Biowarfare, Bioterrorism, and Animal Diseases as Bioweapons

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In the USA, current available resources for personnel, facilities, and sample processing do not as yet allow for development of sustainable wildlife disease monitoring and surveillance programs. Correcting this situation would serve national security by enhancing early warning systems for detecting unusual disease activity and trends in disease activity over time. Findings also would contribute to national efforts to combat emerging diseases that pose threats to human and domestic animal health. Knowledge and Networks Existing wildlife disease programs, although currently limited in size, number, and fiscal resources are rich in knowledge gained from decades of experience. Also, there are extensive networks of collaborators within the wildlife conservation community that can be called upon by the public health and agricultural communities to play a role in disease surveillance and monitoring that serve national homeland security. This collaboration is continuing to develop because it is essential for major improvements in surveillance and response capabilities (Fig. 6.9). We must ORE GON CAL IFO RNI A HAWAII WASH ING TON NEVA DA IDAH O UTAH ARI ZON A ALASKA MON TANA WYOM ING COL ORA DO NEW MEX ICO PUERTO RICO and THE VIRGIN ISLANDS NOR TH DAKOTA SOUT H DAKOTA NEB RAS KA KAN SAS OKL AHO MA TEX AS 264 Disease Emergence and Resurgence: The Wildlife–Human Connection be prepared to rapidly respond to bioterrorists who could capitalize on the current inadequacies of wildlife disease surveillance, monitoring, and response capabilities. Global efforts to combat emerging infectious disease at the wildlifehuman and wildlife-domestic animal interfaces could help overcome existing deficiencies and in the end benefit national homeland security. Reality in a Changing World Although society has limited ability to prevent bioterrorist attacks, there still is a need to take preventative steps to reduce potential risks for such attacks. Increased laboratory security for disease agents, greater controls for investigations involving these pathogens and other security measures implemented since the fall of 2001, are necessary to restrict access to dangerous pathogens. A protective curtain of sorts has been drawn around us that will more readily restrict terrorists from obtaining pathogens that could be used as bioweapons. However, this protective curtain is not impermeable. Enhanced surveillance activities for early detection of MINNESOTA IOWA MIS SOU RI WIS CON SIN ARK ANSAS LOU ISI ANA M ILL INO IS A MISSISSIPP I I C H I A G N IND IAN KEN TUC KY TEN NES SEE ALA BAM A OHI O GEO RGI A Bureau of Indian Affairs Bureau of Land Management Bureau of Reclamation Department of Defense Fish and Wildlife Service Forest Service National Park Service Tennessee Valley Authority Other agencies PEN NSY LVAN IA WES T VIR GIN IA DC VIR GIN IA NOR TH CAR OLI NA SOUT H CAR OLI NA FLO RIDA NEW YORK Figure 6.9 The extensive network of federal lands provides an appropriate grid for wildlife disease surveillance and monitoring to detect emerging diseases in wildlife and attendant threats for domestic animals and humans. NEW JER SEY DEL AWAR E MARY LAN D MAI NE VER MON T NEW HAM PSH IRE MAS SACH USET TS RHO DE ISL AND CON NEC TIC UT
flaws in this protective curtain will be bolstered by enhanced strategic planning, infrastructure development, and rapid response capabilities that minimize impacts and quickly repair damage that may occur. Furthermore, the current curtain assumes frontal attacks by known enemies using familiar tactics for exposing humans and domestic animals to dangerous pathogens. The vulnerability of the curtain to unconventional attacks also needs to be addressed. Wildlife have a great capability to breach the protective curtain and easily pass through its fabric. Examples include infectious diseases transported by wildlife that caused major economic and/or human health impacts, such as Nipah virus in Malaysia, 131,132 SARS in China, 133–137 monkeypox in the USA, 138 and current concerns associated with the role of migratory birds in global movement of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus. Wildlife and the diseases that they can transport represent flaws in the fabric of this protective curtain and can be exploited by terrorists in attacks against society. The protective curtain can be greatly strengthened by fully incorporating the wildlife factor into its fabric. This refurbishment and enhancement can serve society well in many ways, including contributions to the larger issue of infectious disease emergence and resurgence worldwide. Milton Friend Literature Cited 1. Lederberg, J., 1999, Epilogue, in Lederberg, J., ed., Biological weapons: limiting the threat: Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, p. 321–329. 2. Litsios, S., 2001, Plague legends: from the miasmas of Hippocrates to the microbes of Pasteur: Chesterfield, Mo., Science and Humanities Press, 249 p. 3. Théodoridès, J., 1986, Histoire de la rage: cave canem: Paris, Masson, 289 p. 4. Bodson, L., 1994, Ancient views on pests and parasites of livestock: Argos, v. 10, p. 303–306. 5. Blancou, J., 2003, History of the surveillance and control of transmissible animal diseases: Paris, France, Office International des Epizooties, 362 p. 6. Fenner, F., Henderson, D.A., Arita, I., Ježek, Z., and Ladnyi, I.D., 1988, Smallpox and its eradication: Geneva, Switzerland, World Health Organization, 1460 p. (http:// www.who.int/emc/diseases/smallpox/Smallpoxeradication. html) 7. Fleming, G., 1871, Animal plagues: their history, nature, and prevention: London, UK, Chapman and Hall, 548 p. 8. Kohn, G.C., ed., 1995, Encyclopedia of plague and pestilence: New York, N.Y., Facts on File, Inc., 408 p. 9. McNeill, W.H., 1976, Plagues and peoples: Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Press, 369 p. 10. Morse, S.S., 1993, Emerging viruses: Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 317 p. 11. Verano, J.W., and Ubelaker, D.H., eds., 1992, Disease and demography in the Americas: Washington, D.C., Smithsonian Institution Press, 294 p. 12. Lederberg, J., 2000, Infectious history: Science, v. 288, p. 287–293. 13. Ban, J., 2000, Agricultural biological warfare: an overview: Alexandria, Va., Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, The Arena, no. 9, p. 1–8. (http://www.mipt.org/ pdf/agrobiowarfareoverview.pdf) 14. Geissler, E., and van Courtland Moon, J.E., eds., 1999, Biological and toxin weapons: research, development and use from the Middle Ages to 1945: Oxford, UK, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Oxford University Press, 279 p. 15. Osterholm, M.T., 2001, Bioterrorism: a real modern threat, in Scheld, W.M., Craig, W.A., and Hughes, J.M., eds., Emerging Infections 5: Washington, D.C., ASM Press, p. 213–222. 16. Wheelis, M., 2002, Biological warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa: Emerging Infectious Diseases, v. 8, p. 971–975. 17. Wheelis, M., 1999, Biological warfare before 1914, in Geissler, E., and van Courtland Moon, J.E., eds., Biological and toxin weapons: research, development and use from the Middle Ages to 1945: Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, p. 8–34. 18. Norris, J., 1977, East or west? The geographic origin of the Black Death: Bulletin of the History of Medicine, v. 51, p. 1–24. 19. Inglesby, T.V., Dennis, D.T., Henderson, D.A., Bartlett, J.G., Ascher, M.S., Eitzen, E., Fine, A.D., Friedlander, A.M., Hauer, J., Koerner, J.F., Layton, M., McDade, J., Osterholm, M.T., O’Toole, T., Parker, G., Perl, T.M., Russell, P.K., Schoch-Spana, M., and Tonat, K., for the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense, 2000, Plague as a biological weapon: medical and public health management: Journal of the American Medical Association, v. 283, p. 2281–2290. 20. Perry, R.D., and Fetherston, J.D., 1997, Yersinia pestis: etiologic agent of plague: Clinical Microbiology Reviews, v. 10, p. 35–66. 21. Slack, P., 1989, The black death past and present: Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, v. 83, p. 461–463. 22. Christopher, G.W., Cieslak, T.J., Pavlin, J.A., and Eitzen, E.M., Jr., 1997, Biological warfare: a historical perspective: Journal of the American Medical Association, v. 278, p. 412–417. 23. Harris, S.H., 2002, Factories of death: Japanese biological warfare, 1932–1945, and the American cover-up: New York, N.Y., Routledge, 385 p. 24. Inglesby, T.V., 2001, Bioterrorist threats: what the infectious disease community should know about anthrax and plague, in Scheld, W.M., and Hughes, J.M., eds., Emerging Infections 5: Washington, D.C., ASM Press, p. 223–234. 25. World Health Organization, 1970, Health aspects of chemical and biological weapons: Geneva, Switzerland, p. 98–109. 26. Alibek, K., and Handelman, S., 1999, Biohazard: the chilling true story of the largest covert biological weapons program in the world, told from the inside by the man who ran it: New York, N.Y., Random House, 319 p. 27. Frist, W.H., 2002, When every moment counts: what you need to know about bioterrorism from the Senate’s only doctor: Lanham, Md., Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Biowarfare, Bioterrorism, and Animal Diseases as Bioweapons 265
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