Chimera and the Continuum of Humanity - Emory University School ...

374 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55
a being has full moral standing if and only if it is rational. 200 Kant believed
that only humans are rational and, therefore, rationality was the morally
defining characteristic of humanity. 201 Animals, which lack the capacity to
reason, are thus not morally relevant. 202 The most familiar application of
Kant’s moral theory is his categorical imperative, which states that a human
should “act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the
same time as an end.” 203 According to the categorical imperative, the killing of
a human is always morally prohibited, regardless of any countervailing
considerations. 204 It is not clear, however, if and how Kant’s moral theory
applies to chimera that are part human (and thus owed total, inviolable moral
respect) and part animal (and thus owed none).
Despite numerous attempts over several centuries, no one has established
one fixed set of characteristics such as communicative ability or rationality that
includes all humans and excludes all nonhuman organisms. 205 Modern
research has demonstrated that animals can communicate, exhibit intelligence,
and experience emotion. 206 Some intelligent animals exhibit these traits more
strongly than certain humans, such as the very young, the severally mentally
handicapped, or the comatose. 207 Similar to Justice Stewart’s famous
statement on defining pornography, 208 maybe in the era of biotechnology we
cannot define humanity, but we know it when we see it. 209 Nevertheless, the
200 Andrew W. Siegel, The Moral Insignificance of Crossing Species Boundaries, AM. J. BIOETHICS,
Summer 2003, at 33, 34.
201 Margaret MacDonald, Natural Rights, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 21, 28 (Jeremy Waldon ed., 1984) (for
Kant, “[m]en share all other characteristics with the brutes . . . but reason was alike in all men, it was man’s
defining characteristic”).
202 Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law’s Role in Prevention, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 15 (2001). Under this view, the value of any nonhuman things resides only in its value to humans.
Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra note 201, at 41, 55–56.
203
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 32 (1974) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton trans., 1956)).
204 Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an
Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State’s Duty to Protect Its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 195, 230 (2001).
205 Robert & Baylis, supra note 43, at 5.
206 See generally Linden, supra note 196.
207 Robert & Baylis, supra note 43, at 5.
208 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today attempt
further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of hardcore
pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.”).
209 See Robert & Baylis, supra note 43, at 5 (stating that “[w]e all know a human when we see one, but,
really, that is all that is known about our identity as a species”).