Africa and the Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

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EMERgINg POwERS ANd gLOBAL ChALLENgES PROgRAMME high-intensity inter-operability with other navies in combined operations, 97 aligning it with its perception as a world-class maritime combat service and making it an indispensible maritime military partner. Like the other navies in this survey, Japan has understood the benefits of an ‘own’ base away from home and is building a base in Djibouti for military personnel engaged in antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden region. The new base will be the first foreign Japanese military base since the Second World War. 98 Besides the maritime patrol aircraft already in Djibouti, the base will certainly facilitate logistics, maintenance, medical and other services. The new base is significant also because it underscores the extent of the measures that a pacifist nation like Japan is prepared to take in order to ensure its security of trade and energy. 99 These security operations contribute to ensuring the safe and secure passage of Japan’s considerable maritime trade. AfRICA ANd thE GEoPolItICS of thE INdIAN oCEAN The preceding part of the paper analysed the dynamics of main and extra-regional stakeholder nations off Africa’s eastern seaboard, the Indian Ocean. This portion of the Indian Ocean includes Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa (east of Cape Agulhas); as well as the island states off Africa (Mauritius, Seychelles, the Comoros (not including Mayotte; French) and Madagascar). This study now addresses how Africa has responded, at continental maritime military level, to the escalating dynamics off its eastern and southern coastal zone in the Indian Ocean. Africa, as a continent and as individual states, needs to be proactive, so as not to become dependent on external actors or be forced to react to external agendas that impact on its vital interests. All of the nations surveyed above are involved to some degree with maritime military engagement and co-operation in Africa, mostly at bilateral level. At continental level, the African Union (AU) has responded to initiatives from the EU, the US, China, France and India – countries/region that have institutionalised political mechanisms to deal with security issues as part of devolved processes. Its response has generally been to accept invitations to conferences and to establish and institutionalise mechanisms with these partners. The process then is for the AU to devolve to its member states the decisions and actions required for implementation against agreed target dates. However, the AU has insufficient capacity to deal with often technical issues, and the legal and/or scientific expertise provided by these extraneous stakeholders often shape Africa’s response and effectiveness. 100 Furthermore, African states themselves generally do not possess the capacity to monitor and implement, to the required standard and at the right time, the high volume of resolutions and actions that emanate either from its continental or their regional structures; the result is often ‘no action taken’. The general impression of Africa’s maritime initiatives seems to be ‘how passive Africa has been in this whole affair’. 101 The following section therefore gives an overview of the institutional mechanisms that operate in the maritime military domain, as they affect or are given effect to, by Africa. First, it is important to analyse the maritime requirements of Africa’s navies, which do not need to have global reach, or be very sophisticated in terms of maritime platforms or SAIIA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 78 20
AfRICA ANd thE gEOPOLItICS Of thE INdIAN OCEAN weapons technology. In essence, they need to ‘outgun’ identified adversaries – typically maritime criminals, pirates, illegal fishing boats and trawlers and human traffickers – that traditionally do not possess much in the way of armament. Hence, most African navies or coast guards only need to fulfil their maritime constabulary duties. Objectively stated, Africa’s navies need to ensure compliance with international maritime law, specifically the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 and a number of other legal prescripts in the provision of maritime service; to which they are signatories. Coastal and island states have been given vast tracts of seaward estate by virtue of the international community and through UNCLOS. The quid pro quo is that they need to be able to enforce maritime law and ensure good maritime order. Hence, Africa’s navies need suitable ocean-going ships able to provide the necessary geographical coverage, with well-trained officers and sailors and professional and adequate logistics (docking and repair facilities, logistic matériel support). Yet, the navies of East Africa, apart from South Africa, Egypt and Kenya, would be classified as coastal or token navies, reflecting the very low priority of maritime issues on their governments’ agendas. 102 Most of all, political will is necessary so that navies receive priority funding, along with land and air military components. thE AfRICAN uNIoN’S MARItIME StRAtEGy The AU is developing an integrated maritime strategy. This multi-layered strategy has two aims: to address Africa’s seaborne challenges and to sustain more wealth from the oceans that surround the continent. In early April 2010, as part of the inclusive process to develop this strategy, the AU hosted an ‘experts’ workshop on maritime security and safety’. One of the workshop’s recommendations was that the workshop ‘should be followed by a series of other activities aimed at raising awareness among the key stakeholders of the continent, mobilising the indispensable political will, building capacity at all levels, securing the required resources, as well as building partnerships’. 103 However, the integrated maritime safety and security strategy for Africa appears to be a work in progress, a paper tiger. The AU’s belated development of an integrated maritime strategy reflects in many ways the challenges facing the Sea Power for Africa Symposiums (SPASs). The AU only started this project in earnest in 2010, and years after the navies of the world began the World Food Programme ship protection/anti-piracy operations off Somalia, following several United Nations Security Council resolutions to curb Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty so that maritime and military forces can operate within an extended international law framework. The AU barely recognises the importance of maritime affairs on countries’ economies and socio-economic development, the result of a ‘landward centric’ basis for managing security related issues. Hence, too few resources are allocated to maritime forces, infrastructure, training and logistics (such as dry-docks and maintenance facilities). The probability that the continental strategy will be implemented and sustained is low, as the responsibility for enacting the strategy will fall on national navies, which are – with very few exceptions – severely under-resourced. SAIIA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 78 21
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Africa and the Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

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