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Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners And Trading Volumes

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<strong>Estimating</strong> <strong>Trade</strong> <strong>Flows</strong>: <strong>Trading</strong> <strong>Partners</strong><br />

<strong>And</strong> <strong>Trading</strong> <strong>Volumes</strong><br />

Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz & Yona Rubinstain (2008)<br />

Presented by Camilo A. Ulloa<br />

March 17, 2009


1 Introduction<br />

Gravity equations (Timebergen, 1962):<br />

T Fij : f Economic sizeij; T rade resistenceij<br />

Traditional estimates of trade ‡ows using gravity equations are biased:<br />

– They include only countries with positive trade ‡ows between them.<br />

,! Heckman selection bias.<br />

– They impose symmetry in the trade ‡ows between pairs of countries.<br />

,! Omitted variable bias: fraction of exporting …rms (i.e., extensive<br />

margin of trade).


In this paper, the authors develop a theoretical model of international trade<br />

with productivity heterogeneous …rms (Melitz 2003).<br />

(i) The model is able to predict positive as well as zero trade ‡ows.<br />

(ii) The model can predict positive, but asymmetric, bilateral trade ‡ows.<br />

(iii) The model generates a generalized gravity equation (<strong>And</strong>erson and van<br />

Wincoop, 2003)<br />

,! The impact of trade frictions on trade ‡ows can be decomposed:<br />

– Intensive margins: <strong>Trade</strong> volume per exporter.<br />

– Extensive margins: Number of exporters.


2 A Glance at the data.


Thus, the empirical evidence suggest that:<br />

(i) About 50% of the country pairs do not trade between them.<br />

(ii) The world trade growth from 1970 to 1997 was predominantly due to the<br />

growth of the volume of trade among countries that traded with each other<br />

in 1970.<br />

(iii) Bilateral trading volumes in 1997 of countries that traded in both directions<br />

since 1979 have been much larger than bilateral trading volumes of<br />

countries that did not trade in both directions (35 times larger on average).


3 Theory.<br />

There are J countries, j = 1; 2; :::; J. Each of them consumes and produces<br />

a continuum of products. Country j 0 s preferences are described by<br />

the following utility function (CES).<br />

where:<br />

uj =<br />

" Z<br />

l2Bj<br />

xj (l) dl<br />

– xj (l) : Consumption of product l.<br />

# 1=<br />

; 0 < < 1;<br />

– Bj : Set of products available for consumption in j.<br />

– " = 1=(1 ) : Elasticity of substitution across products.


Then, country j’s demand for product l is:<br />

where<br />

xj (l) = epj (l) "<br />

Yj 1 "<br />

Pj – epj (l) : price of product l in country j<br />

– Pj : country j’s ideal price index:<br />

Pj =<br />

" Z<br />

l2Bj<br />

# 1=(1 ")<br />

epj<br />

1 "<br />

(l)<br />

,! every product has a constant demand elasticity ".<br />

(1)<br />

(2)


Country j has a measure Nj of …rms, each one producing a distinct product,<br />

which is also distinct from the products produced by country-i …rms.<br />

Thus, there are P J j Nj …rms and products in the world economy.<br />

A country- j …rm faces a production cost cja per unit of output.<br />

– a : …rm speci…c unit requirements of country j 0 s inputs (i.e., domestic<br />

…rms only use domestic inputs).<br />

– cj : country speci…c cost of these inputs.<br />

,! Thus, 1=a is the …rm’s productivity level.<br />

It is assumed that a is distributed according to a common CDF for all<br />

countries, G (a), with support [a L; a H], and a H > a L > 0.


A country- j …rm that sells its product in country i faces 2 additional costs:<br />

– A …xed cost of serving country i: cjfij<br />

– A "melting iceberg" transport cost: ij<br />

,! fij and ij are not …rm speci…c.<br />

n<br />

fjj = 0; fij > 0 o<br />

n<br />

jj = 1; ij > 1 o<br />

There is monopolistic competition in …nal products. Thus (1) implies that a<br />

country- j producer with productivity 1=a will set a price: pj (a) = cja=<br />

If the country- j producer of l sells to consumers in country i, then sets a<br />

delivered price (in country i)<br />

cja<br />

(3)<br />

epj (l) = ij


Thus, the operating pro…ts from these sales to country i are:<br />

ij (a) = (1 )<br />

! 1 "<br />

ijcja<br />

Yi cjfij<br />

Pi<br />

,! Since fjj = 0; jj = 1 and 2 (0; 1) =) jj (a) > 0. That is, all<br />

Nj producers sell in country j.<br />

,! Moreover, sales in country i 6= j are pro…table i¤ a aij , where aij<br />

is de…ned by the zero pro…ts condition:<br />

(1 )<br />

! 1 "<br />

ijcjaij<br />

Yi = cjfij<br />

Pi<br />

(4)


Notice that:<br />

(i) Only a fraction G(aij) of country j0s Nj …rms export to country i<br />

=) Bi is smaller than the total set of world products.<br />

(ii) If aij aL =) G(aij) = 0 (i.e. The model can predict zero trade<br />

volumes).<br />

(iii) If aij > a L =) All …rms from country j export to i:


Let de…ne<br />

Vij =<br />

( R aij<br />

a L a 1 " G(aij) for aij > a L<br />

0<br />

Then, the demand function (1) and the pricing rule (3) imply that the<br />

value of country i’s imports from j is<br />

Mij =<br />

! 1 "<br />

cj ij<br />

YiNjVij<br />

Pi<br />

Furthermore the de…nition of the country i’s ideal price index (2) imply:<br />

Pi =<br />

JX<br />

j=1<br />

! 1 "<br />

cj ij<br />

NjVij<br />

Pj<br />

(5)<br />

(6)<br />

(7)


4 Empirical framework<br />

First, a completely parametric approach was implemented and then some<br />

of the parameterization assumptions were progressively relaxed.<br />

Baseline case: 1=a is Pareto distributed, truncated to the support [a L; a H].<br />

G (a) = ak ak L<br />

ak H<br />

ak ; k > (" 1)<br />

L<br />

,! aij < a L for some i j pairs is allowed (i.e., Mij = 0).<br />

,! Mij 6= Mji is also allowed (i.e., Mij = 0 and Mji > 0 or Mij > 0<br />

and Mji = 0).


Under the Pareto distribution assumption, (5) becomes:<br />

where<br />

Vij =<br />

Wij = max<br />

and aij is determined by (4).<br />

k "+1<br />

kaL (k " + 1) a k H ak L<br />

8<br />

<<br />

:<br />

! k "+1<br />

aij<br />

a L<br />

W ij<br />

1; 0<br />

9<br />

=<br />

;<br />

(8)


Rewriting (6) in log-linear form we get<br />

mij = (" 1) ln (" 1) ln cj+nj+(" 1) pi+yi+(1 ") ln ij+ ij<br />

It is assumed that the variable trade costs, ij,.that a¤ect the volume of<br />

…rm-level exports costs are stochastic.<br />

where:<br />

(" 1)<br />

ij D ij exp uij<br />

– Dij : Symmetric distance between i and j (observed trade friction).<br />

– uij i:i:d N 0; 2 u : Country-pair speci…c unmeasured (unobserved)<br />

trade frictions.


Then the log-linear representation of (6) yields the estimating equation<br />

where:<br />

– Constant term:<br />

mij = 0 + j + i dij + wij + uij (9)<br />

0 = (" 1) ln + ln h<br />

k "+1<br />

kaL = (k " + 1) a k H akL – Fixed e¤ect of the exporting country: j = (" 1) ln cj + nj.<br />

– Fixed e¤ect of the importing country: i = (" 1) pi + yi.<br />

– Country-pair speci…c factor which controls for the fraction of …rms that<br />

export from j to i: wij.<br />

The inclusion of this factor is the most important di¤erence with traditional formulations (i.e.,<br />

<strong>And</strong>erson and van Wincoop, 2003).<br />

i


Remark 1 Notice that:<br />

(i) If wij is not included, then the coe¢ cient on any trade barrier<br />

(i.e., ) can not be interpreted as the elasticity of a …rm’s trade<br />

with respect to that trade barrier (i.e., distance) =) Omitted variable<br />

bias.<br />

(ii) If country pairs with zero trade ‡ows are excluded, then:<br />

Corr(dij;uij)<br />

> 0<br />

For exmaple, country pairs with large observed trade barriers (i.e., high<br />

dij ) that trade, are likely to have low unobserved trade barriers (i.e.,<br />

high uij). =) Heckman selection bias.


4.1 Firm Selection into Export Markets (Wij : ' aij )<br />

Let de…ne the latent variable<br />

Zij =<br />

(1 ) Picj ij<br />

cjfij<br />

" 1<br />

1 "<br />

YiaL (10)<br />

That is, the ratio of variable export pro…ts for the most productive …rm<br />

(1=a L) to the …xed costs for exports from j to i.<br />

(k "+1)=(" 1)<br />

Notice that equations (4) and (8) imply that: Wij = Z ij<br />

,! a) Wij is a monotonic function of Zij; and b) Positive exports from country<br />

j to i are observed () Zij > 1.<br />

1


It is assumed that the …x trade costs, fij; are stochastic:<br />

where:<br />

fij exp EX;j + IM;i + k ij vij<br />

– EX;j : Country j …xed export costs common across all destinations.<br />

– IM;i : Country i …xed trade barrier imposed on all exporters.<br />

– ij : Any additional country-pair speci…c …xed trade costs.<br />

– vij i:i:d N 0; 2 u : unmeasured (unobserved) trade frictions, possible<br />

correlated with the uij.


Thus, taking into account that (" 1) ln ij ln dij uij, it follows<br />

that (10) can be rewritten in the log-linear form:<br />

where:<br />

zij = 0 + j + i dij ij + ij (11)<br />

– Constant term: 0 = [ln (1 ) + (" 1) ln ( =a L)]<br />

– Exporter …xed e¤ect: j = " ln cj EX;j.<br />

– Importer …xed e¤ect: i = (" 1) pi + yi IM;i<br />

– ij uij + vij i:i:d N 0; 2 with 2 = 2 u + 2 v


Let de…ne the indicator variable<br />

Tij =<br />

(<br />

1 ; country j exports to country i<br />

0 ;<br />

and let ij be the the conditional probability that country j exports to i.<br />

Then a Probit equation can be speci…ed as follows. y<br />

ij = Pr Tij = 1j observed variables<br />

= 0 + j + i d ij ij (12)<br />

where ( ) is de cdf of the unit-normal distribution.<br />

y In order to get a well speci…ed probit without, the equation (11) was divided by the standard<br />

deviation of the error term.


In this context, a consistent estimate for Wij can be obtained as<br />

where<br />

– b Z ij = exp bz ij = exp h<br />

Z ij<br />

exp zij=<br />

cWij = max b Zij 1; 0 (13)<br />

1 bij<br />

i<br />

is the predicted value of<br />

– b ij is the predicted probability of exports from country j to i.<br />

– (k " + 1) = (" 1)


4.2 Consistent Estimation of the Log-Linear Equation<br />

Consistent estimation of (9) requires consistent estimations of:<br />

E h<br />

wijjTij = 1; : i<br />

and E h<br />

uijjTij = 1; : i<br />

The …rst controls for the endogenous number of exporters, and the second<br />

for the selection of country pairs into trading partners.<br />

Notice that (11) implies that both terms depend on<br />

h<br />

= E<br />

In particular, E h<br />

uijjTij = 1; : i<br />

ij<br />

ijjTij = 1; : i<br />

= corr uij; ij ( u= ) ij


Since ij is unit-normal distributed, it follows that ij<br />

estimated from the inverse of the Mills ratio.<br />

b ij = bz ij = bz ij<br />

=) bz ij bz ij + b ij !p E h<br />

z ij jTij = 1; : i<br />

=) bw ij ln n<br />

exp h<br />

bz ij + b ij<br />

1 io<br />

can be consistently<br />

!p E h<br />

wijjTij = 1; : i<br />

Thus, consistent estimation of (9) can be obtained from the transformation<br />

mij = 0 + j + i dij +ln n<br />

exp h<br />

where E h<br />

eijjTij = 1; : i<br />

z Standard Heckman (1979) correction for sample selection.<br />

bz ij + b ij<br />

1 io<br />

+ u b ij +eij<br />

(14)<br />

= 0 and u corr uij; ij ( u= ). z


5 TRADITIONAL ESTIMATES<br />

Table I provides representative traditional estimates of the gravity equation<br />

(i.e., without biases’correction) and the estimates for the …rst stage Probit<br />

equation (12).<br />

– Unidirectional trade value for 158 countries.<br />

– Both equations were estimated for the year 1886 and for an extended<br />

sample period that cover all of the 1980s, adding year …xed e¤ects.<br />

– Additional estimates adding bilateral controls for WTO/GATT membership<br />

are also provided (sample period: 1980s).


Basic results:<br />

– In general, the same variables that have a signi…cant e¤ect on export<br />

volumes from j to i also have a signi…cant e¤ect on the probability<br />

that j exports to i.<br />

,! Strong evidence that traditional gravity equation estimates are biased.<br />

– Common religion strongly a¤ects the formation of trading relationships<br />

(the probability of trading) but has no e¤ect on the volume of trade.<br />

– WTO membership has a strong and signi…cant e¤ect on the formation<br />

of bilateral trading relationships (Subramanian and Wei, 2007).<br />

– The results are not speci…c to 1986. y<br />

An exception is land border that may be due to territorial border con‡icts.<br />

y The 1986 results can be compared with other studies. (i.e., Eaton et al, 2004).


6 TWO-STAGE ESTIMATION<br />

As was described in the previous sections, the estimation of the gravity<br />

equation (14) requires the estimation of a …rst-stage selection equation<br />

(such as the Probit equation 12).<br />

6.1 Identi…cation<br />

Notice that if no additional identi…cation restrictions are imposed (i.e.,<br />

valid excluded variables), then the identi…cation of the parameters in (14)<br />

relays on the normality assumption for the unobserved trade costs.


The economic model suggest that any trade barrier that a¤ect …xed trade<br />

costs but do not a¤ect variable trade costs is a valid excluded variable.<br />

– Country-level data on …rm’s entry regulation costs (Djankov et al, 02).<br />

(i) Regulation cost: f= 1g if the relative cost (% GDP per capita) of<br />

forming a business > median in country i and country j.<br />

(ii) Regulation cost (days and procedures): f= 1g if the sum of the<br />

# of days and procedures to form a business is > median in country<br />

i and country j.<br />

=) There is not available regulation cost data for 42 countries, Moreover,<br />

8 countries export to everyone and Japan imports from everyone in the<br />

remaining sample =) the available observations are reduced to a half.


6.2 Parameterization assumptions.<br />

In principle, the parameterization assumptions (i.e., Pareto cdf for G ( )<br />

and the uij+vij i:i:d N 0; 2 ) may play an important role in the results.<br />

1. Fully parametrized estimation: Probit equation (12) in the …rst step<br />

and NLS in the second step to estimate (14).<br />

2. Semiparametric method: The Pareto assumption for G ( ) was dropped<br />

and reverted and to the general speci…cation for V ij in (5):<br />

– First Stage: Form (4) & (10): ij (zij); can be any increasing<br />

function of zij. Thus, ( bz ij) was approximated with a polynomial<br />

in bz ij, and E h<br />

VijjTij = 1; : i<br />

was directly controlled using ( bz ij).<br />

– Second Stage: using OLS.


3. Nonparametric method: The joint normality assumption for the unobserved<br />

trade costs was relaxed.<br />

– First Stage: Probit equation in (12), but using directly the b ij,<br />

instead of using the normality assumption to recover the bz ij and<br />

b ij. y<br />

The obtained b ij were partioned into a number of bins (50 and<br />

100) with equal observations, and an indicator variable to every bin<br />

was assigned. This procedure allows to approximate an arbitrary<br />

functional form of the b ij in a ‡exible way.<br />

– Second Stage: using NLS.<br />

Mills ratio for the selection correction is not longer used.<br />

y Logit and t-distributions were also considerd and the results were strikingly similar.


Basic Results:<br />

– In general, the benchmark gravity equation leads to upward biased<br />

estimates of the trade frictions in the volume of trade. It confound the<br />

true e¤ect of these frictions with their indirect e¤ect on the proportion<br />

of exporting …rms.<br />

– The Pareto distribution assumption for G ( ) does not seem to a¤ect<br />

the general results.<br />

– The joint normality assumption for the unobserved trade costs does<br />

not seem to a¤ect the general results.


7 AN ALTERNATIVE EXCLUDED VARIABLE<br />

Notice that the results in the table II also suggest that common religion<br />

strongly a¤ects the formation of trading relationships (the probability of<br />

trading) but has no e¤ect on the volume of trade.<br />

In this section, this common religion variable is used as excluded variable<br />

in the estimation of (14).<br />

– First, the three estimation procedures applied to the reduced sample<br />

(i.e., previous section sample) are implemented.<br />

– Then, the estimation is extended to the full sample of countries.<br />

Table III provides the estimation results.


Basic Results:<br />

– Religion is a legitimate excluded variable, and can be used to estimate<br />

the model on the full sample of countries.<br />

– Estimated trade frictions in the benchmark gravity equation are con-<br />

…rmed to be biased.<br />

– By increasing the country coverage it is possible to study how the biases<br />

vary with country pairs’characteristics.


8 ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS<br />

8.1 Decomposing the Biases<br />

To examine the relative importance of the standard gravity equations<br />

biases, two speci…cations of the second-stage equation (14) were estimated<br />

(see Table IV).<br />

1. Correcting the unobserved heterogeneity bias (i.e., adding bz ij = 1 bij<br />

as regressor to the benchmark gravity equation).<br />

2. Correcting the selection bias (i.e., adding b ij as regressor to the benchmark<br />

gravity equation).


,! unobserved heterogeneity bias dominates.


8.2 Evidence on Asymmetric <strong>Trade</strong> Relationships<br />

In this subsection it is studied whether the predicted asymmetries (…rst<br />

stage estimation) can explain the direction of trade ‡ows and net bilateral<br />

trade balances (see Table V).<br />

1. OLS regression of Tij Tji on b ij b ji.<br />

2. OLS regression of mij mji on the di¤erences in the proportion of<br />

exporting …rms:<br />

– bw ij<br />

bw ji, in the NLS speci…cation.<br />

– b( bz ij) b( bz ji), in the polynomial approximation.


,!The predicted asymmetries have explanatory power for the direction of trade<br />

‡ows and net bilateral trade balances.


8.3 Counterfactuals<br />

Counterfactual experiment: The distance trade cost decreases in 10%<br />

d 0 ij<br />

dij = log 0:9<br />

– The study is focused on the elasticity of the overall trade response for<br />

each country pair:<br />

cm 0 ij mij = d 0 ij dij<br />

(i) These elasticities vary along country pair income. =) Summary<br />

statistics across three groups of country pairs are reported (see Table<br />

VI).<br />

(ii) The elasticity response at the intensive margin is …xed at 0.799 (NLS)<br />

and 0.862 (polynomial approximation) =) the heterogeneity in the<br />

predicted elasticity response is due to the extensive margin.


,! The heterogeneous trade responses show that the variation of these elasticities<br />

is large.<br />

Figure III depicts the distribution of these elasticities across country pairs<br />

group.


,! When trade costs related to distance fall, the response of the extensive<br />

margin of trade is predicted to be larger for less developed countries.

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