[2007] 1 SLR(R) 629 - Singapore Law

672 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2007] 1 SLR(R)
continue to bear the meaning which upon its true construction in the
light of the relevant surrounding circumstances it bore at that time.
It is therefore open to argument in a future case whether in the context of
the political and commercial conditions existing in Singapore in 1878, the
legislature of the Straits Settlements had intended s 4(10) to give power to
the court to grant interlocutory injunctions in aid of foreign court
proceedings, or even less likely in aid of foreign arbitral proceedings. Unlike
in England where legislative and policy developments since the 1980s
appeared to have influenced the courts in their interpretation of s 37(3) of
the English 1981 Act (which has no equivalent in Singapore), there has been
no such development in Singapore in relation to s 4(10) of the CLA as a
source of statutory authority in relation to Mareva injunctions in aid of
foreign proceedings until the enactment of the IAA. Given that Parliament
ignored s 4(10) of the CLA entirely when it enacted the IAA to provide a
new statutory framework for international arbitrations in Singapore, a
court would need to know why it was necessary to enact s 12(7) of the IAA
if the court had power under s 4(10) to grant Mareva relief in aid of foreign
arbitrations. Perhaps it was simply a case of Parliament’s attention not
having been drawn to the need to provide a broader framework to deal with
interim measures to assist foreign proceedings, whether court or arbitral
proceedings.
95 Finally, it may be useful to refer to the approach of the Court of
Appeal of the Bahamas in a similar situation concerning the power of a
Bahamas court to grant a Mareva injunction in aid of foreign court
proceedings where the plaintiff did not have a pre-existing cause of action.
In Meespierson (Bahamas) Limited v Grupo Torras SA (1999–2000)
2 ITELR 29, the court had to consider scope of s 21(1) of the Supreme
Court Act (Bahamas) which was modelled verbatim on s 37(1) of the
English 1981 Act (and which Ang J had held to be materially similar,
although differently worded from s 4(10) of the CLA). However, when the
Bahamas Parliament enacted s 21(1), it omitted to enact s 37(3) of the
English 1981 Act (which as we have stated earlier conferred statutory power
on the court to grant Mareva injunctions against foreign residents). In the
High Court, the Chief Justice held that s 21(1) empowered her to grant a
free-standing injunction. The Court of Appeal unanimously overruled her
and decided that it was bound by the decision of the Privy Council which
applied The Siskina on the power of the court under s 37(1) of the English
1981 Act. The President of the Court of Appeal, in his judgment, said (at 34,
35 and 38):
It is trite that the The Siskina approach to the Mareva injunction has
held sway in subsequent cases in English and Commonwealth courts
without departure from the underlying pre-supposition of there being
an existing cause of action for which relief is claimed in substantive
proceedings brought in the jurisdiction. There have been significant
English statutory developments which impinge on Mareva relief,