Western Sahara and the United States' geographical imaginings

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Alex Thurston Counterterrorism and Democracy Promotion in the Sahel elites in Washington, the US ambassador predicted continuity in US-Mauritanian relations under Obama. The day before the Mauritanian elections in July 2009, a writer for the Wall Street Journal said the event would ‘test’ Washington’s stated preference for democratic transitions in Arab countries even at the expense of ‘more pragmatic considerations such as the fight against terrorism, rolling back Iranian influence, and promoting Israeli-Arab peace’ (Trofimov 2009a). When Washington accepted the election of Abdel Aziz, despite serious allegations of fraud coming from the opposition camp, the result of this test seemed to favor stability, not democracy. Whether Abdel Aziz will prove an effective partner in fighting terrorism remains to be seen, though his past record in this arena has produced skepticism among his critics. Post-Cold War Niger’s democratic transition came earlier than Mauritania’s, but has proved no less turbulent. Nigerien experiments with democracy have alternated with periods wherein leaders consolidate power through extra-constitutional means. Beginning in 1989, a decade of civil society activism and popular pressure led to the collapse of the regime of President Ali Saibou and a prolonged transition involving several civilian and military systems. Ultimately, democratic elections in 1999 placed former army officer Mamadou Tandja into power, but “the new president and his party are the direct heirs to the single party of the predemocratic period” (Villalon and Idrissa 2005: 44). At any rate, the elections of 1999 and Tandja’s re-election in 2004 were hailed as free and fair, and when Tandja visited the White House in 2005, Bush ‘praised his adherence to democratic values’ (Nossiter 2009). In late 2008, however, Tandja’s supporters began arguing that he should remain in power beyond his constitutionally mandated two-term limit. Eventually, Tandja announced that a referendum would be held on the question of extending his mandate and allowing him to run for a third term. Conflicts over the referendum, pitting the president against other branches of government, resulted in the dissolution of the parliament and the constitutional court. After a tense period of opposition protests and outcry from international groups and regional bodies like the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), the referendum on August 4, 2009 delivered a resounding victory for Tandja. In the succeeding weeks, Tandja tightened control over the country, detaining journalists, opposition figures, and human rights activists. Washington’s initial reaction to these events was mild; in July, before the referendum, the White House expressed concern at Tandja’s actions and said it was monitoring the situation (BBC 2009c). On August 14, at the close of her trip to Africa, Hillary Clinton (2009) reiterated US concern regarding Niger but said, ‘We haven’t yet made a determination as to the best way forward’. When ECOWAS suspended Niger after parliamentary elections in late October (which the opposition boycotted), the White House again expressed concern about Tandja’s behavior, but no major policy changes were evident. In November, the European Union suspended development aid to Niger. It was not until December, as the originally mandated end of Tandja’s time in office approached, that Washington acted. First, the Millennium Challenge Corporation suspended around $20 million in aid to Niger (Reuters 2009a). Then, in advance of Niger’s fifty-first anniversary of the founding of its republic, Obama directed a brief statement at Tandja, saying, ‘America looks forward to the day when Niger can celebrate both the proclamation of the republic and its firm transition to democracy’ (Reuters 2009b) Finally, when Tandja’s original term formally expired, Washington halted all non-humanitarian assistance to the government in Niamey and restricted the travel of some top officials (Reuters 2009c). Soon after, the U.S. government suspended trade benefits with Niger, along with two other African countries in crisis, Guinea and Madagascar (Reuters 2009d). Multiple readings are possible concerning the Obama administration’s decision-making process on Niger. One is that Washington simply followed Brussels’ lead. Another is that Obama gave Tandja until the final moment to change course, and had been prepared all along to impose stiff penalties on Niamey. A third, more cynical view, would speculate that European and US measures against Tandja were brief, pro forma spectacles that could be dropped after the crisis ended — in this view, Tandja was likely to remain in power despite condemnation from abroad, as happened with Kenya’s Mwai Kibaki and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. No matter what interpretation one follows, 2009 ended with Tandja engaging warily in ECOWAS-backed negotiations with the Nigerien opposition but holding firm on core issues. On December 28, his administration defied international and regional critics and held CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS BULLETIN N°85 - SPRING 2010 5
Alex Thurston Counterterrorism and Democracy Promotion in the Sahel municipal elections, which the opposition boycotted. These elections, some feared, were another way for Tandja and his party to consolidate their rule and exclude opposition politicians from positions of power. As talks between Tandja and the opposition stalled, protests continued in Niamey, aid groups’ warnings of a looming food crisis grew increasingly urgent, and some outside donors gave emergency aid (Reuters 2010a). In this atmosphere of tension, Nigerien army officers broke the political deadlock, forcing Tandja out of office on February 18, establishing a transitional government, and promising to hold elections quickly. Given that the junta included officers who had participated in the last transition to democracy in 1999, many observers took them at their word. US pressure appears not to have directly affected political outcomes in Niger in the period leading up to the coup, though arguably the withdrawal of US aid money contributed to the tensions that forced Tandja’s ouster. In fact, the coup may have come as something of a relief to Washington. As reporters for Reuters wrote shortly after the military takeover in Niamey, ‘Foreign governments have criticized the army takeover but diplomats recognize, in private, that it has offered a breakthrough in a stalemate where international mediation failed’ (Reuters 2010b) The Times of London went further, arguing that in contrast to French and African Union condemnation of the junta, ‘the United States appeared to give the move…its approval’ (Clayton 2010). Perhaps more significant than the bilateral US-Niger relationship is the regional context in which America’s behavior toward Mauritania and Niger played out. Observers could not help but compare the two most high-profile Sahelian votes of 2009 and their outcomes; a writer for Reuters Africa Blog (2009) remarked that even though Niger faced punitive measures after Tandja’s referendum in August, ‘the fact that new benefits 5 BULLETIN N°85 - SPRING 2010 were simultaneously extended to Mauritania may also give a lesson in how would-be coup makers should best behave if they want to get away with it’. Quick elections and a pledge of support in the War on Terror, the writer went on, seemed to have won favor in Washington for Mauritania. After the overthrow of Tandja, another writer for Reuters brought the argument full circle, saying that Mauritania’s coup had provided the blueprint for Niger’s. If the perception that American leaders are reconciled to this model becomes widespread, cynicism about Washington’s pro-democracy credentials may grow even more in and outside the region. If the choice to ignore accusations of fraud in Mauritania’s elections, hesitate for months before taking action on Niger, and convey a degree of toleration for the February coup in Niger seemed to confirm Washington’s emphasis on stability in the Sahel, the lack of reaction to activities by AQIM in 2009 and early 2010 was even more indicative of US policymakers’ changing calculus in the region. As AQIM’s goals have shifted away from attacking the Algerian army and toward targeting European and US civilians, its sphere of operations has expanded, making it, as one observer writes, ‘quite Saharan’ (The Moor Next Door 2008). In June 2009, AQIM affiliates in Mali executed Edwin Dyer, a British citizen who had been abducted along with three other European tourists in Niger in January of 2009; his compatriots were released several weeks after his death. Also in June, a US aid worker, Christopher Leggett, was killed during an attempted kidnapping in Nouakchott. AQIM claimed responsibility (BBC 2009b). Clashes between AQIM fighters and government soldiers occurred sporadically from the summer of 2009 through the time of writing. US military plane in Atar, Mauritania, 27 March 2004 (Source: US military) These AQIM kidnappings and murders produced little reaction in official Washington. In contrast to the sharp words British Prime Minister Gordon Brown had for AQIM after Dyer’s death (Al Jazeera English CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS
Page 1 and 2:
Bulletin N°85 — Spring 2010 conc
Page 3 and 4:
Editor’s Introduction Introductio
Page 5 and 6:
Jacob Mundy Securitizing the Sahara
Page 7 and 8: Jacob Mundy Securitizing the Sahara
Page 15 and 16: Stephen Harmon From GSPC to AQIM: T
Page 33 and 34: Caroline Ifeka War on ‘Terror’
Page 53 and 54: Alex Thurston Counterterrorism and
Page 57: Alex Thurston Counterterrorism and
Page 65 and 66: Intervention Western Sahara and the
Page 67 and 68: Konstantina Isidoros Western Sahara
Page 75 and 76: Yahia H. Zoubir The Western Sahara
Page 81 and 82: Vijay Prashad Sahelian Blowback: Wh
Page 83 and 84: Vijay Prashad Sahelian Blowback: Wh
Page 85 and 86: Anne E McDougall All Quiet on the W
Page 87 and 88: Daniel Volman and Jeremy Keenan The
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Western Sahara and the United States' geographical imaginings

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