as mother tongue, but identifying as atheist. However, if the person chooses from a
different national identity packages (i.e., the citizens does not just opt out, but also opts in
to another group identity), we consider it a strong hybrid identity. Determining the scale
of these choices is methodologically not always easy, as not all statistical offices provide
cross-tabulations of national identity, religion, and language.
In terms of language, between 0.13 percent in Kosovo and 6.74 percent in Montenegro
(see Table 5) of the population chose a language not fitting into the identity package
suggested by the state and called for by ethnic entrepreneurs. In some cases, the language
is simply not declared or “unknown,” including fictional languages. In others, respondents
use the old categories of Serbo-Croatian or other hyphenated names of the language. In
Montenegro, some also merely called their language “mother tongue,” a reflection of the
fact that the language taught in schools was officially known as such between 2003 and
2011 and encompassed the different variants of Serbo-Croatian.
Montenegro is also the country with the largest share of citizens opting out of the
expected link between national identity and language. According to cross-tabulation data,
a fifth of the population does not speak the language associated with their respective
national identity (see Table 6). A majority of Croats, and between a third and 40 percent of
Montenegrins and Bosniaks, respectively, indicate not speaking “their” national language.

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 897
TABLE 6
Incongruent National and Language Identities in Montenegro, 2011
Number
Percentage of National
Identity Group
Albanians not speaking Albanian 1,695 5.57
Montenegrins not speaking Montenegrin 93,999 33.71
Bosniaks not speaking Bosnian 21,734 40.54
Serbs not speaking Serbian 4,954 2.78
Croats not speaking Croatian 4,163 69.14
Total 126,545
In the cases of Croatia and Serbia, cross-tabulation is not possible, but comparing
mother tongue and national identity allows us to identify the extent to which members
of a particular identity group speak the language associated with it. The key cases are
minorities associated with one of the four languages (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, and
Montenegrin) that emerged from Serbo-Croatian. Being mutually comprehensible, 9 the
main differences between the languages are geographic, not ethnic, thus giving individuals
the possibility to choose among them (Greenberg, 2008). In analyzing the data, we find
significant discrepancies between national and linguistic self-identification. In Serbia, the
relationship between Croat speakers and Croats is only 33.2 percent (19,223 Croat speakers,
57,900 Croats), between Montenegrin speakers and Montenegrins 6.54 percent (2,519
Montenegrin speakers, 38,527 Montenegrins), and between Bunjevac speakers to members
of the Bunjevac community 40.91 percent (6,835 vs. 16,706). Only a large majority of
Bosniaks have indicated that they speak Bosnian (95.59 percent), unlike in Montenegro
(138,871 Bosnian speakers vs. 145,278 Bosniaks). The latter is also less of a surprise, as
the language has been both a site of political mobilization in Sandžak for community
leaders, and during the census campaign Bosniak religious and political leaders stressed
the importance of “choosing” Bosnian as mother tongue. In Croatia, Bosniaks lack this
cohesion, as the relationship between Bosniaks and Bosnian speakers is 53.55 percent
(31,479 vs. 16,856), and the relationship between Serbs and Serbian speakers is only 28.33
percent (186,633 vs. 52,879). Even if we were to add all Serbo-Croatian speakers, a majority
of Serbs in Croatia indicated that they speak Croatian or refused declaration. While this
choice could be attributed to assimilation, it might also point to a greater ambiguity of
identity than polarization of identity during the war and its aftermath suggests.
In addition to language, religion provides for some insights on citizens rejecting established
identity packages; here, weak hybrid identities prevail, as it is rare that individuals
opt for a religion associated with other communities (e.g., a Serb identifying as a Catholic).
More commonly, citizens either refuse declaration or choose to categorize themselves as
agnostics and atheists. As religious institutions and ethno-national parties and organizations
continuously emphasized not just the religious, but also the national, duty to identify
along religious lines, this choice is not just a reflection of individual preference, but also a
rejection of the imposed ethno-national identity categories. Cross-tabulation is available in
Croatia and Montenegro, which allows us to identify those citizens who chose on national
identity category, and chose a religious identity that does not “fit” the expect result. This
might include either those opting out of the dominant religious categories (e.g., Croats who
9 While Croatian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin are written in the Latin script, Serbian is written in both
Cyrillic and Latin script, although it is constitutionally defined as being written in Cyrillic only.

898 Social Science Quarterly
TABLE 7
Incongruent National and Religious Identities in Montenegro and Croatia, 2011
Croatia
Montenegro
Percentage of
Percentage of
Numbers National Category Numbers National Category
Non-Catholic Croats 275,283 7.1 494 8.2
Non-Orthodox Serbs 27,103 14.52 3,058 1.71
Non-Orthodox Montenegrins 2,695 59.66 32,132 11.52
Non-Muslim Bosniaks 3,520 11.18 152 0.28
indicate that they are agnostics or atheists) or those choosing a religion not conventionally
associated with the national identity of choice (e.g., Serbs indicating that they are Catholic)
(Table 7).
According to the data from Croatia and Montenegro, 7.19 and 5.76 percent of the
populations, respectively, do not follow the established link between religion and national
identity. Among those opting out of the dominant national religion, most identify as
atheists or agnostics. A total of 4.57 percent of Croat citizens indicate that they are agnostic
or atheists. The share of atheists or agnostics among Croats is slightly lower than among
all at 3.92 percent. Among Croatian Serbs, the share of atheists stands at 10.44 percent,
a surprisingly large number considering the common assumption that religious markers
matter more among minorities. The picture among other minorities in Croatia is mixed,
with some similar to the Serb minority (e.g., Italians), and others exceeding Croats in
levels of religious affiliation (e.g., Hungarians). In Montenegro, a more traditional society,
the share is somewhat lower, with only 1.3 percent of the population being atheists or
agnostics. The highest rates are among Montenegrins (2.23 percent) and the lowest among
Bosniaks and Albanians (0.008 percent and 0.01 percent, respectively). However, there
are substantial numbers who opt for other major religions, such as some 6.6 percent of
Montenegrins in Montenegro who are Muslims or Catholics, and 0.68 percent of Croats
in Croatia who are Orthodox or Muslims.
There is no single cause of why individuals opt out of the established identity categories.
As noted in the U.S. context (Rockquemore, Brunsma, and Delgado, 2009), these
individuals cannot be understood as a single community, even if the label of Yugoslav
identity to encompass many of them had still been available. Markowitz has noted in her
research on identity categories in Sarajevo that a substantial number of citizens identify
themselves as Bosnians and reject the ethno-nationalist labels imposed on them because
of the consequences of the war and the Dayton power sharing structures (2007). In addition,
a number of cases examined here indicate citizens who define their identity in
ethno-national categories, but do not accept the terms offered by elites. For example, in
Montenegro, the ambiguity between Serbian and Montenegrin identity has been great ever
since the formal recognition of a Montenegrin nation in post-World War II Yugoslavia.
However, this identity was always viewed by the state, and many citizens, as being “thin”
and sharing many attributes with Serb identity. The nation-building process since the late
1990s, which resulted in Montenegro’s independence in 2006, produced a self-defined
language and Orthodox Church, but many Montenegrins retain strong ties to Serbian
identities, as do many Serbs who only “switched” from Montenegrin identity since the
1990s (Jenne and Bieber, 2014).

The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges 899
The contestations we have explored reflect both instances of the erosion or challenges to
ethno-national categories, as well as processes in which new (or redefined) categories emerge.
The long trajectory might follow divergent paths: some might follow larger global trends
of hybrid and hyphenated identities, while others might shift toward more consolidated
ethno-national identity categories.
Conclusion
This article has argued that censuses are sites of negotiating national identities between
state, ethnic entrepreneurs, and citizens. The categories that are proposed and campaigned
over suggest particular identity packages that conflate ethnic identity with mother tongue
and religion. The study of contestation of the post-Yugoslav censuses suggests that in order
to understand how ethnicity is reproduced, we need to focus not only on competition
and conflict between groups, their political representatives, and the state, but also on the
mechanisms through which these ethnic entrepreneurs demand, request, and suggest loyalty
and group cohesion, as well as the extent to which citizens respond.
The response varies across the region. Kosovo has the most rigid ethno-national boundaries,
with few citizens opting out of the established identity packages in the census. Ethnic
polarization and territorialization, as well as the relatively clear “objective” markers of distinction
between key groups, reinforce more rigid categories of identity. Croatia, on the
other hand, is also an example of a state with a strong dominant national identity and little
contestation over national identity. Most “opting out” occurs here as expressions of soft
hybrid identities, namely, in regard to religion, where nearly 5 percent of the population
identify as agnostics or atheists. Serbia, on the other hand, has more stable religious identities
and the contestation occurs mostly within minorities, either between different identity
categories (Muslim-Bosniak, Croat-Bunjevac, or Vlach-Romanian) or between the majority
and minorities when it comes to citizens identifying with a minority identity, but not
language. Finally, Serbia also has a significant number of citizens who do not claim to have
any national identity. Montenegro has the largest degree of “opting out” with 6 percent
of the population rejecting the dominant categories of national identity, over 20 percent
rejecting the presumed link between national identity and language, and 5 percent the
link between nation and religion. The study of census category making, and the response
of citizens, thus helps to map out the rigidity of identity in the perception of the state as
census makers and the citizens as respondents to the census.
Furthermore, this article demonstrates that a significant number of citizens in most
countries of the region do not fit, or want to fit, into the ethno-national identity categories
that states, political parties, and ethnic entrepreneurs promote. The census constitutes the
most rigid test of identity, as individuals have to name their national identity, religion, and
language to a stranger who represents the state, subversion is discouraged, and public debates
focus on choosing the right identity. Making choices that subvert the ethno-nationalist
paradigm is heavily discouraged in the public discourse and categories offered in censuses.
Nevertheless, between around 10 percent of Croatian citizens and a third of Montenegrins
reject the presumed national identity packages, constituting a significant finding that shows
the limitations of efforts by the state and ethnic entrepreneurs in imposing ethno-national
identities. This article has shown that the choice for noncongruent identity combinations
is largely connected to the proximity of identities, especially in regard to language, or when
two ethnic groups have the same religion (e.g., Serbs and Montenegrins).
A second feature that can explain the cohesiveness of ethno-national identities in censuses
is polarization (i.e., identity packages are more coherent and less challenged in more

900 Social Science Quarterly
polarized contexts, like Kosovo). For example, Slavic Muslims in the Sandžak region are
more likely to identify as Bosniaks and Bosnian speaking in Serbia than in Montenegro.
The key difference is that Bosniaks in Serbia have been more marginalized by the state,
while Bosniaks in Montenegro have been more successfully integrated into state structures.
Similarly, within Croatia, the congruence of the number of Serbs and Serbian speakers is
greater in polarized, postconflict settings than in regions that did not experience the war. 10
Self-identified Yugoslavs in socialist Yugoslavia have mostly disappeared, but in settings
where ethno-national polarization was limited, they were not easily absorbed into the
national identities of the postwar and post-Yugoslav states. In these circumstances, they
appear to have rather opted out of these identities through choosing not to provide
their national identity, and indicating regional or other nonnational identities. With the
exception of Bosnia, individuals are unable to choose a state identity that is not congruent
with the ethno-national identity. As a result, the identification with a state that was possible
with Yugoslavs is no longer possible.
This article has two implications for the study of nationalism. First, the study of censuses
provides a fruitful site of research, as they are an instance where categories are imposed,
negotiated, accepted, and rejected. Second, considering the significance of censuses, they
remain understudied in deeply divided societies where census results shape political competition
and influence potential conflict.
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in Vrbovsko (a town close to Rijeka in the Gorski Kotar region largely uneffected by the war), it is 1.26–35.22
percent.

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