HOW ETHICAL LEADERSHIP MADE DISNEY PIXAR INTO A ...
HOW ETHICAL LEADERSHIP MADE DISNEY PIXAR INTO A ...
HOW ETHICAL LEADERSHIP MADE DISNEY PIXAR INTO A ...
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Introduction<br />
<strong>HOW</strong> <strong>ETHICAL</strong> <strong>LEADERSHIP</strong> <strong>MADE</strong> <strong>DISNEY</strong> <strong>PIXAR</strong> <strong>INTO</strong> A<br />
SUSTAINABLE LEARNING ORGANIZATION *<br />
JAMES M. HALEY* and MOHAMMED H. SIDKY**<br />
This paper examines how ethical leadership develops organizational<br />
learning based on mutual trust and teamwork. Roy Disney, the<br />
nephew of Walt Disney, is an excellent example of how an ethical<br />
leader can transform an organization. Without him the successful<br />
merger of Pixar and Disney would never have happened. The box<br />
office successes of Disney Pixar such as the Academy Award winning<br />
Toy Story 3 shows that the merger is working, when most mergers fail.<br />
We believe that this applied research about ethical leadership and<br />
organizational learning at Disney Pixar provides many lessons to be<br />
learned by MBA students and business leaders about how to create a<br />
sustainable organization.<br />
In our view, ethical leadership is required to organize a team of leaders such that a merger can<br />
become a sustainable learning organization. What is ethical leadership? According to Johnson<br />
(2012):<br />
―(It) …. Is a two-part process involving personal moral behavior and moral influence… Both<br />
components are essential. Leaders must demonstrate such character traits as justice, humility,<br />
optimism, courage, and compassion… They are also responsible for ethical behavior of others…<br />
Leaders act as role models for the rest of the organization.‖<br />
The merger of Disney Pixar is an example of a new and larger animation organization that ethically<br />
combines the traditions of Disney with the talent and technologies of Pixar. Before Disney and<br />
Pixar could learn this lesson to combine into a learning organization, they had to share space just to<br />
talk to each other. Ironically, the Disney Pixar merger almost never happened because for a time<br />
there was little trust between the organizations.<br />
Roy Disney was an ethical leader who transformed the Walt Disney Company by making<br />
management accountable. He wanted the Disney Chairman and CEO, Eisner replaced because he<br />
� This paper extends the research, conducted about Exxon Mobil’s successful merger by Haley<br />
(kapuncensko51@comcast.net) and Sidky (msidky@pointpark.edu), first presented at the 2006 Strategic<br />
Management Society (SMS) Conference in Vienna, Austria and then presented at the 2007 International<br />
Business Research Conference in Sidney, Australia, included new research about the early success of the<br />
Disney Pixar merger.<br />
� Research updated by Michael DeSantis, MBA. (Mldst12@yahoo.com)<br />
*,Ph.D. & MBA, POINT PARK’S H.J. HEINZ ENDOWED, CHAIR OF MANAGEMENT<br />
**Ph.D. PROFESSOR OF MANAGEMENT, POINT PARK UNIVERSITY
lacked the necessary vision to lead the company. One of Roy’s concerns was Eisner’s failure to<br />
build constructive relationships with creative partners, especially Pixar. Disney was forced to resign<br />
from the company’s board of directors. In his attached resignation letter in Appendix 1, Disney<br />
called for Eisner’s resignation. Roy believed that Eisner made Disney ―…rapacious, soulless and<br />
always looking to make a quick buck.‖<br />
After Disney resigned as a director, he rallied investors to withhold 45 percent of the votes cast for<br />
Eisner remaining as director of the company. This vote of ―no confidence‖ is unprecedented and it<br />
forced the board to eventually strip Eisner of his role as Board Chairman. He then resigned as<br />
Chief Executive in 2005, a year before his contract was up. This led to a change in leadership<br />
provided by the new company President and CEO, Bob Iger.<br />
Since Iger succeeded Eisner, he extended an olive branch to Steve Jobs, the founder of Apple,<br />
which ultimately led to the $7.4 billion merger with Pixar, now making Jobs the largest investor in<br />
Disney Pixar but also a leader that Iger could work with to ensure a smooth transition to integrate<br />
Pixar with Disney. Clearly, unifying organizational leadership based on shared values is necessary<br />
to integrate different organizations. That is why it was helpful for Iger to state his core values. Iger<br />
promised to do what was right, not simply what was legal. But more steps had to be taken beyond<br />
opening communication to ensure that organizational learning emerged from the new organization.<br />
Iger was able to fix many of Disney’s problems in animation by working more closely with Pixar.<br />
John Lasseter, Chief Creative Office for Walt Disney and Pixar Animation Studios, gives credit to<br />
Roy Disney for fostering creativity at Disney Pixar because he puts his heart and soul into<br />
preserving Disney’s legendary past, while helping move the art of animation into the modern age of<br />
embracing new technology.<br />
Mergers are one means to acquire the operational knowledge that is specific to the new<br />
organization, making the strategic vision of the merger a reality. This creative change has been<br />
encouraged at the new Disney Pixar organization. Senior management led by CEO, Iger, has<br />
pledged to work with Lasseter, the creative leader of Pixar, (see Policies in Appendix 2). This<br />
committee was contractually committed to preserve and promote the brain trust that is the creative<br />
learning team of Pixar, headed by Lasseter (See Exhibits 1 &2). Thus a learning process emerged<br />
that so far has avoided the mistakes leading to failure of most other mergers.<br />
Why Most Mergers Fail<br />
According to Lundberg (2001) corporate combinations fail to achieve their anticipated benefits<br />
70% of the time. Research conducted by Harding and Rovit (2004) involving over 50 case studies,<br />
15 years of merger and acquisition data, and surveys of 250 senior executives found a 70% failure<br />
rate. The response rates for failure are as follows:<br />
1. Ignored potential integration challenges (67%)<br />
2. Over-estimated synergies (66%)<br />
3. Had problems integrating management teams and/or retaining key managers (61%).<br />
(Harding and Rovit 2004).
If the failure rate is so high, why do businesses (80% of the Fortune 100 over the past 20 years)<br />
continue to engage in mergers and acquisitions? Harding and Rovit consider M&A’s as a<br />
necessary growth option for many companies: ―Unless you have a killer business model ... it's<br />
virtually impossible to build a world class company without doing deals.‖ (Harding and Rovit<br />
2004)<br />
According to some estimates, 85% of merger failures are related to the mismanagement of cultural<br />
issues. Awareness of cultural differences is then seen as an issue of primary concern when merging<br />
organizations. According to Miller (2000):<br />
―Once you develop an understanding of the current culture, and have compared that with<br />
the goals of the merged organization, it is time to think through what it will take to<br />
implement that strategy. This process requires consideration of a number of factors,<br />
including organizational structure, operating and decision-making apparatus, reward<br />
systems, and people related issues.‖<br />
At the very center of this lies the task of creating a culture of learning, based on shared values,<br />
where continuous interaction with internal and external environmental changes take place and<br />
necessary adaptations made.<br />
Apparently, this learning process was never put in place at the merger of AOL and Time Warner.<br />
For example Time Warner Cable’s high speed Internet services, Road Runner, as part of its<br />
profitable cable operations was never integrated with AOL. Case (2005) explained:<br />
―At the time we felt that broadband was the most important strategic challenge for AOL, and<br />
a merger with Time Warner would help accelerate AOL’s transition to broadband…In my<br />
view AOL should have replaced Roadrunner as TW’s cable broadband 5 years ago. That<br />
didn’t happen, but partnerships with other high speed providers like DSL were made more<br />
difficult because people assumed AOL was in the cable camp. So instead of accelerating<br />
AOL’s broadband push, it slowed it. Obviously, this was a big disappointment for me and<br />
others who believed in AOL and believed in broadband.‖ (Case 2005)<br />
The first AOL Time Warner Annual Report in 2000 claimed that it was fostering ―… a nimble,<br />
entrepreneurial culture‖ that recognizes that it can only succeed if everyone supports the new<br />
organization based on a, ―shared set of values and common goals.‖ But the team-work necessary to<br />
integrate the two companies never happened, because Case, as Chairman of AOL Time Warner,<br />
was not a ethical leader, since he failed to provide a clear vision of what the merger should be. In<br />
fact he now admits the merger was a mistake and should never have happened. This failure was<br />
avoided in the merger of Disney Pixar. The integration of these two organizations preserved the<br />
―Pixar culture‖ and vision as a key objective of the steering committee in order to create a<br />
sustainable learning organization (see Appendix 2).<br />
Sharing a New Strategic Vision<br />
A bigger learning organization emerges if there are diverse learning teams embedded throughout<br />
the organization led by a team of leaders sharing a strategic vision that creates a sustainable<br />
competitive advantage. Then it becomes possible to manage the increased complexity of economies
of scale and scope in a unique way that is hard for competitors to easily copy. Mergers and<br />
acquisitions represent a means to accelerate this process. Often competitors merge without creating<br />
market power but still profit by leveraging the combined propriety knowledge of the merged firms.<br />
By combing different companies, each business organization saves both time and money, learning<br />
what the other firm knows about the technology, production, and marketing of expanded operations<br />
that result from the merger. The evolution of a business learning to be more efficient and effective<br />
is complex. It is thus difficult to copy another organization's proprietary knowledge. It is thus easier<br />
acquire another firm’s organizational learning by simply buying the company (Haley, 1986).<br />
Whether a learning organization emerges from a merger of two firms critically depends on team<br />
learning by corporate directors and senior managers leading the new business combination. Senge<br />
(1990, p.236) defines team learning as ―…the process of aligning … the capacity of a team to<br />
create the results its members truly desire. It builds on the discipline of developing shared vision. It<br />
also builds on personal mastery, for talented teams are made up of talented individuals.‖<br />
To make a merger work requires more than a team of leaders. Success depends on the emergence of<br />
learning teams throughout the new organization that is committed to implement the strategic vision<br />
of the merger. Our research reveals the following conditions for the successful combination of<br />
separate business organizations (Haley and Sidky 2005):<br />
1. The catalyst that begins the integration of proprietary knowledge, resulting from mergers<br />
and acquisitions, is the organizational leadership provided by a team of leaders including<br />
directors and senior managers, which develops a shared strategic vision of how the newly<br />
combined organization should change to create a competitive advantage.<br />
2. Continuity of management must be achieved, which includes keeping key managers and<br />
other knowledge workers from both merging organizations in order to preserve and<br />
combine everyone's essential know-how.<br />
3. Product and process technologies of each organization should be similar or compatible<br />
enough for the new organization to integrate the shared proprietary knowledge that creates<br />
greater economies of scale and scope.<br />
4. The combined business must organize a new system and culture for managing the people,<br />
products, and technologies which the competing organizations had been too small or<br />
undercapitalized to exploit by themselves.<br />
5. The merged organization must be able to internalize the learning process, such that learning<br />
is no longer limited to reacting to change, but also in anticipating and planning for potential<br />
changes. The creation and institutionalization of many learning teams throughout the new<br />
company should have the potential for the emergence of a bigger learning organization.<br />
If these necessary operating conditions exist, effective and efficient learning can take place, as well<br />
as the potential for greater competitiveness. On the contrary, if these operating conditions do not<br />
exist, then failure of a business combination is almost guaranteed. Successful mergers and
acquisitions enjoy a sustainable advantage that is difficult to copy, because it is generally too hard<br />
to make most business combinations work.<br />
Acquiring Organizational Learning<br />
By merging, each business organization can save both time and money, learning what the other<br />
firm knows about the technology, production, and marketing of expanded operations that result<br />
from the merger. The dynamics of organizational learning to achieve increased efficiency and<br />
effectiveness is computationally complex. This makes it difficult to copy another organization's<br />
proprietary knowledge (Haley, 1986). So it might be better to acquire what a competitor knows.<br />
A merger is a cooperative strategy for integrating the learning process between firms through the<br />
sharing of firm-specific experience. This promise of synergy from merging critically depends on<br />
each organization's willingness to share what it knows. ―Being open to the realities of ... the needs,<br />
interests, and perspectives that exist in (competing organizations) may allow managers to search for<br />
organizational forms, and relations that more effectively accommodate (the merger's) people and<br />
processes...‖ (Sidky & Kersten, 2001).<br />
Traditional economic theory and the resource-based view of business strategy do not effectively<br />
address these issues. Then importance of firm-specific knowledge is recognized as either a factor of<br />
production or a resource that creates value. According to a resource based view of competitive<br />
advantage, counting, copyrights, trademarks, patents, manufacturing plants, stores, employees and<br />
market share, are better measurements of success. So M&A activity should be like playing<br />
monopoly such that companies accumulate things that are tangible. Then why not simply count the<br />
number of deals that a company does? Clearly this view misses the point, because most deals fail.<br />
The resource based view (RBV) of a firm’s performance has evolved to incorporate intangible<br />
resources that possess inimitability, variety, and nontradability (Cho & Pucik, 2005:556). But<br />
empirically it is hard to find confirmation of this more sophisticated RBV model of sustainable<br />
competitive advantage, which is limited by its mostly static framework of the firm’s organization<br />
(Newbert, 2002). Competitive advantage is a dynamic, not a static concept. The failure of these<br />
competing paradigms is that they do not explain how individuals, teams, and organizations actually<br />
learn.<br />
Creating a Learning Organization: Single-loops and Double-loops<br />
In our view, a more useful perspective can be found using a systems approach to organizational<br />
learning. Argyris and Shon (1978) distinguished between what they called single-loop and doubleloop<br />
learning processes.<br />
Single-loop learning involves the ability to detect errors and make corrections relative to preestablished<br />
operating norms. Dodgeson (1993:8) considers single-loop learning as related to<br />
activities which ―add to the knowledge base or firm-specific competencies or routines of the firm<br />
without altering the nature of their activities.‖ Firm-specific competence is seen as ―individual to<br />
the particular firm, and is a crucial factor in affecting their competitiveness.
Double-loop learning on the other hand, adds an additional step to the learning process by<br />
incorporating means and methods though the operating norms of an organization can be questioned.<br />
(Dodgeson, 1993:8) sees double-loop learning as involving ―changing the firms specific<br />
competencies and routines. In double-loop learning, the organization must have the ability to ask<br />
serious questions regarding their operating norms.<br />
Morgan (1997:92-93) presents some of these questions:<br />
1. What business are we in, is it the right business?<br />
2. Can we create fundamentally new products and services?<br />
3. Can we redefine the boundaries between different industries and services so that new niches<br />
emerge?<br />
4. Can we structure our organization around business processes that reflect a customer<br />
viewpoint rather than the influence of traditional department structures?<br />
5. Can we redesign business processes in a way that will increase the quality of production and<br />
reduce costs?<br />
6. Can we replace our organizational hierarchy with a network of self-managing teams?<br />
Morgan (1997:83) says that ―all these questions contain a double-loop learning potential because<br />
they invite the questioner to examine the status quo and consider alternative modes of operation.<br />
They encourage us to understand the key organizational attributes from the standpoint of a new<br />
frame‖. Or as Peter Drucker first said: ―What is our business and what should it be?‖ Rockefeller’s<br />
initial answer to these questions, when he controlled only 10% of oil refining after America’s civil<br />
war, was first to create the world’s largest refinery company. Standard Oil, by merging with other<br />
competing refineries, eventually gave him 95% control of refining. Once he achieved this mission<br />
he then realized that Standard Oil should become the world’s first, vertically-integrated oil<br />
company by backward integrating into oil production and distribution. Mergers and acquisitions<br />
again made this vision of the strategic control of oil possible.<br />
Is Disney-Pixar Creating a Culture of Learning?<br />
A modern merger that so far is creating similar ―synergies‖ is Disney’s acquisition of Pixar,<br />
involving $7.4 billion in stock. Clearly, this combination is seeking to backward integrate Disney’s<br />
distribution and production of traditional animation with Pixar’s advanced technologies. To<br />
successfully manage this change Disney wants Jobs, the head of both Pixar and Apple, to join<br />
Disney as a corporate director and Disney’s largest shareholder. Commenting on Jobs and the<br />
Disney Pixar merger, Safo, a director at the Institute for the Future says: ―He’s the only guy who<br />
has applied systems thinking to media, he’s the only person who bridges both hardware and<br />
software,‖ (The New York Times, January 21, 2006, p. B6).<br />
Interestingly, the new company is formally developing a team of leaders to integrate the Pixar with<br />
Disney. For example the merger will make Pixar Vice President, Lasseter, the chief creative officer<br />
of the Pixar and Disney animation studios. He will have the authority to ―green light‖ films for<br />
both studios, although Disney CEO Iger has the final approval. To ensure these two leaders work<br />
with each there is a steering committee that includes Iger, Jobs, and Lasseter, whose job is to<br />
oversee feature animation at both studios, and to help maintain the Pixar ―culture‖, among other
duties. Obviously this is a formal way to unite the leadership of both organizations with a new<br />
shared strategic vision of what Disney Pixar should be. (See Exhibit 1).<br />
Pixar’s ―brain trust‖ of seven directors and creative executives were also listed as company assets,<br />
and the agreement requires that a majority of them agree to join the combined company. Those<br />
employees include ―Finding Nemo‖ director Andrew Stanton; ―Monsters, Inc.‖ director Pete<br />
Docter; ―The Incredibles‖ director Brad Bird; director/writer Bob Peterson; story artist Brenda<br />
Chapman; Editor Lee Unkrich; and sound designer Gary Rydstrom.<br />
The merger also sets up a ―steering committee‖ whose job is to oversee feature animation at both<br />
studios, and to help maintain the Pixar ―culture,‖ among other duties. The committee must meet at<br />
Pixar headquarters at least one full day every other month. The agreement protects Pixar’s right to<br />
eschew employment contracts, and mandates that the studio continue to be called Pixar. The<br />
branding of films made after the merger is finalized will be changed to ―Disney Pixar.‖ The<br />
groundbreaking animation company will, however, stay in Emeryville, California, with a sign at its<br />
gate that ―shall not be altered‖ from ―Pixar,‖ the agreement said‖ (Keating, 2006).<br />
So far it appears that Disney is enhancing, and integrating the technology of Pixar’s creative talent<br />
by protecting their autonomy from the rest of Disney. In this way the animation hits should keep<br />
coming from the brain trust whose creative culture is preserved by being structurally separated<br />
(Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).<br />
Teamwork, leadership, and integration are continuing to make the Disney Pixar merger work.<br />
Disney has been working with Pixar for years distributing box-office hit movies such as Toy Story,<br />
Monster’s Inc., and Finding Nemo to name a few. (See Exhibit 3). So Disney and Pixar know how<br />
to work with each other as they are now learning to integrate on many levels and still preserve their<br />
identities. For example, Pixar’s smash hit Cars characters are available for purchase on<br />
Disneystore.com and can be found as main attractions at Disney’s theme parks. (See Exhibit 4).<br />
Steve Jobs, former CEO and current Chairman of the Board at Apple and acting member of the<br />
board of directors at Disney Pixar, brings proven leadership and additional integration ideas to the<br />
newly merged company and makes it possible for a synergy between Disney, Pixar, and Apple to<br />
occur. The Disney owned TV network ABC has made many of its hit television shows available<br />
exclusively on Apple’s subscription download site, iTunes. Walt Disney Records is making its<br />
music, as well as its soundtracks from both classic Disney films and Disney Pixar animated films<br />
exclusively available on iTunes.<br />
Leaders Learning to Change the Future<br />
Ethical leaders are necessary to create a learning organization that encourages creative thinking and<br />
creative problem solving. They recognize the central importance of knowledge workers in their<br />
acquisition of competing firms and businesses. According to Crossan & Vera (2004):<br />
―Leadership of organizational learning requires strategic leaders to frequently perform roles<br />
involving … the development of high levels of learning … across the organization.‖
In fact the research shows that there are different leadership styles that facilitate different types of<br />
organizational learning. For example, transformational leadership provides a clearer vision of the<br />
future that encourages the organization to change more rapidly to meet the challenges of new<br />
competitive environments (Tichy & Ulrich, 1984; Crossan & Vera, 2004).<br />
Conventional management practice establishes a top-down, bureaucratically controlled approach<br />
which encourages a narrow focus, limiting learning to achieve pre-determined objectives. A<br />
learning organization however, while requiring a sense of direction, also creates a ―space in which<br />
many possible actions and behaviors can emerge including those that can question the limits being<br />
imposed.‖(Morgan, 1997:95). Successful mergers and acquisitions, which bring together<br />
competing organizations, need to find this ―space‖, in order to determine which organizational<br />
norms are necessary for the continuing growth and development of the new organization, and<br />
which norms have to be pushed aside.<br />
The merger between Disney and Pixar has also created what seems to be an evolving partnership<br />
between Disney and Apple that provides more space to collaborate. Disney now has agreements in<br />
place to sell hit ABC prime time shows, such as ―Desperate Housewives‖, as well as content from<br />
ABC sports and ESPN on Apple’s popular iTunes music and video store. The 2006 Disney Pixar<br />
annual report states, ―With our groundbreaking deals last year to make our television shows and<br />
movies available on iTunes, as well as our new on-demand services provided through ABC.com<br />
and DisneyChannel.com, we have been at the forefront of responding to the consumer‖<br />
When the merger first occurred there was uncertainty about whether the initial success of this<br />
merger could be sustained. So far learning teams have emerged throughout the new company<br />
creating the magic of Disney animation on movie screens, DVDs, the internet, toys, and theme<br />
parks around the world? Keeping Pixar’s creative talent together was critical to ensure a learning<br />
process emerged that continues to create a new line of Disney animated characters that are as<br />
captivating as Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, and Snow White. Clearly Pixar is putting the magic<br />
back into Magic Kingdom.<br />
Conclusion<br />
From the outside looking in, creating a learning organization by mergers and acquisitions seems so<br />
intangible and too vague to explain. But if you are a participant in combining organizations<br />
success or failure is very real. For example, the absence of a shared strategic vision and poor<br />
communication ensures almost immediate failure. The loss of key employees undermines longterm<br />
success.<br />
Mergers and acquisitions can make an organization that is willing to learn become aware that new<br />
and better ways of doing business are possible. In order to sustain the advantage of a learning<br />
organization so called intangibles like leadership, ethics, strategy, team work, and organizational<br />
communication still matter.<br />
At this writing however, the near future seems promising. Disney Pixar continues to be an example<br />
of how a learning organization becomes sustainable. A lesson that MBA students and business<br />
leaders should learn.
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Exhibit 1 *<br />
Disney Steering Committee<br />
� John Lasseter, Chief Creative Officer.<br />
� Steve Jobs, Disney Board of Directors<br />
� Robert Iger, Disney CEO<br />
� Dick Cook, Walt Disney Studios Chairman<br />
� Tom Staggs, Disney Chief Financial Officer<br />
� Edwin Catmull, President of Pixar and Disney<br />
Animation<br />
* Policies for Management of the Feature Animation Businesses, Exhibit 99.1, Filed with the Securities Exchange<br />
Commission as of January 26, 2006, 1:34 PM ET. Found at http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.vCAq.c.htm.
Exhibit 2 †<br />
Pixar’s Brain Trust<br />
� Finding Nemo director, Andrew Stanton<br />
� Monsters, Inc. director, Pete Docter<br />
� The Incredibles director, Brad Bird<br />
� Director/Writer, Bob Peterson<br />
� Story artist, Brenda Chapman<br />
� Editor, Lee Unkrich<br />
� Sound Designer, Gary Rydstrom<br />
� Writer, Michael Ardnt<br />
† Policies for Management of the Feature Animation Businesses, Exhibit 99.1, Filed with the Securities Exchange<br />
Commission as of January 26, 2006, 1:34 PM ET. Found at http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.vCAq.c.htm.
Exhibit 3 ‡<br />
Disney Pixar Academy Awards and Movie Revenue<br />
� Toy Story (1995)- Worldwide Gross $358 Million<br />
o Special Achievement – John Lasseter<br />
� A Bug’s Life (1998)- Worldwide Gross $362 Million<br />
� Toy Story 2 (1999)- Worldwide Gross $483 Million<br />
� Monsters, Inc. (2001)- Worldwide Gross $524 Million<br />
o Best Original Song- ―If I Didn’t Have You‖<br />
� Finding Nemo (2003)- Worldwide Gross $850 Million<br />
o Best Animated Film<br />
� The Incredibles (2004)- Worldwide Gross $629 Million<br />
o Best Animated Film<br />
o Best Sound Editing<br />
� Cars (2006)- Worldwide Gross $461 Million<br />
� Ratatouille (2007)- Worldwide Gross $621 Million<br />
o Best Animated Feature Film<br />
� Wall-E (2008)- Worldwide Gross $521 Million<br />
o Best Animated Film<br />
� Up (2009)- Worldwide Gross $731 Million<br />
o Best Animated Feature Film<br />
o Best Music (Original Score)<br />
� Toy Story 3 (2010)- Worldwide Gross $1.063 Billion<br />
o Best Animated Feature Film<br />
o Best Original Song- “We Belong Together”<br />
� ‡ Pixar, 2011. Feature films. Found at http://www.pixar.com/featurefilms/index.html.<br />
� ‡Disney, 2011. Disney Animated Movies Academy Award nominations and wins. Found at<br />
http://www.disneyclips.com/newsinfo/awardnom.html.
Exhibit 4 §<br />
Pixar Themed Attractions at Disney Parks<br />
� Walt Disney and Disneyland Resorts<br />
o Monsters Inc. Laugh Floor<br />
o Finding Nemo-The Musical<br />
o The Seas with Nemo and Friends<br />
o Block Party Bash<br />
o Finding Nemo Submarine Voyage<br />
o A Bug’s Land<br />
o Monsters Inc., Mike and Sulley to the Rescue<br />
o Pixar Play Parade<br />
o Turtle Talk with Crush<br />
o It’s Tough to be a Bug<br />
o Buzz Lightyear’s Space Ranger Spin<br />
o Buzz Lightyear Astroblasters<br />
§ Wow, They Noticed! April 10, 2008. WDW News Today. Found at http://wdwnewstoday.com/archives/643.
November 30, 2003<br />
Mr. Michael D. Eisner, Chairman<br />
The Walt Disney Company<br />
500 South Buena Vista Street<br />
Burbank, CA 91521<br />
Dear Michael,<br />
Appendix 1 **<br />
Roy Disney’s Letter of Resignation<br />
It is with deep sadness and regret that I send you this letter of resignation from the Walt<br />
Disney Company, both as Chairman of the Feature Animation Division and as Vice<br />
Chairman of the Board of Directors.<br />
You well know that you and I have had serious differences of opinion about the direction<br />
and style of management in the Company in recent years. For whatever reason, you have<br />
driven a wedge between me and those I work with even to the extent of requiring some<br />
of my associates to report my conversations and activities back to you. I find this<br />
intolerable.<br />
Finally, you discussed with the Nominating Committee of the Board of Directors its<br />
decision to leave my name off the slate of directors to be elected in the coming year,<br />
effectively muzzling my voice on the Board — much as you did with Andrea Van de<br />
Kamp last year.<br />
Michael, I believe your conduct has resulted from my clear and unambiguous statements<br />
to you and the Board of Directors that after 19 years at the helm you are no longer the<br />
best person to run the Walt Disney Company. You had a very successful first 10-plus<br />
years at the Company in partnership with Frank Wells, for which I salute you. But, since<br />
Frank's untimely death in 1994, the Company has lost its focus, its creative energy, and<br />
its heritage.<br />
As I have said, and as Stanley Gold has documented in letters to you and other members<br />
of the Board, this Company, under your leadership, has failed during the last seven years<br />
in many ways:<br />
** Text of Roy Disney’s Resignation Letter, 2001. USA Today. Found at<br />
http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2003-12-01-disney-letter_x.htm.
1. The failure to bring back ABC Prime Time from the ratings abyss it has been in for<br />
years and your inability to program successfully the ABC Family Channel. Both of these<br />
failures have had, and I believe, will continue to have, significant adverse impact on<br />
shareholder value.<br />
2. Your consistent micro-management of everyone around you with the resulting loss of<br />
morale throughout this Company.<br />
3. The timidity of your investments in our theme park business. At Disney's California<br />
Adventure, Paris, and now in Hong Kong, you have tried to build parks "on the cheap"<br />
and they show it, and the attendance figures reflect it.<br />
4. The perception by all of our stakeholders — consumers, investors, employees,<br />
distributors and suppliers — that the Company is rapacious, soul-less, and always<br />
looking for the "quick buck" rather than the long-term value which is leading to a loss of<br />
public trust.<br />
5. The creative brain drain of the last several years, which is real and continuing, and<br />
damages our Company with the loss of every talented employee.<br />
6. Your failure to establish and build constructive relationships with creative partners,<br />
especially Pixar, Miramax, and the cable companies distributing our products.<br />
7. Your consistent refusal to establish a clear succession plan.<br />
In conclusion, Michael, it is my sincere belief that it is you who should be leaving and<br />
not me. Accordingly, I once again call for your resignation or retirement. The Walt<br />
Disney Company deserves fresh, energetic leadership at this challenging time in its<br />
history just as it did in 1984 when I headed a restructuring which resulted in your<br />
recruitment to the Company.<br />
I have and will always have an enormous allegiance and respect for this Company,<br />
founded by my uncle, Walt, and father, Roy, and to our faithful employees and loyal<br />
stockholders. I don't know if you and other directors can comprehend how painful it is<br />
for me and the extended Disney family to arrive at this decision.<br />
In accordance with Item 6 of Form 8-K and Item 7 of Schedule 14A, I request that you<br />
disclose this letter and that you file a copy of this letter as an exhibit to a Company Form<br />
8-K.<br />
With sincere regret,<br />
Roy E. Disney<br />
cc: Board of Directors
Appendix 2 ††<br />
POLICIES FOR MANAGEMENT<br />
OF<br />
THE FEATURE ANIMATION BUSINESSES<br />
The following sets forth certain policies and principles which shall be adopted and<br />
implemented with respect to the management and operation of the Disney and Pixar Feature<br />
Animation Businesses, all of which are subject to the authority of the Disney Chief Executive<br />
Officer to take such actions as are in the best interests of the shareholders of Disney.<br />
Management Responsibilities<br />
Edwin E. Catmull shall be the President of Pixar and Disney Animation, heading the<br />
combined animation businesses of Disney and Pixar, reporting directly to Robert A. Iger and<br />
Richard Cook jointly.<br />
John A. Lasseter shall be the Chief Creative Officer of Pixar and Disney Animation and Walt<br />
Disney Imagineering, reporting to Robert A. Iger. John A. Lasseter will have ―green lighting‖<br />
authority for Disney and Pixar feature animation productions, subject to final approval by Disney’s<br />
CEO.<br />
Steering Committee<br />
Upon the effective date of the Disney – Pixar merger, a Committee (―Committee‖) shall be<br />
immediately established to help provide oversight to the Feature Animation Businesses of Disney<br />
and Pixar.<br />
The principal objectives of the Committee are: (i) to help maintain the Pixar ―culture,‖ (ii) to<br />
help supervise Pixar and Disney Feature Animation, (iii) to oversee Pixar compensation practices<br />
and (iv) to approve the film budgets of Pixar, all subject to final approval by Disney’s Chief<br />
Executive Officer.<br />
The Committee shall initially consist of the following members: Edwin E. Catmull, John A.<br />
Lasseter, Robert A. Iger, Richard Cook, Thomas O. Staggs, and Steven P. Jobs.<br />
It is intended that the Committee will meet at the headquarters of Pixar in Emeryville for at<br />
least one full day during every other calendar month.<br />
†† Policies for Management of the Feature Animation Businesses, Exhibit 99.1, Filed with the Securities Exchange<br />
Commission as of January 26, 2006, 1:34 PM ET. Found at http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.vCAq.c.htm.
Pixar Compensation Practices<br />
Pixar shall retain its existing compensation philosophies and practices, including not using<br />
employment contracts, the granting of employee stock options, the maintenance of executive<br />
employee bonus plans and employee medical benefits and other fundamental human resource<br />
policies and practices for at least five years or such shorter period as the Committee may decide.<br />
Branding Arrangements<br />
Location<br />
Pixar will continue to be called ―Pixar‖.<br />
The branding of Pixar’s previous films and products will not be altered.<br />
Future films produced by Pixar will be branded Disney Pixar.<br />
Pixar’s operations will continue to be based in Emeryville, California. The Pixar sign at the<br />
gate shall not be altered.