Biowarfare, Bioterrorism, and Animal Diseases as Bioweapons

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A single case of a high profile disease (e.g., BSE) or a small number of cases of more common diseases (e.g., Newcastle disease or bovine tuberculosis) may result in international sanctions that cause major economic losses for agriculture and related industries. The connectivity between many diseases of animals and humans suggests the need for integrated preparedness for addressing the potential for bioterrorism attacks against animals. The 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in Europe is somber testimony to the costs that can be incurred by agriculture from the introduction of a highly contagious disease. More than 6 million animals were slaughtered to combat this disease. 209 Predicted costs from an FMD outbreak in California alone are at least $13.5 billion. 210 Pacific Ocean EXPLANATION USA Era, country and disease species WW1 USA* (horses, mules) Romania (horses, sheep, livestock) Spain (horses, cattle) Norway (reindeer, cattle) France (horses) Atlantic Ocean France Spain Norway Zimbabwe Romania Kenya 1952 Kenya (cattle) 1978–80 Rhodesia (cattle) (now Zimbabwe) 1982–84 Afghanistan (horses) 248 Disease Emergence and Resurgence: The Wildlife–Human Connection “Double Agents” Pathogens that can cause disease in humans and animals can be viewed as “double agents” relative to the populations they can impact. Although the historic use of biological agents in wartime appears to have been specifically focused on either human or animal targets, most of the early uses of microbes as bioweapons involved agents capable of causing serious disease in both (Table 6.1). The interfaces between humans and animals can promote persistence and spread of infectious agents. Thus, careful selection of target situations can enhance the probabilities for disease in both humans and animals, and increase the potential for environmental persistence of the disease agent and disease spread through animal movements. Afghanistan Indian Ocean Glanders Anthrax Plant toxin * Maryland, Virginia, and New York area Figure 6.4 Documented war time uses of biological weapons to target livestock (developed from Wilson et al. 110 ). Pacific Ocean
Anthrax is an example of a “double agent.” In 1979, there was an accidental release of anthrax spores from a research facility within the former Soviet Union. 26 According to one report, at least 77 people who lived or worked within 4 km in a narrow zone downwind from the release site became infected and 66 died, making this the largest documented epidemic of inhalation anthrax in history. 22, 118 Livestock deaths from anthrax extended out to 50 km. 119 The final death toll may have been as high as 200 to 1,000 people. 73, 120 The deliberate uses of anthrax in Africa were even more devastating. Anthrax appears to have been used as a bioweapon in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) during the war of independence in the 1970s. 110 Those in power targeted cattle Characteristics of the Most Dangerous Pathogens in Attacks Against Agriculture Pathogens that pose the greatest terrorist threat (Most Dangerous category) to agriculture were determined by experts who identified combinations of the following characteristics. 110 Pathogen characteristic Outcome Highly infectious and contagious Low doses able to cause initial infections and disease followed by spread from one animal to another. Good ability to survive in the environment Not easily inactivated by ambient temperatures and other physical conditions outside of the host, so that contact with pathogen-contaminated substrates (e.g., water, soil, vegetation) can serve as sources for infection. Predictable clinical disease pattern, including morbidity and mortality to undermine the morale and food supply of those seeking independence. The breakdown of government administration and veterinary services due to the war aided anthrax’s epizootic nature and disease spread. The ensuing human epidemic resulted in about 10,000 cases of illness and hundreds of deaths. The persistence of anthrax in Zimbabwe since then continues to take a large toll on human life, domestic animals, and wildlife. 110 Anthrax is only one of several infectious diseases capable of causing severe illness and death in humans and animals alike. Because of this, there is great difficulty in combating such diseases and an increased probability for persistent residual effects. Allows terrorists to consider specific species targets and strategically plan to produce desired impacts. Pathogenic for livestock or poultry May cause severe disease outcomes such as mortality, reproductive failure, and economic losses due to product embargoes. Available and easy to acquire and produce Allows use of common agents that are easy to cultivate, have minimum requirements for special handling to retain virulence, and can be obtained easily from natural disease events and other sources. Attributable to natural outbreak, ensuring plausible deniability Facilitates covert activities oriented toward disruptive impacts without providing leads for pursuit of the perpetrators. Not harmful to perpetrator Exposure to pathogen does not impair the health of perpetrators, thereby facilitating transport of the pathogen, as well as repeated attacks by the perpetrator. Easily disseminated Does not require elaborate or cumbersome means for pathogen transport and subsequent exposure of target animals (e.g., contamination of food and water by a small amount of agent). Concentrated livestock and poultry operations, such as feedlots and poultry houses, facilitate the transmission of infectious disease agents that may be introduced. Also, animal movements associated with commerce facilitate disease spread to other locations. These considerations have great bearing on the effectiveness of a bioterrorist attack. Biowarfare, Bioterrorism, and Animal Diseases as Bioweapons 249
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