The Economist - January 29th, 2005

What Sunday can tell you, and what it can't
Only part of the answer will come on Sunday (see article). Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda's selfappointed
representative in Iraq, has promised to kill anyone who has the temerity to vote. He has
already murdered more than enough people for Iraqis to know that this is no idle threat. On the
other hand, powerful forces in Iraq—including, probably, an overwhelming majority of both Kurds
and Shia Arabs—are strongly in favour of the election. If on polling day millions of people prove
willing to defy the threats of the insurgents and turn out to vote, Iraq will indeed have taken a
useful and inspiring stride forward. That, after all, is what happened in Afghanistan last October, in
another election which Islamic fundamentalists had vowed to disrupt but which ended up by
strengthening the legitimacy of the central government.
In Iraq's case, however, polling day will be only the first of many tests. It will help to show
whether the majority of Iraqis want a multi-party democracy or whether, like Mr Zarqawi, they see
democracy as a pernicious doctrine that puts rule by men in place of the rule of God. But showing
an appetite for democracy is not the same thing as acquiring one. That entails more than just
holding an election. The election must also produce a government that is capable of running the
country.
Not even a high turnout on polling day is going to give Iraqis that sort of government soon. If all
goes well a good turnout should produce an elected government with broader legitimacy than the
present government of appointees. But because large parts of the Sunni heartland are in open
revolt against the new order, and because America disbanded the old army and has been dismally
slow to train a new one, the new government will still have to enforce its will at the point of an
American gun. Like armed missionaries throughout history, the Americans are not popular in Iraq,
even among Shias. So relying on American military power will be a hard thing for any new
government to do for long without jeopardising some of the legitimacy the election confers on it.
A proper democracy does not only require effective government, freely chosen. It has also to be
judged by its treatment of minorities. In Iraq, one consequence of Sunday's election is sure to be
a transfer of power from the Sunni minority on which Saddam built his power to the longoppressed
Shias. The dictatorship of the majority is arguably a little less odious than the
dictatorship of the minority. But only a little. If Iraq is to cohere as a single state, the Shias will
have to reassure all the country's minorities that they can thrive under the new dispensation. So
far, the Shia political establishment has said the right things. It promises to work with Sunnis
despite the boycott of the election by some of their parties, and plays down the part religion will
play in the new order. The true test will come later, when it is time to write a constitution that sets
out the role of Islam, the balance between the centre and the provinces, and the sharing of oil
revenues.
Timing the exit
On paper, this process is supposed to be swift. The present plan calls for the election of yet
another new government under a new referendum-approved constitution by the end of this year.
In practice, a country wrecked by dictatorship, invasion and insurgency will take much longer
before it stands a chance of inspiring the rest of the Arab world. Until and unless legitimacy brings
security and the rule of law, democracy will risk looking weak and ineffectual, not the source of
hope and freedom Mr Bush desires.
As that process plays out, testing every day the mettle of democracy, the trickiest task for a new
government will be to decide whether American troops are still a solution or have become a
problem. They already provide a focus for nationalist insurgents, as well as daily providing new
grievances by their actions. For the moment, however, the answer has to be that they should