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Western Sahara and the United States' geographical imaginings

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Caroline Ifeka War on ‘Terror’ : AFRICOM, <strong>the</strong> Kleptocratic State <strong>and</strong> Under-Class Militancy in West Africa-Nigeria<br />

<strong>and</strong> World Trade Centre, in 1999-2000 twelve nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />

Nigerian state governors (Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi,<br />

Kano, Yobe, Jigawa, Bauchi, Katsina, Niger, Bauchi,<br />

Adamawa <strong>and</strong> Gombe) declared <strong>the</strong>ir commitment<br />

to <strong>the</strong> full-blown establishment of Shari‘a law in <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

states. (There are thirty-six states in Nigeria.) Led by<br />

Zamfara state’s governor, <strong>the</strong>y proclaimed <strong>the</strong> urgent<br />

need to sanitise state legal systems that did little or<br />

nothing to implement Quranic justice <strong>and</strong> governance;<br />

in two or three years, however, kleptocratic<br />

governance ensured that Shari‘a, too, became comatose<br />

so Islamist religious sect leaders began preaching<br />

again for governance reform <strong>and</strong> justice according to<br />

<strong>the</strong> Quran.<br />

After twelve nor<strong>the</strong>rn Nigerian states implemented<br />

Shari’a law, different views at home <strong>and</strong> in US-European<br />

metropoles began to be expressed regarding<br />

<strong>the</strong> likelihood of Nigerian ‘terrorism’ in addition to<br />

on-going militancy in <strong>the</strong> oil producing Niger Delta<br />

threatening Nigeria’s stability as a core US crude oil<br />

supplier. Nigeria holds <strong>the</strong> largest concentration of US<br />

capital in Africa, mainly <strong>the</strong> result of investment in <strong>the</strong><br />

past thirty years by <strong>the</strong> world’s largest multi-national<br />

oil corporations, ExxonMobil <strong>and</strong> TexacoChevron. Toge<strong>the</strong>r<br />

with <strong>the</strong> UK <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong>’s Royal Dutch Shell<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation,<br />

ExxonMobil <strong>and</strong> ChevronTexaco are aiming to supply<br />

25% of US oil needs, though this goal requires a<br />

sustainable resolution of <strong>the</strong> Niger Delta crisis (Peel<br />

2009; Amanze-Nwachuku 2010) Militancy <strong>and</strong> perceived<br />

terrorism threaten US-EU strategic interests in<br />

sustaining MNC capital accumulation.<br />

Opinions about ‘terrorism’ in Nigeria have changed.<br />

First, some writers in 2000-04 saw no evidence of<br />

al-Qaeda linked terrorist cell penetration of nor<strong>the</strong>rn<br />

Nigeria, nor that terrorist <strong>and</strong> criminal syndicates trafficking<br />

guns, drugs, <strong>and</strong> people had linked up. Yet in<br />

2003-04 informants in Cross River state, which abuts<br />

Rivers (a core Niger Delta state), hinted that some Niger<br />

Delta militant youth were in contact with groups<br />

elsewhere in Nigeria <strong>and</strong> beyond; by 2006, I believed<br />

that a few ‘restive’ youth in <strong>the</strong> Delta <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> country’s<br />

nor<strong>the</strong>rn regions were exchanging information. Using<br />

information technology (IT), militants were moving<br />

closer toge<strong>the</strong>r; some were becoming more frustrated<br />

<strong>and</strong> angry at <strong>the</strong> ‘selfishness’ of plutocratic politicians,<br />

corporate chief executives, military, police <strong>and</strong> intelligence<br />

services in not distributing down <strong>the</strong> clientelist<br />

BULLETIN N°85 - SPRING 2010<br />

chain financial profits in stolen state funds <strong>and</strong> trafficked<br />

illegal goods; <strong>the</strong>y were beginning to move<br />

beyond ethnic nationalism/religious fundamentalism<br />

into a shared sense of under-class alienation from<br />

l<strong>and</strong>s, livelihoods <strong>and</strong> largesse (Ifeka 2006). Equally,<br />

information was seeping into nor<strong>the</strong>rn Nigerian contexts<br />

about <strong>the</strong> plight of <strong>the</strong> Tuaregs, repressed by <strong>the</strong><br />

Nigerien state — <strong>and</strong> probably covertly by <strong>the</strong> Algerian<br />

secret services (Keenan 2006, 2009) — for <strong>the</strong>ir aggressive<br />

posture in regard to <strong>the</strong>ir ethnicity’s claims<br />

to customary ownership of l<strong>and</strong>, oasis, subterranean<br />

water <strong>and</strong> uranium resources.<br />

Second, a few authors wrote about <strong>the</strong> perceived ‘terrorist’<br />

threat posed by forms of Islamisation, including<br />

Shar’ia law, to West African security <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> US’s need<br />

for sustainable energy flows from Nigeria (Volman<br />

2003). Certain commentators began to underst<strong>and</strong><br />

that US policy could be more nuanced, less likely to<br />

cause unwanted ‘terrorist’ strikes in North America’s<br />

homel<strong>and</strong>, if <strong>the</strong> Pentagon took on board that Nigeria’s<br />

large Muslim population — in 1998 estimated<br />

numerically to be <strong>the</strong> fifth largest in <strong>the</strong> world at c. 78<br />

million relative to Indonesia’s c. 196 million (Islamic<br />

Web 1998; ABC 2009)— does not exist in a social,<br />

cultural or economic <strong>and</strong> historical vacuum. Ra<strong>the</strong>r,<br />

Muslims, about 57% of c. 140 million Nigerians in <strong>the</strong><br />

2001 Population Census, largely Sunni congregations<br />

<strong>and</strong> bro<strong>the</strong>rhoods leavened by a sprinkling of Sufi<br />

adherents, boast historic connections via <strong>the</strong> ancient<br />

trans-<strong>Sahara</strong>n trade routes with <strong>the</strong> Middle East <strong>and</strong><br />

North African Maghrib (Parker <strong>and</strong> Rathbone 2007:<br />

7-8ff). Such historic connections <strong>and</strong> shared underst<strong>and</strong>ings<br />

suggest both <strong>the</strong> possibility of US/Maghribi<br />

diplomacy exercised for peace, as well as some radical<br />

Ummah states’ support for Islamist fundamentalist<br />

cells (dubbed ‘terrorist’ by AFRICOM-NATO) in Nigeria.<br />

Third, o<strong>the</strong>r observers inclined to <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> Federal<br />

Republic of Nigeria could split. In 2004 a defence<br />

analyst identified Nigeria as a ‘potent mix of communal<br />

tensions, radical Islamisation, <strong>and</strong> anti-Americanism’,<br />

in <strong>the</strong>ir view fertile grounds for militancy that<br />

threatens to tear Nigeria apart (Morrison 2004: 75-8).<br />

Late in 2009, ano<strong>the</strong>r defence analyst advising <strong>the</strong> US<br />

Pentagon, addressed a forum sponsored by <strong>the</strong> Royal<br />

African Society at a University of London institution,<br />

<strong>and</strong> stated that Nigeria could fragment. The Niger Delta<br />

‘crisis’ <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> emergent Ijaw ethnic-nation state’s<br />

CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS

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