Estrategias sociales de prevención y adaptación Social ... - La RED

Yet controlled flooding was a time-honoured practice in the Netherlands to deal with
excess water influx. “Calamity polders” were assigned in there sparsely populated eastern
regions. Inhabitants were aware that they lived in “calamity polders” and would be compensated
for their loss (Klijn and Van Der Most 200x). The plan revived ancient history in that
very region – until deep into the 20 th century two sluices were built which were customarily
opened each year on 11 November to inundate the polder Inundation served the purpose of
counter pressure against dikes to prevent dike breaches, and fertilisation through sedimentation
left behind by the water (Warner, Roth, Winnubst, 2006).
Ice floes would damage dikes and dike breaches occurring each year forcing people to
live higher up or flee to artificial mounds.
The river changed course all the time, and upstream and downstream water boards quarrelled
all the time (Roth et al., 2006). Engineering works reduced the size of the river and
stabilised its course. In 1926 the practice of inundation stopped.
But for the Ooij citizens, the threat were also administrative – the nearby city of Nijmegen,
one of the oldest towns in the Netherlands, had set its sights on the polder as early as
1900. Repeated attempts were resisted. Nijmegen wanted to increase the bend in the river
Waal to enable bigger ships to navigate the river – the Waal branch of the Rhine is the most
busily transportation route in Europe. In 1995 and 1998 dike reinforcement led to protests
and in 2000 the polder was designated “calamity polder statuses after a study by Haskoning
exploring potential for the area as a retention area (ibid.).
Resistance took place at five levels (Warner, 2008). After the provincial authorities and
Chamber of Commerce took an early lead (1), the mayor of Beek and Ubbergen carried the
flame (2), a local civic platform emerged (3) in 2002 instigated by the local rabo Bank’s
branch office, which lobbied national politicians (4). These four groups however would not
have been co successful without the tacit support from a “fifth column” within the state
apparatus, who our interviewees suggest leaked a critical report to the local platform (Froth
et al., 2006). This and other reports undermined the assumptions and calculations made to
underpin the rationale for the selection and designation of the polder for controlled flooding.
The water vice minister was forced to backtrack in 2005, although it should be observed
that the plan was shelved, not abandoned.
As an intermediate solution, the Ooij platform accepted the compartmentalisation of
the area, more in line with Van Ellen’s idea for Bangladesh in the 1990s as part of that
country’s Flood Action Plan. Monsoon flood water was to be drained in a finely grained
network of sluices, whose doors would be democratically opened and closed (Warner,
2010). Prof van Ellen, opposed to control flooding in his backyard, was one of the Panel of
Experts. This carried an interesting irony as the Querdamm built between Ooij and Düffel in
the 20 th century made sure an event would only flood the Ooij - not the Düffel.
Building on Mounds. Another way of accepting floods is to build mounds while leaving the
area exposed to regular flooding. This is now practiced in some “Space for the River” pilot
projects. Building on mounds is in fact
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