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Causal risk models of air transport - NLR-ATSI

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that, while a causal <strong>risk</strong> model can be used in a TLS approach, the model can fully come to<br />

justice in an ALARP approach which strives for continuous improvement.<br />

2.5. Theories about accident causation<br />

Risk from <strong>air</strong> <strong>transport</strong> is almost exclusively related to accidents 9 . In a desire to understand<br />

and prevent the occurrence <strong>of</strong> accidents, many researchers have tried to develop a concept<br />

or framework for describing accident causation. Some <strong>of</strong> these theories have been very<br />

influential on the way we think about accidents and the representation <strong>of</strong> accidents in<br />

mathematical <strong>models</strong>. For that reason this section provides a brief overview <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> the<br />

most important accident causation theories and concludes with what this means for <strong>risk</strong><br />

model requirements.<br />

For the purpose <strong>of</strong> accident investigation, it is <strong>of</strong>ten assumed that accidents involve the<br />

occurrence <strong>of</strong> a set <strong>of</strong> successive events that produce unintentional harm. The start <strong>of</strong> this<br />

sequence is a deviation or perturbation that disturbs the existing equilibrium or state <strong>of</strong><br />

homeostasis. Benner [1975] pointed out that events during accidents occur both in series<br />

and in parallel and proposed flow charting methods to represent this. Accident investigation<br />

tools like Event and <strong>Causal</strong> Factors Analysis (ECFA) [Buys & Clark 1995] and<br />

Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) [Johnson 1975] use this concept to provide<br />

a structure for integrating and subsequently communicating investigation findings. Already<br />

in 1935, Heinrich developed a theory that introduces an additional dimension to such<br />

accident chain model. He compared the occurrence <strong>of</strong> an accident to a set <strong>of</strong> lined-up<br />

dominoes [Heinrich et al 1980]. The five dominoes were a) ancestry and social<br />

environment, b) worker fault, c) unsafe act or unsafe condition, d) accident and e) damage<br />

or injury. Central to Heinrich’s original statement <strong>of</strong> the model is the assertion that the<br />

immediate causes <strong>of</strong> accidents are <strong>of</strong> two different types; unsafe acts and unsafe conditions.<br />

Heinrich’s domino model was also useful to explain how by removing one <strong>of</strong> the<br />

intermediate dominoes, the remaining ones would not fall and the injury would not occur.<br />

Reason [1990] took Heinrich’s unsafe acts and unsafe conditions a step further by refining<br />

the distinction between different types <strong>of</strong> failures that line up to create an accident. Building<br />

upon work by Rasmussen [1983], Reason describes an accident as a situation in which<br />

latent failures, arising mainly in the managerial and organisational spheres, combine<br />

adversely with local trigger events (weather, location etc) and with active failures <strong>of</strong><br />

individuals at the operational level. Latent failures are failures that are created a long time<br />

before the accident, but lie dormant until an active failure triggers their operation. Their<br />

defining feature is that they were present within the system well before the onset <strong>of</strong> an<br />

accident sequence. Like many other high-hazard, low-<strong>risk</strong> systems, the aviation system has<br />

developed such a high degree <strong>of</strong> technical and procedural protection that it is largely pro<strong>of</strong><br />

against single failures, either human or mechanical. The aviation system is more likely to<br />

suffer ‘organizational accidents’ [Reason 1990]. That is, a situation in which latent failures,<br />

arising mainly at the managerial and organizational level, combine adversely with local<br />

triggering events and with the active failures <strong>of</strong> individuals at the execution level [Reason<br />

1997]. This concept is <strong>of</strong>ten graphically illustrated as slices <strong>of</strong> holed cheese, each slice<br />

representing a barrier at a different organisational level. The holes in the cheese are barrier<br />

failures and an accident occurs when the holes line up. The ‘Swiss cheese’ model has been<br />

useful to underline the importance <strong>of</strong> organisational factors in accidents. Perrow [1984] also<br />

describes accidents as occurrences where apparently trivial events cascade through the<br />

system to cause a large event with severe consequences. He uses the term ‘normal<br />

9<br />

Examples <strong>of</strong> non-accident <strong>risk</strong> in <strong>air</strong> <strong>transport</strong> are deep vein thrombosis and possible<br />

health effects <strong>of</strong> exposure to higher levels <strong>of</strong> electromagnetic radiation.<br />

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