The impact of evaluation based funding on university research - EAIR

<strong>The</strong> <strong>impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> on university research:
Australia and Germany compared.
Paper presented to the
29th ANNUAL EAIR FORUM
26 to 29 August 2007
Innsbruck, Austria
Name <strong>of</strong> Author(s)
Stefan Lange
Contact Details
Dr. Stefan Lange
Endowed Chair for Science Organization, Higher Education and Science Management
German University <strong>of</strong> Administrative Sciences Speyer
Post Box 14 09
D-67324 Speyer
Germany
E-mail: lange@dhv-speyer.de
Key words
Assessment /Evaluation, Funding – State higher education, Governance, Higher education policy /
development, Research policy- National and/or institutional

Abstract
<strong>The</strong> <strong>impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong>-<strong>funding</strong> on university research: Australia and Germany compared.
Evidence suggests that <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> mechanisms trigger adaptive behaviour in scientists,
leading to unintended changes in knowledge production. However, there is no conclusive evidence about
when (under what circumstances), how (by what processes) and with what effects researchers adapt to
these mechanisms. To answer these crucial questions case studies in two different higher education
systems have been conducted: Australia and Germany. To overcome the methodological weaknesses <strong>of</strong>
earlier studies, a comparative investigation <strong>of</strong> several research fields and universities has been conducted,
combining qualitative interviews, ethnographic observations and bibliometric studies.

<strong>The</strong> <strong>impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong>-<strong>funding</strong> on university research: Australia and Germany compared.
1. Introduction
<strong>The</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> the project, this contribution is <strong>based</strong> upon, is to establish whether researchers adapt to <strong>funding</strong>
conditions and, if so, with what consequences for the content <strong>of</strong> their research. 1 This will be achieved by
combining bibliometric analyses at various levels, interview-<strong>based</strong> case studies <strong>of</strong> research groups from all
major disciplines at various universities, and in-depth studies applying ethnographic observations <strong>of</strong>
researchers' adaptive behaviours in two different national higher education systems: Australia and
Germany. While anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> mechanisms affect
the content <strong>of</strong> scientific research, it provides no systematic account <strong>of</strong> how this occurs. <strong>The</strong>re is no
conclusive evidence about when (under what circumstances), how (by what processes) and with what
consequences researchers adapt to these instruments.
Former investigations <strong>of</strong> the afore mentioned adaptation processes have primarily been conducted with
regard to the consequences <strong>of</strong> the British Research Assessment Exercise (Harley/Lee 1997; McNay 1997;
Henkel 2000; for the U.S. system see Chubin/Hackett 1990; for Australia Marginson/Considine 2000). But
all these investigations bear substantial methodological weaknesses, lacking sufficient information about
operationalisation, the construction <strong>of</strong> questionnaires or methods <strong>of</strong> data analysis. So it remains unclear on
what kind <strong>of</strong> empirical evidence conclusions and generalisations have been drawn.
<strong>The</strong> project presented here compares the <strong>impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Australian and the German <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong>
<strong>funding</strong> regime on research conditions in generally and on the contents <strong>of</strong> research in particular. For that
purpose the project design is guided by a conceptual framework that combines insights from the new
institutionalism, the sociology <strong>of</strong> scientific knowledge and recent research on the governance <strong>of</strong> higher
education institutions. In order to investigate the causal relationship between institutional mechanisms and
the cognitive content <strong>of</strong> scientific research, an 'actor-centred' neoinstitutionalist analytical framework
(Mayntz/Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997) is employed. This framework allows inclusion <strong>of</strong> non-institutional
factors into explanations, which is <strong>of</strong> special importance for science studies where any empirical
investigation must take into account field-specific characteristics <strong>of</strong> causation.
<strong>The</strong> declared aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> is to motivate universities to improve their research
performance – to provide more value for public money, to put it in a nutshell. Evaluation <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> is
in this respect a prominent part <strong>of</strong> New-Public-Management (NPM) strategies introduced to higher
education institutions, with Australia being a forerunner in this respect (with a 20 year experience) and
Germany being a latecomer, establishing parts <strong>of</strong> NPM since the late 1990s (Kehm/Lanzendorf 2006,
Lange/Schimank 2007). Governments expect from <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> an improvement <strong>of</strong> research
quantity and quality, without unintended consequences such as severe thematic or structural shifts in their
national research landscape. If these expectations can be fulfilled is still unclear. But it is unclear too, if
<strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> has all the negative effects on research work as supposed by its critics. <strong>The</strong>re is
no solid and empirically informed knowledge about the long term effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> on
the process <strong>of</strong> the production <strong>of</strong> knowledge. This is exactly what we try to find out. With regard to the
<strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> distribution <strong>of</strong> public funds from governments we compare the Australian higher
education system with its 15 years experience to the German system, where <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> has
just been introduced and is unlikely to have already an outstanding <strong>impact</strong> on research conditions. So the
German case study is methodologically a “zero-measurement”, representing the “basic state <strong>of</strong> research”
before the advent <strong>of</strong> an <strong>evaluation</strong>-<strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> system (Lange 2007). Our sample until now includes 7
Australian universities (179 interviews) and 1 German university (36 interviews). We conducted
interviews with researchers from 6 disciplines, interviewing 3 pr<strong>of</strong>essors and 2 postdocs per discipline.
<strong>The</strong>se disciplines are: Physics, Biology, Geology, Mathematics, History and the Political Sciences. At
each University we interviewed the deans or heads <strong>of</strong> the faculties, departments or schools where the
researchers were located as well as three representatives <strong>of</strong> the central university management to get a clue
on the universities reaction to governmental policies on the one hand and its internal management
strategies with regard to research on the other.
1 This research project is still ongoing and funded by the German Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF)
and by the Australian Research Council (ARC). <strong>The</strong> researcher team consists <strong>of</strong> Jochen Gläser, Stefan Lange,
Grit Laudel and Uwe Schimank.

<strong>The</strong> interviews with the researchers were prepared by making bibliographic anylysis with SCI-data 2 to get
a clue on research paths, research results presented in SCI-rated articles, the quantity <strong>of</strong> such articles and
their relevance (measured via citation counts) to their peers. This gave us empirical evidence for asking
questions about external reasons (like <strong>funding</strong> matters) intervening in or changing existing research paths
or starting new ones. 3
(Figure 1: Example <strong>of</strong> a bibliometric research trail)
2. Evaluation <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> <strong>of</strong> research in Australia and Germany
In both countries a part <strong>of</strong> the public <strong>funding</strong> for universities is devoted to research. In Australia this part
<strong>of</strong> research <strong>funding</strong> is nowadays nearly completely coupled to performance indicators. <strong>The</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong>
this performance dependent basic <strong>funding</strong> started in 1995 and developed towards a system in which five
research block grants are distributed to universities. <strong>The</strong>se block grants are <strong>based</strong> on quantitative
performance indicators (see below):
Grant Competitive
external <strong>funding</strong>
Research Infrastructure
Block Grant
Institutional Grants
Scheme
Research Training
Scheme
Australian
Postgraduate Awards
International
Postgraduate Research
Scholarships
Table 1: Australian research block grants in 2005
Weight <strong>of</strong> Indicators
Research Students
(Masters und PhD)
Publications
Total (Mio AUD)
100 183.0
60 Total number: 30 10 290.6
40 Completions: 50 10 552.2
40 Completions: 50 10 91.2
40 Completions: 50 10 18.0
Sum 1135
<strong>The</strong> basic public <strong>funding</strong> <strong>of</strong> universities in Germany does not distinguish into a teaching or a research
component. In the German Bundesland (state in the federation) , the university <strong>of</strong> our case study is
located, the amount <strong>of</strong> the budget distributed via research performance indicators in 2005 was at 2,1 % -
2 We took SCI-data in those disciplines where these were easily available. Especially in History and Political
Sciences we looked on the researchers publication records and conducted additional information from discipline
specific data basis, which helped us to construct an individual research path.
3 For a broader sketch on the projects methodology see Gläser/Laudel 2007.

with 1,7 % for the amount <strong>of</strong> external <strong>funding</strong> and 0,4 % for PhD-completions. While in Australia 7,9 %
<strong>of</strong> the entire public budget was distributed along research performance indicators, it was 2,1 % in
Germany (for the whole formula see table 2 below). But we have to keep in mind that the amount <strong>of</strong>
public <strong>funding</strong> on an universities income portfolio is only 41 %, while it is still over 80 % in Germany.
Evaluation <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> is a central means to introduce quasi-markets in higher education. But it is just
one <strong>of</strong> the many tools used for the reform <strong>of</strong> higher education systems all over the OECD world and is
supposed to work properly only in combination with the other instruments <strong>of</strong> reform. Usually it goes hand
in hand with measures like strengthening <strong>of</strong> the university management, the involvement <strong>of</strong> external
stakeholders and pr<strong>of</strong>ile building strategies on all university levels. <strong>The</strong>se other instruments cannot be
discussed here in detail. 4 For the purpose <strong>of</strong> this CD-Rom-contribution I leave the overall higher education
policies on the macro level in Australia and Germany aside and will continue with 1) the reactions <strong>of</strong>
university management and 2) the researchers adaptation strategies to the new policy directives imposed
by NPM-friendly policies and especially the introduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong>.
recurrent basic <strong>funding</strong> by government 90 %
formula <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> 10 %
formula <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> by teaching indicators 20 % is distributed on the number <strong>of</strong> students in
the first four semesters,
35 % is distributed on the number <strong>of</strong>
graduations (with a bonus for short study time)
formula <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> by research indicators 20 % is distributed on the amount <strong>of</strong> external
<strong>funding</strong>,
5 % is distributed on the number <strong>of</strong> PhD-
basic funds for chairs and institutes
incorporated in the formula
Table 2.: Funding formula <strong>of</strong> the German University
graduations
20 % is distributed on the number <strong>of</strong> fixed
posts for academics
3. How university management adapts to <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> and accompanying NPMtools
New patterns <strong>of</strong> organisational behaviour which could be observed in the management <strong>of</strong> all universities
were first <strong>of</strong> all a strengthening and pr<strong>of</strong>essionalisation <strong>of</strong> the central and middle management <strong>of</strong>
universities. In Australia, business like management structures are widely established as an instrument <strong>of</strong>
coping with the competitive quasi-market-environment set by NPM-policy-reforms which trace back to
the middle <strong>of</strong> the 1980s. In Germany first attempts towards this direction are observable, too.
One <strong>of</strong> the political core interests in both countries was the strengthening <strong>of</strong> the decision making power <strong>of</strong>
organisational executives in universities. However, to which degree vice-chancellors, rectors, presidents,
deans and council members make use <strong>of</strong> these legal powers is still highly diverse even in Australia.
Building pr<strong>of</strong>iles and research centres which fit to these pr<strong>of</strong>iles is a new form <strong>of</strong> research organization
introduced by NPM, with the aim to change research behaviour from individual towards collaborative
projects and towards the development <strong>of</strong> “critical masses”. Such activities should provide advantages in
the competitive bidding for external research grants and happened regularly in research areas that had
priority on the governmental <strong>funding</strong> agenda. Most universities in our sample invested in research centre
building activities according to certain pr<strong>of</strong>iles, trying to shift financial resources from non priority areas
to the centres. However, in many cases reported from Australia and Germany, universities can only
provide very small amounts <strong>of</strong> start-up money for these centres.
All universities try to invest heavily in special funds to boost and reward researchers’ activities in the
competition for external grants and to support grant application and the preparation <strong>of</strong> proposals. Special
funds for these issues are located at central as well as faculty/department level. However, again the
financial resources universities can spend on these issues are scarce. In Australia for example we find the
institution <strong>of</strong> “near miss”-grants, which provide a researcher with a bit <strong>of</strong> money to improve a project
4 For an overview on the macro level see Lange/Schimank 2007.

proposal which missed <strong>funding</strong> by the ARC but was recommended for a new submittal in the following
year. In Germany we find efforts by the central administration to support researchers bidding for large
collaborative research grants from the DFG or the European Commission.
In all universities recruiting policies for vacant chairs are no longer a task <strong>of</strong> pure academic decision
making in representative boards and commissions on faculty or department level. All university managers
we interviewed claimed that strategic recruiting according to pre-defined core areas <strong>of</strong> research in
Australia and Germany – <strong>of</strong>ten with regard to certain pr<strong>of</strong>iles which were bargained between university
and government – is the most important tool for a pro-active university management. International
collaborations, “big” third party funded research projects, publications in international journals with high
<strong>impact</strong> factors and, last but not least, the fitting <strong>of</strong> the candidates’ research priorities to the pr<strong>of</strong>iles <strong>of</strong> the
departments or institutes are ranking high on the want list <strong>of</strong> university managers. In Australia the applied
character <strong>of</strong> research and industry collaborations are weighted higher than in Germany. It was common to
all universities that excellent research performance was weighted higher in recruiting policies for vacant
chairs and pr<strong>of</strong>essorships (and for internal promotion too) than excellent teaching performance. This was
even clear from the interviews with German university managers despite <strong>of</strong> their claims that the
Humboldtian ideal <strong>of</strong> the teaching-research nexus would be still in favour.
Where the distribution <strong>of</strong> government funds is dependent on success measured via performance indicator
schemes the adaptation <strong>of</strong> university managers to these indicators with regard to their internal allocation
decisions seems to depend on how much money is allocated by this instrument. In Australia all the money
available for research depends on indicators. University managers are not confident with the <strong>funding</strong>
formulae <strong>of</strong> the National Grant Schemes, because they have the impression that these do not appropriately
measure research quality. However, they tend to copy the formulae when it comes to university intern
distributions because their prior endeavour is to maximise the university’s income. Accordingly, most <strong>of</strong>
the managers believe that income maximisation would best be achieved by adopting the external <strong>funding</strong>
criteria and thus rewarding faculties and schools for contributing to the university’s income. This
mechanism is well known as “mimetic isomorphism” (DiMaggio/Powell 1991). In this case university
organisations adopt institutional structures provided by powerful external actors from which they are
dependent rather than copying successful structures from other, peer-like organisations. Only the
weighting <strong>of</strong> the formulae is modified to prevent especially humanities and social sciences from being
completely left behind by the natural sciences. In the German case, where only a small proportion <strong>of</strong> the
overall budget is distributed to the university via performance indicators, the formula was not generally
copied for internal allocation decisions <strong>of</strong> the universities. All faculties got their historical share so far and
only one faculty (from seven) used the government formula for internal distribution.
4. Adaptation patterns <strong>of</strong> researchers
Adaptation <strong>of</strong> researchers can be observed in five interconnected dimensions, in which the changes in
university governance in general and the <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> in particular are mainly seen as
problematic – with slight differences between the Australian and German case: the availability <strong>of</strong> time for
conducting research, the <strong>funding</strong> situation, adaptation to pr<strong>of</strong>ile building activities and the influence <strong>of</strong>
<strong>evaluation</strong> schemes.
Time
<strong>The</strong> time dimension was the variable most frequently mentioned, especially among German university
researchers. Much more than the increasing teaching load, the pr<strong>of</strong>essors we interviewed saw rising
bureaucratisation and the resulting high amount <strong>of</strong> administrative work as the most significant restriction
<strong>of</strong> their research activities. Most conspicuous are the increasing accountability coming along with the
Bologna process, the devolving <strong>of</strong> previously centralized administrative tasks to institutes and chairs in the
context <strong>of</strong> internal change management; and the bureaucratic drift <strong>of</strong> externally funded research itself.
Competitive bidding for grants and meeting the demands <strong>of</strong> targeted <strong>funding</strong> schemes was a time
consuming exercise in both countries.
Funding
German university pr<strong>of</strong>essors are still allocated recurrent basic <strong>funding</strong> for research while in Australia all
money available for research is distributed via <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> schemes. In Germany the extent to which
academics can conduct research with their recurrent basic <strong>funding</strong> or whether they were dependent on
external <strong>funding</strong> varied strongly between the disciplines. All interviewed history pr<strong>of</strong>essors declared that it

is hard but not impossible to conduct historical research projects in the traditional lone manner without
grants. Since the recurrent <strong>funding</strong> does not cover research expenses, most historians reported that they
invest private money to get the books, copies, or micr<strong>of</strong>ilms they need, or to finance stays in national and
foreign archives and libraries.
<strong>The</strong> situation <strong>of</strong> mathematicians was very similar to that <strong>of</strong> the historians. <strong>The</strong> majority were classical
‘solitary and free’ researchers who conduct low-cost research by solving mathematical problems with
‘paper and pencil’. <strong>The</strong>y do not have external funds because their basic <strong>funding</strong> is sufficient to supply
them with the few things they need including a small amount <strong>of</strong> travel money for attending international
conferences.
While recurrent basic <strong>funding</strong> appears to be sufficient for much historical and mathematical research, the
majority <strong>of</strong> academics from the political sciences, geology, biology and physics depend heavily on
external <strong>funding</strong>. Pr<strong>of</strong>essors in biology and physics declared that they could not perform effectively
without much external <strong>funding</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y claimed that they can only perform successful and internationally
visible research in the highly competitive environments <strong>of</strong> their specialties if they can conduct several
related projects at the same time and if they have access to up-to-date expensive laboratory equipment or
radiation sources. Observable adaptation happened primarily as some kind <strong>of</strong> lip service: researchers in all
disciplines depending on external funds adapted to the “proposal lyrics” <strong>of</strong> the <strong>funding</strong> agencies but
without changing their research itself substantially. In Australia we made similar observations. In most
cases historians and theoretical mathematicians did not need <strong>funding</strong> for their research but – different to
Germany – were forced to attract funds by their departments and schools just to contribute to the
organisation’s income. Adaptation to “proposal lyrics” and references to utility pressures in the process <strong>of</strong>
competitive bidding was much stronger in Australia than in Germany because the few <strong>funding</strong> agencies
available for Australian researchers – mainly the Australian Research Council (ARC) – have a strong bias
on applied or at least applicable research. Another adaptation pattern observable here was accommodating
patrons: many researchers had to invest time in consulting or supply jobs for industry to gain external
income which could be spent for research later on. This seems to be common practice even for those who
have success in competitive bidding because the project grants are in most cases not high enough to cover
all real costs <strong>of</strong> a research project. Another common effect <strong>of</strong> the ’accommodating patrons’-pattern for
Australian researchers is the dropping <strong>of</strong> unfashionable and in the end un-fundable lines <strong>of</strong> research.
Academics are convinced that they need to anticipate and accommodate the interests <strong>of</strong> decision-makers –
inside or outside their university – and internalise these outward interests and expectations in their
consideration about their research plans.
Pr<strong>of</strong>ile Building
Pr<strong>of</strong>ile building via the establishment <strong>of</strong> research centres in universities is a new form <strong>of</strong> research
organisation introduced by NPM. It aims at changing research behaviour from individual towards
collaborative projects and towards the development <strong>of</strong> “critical masses”, providing advantages in the
competitive bidding for external research grants. In Australia as well as in Germany we can observe that a
majority <strong>of</strong> academics deal strategically with these centres but do not commit to them intrinsically. Most
important in the German context is that a lot <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essors who represent unfashionable (but for teaching
purposes still necessary) specialties inside their disciplines are sidelined by pr<strong>of</strong>ile and centre building
strategies <strong>of</strong> their universities and have to cope with a steady reduction <strong>of</strong> casual staff. <strong>The</strong>ir adaptation
pattern is in many cases “inner emigration”: they step out <strong>of</strong> the university governance regime and do what
they want to do with limited resources because they do not see any advantage in participation. Such
adaptation patterns were not reported from Australia.
Evaluation Schemes
Interestingly, no adaptation to <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> formulae was observable: neither in the weak
German nor in the strong Australian regime. In Germany, the amount <strong>of</strong> money allocated via performance
indicators in the universities is still too small to have a steering effect. No pr<strong>of</strong>essor will change his
research behaviour for an annual gain or loss <strong>of</strong> approximately 2.000 – 4.000 € for his chair. In Australia,
academics adapt only indirectly to the indicators <strong>of</strong> the <strong>funding</strong> formulae. <strong>The</strong>y are aware that they need to
have an impressive publication record and external grants in order to be promoted in their university.
Some <strong>of</strong> them stated that they changed their publication strategy by publishing more, publishing alone (if
possible) and try to publish in international journals with high reputation. However, none <strong>of</strong> them reported
changes in the content <strong>of</strong> their research resulting from the changed publication behaviour. <strong>The</strong>

interviewees’ descriptions gave the impression that these adaptations occurred ex post in decisions about
how to publish finished research. Several researchers in the humanities applied for grants just because
having grants was an internal promotion criterion. Aside from an indirect influence via promotion no
direct adaptation occurred for a simple financial reason: the formula money is not allocated directly to the
individual researchers; it flows from the central university level to the department and school level where
it is used to cover basic infrastructure and salary costs. Only minor parts <strong>of</strong> these resources remain to feed
some special funds for travel costs and internal grants. So in the end – like in Germany – there is not
enough money in the allocation system to have an effective steering <strong>impact</strong>.
Adaptation as ‘stretching’ and ‘downsizing’ research
However, a common pattern <strong>of</strong> adaptation reported by nearly all interviewees in Australia and Germany
was the ‘stretching’ <strong>of</strong> research due to the overall scarcity <strong>of</strong> research <strong>funding</strong> and research time. This
means that academics expanded the time horizons <strong>of</strong> their research projects significantly. A project with
an estimated duration <strong>of</strong> two or three years could last much longer under the above mentioned
unfavourable conditions. In competitive research fields the need to stretch one’s research due to a lack <strong>of</strong>
individual research time, good infrastructure or too restrictive external <strong>funding</strong> is a clear obstacle for
keeping up with the cutting edge <strong>of</strong> research. Adaptation as downsizing ones research was as common as
‘stretching’ and happened with respect to all major features <strong>of</strong> a research project. In theoretical
mathematics there is no empirical research that could be downsized. <strong>The</strong>refore, the only available strategy
reported was narrowing the problem by limiting the range <strong>of</strong> topics that were addressed in a project. <strong>The</strong>
empirical disciplines could go further by narrowing the research object by either reducing the number <strong>of</strong>
objects investigated (reduce the number <strong>of</strong> sites for fieldwork, reduce time spent in archives) or using less
suitable objects (e.g. sites for fieldwork closer to the university). Similarly, academics could narrow the
methodology by reducing the variety <strong>of</strong> methods used to investigate an object, applying ‘cheaper’ methods
that used less expensive equipment or reduce the number <strong>of</strong> tests and pre-tests.
5. Preliminary results
<strong>The</strong> preliminary results <strong>of</strong> our project so far can be summed up as follows:
• <strong>The</strong> boundary between academic research and managerial rationality starts to blur, but does not
change the academic ethos yet: <strong>The</strong> discipline still remains a strong principal for most academics even
in NPM-first-mover countries with a high amount <strong>of</strong> <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> and other NPM-tools
such as Australia.
• <strong>The</strong> consensus culture among academics is slightly eroding caused by managerial pr<strong>of</strong>ile building and
indicator <strong>based</strong> allocation decisions because single pr<strong>of</strong>essors and whole disciplines fitting to the new
pr<strong>of</strong>ile or to the set <strong>of</strong> indicators seek their advantage on the cost <strong>of</strong> those who do not or can not fit.
This can be observed in Germany too, where NPM in higher education is still in a stage <strong>of</strong>
introduction. However, in Germany, where NPM reforms are pretty new and less coherent compared
to Australia, a majority <strong>of</strong> the interviewed deans and (vice-) rectors claimed they would refuse to lead
their units in a harsh managerial way. Leadership by moderation, being primus inter pares in
commissions and boards, amplifying bottom-up initiatives from the institutes and chairs is still
preferred compared to top-down decision making. Not surprisingly one dean stated that leading a big
department simply by top down decisions would be “unthinkable”. Even in Australia it is evident from
the actual literature that university managers tend to buffer pressures that arise from governmental
policies as good as they can in order to protect “their” academics. <strong>The</strong>y do not simply act as willing
agents <strong>of</strong> NPM, defining their new position <strong>of</strong> power like the government might have expected them
to. However, with regard to still decreasing recurrent <strong>funding</strong> and the need to survive in a more and
more competitive environment they copy the disliked governmental performance indicators and have
to make uncomfortable decisions for bad performing researchers in their organisation anyway. Usual
sanctions are: removal <strong>of</strong> casual staff, no further promotion, increases in teaching and administration
duties and <strong>of</strong> course no money for research equipment. Sometimes competitive pressure arises without
the involvement <strong>of</strong> managers. In the German university, for example, we could observe a fierce
struggle between disciplines in the faculty for natural sciences – mathematics on the one and the
laboratory <strong>based</strong> natural sciences on the other hand – for scarce resources and pr<strong>of</strong>essorships. <strong>The</strong>
latter put the dean under pressure to re-allocate recurrent <strong>funding</strong> and to re-distribute chairs and staff
claiming that the mathematical institute’s current share is too high with regard to the number <strong>of</strong>
students, third party <strong>funding</strong> and publications achieved by the mathematicians. Similar conflicts could

e observed within one institute <strong>of</strong> geology between those chairs who were able to fit to politically
fashionable and fundable themes (in this case: anthropogene effects on climate change) and those who
could not adapt to the new fashion.
• Most individual researchers in both countries <strong>of</strong> our sample expressed the feeling that they have no
power to influence the organisational context they are in. If they can, they try to act according to the
new rules and attract external <strong>funding</strong> to follow their research paths. Generally the power <strong>of</strong> the
individual researcher seems to decline while the power <strong>of</strong> the scientific elite – in most cases those
involved in the peer review <strong>of</strong> <strong>funding</strong> organisations and <strong>evaluation</strong> committees – seems to increase.
However, with regard to efficacy, <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> seems to “bypass” the organisational level
<strong>of</strong> universities and affect members <strong>of</strong> the organisations directly (Scott 1991: 180/181). Academics
perceive the performance expectations built into research <strong>evaluation</strong>s as signals <strong>of</strong> what society values
about their research, and a majority <strong>of</strong> them seems to adapt to these general expectations.
• University researchers do not adapt directly to <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> indicators in their
universities. <strong>The</strong> reason for this non-adaptation is simple: the incentives are too small in both
countries because all universities in our sample simply had too little to share with their individual well
performing researchers. In Australia researchers have no discretion over the money they earn for their
universities with regard to their results in the National Grant Schemes. Participants in this <strong>evaluation</strong>
<strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> system are the universities as corporate organisations. Accordingly, they have the full
discretion to spend that money on whatever they want to but mostly they will spend it for basic needs:
for infrastructure, salaries and certain selected priority areas.
• <strong>The</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong> research by pushing researchers to choose important problems at the international
research frontier is the declared priority <strong>of</strong> all politicians and managers who affirm the application <strong>of</strong>
<strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong> as a NPM-tool to university research. However, no attempts <strong>of</strong> academics to
turn their research into “world class research” due to the incentives and sanctions <strong>of</strong> the quasi-markets
established by the <strong>evaluation</strong>s, <strong>funding</strong> instruments and new promotion criteria could be found in our
sample. <strong>The</strong> academics we interviewed did not extend the space and scope in which they sought
research problems but rather adapted within the limits <strong>of</strong> that space according to the chances <strong>of</strong>
<strong>funding</strong> they perceived. What is boosted is mostly opportunistic behaviour with regard to the real or
expected incentives and sanctions in Australia and Germany. Additionally we could observe several
cases <strong>of</strong> inner emigration <strong>of</strong> elder pr<strong>of</strong>essors in Germany, which appeared with regard to their status as
civil servants, who can not be dismissed and whose working tasks and duties can neither be changed
by government nor by university management. However, none <strong>of</strong> the interviewed academics
conducted “better” research, addressed more fundamental problems, or provided more surprising
solutions since he came under the regime <strong>of</strong> <strong>evaluation</strong> <strong>based</strong> <strong>funding</strong>.
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