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SESSION SECURITY AND ALLIED TECHNOLOGIES Chair(s) TBA

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8 Int'l Conf. Security and Management | SAM'11 |<br />

requires further investigation. The ability to verify the correctness<br />

of the data in a cloud environment can be formidable<br />

and expensive to cloud users [1]. The notion of public<br />

auditability has been proposed in the context of ensuring<br />

remotely stored data integrity with different systems and<br />

security models. However, most of these schemes do not<br />

support the privacy protection of users’ data against external<br />

auditors. How to efficiently audit and provide data secrecy<br />

at the same time also requires further study.<br />

Resource pooling with location independence, rapid elasticity,<br />

and on-demand self-service are three out of the five<br />

essential cloud characteristics [33]. The highly distributed<br />

and dynamic storage environment requires a security service<br />

to be highly flexible and configurable. On-demand security<br />

control and configurable security features are thus highly<br />

desirable.<br />

6.5 Virtualization<br />

With the increasing complexity of massive storage management<br />

and data sharing in heterogeneous environments,<br />

more efficient and intelligent storage systems are in demand.<br />

Zeng et al. [46] proposed a virtual storage architecture to<br />

integrate heterogeneous storage systems and abstract their<br />

management, collaboration and interaction. With more demands<br />

on massive and high capacity storage, we believe<br />

that heterogeneous storage systems will converge in term<br />

of usability. Also, as Zeng pointed out in [46], “network is<br />

storage and storage is the network”.<br />

Data protection becomes even more import as collaboration<br />

is required amongst mutually untrusted distributed<br />

storage systems. The appearance of Fabric, a new system<br />

and language to build secure distributed information systems<br />

[32], has indicated the need of federate storage systems<br />

to share computational resources across various security<br />

domains. We believe federate storage systems with different<br />

storage types across mutual distrust domains will eventually<br />

emerge. Their security management, data transformation,<br />

auditing, usability and scalability will be yet another research<br />

area.<br />

6.6 Optimization<br />

Reliability and availability of storage systems are implemented<br />

through redundancy. Sometimes this can introduce<br />

significant system overheads. Data de-duplication [2]<br />

removes high redundancy among files or data blocks, cuts<br />

storage capacity requirements, reduces network traffic, and<br />

improves performance.<br />

The main challenges of data protection in de-duplication<br />

are integrity, data segmentation and privacy. De-duplication’s<br />

breaking of files into chunks/segments/blocks causes data<br />

integrity concerns. It can also erase the boundaries of data or<br />

file groupings. Encrypting the same data with different keys<br />

will generate different ciphertexts. Even if there is only one<br />

key, management issues, such as key refreshing, can cause<br />

severe problems because each data block can come from<br />

different file version.<br />

De-duplication systems often use meta data, index<br />

trees and hash databases to detect and locate<br />

chunks/segments/blocks in storage. Such information needs<br />

to be properly protected against different threats. Data deduplication<br />

on encrypted data still remains challenging.<br />

Secure keyword searching or pattern matching received<br />

attention [37], but still remains challenging. Consistency<br />

issues of access right, especially the copies cached on the<br />

client side, has not received enough attention.<br />

7. Conclusions<br />

This paper presents a survey of security features and techniques<br />

in existing distributed storage systems. We classified<br />

distributed storage systems into three categories: centralized,<br />

distributed and hybrid. We then listed the threats and protection<br />

mechanisms and identified two protection models (user<br />

centric and storage centric) for distributed storage systems.<br />

We then examined several distributed storage systems and<br />

identified emerging issues. In reality, it will be difficult<br />

(impossible) to build a distributed storage system that can<br />

satisfy all the potential requirements of the environments<br />

in which these systems are needed. However it is hoped<br />

that this discussion has helped to raise awareness of the<br />

challenges and potential solutions that can be applied in<br />

order to incorporate security into systems of this type.<br />

References<br />

[1] Cloud Security Alliance. http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org. Security<br />

guidance for critical areas of focus in cloud computing.<br />

[2] Lior Aronovich, Ron Asher, Eitan Bachmat, Haim Bitner, Michael<br />

Hirsch, and Shmuel T. Klein. The design of a similarity based<br />

deduplication system. In SYSTOR ’09, 2009.<br />

[3] G. Ateniese, R. Burns, R. Curtmola, J. Herring, L. Kissner, Z. Peterson,<br />

and D. Song. Provable data possession at untrusted stores.<br />

In 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security,<br />

page 598Ű609. ACM, 2007.<br />

[4] G. Ateniese, R. D. Pietro, L. V. Mancini, and G. Tsudik. Scalable<br />

and efficient provable data possession. In SecureCommŠ08, 2008.<br />

[5] John Bethencourt, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Ciphertext-policy<br />

attribute-based encryption. In IEEE Symposium on Security and<br />

Privacy - S&P, pages 321–334, 2007.<br />

[6] C. Blundo, S. Cimato, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, A. De Santis,<br />

S. Foresti, S. Paraboschi, and P. Samarati. Efficient key management<br />

for enforcing access control in outsourced scenarios. In IFIP Advances<br />

in Information and Communication Technology, volume 297, pages<br />

364–375. Springer Boston, 2009.<br />

[7] Ling Cheung and Calvin Newport. Provably secure ciphertext policy<br />

abe. In the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications<br />

security, pages 456 – 465. ACM, 2007.<br />

[8] Inc Cluster File Systems. Lustre: A scalab high performance file<br />

system. White paper, Jan 2002.<br />

[9] E. Damiani, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S. Jajodia, S. Foresti, S. Paraboschi,<br />

and P. Samarati1. Selective data encryption in outsourced<br />

dynamic environments. In VODCA, 2006.<br />

[10] M. Factor, K. Meth, D. Naor, O. Rodeh, and J. Satran. Object storage:<br />

The future building block for storage systems: A position paper. In<br />

the Second International IEEE Symposium on Emergence of Globally<br />

Distributed Data, page 119Ű123, 2005.

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