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Introduction<br />

<strong>HOW</strong> <strong>ETHICAL</strong> <strong>LEADERSHIP</strong> <strong>MADE</strong> <strong>DISNEY</strong> <strong>PIXAR</strong> <strong>INTO</strong> A<br />

SUSTAINABLE LEARNING ORGANIZATION *<br />

JAMES M. HALEY* and MOHAMMED H. SIDKY**<br />

This paper examines how ethical leadership develops organizational<br />

learning based on mutual trust and teamwork. Roy Disney, the<br />

nephew of Walt Disney, is an excellent example of how an ethical<br />

leader can transform an organization. Without him the successful<br />

merger of Pixar and Disney would never have happened. The box<br />

office successes of Disney Pixar such as the Academy Award winning<br />

Toy Story 3 shows that the merger is working, when most mergers fail.<br />

We believe that this applied research about ethical leadership and<br />

organizational learning at Disney Pixar provides many lessons to be<br />

learned by MBA students and business leaders about how to create a<br />

sustainable organization.<br />

In our view, ethical leadership is required to organize a team of leaders such that a merger can<br />

become a sustainable learning organization. What is ethical leadership? According to Johnson<br />

(2012):<br />

―(It) …. Is a two-part process involving personal moral behavior and moral influence… Both<br />

components are essential. Leaders must demonstrate such character traits as justice, humility,<br />

optimism, courage, and compassion… They are also responsible for ethical behavior of others…<br />

Leaders act as role models for the rest of the organization.‖<br />

The merger of Disney Pixar is an example of a new and larger animation organization that ethically<br />

combines the traditions of Disney with the talent and technologies of Pixar. Before Disney and<br />

Pixar could learn this lesson to combine into a learning organization, they had to share space just to<br />

talk to each other. Ironically, the Disney Pixar merger almost never happened because for a time<br />

there was little trust between the organizations.<br />

Roy Disney was an ethical leader who transformed the Walt Disney Company by making<br />

management accountable. He wanted the Disney Chairman and CEO, Eisner replaced because he<br />

� This paper extends the research, conducted about Exxon Mobil’s successful merger by Haley<br />

(kapuncensko51@comcast.net) and Sidky (msidky@pointpark.edu), first presented at the 2006 Strategic<br />

Management Society (SMS) Conference in Vienna, Austria and then presented at the 2007 International<br />

Business Research Conference in Sidney, Australia, included new research about the early success of the<br />

Disney Pixar merger.<br />

� Research updated by Michael DeSantis, MBA. (Mldst12@yahoo.com)<br />

*,Ph.D. & MBA, POINT PARK’S H.J. HEINZ ENDOWED, CHAIR OF MANAGEMENT<br />

**Ph.D. PROFESSOR OF MANAGEMENT, POINT PARK UNIVERSITY


lacked the necessary vision to lead the company. One of Roy’s concerns was Eisner’s failure to<br />

build constructive relationships with creative partners, especially Pixar. Disney was forced to resign<br />

from the company’s board of directors. In his attached resignation letter in Appendix 1, Disney<br />

called for Eisner’s resignation. Roy believed that Eisner made Disney ―…rapacious, soulless and<br />

always looking to make a quick buck.‖<br />

After Disney resigned as a director, he rallied investors to withhold 45 percent of the votes cast for<br />

Eisner remaining as director of the company. This vote of ―no confidence‖ is unprecedented and it<br />

forced the board to eventually strip Eisner of his role as Board Chairman. He then resigned as<br />

Chief Executive in 2005, a year before his contract was up. This led to a change in leadership<br />

provided by the new company President and CEO, Bob Iger.<br />

Since Iger succeeded Eisner, he extended an olive branch to Steve Jobs, the founder of Apple,<br />

which ultimately led to the $7.4 billion merger with Pixar, now making Jobs the largest investor in<br />

Disney Pixar but also a leader that Iger could work with to ensure a smooth transition to integrate<br />

Pixar with Disney. Clearly, unifying organizational leadership based on shared values is necessary<br />

to integrate different organizations. That is why it was helpful for Iger to state his core values. Iger<br />

promised to do what was right, not simply what was legal. But more steps had to be taken beyond<br />

opening communication to ensure that organizational learning emerged from the new organization.<br />

Iger was able to fix many of Disney’s problems in animation by working more closely with Pixar.<br />

John Lasseter, Chief Creative Office for Walt Disney and Pixar Animation Studios, gives credit to<br />

Roy Disney for fostering creativity at Disney Pixar because he puts his heart and soul into<br />

preserving Disney’s legendary past, while helping move the art of animation into the modern age of<br />

embracing new technology.<br />

Mergers are one means to acquire the operational knowledge that is specific to the new<br />

organization, making the strategic vision of the merger a reality. This creative change has been<br />

encouraged at the new Disney Pixar organization. Senior management led by CEO, Iger, has<br />

pledged to work with Lasseter, the creative leader of Pixar, (see Policies in Appendix 2). This<br />

committee was contractually committed to preserve and promote the brain trust that is the creative<br />

learning team of Pixar, headed by Lasseter (See Exhibits 1 &2). Thus a learning process emerged<br />

that so far has avoided the mistakes leading to failure of most other mergers.<br />

Why Most Mergers Fail<br />

According to Lundberg (2001) corporate combinations fail to achieve their anticipated benefits<br />

70% of the time. Research conducted by Harding and Rovit (2004) involving over 50 case studies,<br />

15 years of merger and acquisition data, and surveys of 250 senior executives found a 70% failure<br />

rate. The response rates for failure are as follows:<br />

1. Ignored potential integration challenges (67%)<br />

2. Over-estimated synergies (66%)<br />

3. Had problems integrating management teams and/or retaining key managers (61%).<br />

(Harding and Rovit 2004).


If the failure rate is so high, why do businesses (80% of the Fortune 100 over the past 20 years)<br />

continue to engage in mergers and acquisitions? Harding and Rovit consider M&A’s as a<br />

necessary growth option for many companies: ―Unless you have a killer business model ... it's<br />

virtually impossible to build a world class company without doing deals.‖ (Harding and Rovit<br />

2004)<br />

According to some estimates, 85% of merger failures are related to the mismanagement of cultural<br />

issues. Awareness of cultural differences is then seen as an issue of primary concern when merging<br />

organizations. According to Miller (2000):<br />

―Once you develop an understanding of the current culture, and have compared that with<br />

the goals of the merged organization, it is time to think through what it will take to<br />

implement that strategy. This process requires consideration of a number of factors,<br />

including organizational structure, operating and decision-making apparatus, reward<br />

systems, and people related issues.‖<br />

At the very center of this lies the task of creating a culture of learning, based on shared values,<br />

where continuous interaction with internal and external environmental changes take place and<br />

necessary adaptations made.<br />

Apparently, this learning process was never put in place at the merger of AOL and Time Warner.<br />

For example Time Warner Cable’s high speed Internet services, Road Runner, as part of its<br />

profitable cable operations was never integrated with AOL. Case (2005) explained:<br />

―At the time we felt that broadband was the most important strategic challenge for AOL, and<br />

a merger with Time Warner would help accelerate AOL’s transition to broadband…In my<br />

view AOL should have replaced Roadrunner as TW’s cable broadband 5 years ago. That<br />

didn’t happen, but partnerships with other high speed providers like DSL were made more<br />

difficult because people assumed AOL was in the cable camp. So instead of accelerating<br />

AOL’s broadband push, it slowed it. Obviously, this was a big disappointment for me and<br />

others who believed in AOL and believed in broadband.‖ (Case 2005)<br />

The first AOL Time Warner Annual Report in 2000 claimed that it was fostering ―… a nimble,<br />

entrepreneurial culture‖ that recognizes that it can only succeed if everyone supports the new<br />

organization based on a, ―shared set of values and common goals.‖ But the team-work necessary to<br />

integrate the two companies never happened, because Case, as Chairman of AOL Time Warner,<br />

was not a ethical leader, since he failed to provide a clear vision of what the merger should be. In<br />

fact he now admits the merger was a mistake and should never have happened. This failure was<br />

avoided in the merger of Disney Pixar. The integration of these two organizations preserved the<br />

―Pixar culture‖ and vision as a key objective of the steering committee in order to create a<br />

sustainable learning organization (see Appendix 2).<br />

Sharing a New Strategic Vision<br />

A bigger learning organization emerges if there are diverse learning teams embedded throughout<br />

the organization led by a team of leaders sharing a strategic vision that creates a sustainable<br />

competitive advantage. Then it becomes possible to manage the increased complexity of economies


of scale and scope in a unique way that is hard for competitors to easily copy. Mergers and<br />

acquisitions represent a means to accelerate this process. Often competitors merge without creating<br />

market power but still profit by leveraging the combined propriety knowledge of the merged firms.<br />

By combing different companies, each business organization saves both time and money, learning<br />

what the other firm knows about the technology, production, and marketing of expanded operations<br />

that result from the merger. The evolution of a business learning to be more efficient and effective<br />

is complex. It is thus difficult to copy another organization's proprietary knowledge. It is thus easier<br />

acquire another firm’s organizational learning by simply buying the company (Haley, 1986).<br />

Whether a learning organization emerges from a merger of two firms critically depends on team<br />

learning by corporate directors and senior managers leading the new business combination. Senge<br />

(1990, p.236) defines team learning as ―…the process of aligning … the capacity of a team to<br />

create the results its members truly desire. It builds on the discipline of developing shared vision. It<br />

also builds on personal mastery, for talented teams are made up of talented individuals.‖<br />

To make a merger work requires more than a team of leaders. Success depends on the emergence of<br />

learning teams throughout the new organization that is committed to implement the strategic vision<br />

of the merger. Our research reveals the following conditions for the successful combination of<br />

separate business organizations (Haley and Sidky 2005):<br />

1. The catalyst that begins the integration of proprietary knowledge, resulting from mergers<br />

and acquisitions, is the organizational leadership provided by a team of leaders including<br />

directors and senior managers, which develops a shared strategic vision of how the newly<br />

combined organization should change to create a competitive advantage.<br />

2. Continuity of management must be achieved, which includes keeping key managers and<br />

other knowledge workers from both merging organizations in order to preserve and<br />

combine everyone's essential know-how.<br />

3. Product and process technologies of each organization should be similar or compatible<br />

enough for the new organization to integrate the shared proprietary knowledge that creates<br />

greater economies of scale and scope.<br />

4. The combined business must organize a new system and culture for managing the people,<br />

products, and technologies which the competing organizations had been too small or<br />

undercapitalized to exploit by themselves.<br />

5. The merged organization must be able to internalize the learning process, such that learning<br />

is no longer limited to reacting to change, but also in anticipating and planning for potential<br />

changes. The creation and institutionalization of many learning teams throughout the new<br />

company should have the potential for the emergence of a bigger learning organization.<br />

If these necessary operating conditions exist, effective and efficient learning can take place, as well<br />

as the potential for greater competitiveness. On the contrary, if these operating conditions do not<br />

exist, then failure of a business combination is almost guaranteed. Successful mergers and


acquisitions enjoy a sustainable advantage that is difficult to copy, because it is generally too hard<br />

to make most business combinations work.<br />

Acquiring Organizational Learning<br />

By merging, each business organization can save both time and money, learning what the other<br />

firm knows about the technology, production, and marketing of expanded operations that result<br />

from the merger. The dynamics of organizational learning to achieve increased efficiency and<br />

effectiveness is computationally complex. This makes it difficult to copy another organization's<br />

proprietary knowledge (Haley, 1986). So it might be better to acquire what a competitor knows.<br />

A merger is a cooperative strategy for integrating the learning process between firms through the<br />

sharing of firm-specific experience. This promise of synergy from merging critically depends on<br />

each organization's willingness to share what it knows. ―Being open to the realities of ... the needs,<br />

interests, and perspectives that exist in (competing organizations) may allow managers to search for<br />

organizational forms, and relations that more effectively accommodate (the merger's) people and<br />

processes...‖ (Sidky & Kersten, 2001).<br />

Traditional economic theory and the resource-based view of business strategy do not effectively<br />

address these issues. Then importance of firm-specific knowledge is recognized as either a factor of<br />

production or a resource that creates value. According to a resource based view of competitive<br />

advantage, counting, copyrights, trademarks, patents, manufacturing plants, stores, employees and<br />

market share, are better measurements of success. So M&A activity should be like playing<br />

monopoly such that companies accumulate things that are tangible. Then why not simply count the<br />

number of deals that a company does? Clearly this view misses the point, because most deals fail.<br />

The resource based view (RBV) of a firm’s performance has evolved to incorporate intangible<br />

resources that possess inimitability, variety, and nontradability (Cho & Pucik, 2005:556). But<br />

empirically it is hard to find confirmation of this more sophisticated RBV model of sustainable<br />

competitive advantage, which is limited by its mostly static framework of the firm’s organization<br />

(Newbert, 2002). Competitive advantage is a dynamic, not a static concept. The failure of these<br />

competing paradigms is that they do not explain how individuals, teams, and organizations actually<br />

learn.<br />

Creating a Learning Organization: Single-loops and Double-loops<br />

In our view, a more useful perspective can be found using a systems approach to organizational<br />

learning. Argyris and Shon (1978) distinguished between what they called single-loop and doubleloop<br />

learning processes.<br />

Single-loop learning involves the ability to detect errors and make corrections relative to preestablished<br />

operating norms. Dodgeson (1993:8) considers single-loop learning as related to<br />

activities which ―add to the knowledge base or firm-specific competencies or routines of the firm<br />

without altering the nature of their activities.‖ Firm-specific competence is seen as ―individual to<br />

the particular firm, and is a crucial factor in affecting their competitiveness.


Double-loop learning on the other hand, adds an additional step to the learning process by<br />

incorporating means and methods though the operating norms of an organization can be questioned.<br />

(Dodgeson, 1993:8) sees double-loop learning as involving ―changing the firms specific<br />

competencies and routines. In double-loop learning, the organization must have the ability to ask<br />

serious questions regarding their operating norms.<br />

Morgan (1997:92-93) presents some of these questions:<br />

1. What business are we in, is it the right business?<br />

2. Can we create fundamentally new products and services?<br />

3. Can we redefine the boundaries between different industries and services so that new niches<br />

emerge?<br />

4. Can we structure our organization around business processes that reflect a customer<br />

viewpoint rather than the influence of traditional department structures?<br />

5. Can we redesign business processes in a way that will increase the quality of production and<br />

reduce costs?<br />

6. Can we replace our organizational hierarchy with a network of self-managing teams?<br />

Morgan (1997:83) says that ―all these questions contain a double-loop learning potential because<br />

they invite the questioner to examine the status quo and consider alternative modes of operation.<br />

They encourage us to understand the key organizational attributes from the standpoint of a new<br />

frame‖. Or as Peter Drucker first said: ―What is our business and what should it be?‖ Rockefeller’s<br />

initial answer to these questions, when he controlled only 10% of oil refining after America’s civil<br />

war, was first to create the world’s largest refinery company. Standard Oil, by merging with other<br />

competing refineries, eventually gave him 95% control of refining. Once he achieved this mission<br />

he then realized that Standard Oil should become the world’s first, vertically-integrated oil<br />

company by backward integrating into oil production and distribution. Mergers and acquisitions<br />

again made this vision of the strategic control of oil possible.<br />

Is Disney-Pixar Creating a Culture of Learning?<br />

A modern merger that so far is creating similar ―synergies‖ is Disney’s acquisition of Pixar,<br />

involving $7.4 billion in stock. Clearly, this combination is seeking to backward integrate Disney’s<br />

distribution and production of traditional animation with Pixar’s advanced technologies. To<br />

successfully manage this change Disney wants Jobs, the head of both Pixar and Apple, to join<br />

Disney as a corporate director and Disney’s largest shareholder. Commenting on Jobs and the<br />

Disney Pixar merger, Safo, a director at the Institute for the Future says: ―He’s the only guy who<br />

has applied systems thinking to media, he’s the only person who bridges both hardware and<br />

software,‖ (The New York Times, January 21, 2006, p. B6).<br />

Interestingly, the new company is formally developing a team of leaders to integrate the Pixar with<br />

Disney. For example the merger will make Pixar Vice President, Lasseter, the chief creative officer<br />

of the Pixar and Disney animation studios. He will have the authority to ―green light‖ films for<br />

both studios, although Disney CEO Iger has the final approval. To ensure these two leaders work<br />

with each there is a steering committee that includes Iger, Jobs, and Lasseter, whose job is to<br />

oversee feature animation at both studios, and to help maintain the Pixar ―culture‖, among other


duties. Obviously this is a formal way to unite the leadership of both organizations with a new<br />

shared strategic vision of what Disney Pixar should be. (See Exhibit 1).<br />

Pixar’s ―brain trust‖ of seven directors and creative executives were also listed as company assets,<br />

and the agreement requires that a majority of them agree to join the combined company. Those<br />

employees include ―Finding Nemo‖ director Andrew Stanton; ―Monsters, Inc.‖ director Pete<br />

Docter; ―The Incredibles‖ director Brad Bird; director/writer Bob Peterson; story artist Brenda<br />

Chapman; Editor Lee Unkrich; and sound designer Gary Rydstrom.<br />

The merger also sets up a ―steering committee‖ whose job is to oversee feature animation at both<br />

studios, and to help maintain the Pixar ―culture,‖ among other duties. The committee must meet at<br />

Pixar headquarters at least one full day every other month. The agreement protects Pixar’s right to<br />

eschew employment contracts, and mandates that the studio continue to be called Pixar. The<br />

branding of films made after the merger is finalized will be changed to ―Disney Pixar.‖ The<br />

groundbreaking animation company will, however, stay in Emeryville, California, with a sign at its<br />

gate that ―shall not be altered‖ from ―Pixar,‖ the agreement said‖ (Keating, 2006).<br />

So far it appears that Disney is enhancing, and integrating the technology of Pixar’s creative talent<br />

by protecting their autonomy from the rest of Disney. In this way the animation hits should keep<br />

coming from the brain trust whose creative culture is preserved by being structurally separated<br />

(Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).<br />

Teamwork, leadership, and integration are continuing to make the Disney Pixar merger work.<br />

Disney has been working with Pixar for years distributing box-office hit movies such as Toy Story,<br />

Monster’s Inc., and Finding Nemo to name a few. (See Exhibit 3). So Disney and Pixar know how<br />

to work with each other as they are now learning to integrate on many levels and still preserve their<br />

identities. For example, Pixar’s smash hit Cars characters are available for purchase on<br />

Disneystore.com and can be found as main attractions at Disney’s theme parks. (See Exhibit 4).<br />

Steve Jobs, former CEO and current Chairman of the Board at Apple and acting member of the<br />

board of directors at Disney Pixar, brings proven leadership and additional integration ideas to the<br />

newly merged company and makes it possible for a synergy between Disney, Pixar, and Apple to<br />

occur. The Disney owned TV network ABC has made many of its hit television shows available<br />

exclusively on Apple’s subscription download site, iTunes. Walt Disney Records is making its<br />

music, as well as its soundtracks from both classic Disney films and Disney Pixar animated films<br />

exclusively available on iTunes.<br />

Leaders Learning to Change the Future<br />

Ethical leaders are necessary to create a learning organization that encourages creative thinking and<br />

creative problem solving. They recognize the central importance of knowledge workers in their<br />

acquisition of competing firms and businesses. According to Crossan & Vera (2004):<br />

―Leadership of organizational learning requires strategic leaders to frequently perform roles<br />

involving … the development of high levels of learning … across the organization.‖


In fact the research shows that there are different leadership styles that facilitate different types of<br />

organizational learning. For example, transformational leadership provides a clearer vision of the<br />

future that encourages the organization to change more rapidly to meet the challenges of new<br />

competitive environments (Tichy & Ulrich, 1984; Crossan & Vera, 2004).<br />

Conventional management practice establishes a top-down, bureaucratically controlled approach<br />

which encourages a narrow focus, limiting learning to achieve pre-determined objectives. A<br />

learning organization however, while requiring a sense of direction, also creates a ―space in which<br />

many possible actions and behaviors can emerge including those that can question the limits being<br />

imposed.‖(Morgan, 1997:95). Successful mergers and acquisitions, which bring together<br />

competing organizations, need to find this ―space‖, in order to determine which organizational<br />

norms are necessary for the continuing growth and development of the new organization, and<br />

which norms have to be pushed aside.<br />

The merger between Disney and Pixar has also created what seems to be an evolving partnership<br />

between Disney and Apple that provides more space to collaborate. Disney now has agreements in<br />

place to sell hit ABC prime time shows, such as ―Desperate Housewives‖, as well as content from<br />

ABC sports and ESPN on Apple’s popular iTunes music and video store. The 2006 Disney Pixar<br />

annual report states, ―With our groundbreaking deals last year to make our television shows and<br />

movies available on iTunes, as well as our new on-demand services provided through ABC.com<br />

and DisneyChannel.com, we have been at the forefront of responding to the consumer‖<br />

When the merger first occurred there was uncertainty about whether the initial success of this<br />

merger could be sustained. So far learning teams have emerged throughout the new company<br />

creating the magic of Disney animation on movie screens, DVDs, the internet, toys, and theme<br />

parks around the world? Keeping Pixar’s creative talent together was critical to ensure a learning<br />

process emerged that continues to create a new line of Disney animated characters that are as<br />

captivating as Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, and Snow White. Clearly Pixar is putting the magic<br />

back into Magic Kingdom.<br />

Conclusion<br />

From the outside looking in, creating a learning organization by mergers and acquisitions seems so<br />

intangible and too vague to explain. But if you are a participant in combining organizations<br />

success or failure is very real. For example, the absence of a shared strategic vision and poor<br />

communication ensures almost immediate failure. The loss of key employees undermines longterm<br />

success.<br />

Mergers and acquisitions can make an organization that is willing to learn become aware that new<br />

and better ways of doing business are possible. In order to sustain the advantage of a learning<br />

organization so called intangibles like leadership, ethics, strategy, team work, and organizational<br />

communication still matter.<br />

At this writing however, the near future seems promising. Disney Pixar continues to be an example<br />

of how a learning organization becomes sustainable. A lesson that MBA students and business<br />

leaders should learn.


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Addison-Wesley Publishing Company<br />

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Leadership Quarterly, 17: 595-616.<br />

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Academy of Management Review, Vol. 29: 226-227.<br />

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Competing Firms Merge into Bigger Learning Organizations?‖ Paper presented at the 12 th Annual<br />

International Conference on Advances in Management, July 2005, Washington, D.C.<br />

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Keating, G. (2006) ―Disney-Pixar merger pact lays out conditions‖, Boston.com<br />

http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2006/01/27/disney-pixar


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Exhibit 1 *<br />

Disney Steering Committee<br />

� John Lasseter, Chief Creative Officer.<br />

� Steve Jobs, Disney Board of Directors<br />

� Robert Iger, Disney CEO<br />

� Dick Cook, Walt Disney Studios Chairman<br />

� Tom Staggs, Disney Chief Financial Officer<br />

� Edwin Catmull, President of Pixar and Disney<br />

Animation<br />

* Policies for Management of the Feature Animation Businesses, Exhibit 99.1, Filed with the Securities Exchange<br />

Commission as of January 26, 2006, 1:34 PM ET. Found at http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.vCAq.c.htm.


Exhibit 2 †<br />

Pixar’s Brain Trust<br />

� Finding Nemo director, Andrew Stanton<br />

� Monsters, Inc. director, Pete Docter<br />

� The Incredibles director, Brad Bird<br />

� Director/Writer, Bob Peterson<br />

� Story artist, Brenda Chapman<br />

� Editor, Lee Unkrich<br />

� Sound Designer, Gary Rydstrom<br />

� Writer, Michael Ardnt<br />

† Policies for Management of the Feature Animation Businesses, Exhibit 99.1, Filed with the Securities Exchange<br />

Commission as of January 26, 2006, 1:34 PM ET. Found at http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.vCAq.c.htm.


Exhibit 3 ‡<br />

Disney Pixar Academy Awards and Movie Revenue<br />

� Toy Story (1995)- Worldwide Gross $358 Million<br />

o Special Achievement – John Lasseter<br />

� A Bug’s Life (1998)- Worldwide Gross $362 Million<br />

� Toy Story 2 (1999)- Worldwide Gross $483 Million<br />

� Monsters, Inc. (2001)- Worldwide Gross $524 Million<br />

o Best Original Song- ―If I Didn’t Have You‖<br />

� Finding Nemo (2003)- Worldwide Gross $850 Million<br />

o Best Animated Film<br />

� The Incredibles (2004)- Worldwide Gross $629 Million<br />

o Best Animated Film<br />

o Best Sound Editing<br />

� Cars (2006)- Worldwide Gross $461 Million<br />

� Ratatouille (2007)- Worldwide Gross $621 Million<br />

o Best Animated Feature Film<br />

� Wall-E (2008)- Worldwide Gross $521 Million<br />

o Best Animated Film<br />

� Up (2009)- Worldwide Gross $731 Million<br />

o Best Animated Feature Film<br />

o Best Music (Original Score)<br />

� Toy Story 3 (2010)- Worldwide Gross $1.063 Billion<br />

o Best Animated Feature Film<br />

o Best Original Song- “We Belong Together”<br />

� ‡ Pixar, 2011. Feature films. Found at http://www.pixar.com/featurefilms/index.html.<br />

� ‡Disney, 2011. Disney Animated Movies Academy Award nominations and wins. Found at<br />

http://www.disneyclips.com/newsinfo/awardnom.html.


Exhibit 4 §<br />

Pixar Themed Attractions at Disney Parks<br />

� Walt Disney and Disneyland Resorts<br />

o Monsters Inc. Laugh Floor<br />

o Finding Nemo-The Musical<br />

o The Seas with Nemo and Friends<br />

o Block Party Bash<br />

o Finding Nemo Submarine Voyage<br />

o A Bug’s Land<br />

o Monsters Inc., Mike and Sulley to the Rescue<br />

o Pixar Play Parade<br />

o Turtle Talk with Crush<br />

o It’s Tough to be a Bug<br />

o Buzz Lightyear’s Space Ranger Spin<br />

o Buzz Lightyear Astroblasters<br />

§ Wow, They Noticed! April 10, 2008. WDW News Today. Found at http://wdwnewstoday.com/archives/643.


November 30, 2003<br />

Mr. Michael D. Eisner, Chairman<br />

The Walt Disney Company<br />

500 South Buena Vista Street<br />

Burbank, CA 91521<br />

Dear Michael,<br />

Appendix 1 **<br />

Roy Disney’s Letter of Resignation<br />

It is with deep sadness and regret that I send you this letter of resignation from the Walt<br />

Disney Company, both as Chairman of the Feature Animation Division and as Vice<br />

Chairman of the Board of Directors.<br />

You well know that you and I have had serious differences of opinion about the direction<br />

and style of management in the Company in recent years. For whatever reason, you have<br />

driven a wedge between me and those I work with even to the extent of requiring some<br />

of my associates to report my conversations and activities back to you. I find this<br />

intolerable.<br />

Finally, you discussed with the Nominating Committee of the Board of Directors its<br />

decision to leave my name off the slate of directors to be elected in the coming year,<br />

effectively muzzling my voice on the Board — much as you did with Andrea Van de<br />

Kamp last year.<br />

Michael, I believe your conduct has resulted from my clear and unambiguous statements<br />

to you and the Board of Directors that after 19 years at the helm you are no longer the<br />

best person to run the Walt Disney Company. You had a very successful first 10-plus<br />

years at the Company in partnership with Frank Wells, for which I salute you. But, since<br />

Frank's untimely death in 1994, the Company has lost its focus, its creative energy, and<br />

its heritage.<br />

As I have said, and as Stanley Gold has documented in letters to you and other members<br />

of the Board, this Company, under your leadership, has failed during the last seven years<br />

in many ways:<br />

** Text of Roy Disney’s Resignation Letter, 2001. USA Today. Found at<br />

http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2003-12-01-disney-letter_x.htm.


1. The failure to bring back ABC Prime Time from the ratings abyss it has been in for<br />

years and your inability to program successfully the ABC Family Channel. Both of these<br />

failures have had, and I believe, will continue to have, significant adverse impact on<br />

shareholder value.<br />

2. Your consistent micro-management of everyone around you with the resulting loss of<br />

morale throughout this Company.<br />

3. The timidity of your investments in our theme park business. At Disney's California<br />

Adventure, Paris, and now in Hong Kong, you have tried to build parks "on the cheap"<br />

and they show it, and the attendance figures reflect it.<br />

4. The perception by all of our stakeholders — consumers, investors, employees,<br />

distributors and suppliers — that the Company is rapacious, soul-less, and always<br />

looking for the "quick buck" rather than the long-term value which is leading to a loss of<br />

public trust.<br />

5. The creative brain drain of the last several years, which is real and continuing, and<br />

damages our Company with the loss of every talented employee.<br />

6. Your failure to establish and build constructive relationships with creative partners,<br />

especially Pixar, Miramax, and the cable companies distributing our products.<br />

7. Your consistent refusal to establish a clear succession plan.<br />

In conclusion, Michael, it is my sincere belief that it is you who should be leaving and<br />

not me. Accordingly, I once again call for your resignation or retirement. The Walt<br />

Disney Company deserves fresh, energetic leadership at this challenging time in its<br />

history just as it did in 1984 when I headed a restructuring which resulted in your<br />

recruitment to the Company.<br />

I have and will always have an enormous allegiance and respect for this Company,<br />

founded by my uncle, Walt, and father, Roy, and to our faithful employees and loyal<br />

stockholders. I don't know if you and other directors can comprehend how painful it is<br />

for me and the extended Disney family to arrive at this decision.<br />

In accordance with Item 6 of Form 8-K and Item 7 of Schedule 14A, I request that you<br />

disclose this letter and that you file a copy of this letter as an exhibit to a Company Form<br />

8-K.<br />

With sincere regret,<br />

Roy E. Disney<br />

cc: Board of Directors


Appendix 2 ††<br />

POLICIES FOR MANAGEMENT<br />

OF<br />

THE FEATURE ANIMATION BUSINESSES<br />

The following sets forth certain policies and principles which shall be adopted and<br />

implemented with respect to the management and operation of the Disney and Pixar Feature<br />

Animation Businesses, all of which are subject to the authority of the Disney Chief Executive<br />

Officer to take such actions as are in the best interests of the shareholders of Disney.<br />

Management Responsibilities<br />

Edwin E. Catmull shall be the President of Pixar and Disney Animation, heading the<br />

combined animation businesses of Disney and Pixar, reporting directly to Robert A. Iger and<br />

Richard Cook jointly.<br />

John A. Lasseter shall be the Chief Creative Officer of Pixar and Disney Animation and Walt<br />

Disney Imagineering, reporting to Robert A. Iger. John A. Lasseter will have ―green lighting‖<br />

authority for Disney and Pixar feature animation productions, subject to final approval by Disney’s<br />

CEO.<br />

Steering Committee<br />

Upon the effective date of the Disney – Pixar merger, a Committee (―Committee‖) shall be<br />

immediately established to help provide oversight to the Feature Animation Businesses of Disney<br />

and Pixar.<br />

The principal objectives of the Committee are: (i) to help maintain the Pixar ―culture,‖ (ii) to<br />

help supervise Pixar and Disney Feature Animation, (iii) to oversee Pixar compensation practices<br />

and (iv) to approve the film budgets of Pixar, all subject to final approval by Disney’s Chief<br />

Executive Officer.<br />

The Committee shall initially consist of the following members: Edwin E. Catmull, John A.<br />

Lasseter, Robert A. Iger, Richard Cook, Thomas O. Staggs, and Steven P. Jobs.<br />

It is intended that the Committee will meet at the headquarters of Pixar in Emeryville for at<br />

least one full day during every other calendar month.<br />

†† Policies for Management of the Feature Animation Businesses, Exhibit 99.1, Filed with the Securities Exchange<br />

Commission as of January 26, 2006, 1:34 PM ET. Found at http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.vCAq.c.htm.


Pixar Compensation Practices<br />

Pixar shall retain its existing compensation philosophies and practices, including not using<br />

employment contracts, the granting of employee stock options, the maintenance of executive<br />

employee bonus plans and employee medical benefits and other fundamental human resource<br />

policies and practices for at least five years or such shorter period as the Committee may decide.<br />

Branding Arrangements<br />

Location<br />

Pixar will continue to be called ―Pixar‖.<br />

The branding of Pixar’s previous films and products will not be altered.<br />

Future films produced by Pixar will be branded Disney Pixar.<br />

Pixar’s operations will continue to be based in Emeryville, California. The Pixar sign at the<br />

gate shall not be altered.

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