Chimera and the Continuum of Humanity - Emory University School ...

376 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55
Beyond speciesism, the “species” concept itself has been criticized as being
inherently flawed as a scientific distinction. 216 Even putting aside modern
biotechnology, the species concept is merely a convenient mechanism by
which to group life forms that are evolutionarily related to varying degrees. 217
Nevertheless, the line between humans and animals has importance as a moral
and social construct; “we rely on the notion of fixed species identities and
boundaries in the way we live our lives and treat other creatures, whether in
decisions about what we eat or what we patent.” 218 Chimera technology
strongly challenges these notions of “fixed species identities.” 219 The gap
between our moral concept of a fixed, unique human species and the modern
scientific reality of chimera technology has left us with an inadequate moral
framework. 220 This decoupling of the moral concept of personhood from the
biological concept of humanness will, according to some commentators, lead
to moral ambiguity. 221 Thus, we must be open to a more flexible moral
framework, one that does not rely only on drawing sharp distinctions between
humans and nonhumans.
considered a “subordinate and inferior class of beings” at the time that the Constitution was framed); RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 38 (1975) (stating that “north and south, he [the black man] was classified as a lower
form of human life and therefore fair game for continual debasement”); Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human
Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 468–69
(1989) (stating that “[e]arly geneticists believed that qualities such as intelligence, industry and righteousness
were linked to genetic endowment and would predict race, ethnicity, physical handicap and social class. The
risks of racism have thus long been associated with genetic research”). But see David Wasserman, Species and
Races, Chimeras, and Multiracial People, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 2003, at 13, 13 (distinguishing racial
classifications and arguing that moral lines between humans and chimera should be maintained).
216 David Castle, Hopes Against Hopeful Monsters, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 2003, at 28, 28; see
Robert & Baylis, supra note 43, at 3 (“[A]t present, there are somewhere between nine and twenty-two
definitions of species in the biological literature. Of these, there is no one species concept that is universally
compelling.”).
217 Robert & Baylis, supra note 43, at 2–4.
218 Id. at 6. While animals are not afforded constitutional rights, society has recognized the special moral
status of certain intelligent animals. For instance, there are strict limitations and requirements for primate
research. Castle, supra note 216, at 29.
219 Robert & Baylis, supra note 43, at 2.
220 Id.
221 Id. However, it is not clear that Robert and Baylis believe that this threat of moral ambiguity is
sufficient to make it immoral or unethical to produce chimera. In response to Robert and Baylis, others have
argued that affording special moral standing to certain chimera would not actually threaten society’s moral
structure. Siegel, supra note 200, at 34. This is because in the “extraordinary instance” where a chimera
might exhibit high-level cognitive abilities, we would be able to accord it special respect without changing the
firmly entrenched idea that human life is sacred and distinct from other animals. Id. The extent of this
“special respect,” however, is undetermined because while humans do possess a framework for understanding
our moral obligations to chimera, society still needs to determine which “properties are relevant to moral
status” and “whether chimeras possess the relevant moral properties.” Id.