Chimera and the Continuum of Humanity - Emory University School ...

380 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55
As an extreme example of the error in totally rejecting chimera personhood,
the technical definition of chimera includes humans who have received
medical implants derived from animals, such as pig heart valves. 246 Regardless
of their opinions of his politics, most people would unquestionably consider
Senator Jesse Helms a “person,” but strictly speaking Helms is a humananimal
chimera because he has a surgically implanted pig heart valve. 247 A
drop of animal does not an animal make. 248 At some point, chimera must
qualify as persons under the Constitution. 249 To conclude otherwise would
necessitate an overly formalistic definition of person. Therefore, it is
important to have a flexible analytical framework based on essential human
biological and cognitive traits in order to decipher the personhood of
questionable human-animal chimera. 250 The development of such a framework
is desirable so that courts will not be wholly unprepared to address the issues
of chimera. 251
A. The Essential Factors of Constitutional Personhood
Paralleling the moral rights discussion in Part IV, two distinct but
interrelated approaches to chimera personhood have been suggested. The first
approach to chimera personhood focuses on biological material because “[i]t
cannot reasonably be disputed that an essential part of the definition of Homo
concerns that need to be considered.” GUIDELINES, supra note 53, at 40.
246 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
247 See Bok, supra note 39, at 25.
248 See Wasserman, supra note 215, at 13 (discussing the one drop concept of human-animal chimera in
comparison to racial classifications).
249 See Rivard, supra note 131, at 1468 (arguing that “if members of another species are like humans in
relevant ways, then it would be wrong to deny them constitutional personhood on the basis of irrelevant
criteria such as genetic composition or appearance”).
250 It maybe irresponsible to leave this research unexamined and unchecked by the legal system, solely to
whims of individual researchers. While human-animal chimera research certainly has promise, “[e]ndorsing
scientific research simply because it is interesting and it might prove useful is a dangerous path . . . . Much
‘useful’ information can be derived from experiments that are objectively evil. The ends, no matter how
noble, cannot justify any and all possible means.” Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate
Limits of Science in the Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 157, 167–68
(2003) (emphasis removed).
251 See Elizabeth L. DeCoux, In the Valley of the Dry Bones: Reuniting the Word “Standing” with Its
Meaning in Animal Cases, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L & POL’Y REV. 681, 761 (2005) (“Courts could suddenly
find themselves having to scramble, unprepared, to weigh a scientist’s assertion of the right to ‘head off’ any
pesky claims an human/animal chimera might make, against the claims of the chimera himself. In such a
situation, courts would also have to contend with the multitude of amici that may ask to express their views,
while the court tries to avoid such embarrassing computations as those that were used many decades ago to
determine who was mulatto and who was not.”).